Voici les éléments 1 - 10 sur 93
- PublicationMétadonnées seulementCognition, Culture and Society. What cognitive scientists have to say to social scientists(2007)
- PublicationMétadonnées seulementEpistemic vigilance(2010)
;Sperber, Dan ; ;Heintz, Christophe ;Mascaro, O. ; ;Origgi, GloriaWilson, DeirdreHumans massively depend on communication with others, but this leaves them open to the risk of being accidentally or intentionally misinformed. To ensure that, despite this risk, communication remains advantageous, humans have, we claim, a suite of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance. Here we outline this claim and consider some of the ways in which epistemic vigilance works in mental and social life by surveying issues, research and theories in different domains of philosophy, linguistics, cognitive psychology and the social sciences.
- PublicationMétadonnées seulementEn quoi notre cerveau est-il social(Paris: Hermann, 2011)
; ;Bronner, GéraldSauvayre, Romy
- PublicationMétadonnées seulementL'esprit de la sociologie(Paris: Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 2011)
; ;Kaufmann, Laurence
- PublicationMétadonnées seulementLa conscience plurielle. Les formes de la conscience au cours du développement(Québec: Presses Universitaires du Québec, 2007)
; ;Pons, FranciscoDoudin, Pierre-Alain
- PublicationAccès libreThe ABC of Social Learning: Affect, Behavior, and Cognition(2021-7-22)
; ;Bazhydai, Marina ;Sievers, Christine ;Debates concerning social learning in the behavioral and the developmental cognitive sciences have largely ignored the literature on social influence in the affective sciences despite having arguably the same object of study. We argue that this is a mistake and that no complete model of social learning can exclude an affective aspect. In addition, we argue that including affect can advance the somewhat stagnant debates concerning the unique characteristics of social learning in humans compared to other animals. We first review the two major bodies of literature in nonhuman animals and human development, highlighting the fact that the former has adopted a behavioral approach while the latter has adopted a cognitive approach, leading to irreconcilable differences. We then introduce a novel framework, affective social learning (ASL), that studies the way we learn about value(s). We show that all three approaches are complementary and focus, respectively, on behavior toward; cognitions concerning; and feelings about objects, events, and people in our environment. All three thus contribute to an affective, behavioral, and cognitive (ABC) story of knowledge transmission: the ABC of social learning. In particular, ASL can provide the backbone of an integrative approach to social learning. We argue that this novel perspective on social learning can allow both evolutionary continuity and ontogenetic development by lowering the cognitive thresholds that appear often too complex for other species and nonverbal infants. Yet, it can also explain some of the major achievements only found in human cultures.
- PublicationMétadonnées seulementThe role of interest in the transmission of social values(2013)
;The environment is so rich with information that our cognitive system would be overloaded without a way to evaluate what is relevant for our needs and goals. Appraisal theory has shown how emotions, by ?tagging? the environment with differential values, enable the attribution of our attentional resources to what is most relevant in any given circumstances. Most often, however, the different cues triggering the allocation of attention are thought of as purely individualistic, like physiological needs or past encounters with certain stimuli. This approach is perfectly appropriate for objects, organisms or events that, by their intrinsic properties, affect the organism?s well being. But for humans, many aspects of the environment are culturally or temporally dependent: a soccer game may be highly relevant to some, but not at all to others. This paper contributes to a better understanding of the processes by which different elements of our social environment acquire value through our socialization process. We recruit different concepts proposed by developmental psychologists to shed some light on this social acquisition of relevance. The notion of ?joint attention,? for example, is particularly important to understand how we are sensitive to the other?s focus of attention. Similarly, the term ?social referencing? has been used to describe the process of taking into account the affective reaction to a given stimuli, in order to direct our behavior. At the core of this process, called ?social appraisal? by Manstead, we propose that a specific emotion plays a major role: interest. Someone else?s expression of interest, which seems to be detectable from a very early age, is extremely useful in gauging what is worthy of attention among stimuli that are not inherently interesting. The paper highlights how external sources of information (the life experiences of community members) indicate what is relevant, thus giving access to the social values of that group.
- PublicationAccès libreAffective Social Learning serves as a quick and flexible complement to TTOM(2020-5-28)
;Although we applaud the general aims of the target article, we argue that Affective Social Learning completes TTOM by pointing out how emotions can provide another route to acquiring culture, a route which may be quicker, more flexible, and even closer to an axiological definition of culture (less about what is, and more about what should be) than TTOM itself.