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Kandul, Serhiy
Nom
Kandul, Serhiy
Affiliation principale
Fonction
Postdoctoral research assistant
Email
serhiy.kandul@unine.ch
Identifiants
Résultat de la recherche
Voici les éléments 1 - 2 sur 2
- PublicationAccès libreNo begging, no money? Experimental Analysis of Procedural Preferences for Redistribution(2019)
; Nikolaychuk, OlexandrThe experimental literature on pro-social behavior has been largely focused on settings where the decision of donors is sufficient for an interaction to occur. However, in many real-life applications recipients first have to ask donors for help to initiate the transaction. We suggest that recipients and donors might have different preferences over these redistribution procedures and test this proposition in a laboratory experiment. We let participants play a dictator game under two procedures: (1) a dictator first chooses a transfer, and the recipient then decides to accept or reject it; (2) recipient first decides to ask or not for a transfer, and if asked the dictator then chooses a transfer which can be accepted or rejected by the recipient. First, we find that a minority of recipients shy away from “begging”, but happily accept the transfer initiated by dictators. Second, while the majority of recipients prefer asking dictators to share, dictators share much less under this experimental procedure. - PublicationAccès libreI Deserve More! An Experimental Analysis of Illusory Ownership in Dictator Games(2018)
; Nikolaychuk, OlexandrDelineation of someone's ownership typically involves the sense of deservedness: the property right is respected as long as the owner deserve to own the object. Objectively, deservedness is often linked to one's actions or specific attributes that justify the owner's claims. We argue that people might get the sense of deservedness without an objective causal attribution. In our experiment, the pure luck defines the allocation of the roles. Still, compared to a standard setting, in a treatment where actions have no causal effect on the outcome, dictators keep larger share. At the same time, dictators do not compensate recipients for their irrelevant actions. We interpret this asymmetry in reaction towards the procedures of role allocation as 'illusory property': people care about irrelevant procedures only if they favor themselves but not others.