Ressentiment et valeurs morales: Max Scheler, critique de Nietzsche
Date de parution
Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie
De la page
A la page
Nietzsche's theory of the origin of Christian moral values is based on the psychological phenomenon of ressentiment. Refuting Nietzsche, Scheler asserts a realist theory of axiological hierarchy; but his epistemology of values demands a central role for ressentiment, comparable in importance (but for different reasons) to the role which Nietzsche gives it. This article elucidates Scheler's analysis of ressentiment and its role in his epistemology. Scheler makes important concessions to Nietzsche concerning the necessity of the ressentiment interpretation of certain concrete morals and modern ideologies. These concessions place him on sufficiently similar terrain to explain Nietzsche's erroneous conclusions concerning the real meaning of Christian moral values.
Type de publication
Resource Types::text::journal::journal article