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Heesen, Raphaela

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Heesen, Raphaela
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https://libra.unine.ch/handle/123456789/1109

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  • Publication
    Accès libre
    Evidence of joint commitment in great apes' natural joint actions.
    (2021-12-01T00:00:00Z)
    Heesen, Raphaela 
    ;
    Zuberbühler, Klaus 
    ;
    Bangerter, Adrian 
    ;
    Iglesias, Katia 
    ;
    Rossano, Federico
    ;
    Pajot, Aude
    ;
    Guéry, Jean-Pascal
    ;
    Genty, Emilie 
    Human joint action seems special, as it is grounded in joint commitment-a sense of mutual obligation participants feel towards each other. Comparative research with humans and non-human great apes has typically investigated joint commitment by experimentally interrupting joint actions to study subjects' resumption strategies. However, such experimental interruptions are human-induced, and thus the question remains of how great apes naturally handle interruptions. Here, we focus on naturally occurring interruptions of joint actions, grooming and play, in bonobos and chimpanzees. Similar to humans, both species frequently resumed interrupted joint actions (and the previous behaviours, like grooming the same body part region or playing the same play type) with their previous partners and at the previous location. Yet, the probability of resumption attempts was unaffected by social bonds or rank. Our data suggest that great apes experience something akin to joint commitment, for which we discuss possible evolutionary origins.
  • Publication
    Accès libre
    Assessing joint commitment as a process in great apes.
    (2021-08-20T00:00:00Z)
    Heesen, Raphaela 
    ;
    Bangerter, Adrian 
    ;
    Zuberbühler, Klaus 
    ;
    Iglesias, Katia 
    ;
    Neumann, Christof 
    ;
    Pajot, Aude
    ;
    Perrenoud, Laura
    ;
    Guéry, Jean-Pascal
    ;
    Rossano, Federico
    ;
    Genty, Emilie 
    Many social animals interact jointly, but only humans experience a specific sense of obligation toward their co-participants, a . However, joint commitment is not only a mental state but also a that reveals itself in the coordination efforts deployed during entry and exit phases of joint action. Here, we investigated the presence and duration of such phases in  = 1,242 natural play and grooming interactions of captive chimpanzees and bonobos. The apes frequently exchanged mutual gaze and communicative signals prior to and after engaging in joint activities with conspecifics, demonstrating entry and exit phases comparable to those of human joint activities. Although rank effects were less clear, phases in bonobos were more moderated by friendship compared to phases in chimpanzees, suggesting bonobos were more likely to reflect patterns analogous to human "face management". This suggests that joint commitment as process was already present in our last common ancestor with .
  • Publication
    Accès libre
  • Publication
    Accès libre
    How apes get into and out of joint actions: Shared intentionality as an interactional achievement
    (2020)
    Genty, Emilie 
    ;
    Heesen, Raphaela 
    ;
    Guéry, Jean-Pascal
    ;
    Rossano, Federico
    ;
    Zuberbühler, Klaus 
    ;
    Bangerter, Adrian 
    Compared to other animals, humans appear to have a special motivation to share experiences and mental states with others (Clark, 2006; Grice, 1975), which enables them to enter a condition of ‘we’ or shared intentionality (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005). Shared intentionality has been suggested to be an evolutionary response to unique problems faced in complex joint action coordination (Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005) and to be unique to humans (Tomasello, 2014). The theoretical and empirical bases for this claim, however, present several issues and inconsistencies. Here, we suggest that shared intentionality can be approached as an interactional achievement, and that by studying how our closest relatives, the great apes, coordinate joint action with conspecifics, we might demonstrate some correlate abilities of shared intentionality, such as the appreciation of joint commitment. We provide seven examples from bonobo joint activities to illustrate our framework.
  • Publication
    Accès libre
    Social play as joint action: A framework to study the evolution of shared intentionality as an interactional achievement.
    (2017-12-01T00:00:00Z)
    Heesen, Raphaela 
    ;
    Genty, Emilie 
    ;
    Rossano, Federico
    ;
    Zuberbühler, Klaus 
    ;
    Bangerter, Adrian 
    Social play has a complex, cooperative nature that requires substantial coordination. This has led researchers to use social games to study cognitive abilities like shared intentionality, the skill and motivation to share goals and intentions with others during joint action. We expand this proposal by considering play as a joint action and examining how shared intentionality is achieved during human joint action. We describe how humans get into, conduct, and get out of joint actions together in an orderly way, thereby constructing the state of "togetherness" characteristic of shared intentionality. These processes play out as three main phases, the opening (where participants are ratified and joint commitments are established), the main body (where progress, ongoing commitments, and possible role reversals are coordinated), and the closing (where the intention to terminate the action is coordinated and where participants take leave of each other). We use this process in humans as a framework for examining how various animal species get into, maintain, and get out of play bouts. This comparative approach constitutes an alternative measure of those species' possession of shared intentionality. Using this framework, we review the play literature on human children and different social species of mammals and birds in search of behavioral markers of shared intentionality in the coordination of play bouts. We discuss how our approach could shed light on the evolution of the special human motivation to cooperate and share psychological states with others.