Emotions and Evaluative Knowledge. A Perspective on Epistemic and Moral Potential of Anger

This thesis aims to explore emotions from an epistemic and normative philosophical perspective, delineating their indispensability for evaluative knowledge, and elucidating ways to promote this specific form of knowledge. Specifically, I will focus on the emotion of anger, given its tendency to provoke heightened disagreements among philosophers in moral and normative domains. I will advocate for an attitudinalist account, which, in comparison to other theories, appears to better explicate the epistemic role of all emotions, including anger. According to the attitudinalist account, anger grants us insight into the reasons behind the offensiveness of a situation or event. The text delves not only into the potential epistemic role of anger but also its moral implications within a democratic context, as its expression fosters evaluative knowledge crucial for combating social injustice. Finally, I defend an epistemic perspectivism; emotions concern an alternative form of knowledge that diverges from the traditional paradigm in that it does not seek absolute objectivity; rather, truth is contingent upon the emotional experiences of the subject.