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- PublicationAccès libreA Socratic essentialist defense of non‐verbal definitional disputes(2023-04-28)
; In this paper, we argue that, in order to account for the apparently substantive nature of definitional disputes, a commitment to what we call ‘Socratic essentialism’ is needed. We defend Socratic essentialism against a prominent neo-Carnapian challenge according to which apparently substantive definitional disputes always in some way trace back to disagreements over how expressions belonging to a particular language or concepts belonging to a certain conceptual scheme are properly used. Socratic essentialism, we argue, is not threatened by the possibility that some apparently substantive definitional disputes may turn out to be verbal or conceptual, since this pluralist strategy, in our view, requires a commitment to more, rather than fewer, essences. What is more, a deflationary, metaphysically ‘light-weight’ construal of the essence-ascriptions in question leads to a peculiar conception of the pursuit of metaphysicians as behaving like deceptive (or self-deceived) grammarians pretending to be scientists. Moreover, this deflationary attitude, we argue, spreads beyond metaphysics and philosophy more broadly to apparently substantive definitional disputes in the sciences as well as other in other disciplines, such as art criticism. - PublicationAccès libreBitter Joys and Sweet Sorrows(London: Routledge, 2018)
; ;Tappolet, Christine ;Teroni, FabriceKonzelmann Ziv, AnitaWe sometimes experience pleasures and displeasures simultaneously: whenever we eat sfogliatelle while having a headache, whenever we feel pain fading away, whenever we feel guilty pleasure while enjoying listening to Barbara Streisand, whenever we are savouring a particularly hot curry, whenever we enjoy physical endurance in sport, whenever we are touched upon receiving a hideous gift, whenever we are proud of withstanding acute pain, etc. These are examples of what we call " mixed feelings ". Mixed feelings are cases in which one and the same person experiences pleasure and displeasure at the same time. Mixed feelings raise two questions: If pleasure and displeasure are contraries, how can mixed feelings be possible? Does the excess of pleasure that we feel when experiencing mixed feelings itself constitute a new feeling, that results from the co-occurrence of the first two? I argue that mixed feelings are possible and that their existence does not threaten the contrariety of pleasure and displeasure, and that there are no resultant feelings: having a lot of pleasure and a little displeasure does not result in having additional mild pleasure. Finally, I suggest that although both false, scepticism towards the existence of mixed feelings, as well as the idea according to which resultant feelings exist, are inspired from a single and correct idea: that pleasure and displeasure do fuse in some cases. - PublicationRestriction temporaireUne analyse de la notion de manière en termes de relation de spécificationDans cette étude, je propose une analyse conceptuelle de la notion de manière, analyse qui permet à la fois de comprendre ce qu’est une manière d’être quelque chose et une manière de faire quelque chose. Pour y parvenir, je mobilise des outils appartenant à divers champs théoriques, notamment la métaphysique, l’ontologie de l’action, l’analyse des adverbes et la sémantique lexicale. Une part importante de ce travail est consacrée à l’examen de la relation de spécification et à ces deux variétés que sont la relation déterminable-déterminé et la relation genre-espèce. Je m’efforce par ailleurs de mener des analyses qui tiennent compte de nos intuitions et de la langue ordinaire. La thèse principale que je défends est qu’une manière correspond au spécifié d’un spécifiable complexe. Ainsi, les spécifiables simples n’admettent pas de manière : il existe différentes manières de se déplacer, d’être rouge et d’être assis, mais il n’existe pas différentes manières d’avoir une taille, une masse ou une température. Je soutiens également que les manières peuvent appartenir à cinq catégories ontologiques distinctes : (1) les qualités (être pourpre est une manière d’être rouge), (2) les états (être assis en tailleur est une manière d’être assis), (3) les propriétés sortales (être une maison en brique est une manière d’être une maison), (4) les sortes d’action (marcher est une manière de se déplacer) et (5) les relations (être marié à Hélène sous le régime de la participation aux acquêts est une manière d’être marié à Hélène). Les analyses que je propose dans cette étude permettent ainsi d’éclairer un concept qui joue un rôle important dans l’économie de nos descriptions mais qui n’a été traité que de façon marginale en philosophie contemporaine. Abstract: In this study, I elaborate a conceptual analysis of the notion of “manner” (or “way”), in order to understand what is a “way of being something” and a “way of doing something.” I use some tools belonging to diverse theoretical fields, including metaphysics, the ontology of action, adverbial analysis, and lexical semantics. A substantial part of this work is dedicated to examine the relation of specification and its two varieties, namely the determinable-determinate relation and the genus-species relation. Furthermore, my analysis takes seriously both our intuitions and ordinary language. My main claim is that a manner is the specified of a complex specifiable. Thus, simple specifiables do not admit manners: there are different ways of moving, of being red and of sitting, but there are not different ways of having a size, a mass or a temperature. I also defend that manners belong two five different ontological categories: (1) qualities (being crimson is a way of being red), (2) states (sitting cross-legged is a way of sitting), (3) kinds (being a brick house is a way of being a house), (4) actions (walking is a way of moving) and (5) relations (being married to Helen under the joint property’s regime is a way of being married to Helen). My work thus clarifies a notion which has an important place in our description of the world, but which has never been examined deeply and systematically in contemporary philosophy.
- PublicationMétadonnées seulementThe Experience of Absolute Beauty in Hutcheson: Perception, Reason and Pleasure(2016)"Francis Hutcheson and the Origin of the Aesthetic", Endre Szécsenyi ed., (Research Institute of Irish and Scottish Studies, University of Aberdeen)
- PublicationMétadonnées seulement
- PublicationAccès librePleasure and its Contraries(2014)What is the contrary of pleasure? “Pain” is one common answer. This paper argues that pleasure instead has two natural contraries: unpleasure and hedonic indifference. This view is defended by drawing attention to two often-neglected concepts: the formal relation of polar opposition and the psychological state of hedonic indifference. The existence of mixed feelings, it is argued, does not threaten the contrariety of pleasure and unpleasure.
- PublicationMétadonnées seulement
- PublicationMétadonnées seulement