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Reins, Evert

Nom
Reins, Evert
Affiliation principale
Fonction
Ancien.ne collaborateur.trice
Identifiants
https://libra.unine.ch/handle/123456789/1133

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  • Publication
    Accès libre
    Reciprocity and gift exchange in markets for credence goods
    (2023)
    Kandul, Serhiy 
    ;
    Lanz, Bruno 
    ;
    Reins, Evert 
    We study the role of reciprocity in markets where expert-sellers have more information about the severity of a problem faced by a consumer. We employ a standard experimental credence goods market to introduce the possibility for consumers to gift the expert-seller before the diagnostic, where the gift is either transferred unconditionally or conditionally on solving the problem. We find that both types of gifts increase the frequency of consumer-friendly actions relative to no gift, but only conditional gifts translate into efficiency gains when the consumer faces a high-severity problem. This suggests that partial alignment of incentives via conditional gifts may outweigh kindness motives when reciprocal actions are not directly observed. Using further treatments with surprise gift exchange, we show that withholding a gift that is expected by expert-sellers significantly reduces the likelihood of consumer-friendly behavior whereas sending a gift to expertsellers who do not expect one has no effect.
  • Publication
    Métadonnées seulement
    Asymmetric information on the market for energy efficiency: Insights from the credence goods literature
    (Neuchâtel University of Neuchâtel Department of Economics and Business, 2019)
    Lanz, Bruno 
    ;
    Reins, Evert 
    Imperfect information is widely acknowledged to hamper the adoption of energy efficient technologies. In this paper, we study supply-side implications of the associated incentive structure. We build on existing evidence suggesting that energy efficiency owns a credence component, whereby the supply side of the market has more information about what technology is best for consumers. The literature on credence goods markets suggests that informational advantage by an expert-seller leads to market inefficiencies, including low trade volume. We start by developing a simple framework to study supply-side incentives related to the provision of energy efficient technologies. We then document inefficiencies and potential remedies by discussing linkages between an empirical literature on credence goods and that on the market for energy efficiency. Doing so, we identify policy implications and research gaps that are relevant for the adoption of energy efficiency technologies.
  • Publication
    Métadonnées seulement
    Asymmetric information on the market for energy efficiency: Insights from the credence goods literature
    (SCCER-CREST working paper, 2019)
    Lanz, Bruno 
    ;
    Reins, Evert 
    Imperfect information is widely acknowledged to hamper the adoption of energy efficient technologies. In this paper, we study supply-side implications of theassociated incentive structure. We build on existing evidence suggesting that energyefficiency owns a credence component, whereby the supply side of the market hasmore information about what technology is best for consumers. The literature oncredence goods markets suggests that informational advantage by an expert-seller leads to market inefficiencies, including low trade volume. We start by developing a simple framework to study supply-side incentives related to the provision of energy efficient technologies. We then document inefficiencies and potential remediesby discussing linkages between an empirical literature on credence goods and thaton the market for energy efficiency. Doing so, we identify policy implications andresearch gaps that are relevant for the adoption of energy efficiency technologies.