Voici les éléments 1 - 10 sur 11
- PublicationAccès libreI Deserve More! An Experimental Analysis of Illusory Ownership in Dictator Games(2018)
;Nikolaychuk, OlexandrDelineation of someone's ownership typically involves the sense of deservedness: the property right is respected as long as the owner deserve to own the object. Objectively, deservedness is often linked to one's actions or specific attributes that justify the owner's claims. We argue that people might get the sense of deservedness without an objective causal attribution. In our experiment, the pure luck defines the allocation of the roles. Still, compared to a standard setting, in a treatment where actions have no causal effect on the outcome, dictators keep larger share. At the same time, dictators do not compensate recipients for their irrelevant actions. We interpret this asymmetry in reaction towards the procedures of role allocation as 'illusory property': people care about irrelevant procedures only if they favor themselves but not others.
- PublicationAccès libreNo begging, no money? Experimental Analysis of Procedural Preferences for Redistribution(2019)
;Nikolaychuk, OlexandrThe experimental literature on pro-social behavior has been largely focused on settings where the decision of donors is sufficient for an interaction to occur. However, in many real-life applications recipients first have to ask donors for help to initiate the transaction. We suggest that recipients and donors might have different preferences over these redistribution procedures and test this proposition in a laboratory experiment. We let participants play a dictator game under two procedures: (1) a dictator first chooses a transfer, and the recipient then decides to accept or reject it; (2) recipient first decides to ask or not for a transfer, and if asked the dictator then chooses a transfer which can be accepted or rejected by the recipient. First, we find that a minority of recipients shy away from “begging”, but happily accept the transfer initiated by dictators. Second, while the majority of recipients prefer asking dictators to share, dictators share much less under this experimental procedure.
- PublicationMétadonnées seulementSocial comparison and energy conservation in a collective action context: A field experimentThis field experiment quantifies the impact of social norm information on the demand for indoor temperature. Based on high-frequency data from indoor temperature monitors, we provide participating households with a comparison of average temperature in their apartments relative to that measured in a control group. For more than 90 percent of participants, financial benefits of energy savings are only indirect, as building-level heating costs are shared across apartments in proportion to their volume. Despite the associated collective action problem, we estimate that the intervention induces a -0.28 C reduction in average indoor temperature. This suggests that direct monetary incentives is not a pre-requisite for social comparison feedback to induce energy savings.
- PublicationAccès libreWhen within- and outgroup norms conflict: A public good experiment with strategic ignorance of social normsSocial norm feedback, i.e. informing people about the behavior of others, has been shown to influence prosocial behavior in many domains, including tax compliance and energy conservation. We introduce social norm feedback in a public good setting and study the interplay between payoff-relevant within-group norms and payoff-irrelevant outgroup norms. We show that conflict between within- and outgroup norms dampens within-group conditional cooperation. Further, participants strategically ignore outgroup norms when these go against self-interest, instead consulting norm information that allows them reducing their contributions. On aggregate, such information acquisition/avoidance strategy favors exposition to norms that hastens the breakdown of cooperation. Finally, norm avoidance is higher when feedback is based on individual rather than group-level comparisons, which is consistent with a self-image cost associated with social norm feedback.
- PublicationAccès libreLying under self-control depletion and time pressure(2019)
;Naguleswaran, ApsharaDealing with temptations requires self-control. If lying for money constitutes a temptation, restricting people’s self-control resources would enhance unethical behavior. We argue that the effect of the self-control on lying depends on two things: 1) easiness to grasp the opportunity to lie, and 2) the amount of time available to decide. In an incentivized online experiment, we manipulate participants’ self-control resources through an ego depletion task and allow them to misreport the outcome of a dice-roll with and without time pressure. We find evidence that ego depletion increases the fraction of truth-tellers under time pressure. Our findings suggest that when discovering the opportunities to lie is not trivial and people are constrained with the time, self-control depletion enhances people’s ethical behavior
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- PublicationAccès librePublic good provision, in-group cooperation and out-group descriptive norms: A lab experimentWe use a public good experiment to study how in-group cooperation is affected by payoff-irrelevant information about cooperation in other groups (i.e., descriptive out-group feedback). We find that positive out-group feedback, indicating above-average cooperation, deters low in-group contributors from increasing their contribution towards the in-group average. By contrast, negative out-group feedback, which informs participants about below-average cooperation, deters high in-group contributors from decreasing their contribution towards the in-group average. These two effects work together to dampen contribution patterns associated with conditional cooperation. Further, we show that the effects are stronger for individual-level feedback (comparing individual contributions with the out-group average) than for group-level feedback (comparing total contributions by in-group members with that of other groups). Interestingly, when allowed to avoid out-group feedback information, the propensity to consult the feedback is similar for high and low in-group contributors, suggesting that information acquisition is not always self-serving.
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