Generic Essence, Objectual Essence, and Modality
Date de parution
Noùs, Wiley, 2006/40/4/753-767
When thinking about the notion of essence or of an essential feature, philosophers typically focus on what I will call the notion of <i>objectual</i> essence. The main aim of this paper is to argue that beside this familiar notion stands another one, the notion of <i>generic</i> essence, which contrary to appearance cannot be understood in terms of the familiar notion, and which also fails to be correctly characterized by certain other accounts which naturally come to mind as well. Some of my objections to these accounts are similar to some of Kit Fine's compelling objections to the standard modal account of (objectual) essence (Fine 1994). In the light of these objections, Fine advances the view that it is metaphysical necessity which has to be understood in terms of essence, rather than the other way around, and takes essence to be unanalyzable. When formulating his view, Fine had only objectual essence in mind (or had both concepts in mind, but assumed that the generic is a special case of the objectual), and for that reason, I will argue, his account fails. I will suggest that Fineans should modify their view, and take it that metaphysical necessity is to be understood in terms of the <i>two</i> notions of essence—a view I myself find appealing. Finally, I will end by suggesting a further move which reduces the objectual to the generic, making metaphysical necessity reducible to generic essence alone—a move with which I myself have some sympathy.
Type de publication
Resource Types::text::journal::journal article