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Self-Defeating Beliefs and Misleading Reasons
Date de parution
2018-12-5
In
International Journal of Philosophical Studies
Vol.
1
No
27
De la page
57
A la page
72
Revu par les pairs
1
Résumé
We have no reason to believe that reasons do not exist. Contra Bart Streumer’s recent proposal, this has nothing to do with our incapacity to believe this error theory. Rather, it is because if we know that if a proposition is true, we have no reason to believe it, then we have no reason to believe this proposition. From a different angle: if we know that we have at best misleading reasons to believe a proposition, then we have no reason to believe it. This has two consequences. Firstly, coming close to believing the error theory is idle or pointless. Secondly, philosophers who argue that believing sweeping theories like determinism or physicalism is self-defeating because they are either false or believed for no reason pursue a worthwhile argumentative strategy.
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Type de publication
journal article
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