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Chaire de droit européen et de droit de la concurrence
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CH
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Academic Institute
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Voici les éléments 1 - 10 sur 33
- PublicationMétadonnées seulementLa protection juridique des soumissionnaires dans le droit et la pratique des cantons(1993)
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- PublicationMétadonnées seulementFTC v. Actavis: Are Reverse Payment Settlements Antitrust Immune?The purpose of this article is to analyse the Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis and to provide an overview of the legal debate on reverse payment settlements in the U.S. and the EU. First, the facts and the holdings of the District and the Appellate Court on the Actavis settlement are presented. Second, an analysis of the scope of the patent test, the presumptive illegality approach and the Actavis rule of reason follows. Third, the main legal issues arising from the Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis are discussed, focusing on the question of no-authorized generic commitments in the context of the Effexor XR Antitrust Litigation. Finally, the European Commission’s initiatives on reverse payment settlements and the Lundbeck case are briefly presented. The decision of the General Court of the European Union in the Lundbeck case will be the first to set the standard for the review of reverse payment settlements under European competition law. This article aims to stress the need for the European Union to benefit from the troubled U.S. experience on reverse payment settlements.
- PublicationMétadonnées seulementRapport suisse(Copenhagen: DJOF Publishing, 2014)
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- PublicationMétadonnées seulementLundbeck v. Commission: the first decision of the European General Court on reverse payments(2016-10-10)On September 8, 2016, the General Court of the European Union published its decision on Lundbeck v. Commission, its first decision on patent settlements involving reverse payments. This commentary focuses on the main points of the Lundbeck decision: the role of the patent and of the presumption of patent validity in the antitrust analysis, the issue of potential competition and the importance of the size of the payments. It presents the General Court’s analysis and considerations which led to a finding of a restriction of competition by object and also discusses the influence of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis on the General Court’s reasoning. Finally, it argues that the General Court’s decision does not amount to a class condemnation of all patent settlements involving reverse payments as restrictions by object and maintains that the standard set by the Lundbeck decision is not necessarily harsher than the one embraced by FTC v. Actavis.