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Presentism without Presentness
Auteur(s)
Rosenkranz, Sven
Date de parution
2015
In
Thought, A Journal of Philosophy, Wiley, 2015/9/1/19-27
Résumé
We argue that presentism, understood as a view about time and existence, can perspicuously be defined in opposition to all other familiar contenders without appeal to any notion of presentness or cognate notions such as concreteness. Given recent worries about the suitability of such notions to cut much metaphysical ice, this should be welcomed by presentism's defenders. We also show that, irrespective of its sparse ideology, the proposed formulation forestalls any deviant interpretation at odds with the view it aims to capture.
Identifiants
Type de publication
journal article
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