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Dimitrakakis, Christos
Nom
Dimitrakakis, Christos
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Professor
Email
christos.dimitrakakis@unine.ch
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Voici les éléments 1 - 8 sur 8
- PublicationAccès libreEnvironment Design for Inverse Reinforcement Learning(2024)
; Learning a reward function from demonstrations suffers from low sample-efficiency. Even with abundant data, current inverse reinforcement learning methods that focus on learning from a single environment can fail to handle slight changes in the environment dynamics. We tackle these challenges through adaptive environment design. In our framework, the learner repeatedly interacts with the expert, with the former selecting environments to identify the reward function as quickly as possible from the expert’s demonstrations in said environments. This results in improvements in both sample-efficiency and robustness, as we show experimentally, for both exact and approximate inference. - PublicationAccès libreBandits Meet Mechanism Design to Combat Clickbait in Online Recommendation(2024)
; Haifen XuWe study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We approximately characterize all Nash equilibria of the arms under UCB-S and show a $\tilde{\mathcal{O}} (\sqrt{KT})$ regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design - PublicationAccès libreStrategic Linear Contextual Bandits(2024)
; Haifeng XuMotivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design. - PublicationAccès libreMinimax-Bayes Reinforcement Learning(2023)
; - PublicationAccès libreMinimax-Bayes Reinforcement Learning(PMLR, 2023)
; - PublicationAccès libreEnvironment Design for Inverse Reinforcement Learning(2022)
- PublicationAccès libreOn Meritocracy in Optimal Set Selection(2021-02-23T20:36:36Z)
; Anne-Marie GeorgeTypically, merit is defined with respect to some intrinsic measure of worth. We instead consider a setting where an individual's worth is \emph{relative}: when a Decision Maker (DM) selects a set of individuals from a population to maximise expected utility, it is natural to consider the \emph{Expected Marginal Contribution} (EMC) of each person to the utility. We show that this notion satisfies an axiomatic definition of fairness for this setting. We also show that for certain policy structures, this notion of fairness is aligned with maximising expected utility, while for linear utility functions it is identical to the Shapley value. However, for certain natural policies, such as those that select individuals with a specific set of attributes (e.g. high enough test scores for college admissions), there is a trade-off between meritocracy and utility maximisation. We analyse the effect of constraints on the policy on both utility and fairness in extensive experiments based on college admissions and outcomes in Norwegian universities.