Artifacts and the Limits of Agentive Authority
Editor(s)
Miguel Garcia-Godinez
Publisher
Palgrave/Macmillan
Date issued
2023
In
Thomasson on Ontology / ed.: Miguel Garcia-Godinez
From page
209
To page
241
Reviewed by peer
true
Subjects
Artifacts agents intentions use reproduction prototypes functions kinds classification.
Abstract
Amie Thomasson and other proponents of author-intention-based accounts of artifacts hold that an artifact is what its original author(s) intended it to be. By contrast, according to the user-based framework developed by Beth Preston, an artifact’s function is determined by the practices of users and reproducers. In this chapter, I argue that both author-intention-based and user-based frameworks suffer from an overly agent-centric orientation: despite their many interesting differences, both approaches run into difficulties with scenarios in which the attitudes or dispositions of the relevant agents, whether they are authors, users or reproducers, do not serve as a reliable guide on which to base an artifact’s classification as a member of a certain artifact kind. Such alternative categorizations, which conflict with both author-intentions and user-practices, demonstrate the need for a more object-centered alternative perspective concerning prototype production and the nature of artifacts more generally.
Publication type
book part
File(s)![Thumbnail Image]()
Loading...
Name
Artifacts and the Limits of Agentive Authority.pdf
Type
Main Article
Size
319.21 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
