



# Policies and Prejudice: Integration Policies Moderate the Link Between Immigrant Presence and Anti-Immigrant Prejudice

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More people than ever migrate across the world, thereby more people than ever live, study, and work in countries, regions, and institutions with high immigrant presence. Conflict and threat theories have argued that increasing immigration inevitably heightens native citizens' anti-immigrant prejudice. Drawing on alternate strands of social psychological literature such as contact theory, the present study challenges this argument. We highlight the role of the sociopolitical context of prejudice focusing on socioeconomic and legal integration policies. We reason that such integration policies shape intergroup relations by reducing structural (socioeconomic and legal) inequalities. Thus, inclusive policies will effectively reduce prejudice especially at high levels of immigrant presence through empowering immigrants and reducing immigrant disadvantage. Indeed our findings identify inclusive integration policies as a key condition for low anti-immigrant prejudice in high-immigration contexts. We analyze surveys of 143,752 participants across 66 different countries, 20 subnational regions, and 64 institutions as sociopolitical contexts using six different data sets in eight studies. Our multilevel analyses consistently demonstrate that anti-immigrant prejudice is lower among natives when higher levels of immigrant presence are coupled with inclusive, rather than exclusive, integration policies. Inclusive policies that render immigrants more equal to natives are the path to improved intergroup relations and social cohesion in diverse societies.

**Keywords:** immigration, anti-immigrant prejudice, equality, immigrant integration policy, multilevel analysis

**Supplemental materials:** <https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000376.supp>

Humans have always been on the move. Today more people than ever are migrating around the world (International Organization for Migration, 2020a). In this era of mass migration, a major

societal challenge is to understand when people from different backgrounds can live together without hatred and conflict. Native citizens, that is, citizens who were born in the country where they live, react in different ways to the presence of immigrants (Guimond et al., 2014; Putnam, 2007). Some natives resist immigration and react to immigrants with hostility and anti-immigrant prejudice, while others embrace migration-related diversity and accept immigrants. More prejudiced natives discriminate more against immigrants, restricting immigrant opportunities and exacerbating intergroup tensions (Fiske, 1998; Schütz & Six, 1996). Reflecting the societal and political importance of this question, hundreds of studies have investigated the relationship between immigrant presence and natives' attitudes (for meta-analyses, see Dinesen et al., 2020; Pottie-Sherman & Wilkes, 2017; van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014). The evidence is mixed however: Some studies conclude that higher immigrant presence is linked to higher anti-immigrant prejudice, yet other studies relate it to lower anti-immigrant prejudice, and still others find no relation (Hewstone, 2015; Meuleman et al., 2009; Pettigrew et al., 2010).

In this article, we develop a macrolevel explanation to anti-immigrant prejudice centering the role of equality in the broader sociopolitical context (Oishi & Graham, 2010; Pettigrew, 2018). We examine the proposition that past evidence is inconclusive because it is "not diversity per se but unequal diversity that makes

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This research was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation National Center of Competence in Research (NCCR) – on the move (Grant 51NF40-182897) awarded to Eva G. T. Green, Juan Manuel Falomir-Pichastor, and Anita Manatschal.

We would like to thank Alexandra Filindra at the University of Illinois, Bart Meuleman at the University of Leuven, members of the Social Psychology group at the University of Lausanne, the Center for Social and Cultural Psychology and the Group for Research on Ethnic Relations, Migration & Equality at the Free University of Brussels, the Center for the Study of Ethnicity and Migration at the University of Liège and the Center for Social and Cultural Psychology at the University of Leuven for their feedback on earlier versions of this article.

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a difference" (Portes & Vickstrom, 2011, p. 472). Our study provides the first empirical test of this proposition. More precisely, we expect increased anti-immigrant prejudice only when immigrant presence is high and exclusive integration policies manifest inequality between natives and immigrants. Conversely, we expect low anti-immigrant prejudice when immigrant presence is high but inclusive integration policies treat the two groups as more equal.

### Immigrant Integration Policies and Inequality

Diversity is not inherently unequal, but equality depends largely on policy responses to immigration. Authorities in countries, regions, or institutions, as sociopolitical contexts, grant more or less equal or restricted rights to immigrants compared with native citizens (Guimond et al., 2014; Joppke & Seidle, 2012; Penninx & Garcés-Masareñas, 2016). Such integration policies regulate several areas of life. When socioeconomic policies are more inclusive, laws and regulations bestow more equal rights on immigrants and their offspring providing more equal access to education, health care, housing, or the labor market. Legal-political integration policies can also grant immigrants more rights to participate politically, protect them from discrimination, extend voting rights, or ease the acquisition of citizenship. Inclusive socioeconomic and legal-political integration policies thus allow immigrants to improve their societal position (Bilgili et al., 2015; International Organization for Migration, 2020a). Immigrants and their offspring have more equal educational qualifications, occupations, and earnings in more inclusive sociopolitical contexts (Hainmueller et al., 2016; 2019; Manatschal & Stadelmann-Steffen, 2013). Furthermore, they participate more in politics (Cinalli & Giugni, 2011; Manatschal & Stadelmann-Steffen, 2014). Increased equality due to inclusive policies should also affect how natives view immigrants in society.

### Immigrant Presence and Immigrant Integration Policies: The Threat Rationale

In contrast with the above argument by Portes and Vickstrom (2011) that only unequal diversity induces higher prejudice, based on conflict and threat theories, natives will feel threatened by high immigrant presence and inclusive policies will further exacerbate threat feelings. In line with the threat argument, several studies have related larger immigrant presence to more perceived threat and stronger prejudice against immigrants among natives (e.g., McLaren, 2003; Meuleman et al., 2009; Quillian, 1995). Similarly to high levels of immigrant presence, high levels of ethnic-racial diversity can induce perceptions of threat and ethnic-racial prejudice among ethnic-racial majority members (Craig et al., 2017; Craig & Richeson, 2014; Major et al., 2018).

Looking beyond the mere presence of immigrants, threat theories suggest that whether immigrants are seen as threatening, also depends on their societal position (Stephan et al., 2016). As argued above, when integration policies are more inclusive and immigrants receive more equal rights, their societal position becomes more equal. From a threat perspective, natives may see more empowered immigrants as especially threatening, to the extent that they are seen as more capable of taking away resources from natives (Morrison & Ybarra, 2008; Stephan et al., 2016). Therefore, based on conflict and threat theories, combinations of high immigrant presence with inclusive integration

policies should induce the highest levels of threat and prejudice among natives.

### Immigrant Integration Policies and Prejudice

Despite competing theoretical expectations relating integration policies to higher or lower levels of anti-immigrant prejudice, most empirical evidence points in the direction of less prejudice in the presence of inclusive policies. Comparative studies have consistently associated inclusive legal-political and socioeconomic integration policies to more positive attitudes (Callens & Meuleman, 2017; Green et al., 2020; Hooghe & de Vroome, 2015; Schlueter et al., 2013). Similarly, cross-national and cross-institutional studies have found less prejudice when multicultural policies or ideologies value cultural diversity (de la Sablonnière et al., 2020; Galinsky et al., 2015; Guimond et al., 2014; Kauff et al., 2020). These repeated findings have been attributed to the fact that inclusive policies convey a norm of tolerance. Indeed, perceived norms on prejudice align almost perfectly with individuals' own prejudiced attitudes, so that normative shifts afford the expression or suppression of prejudice toward specific groups (Crandall et al., 2018; McDonald & Crandall, 2015).

Going beyond (perceived) antiprejudice norms, legal-political and socioeconomic integration policies also shape prejudice by equalizing intergroup relations. If such policies were consequential only or mainly to the extent that they shift antiprejudice norms in society, there is no reason to expect differential policy effects depending on immigrant presence. Take for example how anti-Semitism persists in some countries in line with anti-Semitic norms and narratives and in the (near) absence of Jews (Bilewicz et al., 2013). In a similar manner, to the extent that integration policies convey antiprejudice norms, they should go against anti-immigrant prejudice even in the absence of immigrants. We advance an alternate explanation from how integration policies shape intergroup relations in ways that reduce structural (socioeconomic and legal) inequalities. Such an approach implies that inclusive policies will effectively reduce prejudice especially at high levels of immigrant presence and that they do so through empowering immigrants and reducing immigrant disadvantage.

There is indirect evidence for the interplay of policy effects with immigrant presence from other social science fields. More specifically, past research has revealed that higher immigrant presence or flow has been related to lower political and organizational participation or less support for some domains of redistribution only in countries with less inclusive or less multicultural policies (Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010; Kwon & Curran, 2016). In a similar vein, higher immigrant presence coincides with lower levels of trust only in regions with more exclusive labor policies (Gundelach & Manatschal, 2017). However, none of these study samples distinguished natives from nonnatives and none assessed anti-immigrant prejudice as an outcome. Consequently, the evidence is not yet conclusive from an intergroup relations perspective.

### When Immigrant Presence and Inclusive Immigrant Integration Policies Engender Reduced Prejudice

Why would natives hold less xenophobic attitudes toward immigrants when their presence is high, and immigrants and their offspring are empowered by inclusive integration policies? First, intergroup contact research has shown that natives have less

negative attitudes toward immigrants when they encounter immigrants more frequently (Esses, 2021; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Inclusive integration policies reduce segregation between immigrants and natives thereby increase contact among them (Green et al., 2020). In turn, contact with immigrants predicts lower prejudice, as demonstrated by hundreds of studies (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

Second, beyond contact in general, equal contact is especially effective in reducing anti-immigrant prejudice, for example when natives meet immigrants as colleagues or neighbors (Allport, 1954; Paluck et al., 2019). Indeed, meta-analytic evidence from close to 190,000 respondents in 36 countries shows that contact with members of other social groups relates to greater reductions in prejudice in more egalitarian societies (Kende et al., 2018). Similarly, past research across 20 countries with 30,000 survey respondents reveals that contact effects are stronger when natives encounter immigrants in societies with more inclusive policies (Green et al., 2020). To the extent that inclusive integration policies afford more equal contact with immigrants, the presence of immigrants is likely related to lower anti-immigrant prejudice in countries, regions, or institutions with more inclusive policies.

Third, personal interactions with immigrants are not necessary for reducing hostility toward immigrants: Being aware of other fellow natives with close relations with immigrants also results in less prejudiced attitudes (Dhont & Van Hiel, 2011; Turner et al., 2007). When inclusive integration policies are implemented, immigrants are more likely to be present in all walks of life, and even when natives do not encounter immigrants personally, they are likely to know other natives who do. As a consequence of such indirect encounters, natives should be less prejudiced when policies are inclusive.

Finally, even mere exposure to counterstereotypical representations of immigrants as equal and active members of society, for example, via media, public or political discourses, can decrease anti-immigrant prejudice (Prati et al., 2018; Ramasubramanian, 2011). All in all, anti-immigrant prejudice should be thus lower among natives when higher levels of immigrant presence are coupled with inclusive, rather than exclusive, integration policies.

## The Present Study

The present study investigates whether the relation between immigrant presence and anti-immigrant prejudice depends on immigrant integration policies. We examine this question comparing countries, regions, and institutions as sociopolitical contexts that regulate immigrant integration (Bourhis et al., 1997; Penninx & Garcés-Masareñas, 2016). We assess policies granting immigrants more or less equal rights relative to natives in the socioeconomic and legal-political domains. We propose that such policies are especially consequential at high levels of immigrant presence and that inclusive policies afford lower levels of prejudice because they render immigrants more equal to natives. We expect that natives will express the least anti-immigrant prejudice in highly diverse countries, regions, and institutions with inclusive integration policies. Hence, we take a contextual approach to anti-immigrant prejudice heeding to recent calls that social psychology should problematize the broader social-political context beyond investigating individual-level phenomena (Oishi & Graham, 2010; Pettigrew, 2018). More specifically, we highlight how prejudice is constituted by social structures as

codified in immigrant integration policies (Dixon et al., 2012; Salter et al., 2017). We thus go beyond previous social psychological research centering individual moderators of the diversity-prejudice link (Sibley et al., 2013; Van Assche et al., 2018; 2019). Most importantly, and in line with the global importance of migration, we examine these questions in a broad array of national contexts going thereby beyond previous research on anti-immigrant prejudice that was largely implemented in Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic settings (Dinesen et al., 2020; Henrich et al., 2010; Pottie-Sherman & Wilkes, 2017; van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014).

## Method

### Data

To test our predictions, we matched contextual data on integration policies and immigrant presence at the national, regional (Swiss cantons), and institutional (Belgian Flemish schools) levels with individual-level data on anti-immigrant prejudice among natives. Our goal was to combine the highest quality data available while covering the broadest possible range of cases. We used survey data to tap anti-immigrant prejudice, searching suitable cross-national surveys in the GESIS data archive and through a systematic literature review (GESIS—Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, 2020). We identified policy indices in lists of indicators from the International Organization for Migration (International Organization for Migration, 2020b). All the policy indices captured the extent of equal rights and equal treatment of immigrants relative to natives. We used data on immigrant presence from the OECD, the United Nations, the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, and the Flemish-Belgian Ministry of Education (Emonds et al., 2015; OECD, 2020; OFS - Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2020; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 2019). We used immigrant presence as opposed to other measures of diversity such as the Herfindahl index<sup>1</sup> because of our focus on immigrant integration and anti-immigrant prejudice.

For cross-national comparisons, we selected probability-based surveys that met three criteria. First, they measured some aspect of anti-immigrant prejudice such as threat perceptions or attitudes toward immigrants. We investigated anti-immigrant prejudice in its broadest sense following theoretical approaches from social psychology that define prejudice as negative feelings, beliefs, and the tendency to exhibit prejudice toward certain groups (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010; Olson & Zabel, 2016; Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010). This broad approach also follows previous reviews on anti-immigrant prejudice (Pottie-Sherman & Wilkes, 2017). For this reason, we examined both threat perceptions and various attitudinal measures (social distance from immigrants, bias toward immigrant groups). Threat perceptions and attitudes are closely linked theoretically and numerous studies established immigrant threat perceptions as robust and most proximal predictors of anti-immigrant

<sup>1</sup>The Herfindahl index is the most commonly used index of ethnic diversity that provides information on the concentration of several ethnic groups in a setting. It can be interpreted as the likelihood that two randomly drawn individuals do not belong to the same ethnic group (Schaeffer, 2013).

attitudes (Riek et al., 2006; Rios et al., 2018; Stephan et al., 2016). In the current study, we only examined so-called realistic threat perceptions as outcomes, that is, perceptions that include “the threat of . . . loss of political power (e.g., disenfranchisement), economic power, territory, or valued resources (e.g., natural resources); theft, destruction of property. . . and lack of access to education, health care or the necessities of life (Stephan et al., 2016, p. 257).” This limitative focus on socioeconomic and legal-political threats matches our explanatory focus on the socioeconomic and legal-political integration policies that regulate precisely these areas of life.<sup>2</sup> Second, the survey data identified respondents who are native citizens as either native born, or native origin. Third, the survey data matched contextual data on immigrant integration policies and immigrant populations that were gathered 1 or maximum 2 years earlier. Subnational comparisons at the regional and institutional level were limited to one study each due to restricted availability of, or access to subnational policy data. We selected a school-based study to exemplify institutions because schools are the most widely attended type of institutions.

With these selection criteria, we could implement eight comparative studies, six cross-national comparisons and two subnational studies. In Study 1, we compared 20 countries using the European Social Survey Round 7 (ESS) data and the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) from 2014 (NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, 2014; Huddleston et al., 2015). The MIPEX is the most detailed and extensive index of immigrant integration policies with the largest number of subindicators and broadest coverage of policy fields (Helbling, 2013). More specifically, the MIPEX is a country-level index of immigrant integration policies that simultaneously considers 167 policy indicators from eight policy domains (i.e., health care, education, political participation, labor market mobility, antidiscrimination laws, permanent residence, access to nationality, family reunion). The indicators measure whether immigrants have comparable rights and access to services in these policy domains vis-à-vis natives. The index is based on expert surveys in each country and has been updated yearly since 2007. Furthermore, overall it forms a reliable scale,  $\alpha = .93$  (Ruedin, 2011). For these reasons, it has been widely used in comparative sociological and social psychological research (Callens & Meuleman, 2017; Green et al., 2020; Hooghe & de Vroome, 2015; Schlueter et al., 2013; Tatarko et al., 2021).

However, the ESS analysis limited our sample to European countries. Therefore, to test our predictions, in Study 2, we also tested our predictions employing the International Social Survey Program (ISSP 2013 National Identity Module) data and the MIPEX in 19 countries including countries outside the EU such as Turkey, Japan, and the United States (ISSP Research Group, 2015). We undertook also a third study to test the hypothesis in other countries outside the EU.

In Study 3, our analysis with the most recent complete wave of the World Values Survey (WVS Round 6, 2010–2014) included countries such as South Korea, Turkey, or the United States (Inglehart et al., 2020). A large number of WVS countries that overlapped with the MIPEX coverage did not include information on the immigration status of the respondents; therefore, we could only implement this analysis comparing 12 countries.

In addition, because using the 2010–2014 MIPEX limited our analysis to OECD countries, and to ensure a broader coverage of countries, Study 4 implemented cross-country analyses using the UNDESA policy index with the WVS (WVS Round 6, 2010–2014).

The UNDESA policy index is a binary measure on the existence of integration policies that covers most countries in the world (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 2020). Selecting those WVS countries that included information on the respondents’ immigration status and that were within 2 years from the policy and population data allowed comparing 33 countries.

Furthermore, we implemented two more studies with the partially available WVS Round 7 (WVS Round 7, 2017–2021).<sup>3</sup> In Study 5 we tested our hypothesis using the MIPEX indices from 2017–2020 covering 19 WVS countries and in Study 6 we used the UNDESA policy index with a coverage of 30 WVS countries.

Finally, in Studies 7 and 8 we matched survey data with policies at the subnational level. In Study 7 we compared 20 Swiss cantons using the European Values Survey and an index of cantonal integration policies (European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association, 2008; Manatschal, 2011). In Study 8 we compared 64 Flemish-Belgian schools using the CILS-Leuven survey and the schools’ equality policies (Celeste et al., 2019; Emonds et al., 2015).

Altogether, the samples include responses from 143,752 participants in 66 countries, 20 regions, and 64 institutions. We sampled participants from the following countries: Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Singapore, Serbia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Vietnam. Please note that the sample partly overlaps in Study 3 and Study 4 and also in Study 5 and Study 6 as both pairs of studies draw on the same World Values Survey, respectively, but the participants are only counted once when reporting the overall sample size.

Table 1 describes the main characteristics of the data sets. Below we provide details of the samples and materials for each study. Table S1 in the online supplemental materials shows levels of immigrant presence and policies per country in each study.

## Study 1

### Participants

For the first cross-country comparison, we used the European Social Survey Immigration Module from 2014 and focused on native

<sup>2</sup> In parallel with realistic threat perceptions, symbolic threat perceptions are also key predictors of anti-immigrant prejudice. Symbolic threat perceptions express fears that the ingroup’s value system and traditions could be destroyed (Riek et al., 2006; Rios et al., 2018; Stephan et al., 2016). As symbolic threat perceptions do not correspond to our argument that integration policies are related to lower xenophobia because of higher socioeconomic and legal-political equality, we do not include them in our studies.

<sup>3</sup> We used the data available in May 2021, the data collection of WVS Round 7 ends in December 2021. In May 2021 the data was available for 49 countries.

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**Table 1**  
*Datasets Used in Each Study*

Study number	Dataset	N of participants	N of contextual units	Type of contextual units	Policy measure	Anti-immigrant prejudice measure
Study 1	European Social Survey (ESS) Round 7, 2014	N = 28,161	20	Country	Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (Huddleston et al., 2015)	Realistic threat
Study 2	International Social Survey Program (ISSP), 2013	N = 19,712	19	Country	MIPEX (Huddleston et al., 2015)	Realistic threat
Study 3	World Values Survey (WVS) Round 6, 2010–2014	N = 15,533	12	Country	MIPEX (Huddleston et al., 2015)	Social distance from immigrants
Study 4	World Values Survey (WVS) Round 6, 2010–2014	N = 46,036	33	Country	UNDESA World Population Policies (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 2020)	Social distance from immigrants
Study 5	World Values Survey (WVS) Round 7, 2017–2020	N = 28,480	19	Country	MIPEX (Solano & Huddleston, 2020)	Social distance from immigrants
Study 6	World Values Survey (WVS) Round 7, 2017–2020	N = 39,422	30	Country	UNDESA World Population Policies (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 2020)	Social distance from immigrants
Study 7	Swiss part of the European Values study (Swiss EVS) 2008	N = 908	20	Swiss cantons	Cantonal integration policies (Manatschal, 2011)	Realistic threat
Study 8	Leuven Children of Immigrants Longitudinal study (CILS), 2012–2013	N = 1,472	64	Schools in Flanders, Belgium,	Policies of equal treatment in the school (Celeste et al., 2019)	Bias against immigrants

majority members’ feelings of threat (NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, 2014). We sampled native majority members based on whether they were born in the country of the survey, the sample included N = 28,161 participants. We used country of birth as the selection criteria because other cross-national samples do not include information on the respondent’s parentage and we aimed to keep the cross-national samples comparable across studies. Samples covered the following 20 countries: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and Slovenia. Israel was excluded as there is no MIPEX score available.

**Measures**

While the ESS 2014 contained four items measuring respondents’ perceptions of realistic threat, we used three items whose measurement was shown to be sufficiently similar across the countries under study.<sup>4</sup> Invariance testing ensured that the substantial conclusions drawn from the analyses are not biased by measurement issues (e.g., inaccurate translations; Davidov et al., 2014). The three items are “Would you say that people who come to live here generally take jobs away from workers in [country], or generally help to create new jobs?” (0 = *take away jobs*; 10 = *create new jobs*); “Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?” (0 = *generally take out more*;

10 = *generally put in more*); “Are [country]’s crime problems made worse or better by people coming to live here from other countries?” (0 = *crime problems made worse*; 10 = *crime problems made better*). Answers were reverse coded so that higher values represent greater threat perceptions and a three-item composite score of realistic threat was computed.  $\alpha = .71$ , ranging by country from .56 to .82 ( $M = 5.68, SD = 1.72$ ).

We measured immigrant presence as the percentage of foreign born residents in a country using country-level statistics from the OECD international migration database from 2014 (OECD, 2020). Percentages ranged from 1.6 to 29.39 ( $M = 11.78, SD = 5.70$ ).

We measured immigrant integration policies by using the Migrant Integration Policy Index from 2014 (MIPEX; Huddleston et al., 2015). The index is coded from 0 (exclusive) to 100 (inclusive), scores in the study ranged from 38 to 80 ( $M = 57.04, SD = 11.56$ ).

**Study 2**

**Participants**

For the second cross-country comparison, we employed the International Social Survey Program’s (ISSP) National Identity Module from 2013 and focused on native majority members’ feelings of threat (ISSP Research Group, 2015). As the ISSP has no

<sup>4</sup> Partial scalar invariance, that is the minimum level of invariance to perform unbiased mean comparisons was reached (Satorra-Bentler corrected  $\chi^2(254) = 1411.11, p < .001$ ; CFI = .942, RMSEA = .072).

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questions on immigrant status of the participants, we selected participants based on their citizenship, the sample included  $N = 19,712$  participants. We conducted the analysis in the following 19 countries: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. Preliminary analyses showed that a sufficient level of measurement invariance could be obtained only when excluding Portugal.<sup>5</sup>

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### Measures

We measured perceptions of realistic threat with the following three items: "Immigrants increase crime rates"; "Immigrants are generally good for economy"; and "Immigrants take jobs away from people born in [Country]." Answers ranged from 1 to 5 with higher scores indicating higher threat.  $\alpha = .69$ , ranging from .51 to .79 across countries ( $M = 3.2$ ,  $SD = .89$ ).

We used the OECD statistics on the percentage of immigrant population matching the survey year (OECD, 2020). Percentages ranged from .37 to 29 ( $M = 11.06$ ,  $SD = 6.37$ ).

To measure integration policies we used the MIPEX scores similarly to the previous cross-country comparison (Huddlestone et al., 2015). This time we included the 2013 MIPEX scores to match with the survey years. Scores ranged from 24 to 80 ( $M = 53.89$ ,  $SD = 13.69$ ).

### Study 3

#### Participants

For the third cross-country comparison we used the sixth round of the World Values Survey collected in 2010–2014 and focused on native majority members' social distance from immigrants (Inglehart et al., 2020). Again, we sampled native majority members based on whether they were born in the country of the survey, the sample included  $N = 15,533$ . As survey respondents were only asked about their country of origin in a limited number of countries, our analysis was restricted to the following 12 countries: Cyprus (2011), Estonia (2011), Germany (2013), the Netherlands (2012), New Zealand (2011), Poland (2012), Romania (2012), Slovenia (2011), South Korea (2010), Sweden (2011), Turkey (2012), and United States (2011). While the number of contextual units is small in this study, we expect reliable estimates even with fewer units, because we estimate fixed effects in a probit model and not variance parameters (Arend & Schäfer, 2019; Stegmueller, 2013).

### Measures

We measured social distance from immigrants with one item. Participants were asked "On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?" When participants answered "Immigrants/foreign workers" their response was coded as "1" when they did not choose immigrants/foreign workers their response was coded as "0." A total of 22.6% of respondents indicated immigrants/foreign workers as unwanted neighbors.

As the World Values Survey is sampled in different years in different countries, we matched the percentage of immigrant population using from the OECD or UN migration database (OECD, 2020; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

Population Division, 2019) to the corresponding survey years. Percentages ranged from .32 to 21.70 ( $M = 10.76$ ,  $SD = 6.61$ ).

To measure integration policies we again drew upon the MIPEX index similarly to the previous cross-country comparisons and matched MIPEX scores to the corresponding survey years. Scores ranged from 23 to 80 ( $M = 53.08$ ,  $SD = 15.63$ ).

### Study 4

#### Participants

For the fourth cross-country comparison, we employed again the sixth round of the World Values Survey collected in 2010–2014 and focused on native majority members' social distance from immigrants (Inglehart et al., 2020). Again, we sampled native majority members based on whether they were born in the country of the survey,  $N = 46,036$ . As survey respondents were only asked about their country of origin in a limited number of surveys, our analysis was also limited to these countries.

The final sample included the following 33 countries: Armenia (2011), Azerbaijan (2011), Belarus (2011), Chile (2012), Colombia (2012), Cyprus (2011), Estonia (2011), Ghana (2012), Kazakhstan (2011), Kyrgyzstan (2011), Malaysia (2012), Mexico (2012), Morocco (2011), the Netherlands (2012), New Zealand (2011), Nigeria (2012), Pakistan (2012), Peru (2012), Philippines (2012), Poland (2012), Qatar (2010), Romania (2012), Russian Federation (2011), Rwanda (2012), Singapore (2012), Slovenia (2011), South Korea (2010), Sweden (2011), Trinidad and Tobago (2010), Turkey (2012), Ukraine (2011), United States (2011), and Uruguay (2011).

### Measures

We measured social distance from immigrants with the same item that we employed in Study 3. A total of 22% of respondents indicated that they would prefer not to have immigrants or foreign workers as neighbors.

We used the UN statistics from 2010 to measure the percentage of immigrant population (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 2019). The closest UN population data was gathered in 2010. Percentages ranged from .20 to 81.80 ( $M = 10.00$ ,  $SD = 15.67$ ).

We used a binary measure of immigrant integration policies from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division that indicates whether the government has any policies or programs aimed at integrating nonnationals into the host society. The UN policy data was available for 2009 and 2011 for the survey years that we could employ from the WVS. For the survey data collected in 2010 we used the 2009 policy data and for the survey data collected in 2011–2012 we used the 2011 policy data (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

<sup>5</sup> When all countries were considered, it was indeed not possible to reach the minimum level of invariance to perform unbiased mean comparisons (i.e., partial scalar invariance). The Portuguese sample was revealed to contribute most, and by far, to the chi-square value of the model. Two threat items out of three were found to be non-invariant in this country, when a minimum of two invariant items is required (Byrne et al., 1989). For this reason, Portugal was not considered in the final analyses thus invariance was reached (for similar issues with immigration-related items in ISSP; see (Sarrasin et al., 2019).

Population Division, 2020). No immigrant integration policies were implemented in four of the countries included in the WVS.

## Study 5

### Participants

For the fifth cross-country comparison, we employed the currently available data from the seventh round of the World Values Survey collected in 2017–2020 and focused on native majority members' social distance from immigrants (Inglehart et al., 2020). Again, we sampled native majority members based on whether they were born in the country of the survey,  $N = 28,480$ .

The final sample included the following 19 countries: Argentina (2017), Australia (2018), Brazil (2018), Chile (2018), China (2018), Cyprus (2019), Germany (2018), Greece (2017), Indonesia (2018), Japan (2019), South Korea (2018), Mexico (2018), New Zealand (2020), Romania (2018), Russia (2017), Serbia (2017), Turkey (2018), Ukraine (2020), and United States (2017).

### Measures

We measured social distance from immigrants with the same item that we employed in Studies 3 and 4. A total of 21% percent of respondents indicated that they would prefer not to have immigrants or foreign workers as neighbors.

As the World Values Survey is sampled in different years in different countries, we matched the percentage of immigrant population using data from the OECD or UN migration database (OECD, 2020; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 2019) to the corresponding survey years. Percentages ranged from .07 to 29.50 ( $M = 8.79$ ,  $SD = 9.07$ ).

To measure integration policies we used the MIPEX scores similarly to Studies 1–3 (Solano & Huddleston, 2020). We matched the MIPEX scores to the survey years. Scores ranged from 28 to 76 ( $M = 51.59$ ,  $SD = 14.31$ ).

## Study 6

### Participants

For the final cross-country comparison, we again used the available data from the seventh round of the World Values Survey collected in 2017–2020 and focused on native majority members' social distance from immigrants (Inglehart et al., 2020). Like in previous studies, we sampled native majority members based on whether they were born in the country of the survey,  $N = 39,422$ .

The final sample included the following 30 countries: Argentina (2017), Australia (2018), Bangladesh (2018), Brazil (2018), Chile (2018), China (2018), Colombia (2018), Ethiopia (2020), Germany (2018), Greece (2017), Guatemala (2020), Iraq (2018), Japan (2019), Kazakhstan (2018), Jordan (2018), Kyrgyzstan (2020), Mexico (2018), New Zealand (2020), Nigeria (2018), Peru (2018), Philippines (2019), Romania (2018), Russia (2017), Serbia (2017), Vietnam (2020), Tajikistan (2020), Thailand (2018), Tunisia (2019), Turkey (2018), and Ukraine (2020).

### Measures

We measured social distance from immigrants with the same item that we employed in Studies 3, 4, and 5. A total of 24% of

respondents indicated that they would prefer not to have immigrants or foreign workers as neighbors.

As the World Values Survey is sampled in different years in different countries, we matched the percentage of immigrant population from the OECD or UN migration database (OECD, 2020; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 2019) to the corresponding survey years. Percentages ranged from .07 to 33.33 ( $M = 6.47$ ,  $SD = 8.94$ ).

We used the same binary measure of immigrant integration policies as in Study 4 from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division. The UN policy data was only available for 2019 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 2020). Two countries indicated that they did not implement policies to integrate immigrants.

## Study 7

### Participants

We compared cantons in Switzerland using the Swiss data of the European Values Survey from 2008 (European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association, 2008). We focused on native majority members' feelings of threat. We sampled native majority members based on whether they were born in Switzerland ( $N = 908$ ). The sample covers only 20 Swiss cantons as the survey data was not available for six cantons out of 26, the sample included Zürich, Bern/Berne, Luzern, Schwyz, Nidwalden, Glarus, Fribourg/Freiburg, Solothurn, Basel-Stadt, Basel-Landschaft, Schaffhausen, St. Gallen, Graubünden/Grigioni/Grischun, Aargau, Thurgau, Ticino, Vaud/Waadt, Valais/Wallis, Neuchâtel, and Genève.

### Measures

We measured perceptions of realistic threat with the following four items: "Immigrants take away jobs from the Swiss"; "Immigrants increase crime problems"; "Immigrants are a strain on welfare system"; and "Immigrants will become a threat to society"  $\alpha = .84$ . Preliminary analyses showed a sufficient level of measurement invariance across linguistic regions in Switzerland (out of the four items the intercept of only one was found to be noninvariant, in the German-speaking sample).<sup>6</sup> Scores ranged from 1 to 10 with higher scores indicating higher threat ( $M = 6.28$ ,  $SD = 1.94$ ).

We measured immigrant presence as the percentage of residents without Swiss citizenship using cantonal statistics from the Swiss National Statistics Bureau. We opted for percentage of residents

<sup>6</sup> Multigroup confirmatory factor analyses showed that configural invariance was reached, which means that the same factorial pattern was found across the three Swiss linguistic regions ( $\chi^2(5) = 8.98$ ,  $p = .11$ , CFI = .998, RMSEA = .043; note that the errors between two items, v270 and v271, were allowed to correlate in the three subgroups). The next step, metric invariance, ensures that the factors loadings are similar, which means that the estimated relationship between concepts of interest are not biased by intergroup differences. In the present case, metric invariance was also reached ( $\chi^2(11) = 22.22$ ,  $p = .02$ , CFI = .993, RMSEA = .049), because the difference in CFI was smaller than .010, and that in RMSEA smaller than .015 (Chen, 2007). Finally, reaching scalar invariance suggests that means can be compared across groups. In the present case, full scalar invariance was not reached ( $\chi^2(17) = 108.18$ ,  $p < .001$ , CFI = .945, RMSEA = .112). We thus decided to relax the equality constraint for one item (v272 in German), which does not compromise the quality of the mean comparison (Byrne et al., 1989). The resulting model indicated that partial scalar invariance was reached ( $\chi^2(16) = 43.06$ ,  $p < .001$ , CFI = .98, RMSEA = .063).

without Swiss citizenship as being born in Switzerland does not translate into citizenship. Percentages ranged from 10.04 to 37.41 ( $M = 20.67$ ,  $SD = 6.32$ ).

We measured the inclusiveness of integration policies with an index specifically developed for the Swiss context (Manatschal, 2011). The index measures the same domains of integration as the MIPEX index at the cantonal level. Policies were coded between 2004 and 2008. Scores ranged from .25 to .76 with higher scores indicating more inclusive policies ( $M = .49$ ,  $SD = .12$ ).

## Study 8

### Participants

Finally, we compared schools in Flanders, the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium using the Belgian part of the international Children of Immigrants Longitudinal study CILS (Emonds et al., 2015). We sampled native majority participants based on whether they and their parents were born in Belgium to match the administrative measure that captures the percentage of students of immigrant origin,  $N = 1,472$  in 64 schools.

### Measures

We measured anti-immigrant bias by computing a bias score comparing attitudes toward native Belgians and toward the largest immigrant-origin groups of Turkish and Moroccan origin in Belgium. Because the sample consisted of adolescents, we computed a bias score in line with developmental social psychological theories and measurement practices. Developmental studies show that during childhood and adolescence ingroup and outgroup evaluations develop interdependently and simultaneously, thus bias scores are often used to measure prejudice (Pfeifer et al., 2007; Rutland et al., 2010). Participants independently rated how they feel “about the following groups in Belgium on a scale that runs from 0 to 100” about Belgians, Turks, and Moroccans. We computed the bias score as a difference score between feelings toward Belgians and feelings toward Turks and Moroccans (Emonds et al., 2015). Thus, scores ranged from  $-100$  to  $100$  ( $M = 43.65$ ,  $SD = 29.69$ ).

We measured immigrant presence with the administrative measure used in schools in Belgium, the percentage of students speaking a foreign language at home (Emonds et al., 2015). Percentages ranged from 0% to 69% ( $M = 24.9$ ,  $SD = 20.73$ ).

We used a measure of equal treatment policies derived from content-analyzing diversity policies in these Belgian schools (Celeste et al., 2019). We focused in the current analysis on policies of equal treatment as the most comparable aspect of school policies to the socioeconomic and political integration policies at the country or cantonal level. Equal treatment policies in schools mostly entailed mentioning equality as a value. We used z-scores ranging from  $-1.54$  to  $2.78$  (standardized in Celeste et al., 2019;  $M = -.05$ ,  $SD = 1.03$ ; six schools were excluded from the complete sample as there were no native students).

The data, code, and output for all the studies is available at the following link:

[https://osf.io/j5h4e/?view\\_only=5b6652ff0bd14db9ad096326dcbf8ed7](https://osf.io/j5h4e/?view_only=5b6652ff0bd14db9ad096326dcbf8ed7)

## Analytic Strategy

To test whether integration policies moderate the relationship between immigrant presence and anti-immigrant prejudice, we ran stepwise multilevel regression analyses (Hox et al., 2010; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). The main analyses in all the studies were run in consecutive steps starting from the null model (null models in Tables S2 to S9 in online supplemental materials). Second, we included Level 1 control variables (“Level 1 predictor” models). In cross-country (Studies 1–6) and cross-cantonal (Study 7) analyses, we controlled for known individual predictors of anti-immigrant prejudice that were available across data sets such as participants’ age, gender, level of education, and religiosity. In comparative analysis across schools (Study 8), we controlled for participants’ age and gender. Third, we included the Level 2 predictors immigrant presence and integration policies (“Level 2 predictor” models) and finally added the interaction between immigrant presence and integration policies (“Interaction” model) to test the key hypothesis of this research. In additional analyses with the contextual controls, we included each country or canton level predictor one by one in the final interaction model (see Supplement 2 and Tables S10–S14).

In Studies 1, 2, 7, and 8 the outcome variables were continuous; therefore, we used multilevel linear regression. In Studies 3, 4, 5, and 6 social distance was measured with a binary variable (no/yes) therefore we implemented multilevel logistic regressions.

## Results

### Does the Association of Immigrant Presence With Anti-Immigrant Prejudice Depend on Integration Policies?

To answer our main question, we first examined whether there is significant cross-country, cross-regional or cross-institutional variation in anti-immigrant prejudice. In every analysis, we observed statistically significant contextual variation, suggesting that country, regional, or institutional factors substantially contribute to anti-immigrant prejudice (see detailed narrative by study in Supplement 1 and null models in Tables S2 to S9 in online supplemental materials).

Second, we looked at the main effects of immigrant presence and integration policies in the final interaction models (see Table 2, Column 2 for the main effect of immigrant presence and Column 3 for the main effect of integration policies and Tables S2 to S9 in supplemental materials for complete set of stepwise models). Consistent with the idea that the relation between immigrant presence and anti-immigrant prejudice depends on integration policies, the main effect of immigrant presence on anti-immigrant prejudice varied across studies, we found a negative relation in three studies (1, 2, and 8), positive in two studies (4 and 6) and no significant relations in three studies (3, 5, and 7). In contrast, inclusive policies were consistently related to lower anti-immigrant prejudice, with a significant main effect in five out of eight studies (2–6), and marginal in Study 1.

Third, to test our key hypothesis, we examined the interaction between immigrant presence and integration policies in predicting anti-immigrant prejudice. In seven out of eight sets of analyses, we indeed found that immigrant presence and integration policies jointly predicted anti-immigrant prejudice (see Table 2, Column 4,

T2



**Table 2**

Significance Levels and Confidence Intervals for the Interaction Between Immigrant Presence and Policies and for the Wald Tests Comparing Estimated Values of Anti-Immigrant Prejudice

Study	Immigrant presence main effect	Policy main effect	Interaction between immigrant presence and policies	Difference between less and more inclusive policies at high immigrant presence	Difference between low and high immigrant presence at inclusive policies
1	-0.04*[-0.06, 0.01]	-0.01†[-0.02, 0.00]	-0.00*[-0.00, -0.00]	$p = .008$	$p = .021$
2	-0.02*[-0.03, 0.00]	-0.01**[-0.01, -0.00]	-0.00**[-0.00, -0.00]	$p < .001$	$p = .007$
3	-0.01[-0.08, 0.06]	-0.04**[-0.06, -0.01]	-0.00**[-0.01, -0.00]	$p < .001$	$p = .216$
4	0.37***[0.26, 0.48]	-3.40***[-4.50, -2.30]	-0.35***[-0.46, -0.24]	$p < .001$	$p = .152$
5	0.02 [-0.02, 0.06]	-0.05***[-0.08, -0.03]	0.00 [-0.00, 0.00]		
6	0.68*** [0.58, 0.79]	-4.211***[-4.89, -3.54]	-0.69***[-0.81, -0.58]	$p < .001$	$p = .609$
7	1.55 [-2.60, 5.69]	-0.71[-2.22, 0.81]	-23.28*[-40.68, -5.88]	$p = .027$	$p = .516$
8	-31.61***[-43.04, -20.19]	-1.05 [-3.44, 1.33]	-14.37†[-26.92, -1.81]	$p = .057$	$p < .001$

Note. Entries represent unstandardized coefficients.  
 †  $p < .10$ . \*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$  (2-tailed).

for the significance level of the interaction between immigrant presence and integration policies and Tables S2 to S9 in online supplemental materials for complete set of stepwise models). The interaction was significant in Studies 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 and marginally significant in Study 8 (though adding the interaction significantly improved model fit). In Study 5, the interaction was not significant and did not improve model fit, though more inclusive policies still predicted lower anti-immigrant prejudice (see Table S7).

Fourth, to interpret the interplay between immigrant presence and integration policies in predicting anti-immigrant prejudice, we plotted the interactions in Studies 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8. More specifically, in each study we estimated the predicted values of anti-immigrant prejudice at low and high immigrant presence and at less or more inclusive policies, defined as minus or plus one standard deviations from the mean. Thus, we estimated the magnitude of anti-immigrant prejudice at all four possible combinations of the predictors (i.e., low immigrant presence and less inclusive policies, low immigrant presence and more inclusive policies, high immigrant presence and less inclusive policies, high immigrant presence and more inclusive policies). Finally, we tested whether the difference between these four estimated values was significant with a Wald test. Our predictions are confirmed when at high levels of immigrant presence, anti-immigrant prejudice is lower in countries with more inclusive, rather than more exclusive, policies. Figures 1 to 7 show the results from the different studies and Columns 5 and 6 in Table 2 show the results of the Wald tests probing the difference between the estimated values.


Most importantly, as expected, we found that in contexts of high immigration, prejudiced attitudes were lower when policies were more inclusive than when they were less inclusive (Studies 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8). Figures 1–7 depict these patterns of anti-immigrant prejudice and Table 2 (Column 5) confirms that the difference in the estimated values of anti-immigrant prejudice was significant (or marginally significant for Study 8,  $p = .057$ ) in each of these studies. Moreover, when policies were inclusive, anti-immigrant prejudice was lower in three of the studies when diversity was higher (Studies 1, 2, and 8; as seen in Figures 1, 2, and 7 and Table 2 Column 6). In Studies 3, 4, 6, and 7 however, the difference between low and high immigrant presence at more inclusive policies was not significant (Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 and Column 6). Interestingly, in Studies 4 and

5, the difference between low and high immigrant presence was significant when policies were exclusive (and not when policies were inclusive): Exclusive policies were related to stronger anti-immigrant prejudice at high levels of immigrant presence than at low levels of immigrant presence. Finally, in contexts of low immigration, there was no significant difference in either of the studies between more inclusive and less inclusive policy contexts (see Figures 1 to 7).

While Study 7 (see Figure 6) seems like an exception to this pattern, the estimated combination of low immigrant presence and inclusive policies is actually hypothetical: There are no cantons with immigrant presence 1 SD below the mean (14%) and inclusive policies that are 1 SD over the mean (.62). Please also note that the pattern of results in Study 7 (see Figure 6) seems to deviate from the general pattern in the sense that levels of prejudice seem lower at the combination of low immigrant presence and less inclusive policies than at the combination of high immigrant presence and more inclusive policies. However, the difference between these two estimates was not statistically significant.

Thus, the main findings confirm our predictions: Attitudes toward immigrants were more positive in high-immigration contexts when policies were inclusive than when policies were exclusive in seven out of eight studies. The results also showed that at low levels of immigrant presence, immigrant integration policies were not consequential

**Figure 1**  
 Study 1. Realistic Threat Predicted by Immigrant Presence and Integration Policies (MIPEX) in ESS Data in 20 Countries



Note. Threat scores ranged from 0 to 10. ESS = European Social Survey.


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F1-F7

**Figure 2**  
Study 2. Realistic Threat Predicted by Immigrant Presence and Integration Policies (MIPEX) in ISSP Data in 19 Countries



Note. Threat scores ranged from 1 to 5. ISSP = International Social Survey Program.


\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$  (2-tailed).

for prejudice. These results demonstrate that the effect of immigrant presence on anti-immigrant prejudice depends on the inclusiveness of immigrant integration policies in high-immigration contexts.

### Is It Specifically Immigrant Integration Policies That Make a Difference?

To exclude that the result patterns are due to economic, social, or political factors beyond integration policies, we performed additional analyses across countries and cantons. While some of these contextual measures were related to anti-immigrant prejudice, our key finding held over wealth, income inequality, unemployment rates, general anti-immigrant climate, general civil-political rights, and the political discourse on immigration (see detailed narrative of analyses with contextual controls in Supplement 2 and Tables S10–S14 in online supplemental materials). Our main finding also replicated


**Figure 3**  
Study 3. Social Distance Predicted by Immigrant Presence and Integration Policies (MIPEX) in WVS 6 Data in 12 Countries



Note. Social distance was measured as a binary variable, 1 indicated that respondent prefers not to have immigrants or foreign workers as neighbors. WVS = World Values Survey.

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Figure 4**  
Study 4. Social Distance Predicted by Immigrant Presence and Integration Policies (UNDESA) in WVS 6 Data in 35 Countries



Note. Social distance was measured as a binary variable, 1 indicating that respondent prefers not to have immigrants or foreign workers as neighbors. WVS = World Values Survey.


\*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

while taking into account the quadratic term of immigrant presence, thus controlling for a potential effect of a tipping point in immigrant presence beyond its linear effect (see also narrative in Supplement 2 and Tables S10–S14 in online supplemental materials). Therefore, these findings suggest that the interplay of policies and immigrant presence predict prejudiced attitudes beyond other factors.

### Why Do Immigrant Integration Policies Make a Difference?

The European Social Survey (ESS; Study 1) and the CILS-Leuven (Study 8) data allowed us to test whether higher immigrant presence and more inclusive policies would mean that natives have more contact with immigrants, reducing thereby prejudice. To test this argument, we implemented a similar analysis to our

**Figure 5**  
Study 6. Social Distance Predicted by Immigrant Presence and Integration Policies (UNDESA) in WVS 7 Data in 30 Countries




Note. Social distance was measured as a binary variable, 1 indicating that respondent prefers not to have immigrants or foreign workers as neighbors. WVS = World Values Survey.

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

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**Figure 6**

Study 7. Realistic Threat Predicted by Presence of Nonnationals and Integration Policies (Swiss Cantonal Policy Index) in EVS Data in 20 Swiss Cantons



Note. Threat scores ranged from 1 to 10. EVS = European Values Study.  
\*  $p < .05$ .

main analysis, but testing contact with immigrants or people of immigrant origin as an outcome measure (see detailed narrative in Supplement 3). We found in the ESS analysis that natives had the most contact with immigrants when there are more immigrants in a country and policies are more inclusive (see Supplemental Materials Figure S1, Table S15).

In the CILS-Leuven analysis, native students had more contact with immigrant-origin students in schools with a higher presence of immigrant-origin students and in schools with more inclusive policies, though the interaction of presence of immigrant-origin students and policies was not significant (see Supplemental Materials Table S17). Individual-level contact predicted lower prejudice both in Study 1 and Study 8 (see Tables S16 and S18).

The results from these two studies suggest that increased and more equal contact with immigrants or people of immigrant origin could be one reason why the interplay of increased immigrant presence and more inclusive policies is related to reduced xenophobia. Note that we also tested a moderated mediation model with immigrant presence and policies jointly predicting anti-immigrant prejudice through contact. In the full model, the interaction term Immigrant Presence  $\times$  Policies Predicting Contact was significant in the ESS analysis, but it was not in the CILS analysis (as in the analysis above when we only included contact as an outcome variable). In addition, the contextual link between contact and anti-immigrant prejudice was only significant in the CILS analysis but not in the ESS analysis. These results might be due to statistical and data constraints (i.e., very high correlations between immigrant presence and contact at the contextual level and more parameters than contextual units in the ESS analysis). These findings suggest that contact may play a role, but that contact in itself does not fully explain the relation between the Immigrant Presence  $\times$  Policy interaction and prejudice.

## Discussion


The present article set out to question the argument that higher immigrant presence translates to higher anti-immigrant prejudice,

and to clarify why previous studies found inconsistent results regarding the link between immigrant presence and anti-immigrant prejudice. Across seven out of eight studies (six data sets), our results show consistently that natives express lower prejudice in high-immigration contexts when higher immigrant presence is coupled with inclusive immigrant integration policies. We thus go beyond previous studies that have shown that inclusive integration policies are consequential without however accounting for the interactive role of immigrant presence (Callens & Meuleman, 2017; de la Sablonnière et al., 2020; Guimond et al., 2014; Hooghe & de Vroome, 2015; Schlueter et al., 2013). These studies argued that inclusive policies reduce prejudice because they set more tolerant, proimmigrant norms. While proimmigrant norms should shape anti-immigrant prejudice regardless of immigrant presence, our findings demonstrate however that legal and socioeconomic policies matter the most in high-immigrant settings. We argue that this is due to the fact that inclusive legal and socioeconomic integration policies render immigrants more equal to natives (Bilgili et al., 2015; Hainmueller et al., 2016; 2019; International Organization for Migration, 2020a; Manatschal & Stadelmann-Steffen, 2013). Thus, our results offer little support for predictions from conflict and threat theories, predictions that would forecast the highest levels of anti-immigrant prejudice at high immigrant presence and more inclusive integration policies (Morrison & Ybarra, 2008; Stephan et al., 2016). In contrast, our findings provide empirical evidence for previous theoretical arguments that it is “not diversity per se but unequal diversity” that exacerbates prejudice (Portes & Vickstrom, 2011).

We tested our hypothesis to explain anti-immigrant prejudice in diverse contexts and at different levels of governance, focusing on socioeconomic and legal-political policies to capture the potential empowerment of immigrants (Helbling, 2013; Penninx & Garcés-Masareñas, 2016). More specifically, we conducted comprehensive cross-national analyses across six different data sets covering altogether 66 countries and over 140,000 participants. In the cross-national analyses, we replicated the results with two different policy indices covering largely rich, democratic, industrialized Western countries, but also a substantial number of countries beyond the Western world. Our study thus surpasses previous research on

**Figure 7**

Study 8. Bias Scores Predicted by Percentage of Students Speaking a Foreign Language and School Policies of Equal Treatment in CILS-Leuven Data in 65 Schools



Note. Bias scores ranged from -100 to 100. CILS = Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study.

†  $p < .10$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

anti-immigrant prejudice that was overwhelmingly implemented in Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic nations (Dinesen et al., 2020; Henrich et al., 2010; Pottie-Sherman & Wilkes, 2017; van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014). As diversity is governed at different levels, we also investigated the effect of subnational policies across 20 Swiss cantons and 64 Flemish-Belgian schools with altogether approximately 2,400 participants. The results on subnational governance also replicate the main findings. In short, more inclusive policies were related to lower anti-immigrant prejudice at all levels of governance and across a broad range of contexts.

We reason that such integration policies shape intergroup relations by providing immigrants' more or less equal legal-political and socioeconomic rights compared with natives. More extensive rights, in turn, are conducive to more equal school, labor market, civic, and political participation outcomes for immigrants in reality. Thus inclusive policies will lower anti-immigrant prejudice through more equal immigrant-native relations especially at high levels of immigrant presence. With these arguments and findings, we develop a contextual social psychological approach to anti-immigrant prejudice that conceptualizes prejudice in its broader social-political context beyond individual-level factors (Oishi & Graham, 2010; Pettigrew, 2018). Thus the present studies also go beyond previous research demonstrating that the diversity-prejudice relation is moderated by individual factors (Sibley et al., 2013; Van Assche et al., 2018, 2019).

While our key results replicated across the studies, the patterns also somewhat differed. More specifically, Studies 1, 2, and 8 showed that anti-immigrant prejudice was the lowest in high immigration contexts with inclusive policies. In Studies 3, 4, 6, and 7, we also found that integration policies are especially consequential at high immigrant presence, but levels of anti-immigrant prejudice were comparable when policies were inclusive at all levels of immigrant presence. Furthermore, in Studies 4 and 6, prejudice levels differed across exclusive policy contexts and not in inclusive policy contexts. High levels of immigration were related to the highest levels of prejudice in exclusive policy contexts. These results thus align with our findings in Studies 1, 2, and 8 even if they do not provide a direct replication. We speculate that the difference might be due to the type of data available. Studies 1, 2, and 8 had continuous outcome variables, more contextual units (20 countries in Study 1, 19 countries in Study 2, and 64 schools in Study 8), and fine-grained policy measures (MIPEX or CILS). In contrast, Study 3 had lower number of contextual units (12 countries), while in Studies 4 and 6 we drew on binary policy measures. Thus, we suspect that the differences in results might be due to data constraints: The lower number of contextual units might not have been sufficient to fully capture the interaction and binary policy measure did not differentiate between less and more inclusive policy environments. These three studies were still informative as they demonstrated that immigrant presence and policies jointly predict prejudice.

Finally, the interaction did not replicate in Study 5. This might be due to some specificities in the migration patterns of the countries and the time of the data collection. In Study 5, respondents in some countries expressed very high levels of social distance. Highest scores were in Serbia and Turkey where 54% and 49% of the respondents, respectively, did not wish to have immigrants as neighbors. Though these countries are not traditional immigrant-receiving countries, in the years preceding the surveys they experienced high migration inflows or transit, often of undocumented

immigrants. Thus, the official statistics might not accurately reflect the level of immigrant presence in these countries.<sup>7</sup>

Our results also demonstrate that when immigrant presence is high and policies are inclusive, natives have more contact with immigrants (though the effects were only marginally significant in Study 8). Previous studies revealed that higher levels of diversity are related to lower anti-immigrant prejudice when immigrants and natives are not segregated from each other, and diversity translates into more contact between natives and immigrants (Hewstone, 2015; Laurence et al., 2019; Savelkoul et al., 2011). Our findings go beyond these previous studies by identifying inclusive integration policies as a key condition to reduce segregation especially in highly diverse contexts. Thus, the results also complement previous studies showing that higher levels of contextual contact in regions, districts, or neighborhoods reduce prejudice (Christ et al., 2014). As we argued, more inclusive integration policies empower immigrants who can thus achieve more equal educational, labor market, and political positions (Cinalli & Giugni, 2011; Hainmueller et al., 2016, 2019; Manatschal & Stadelmann-Steffen, 2013; 2014). These more equal positions could also serve to reduce segregation between immigrants and natives. Furthermore, such equal positions would afford more equal contact, equal contact that is especially effective in reducing prejudice (Allport, 1954; Kende et al., 2018).

One crucial question when interpreting the results is whether it is really policies and immigrant presence that shape anti-immigrant prejudice, or whether countries, regions, and institutions where individuals' hold more favorable attitudes toward immigrants implement more inclusive policies and regulate immigrant rights more favorably. Previous research comparing EU countries has shown that changes in policies predict changes in xenophobia but not vice versa, supporting our claims on the effect of policies (Schlueter et al., 2013). At the same time, inclusive integration policies would be hard to sustain if opposed by the majority of the electorate, and some previous studies suggest that attitudes also influence policies (Bloemraad & Wright, 2014). We acknowledge that a certain level of attitudinal support might be necessary to implement more inclusive policies, and future research should engage with this recursive relationship. However, based on our studies we conclude that at high immigrant presence more inclusive integration policies relate to reduced anti-immigrant prejudice. Moreover, our results show that the interplay of high immigrant presence and inclusive policies are associated with reduced prejudice even over other sociopolitical factors that could induce hostility toward immigrants such as unemployment or pervasive anti-immigrant discourses.

## Limitations and Future Directions

We encountered some limitations pertaining to data and coverage in our endeavor to test the relationship between immigrant

<sup>7</sup> A large number of Syrian refugees migrated to Turkey due to the civil war in these years but their presence might not be accurately captured by the immigration statistics. Attesting to this potential inaccuracy, estimates widely differed across sources: the immigrant percentage for 2017 was 2.4 in the OECD and 6.1 in the UN database. Serbia was on the Balkan migration route experiencing high migration flows during these years. Only a small fraction of these people on the move applied for asylum or residence permit in Serbia thus the immigration statistics do not capture the extent of this flow.

presence, integration policies, and anti-immigrant prejudice. First, while the pattern of results was consistent across national contexts, for most non-Western countries the policy measures only offered limited information (Studies 4 and 6). As migration is truly a global phenomenon, in the future more detailed policy indices should be compiled to allow for more robust comparison. Second, some of the large-scale studies (Studies 3–6) only included binary measures of anti-immigrant prejudice. Third, currently available large-scale surveys do not allow examining whether equal contact or extended contact would be more frequent at high immigrant presence and inclusive policies, neither to test whether natives see more counterstereotypical representations of immigrants in such settings. Fourth, natives' attitudes differ toward immigrants of different origin and gender, but large-scale surveys usually only allow for testing attitudes toward immigrants in general. Therefore, future large-scale surveys should include composite scales of anti-immigrant prejudice, items on equal contact, extended contact, and representations of immigrants and items that differentiate between attitudes toward different immigrant groups. Furthermore, to adequately test these questions concerning different immigrant groups, group-specific policy indicators and immigrant presence data would also be necessary. Fifth, to firmly establish the causal directions and to test the proposed social psychological mechanisms in depth, our cross-sectional findings should be extended by longitudinal survey studies, as well as survey and field experiments. Attention should be given to specific immigrant groups that are in special need of inclusive integration policies such as refugees. Finally, at the subnational level, we could only analyze one example for regional and institutional policies each, as currently available data is scarce. For this reason, more subnational policy data should be compiled and published.

## Conclusion

As immigration is steadily increasing around the world, one of the decisive societal challenges of our time is to find ways to live together peacefully and cohesively (International Organization for Migration, 2020a). The present research contributes to the development of a contextual social psychology of immigration attitudes and highlights the importance of the broader social-political context. Taken together, the results of our comprehensive analyses at different regulatory levels identify the key condition for low anti-immigrant prejudice at high immigrant presence: inclusive legal and socioeconomic integration policies that render immigrants more equal to natives. While exclusive integration policies might seem like an attractive option for policymakers to placate natives' supposed concerns and right-populist parties' demands, our findings show that this strategy would be detrimental to intergroup relations in diverse societies. Instead, formulating more inclusive policies could feed a virtuous circle as more inclusive policies reduce xenophobia among natives. Lower xenophobia in turn would induce lower discrimination toward immigrants, thus improving intergroup relations and boosting social cohesion (Fiske, 1998; Schütz & Six, 1996). In parallel, inclusive policies translate into more equality between natives and immigrants, thus further contributing to this virtuous circle (Bilgili et al., 2015; International Organization for Migration, 2020a; Manatschal & Stadelmann-Steffen, 2013; Mettler & Soss, 2004). All in all, to strive for social cohesion and positive intergroup

relations, our findings urge authorities at all levels of governance to equalize immigrant-native relations through inclusive integration policies.

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Received January 21, 2021

Revision received July 15, 2021

Accepted July 22, 2021 ■



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