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# **Emotions and Evaluative Knowledge**

*A Perspective on Epistemic and Moral Potential of Anger*

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## **Introduction**

This thesis aims to understand emotions from an epistemic and normative philosophical perspective, how they are indispensable for evaluative knowledge, and lastly how we can promote this particular form of knowledge. In particular, I will take into consideration the emotion of anger which causes heightened disagreement among philosophers. In the initial section, I will establish a theoretical foundation and framework for emotions. This groundwork is essential for acquiring the necessary tools to analyse various theories of emotions comprehensively. I will present three theories: judgmentalism, representationalism, and attitudinalist account. The comparison of these theories will lead me to take a position and finally assume the attitudinalist account. The latter, compared with other theories, is better suited to explain and elucidate evaluative knowledge.

Once established what an emotion is and its indispensability in acquiring evaluative knowledge, I will defend the indispensability claim of emotion from fallacies. Therefore, in the second part, I will better clarify the relationship between emotion and evaluative knowledge as it has always been a subject of confusion and controversy. I will argue that moral, prudential, and practical reasons are irrelevant to the underlying relationship between emotions and values. In conclusion, I will focus on the case of the outlaw emotion that highlights the irrelevance of such reasons.

Indeed, in the following part, I will analyze the emotion of anger, as in particular it has always been prejudiced and stereotyped precisely because of these reasons. Precisely, some philosophers still resist attributing an epistemic function to anger as they claim that its nature is malignant. In these regards, I will report the thoughts of Laura Silva (2021) and Myisha Cherry (2021) as they argue that anger is not inherently malignant, but rather there are conditions under which it can be inappropriate or appropriate, showing that the knowledge elicited by appropriate rage is crucial to fight against oppressive societies.

In part four, I will explore the potential effectiveness of appropriate anger in democratic contexts, which will prove useful in preventing possible demagoguery. In this regard, it will be shown that anger not only witnesses the existence of the offensiveness of injustice but is also able to communicate it, as emotions are inherently communicative. For this reason in democracy, public discourse represents an opportunity to grow

evaluative knowledge. Indeed, Lepoutre (2021) argues that public discourses are inclusive if and only if they are structured in the form of an emotionally charged narrative.

In the final section, I will delve into the structure of evaluative knowledge compared to factual knowledge. I will argue for a specific perspective on this knowledge by analysing its normative and epistemic implications, particularly in a social-political context.

# 1 Theoretical Framework on Emotions

The first part of my thesis concerns providing a theoretical framework on emotions which will be the key to understanding the rest of the work. Hence, I will, first, report a theoretical and philosophical background of emotions, by contextualizing the notions of *intentionality*, *attitude*, and *phenomenology* with a reference to the philosophies of Brentano and Husserl, those who reintroduced these terms.

However, before delving into the various accounts of emotions, I wanted to digress on the normativity field, as the main contemporary assumption claims that emotions apprehend in evaluative terms the environment. So, I am going to report on the main debate on normativity which aims to explain what a value is, and in the specific, I am going to focus on those evaluative terms that are involved in emotions.

After providing a theoretical and normative background, I am finally going to analyze from an epistemological point of view the main account of emotions; judgmentalists, representationalists, and attitudinalists, by providing an argument in favor of the latter as it will also be our key to interpretation.

## 1.1 Philosophical Background; Brentano and Husserl

If we look at the word “emotion” in the American Psychological Association (APA) Dictionary, we will find the following definition: “a complex reaction pattern, involving experiential, behavioral, and physiological elements, by which an individual attempts to deal with a personally significant matter or event. The specific quality of the emotion (e.g., fear, shame) is determined by the specific significance of the event.” (*APA Dictionary of Psychology*, n.d.-a). Psychological sciences share the same insight as philosophy of emotions. Indeed most philosophical theories define emotion as reactions that have two essential features. Firstly, the emotions phenomenologically<sup>1</sup> manifest themselves through bodily feelings and sensations. Secondly, emotions are always about something; they have an intentional object.

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<sup>1</sup> Phenomenology is a discipline founded by Husserl (1859-1938), a pupil of Brentano. Phenomenology is the study of phenomena (what appears) as they manifest themselves in our consciousness. In the case of emotions, it is a matter of lending how they manifest themselves, as something pleasant or unpleasant.

Thanks to the philosophical works of Franz Brentano (1838-1917) and Edmund Husserl (1859- 1938), we can understand and talk about emotions through the notions of *intentionality*, *attitude*, and *phenomenology*.

Intentionality is a notion that was reintroduced<sup>2</sup> into philosophy by Brentano who modifies its meaning, a constitutive property of our consciousness. He claims that every psychic phenomenon is directed towards an object where the intentionality is the towardness-relationship between consciousness and the object. He, then classifies psychic phenomena based on their intentionality; representation, judgment, and affective state; representation is having an object present to consciousness, judgment is the assent or denial of the represented content, and finally, the affective state is the love or hate concerning the represented content.

Husserl, based on Brentano's theories, confirm the assumption according to which consciousness is essentially intentional in the sense that every attitude (set of mental states) is about something. Husserl, then, is interested in investigating the intended object (intentional object) and thus also the way it is intended (attitude). These investigations constitute the phenomenological method that intends to explore only what appears in our consciousness (the phenomenon<sup>3</sup>) without reference to any kind of external assumption, in other words, the aim is to investigate objectively what we experience subjectively. Hence, he takes a different direction compared to Kant<sup>4</sup>, as the consciousness transcends the appearance of the object, namely the consciousness grounds and objectifies reality<sup>5</sup>,

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<sup>2</sup> Intentionality comes from the Latin term *intentio* used in medieval philosophy and logic to refer to 'concept' 'intention'. In logic, the intention of a concept represents the connotation and meaning of that concept as distinguished from the extension which is the meaning of the concept. Two concepts can have the same meaning but different connotations for example the morning star and the evening star refer to the same star but have two different connotations.

<sup>3</sup> As opposed to the kantian noumeno.

<sup>4</sup> Humanity has limitations in knowledge, as it is only able to know apparent reality, phenomenon, but not reality itself, the noumenon. (See. Kant, I. (1998). On the ground of the distinction of all objects in general into phenomena and noumena (as in the first edition). In P. Guyer & A. Wood (Eds.), *Critique of Pure Reason* (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, pp. 338-353). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511804649.018)

<sup>5</sup> *Husserlian transcendental turning point* is the direction towards an eidetic position; the intentional object being interrelated and interdependent with the act of consciousness is immanent, according to Husserl it can be reached at the object itself, as consciousness itself transcends the immanence. (see. Theodorou, 2012)

in other words, the intentional object would be the result of the transcendence of consciousness, so the intentional object would no longer be a phenomenon.

So how does Husserl interpret the emotions? What kind of intentional relationship characterizes this affective and evaluative phenomenon?

He defines an emotion as an attitude that has a valued object. The emotional mechanism operates in two structures; the first one is objectifying the object by a representational attitude, what later we'll call the cognitive bases, and the second one is the emotive attitude towards what is represented. In other words, the emotion is the feeling of the represented intentional object where the feeling transcends the representation as a felt-object.

As a result of the intentional feeling, we interpret the felt- object as having a new objective property (funny, boring, and so forth). Indeed, Husserl claims that emotions are those attitudes that allows us to experience reality with new properties (evaluative).

However, Husserl struggles in the attempt to clarify the evaluative properties through the transcendent consciousness, precisely because to transcend would mean to make these properties objective, but it is evident that everyone does not judge the same situation having the same evaluative properties. For example, I might judge a movie as exciting, while other people might judge it as boring. Husserl is not clear on whether emotion is objectifying or not (Husserl, 1900; Theodorou, 2012).

Let's consider the term 'rude', is really a person definable in his/her essence as rude? Is this propriety ontologically necessary for the existence of that person? or if I think that the person is rude, is it necessarily a universal truth?

I am going to discuss these particular terms such as 'rude' in the next section to better understand Husserl's struggle to define emotions.

However, despite its unsatisfactory conclusion, Brentano and Husserl laid the foundations for the contemporary philosophy of the emotions. In fact, many theories start from the following assumption: emotions are reactions that have bodily feelings and are directed toward a particular object that is presented as having a value. In other words, we react emotionally to certain relevant properties and not by virtue of the object itself. For instance, Marco gets scared of dogs because dogs appear frightening to Marco. This represents the starting point from which philosophers develop their theories. The challenge philosophers face is to clarify the link between these evaluative properties and the corresponding emotions.

## 1.2 Value and Evaluative Judgment

Unlike perception, belief, and desire, emotions represent a harder epistemological challenge. The proposition "Today it is raining in Geneva" is true if and only if it corresponds to reality, while the proposition "Today the weather is horrendous in Geneva" cannot be defined as true or false, as some could like the raining atmosphere. So, it is difficult to define truth conditions in evaluative judgments.

Terms such as 'horrendous', 'funny', and 'boring' seem to be queer<sup>6</sup> in the sense that they can neither be defined as totally objective nor subjective. Since emotions seem to be linked with an evaluation, in the sense that emotion appraises the environment in evaluative terms, it seems appropriate to do a brief digression on normativity.

Normativity investigates the concepts of values and reasons and how they are related. Normative propositions are about reasons and values, whereas descriptive ones are about the world. For instance, 'Today, Geneva is rainy' is a descriptive proposition, whereas 'Today the weather of Geneva is bad' is a normative proposition, as I am not describing the weather in Geneva, but I am evaluating it.

However, the relation between normative and factual is not exactly clear. There is a major debate between those who argue that normativity can be derived from the factual and those who argue that normativity is not reducible to the factual. The *buck-passing account* states that normative things can be explained non-normatively. If we take the terms 'good' and 'bad' could be reduced to pro-attitude or con attitude which are not normative (Skorupski, 2007). On the other hand, there are other philosophers (Gregory, 2013) who claim that the *buck-passing account* fails as the reason is itself normative because it stems from the normative dimension. For example, if you want to explain what is 'morally wrong' you might answer that it is a reason to blame (a reason for an attitude), but blame is an appropriate response to morally wrong. So these philosophers try to save their independence and autonomy from the facts with different theories.

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<sup>6</sup> The *Queerness argument*: If these values were objective, then they would be strange entities, qualities or relationships, as they are completely different from everything that exists. (See Mackie, J. L. 1977, *Ethics*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.)

However, emotions seem to be correlated with the so-called *thick concepts*<sup>7</sup>, this connection seems to be the reason for Husserl's struggle. Let's see why.

What makes these terms special, and problematic is their being hybrid is; they are both normative and descriptive. While the terms 'good' or 'bad' could be considered purely normative, as they do not need to say what the facts provide a reason, the *thick terms* are more specific about what attitude there is a reason for. For example, to say that 'this movie is scary' is to say that there are reasons to be scared of this movie.

On the one hand, one can say that the movie is 'fear-causing', and therefore the terms would be descriptive. However, finding the movie scary is not evidence of the fact that movie is scary. Indeed, 'frightening' could also mean 'fear-worthy' and then it would be normative. Nonetheless, we cannot eliminate the descriptive component, otherwise there would be no reason for me to be scared of the movie. The thick evaluative terms have a reasons-giving factual component that is inextricable.

This digression on normativity is important to better understand the concept of *thickness*, which seems to be closely connected to our emotions, as they are the most suitable terms to express an emotional experience.

As we have already mentioned, emotions learn about their surroundings in evaluative terms and elicit evaluative judgments that are not purely normative as they are inextricable from the environment. For example, if a close friend dies, I will find the situation sad. What happens if I substitute these terms in purely normative terms?

In thin terms, I would say that If a close friend dies, I will find the situation bad. We immediately notice how the 'bad' is not suitable for the situation since it does not say anything about the specific reason in favor of sadness towards the situation. On the other hand, if we substitute the terms with the descriptive ones; I would say that if a close friend dies, I find out that I have tears on my cheek or that the muscle tone of my face is

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<sup>7</sup> Bernard Williams coined the term thick concept in his book 'Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy' (1985). A thick concept is a specific evaluative concept that is also descriptive. The terms courageous, funny, and brilliant are examples of thick concepts that are both evaluative and descriptive which differ from the purely descriptive concepts such as red, cold, and so forth. However, they differ from thin concepts (ought, good, wrong) as they are purely evaluative. According to Williams thick values are 'action-guiding' as they express the presence of reasons for action and are also 'guided by the world' as their correctness depends on the state of affairs.

weakened. We can see again that the description of sadness in purely descriptive terms, is unable to generate such reasons for being sad.

In conclusion, we generally tend to describe events that trigger emotions with these specific terms: ‘Marco’s joke was so funny, I laughed a lot’, it would be difficult to imagine describing these situations in any other kind of terms than *thick concept*. Since these concepts express both an evaluative and a descriptive property.

The theoretical background and digression on normativity provide us with the proper tools to better understand theories of emotions and what the main philosophical challenges are in defining emotions.

### **1.3 Theories of emotions**

#### *1.3.1 Judgmentalists*

Some argue that the relationship between emotion and evaluative property is judgment i.e. I am frightened because I believe the dog is frightening (Prinz, 2015). They would then explain emotion as that attitude that judges the object as having evaluative properties (intentional object). One might raise the objection that judgment involves being descriptive because to judge would mean to believe that the dog has certain attributes such as sharp teeth, very large stature, a very severe growl, and so forth, therefore it would not involve any value. However, the evaluative nature of judgment in emotions is guaranteed by what is called *motivation internalism* (Prinz, 2015). *Motivation internalism* emerges from a moral issue, where it is argued that for one to make a moral judgment (which we will call evaluative in this case), one must necessarily be motivated to action. If an evaluative judgment consists of emotions and if emotion involves motivation, therefore the evaluative judgment necessarily is motivating. Hence, judging an object as frightening means being motivated to flee or avoid the object. Indeed, reacting to the physical properties of the dog motivates me to flee or to avoid the dog. At first sight, this theory seems to be very convincing, although it meets problems.

First, the *motivation internalism* of judgment fails when emotions do not correspond to an action. The main objection is that one can understand what is frightening but still, he/she is not motivated to flee or to avoid and can still be indifferent to the object. If we take into consideration the case of imagination we can imagine a spider, which does not motivate me to run away, even though I think it is scary. Indeed, an emotion may not necessarily be followed by an action. Thus, the relationship between emotion and the

motivation for action turns out to be weak, as it is contingent. Here, we are not ruling out the fact that emotions do not have an action tendency, but rather we are arguing that emotions do not need evaluative judgments which is finally motivating.

Secondly, emotion does not require judgment to occur. There are cases where I believe the object is frightening and not frightened by it or cases where I do not believe the object is frightening and frightened by it. Consequently, belief is not a necessary condition for emotion. In addition, this theory could not explain emotions in children and animals, since the cognitive faculty of judgment would include mastering the concept into the proposition believed to be true. So it would be too demanding for those who do not possess these abilities such as animals and young children.

However, some respond that empirical studies have shown instead that people react emotionally when they make moral judgments. empirical studies show that areas of the brain that process emotions are activated when we make moral judgments (Prinz, 2015). This argument says nothing about the fact that emotions necessarily require moral judgments, for what is being shown is that tasks that require moral judgments such as moral dilemmas, involve emotional reactions as we could imagine different scenarios of the dilemma. So, we are not ruling out the fact that emotions do not react to the content of moral issues, but we are ruling out the fact that emotions to be such must include moral judgments.

So, judgmentalism does not lend itself to defining what an emotion is, as the attitude of judgment does not seem to be suitable for defining what an emotion is, and therefore motivational internalism is also unable to explain the relationship between emotion and evaluative properties.

### *1.3.2 Representationalists*

So, emotion as a value judgment is shown to be weak, thus alternatives to this theory are developed from an attempt to define emotion not as a judgment but rather as a perception, taking inspiration from William James (1884). According to William James' theory, an emotion is the agent's feeling of bodily modification, ultimately triggered by his apprehension of certain objects. For James, therefore, the emotional reaction results only from feeling the bodily change that is due to relevant properties of an object, X. This means that the intentional object of the emotion is not X, but our own bodily sensation triggered by X.

However, this account seems to fail as soon as we highlight the reason why we react to salient features (evaluative properties) of the environment with the belief that they are felt (Deonna & Teroni, 2012). The relationship between emotion and object is too remote because it is mediated by body sensation, in fact, this model encounters difficulties when asking why one reacted to X as the emotions are generated by feeling body reactions and not directly by the evaluative properties of the object. However, James enhances the phenomenological role of emotions while neglecting the intentional one.

An alternative account of the Jamesian theory is the perception model to cope with the intentional constraint. This model tries to solve the distance created between emotions and evaluative properties, arguing that emotions are perceptions of values; the intentionality of emotions is analogous to the intentionality of perception (Döring, 2007). I experience the red pot in the same way I experience the dog as fearful. The advantage gained by the perceptual model is that first, it does not necessitate the inclusion of a judgment; experiencing fear does not necessitate mastering the concept of fear. Indeed, perceiving red does not mean mastering the concept of redness. Secondly, the perception does not need any mediation, as they have direct access to the evaluative properties, thus they would cope with the intentional constraint met by James.

However, the perceptual model also seems to be *prima facie* persuasive, but it fails because the phenomenology of perception has very different characteristics from that of emotions (Deonna & Teroni, 2012). Indeed, emotions have an affective phenomenology that can have a positive or negative valence. The same cannot be said about perception as it represents a neutral phenomenology. In addition, evaluative properties are ontologically different from physical properties, and thus they have different accessibility ways. Perception has direct access to the corresponding factual properties, whereas emotion requires cognitive bases to represent the evaluative properties. For example, I am reading a newspaper article about genocide, to be outraged, I need those cognitive faculties that allow me to be able to read and understand what I am reading by imagining the situation. If the intentional object would not be provided by these cognitive bases, the emotion could not occur. To sum up, the perceptual model seeks to develop an alternative to James' theory and Judgmentalism; they attempt to explain the emotions referring to perception which ultimately leads to neglecting the affective nature of emotions.

### 1.3.3 *Attitudinalists*

A third option is given by the attitudinal theory of emotion, which does not define emotion as perception or feeling of the evaluative properties, but as a specific type of evaluative attitude; different emotions are different attitudes we take toward the objects provided by their cognitive bases (Deonna & Teroni, 2012, 2021). More precisely, emotions are not the same as judging, believing, or desiring, because each emotion is a different attitude; joy, sadness, and fear are not the same attitudes. So, emotions differ at the level of the attitude and not at the level of content. According to the attitudinal account, emotions are defined as bodily experiences and a tendency to act. Fear is a different attitude from anger as the first involves the experience of the body as prepared to flee or to avoid whereas the latter involves the experience of the body as hostile towards something, thus they are different attitudes because the body has two different forms of engagement towards something. This means that each emotion corresponds to its own agential phenomenological dimension of emotions. So, to say I am scared of the spider means, to experience the tendency to run away from the spider or to be angry with your sister, means to experience feeling hostility toward your sister. From these examples, we can see that the emotion does not represent the thick values, as ‘being angry is related to offence in virtue of being the very attitude it is, not because it represents offence’ (Deonna & Teroni, 2021: p. 1109)

So the concept of emotion is no longer dependent on understanding the thick evaluative concept, as the attitudinal account claims that emotion is a specific felt bodily stance towards an object. The emotion is related to the thick values through the relation ‘meriting a certain kind of attitude’; if a situation represents a constellation of natural properties that constitutes ‘deserving to have a hostile attitude’ means that the situation is offensive. So the term offensive is not primitive as it is not constitutive of the emotion anger, but anger that elucidates the concept of offensive. The epistemological relationship between emotion and value is one of fittingness; that emotion is fitting if and only if the properties of the object exemplify the value. For example, fear is fitting if the properties of the object exemplify the being of scary. More specifically, my bodily tendency to avoid is fitting if and only if the properties of the object exemplify 'deserving-avoidance'. It follows then the epistemological relation of fittingness changes from emotion to emotion since they have different forms of engagement. In the case of anger what is epistemically fitting to the offensive is a form of hostility.

In order to better understand the claim implications of these theories, it is good to consider how they try to explain the link between evaluative properties and emotions and their evaluative correctness conditions<sup>8</sup>. According to attitudinalists, an emotion is a specific felt bodily stance towards objects, and it is fitting if and only if its object exemplifies the relevant evaluative properties. In other terms, the standard correctness is met when the intentional objects exemplify the relevant evaluative properties. What is the standard correctness in the representationalists' account? Comparing the two main theories representationalists and attitudinalists, I argue that the attitudinalist account is more convincing than the representationalists which encounter more difficulties in generating the correctness conditions.

According to the representationalists, emotions are evaluations because they represent values, which phenomenology is given by the presence of the value. The main problem that they have to face is that representing value does not generate any evaluative correctness because it is not equivalent to an evaluation. This represents the main accusation made by the attitudinalists against the representationalists (Deonna & Teroni, 2022a). I agree with attitudinalists because the perception of values does not actually correspond with the act of evaluating. Indeed, the perception of something is not capable by itself of generating conditions of correctness. Let's consider the case of knowledge, knowing proposition,  $p$ , necessitates adopting a psychological attitude to  $p$ . For example, saying 'I know that Giulia has blue eyes.' necessarily implies 'believing that Giulia has blue eyes.' At the same time, perceiving fright is not necessarily an evaluation, because it needs a psychological attitude, therefore perceiving and representing the dog as frightening does not necessarily lead me to evaluate that it is.

It is not clear how the representation of some properties could be evaluative. For this reason, I find the attitudinalist account more appropriate because it can better explain the agent's assessment of the subject matter. For attitudinalists, emotions, are not representations of values but are ways of reacting to what we represent, i.e. emotional attitudes are different ways of engaging with what is represented which phenomenology is due to the reaction of what is represented. So, saying that my fear is the reaction to a big black dog means that the reaction in fear is an ongoing engagement with the

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<sup>8</sup> As with any attitude, there is a standard of correctness, e.g. the belief derives the conditions for which the proposition to which it refers is true or false. The same is for the emotion, if it is an attitude, must give rise to conditions of evaluative correctness; my fear of the dog is correct if the dog is scary.

represented big black dog to avoid it. In terms of correctness, the reaction/engagement is correct if and only if what is represented exemplifies the relevant value. The reaction to fear is correct if and only if the big black dog exemplifies being scary.

We saw that representationalists encounter problems claiming that emotions have evaluative correctness. If the correctness condition holds that emotions are correct if and only if the way they evaluate the environment matches the facts, and if the perceptual model fails to define emotions as evaluations, then the perceptual model is unable to hold that emotion is correct or incorrect. Moreover, representationalists will also fail in attributing an epistemological role to emotions, as they will not be able to construct an adequate model to justify evaluative judgments elicited by emotions.

#### 1.3.4 *Justification and Indispensability Claim*

The representationalist account also seems to show weaknesses in justifying the emotions and evaluative judgments they elicit. However, I will first explain why justifying evaluative judgments is an end that these accounts set themselves.

Despite the different positions taken by the different accounts, all agree that emotions are crucial and necessary to access evaluative properties, thus they are epistemologically fundamental to evaluative knowledge. Indeed, if we imagine a creature that is unable to react emotionally, but by observing other people he has learned what properties constitute values. Can we still argue that this creature truly understands what is offensive, sad, and funny if it does not experience objects as such? how can it justify its evaluative judgments?

We can safely conclude that the creature does not know what is sad, funny, or offensive because he lacks emotional responses that would allow him to have access to this evaluative knowledge because he couldn't know what is funny when he never experienced amusement.

They generally promote the *Indispensability Claim*; emotions are indispensable for evaluative knowledge. However, to declare emotion as a source of evaluative knowledge requires addressing specific epistemological challenges. Philosophers propose models that can guarantee the justification of the evaluative judgment elicited by emotions, namely find evidence in favor of an evaluative judgment.

In order to argue that evaluative correct judgments are true, and thus are evaluative knowledge, one must find a way to justify these judgments. To justify in the

epistemological sense means to bring out the evidence and reasons for such a judgment. Representationalists try to convey the justification by basing their model on *Emotional Dogmatism*<sup>9</sup>; emotions justify evaluative judgment because they make us aware of the evaluative features of the environment that make the relevant evaluative judgments true. It follows an internalist justification; the emotion has immediate access to the evaluative features, and this immediacy allows us to ground the judgment (Döring, 2007). However, this immediateness is suspicious. The parallel between emotion and perception seems to be far-fetched. As opposed to perception, an emotion requires cognitive bases. For instance, to feel indignation towards a social injustice reported in the newspaper, I need those cognitive abilities required in reading. Cognitive bases are necessary to bring the content. Even though, *Emotional Dogmatism* could seem prima facie a solution, it is no longer evident when we include the role of cognitive bases. So, proving that emotions do not enjoy this immediacy, typical of perception, it is no longer possible to claim that emotions justify the evaluative judgment.

Conversely, the *Simple View* claims that emotions play a mediating role because they react to the content provided by the cognitive bases, and they elicit evaluative judgments (Deonna & Teroni, 2022a). This mediating role of emotions seems to lead to a *Dispensability Claim* of emotions for two reasons. Firstly, If the cognitive bases provide evaluative judgments, then it is easy to think that emotions no longer have this epistemologically indispensable role. In other words, to be amused by a joke, I have to judge it as funny. Justified emotions presuppose evaluative knowledge. Secondly if the cognitive are evaluative judgments, they steal the show from emotions, as they become responsible for the evaluative uptake. The role of cognitive bases appears to exclude emotions from the acquisition of evaluative knowledge.

However, *Simple View* succeeds in showing that maintaining the cognitive basis with these two roles will not threaten the indispensability of emotions. Meanwhile, different alternatives try to give the role to emotions to justify the evaluative judgment in order to claim their epistemological indispensability, but these attempts are shown to be redundant since the cognitive bases already justify the evaluative judgment. *Simple View* takes another direction; emotions are indispensable for evaluative knowledge since they

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<sup>9</sup> *Emotional Dogmatism* takes its inspiration from *Dogmatism of Perception*, a theory of epistemology that holds that perceptual experiences are capable of justifying beliefs. (see. Pryor, 2000)

can make us aware of the relevant evidence. For instance, Marco feels indignant to see a boy deliberately setting a cat on fire. Marco's indignation does not provide further evidence of the judgment that the boy is cruel. Nonetheless, feeling indignant allowed Marco to access evaluative knowledge, namely that the boy's action is cruel. If he had not reacted with indignation, Marco could not have learned of the cruelty. From this example, we can identify three roles of emotions (Deonna & Teroni, 2022b). Firstly, emotions in respect to evaluative knowledge, are indispensable because they give access to evidence for evaluative knowledge. Secondly, thanks to the access provided by emotions, they allow us to ground in our awareness evaluative judgment. The attentional processes are emotionally driven, helping us to modulate and draw attention to the relevant features of the situation, and thus guaranteeing the apprehension of the relevant features in complex situations. Finally, emotions are crucial for understanding a value. Emotions serve as a compass in the complex evaluative categorization of objects, as these numbers and constellations of natural properties are experienced in emotions, guiding the application of evaluative concepts. Marco's experience of indignation allows him to categorize the action of the boy as cruel. In a nutshell, evaluative categorization would be emotionally driven. Emotions are tightly connected with the evaluative concept by experiencing them and therefore giving us the conditions to understand them. Saying that Marco categorizes the boy as cruel is not detachable from Marco's understanding that there is evidence in favor of the relevant emotions, i.e. indignation. Although cognitive bases play an indispensable role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge, the attitudinal view does justice to emotion by attributing to it an epistemological indispensability that differs from the role of cognitive bases.

Compared to other theories, attitudinalist theory seems to be better able to respond to the challenges that emotions pose. Arguing that emotions are specific bodily experiences towards something allows us to keep both the phenomenological and intentional components in balance. Moreover, the addition of the cognitive basis does not discredit the importance of emotion, although the former justifies evaluative judgments, emotions play a crucial role in evaluative knowledge. In conclusion, unlike the other theories, the attitudinalist model proposes a definition of emotion that can satisfy intentional, phenomenological, and epistemological constraints.

## 2 In Defense of Emotions

Although the *Indispensability View* is well accepted in contemporary philosophy of mind. Some accounts still resist the appropriateness of certain emotions, as well as their potential epistemological function. For instance, many contemporary philosophers claim that anger could never be fitting and moral as any kind of pro-anger reason is not accepted, and thus can never be considered appropriate. (Pettigrove, 2012; Nussbaum, 2015)

Some theories support moral and/or prudent relationships within the emotion-value relationship, thus defining some emotions as inappropriate. Neglecting an epistemological relationship of fittingness between emotion and value which cannot argue that an emotion is naturally inappropriate.

In the second part, I will argue that anger can be fitting and appropriate, as opposed to some philosophical account that still resists the appropriateness of certain emotions, as well as their potential epistemological function. Starting from reporting the Moralistic fallacy which defends anger from the statement that anger could never be fitting and moral as any kind of pro-anger reason is not accepted, and thus can never be considered appropriate.

Secondly, I will show the aptness of anger which opposes to the critique of counterproductivity. Once deprived of emotions from the fallacies, I am going to explore the so-called outlaw emotions which more than other emotions make it clear that moral, prudential reasons do not contribute to the fittingness of the emotion, and therefore I will show that anger could be an epistemologically and moral and useful tool.

### 2.1 Moralistic Fallacy

My concern is whether we do not have the right to feel an emotion even though this is epistemologically correct. Some philosophers answer by arguing that some emotions are never epistemologically correct and therefore one has no right to feel them. It seems to be by reading different emotions that certain of them were to a certain degree more or less appropriateness, especially if we consider the negative ones. If we take into consideration the distinction between whether some emotions are the right way to feel and whether that feeling gets it right, the situation starts being clearer.

D'Arms and Jacobson (2000) show how philosophers tend to treat the two concepts as if they were the same thing. Taking the main assumption that most philosophers agree with, emotions involve evaluative presentation, regardless of whether it is a matter of “perception”, “attitude” or “judgment”, they claim that emotion is correct/fitting if and only if the emotion correctly represents its object. Being amused is correct/fitting if and only if the joke is funny. In other words, the wrongness of being amused by a joke says to us that the joke is not actually funny; being amused by a racist joke is unfitting because if the joke is offensive, it would be wrong to feel amused. This claim identifies the wrongness with the correctness/fittingness of the emotions. However, the wrongness or rightness concerns a moral question of whether it is right or not to feel amused by a racist joke. The wrongness of rightness is not questioning the correctness/fittingness of the emotion that is whether the emotions are correct/fitting in the sense relevant to whether the joke is funny. Briefly, moral, and prudential reasons are irrelevant to the correctness/fittingness of the emotions. Indeed, we are addressing the question of whether an emotion is presenting the object with certain values, not whether it is good or bad for me to not feel that emotion, or whether it is right or not to feel it. In this matter, imagine the following scenario: a woman is harassed verbally by a man in a street, it is late at night, and the street is deserted. It would be counterproductive to manifest her anger because the man could react badly, he could physically hurt her, and additionally, there would be nobody to help her. These practical and prudential reasons do not count as evidence in favor of the fact that the man’s gesture was not offensive. Likewise, moral reason does not say anything about the fitting object; the wrongness or rightness to feel emotion is irrelevant to the justification of the evaluative judgment.

## **2.2 Counterproductive View**

For the same reasons explained by D'Arms and Jacobson, a long tradition supports the counterproductivity of certain emotions; for example, the expression ‘you should not add fuel to the fire’ means that your anger would make things worse such that there would be sufficient prudential reasons not to get angry. Again, this prudential view seems not to distinguish prudential reasons from fittingness ones; in case of a moral violation, the victim should not get angry for counterproductive reasons because it would not erase the offending act, which has already occurred, and it would incite violence and hatred. However explains that these reasons external to the emotion have no impact on

the correctness of the emotion, nevertheless in some situations; emotions may be appropriate for the situation, but still counterproductive. For example, my anger is apt because it is in response to an injustice, yet my anger would endanger the lives of myself and my family (2018). Srinivasan defines this situation as affective injustice because there is a normative conflict; the victim must choose whether to become angry to seek change in the world or choose to sacrifice anger for his or her own good and that of his or her family. Thus, the victim of systematic oppression is subject to two injustices, the social and the affective/normative. Moreover, the normative conflict that the victim feels not only shifts the focus from the unjust situation but also shifts the responsibility from the perpetrator to the victim, as prudent considerations force the victim to make a difficult decision.

It follows a policy of *letting go*, suggesting avoidance strategies, in which the responsibility falls on the victim and not on the offender since the victim cannot be angry for prudential reasons it is suggested to avoid those situations that could trigger anger. For instance, it suggests women not to dress seductively, and not go out alone at night to not be harassed. The policy of prudence is to act concretely to avoid danger because in any case anger would make things worse. In addition, considerations of prudent reasons risk falling into misconception; for example, the victim is responsible for avoiding such injustice. anger is the appropriate and suitable emotional response to moral wrongdoing; if this is put out of action, it will be difficult to tackle injustice.

Srinivasan, like D'Arms and Jacobson, realizes that these reasons promoted by the counterproductive critique, are not related to the apt of anger, as they are extrinsic reasons and not intrinsic to anger. Even though sometimes practical, moral, and prudential reason coincidentally seems to be relevant to the fittingness of the emotion, they actually do not have the supremacy to justify or not justify the evaluative judgment. So the moralistic fallacy argues that moral reasons do not contribute to and justify the evaluative judgment, in that laughing at black humor is immoral and therefore the joke is not funny. When in fact it does not question whether the joke is actually funny or not. Extrinsic reasons for emotions are not reasons that have to justify power over evaluative judgments. In conclusion, the moralist fallacy and the counterproductive view are examples of confusion on the normative level where different reasons are used interchangeably, precisely moral and prudential reasons are wrongly substituted for the reason correctness. Moreover, confusing extrinsic reasons with intrinsic ones also creates misconceptions

regarding the evaluative properties of the situation. Since these reasons do not elucidate the concept of value, they lead to misinterpretations, as we have seen in the case of counterproductive criticism. Moralistic and prudential fallacies have the necessary tools for me to explore and understand the different theories of anger which I will present in the next part of the thesis.

### **2.3 Outlaw Emotions**

However, this distinction between feeling the right way and feeling the right way is clear in the case of outlaw emotions, as they seem to rebel against these moral or prudential considerations. Indeed, the outlaw emotion is a particular emotion that emerges when the extrinsic and intrinsic reasons are in conflict. “Outlaw emotions are emotions that stand in tension with a large set of an agent’s beliefs.” (Silva, 2021a, p. 664). This type of emotion is peculiar because it is not only in conflict with one belief but with a wider belief system. Indeed, they occur in specific contexts; they are more frequent under conditions of oppression since agents are more likely to internalize the dominant ideology and morality of social oppression.

Laura Silva imagines the scenario of a woman experiencing an outlaw emotion; Raquel was born and raised in a sexist society in which sexual harassment was normalized due to a society that legitimizes the sexualization and objectification of the female body. Close friends and relatives think that harassment is not an aggression, rather they see it, instead, as a compliment. One night, Raquel decides to go out with her friends, at a moment a stranger squeezes her body, he smiles at her as if inviting her to talk to him. Some friends felt excited and invited her to go to talk to him. Others felt jealous because they wanted to be squeezed too. While Raquel felt strong discomfort and disgust, she had the impression that the gesture was not good. However, she also felt confusion about her reactions since she knows that she should feel flattered according to her internalized beliefs: squeezing the body without consent is interpreted as a compliment. She should interpret the gesture as something flattery, and thus be excited by it. Indeed, if we look through the eyes of the sexist society, there are no reasons that justify Raquel’s anger and discomfort; it is wrong to feel angry at the man’s action because it is not offensive.

Following the moralistic fallacy, in this case, the wrongness of feeling anger is evidence of the fact that the squeezing is inoffensive. However, these are reasons that are related to the wrongness or rightness of feeling those emotions and therefore they are not

related to the fittingness of her emotions. As D'Arms and Jacobson suggested, the wrongness of feeling amused by a black humor joke does not bring any evidence to the fact the joke was not funny. In this case, when I use the term 'wrongness', I refer to the morality as the set of values and principles that define what is good and bad in a specific culture. In Raquel's context, morality/culture is provided by a gender-oppressive ideology according to which Raquel's anger towards the stranger, who squeezed her body, is wrong. However, her judgment that what the man did was not good, is still justified because her anger gives evidence in favor of it.

although the subject considers moral and/or prudent reasons, the outlaw emotions provide us reasons that concern correctness which stand in conflict with the other reasons. Laura Silva suggests in this sense that emotions could play an important epistemological role, that is, in these cases, emotions are more reliable compared to our belief system, in the sense that emotions can give us insights into current reality. It is important to clarify that we are talking about extraordinary, hopefully, cases. We are considering a context of oppression where the agent must internalize beliefs and values that are not compatible with what is reality, otherwise, the conflict given by outlaw emotions would not exist.

It might be objected that these people have internalized a dominant ideology and should be the least reliable people and thus also their evaluative judgment. However, internalizing dominant beliefs does not mean that girls like Raquel cannot experience offensive situations. A wide feminist philosophic literature well documents that in an oppressive society, it is more likely that the victims are more aware of such oppression compared to the privileged ones. Indeed, they are in a better epistemological position to gain knowledge about the oppression compared to the privileged members of the group for three main reasons (Medina, 2013; pp. 56–89).

Firstly, oppressed subjects are more likely to be humbler due to their position which is always considered inferior compared to the privileged. For this reason, they are more prone to question their cognitive deficits and limitations, facilitating the learning process. Secondly, because of their social position, they are motivated to gain knowledge to avoid the harmful side of oppression: try to anticipate the dynamic and understand the mechanism of oppression. In a third stance, for the same reason, they attempt to assume the point of view of the perpetrator to avoid stigmatization, punishment, etc.... This understanding of others' perspectives enables oppressed subjects to develop an open mind, which ultimately guarantees the plasticity to understand and to imagine different

alternative perspectives, also called by Medina, *kaleidoscopic consciousness*. This means that members of the oppressed group are more reliable than privileged at generating true beliefs related to the oppression condition as they are in a better position to gain knowledge. Finally, occupying that particular social position gives them the condition to track particular reasons through an emotional experience, therefore they have the chance to develop more emotionally sensitive.

However, for Laura Silva outlaw emotion justifies evaluative judgment, but as we have seen before justified emotions presuppose evaluative judgment. Evaluative judgment is justified by cognitive bases, as they provide the intentional object to emotion. However, *externalist reliabilism* is not to be dismissed at the time he suits with the attitudinal account; all of the reasons listed by *externalist reliabilism* are compatible and not in conflict with the theory. Due to their position, these people are inclined to experience more certain emotional experiences that allow them to access the evidence that society is abusive and socially unjust. So, outlaw emotion is not the evidence of the fact that society is oppressive, but it is the avenue of access to this evidence. Indeed, the philosopher Jaggar (1989) defines the epistemic role of outlaw emotions as an instrumental and indirect tool for acquiring knowledge. This account claims that outlaw emotions motivate the agent to inquire. Since this kind of emotion for its unconventional nature would be represented to us as confusing, they drive us to understand the motivations and reasons for these emotions. The role is thought of as instrumental and therefore indirect in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. In the case of Raquel, the evaluative assessment ‘what the man did is not good’ is provided by an inquiry motivated by emotion, but by not emotion itself.

Nevertheless, Jaggar seems to be too strict, as the epistemological function attributed to outlaw emotion is research motivation. It would be to add that, research motivation is still possible since outlaw emotion allows access to the evidence of the situation. In Raquel's case, it would be impossible to come to evaluative knowledge, that is, ‘what the man did is not good’ without her experiencing outlaw emotion. In conclusion, emotions give us access to the evidence of a reality that is devoid of prudential and moralistic reasons, precisely because these do not give foundation and evidence to the ‘what the man did is not good’.

The reason I reported this kind of emotion is because in my view its phenomenology is a direct experience of this normative conflict between reasons called

affective injustice. The subject who experiences this emotion may feel destabilized because the emotion is pitted against internalized norms, ideologies, beliefs and hence the name *outlaw* emotion.

### **3 Anger a White Weapon?**

The previous part allowed me to have the tools to understand the difference between those who argue that this anger is intrinsically wrong and inappropriate, and those who argue for the existence of correct and appropriate anger.

This part aims to explore deeply how anger can be fitting and appropriate, especially in an oppressive context. So, I will begin by defining what is an oppression and what are its characteristics, showing through a cognitive behavioral theory how and why oppressive societies are reinforced. As opposed to some contemporary philosophers, I will argue that anger is the most suitable and appropriate tool to fight against forms of oppression. Although anger has been stereotyped as it is considered especially not appropriate to fight against racism or other forms of oppression, I will first report which factors, identified by Laura Silva, make anger appropriate and not. Secondly, I will describe and analyze inappropriate rages and appropriate rages identified by Myisha Cherry. Finally, I am going to report two cases which according to me are representative of fitting and appropriate and unfitting and inappropriate anger.

#### **3.1 Context and Background of Anger**

Since we are referring to emotions that seem to be unjustifiable, as in the case of anger, I would like to analyze these emotions in contexts where their appropriateness is shown to be more evident. In ordinary, everyday life circumstances, anger is usually less frequent and less intense than in circumstances of systemic oppression.

Oppression occurs in those circumstances where members of a group enjoy more power and privilege than members of another group; the privilege is used to maintain the imbalance and inequality among the groups (David & Derthick, 2013). Typically, the dominant group tends to exploit their power and privilege in order to impose their ideology on the oppressed group, that is establishing to the latter the role, their identity, their work, and their lifestyle. These imposed choices ultimately lead to internalizing them. For instance, in a gender-oppressed society, the role of a woman was limited to the domestic walls, this leads the woman to internalize that this is her role, believing that she is not suited to any kind of task outside domesticity.

However, some philosophers still resist giving legitimacy and appropriateness to anger even in the most extreme contexts described above. They argue the wrong intrinsic

nature of anger. Nussbaum (2015) adheres traditional perspective on anger. She defines it as a desire for revenge and retribution, i.e. an angry person wants the perpetrators to suffer in return for the pain. Hence, anger would be immoral since it is a desire for revenge, it would be also irrational and counterproductive since paying back for the offense does not delete what happened and does not change what the offender did. So, the retributive nature of anger seems not to legitimize any actions motivated by this emotion; anger is also always an inappropriate tool to fight against social injustice, discrimination, and oppression because in any case, it would lead to immoral, irrational, and counterproductive outcomes.

This negative image of anger is well-radicalized in our culture, many stories in literature portray anger as destructive towards others and oneself. It is not only in philosophy but also in general culture that this emotion has always been the victim of negative preconceptions. Just think about the famous scene of Achilles' rage in the epic poem "Iliad" by Homer; Achilles gets angry because his commander, Agamemnon, unfairly takes his spoils of war. Achilles, furious, decides to withdraw from the army, knowing that his absence would cost a lot for the army as he is endowed with divine strength. Without going into the details of the story, Achilles' rage has tragic consequences: the death of many Greeks in the army, the death of his best Patroclus, and his death.

As the philosopher Myisha Cherry (2021; p. 1–9) claims, the character of Achilles brings the stereotypical image of anger. Indeed, if we have to think of a furious person, we will tend to imagine violent people, physical aggression, or out-of-control actions, completely irrational and deplorable. People are more afraid of angry reactions towards racism compared to the racism itself, as this emotion is considered dangerous. She says that anger, unlike the rest of emotions, has no nuance and no upside; "*This generalized, one-dimensional, broad-strokes depiction of anger was first painted by ancient thinkers and is perpetuated by contemporary psychologists and philosophers.*" (Cherry, 2021; p.11)

If we consider other emotions, we notice that we are better able to discriminate different facets. For example, we can think about love in different ways, love could be unconditioned, erotic, friendly, and so forth. We are all well aware of these differences, we know well what distinguishes loves from each other; we know that erotic love would be unfitting in a family context (or at least in our society). Let's take into consideration

another emotion such as sadness; there are different types of sadness, such as nostalgia, melancholy, grief, and heartbreak. They are distinguishable from each other because they occur in different situations and have different phenomenological features e.g. nostalgia has a low intensity and is linked to the past, whereas heartbreak has a higher intensity and is linked to the current situation, and we would know when these would be non-fitting for the situation.

For anger, all this lucidity would seem to disappear, on every occasion it would seem unfitting despite the evidence of offensiveness, as in the case of oppression. The lack of a more nuanced conception of anger leads us to a mental rigidity where anger is understood as explosive and destructive. So it would seem obvious to think that anger is not fitting on any occasion. When anger is different, it can respond proportionally to the severity of the wrongdoing. As with love, anger can be understood both as vindication, but also as indignation, as a desire for justice and recognition. In this regard, Laura Silva and Myisha Cherry bring to light the heterogeneity of anger.

### **3.2 Revenge and Recognition**

Laura Silva (2021) proposes an alternative view on the nature of anger, exploring different facets of this emotion. She claims that anger might be also the desire for recognition and not only the desire for revenge. Suppose that your sister is stressed about her university exams; she gets frustrated, and she treats you badly; insulting you. You are angry with your sister because she insulted you without any reason, and you were her scapegoat. Would you still define your anger towards your sister as a desire for revenge, or a desire to hurt her? Or would you rather define it as desiring her to recognize her offending act?

As the author suggests this would be a case where anger is a desire to make your sister recognize her mistake rather than your desire for revenge. In other words, you want her to understand which properties of her actions have merited my anger. Indeed, your desire is satisfied as soon as your sister realizes that her behavior has been harmful to you, thus paying back would not be necessary.

In this case, the role of anger is a sort of feedback, it is an alternative form of communication. I argue that it is an alternative form of communication because it conveys an evaluative type of knowledge in the message. By manifesting, in a non-violent way, my anger, I show that your gesture was offensive; displaying my anger would be a witness

to your offensive gesture as it is reporting the evidence of it. Expressing anger makes the evidence accessible that the situation is offensive leading the offender to recognize his act as offensive, and thus recognize also the offended person's anger as appropriate. In this case, the anger is not punitive or retributive, but it wants to achieve recognition and respect, that's why this type of rage does not end in counterproductive, violent, and destructive outcomes, thus it could be an appropriate way to fight against offensive situations.

Moreover, Silva does not only recognize the existence of a different rage than a retributive one, but she also identifies its conditions. She argues that anger as a desire for recognition is moderated<sup>10</sup> by the changeability of the situation. The changeability of the situation depends on the perceived changeability of the target. If offenders are evaluated by the offended as capable of change, it is more plausible that anger is a desire for recognition. If there is no margin of change of the situation perceived, then one will tend to use violence rather than diplomatic manners, since more abrupt manners would have a stronger impact.

However, the changeability of the situation does not only depend on the offender's perception, but also on the offended person's perception; if the offended person perceives himself as being able to change the situation, then he will use more diplomatic methods, as he feels he is sufficient to change. Conversely, if the offended does not think he has the ability to change the situation, then he will tend to engage in violent and destructive acts.

How does the perception of changeability relate to the desire for recognition? The offended person would like to change the situation so that it is no longer offensive; to do this, the offender must recognize the offensiveness and his responsibility. If the offender does not recognize this, he will continue to engage in those actions that contribute to the offensiveness, that is why the offended desires the recognition. In contrast to the punitive, the desire for recognition motivates the will to communicate the reasons for anger. Making the reasons for the anger shareable enables the target of the anger to recognize the situation as offensive, and unfair.

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<sup>10</sup> Here the variable 'changeability of the situation is a moderator variable as it influences the strength of the relationship between "anger" and "desire for recognition".

### 3.3 Shades of Rage

Like Silva, Cherry gives a more nuanced view of anger, identifying different types of anger. Cherry identifies characteristics that make anger appropriate and inappropriate. Indeed, she carries out this distinction based on the target, action tendency, aim, and perspective that informs the anger. By the term ‘target’ she refers to whom the emotion is directed; by ‘aim’, she alludes to what a person desires to achieve through anger. She uses the term ‘action tendency’ to refer to the tendency to behave in a certain way, and ultimately by ‘perspective’, she means from which attitude or way of thinking the anger comes. Given these notions, she distinguishes five different natures of anger (Cherry, 2021: pp.1-23).

#### 3.3.1 *Inappropriate Rages*

The first one is called *rogue rage*; it usually manifests as anger towards everybody because one could feel marginalized, not considered, and isolated by the general society, this is felt by the person as injustice. As we can immediately see the blurry target; this rage is not referring to a particular institution or members of a group, but it is just blaming anyone for the injustice. Thinking that everybody is against them leads them to isolate themselves from society, trying to build a reality where there are people with the same rage to feel understood. Indeed, this action tendency to isolate themselves explains why they do not want to find a solution or to change something, as the aim is not changing the world, but rather to hit back at the world for the supposed injustice it has been inflicted. Indeed, here, we can see anger in the retributive sense advocated by Martha Nussbaum. The *rogue rage* has no aim, the target is mostly blurry, and the tendency action is completely passive because this anger comes from a nihilistic perspective. If they do not have hope to change things for the better, why should they bother themselves to find a solution? If they do not have a meaning in their life, how could they build an aim to achieve? The nihilistic attitude also explains the reason why people who experience this anger are prone to act violently and randomly because they want just to provoke. Not by chance, in the nihilistic perspective of *rogue rage* we do not find Silva's identified moderator, i.e., the lack of ‘changeability’ toward both outgroup and ingroup transforms rage into a desire for revenge rather than recognition.

The second variation of anger is *wipe rage*; people, who feel this rage, usually experience real injustices that come from the negligence of the government such as

economic disparities and so forth. However their rage is misdirected; their targets are scapegoats, and they blame others for their injustice, and not the government's policies. For instance, in lots of countries, unemployed local people blame immigrants who 'steal the job', when the immigrants are not the cause of their unemployment. The scapegoat represents the easiest and most superficial 'solution', these people will tend to remove the right to work or vote for anti-immigrant policies. The logic underlying this reasoning is that if the fault is the presence of immigrants, then we should wipe out them, causing them social death to deprive them of their rights, in the immigrant case the right to work. However, this is not a solution, since the injustice is not due to immigration, therefore besides being immoral, it would also be counterproductive. This rage comes from the perspective that immigrants could not enjoy the same goods and rights without taking them away from others. This way of thinking could not include a win-win situation, consequently, the only solution is to make the other lose to be the winner.

The third rage identified by Cherry is the *ressentiment rage*; members of oppressed groups are prone to feel these emotions; more precisely the resentment rage is directed toward all the members of the group in power. This anger leads them to act reactively e.g. in order not to feel insecure, I have to consider the other inferior; to be self-respected, I have to disrespect others. On the contrary, being active means trying to create a world where they could have the same rights and maintain their values. For example, African Americans could be angry at all white people because they hold power, and to feel superior they want to take power away from white people. This aim comes from the fact they consider the white person a standard to be followed, as white people have rights and privileges that Afro-Americans do not have. Not by chance, this is prominent in colonized countries, where colonized people have the unconscious tendency to prefer colonizer things and to reject their culture. (David & Okazaki, 2010). The action tendency of resentment would not lead to a non-offensive situation, but by taking away the dominant power, they would repeat the unjust situation.

Another variation of anger is *narcissistic rage* where the target is people who target you. For example, if someone insults you, you proclaim your high status quo in the social hierarchy to delegitimize the target. In other words, narcissistic rage does not come from offensive gestures (the insults) but rather it comes from the fact that they should not insult you due to your high position. In other words, the gesture is offensive to you, but for the others that you consider inferior is not offensive. So their tendency action is to

proclaim and reiterate their position. Naturally, the aim is neither to change nor to defend everyone that is insulted, but rather is do justice only for you. The perspective that informs the narcissistic rage is self-enhance; I get angry because, I am more important than others, and cannot accept such an offensive gesture. Moreover, narcissistic rage is a way to feel the power you hold towards others, deciding what is offensive to whom. In all these cases, emotions are unfitting since they fail to detect the real injustice. Justice should be inclusive and thus involve a win-win perspective for this reason the action tendencies of these rages are inappropriate to change the situation since they believe in an exclusive justice. Therefore, Cherry not only identifies the unfittingness of these rages due to a failure to tackle the injustice but also the inappropriateness as the action tendencies includes harming someone.

Considering these rages, I would therefore agree with Martha Nussbaum, since these rages seem to desire not justice, but injustice towards certain groups.

However, the situation is not that pessimistic, as the last rage found by Cherry gives us hope in this emotion.

### 3.3.2 *Appropriate Rage*

Cherry calls this last rage the *Lordean rage*, named so to honor Audre Lorde, a black activist woman, and author of numerous poems and books, not least legitimizing the use of anger to fight racism. To better understand this rage, we need to enter more in detail; Lorde defines racism as the belief to be superior as belonging to a specific race compared to others, and thus the belief to have the right to exercise power over other races. So, the *Lordean rage* is that rage that is directed at racism, and thus it is fitting, as opposed to the rage described above that they fail to identify the real offensiveness. That is why this rage is morally, politically, and epistemically useful. Indeed, this rage does not need to be replaced by other emotions or to change something, it is the best option to fight racism as it is fitting and appropriate, let's why.

The aim is to change, thus does not include wiping out the members of oppressive groups or taking away their power. It is the desire for change to have a win-win situation where there is no racist belief, policies, or attitude that makes the racist existing.

Secondly, the action tendency is featured by the feeling to act for a better world, where freedom and justice are inclusive. This rage is coming from the capacity to recognize that racism is bad for everybody, and thus a society without racism is better for

everybody. This perspective is different from the one of *wipe rage* and *narcissism rage*, because the latter justice concerns only them, remaining indifferent to others' suffering, while the former promotes a freedom that inclusive and not exclusive. In the case of Lordean rage we can find the moderators of the 'changeability of the target' and 'ability of the oppressed to change' as they coincide with the target and the action tendency, making the Lordean Rage also from Silva's perspective appropriate.

In conclusion, both Silva and Cherry do not argue that anger is always appropriate and fitting since their intention is not to reduce anger to one dimension but rather to explore the different conditions that make anger fitting and appropriate. For Silva, anger is fitting and appropriate when it is a desire for recognition that is moderated by the changeability perceived in the situation.

Instead, for Cherry, appropriate and fitting rage is *Lordean rage*, which has its own action tendency, target, aim, and perspective, if they are respected makes rage fitting and appropriate. So that, if at least one of these criteria is not met, the anger in question is no longer Lordean's, but turns into an inappropriate one. Moderators based on the perception of changeability identified by Silva would also seem to explain Lordean rage since it aims at changing the situation. Indeed, as Cherry suggests, this type of anger gives self-belief and optimism to the offended person, enabling him to act proactively (Cherry, 2021; pp. 61–92).

Although Cherry and Silva call this appropriate anger differently, it is clear that both have brought to light that anger when it is properly directed at injustice is characterized by a tendency to pro-active action to change the situation. If anger is improperly directed towards injustice, as in the case of the anger identified by Cherry, it will be characterized by a tendency towards actions that do not imply change, but to preserve injustice that is favorable to them.

### **3.4 Angry People**

Having established the necessary conditions for fitting and appropriate anger, it seems appropriate to me to present some cases that in my opinion are representative. With the theoretical tools provided by Cherry and Silva, I will first analyze the case of Frederick Douglass and then the case reported by Hochschild in 'Stranger in Their Own Land'.

Let us begin to see more concretely what cases are attributed to Lordean Rage or Anger as a desire for recognition, and instead those cases where anger is retributive.

#### 3.4.1 *Fitting and Appropriate Angry People*

A representative case of Lordean Rage and anger as the desire for recognition is the life of Frederick Douglass (Bell, 2009). He was born into slavery in 1818 and is remembered in African American history for his important contribution to the battle for equal rights. In 1872, he was the first African-American candidate for United States Vice President. Before becoming a leader of the abolitionist movement, he was a slave and rented out to Edward Covey, who was known to be nasty and violent to the slaves. One day, Douglas got angry and resisted one of the cruel attacks of Mr. Covey, and he decided to change his life. Douglas found the self-confidence and dignity to pursue the path of freedom. This episode of anger was crucial, because it enabled him to recognize his oppression and self-respect, motivating him to fight against social injustices. He started to take part in abolitionist society where he had the opportunity to speak in public, denouncing and witnessing the cruelty of slavery. In this context, Douglass met the white abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison who remembered Douglass's rhetorical skills and the influencing and energizing anger with which he spoke. (Lepoutre, 2021; pp. 49-82) The emotion gave him insight into reality. Douglass's case mirrors that of *Lordean Rage*, where his rage is properly directed towards systematic racism, thus in this case the target is epistemologically and correctly represented ensuring then the fittingness of the emotion. Second, action tendency is characterized by a willingness to act to change the situation, as in this case participating and being part of an abolitionist party and engaging in public speaking. From Douglass' perspective, he knows that freedom exists if and only if it is inclusive, and since racism promises freedom only to whites, we have reasons to fight it. This tendency action can be also explained through the moderator of 'changeability of target' and 'ability of the oppressed to change', as Douglass reached the self-confidence and dignity to fight against racism, additionally, he was not only convinced that he could change the situation but also that the situation would be changed. Indeed, as predicted by the presence of the moderators in angry contexts, Douglass does not engage in violent forms, but in diplomatic forms to promote freedom. So for both Silva and Cherry, Douglass's case is appropriate; in fact, it makes itself epistemologically

correct for tackling injustice, and politically and morally useful, since it is endowed with an action tendency that promotes change.

### 3.4.2 *Unfitting and Inappropriate Angry People*

A representative case of inappropriate anger is the one reported by Arlie Russel Hochschild (2016) in the book “Strangers in their Own Land”. It is an interesting case as it is a current and real situation in the USA. Moreover, it represents the political split in the US, and how anger is a political emotion that has a big impact on people. Arlie Russel Hochschild is an important American sociologist who was interested in how Republicans feel, which emotion underlies politics. As she declares, for her was really hard to understand these people; there was a wall preventing empathy from understanding their worldview. This wall is represented by what she calls the *Great Paradox*; ‘Across the country, red states are poorer and have more teen mothers, more divorce, worse health, more obesity, more trauma-related deaths, more low-birth-weight babies and lower school enrollment.’ (Hochschild, 2016, p. 8) and at the same time they are against a federal government; they do not vote for political programs that incentivize subsidies and relief services for the poor, but rather vote for politicians who go invest in the already rich and powerful top 1 percent. The only way to know and understand how people on the right feel, and what the emotions underlie politics, she decided to go to the heart of right-wing America for five years, living, and sharing daily life and conversations with these people.

The *leitmotif* of the conversation between Hochschild and the locals is the environment and its pollution. The local people remembered major environmental disasters due to the presence of large oil companies and other private chemical companies that are responsible for legal and illegal emissions of noxious gases, emissions of toxic waste. She reports an interview with a person who worked for 15 years in one such private company. He witnessed that employers did not ensure good and safe working conditions which caused serious physical health problems. He had to work with dangerous substances with bare hands. The exposure to these substances aggravated his mental health, the company gave no medical assistance, and they fired him for absenteeism. He declared that he was responsible for dumping toxic and illegal waste of the company into the local waters contaminating the waters and the floras in a wide area. The government declared a warning to residents not to swim, not to fish, not to play water sports. The

problem was that those waters represented a big profit for the local economy. Indeed, many workers in the fishing industry, such as fishermen, restaurants, and supermarkets were furious with the government restrictions because it meant, less work and therefore less profit, a proper *killer job*. Unfortunately, this was neither the first nor the last case of these environmental disasters, the lack of safety control caused other serious accidents that led to the death of workers and the destruction of the ecosystem. Faced with these events, the federal government decided to promote new programs to clean up the environment and to establish new restrictive regulations for these private companies to avoid future accidents and health damage to residents. Residents with a Republican political orientation, aware of the guilt of these private businesses, were still angry with the federal government. From their perspective, they felt abandoned by the government, and unsupported, because instead of giving more jobs and thus more money, they would only increase taxes. On the contrary, these big companies represented carriers of work, of economy and now the government-regulated restriction would lead to less work.

The reason I decided to report this case reported by Hochschild, is because, in my opinion, this is a good example of unfitting and inappropriate rage. Let's analyze this case. First of all, the target as we can see is incorrect, they blame the federal government for their conditions, as their anger responds to the belief that the federal state wants to take away jobs by incentivizing restrictions on these private sectors, and thus also diminishing the free market. However, the government represents the scapegoat, because these private companies are the real blame-worthy and thus anger-worthy for these environmental disasters which lead to a necessary intervention by the federal government. The action tendency and the aim, however, seem to be a mix of rogue and wipe and resentment, because they tend to create a kind of political enclave, trying to include people who support their ideas, feeding the strong sense of injustice. They create political parties whose aspiration is to take as much power away from the federal government as possible to have more local power that has no restrictions of some kind on the market. From their perspective, the federal government does nothing but take money, imposing taxes, placing restrictions on the free market, and thus taking away jobs and thus less profit, by taking this power away from the government, they will have more power of their own. This perspective is similar to that of wipe and resentment in that it is a one-loser and one-winner way of thinking. There is no win-win alternative in which the federal and state governments can work together synergistically.

For the sake of clarity, Hochschild does not report this anger analysis, but rather it is my interpretation of the case. I feel it necessary to say that it is a simplification of a very complex issue. I am not taking sides, my intention is not to angelize the U.S. federal government as these dynamics are beyond my knowledge, much less I do not intend to demonize Republican people. It may be that the federal government has other faults, which are not taken into consideration here. However, it is not my purpose to make a socio-political analysis of the United States.

## 4 The Communicative Nature of Emotions

I have already mentioned thick values are constitutive of a constellation of natural properties in a given circumstance. In the case of racism, being systematically discriminated, and being subject to dominant powers, are all properties that constitute offensiveness. It is important since it is not only a proposition related to the factual world but is also charged with a normative dimension that cannot be transmitted except with thick values.

As Silva has already suggested, in the section on anger as a desire for recognition, anger is a form of communication since it makes evaluative knowledge accessible concerning the situation. Accessibility to evidence that the situation is offensive is an ideal condition for satisfying this desire for recognition and change. Further below, I will argue for this reason that deductive described discourses are not appropriate for these political and social issues since they include only factual knowledge and not evaluative one. How then is anger useful for change through communication? and how this communication must be to be effective? I will answer these questions after establishing whether emotions are communicative.

So, I will first explore the socio-evolutionary hypothesis; according to which emotions are inherently communicative because they represent advantages from a social and evolutionary point of view (Anderson, Guerrero, 1996; Buck, 1994; Fridlund, 1991). Both evolution and socialization strongly influence the experience and the expression of emotion since the latter arises from the biological and environmental socializing interaction.

Then, I will focus on democracy, as it is the form of government that needs cooperation the most due to the existence of heterogeneous citizens. Democracy then to be cooperative has to be inclusive which means that the system has to enable the citizens responsive and participate in political life. I will report the thoughts of philosopher Lepoutre, who points out the role of public speech as they are suitable for divulging evaluative knowledge. We will see the challenges that public speech poses, and how this can be set for transmitting the evaluative knowledge. In this regard, Lepoutre will support the form of communication of an emotionally charged narrative, I will explore its efficiency by comparing it with factual communication. Then, I will explore the structure of the narrative, trying to explain why this form is suitable for transmitting evaluative knowledge. Once it has been established that emotions are communicative and that the

best form of communication to convey evaluative knowledge is narrative, I will show that anger appropriately expressed in a narrative form is a powerful tool, and for this reason, if anger is replaced by another emotion, it would not be effective be substituted with other emotions, as the outcome would be different.

#### **4.1 Socio-evolutionary Hypothesis**

The evolutionary hypothesis claims that emotions evolved in humans because they allowed them to be more adaptive and thus ensured their survival (Anderson & Guerrero, 1983). This hypothesis is supported by the fact that emotions are universally present in the human species; there is a cross-cultural sharing of emotions, called basic emotions whose facial expressions are recognizable across cultures (Ekman & Friesen, 1975).

The socio-evolutionary hypothesis of emotion seeks to explain why emotion represents an advantage for survival. Starting with the fact that living with many other members of the same species was fundamental to man's survival; social organization and collaboration were crucial. Around 400,000 years ago, due to unfavorable conditions, humans had to find new options for foraging, they discovered that more cooperative activities implied more food, and this led humans to be interdependent. Foraging collaboration consisted of a choice of the partner, if one was incompetent to cooperate, it was no longer selected by anyone which meant no food (Tomasello, 2019; pp. 10-42).

What is the role of emotions in cooperation? ‘emotions confer reproductive advantage because they help individuals interact cooperatively with others, minimize rejection, and avoid attack from other group member.’ (Anderson & Guerrero, 1983; p. 51). Emotions guide behavior through social interactions and allow us to integrate into society, responding to the many social demands. For instance, emotions such as guilt and shame are emotions that motivate pro-social behavior and regulate cooperativeness. Children do not only judge others for their cooperativeness, but they are also concerned about how others judge their own cooperativeness. If 3-year-old children transgress, they do not only sympathize with the victim, but they also feel guilty and try to repair the damage, since expressing guilt is a way of repairing the judgment others have, restoring it to a cooperative and moral image of themselves (Tomasello, 2019b; Vaish et al., 2011).

As well as the expression of fear alerts other group members to a potential threat and danger, just as the expression of love and affection indicates a desire for cooperation

and bonding. As for anger, Andersen and Guerrero (1996) claim; “it functions to communicate one’s motivated and perhaps irrational and/or dangerous state to other individuals” (p. 76). Here, I will not discuss again the nature of anger whether it is intrinsically good or bad, as we have already established what the conditions of appropriate anger are.

The emotions are communicative as they display messages for another member of the group. Even the negative ones are just as socially important as the positive ones; as the negative valence does not determine inappropriateness or incorrectness, but only the unpleasantness phenomenology.

Moreover, the principle of emotional communication is also supported by the fact that most of our emotions are elicited by interpersonal experiences. As Buck (1994) suggests, the display of emotions derives both from an emotional motivational system and from being intended and perceived by others. As a matter of fact, the expression of emotions differs whether we are alone or whether we are in the presence of other people. For example, we tend to smile and wince in a more accentuated way in front of others compared to when we are alone (Planalp, 1996). Let’s take a daily life situation: if we watch a comic movie, we will laugh more in the presence of other people compared to if we watch it alone (Fridlund, 1991). This leads us to think that emotions are not only expressive reactions but also, but also play a face-to-face communicative role.

It must be pointed out that emotions are not necessarily only experienced in social or interpersonal contexts, but also privately and alone. However, it must be admitted that most of our emotions are more aroused in interpersonal contexts compared to intrapersonal contexts.

To sum up, as the social-evolutionary hypothesis argues, emotions are inherently communicative, their display seems to be important at the social level. The next section is devoted to showing how emotions can be an effective tool in a democratic society. Specifically, it will look at public discourses aimed at the transmission of social and evaluative knowledge and how emotions play a crucial role.

## **4.2 Democratic Communication**

When we think of a democracy, we normally imagine a government that seeks to represent the people with its majorities and minorities, where everyone has the same rights. All citizens therefore have the opportunity and the right to denounce social

injustices, violence, demagoguery, and generally social systems that exclude minorities. In the contemporary age, a culture of public speaking has developed in the democratic tradition to such an extent that it has even become a political symbol and synonym for a well-functioning democracy.

Many philosophers consider inclusive public speech epistemologically and morally fundamental (Cherry, 2021; Silva 2021b, Lepoutre, 2021 pp. 15–48). As for the epistemic point of view, it is an excellent tool, as public discourse is the space and occasion in which communication of different experiences takes place since within a democracy there are so many different social positions. Hence, public speech is a way to impart experiences and thus enable perspective-taking of those people who belong to a different social position. Many social problems only impact one type of group and therefore only members of this one is visible, as the rest of the population of democracy has never encountered. For example, in Italy as in other countries, a former cancer patient, who can consider himself cured, encounters enormous social difficulties. These people have few possibilities of accessing financing, mortgages, financial services, insurance policies, sports activities, employment, etc. Although cured persons do not represent a threat to banks, former cancer patients still suffer exclusion from ordinary services. People, who have never had cancer or who have never had people close to them who have had it, do not know of the existence of these social dynamics, unless of their own free will they inform themselves. Hence, there are social problems that we do not know about because we do not all have the same experiences, which is why public speech represents a place of social knowledge and awareness. Moreover, it can be a great way to counter and prevent oppressive and dominant power, as public speech is also a place where it is possible to demand justification or to denounce certain political decisions, as well as to propose new policies for a better society. In this way, power can be rebalanced preventing it from becoming centralized and monopolized.

#### 4.2.1 *Normative Public Speech*

According to Lepoutre (2021, pp. 15–48), public speech is useful and appropriate if only if it is inclusive, remember that *Lordean* rage has as its goal inclusive, and not exclusive freedom. So, a speech is inclusive if it follows rules that govern the content and the form; he argues that the standard to be followed is the *shared reason constraint*; ‘according to which participants should appeal only to reasons that are suitable shared’

(Lepoutre, 2021; p. 15). By the notion reasons, we refer to those reasons in favor of your claim. This means that the speaker must only refer to reasons that are shared by all participants when justifying his or her claim. If the content is governed by the *shared reason constraint*, then the participants are enabled to be responsive. On the contrary, if reasons are not shared, some participants will not be able to understand and therefore will not be able to be included.

For example, if a political choice is made such that former cancer patients are considered threats to society, this is a non-shared reason by many especially by former cancer patients. These people would find it difficult to contest, as there is no space for them to be responsive because the assumption has already been determined that excludes the reasons of this group.

However, as Lepoutre notes, the *shared reasons constraint* is not always applicable. If the audience is made up of many different groups with different reasons, as in the case of democracy, it would be complicated to find shared reasons. Hence, applying this norm would risk being exclusive to certain groups. Excluding members of certain social positions from the ability to be politically responsive is undemocratic, as it is also exclusion to the right of political participation.

Hence, the other option would therefore be to reduce the representation of the social positions of the audience. This alternative immediately presents problems. First, the selection of the arena<sup>11</sup> is a product of arbitrary power over other people, by selecting who can respond or contest, thus undemocratic. Secondly, it would not be epistemologically useful, because social knowledge does not happen by creating enclaves, as there would be no pool of information and a lack of awareness of others' situations. Thirdly, decisions for the common good could not be applied, precisely because social knowledge is incorrect, as there is ignorance about the perspectives of other groups.

So, shared reasons constraints put us in a dilemma; whether maintaining shared reasons which is almost impossible to apply in non-ideal circumstances, or whether restricting shared reasons which would lead to inevitable exclusion, i.e. the opposite

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<sup>11</sup> Arena is sociological notion which describe metaphorically public location where takes place political interaction. They are neither defined for their geography nor for the Organization. See. Renn, O. (1993). The social arena concept of risk debates.

purpose that shared reasons set. The analysis of the implications of the two alternatives still leads to negative outcomes.

#### 4.2.2 *Emotionally Charged Narrative*

Lepoutre (2021, pp. 15–48) suggests a way to weaken the dilemma; he proposes the application of the norm not at the level of content but at the form level. The strategy to weaken the dilemma is to transform the non-shared reason into a shared reason, focusing on not what is said, but rather on how it is said since the content itself is not enough to make the reason shared but all participants. Referring again to the sociological problem of former cancer patients, how can we make their reason shared by people who did not have cancer?

One option could that a former cancer patient carries out a public discourse where he or she explains logically why they have the right not to declare their past disease in order to have the same access to service as normal people, as they do not represent a threat to those social services. For instance, they could also build a correct inferential argument following the logical step.

*Ideal condition:*

<b>Major premise (shared reason)</b>	All healthy people are not a threat to specific social services,
<b>Minor premise (shared reason)</b>	former cancer patients are healthy,
<b>Conclusion (shared reason)</b>	therefore, all former cancer patients are not a threat to specific social services.

*Table 1 deductive argument; the conclusion derives from the premises, if the premises are true, the conclusion is true. In this case, both premises have shared reasons, thus they should support the shared conclusion.*

*Non-ideal condition:*

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<b>Major premise (shared reason)</b>	All healthy people are not a threat to specific social services,
<b>Minor premise (non-shared reason)</b>	former cancer patients are healthy,
<b>Conclusion (non-shared reason)</b>	therefore, all former cancer patients are not a threat to specific social services.

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*Table 2 deductive argument; the conclusion derives from the premises, if the premises are true, the conclusion is true. In this case, the minor premise is not shared and, thus is not sufficient to make the content of the conclusion shared.*

Even if the deductive argument is logically correct, there are still two problems. Let us take in consideration the *ideal condition*, where the *shared reason constraint* does not arise, as the two premises contain shared reasons and thus the conclusion is shared; the argument is correct but still is not ampliative. The problem with deductive inference is that it does not seem to generate new information; the structure is such that no information is reached in the conclusion that is not already known in the premises. Hence, it is not able to properly convey evaluative knowledge and social awareness. By conferring no other knowledge than the factual, it does not seem to be particularly suitable to understand why these people want to have the same rights as normal people. In conclusion, even though this is logically correct, we cannot say that it is particularly convincing.

The second problem is evident in the second table, *non-ideal condition*. The argument is logically correct, but if one of the two premises does not include a shared reason, it is not possible to derive a shared conclusion. Moreover, The *non-ideal condition* is more realistic than the ideal one, as already pointed out, in democratic reality, heterogeneity brings different reasons that are therefore not shared by all.

In conclusion, discourses based on deductive logic are not suitable in the case of a shared conclusion and are not capable of conferring new social knowledge in any case, because it is not expansive and because it is not a suitable means of transforming unshared reasons into shared reasons, as in the case of the second table.

So how can we shape the form of discourse to turn unshared reasons into shared ones? I argue that is possible if and only if the experience of these people is accessible. So it is necessary to find a form that can make the experience accessible.

These people witness these experiences, and they should talk about them to transmit their worldview, in this way, we can understand their perspective. Telling one's own story, and one's own experience is useful to make accessible the considerations in favor of the claim, namely making shareable one own's reasons.

However, this is not enough, as telling a story does not necessarily imply the accessibility of their experience. As Lepoutre suggests the narrative form should be *emotionally charged*; 'since emotionally charged narrative is not inferential, it is not hostage to lack of shared premises. It aims directly to introduce or make visible certain experiences or perspectives and thereby to enrich the pool of publicly recognized consideration' (Lepoutre, 2021; p. 39). Emotionally charged narratives, unlike deduction, are ampliative, because they communicate new experiences, providing new understandings and points of view. As already mentioned, emotions are crucial on an epistemological level, according to the *Indispensability Claim*, emotions can guide attention toward the relevant properties in the told situation, therefore also guaranteeing apprehension. Hence, they give us access to the evidence of evaluative judgments and allow us to master and understand values.

Emotionally charged narratives are suitable and appropriate to communicate evaluative knowledge and thus overcome the *shared reason constraint*. First, the ability of emotions to modulate attention toward relevant properties, helps the speaker to select what to communicate without falling into redundancy, and irrelevance. Secondly, emotions are also useful for the interlocutor as the emotional component in the narrative makes it easier to grasp only the relevant properties of the target situation. We, therefore, can imagine the situation told by the speaker more easily and more accurately. Lastly, imagining the situation can elicit the emotions themselves, and thus ultimately understand and be aware of their perspective that includes the considerations in favor of their claim, i.e. shared reasons.

In conclusion, at the political level, an emotionally charged narrative is an effective method of communication as it has the power to be inclusive, making the reasons shared by the participants. So it is useful in identifying and understanding social problems

and injustices, and also enriching knowledge by introducing new concepts and interpretations.

#### 4.2.3 *Narrative structure*

The narrative form could have a positive impact on the interlocutors, e.g. it could enhance our moral and ethical principles, promote empathy and perspective-taking, and in more general prosocial behavior (Carroll, 2001). Indeed, fiction or factual narratives could reduce prejudice towards minority groups by presenting their perspective of the world, and their actual culture and thus trying to eliminate the stereotypes of that group. Presenting their perspective enables us to be empathic towards the character, to enter their world, and thus gain evaluative knowledge.

For example the Italian film directed by Matteo Garrone 'Io capitano' (2023) is representative of this epistemological role. It's a fiction film about two young Senegalese men, Seydou and Moussa, who leave their country to go to Europe where they could have a better future. A journey full of near-death challenges that starts from the desert to the Libyan lagers and ends in the Mediterranean Sea. The director listened to the stories of people who undertook the journey from Africa to Europe, he gathered testimonies to take inspiration and to make the film as truthful as possible<sup>12</sup>. In the interview he states that he had realized through their stories were out of our collective imagination: Europeans do not know the challenges of this journey, as he calls it a 'contemporary odyssey'<sup>13</sup>. We know little about it and visually nothing about it. Garrone wanted to make this film because Europeans, but especially Italians, are only used to seeing the end of their journey, which is the landings in Lampedusa, southern Italy, where numerous dead and alive migrants arrive that we consider as numbers. Indeed, the film tries to tell this story from another angle, a counterpoint where the perspective is no longer Europe towards the sea, but Africa towards Europe. The director is keen to highlight that Seydou and Moussa are young people like Western ones, who have the dream of getting to know the world

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<sup>12</sup> Film is based on the true stories of Kouassi Pli Adama Mamadou, Arnaud Zohin, Amara Fofana, Brhane Tareke, and Siaka Doumbia. (See ['Io capitano', al via le riprese del nuovo film di Matteo Garrone](#), su [Sky TG24](#), 21 marzo 2022)

<sup>13</sup> See. 01Distribution. (2023, 7 settembre). *IO CAPITANO - Venezia 80 - Interviste*[Video].

YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlvtKNfQYic>

and therefore want to go to Europe, their story is close to everyone's. However, in their case, they have to risk their lives to realize this dream.

Moreover, this film is an opportunity for young people to identify with Seydou and Moussa to live their experiences and also to understand the privileges they have compared to them. The director has turned his film into a source of social and evaluative knowledge; we not only discover something about them but also about ourselves. As already said, the narrative style enables one to identify himself/herself with the character, experiencing the fear, and the anguish of the journey, and ultimately grasping their evaluative condition by taking their perspective. It also allows one to enter their culture, reducing the stereotypes towards African customs and traditions thanks to the director's choices to be continually guided by the witnesses of the journey and to leave the dialogues in Wolof or French, the most widely spoken languages in Senegal.

This is a good example of how to use narrative for epistemological and moral purposes. Although the film is fictional, it still realistically as represents the true condition of emigration and how it is experienced with its emotional and therefore evaluative component.

The structure of the narrative enables us to convey evaluative knowledge because as Goldie claims (2012) the narrative structure is more than a mere chronicle or list of the sequence of events, it reports events having a shape and a particular organization in such a way that it has coherence, meaningfulness, and evaluative and emotional import.<sup>14</sup>

One might object that narrative factual or fictional are not appropriate because they are subjective and biased and therefore may not be objective. However, I agree with Goldie that objectivity can be maintained even if the narrative structure is by definition perspectival. Narratives, even autobiographical ones, do not aspire to be extremely true in all its aspects and details of the events narrated. Here, the purpose is concerning the evaluative knowledge and not the factual one; where the epistemological component

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<sup>14</sup> By the term coherence, Goldie means the connection between the related events that are relevant to our interest and the interests of our audience. The second characteristic of narrative structure is meaningfulness; the story is meaningful by reporting the thoughts, feelings, and actions of those characters that have a sense of perspective. Finally, evaluative, and emotional import is simply what matters to people, narrative typically communicates evaluative and emotional import with thick evaluative concepts; using terms like funny, fearful, boring, etc... to give an explanation of the emotional responses of the characters. (See. Goldie, 2012)

comes from an attitude-based relation in which the value comes from the psychological attitude, and not from a content-based relating where the value is part of the content; 'That the concept of blue is a very different kind of concept from the concept of offence, say, is shown in the fact that we would not say of an experience of blue that it is a merited response to a surface's blueness' (Deonna & Teroni, 2022; p.19)

For example, a novel that tells of a person who kills his mother and who after the murder decides to go for a beer and watch the football match at the bar. The answer seems to be unfitting; it also seems to be untruthful. Instead, in the case of the film, 'Io capitano', is not a true story, but this is not relevant to us as emotions fit the evaluative condition.

Narrative lends itself to the communication of evaluative knowledge because of its particular structure, as it does not set out to report facts, but only what is relevant and what is value to the character.

### **4.3 Voicing Anger**

Let us quickly return to anger. Anger is appropriate when it correctly represents the object. If a person becomes enraged because his cheap pencil was stolen, then that person's rage is not fitting, and also inappropriate. If, on the other hand, a person becomes enraged because he is systematically subjected to racism, then anger is fitting and appropriate. Briefly, if it responds to an existing wrongdoing, then we can say that anger is morally appropriate and useful.

As we have seen at the communicative level, it is better to adopt an emotionally charged narrative structure to public discourse, because as opposed to argumentative discourse it is inclusive, as it succeeds in transforming unshared reason into shared reason. If a group is subject to social injustice, then the most appropriate and useful response is that of anger and If the group wants to communicate the offensiveness of injustice, then it is suitable to voice anger through narrative. An angry charged narrative would make it easier for the interlocutor to imagine these offensive situations, making the relevant properties of the unjust situation available. In other terms, it would make accessible their worldviews, and their perspectives which present the reasons why they are angry and why they want to fight this social injustice. In this way, the audience can understand the speaker's point of view understanding their anger, and ultimately consider it as appropriate as they recognize the reasons for it, i.e. the situation assessed as unjust.

It could be argued that this political anger could be replaced with sadness because it is a 'safer' emotion, in the sense of less danger. Let us then imagine a woman who has been beaten for years and years by her husband. She has sought out other women witnesses and realizes that this is systematic violence. She decides she wants to make this social problem public, denounce it, witness it, and share her experience with the will to change the situation. She finds herself in front of a heterogeneous audience and tells her experience. For example, she might say that she was attacked almost every day by her husband, who at the same time did not want her to leave and threatened her with death if she did. She says also that she called the police several times, but no one ever intervened.

Let us imagine two scenarios; the first one is the *sad speech*, and the second one is the *angry speech*. So imagine a speech with sadness and the following action tendency: the tone of voice is low in intensity, she speaks slowly with longer pauses, sometimes interrupted by crying, and the words are accompanied by a gesticulation that is a little lively, if not absent. Her body posture is not at all imposing and weaker. From his face, we recognize the typical facial expression of sadness, with a lower tone of facial muscles, and the corners of the mouth down (Ekman & Friesen, 1975).

Imagine instead, the same situation, but accompanied instead by the expression of anger instead of sadness. The episodes told by her are the same but simply the emotion accompanying the narration changes. While she is talking, she raises her voice, she has more intensity and energy, meanwhile, she moves her hands and arms in a concise and lively manner. The posture is commanding and toned. Her face is featured by furrowed brows, tense muscles like jaws and lips, and flared nostrils (Song et al., 2021).

*Sad speech* is not necessarily wrong, as unjust situations imply sad episodes, but in my opinion, it is a secondary emotion. Here, I do not mean that in situations of injustice, one cannot be sad. For example, if a husband beats his wife and she is sad because when she met him, he was not like that, and she would like to be with a man who treats her well. However, I think that sadness is not the main character in question, because it reacts to the implications of this injustice and not to the injustice itself. Whereas anger responds directly to the wrongdoing. Therefore, sadness would shift attention to other properties of the situation that do not represent the injustice, diverting the focus from the real problem. For this reason, I think anger is the best emotion to respond to injustice.

Another reason why sadness is not an appropriate reaction to injustice is because of its non-tendency action. When we are sad, we are not motivated to action, rather we

tend towards passivity, and we feel without energy and hope. Just seeing the face of a sad person who has low muscle tone, does not convey a will to action.

Instead, anger, as Cherry pointed out for Lordean Rage, is characterized by an action tendency for change. Anger gives us the energy and the motivation to change the situation into a better one. It gives us enthusiasm, as she claims 'It also has this optimistic effect because anger influences our perceptions of control and certainty. To that end, angry people think that good things are going to happen and that they will prevail regardless of what happens' (Cherry, 2021; p. 69)

Moreover, the anger display influences how the speaker is perceived by the audience, empirical research shows that emotional expression influences the perception of social position. We usually tend to associate people with angry facial expressions with dominant, strong, intelligent, and competent personalities, and thus with powerful and authoritative. (Tiedens, 2001).

Indeed, it has been shown a correlation between communication of anger and increased support for constructive and conciliatory actions in conflict contexts. Tagar et al. (2011) designed an experiment, where American participants were asked to watch a video of a Syrian leader's speech in Arabic. Before watching the video, participants had to read a text. One group read a text in which the Syrian Leader showed anger toward the United States. The second group read a text in which hope was expressed, and in the last condition the text was factual and thus neutral; there was no emotional information. After the experiment, participants had to answer some questions regarding their appraisals of the topic and policy preferences. Results showed a correlation between the anger condition text and higher levels of support for conciliatory policies. Moreover, this correlation was stronger compared to the hope and the neutral condition text. These findings suggest that anger at an intergroup level promotes conciliatory and supportive action, contrary to what Nussbaum argues. In this kind of context, communication seems to be more successful if the communication includes the expression of anger, as it increases more pro-social feelings in the dominant group compared to the other conditions. Tagar and colleagues seek to explain this relationship between anger expressed by the disadvantaged and the increase in pro-social feelings through empathy. Precisely, anger communication would increase empathy among the dominant group as soon as they saw the reason for the anger of the disadvantaged group and thus, they see

the latter as justified. To understand the underlying reasons for anger, empathic skills need to be brought to bear, and ultimately empathy would increase pro-social feelings.

In conclusion, we have seen how narrative is a great way to convey one's point of view, and how the emotional component is crucial in communication. So, in social contexts where one wants to denounce injustice, a narrative charged with anger is appropriate and fitting. For this reason, if we try to replace anger with another emotion, we will not obtain the ideal conditions to change the situation.

The narrative form could have a positive impact on the interlocutors, e.g. it could enhance our moral and ethical principles, promote empathy and perspective-taking, and in more general prosocial behavior (Carroll, 2001). Indeed, fiction or factual narratives could reduce prejudice towards minority groups by presenting their perspective of the world, and their actual culture and thus trying to eliminate the stereotypes of that group. Presenting their perspective enables us to be empathic towards the character, to enter their world, and thus gain evaluative knowledge.

## 5 Evaluative Knowledge

We saw that the narrative seemed to be the most suitable form of communication for transmitting evaluative knowledge, the perspective of the individual in the narrative emerges and becomes accessible to the interlocutor. In this part, I will try to clarify the structure of evaluative knowledge, arguing that it is perspectival since it does not aim for absolute objectivism.

However, I will argue that this perspectivism is similar to the one of Ortega's which does not fall into relativism or skepticism. Once established where the truth is coming from in the evaluative knowledge, I will argue that societies that did not ensure a plurality of perspectives risk becoming oppressive. Oppression is generated and reinforced by mono-perspectivism; I will report the epistemic vices identified by the philosopher Medina (2013: pp. 27-55) which contribute the mono-perspectivism.

Finally, I will present a way to prevent mono-perspectivism, referring to Ortega, Medina, and Lepoutre's thoughts.

### 5.1 Perspectivism

As we told in the previous section, evaluative knowledge differs from factual ones. Factual knowledge concerns propositions about the world that are true, where the truth is related to the content of the proposition. 'Today the sun is shining in Neuchâtel!' is a true proposition if and only if the sun is shining in Neuchatel, in other terms the content of the proposition has to correspond to the state of affairs<sup>15</sup>. Thus, the descriptive knowledge is utterly objective, because if there is the sun in Neuchatel today, then this is independent from my experience of it. That's why if I say, "Today the sun is shining in Neuchatel!" and actually it is raining, then I would state something false. Descriptive knowledge is not perspectivist due to its independence from any experience.

However, I do not think that we can apply the same principle of objectivity to evaluative knowledge. Hence, 'This conference about financial mathematics is so boring' could be true for me, but at the same time could be false for financier, for the same reason that I explored before when analyzing the queerness of the thick values. So evaluative knowledge is not objective in the same sense as factual knowledge. In this regard one might object that we cannot consider it anymore as knowledge since is not objective.

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<sup>15</sup> How the actual world is.

However, I am not claiming relativism or skepticism here, but I am taking a perspectivist position. Precisely an agent has access to the understanding of evaluative properties of a situation through emotional experience. My perspective is similar to the one of Jose Ortega y Gasset's; he argues that each individual has his own peculiar and unique perspective (José Ortega Y Gasset (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), 2022; Kilgore, 1972). Therefore, the sum of all perspectives of individuals would lead to a more truthful perspective of the world. According to Ortega, every perspective has value, even if it is in complete disagreement with a hypothetical one of our own, the conflict that arises between perspectives is an opportunity for growth of our knowledge, which is possible if and only if there is tolerance. This makes sense as soon as we consider the condition of the plurality of groups in a democracy if individuals experience different situations due to their social position. So, having different social positions means also different social difficulties and injustice; some injustices are present in some groups and not in others, and thus also different perspectives on that specific injustice as the plurality of perspectives leads to different evaluative judgments on the situation. For example, if a political decision is made such that a minority is excluded; those who make this decision do not judge the situation as offensive, while the discriminated group judges it as offensive because it is unjust. If democracy works, everyone has the right to challenge political decisions, and the right to denounce the offensiveness of such policies, in other words, in other words, one has the right to disclose one's social and evaluative knowledge of the situation.

The way to promote evaluative and social knowledge is through narrative emotionally charged public speech, as suggested by Lepoutre (2021: pp. 15–48), the emotionally charged narrative is the communication mode that allows the subject to make visible certain experiences enabling the interlocutor to take his/her perspective, where enabling the perspective taking is transforming the non-shared reasons to shared ones by the interlocutor. Goldie also argues that the narrative is by definition perspectival, as it is structured in such a way as to make the personal perspective accessible. Still, some argue that this is not knowledge, as it would be biased and inappropriate and therefore not suitable for knowledge.

However, as we have already mentioned in the section on narrative, objectivity in the narratives does not come from a content-based relation (the truth of events), but from an attitude-based relation; the political decision taken in such a way that it is

discriminatory towards a minority is constituted by natural properties that minority conceive as favoring hostile engagement. All this is to say that evaluative knowledge is perspectival since the hypothetical anger of discriminators would be unfitting, while that of discriminated would be fitting, but if the discriminators take the perspective of the discriminated, they understand their anger as fitting.

## 5.2 Epistemic Vices and the Mono-perspectivism

In this regard, Medina (2013) by analyzing epistemologically the society, develops a normative theory of epistemic justice. He brings out the importance of having a multi-perspective which is a tool to prevent forms of oppression. Also called kaleidoscopic consciousness is a way to be aware of different perspectives. This is achieved through epistemic interaction, which is not only a mere pooling of information, but also a process that includes collaborative generation of meaning and interpretative possibilities. The conditions therefore to realize this epistemic interaction are ensured by the presence of people who have different perspectives. For instance, according to Lepoutre, the epistemic interaction takes place in public speech, a tool that serves to rebalance power and thus prevent oppression.

For both Medina and Lepoutre, ensuring epistemic interaction in society helps prevent the emergence of demagogies and any form of oppression, as a dominant ideology comes from the promotion of a single perspective that by definition excludes others. It is not by chance that in Totalitarianism, only one ideology is acceptable and legitimate, with the aim to *wipe out* the different ideologies. It is a monopoly of one big perspective that refuses to see the others in order to legitimize itself. As a matter of fact, Medina analyzes the profile of the privileged, they are usually ignorant as they know only one perspective. In this regard, Medina identifies epistemic vices that generate and maintain ignorance. According to Medina epistemic vices are corrupted attitudes that hinder knowledge acquisition; affecting one's capacity to learn from others and the facts, but also damaging the social knowledge as the subject is not contributing. Most importantly, these epistemic flaws contribute to meta-ignorance; one is ignorant about one being ignorant, preventing the possibility of self-correction.

Let's look at Medina's vices; the first one is epistemic arrogance which one assumes to know everything there is to know because he is convinced that his point of view is right, therefore everything different is automatically considered wrong (Medina,

2013; pp. 17-55). So if a privileged person is unaware of social injustices, he/she is not only aware of them, but also, he/she denies such social injustices. Indeed, if there is evidence in favor of the existence of such injustice, the arrogant person believes it to be wrong. Therefore, the arrogant subject does not doubt his own beliefs, as they are considered authoritative, this implies a construction of uncontrolled and unmonitored knowledge, creating blind spots that the subject is unable to detect; this phenomenon is called meta-ignorance, as the subject is ignorant about his ignorance.

The second one is epistemic laziness which comes from the fact that privileged people do not urge and need to know everything, as they enjoy their advantage. The systematic lack of curiosity weakens cognitive attitudes, and laziness to know other points of view leads to getting stuck in one's own, because entering the perspectives of others opens the possibility of changing one's own point of view to adopt a more suitable one, and this implies a cognitive effort that the lazy subject wants to avoid.

Finally, there is close-mindedness, a close-minded person is systematically closed to experience, topic, and perspectives. This mentality is characterized by a strong rigidity, as it denies evidence that could change its point of view. This inflexibility allows the subject to protect its privilege, as remaining open about other people's issues and perspectives would lead to the renunciation of its own privileges.

These vices promote mono perspectivism, hampering perspectival pluralism. The arrogant only takes into account his own point of view which is the only worthy as the others are wrong; the lazy person is not motivated to know the other alternatives, and the closed-minded denies the existence of other perspectives. Mono-perspectivism is not only sustained by these vices. Most importantly from these vices emerges meta-ignorance, i.e. the subject's inability to recognize errors, and thus the inability to self-correct.

White solipsism is a representative case of how meta-ignorance maintains mono-perspectivism. Majszak (2019) by white solipsism means the unconscious habit of white people. Precisely, white people have the illusion of understanding the world truthfully when they look at the world from a white person's point of view to the exclusion of other existential points of view. The author argues that it is an unconscious phenomenon, precisely because people think they already have accurate knowledge of the racial group.

So if evaluative knowledge is perspectivist, then to be ignorant is to maintain mono-perspectivism, which is precisely why the three vices, each in its own way, promote only the perspective of the subject, eliminating the existence of other perspectives.

### 5.3 Preventing Mono-perspectivism

According to Medina, the antidote to meta-ignorance is the principle of epistemic friction, that is cultivating openness to epistemic counterpoints. This principle remembers what Ortega claims in his perspectivism; every perspective has its validity and truth which is why the conflict between perspectives could be an occasion for epistemic growth (José Ortega Y Gasset (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), 2022; Kilgore, 1972). The epistemic friction is realized when there are epistemic interactions that are ensured by a systematic presence of different people who bring their unique perspectives to the field.

One might object that if one is ignorant then to his ignorance and there is no space for self-correction how can they know the unknown of the unknown? One might answer that one would need a miracle, in the sense that it would be a rare phenomenon. The practice of introspection would then be useless since we do not have direct access to cues of what is wrong or right, we certainly do not have Pinocchio's nose. That's why the interaction of perspectives is suitable to prevent the monopolization of one perspective because meta-ignorance is not visible to the subject, but it is visible to the other, the other can witness the existence of something beyond what one believes (Dunning, 2011)

These interactions between perspectives can be realized according to Lepoutre through public discourses with an emotionally charged narrative structure because it is a matter of conveying evaluative knowledge and this is the most suitable form of communication. Apprehension of other perspectives only occurs if communication is inclusive, where reasons are shared by all, this is done through emotional narrative. Thus, Lepoutre identifies direct interaction to achieve the integration of perspectives.

However, I think that indirect interaction could contribute to plural perspectivism. I believe that art can bring out the artist's perspective and reality. This is the same phenomenon that Matteo Garrone in the movie, *Io Capitano*, aims to find counterpoints to the Western perspective on immigration, the angle from Europe to the Mediterranean Sea, he shows the point of view from Africa to Europe; enabling the spectators to take their perspectives. The work realized by the director Garrone tries to break the wall of White solipsism which blocks to broadening knowledge of other racial backgrounds.

## CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the attitudinal account seems to be the most suitable one to define emotion, as it can define and elucidate the epistemic and normative relationship that underlies emotion and value. Anger is a specific bodily stance that is fitting if and only if the object has properties that constitute offensiveness, where this value is understood as 'anger-worthy'. This epistemic relation of fittingness is shown to be suitable to support an indispensability of emotion in accessing these values. If offensiveness is declined in terms of deserving anger, then anger elucidates this concept. Without emotion, we would be ignorant of evaluative knowledge, since understanding occurs through emotion; if I am subjected to racist acts and I do not get angry, I do not understand that the situation was offensive, namely I am evaluatively ignorant of the situation. If emotion is fitting, it not only plays an epistemic role but is also shown to be morally and practically important.

Emotions not only play a role in the acquisition of knowledge but also serve as a means of communication. In line with the social-evolutionary hypothesis and supported by empirical studies, emotions are inherently communicative. The expression of emotions conveys information that proves useful for fostering cooperation between individuals. Hence, their display seems to be important at the social level, contributing to the divulgation of evaluative knowledge and as well as social awareness. Indeed, in the democratic context where social awareness is crucial, the communication of evaluative knowledge is necessary to achieve the inclusiveness required by a democracy. Not by chance, Lepoutre identifies an emotionally charged narrative as the most suitable form of communication for public speech to convey social knowledge which is featured by value. For instance, social injustice constitutes the value of offensiveness. Emotionally charged narratives are inclusive since emotions make the reasons why the situation has such value accessible and shareable.

Emotionally charged narratives are inclusive because emotions render the reasons for attitude-meriting accessible and shareable.

Narrative cannot be objective since it only brings the individual's perspective to light, but this is not a problem since evaluative knowledge is not objectivistic, but rather perspectivist. Hence, the narrative whether fictional or real can be truthful, as the fittingness of the emotion is not ensured by the content of the emotion, but by the emotion itself concerning value. That is why this perspectivism does not turn out to be skeptical or relativistic, otherwise, it would be difficult to communicate and share the experience.

In a perspectivist framework of knowledge, ignorance arises when an individual fails to consider the existence of other different points of view. It is no coincidence that Medina argues that for democracies to be inclusive and to prevent forms of oppression, they support the importance of epistemic interaction where different perspectives can contribute to knowledge. If epistemic friction due to the presence of these perspectives does not take place, there is a risk that power is monopolized in favor of one perspective from which a form of oppression can evolve. Indeed, the epistemic vices contribute to mono-perspectivism which leads to evaluative ignorance.

Emotions, it follows, carry greater significance than commonly perceived. This may be attributed to the historical inclination within the philosophical tradition to label them as irrational, consequently diminishing their perceived importance. Alternatively, some emotions might be seen as threatening, particularly when they challenge privileges or prompt self-examination. Usually, emotions in politics are viewed negatively because they underpin political propaganda, e.g. stirring up fear about immigration. Indeed, I do not believe that emotions are always fitting and appropriate, but I do believe that very often they are not taken seriously when they are fitting and appropriate. As it has been analyzed, anger, when appropriate and fitting, is the best way to fight social injustice. I hope for the advancement of both theoretical and empirical research to enhance our understanding of emotions across their diverse facets.

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