

Consenting to Include? Empirical Patterns of Democracy and Integration Policy

Anita Manatschal and Julian Bernauer
Institute of Political Science, University of Bern

SVPW annual conference, 30.-31. January 2014, Bern

Point of departure, research question



^b
UNIVERSITÄT
BERN

Migration research (e.g. Favell 2001, Koopmans et al. 2012)

Myopic perspective on single / selective set of explanatory factors (e.g. path dependency, party ideology)

neglect of larger institutional democratic setting

Research on empirical democracies (Lijphart 1999, 2012)

No direct answer to this question, but minorities in general: Consensus democracies «kinder and gentler», and better for minority representation

→ *Research question: How do empirical patterns of democracy affect integration policy outputs?*


Explanatory Model




Observed indicators

Latent (quasi-)institutional context


Policy specific context



Explanatory Model



Explanatory Model



Expectations



^b
UNIVERSITÄT
BERN

Immigrants comprise non-eligible individuals...

H1: *Power dispersion does not affect immigrant integration policies*

...vs. eligible immigrants / future electorate: immigrant voters (cf. Koopmans et al. 2012)

H2: *Proportional power dispersion leads to more inclusive immigrant integration policies*

Immigrants = non-territorial minority (vs. Kymlicka 2001, Norris 2008; cf. Vatter 2011)

H3: *Representative-veto power dispersion leads to more exclusive immigrant integration policies*

Combining H2 and H3: centripetal democracy (Gerring et al. 2005)

H4: *The inclusive effect of proportional power dispersion on immigrant integration policy is curbed by strong representative-veto or direct formal veto institutions*

Anti-minority effect of direct democracy (cf. Gerber and Hug 2001, Vatter and Danaci 2010)

H5: *Direct power dispersion leads to more exclusive immigrant integration policies*

Data

Dependent variable

Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX 2010)

- 148 indicators in 7 areas: access to nationality, political participation, labour market mobility, family reunion, anti-discrimination, long term residence, education

Independent variables

yearly measure (1990-2010) of three latent dimensions of democracy

- proportional power dispersion (cabinet type, effective number of parties, disproportionality of the electoral system)
- representative-veto power dispersion (federalism, bicameralism, judicial review)
- Direct power dispersion (direct democracy)

Controls

Party ideology (left, right / populist), immigration legacy, GDP, immigrant share

Research Design and Methods

Research Design:

Cross-sectional analyses (N = 30 European and North American countries)

Methods:

- Frequentist OLS regressions, interactions
- Simultaneous Bayesian measurement and outcome Model (improvement and robustness check of frequentist standard approach)

Results

	<i>Model 1: OLS/interactions</i>	<i>Model 2: OLS</i>	<i>Model 2: Bayesian</i>
<i>Measurement: item discrimination parameters proportional power dispersion</i>			
Electoral disproport.			-0.92 [-1.09;-0.73]
Effective nr. of parties			0.74 [0.68;0.79]
Cabinet type			0.50 [0.41;0.62]
<i>Measurement: item discrimination parameters veto power dispersion</i>			
Federalism			6.03 [3.85;8.99]
Decentralization			2.64 [2.32;3.01]
Bicameralism			0.75 [0.63;0.89]
Judicial review			0.36 [0.28;0.44]
Constitutional rigidity			1.83 [1.44;2.37]
Country-years			602
Executives-parties	5.73 (3.01)*	4.99 (2.34)**	
Federal-unitary	-6.87 (3.41)*	-6.95 (3.25)**	
Proportional power disp.			2.08 [-0.89;4.81]
Repr.-veto power disp.			-1.57 [-4.27;1.18]
Direct democracy	-1.13 (0.96)	-1.05 (0.76)	-1.23 [-2.88;0.48]
Exe.-par. X fed.-uni.	1.34 (3.18)		
Exe.-par. X dir.	-0.24 (0.80)		
GDP (log)	5.22 (2.04)**	5.07 (1.77)**	4.64 [1.85;7.15]
Cabinet share “right”	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 [-0.15;0.08]
Seat share “populist”	-0.16 (0.34)	-0.19 (0.31)	-0.10 [-0.85;0.63]
Immigrants (share)	0.29 (0.37)	0.25 (0.31)	0.25 [-0.27;0.77]
Legacy: “settler”	22.66 (16.05)	18.66 (11.36)	10.55 [-15.92;38.40]
Legacy: “guest”	-2.10 (7.75)	-1.02 (6.86)	
Constant	-9.16 (25.56)	-6.68 (21.62)	-2.02 [-32.60;30.72]
N (countries)	30	30	30
Prob. > F	0.02	0.00	
Adj. R-squared	0.44	0.49	

Concluding remarks



Findings

- Distinct tendency: "**Janus-faced**" impact of democracy on integration policy
 - Prop. power dispersion → inclusive int.pol.
 - Repr.-veto power dispersion → exclusive int.pol.
- Conventional factors lose explanatory power once we account for patterns of democracy

Remaining questions and challenges

- Frequentist **and** Bayesian approach?
- More substantial interpretation of Bayesian results
- low N, collinearity. Reduce explanatory variables?
- Data on immigrant voters?

Appendix, country scores



Appendix, codebook

<i>Indicators</i>	<i>Main sources</i>
<i>Proportional power dispersion (~“executives-parties” dimension)</i>	
1) <i>Cabinet type</i>	
Ordinal (yearly) contrast between one-party minimal winning, multi-party minimal winning, minority, and oversized cabinets	Armingeon, Klaus; Romana Careja; David Weisstanner; Sarah Engler; Panajotis Potolidis; Marlène Gerber. Comparative Political Data Set III 1990-2010, Institute of Political Science, University of Berne 2012; accessed on September 27, 2012; Teorell, Jan, Nicholas Charron, Marcus Samanni, Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein (2012): The Quality of Government Dataset, version 6Apr11. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se ; download November 14, 2012.
2) <i>Party system</i>	
Effective number of parliamentary parties	Gallagher, Michael (2012): Election indices dataset, retrieved from http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/index.php , accessed January 16, 2013; other sources.
3) <i>Electoral system</i>	
Gallagher index of electoral disproportionality	See party system.

Appendix

Representative-veto power dispersion (~“federal-unitary” dimension)

4) *Constitutional federalism*

Territorial power sharing
(federal, semi-federal, and
unitary)

Lijphart (2012: 178); Lundell, Krister and Lauri Karvonen (2003): A Comparative Data Set on Political Institutions. Abo Akademi, Department of Political Science, Finland, received in 2007; other sources.

5) *Fiscal decentralization*

Share of subnational in
total taxes

Armingeon et al. (2012); Teorell et al. (2012); World Bank (<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm>, accessed January 21, 2013).

6) *Bicameralism*

Classification by power
symmetry and partisan
congruence (four
categories)

Armingeon et al. (2012); Lundell and Karvonen (2003); other sources.

7) *Constitutional rigidity*

Ordinal index considering
the required majorities for
change

Siaroff (2009: 218).

8) *Judicial review*

Ordinal index of strength

Lijphart (2012: 215); Siaroff (2009: 218); other sources.

Appendix

Direct power dispersion

9) *Direct Democracy*

Index of direct democratic
power dispersion
(initiatives and
referendums)

Our own calculations mainly based on the data from the Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (C2D), Zurich, <http://www.c2d.ch/> and the IRI/DI Navigator to Direct Democracy (under construction), <http://direct-democracy-navigator.org/countries>, both accessed repeatedly in June 2013; other sources.

Appendix, descriptives

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
MPEX	54.6	13.1	31	83
Executives-parties	0.0	1.0	-2.4	1.8
Federal-unitary	0.0	1.0	-1.4	2.4
Direct democracy	0.1	3.4	-3.2	12.3
GDP (log)	11.8	1.8	8.6	15.8
Right government	46.3	36.2	0	100
Immigrant share	11.4	8.6	0.4	36.6
Populist share (parl.)	5.9	8.0	0	28.9
History: settler state	0.1	.3	0	1
History: guest state	0.4	.5	0	1