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Reciprocity and gift exchange in markets for credence goods

2023, Kandul, Serhiy, Lanz, Bruno, Reins, Evert

We study the role of reciprocity in markets where expert-sellers have more information about the severity of a problem faced by a consumer. We employ a standard experimental credence goods market to introduce the possibility for consumers to gift the expert-seller before the diagnostic, where the gift is either transferred unconditionally or conditionally on solving the problem. We find that both types of gifts increase the frequency of consumer-friendly actions relative to no gift, but only conditional gifts translate into efficiency gains when the consumer faces a high-severity problem. This suggests that partial alignment of incentives via conditional gifts may outweigh kindness motives when reciprocal actions are not directly observed. Using further treatments with surprise gift exchange, we show that withholding a gift that is expected by expert-sellers significantly reduces the likelihood of consumer-friendly behavior whereas sending a gift to expertsellers who do not expect one has no effect.

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Reciprocity and gift exchange in markets for credence goods

2020, Kandul, Serhiy, Lanz, Bruno, Reins, Evert

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Mitigating inefficiencies in markets for credence goods: On the role of reciprocal intentions

2018-9-7, Reins, Evert

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Theory and evidence on the credence component of energy-efficient technologies

2021, Reins, Evert

La composante de confiance des technologies à haut rendement énergétique constitue un obstacle important à leur adoption. Dans le contexte de nombreux investissements dans les technologies à haut rendement énergétique, la demande du marché dispose d’informations limitées sur les technologies ou les services optimaux et doit donc faire confiance à la cote de l’offre du marché. Dans ce cas, l’offre peut exploiter son avantage informationnel, ce qui conduit à des inefficacités caractéristiques des biens de confiance, telles que la fourniture de services insuffisants/extensifs ou la surfacturation de ces services. Dans le premier chapitre de cette thèse, je développe un modèle théorique simple mettant en évidence les inefficacités résultant de la structure d’incitation associée avec les biens de confiance. En discutant des liens entre la littérature empirique sur les biens de confiance et celle sur le marché de l’efficacité énergétique, j’identifie des implications pour la conception de politiques promouvant l’adoption des technologies à haut rendement énergétique. Dans le deuxième chapitre, j’utilise des données sur les systèmes solaires photovoltaïques (PV) subventionnés pour étudier l’aléa moral de second degré (c’est-à-dire les installateurs augmentent les inefficacités lorsque les consommateurs reçoivent des subventions). En utilisant une spécification de variable instrumentale, je quantifie l’impact des niveaux de subvention sur la production d’électricité attendue autodéclarée («design factor») qui influence le total des subventions reçues et les prix de transaction des systèmes PV. Les résultats montrent une association significative et positive entre les niveaux de subvention plus élevés et le «design factor» ainsi que les prix de transaction. Dans le troisième chapitre, j’analyse comment la réciprocité affecte les inefficacités associée avec les biens de confiance. En utilisant un cadre expérimental standard pour les expériences en laboratoire sur les biens de confiance, j’étudie comment l’échange de cadeaux modifie le comportement des consommateurs et des vendeurs experts. Les résultats suggèrent que des cadeaux modestes et inconditionnels peuvent améliorer les résultats du marché, en particulier lorsque les consommateurs ont besoin d’un service coûteux. ABSTRACT : The credence component of energy-efficient technologies is an important barrier to their adoption. In the context of many investments in energy-efficient technologies, the demand-side of the market has limited information about which technology or services are optimal and therefore has to trust the supply-side. In this setting, the supply side may exploit their information advantage, leading to supply-side inefficiencies characteristic for credence goods, such as providing insufficient/extensive services as well as overcharging for these services. In the first chapter of this thesis, I develop a simple theoretical framework highlighting inefficiencies resulting from the associated incentive structure. Discussing linkages between the empirical literature on credence goods and that on the market for energy efficiency, I identify implications for the design of policies promoting the adoption of energy-efficient technologies. In the second chapter, I use data on subsidized solar photovoltaic (PV) systems to study second-degree moral hazard (i.e. the impulse of installers to increase supply-side inefficiencies when consumers receive subsidies). Using an instrumental variable strategy, I quantify the impact of subsidy levels on the self-reported expected electricity output (design factor) influencing the total subsidies received and transaction prices of PV systems. The results show a significant and positive association between larger subsidy levels and the design factor as well as transaction prices. In the third chapter, I analyze how reciprocity affects supply-side inefficiencies. Employing a standard experimental framework for lab-experiments on credence goods, I study how gift exchange changes the behavior of consumers and expert sellers. Results suggest that small and unconditional gifts may improve market outcomes, in particular when consumers need an expensive service.

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Asymmetric information on the market for energy efficiency: Insights from the credence goods literature

2019, Lanz, Bruno, Reins, Evert

Imperfect information is widely acknowledged to hamper the adoption of energy efficient technologies. In this paper, we study supply-side implications of the associated incentive structure. We build on existing evidence suggesting that energy efficiency owns a credence component, whereby the supply side of the market has more information about what technology is best for consumers. The literature on credence goods markets suggests that informational advantage by an expert-seller leads to market inefficiencies, including low trade volume. We start by developing a simple framework to study supply-side incentives related to the provision of energy efficient technologies. We then document inefficiencies and potential remedies by discussing linkages between an empirical literature on credence goods and that on the market for energy efficiency. Doing so, we identify policy implications and research gaps that are relevant for the adoption of energy efficiency technologies.

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Asymmetric Information on the Market for Energy Efficiency: Insights from the Credence Goods Literature

2021, Lanz, Bruno, Reins, Evert

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Asymmetric information on the market for energy efficiency: Insights from the credence goods literature

2019, Lanz, Bruno, Reins, Evert

Imperfect information is widely acknowledged to hamper the adoption of energy efficient technologies. In this paper, we study supply-side implications of theassociated incentive structure. We build on existing evidence suggesting that energyefficiency owns a credence component, whereby the supply side of the market hasmore information about what technology is best for consumers. The literature oncredence goods markets suggests that informational advantage by an expert-seller leads to market inefficiencies, including low trade volume. We start by developing a simple framework to study supply-side incentives related to the provision of energy efficient technologies. We then document inefficiencies and potential remediesby discussing linkages between an empirical literature on credence goods and thaton the market for energy efficiency. Doing so, we identify policy implications andresearch gaps that are relevant for the adoption of energy efficiency technologies.