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Correia, Fabrice

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Correia, Fabrice
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  • Publication
    Accès libre
    Haecceitism as a Theory of Individual Essences
    (2019)
    Scarpati, Maria 
    ;
    Correia, Fabrice 
    ;
    Massin, Olivier 
    ;
    Dasgupta, Shamik
    ;
    Mackie, Penelope
    ;
    Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo
    ;
    Varzi, Achille
    Cette thèse a pour sujet le débat entre deux théories métaphysiques : l’haeccéitisme et l’anti-haeccéitisme. En substance, l’anti-haeccéitiste pense que tout ce qui est le cas est déterminé par la nature qualitative de la réalité, ce que l’haeccéitiste nie. La thèse comporte deux buts principaux. Le premier consiste à formuler et défendre une nouvelle manière de comprendre les deux théories en question. Le deuxième consiste à défendre une version de l’haeccéitisme que j’appelle ‘haeccéitisme austère’. Les chapitres 1-4 se focalisent sur le premier but. Dans le chapitre 1, je considère deux arguments en faveur de l’anti-haeccéitisme. J’explique que ces arguments sont représentatifs de la raison principale pour laquelle certains sont amenés à embrasser l’anti-haeccéitisme. Selon les philosophes en question, si l’haeccéitisme est vrai alors ce que j’appelle des cas d’identité primitive peuvent se produire, et ces cas sont indésirables. En substance, un cas d’identité primitive se produit à chaque fois qu’une caractéristique non-qualitative de la réalité n’est pas fixée par le qualitatif. Dans le chapitre 2, j’énonce deux desiderata qui sont satisfaits par certaines versions de l’anti-haeccéitisme. Ensuite, je défends l’idée qu’une version de l’anti-haeccéitisme au sujet des K (les entités appartenant à une certaine catégorie) doit éliminer la possibilité que des K aient identité primitive ou non-qualitative afin de satisfaire les deux desiderata. En somme, selon ces versions de l’anti-haeccéitisme, pour chaque K, être tel K en particulier consiste à posséder un certain profil qualitatif. J’affirme aussi que (i.) ce débat, si défini correctement, est accessible indifféremment aux nominalistes comme aux réalistes au sujet des propriétés et de relations ; (ii.) avoir identité primitive n’est pas la même chose qu’avoir une haeccéité telle que Duns Scotus le conçoit. Dans le chapitre 3, je fais la distinction entre l’haeccéitisme métaphysique – qui est le sujet principal de ma recherche – et une différente théorie qu’on appelle l’haeccéitisme modal. Ensuite, j’explore la question de savoir si l’haeccéitisme métaphysique peut être défini en termes de survenance. A cet effet, je fournis des raisons en faveur d’une réponse négative et je présente deux manières alternatives de définir le débat concernant l’haeccéitisme métaphysique. La première alternative – défendue par Shamik Dasgupta – est formulée en termes de faits qualitatifs, faits non-qualitatifs, ainsi que d’une relation de fondation métaphysique. La deuxième alternative est celle que je défends. Selon cette dernière, l’anti-haeccéitisme au sujet des K doit soutenir qu’aucun K ne puisse avoir identité primitive. Or, une entité qui n’a pas d’identité primitive est une entité qui possède ce que je définis comme une ‘essence individuelle qualitative minimale’. Donc, l’anti-haeccéitisme au sujet des K implique que chaque K a une essence individuelle qualitative minimale. Une deuxième conséquence est qu’une version forte du principe de l’identité des indiscernables (PII) au sujet des K est vraie. En revanche, si la version de l’anti-haeccéitisme de Dasgupta est défendue, elle n’implique pas de souscrire à une version forte du PII. Dans le chapitre 4, je montre qu’une telle version de l’anti-haeccéitisme n’est pas viable. Une définition correcte du débat doit caractériser l’anti-haeccéitisme comme une théorie qui affirme qu’au moins les entités fondamentales ne peuvent pas avoir d’identité primitive. Les chapitres 5 et 6 sont quant à eux dédiés à mes arguments contre l’anti-haeccéitisme et en faveur de ce que je définis comme l’haeccéitisme austère. Dans le chapitre 5, je montre que l’anti-haeccéitisme au sujet des K est contraint de souscrire à l’idée selon laquelle les K satisfont le PII fort. Je discute les avantages et les inconvénients de cette obligation et je mets également en doute les différentes stratégies que l’anti-haeccéitiste peut adopter pour l’éviter. Dans le chapitre 6, je mets au point et je défends une version de l’haeccéitisme austère. L’haeccéitisme austère au sujet des K soutient notamment qu’il y a des K qui n’ont pas d’essence individuelle qualitative minimale et qu’aucun K ne possède une haeccéité. Je défends l’idée que l’haeccéitisme austère est vrai au sujet de certaines catégories d’entités. De plus, je soutiens qu’il y a des entités qui ont identité primitive au sens fort. C’est à dire, leur identité n’est pas déterminée par autre chose : il s’agit de faits bruts que ces entités sont ces qu’elles sont. Je conclus en répondant de manière systématique aux principales objections et difficultés qui sont avancées contre l’haeccéitisme austère., This thesis deals with the debate that opposes two metaphysical views: Haecceitism and anti-Haecceitism. Roughly speaking, according to anti-Haecceitists everything about reality is determined by the qualitative character of reality itself, while Haecceitists deny that this is the case. The thesis has two main goals. The first is to formulate and defend a novel way to understand the two views in question. The second is to defend a form of Haecceitism that I call ‘Austere Haecceitism’. The first goal provides the focus of the first four chapters of the thesis. In Chapter 1, I consider two arguments for anti-Haecceitism that I take to be emblematic of the typical rationale behind such a view. This rationale has it that if Haecceitism is true then what I call cases of primitive identity can possibly arise and that said cases are for some relevant reason unacceptable. Roughly, cases of primitive identity occur whenever the qualitative character of reality fails to ‘fix’ some non-qualitative feature of reality. In Chapter 2, I lay out two desiderata that a form of anti-Haecceitism may or may not satisfy. I then argue that a form of anti-Haecceitism about the Ks (i.e., the things of a certain class) that satisfies both must rule it out that any of the Ks possibly has primitive, non-qualitative thisness. That is, it must hold that given every single K, for something to be that very K in particular is for it to be qualitatively a certain way. I also contend that (i.) the present debate – if correctly framed – is equally accessible to realists and nominalists about properties and relations; (ii.) the notion of a primitive thisness is not to be confused with that of a Scotusian haecceitas. In Chapter 3, I distinguish the debate on metaphysical Haecceitism that is my topic from one it is at times mistaken with – i.e., the one on modal Haecceitism. I then address the question whether the issue of metaphysical Haecceitism can still (as the one about its modal ‘counterpart’) be stated in terms of supervenience. After providing reasons for a negative answer, I introduce two alternative takes on the present debate. The first one was set forth by Shamik Dasgupta: it is phrased in terms of a distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative facts and of a relation of grounding holding between them. The second strategy is the one I myself defend: it has it that to be an anti-Haecceitist about the Ks one must deny that any such thing may have primitive thisness. Since if something fails to have primitive thisness it must have what I call a ‘qualitative minimal individual essence’, anti-Haecceitism about the Ks in my sense entails that every K has a qualitative minimal individual essence. This entails, in turn, that the Ks respect a strong version of PII, the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. If Dasgupta’s strategy is legitimate then this is not the case: the anti-Haecceitist can guarantee that the Ks do not possibly give rise to cases of primitive identity without committing to strong PII. The aim of Chapter 4 is to prove that strategy unviable. Its upshot is that a proper framing of the present debate must indeed characterize anti-Haecceitism as a view that claims that at least the fundamental entities must fail to have primitive thisness. Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to my case against anti-Haecceitism and for Austere Haecceitism. In Chapter 5, I argue that anti-Haecceitism about the Ks is indeed committed to the claim that such things respect strong PII. After discussing such a commitment, I cast doubts on some further strategies that the anti-Haecceitist may attempt in order to avoid it – strategies that appeal, in particular, to non-qualitative individual essences, irreducibly plural individuation, or some form of eliminativism. In Chapter 6, I develop and defend what I call a form of ‘Austere Haecceitism’. Any view that holds that some Ks have no qualitative minimal individual essence and that no K has a haecceity is a form of Austere Haecceitism about the Ks. My own position is that Austere Haecceitism is true about at least some Ks. Moreover, I hold that some such entities have strongly primitive thisness. That is, their being the very things they are does not consist in and is not determined by anything else at all. After recollecting the main tenets of my view, I defend them and the tenets of a weaker form of Austere Haecceitism, which they include, from some objections that may be raised against it.
  • Publication
    Accès libre
    On the Logic of Factual Equivalence
    (2016)
    Correia, Fabrice 
    Say that two sentences are factually equivalent when they describe the same facts or situations, understood as worldly items, i.e. as bits of reality rather than as representations of reality. The notion of factual equivalence is certainly of central interest to philosophical semantics, but it plays a role in a much wider range of philosophical areas. What is the logic of factual equivalence? This paper attempts to give a partial answer to this question, by providing an answer the following, more specific question: Given a standard propositional language with negation, conjunction and disjunction as primitive operators, which sentences of the language should be taken to be factually equivalent by virtue of their logical form? The system for factual equivalence advocated in this paper is a proper fragment of the first-degree system for the logic of analytic equivalence put forward in the late seventies by R. B. Angell. I provide the system with two semantics, both formulated in terms of the notion of a situation’s being fittingly described by a linguistic item. In the final part of the paper I argue, contra a view I defended in my “Grounding and Truth-Functions” (2010), that the logic for factual equivalence I advocate here should be preferred to Angell’s logic if one wishes to follow the general conception of the relationships between factual equivalence and the notion of grounding put forward in the 2010 paper.
  • Publication
    Accès libre
    Presentism without Presentness
    (2015)
    Correia, Fabrice 
    ;
    Rosenkranz, Sven
    We argue that presentism, understood as a view about time and existence, can perspicuously be defined in opposition to all other familiar contenders without appeal to any notion of presentness or cognate notions such as concreteness. Given recent worries about the suitability of such notions to cut much metaphysical ice, this should be welcomed by presentism's defenders. We also show that, irrespective of its sparse ideology, the proposed formulation forestalls any deviant interpretation at odds with the view it aims to capture.
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    Non-Proxy Reductions of Eternalist Discourse
    (2013)
    Correia, Fabrice 
    Eternalists believe that there are past things and future things which are not present. In contrast, presentists hold that only present objects exist. In this chapter, I discuss presentist reductions of eternalist discourse which do not involve quantification over proxies—i.e. presentistically acceptable surrogates for merely past and merely future entities.
  • Publication
    Accès libre
    Eternal Facts in an Ageing Universe
    (2012)
    Correia, Fabrice 
    ;
    Rosenkranz, Sven
    In recent publications, Kit Fine devises a classification of A-theories of time and defends a non-standard A-theory he calls fragmentalism, according to which reality as a whole is incoherent but fragments into classes of mutually coherent tensed facts. We argue that Fine's classification in not exhaustive, as it ignores another non-standard A-theory we dub dynamic absolutism, according to which there are tensed facts that stay numerically the same and yet undergo qualitative changes as time goes by. We expound this theory in some detail and argue that it is a serious alternative to the positions identified by Fine.
  • Publication
    Accès libre
    On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence
    (2012)
    Correia, Fabrice 
    In his influential paper ‘‘Essence and Modality’’, Kit Fine argues that no account of essence framed in terms of metaphysical necessity is possible, and that it is rather metaphysical necessity which is to be understood in terms of essence. On his account, the concept of essence is primitive, and for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all things. Fine also proposes a reduction of conceptual and logical necessity in the same vein: a conceptual necessity is a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all concepts, and a logical necessity a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts. I argue that the plausibility of Fine's view crucially requires that certain apparent explanatory links between essentialist facts be admitted and accounted for, and I make a suggestion about how this can be done. I then argue against the reductions of conceptual and logical necessity proposed by Fine and suggest alternative reductions, which remain nevertheless Finean in spirit.