Spinoza et le problème de la distinction des substances dans l'Ethique

Both the meaning of E1 P5 and its demonstration have often seemed troublesome to commentators, old and new. An attempt is made to give a reading of the proposition that does justice both to Spinoza's criticism of Descartes's theory of substance from the outset of E 1, and to the global coherence of E1 P1-13. To do so I defend the claim that as long as Spinoza is working with the hypothesis of a plurality of substances (which he discards in E1 P14), he sets no limits to the number of attributes that a substance can have. I oppose the reading of Gueroult and others, for whom Spinoza, at P5, is concerned with substances having only one attribute. Next, an attempt is made to give an informal reading of the demonstration of P5 in such a way that Spinoza can avoid the rather obvious attacks which were later to be made by Bayle and Leibniz. Finally, I sketch out how P5 fits into Spinoza's conception of the theory of metaphysical distinctions in relation to Descartes.