Mercier, Hugo

2020-1-6, Charafeddine, Rawan, Zambrana, Imac M., Triniol, Benoit, Mercier, Hugo, Clément, Fabrice, Kaufmann, Laurence, Reboul, Anne, Pons, Francisco, Van der Henst, Jean-Baptiste

Interactions between males and females often display a power imbalance. Men tend to adopt more dominant physical postures, lead conversations more, and are more likely to impose their will on women than vice versa. Furthermore, social representations typically associate males with a higher power than females. However, little is known about how those representations emerge in early childhood. The present study investigated whether preschool children from different countries assign more power to males than to females in the context of mixed-gender interactions. In Experiments 1a (n = 148) and 1b (n = 403), which implemented power through body postures, 4–6 year-old children from France, Lebanon, and Norway strongly associated power with a male character. Experiment 2 (n = 160) showed that although both French boys and girls identified themselves more with a dominant than with a subordinate posture, girls were less likely to do so in a mixed-gender context. In Experiment 3 (n = 213), which no longer used body postures, boys from Lebanon and France attributed more decision power and resource control to a male puppet than did girls. By investigating gender representations through interactions, the present study shows that children associate gender and power at an early age.

2017-1-20, Vullioud, Colin, Clément, Fabrice, Scott-Philipps, Thom, Mercier, Hugo

Because communication can be abused by senders, it is not inherently stable. One way of stabilizing communication is for senders to commit to their messages. If a sender is committed to a message, she is willing to incur a cost (direct or reputational) if the message is found to be unreliable. This cost provides a reason for receivers to accept messages to which senders are committed. We suggest that expressions of confidence can be used as commitment signals: messages expressed more confidently commit their senders more. On this basis, we make three predictions: that confidently expressed messages are more persuasive (H1’, already well established), that senders whose messages were accepted due to the senders' confidence but were then found to be unreliable should incur costs (H2’), and that if a message is accepted for reasons other than confidence, when it is found to be unreliable the sender should incur lower reputational costs than if the message had been accepted on the basis of the sender's confidence (H3’). A review of the literature revealed broadly supportive but still ambiguous evidence for H2’ and no tests of H3’. In experiments 1, 2, and 3 (testing H2’) participants received the same advice from two senders, one being confident and the other unconfident. Participants were more likely to follow the advice of the confident sender, but once the advice was revealed to have been misguided, participants adjusted their trust so that they trusted the initially unconfident sender more than the confident sender. In experiments 3 and 4 (testing H3’) participants chose between either two senders differing in confidence or two senders differing in competence. Participants followed the advice of the confident sender and of the competent sender. When it was revealed that the advice was misguided, the confident sender suffered from a larger drop in trust than the competent sender. These results are relevant for communicative theories of overconfidence.

2016-10-16, Bernard, Stephane, Castelain, Thomas, Kaufmann, Laurence, Mercier, Hugo, Van der Henst, Jean-Baptiste, Clément, Fabrice

2016-1-1, Bernard, Stephane, Clément, Fabrice, Mercier, Hugo

The current experiment sought to demonstrate the presence of wishful thinking—when wishes influence beliefs—in young children. A sample of 77 preschoolers needed to predict, eight times in a row, which of two plastic eggs, one containing one toy and the other containing three toys, would be drawn by a blinded experimenter. On the four trials in which the children could not keep the content of the egg drawn, they were equally likely to predict that either egg would be drawn. By contrast, on the four trials in which the children got to keep the content of the egg, they were more likely to predict that the egg with three toys would be drawn. Any effort the children exerted would be the same across condi- tions, so that this demonstration of wishful thinking cannot be accounted for by an effort heuristic. One group of children—a sub- group of the 5-year-olds—did not engage in wishful thinking. Children from this subgroup instead used the representativeness heuristic to guide their answers. This result suggests that having an explicit representation of the outcome inhibits children from engaging in wishful thinking in the same way as explicit representations constrain the operation of motivated reasoning in adults.

2018-8-1, Mazzarella, Diana, Reinecke, Robert, Noveck, Ira, Mercier, Hugo

2016-12-20, Cherafeddine, Rawan, Mercier, Hugo, Kaufmann, Laurence, Clément, Fabrice, Reboul, Anne, Van der Henst, Jean-Baptiste

Two experiments with preschoolers (36 to 78 months) and 8-year-old children (Experiment 1, N = 173; Experiment 2, N = 132) investigated the development of children’s resource distribution in dominance contexts. On the basis of the distributive justice literature, 2 opposite predictions were tested. Children could match resource allocation with the unequal social setting they observe and thus favor a dominant individual over a subordinate 1. Alternatively, children could choose to compensate the subordinate if they consider that the dominance asymmetry should be counteracted. Two experiments using a giving task (Experiment 1) and a taking task (Experiment 2) led to the same results. In both experiments, children took dominance into account when allocating resources. Moreover, their distributive decisions were similarly affected by age: Although 3- and 4-year-old children favored the dominant individual, 5-year-old children showed no preference and 8-year-old children strongly favored the subordinate. Several mechanisms accounting for this developmental pattern are discussed.

2016-6-13, Terrier, Nathalie, Bernard, Stephane, Mercier, Hugo, Clément, Fabrice

2018-6-13, Mazzarella, Diana, Trouche, Emmanuel, Mercier, Hugo, Noveck, Ira

2016-11-26, Cherafeddine, Rawan, Mercier, Hugo, Clément, Fabrice, Kaufmann, Laurence, Reboul, Anne, Van der Henst, Jean-Baptiste

2016, Terrier, Nathalie, Clément, Fabrice, Mercier, Hugo, Schmid Mast, Marianne, Van der Henst, Jean-Baptiste

Comment les jeunes enfants apprennent-ils d’autrui via le canal de la communication et comment contrôlent-ils les témoignages transmis par leur environnement social? Les recherches expérimentales de notre thèse de doctorat visent, d’une part, à mettre en évidence que, si le canal communicationnel constitue un moyen rapide et efficace d’augmenter leur stock de connaissances, les enfants sont pourtant peu enclins à considérer comme vraie une représentation qui leur est communiquée si celle-ci entre en conflit avec leur propre perception ou avec des connaissances préalablement stockées en mémoire. D’autre part, nos recherches empiriques ont l’originalité d’examiner le développement de la confiance épistémique sélective lorsque les enfants ne peuvent comparer l’information transmise avec leur propre background informationnel. Se basent-ils, dans ces conditions, sur des indices de nature sociale pour attribuer leur confiance? Si nos recherches empiriques se focalisent sur le développement de la confiance épistémique chez les enfants, un travail théorique propose en préambule une perspective intégrée de la confiance épistémique, avec l’hypothèse que différents types de mécanismes, tant de « bas niveau », suggérant un traitement quasi-automatique et très élémentaire de l’information, que de « haut niveau », soit plutôt réflexifs, participent aux prises de décisions fiduciaires. La confiance épistémique est ensuite discutée à la lumière du contexte de l’évolution de la communication, puis un état de l’art de la littérature spécialisée met en évidence comment et à quel moment les mécanismes de sélection des informations, définis en termes de mécanismes de vigilance épistémique, se développent chez les enfants. Notre partie empirique se destine à poursuivre ces travaux. Une première étude examine si l’âge de la source influence la confiance que va attribuer l’enfant pour acquérir une nouvelle information et dans quelle mesure cette attribution évolue entre l’âge de 2.5 et 5 ans. Un conflit entre l’indice de l’âge et de la fiabilité de la source est ensuite introduit, afin d’examiner si les préférences basées sur une même appartenance sociale sont robustes lorsque l’informateur similaire est étiqueté préalablement comme non fiable. Une deuxième étude examine ensuite l’influence de l'indice du genre, avec les mêmes questionnements sous‐jacents. Les résultats des deux études mettent en évidence que les enfants utilisent l’âge et le genre de la source lorsqu’ils ne disposent pas d’informations soulignant une différence de fiabilité entre celles-ci. Toutefois, ces indices ne sont pas utilisés systématiquement et leur utilisation diffère chez les enfants de 3, 4 ou 5 ans. En revanche, leurs résultats sont plus homogènes lorsqu’ils reçoivent des informations indiquant que la source à l’âge ou au genre similaire n’a pas eu d’accès informationnel. Dans ce cas, les enfants rejettent très clairement son témoignage autour de l’âge de 40 mois. Les enfants en-dessous de cet âge prennent également en compte l’accès informationnel des sources, mais de manière moins systématique. Nous proposons par conséquent certaines pistes développementales pour expliquer pourquoi les enfants les plus jeunes rencontrent encore des difficultés à sélectionner clairement la source fiable. Nous concluons ce travail en mettant en évidence comment les recherches conduites sur l’influence du genre et de l’âge d’une source informationnelle peuvent également générer des réflexions intéressantes pour les secteurs éducatifs et scolaires., How do young children acquire belief and knowledge from others’ testimony and how do they monitor and select fundamental pieces of information to learn about the world? The first aim of this experimental research is to emphasis that preschoolers, from an early age, are able to acquire various information by others, displaying skeptical trust in testimonies and selecting reliable epistemic informants. But despite its utility, this monitoring strategy has a major limitation because children cannot always access epistemic reliability of their sources in order to gauge their trustworthiness. Under these conditions, do children monitor specific social cues to acquire selectively new information? Thus, the second aim of this research is to examine if preschoolers use age and gender cues to selectively choose their informants. While this research specifically focuses on children development of selective trust in others testimony, a theoretical work suggests in introduction an integrated perspective of epistemic trust, suggesting that trust is underlined by both low and high cognitive processes, involving reflective judgment as well as tacit filtering device. Then, this work presents evidence to consider trust as a product of the human cognitive evolution and highlights the major milestones of selective trust development, defined as vigilance epistemic mechanisms. Afterwards the wide variety of cues young children use when evaluating testimony is reviewed. Our empirical work aims to follow up on the ongoing studies. In two studies, this research investigates how young preschoolers, from 2.5- to 5-year-olds, use a social cue (age for Study 1 and gender for Study 2) in the absence of other epistemic cue. Then, these studies combine a social cue with an epistemic cue (visual access) in order to examine if children social preference for similar sources weights more than their epistemic reliability. Both studies show that preschoolers use social cues as age and gender in the absence of other epistemic cues. However, both cues are not equally used by children and developmental differences were underlined. By contrast, results are more homogenous when an epistemic cue conflicts with a social cue. In fact, a key result is that preschoolers, as young as 40 months, are systematically able to give more weight to an epistemic cue than to a social cue when evaluating testimony. However, some children under 40 months did not clearly favor the epistemic cue, although they took it into account. We suggest some cognitive developmental issues to explain why they are sometimes unable to adequately select the testimony of the reliable informant. Finally, we connect the results of the studies with educational and scholar practical fields.