

Assessing the Impact of the Popular Will on Cantonal Integration Policies¹

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Abstract

While the surge of radical right parties over the last decades is assumed to yield a restrictive impact on migration policies in western European countries, so far, such assumptions remain largely descriptive and little is known on how exactly such an influence might occur. The situation appears particularly complex in Switzerland where apart from party influence the instrument of direct democracy allows xenophobic tendencies of the population to impact on policy making in this field. Thus, this paper aims at assessing the individual impact of radical right parties and direct democratic decisions on migration policies. The scarcity of respective studies might not least be explained by the complexity of the comprehensive field migration policy. Switzerland's strong federalism, resulting in a pronounced subnational variation of integration policies, a subfield of migration policies, allows for a systematic comparative analysis of the expected effects at the subnational level. The potentially restrictive impact of the right-populist anti-immigrant Swiss People's Party ("Schweizerische Volkspartei", SVP) on the one and xenophobic direct democratic decisions on the other hand was tested by means of bivariate correlations and multiple regression models. The results of the statistical analysis corroborate the assumption of a restrictive impact of xenophobic tendencies in the population on cantonal integration policies, while a similar but weaker effect could be attested for the SVP. Yet, the findings suggest that particularly voting behavior is linked to the regional context of German- and French-speaking cantons respectively.

Introduction

In recent years, radical right parties have made the immigration issue one of their favorite battlegrounds on which they try to distance themselves from mainstream parties. While this demarcation strategy proved to be effective in terms of electoral gains (Giugni/Passy 2006:15; Kriesi 2005:45), much less is known on if, and whether, how this strategy affects policy outputs in the field of migration policies. Whereas scholars assume a restrictive impact, systematic empirical evidence on this effect remains scarce. With the surge of radical right anti-immigrant parties in western European countries this question gained in relevance and deserves further investigation. Switzerland is no exception to this pattern: Over the last two decades, the right-populist anti-immigrant Swiss People's Party ("Schweizerische Volkspartei", SVP) could more than double its electoral share, being now Switzerland's single strongest party in terms of electoral strength (Vatter 2008:9). Based on this broad popular support the SVP

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claims to be the party that best represents the “popular will”. On the other hand, this “popular will” itself is expected to exert a restrictive impact on migration policy through direct democratic decisions.

The lack of systematic empirical studies on the assumed restrictive effects of radical right parties and direct democratic decisions may be explained with the complexity of the comprehensive field of migration policies. Switzerland's subnational level allows to address this complexity by focusing on cantonal integration policies as one specific subfield of migration policy. The country offers a particularly interesting case for a sound comparative investigation of the respective assumptions for at least three reasons: First, the autonomous Swiss cantons display very diverse integration policies. Second, both factors of central interest, the electoral support for the SVP as well as the popular attitude towards immigrants finding its expression in direct democratic decisions, vary considerably among the cantons. Finally, the subnational Swiss level allows to focus the comparison on the central factors by profiting from the approximation to a most similar cases-design. Besides these factors, a comparative analysis at Switzerland's subnational level allows to assess the historical coinage of cantonal integration policies along the cultural-linguistic cleavage between Switzerland's French and German regions.

In order to test these assumptions, a definition and operationalization of cantonal integration policies is needed. In line with international approaches, the theoretical conceptualization of integration policy used in this paper is based on the idea of migrant's access to citizenship. The respective understanding of citizenship is a broad one including civic, political, socio-structural, cultural and religious rights and obligations. For the measurement of cantonal integration policies, an internationally established instrument was transferred to the subnational level. Conceptual shortcomings of this instrument have been modified in order to foster its theoretical coherence.

Radical Right Parties, Direct Democratic Decisions and Subnational Integration Policies

In spite of a lack of systematic empirical analyses, many scholars assume a restrictive impact of radical right parties on migration policies. Kriesi (2006:216) considers the surge of the radical right even as the driving force behind the illiberal turn in migration policies in western European countries. In a similar vein, Giugni and Passy (2006:16) conceive the radical right as most imminent threat to the identity and interests of the migrant population. Helbling's study on Swiss naturalization practices offers empirical evidence from the local level, where

he disclosed a restrictive influence of the electoral strength of the SVP on the rejection rate of naturalization requests (Helbling/Kriesi 2004:53). According to Mudde (2008:18), the radical right exerts direct influence on the legislation in the field of migration policies through government participation. By contrast, party-political influence through the governmental channel is in Switzerland restricted by broad concordant governments at the national and subnational levels. Therefore, the SVP is assumed to have a rather indirect restrictive impact on migration policies by its gained strength as referendum party (Giugni/Passy 2006:15; Kriesi 2006:218; Skenderovic/D'Amato 2008:225).

However, the SVP is not the first party to occupy the immigrant issue in Switzerland. The country has a long tradition of resistance to foreign infiltration (“Überfremdungsabwehr”) dating back to the post second world war era (Niederberger 2004:22; Mahnig/Piguet 2003:56ff; Skenderovic/D'Amato 2008:32ff). Starting with the “National Movement against Foreign Infiltration of Nation and Homeland” founded in 1961, a series of small radical right wing parties emerged and entered the political arena, using direct democratic instruments of initiative and referendum in order to bring up their anti-immigrant claims into the political debate (Ladner 2006:235f; Skenderovic/D'Amato 2008:207). Yet, with the overwhelming successes of the SVP these former right-wing parties almost completely disappeared from Switzerland's political landscape (Kriesi 2005:45).

Considering this tradition of politicization of immigrant-skeptic sentiments among the Swiss population one could argue that it is not so much the party factor exerting a restrictive impact on cantonal integration policies but the degree of xenophobia in the population. In her studies on immigration policy at Switzerland's national level Lavenex (2006:656) revealed that xenophobic tendencies in the population, besides the demand for labor, are the central steering determinants in this policy field. Similarly, Helbling's studies on the rejection rate of naturalization requests provide empirical evidence on the potentially discriminating effects of direct democracy on the migrant population at Switzerland's local level (Helbling/Kriesi 2004; Helbling 2008;2009). Finally, Kriesi expects the direct democratic arena to be less benevolent to migrant specific issues than the governing political elite (Kriesi 2006:220).

While these studies reveal valuable insights on the potentially restrictive effects of radical right parties on the one and xenophobic tendencies in their combination with direct democracy on the other hand, most of them remain tentatively descriptive or their empirical analysis is restricted to a singular policy output or outcome. Hence, there is a lack of comparative analytical studies providing a systematic empirical test of the expected impacts on policies in

the field of migration policies. The Swiss case with its pronounced federalism exhibits a considerable variety in the respective policies, offering therefore an interesting case for such a comparative investigation at the subnational cantonal level. In the following, the connection between migration policy and federalism will be explained and the relevant policy unit at Switzerland's cantonal level defined.

Migration policy comprises different subfields. Scholars often distinguish two broad areas, immigration policies on the one and immigrant or integration policies on the other hand (Gugni/Passy 2006:1; Lavenex 2004:201). The following definition captures the main difference between the two policy fields by assigning them the respective functions of “gate keeping” vs. “incorporation”:

„[Immigration policy] refers to policies that control the flow and composition of immigrants admitted, whereas [immigrant policy] refers to rights and privileges, obligations and responsibilities of those admitted (...). In short, immigration policy centers on gate keeping, while immigrant policy centers on incorporation” (Schmitter Heisler 2001:153).

Immigrant and integration policy will be used synonymously throughout this paper. The fuzzy term “integration” often experiences a normative charge in the political debate (cf. Bauböck 2006:11; Favell 2001a:118; IMISCOE 2008:4), which further complicates a unified definition of the term and its respective policies. However, Schmitter Heisler's definition of immigrant policy cited above corresponds to the meaning of integration policy used here, describing a policy aiming at the incorporation of migrants into the domestic society by means of rights and obligations.² In federal states, the two policy fields can be attributed to different state levels: While immigration policy commonly falls into the domain of the federal level, immigrant or integration policy is mainly formulated at the subnational level (Akgün/Tränhardt 2001:19). This pattern can be found in several federal countries such as the US, Canada, Austria or Germany³, and it is particularly pronounced in strongly federal organized Switzerland (Ibid). When it comes to integration policies, the Swiss cantons are the main competent and responsible political units, which results in a considerable variation of cantonal integration policies (Cattacin 1996:73; Cattacin/Kaya 2005:289; Efonayi-Mäder 2006:45f; Ireland

² A more detailed definition and conceptualization of integration policy will be presented in the following.

³ For an interesting study on federal variations of integration policy at Germany's subnational *Länder*-level see Henkes (2008).

1994:202; Soysal 1994:71).⁴ Therefore, the analysis of this paper will focus on cantonal integration policies, a subfield of migration policies, as the dependent variable.

Based on the particularities of Switzerland's political system, which endows people with comprehensive participation rights, the "popular will" will be considered a potentially strong influencing factor in the formulation of cantonal integration policies. In this context, two factors will be of central interest: The potential influence of the SVP in terms of its electoral strength and the direct influence of xenophobic attitudes in the population expressed through direct democratic decisions. In order to assess their individual impact, the two factors will be introduced separately into the analysis. For the party factor SVP the following first hypothesis is formulated:

H1: The surge of the anti-immigrant right-populist Swiss People's Party (SVP) over the last two decades yielded a restrictive impact on cantonal integration policies.

Since the migration issue has already been a topic of political debate long before the rise of the SVP, an additional hypothesis will be formulated in order to capture the potential influence of latent xenophobic attitudes in the population. It is expected, that these attitudes are potentially influential through the direct democratic channel.

H2: Xenophobic tendencies in the population expressed through direct democratic decisions have a restrictive impact on cantonal integration policies.

Data and Research Design

The design of this study corresponds to a cross-sectional analysis at Switzerland's subnational level with the 26 Swiss cantons as units of analysis. In spite of Switzerland's pronounced federalism with the cantons exhibiting many features of singular states,⁵ they remain subnational units subject to one national federation and legislation and therefore display many similar structures among each other. By approaching a comparison according to the most similar systems design (Przeworski/Teune 1970), the structure of this study allowed to focus the comparison on the variance of the central variables. At the same time, several context variables such

⁴ With the new law for foreigners ("neues Ausländergesetz", AUG) which came into effect in January 2008, the cantonal competences in the field of integration policies experienced an additional strengthening. Among other things the new law prescribes the appointment of an integration delegate in each canton.

⁵ As for example an institutionalized separation of powers, proper territories and cantonal constitutions (Vatter 2006:204).

as definition and understanding of integration policy or the structure of the political system in the cantons could be held constant.⁶

The dependent variable was captured by the current status of cantonal integration policies. A conceptualization of integration policy in terms of citizenship rights and obligations as well as details on the operationalization follow in the next section. Accordingly, the measurement of the independent variables occurs at a preceding point in time (t-1). The central hypotheses were tested by the following variables: The popular support of the SVP was measured by the electoral vote share of the SVP in cantonal parliamentary elections, while the xenophobic tendency of the population expressed through direct democratic decisions was captured by cantonal rejection rates of proposals concerning immigrants presented at the ballot.⁷ Results from the polls offer more representative data than survey data (e.g. SELECTS, Swiss Household Panel), since surveys sometimes operate with too small numbers of respondents at the cantonal level and thereby run risk of selection bias.⁸ However, additional models based on survey data were considered in order to test the results gained with ballot data. Both, ballot results and survey data are expected to reflect rather stable long-term attitudes of the population towards immigrants.

As already mentioned, the potential influence of the SVP through the governmental channel is expected to be rather weak in Switzerland due to pronounced concordant governments established at the national and cantonal levels. Nevertheless, the governmental share of the SVP was included in the analysis as a control variable. Furthermore, a cultural dummy for the linguistic regions was added in order to control for cultural-linguistic effects. Cattacin and Kaya could observe a “limitrophe” coinage of the regional integration policies in French-speaking and German-speaking cantons by the adjacent countries France and Germany (Cattacin 1996:70; Cattacin/Kaya 2005:290). Speaking in terms of citizenship regimes we could therefore formulate the following assumption for the subnational Swiss context: integration policies in the French part of Switzerland are expected to be influenced by France's universalistic and less restrictive conception of citizenship, while the respective policies in the German part of Switzerland are assumed to be more similar to Germany's stricter assimilationist conception of citizenship. Accordingly, Switzerland's regional level allows to test Brubakers (1992) assumption of a long-term, historical coinage of citizenship policies, which in this

⁶ A similar degree of comparability is hardly reachable at the level of cross-national comparisons. For the restricted cross-national comparability in the complex field of migration policies see IMISCOE 2008:1;3.

⁷ The ballot selected here is the national vote on „regular naturalization and facilitated naturalization for second generation immigrants“ of September the 26th 2004.

⁸ For instance, the minimal number of respondents used in SELECTS is 25 respondents per canton.

context would be a cross-border coinage.⁹ Further controls were added for the degree of urbanization, since the overwhelming majority of immigrants live in urban areas and for the cantonal share of immigrants. Assuming a pragmatic approach to the challenge of integration in urban cantons with an elevated amount of immigrants, both controls are expected to be positively correlated with the dependent variable yielding less restrictive cantonal integration policies.¹⁰

The small number of 26 cases required a careful selection of the statistical procedure as well as of the variables to be included into the respective calculations. Therefore, a two-step procedure has been applied in order to test the central hypotheses regarding the impact of the public opinion on cantonal integration policies. First, bivariate correlations (Pearson's r and Eta) have been performed in order to get a first impression on whether the variables correlate according to the expected pattern. In a second step, the variables with strong and significant correlations were introduced into multiple regression models.

How to Measure Integration Policy

For an empirical analysis of the hypotheses formulated above, a clear conceptualization and measurement of integration policy is needed. When dealing with immigration and integration policies, studies at the international comparative level often make use of the concept of citizenship (see for example Brubaker 1992; Favell 2001b:362f; Tilly 1995:8, Koopmans 2003a; 2005; 2008). Citizenship can broadly be defined as an interaction of rights and obligations toward any given state, creating thereby an area of legal equality between former and new citizens (Brubaker 1992:21; Koopmans/Kriesi 1997:297; Tilly 1995:8). While earlier studies often applied a formal, one-dimensional perspective of citizenship along the axis between *jus-soli* and *jus-sanguinis* (Brubaker 1992), such approaches have occasionally been criticized for being too reductive. According to Wicker (2003:30), economic, educative and social capitals would give a more adequate definition of the position of migrants in the country of residence than their mere civic status. Similarly, the political discourse on integration policy in Switzerland distinguishes between structural (school, work), political or social and cultural aspects of integration (BfM 2006:9; Cattacin/Kaya 2005:293; Prodolliet 2006:88; TAK forthcoming). Accordingly, a more comprehensive conceptualization of citizenship is aimed at. Koopmans (2003a; 2005; 2008) offers such a comprehensive perspective by distinguishing two dimen-

⁹ For Koopmans typology of citizenship regimes see figure 2 in the appendix.

¹⁰ For a detailed operationalization and data sources for the independent and control variables see table 7 in the appendix.

sions of citizenship called formal-legal and cultural dimensions respectively. Each dimension consists of several components and is measured by various indicators. The respective indices are called *Migrant Integration Policy Index* (MIPEX¹¹) for the formal-legal and *Cultural Rights Index* (CRI) for the cultural dimension. Table 1 offers an overview on the respective dimensions and components.

Table 1 – Measuring Integration Policy along the formal (MIPEX) and cultural (CRI) dimensions of citizenship

Index	Components
MIPEX <i>formal-legal dimension</i>	labor market access * family reunion * long term residence political participation * access to nationality * anti discrimination *
CRI <i>cultural dimension</i>	cultural requirements for naturalization * religious rights outside public institutions * cultural rights in public institutions political representation rights (for specific cultural groups) affirmative action (labor market)

Note: * = Components exhibiting sufficient variation at the cantonal level and accordingly included in the measurement of cantonal integration policies. Most of the components in the cultural dimension are not applicable at the cantonal level. However, this dimension has been amended by an additional component measuring the “*tendency for legal recognition of minorities religions*” in the cantons.

The components of the two dimensions reveal a broad understanding of citizenship, embracing structural, civic, political, cultural and religious aspects of citizenship. In order to measure cantonal integration policies, Koopmans citizenship-model has been transferred to the subnational Swiss level. Details on this transfer as well as operationalization and data sources for all the components of the dependent variable measured at the cantonal level can be found in table 8 in the appendix. The asterisks behind the components show that there are many equivalents to measure the formal-legal dimension of citizenship at the cantonal level, while there are only few counterparts for the cultural dimension. This is not surprising, since Switzerland is considered a clear assimilationist country with only scarce concessions to cultural pluralism (Koopmans/Kriesi 1997:299; Koopmans et al. 2005:73; Kleger/D'Amato 1995:266).¹² However, an additional legal component can be added to the cultural dimension

¹¹ Founded by the British Council and the Migration Policy Group (2001, 2006/07). For more information see <http://www.integrationindex.eu> [last consultation 17.07.09].

¹² Based on the two dimensions of citizenship, the formal and the cultural one, Koopmans (2003;2005;2008) typology distinguishes four types of citizenship regimes called assimilationist, segregationist, universalist and multiculturalist (see figure 2 in the appendix).

at Switzerland's cantonal level: the tendency for legal recognition of minorities religions, which may be considered of particular interest for Switzerland's growing Muslim community (Christmann 2009:4, Cattacin et al. 2003).¹³

Yet, a closer look at the components of the two dimensions reveals that they lack a coherent theoretical embedding. The components of the MIPEX cover such different issues as socio-structural (labor market access), political (political participation) or civic aspects (access to nationality). Equally, the cultural dimension comprises a mix of cultural and religious aspects. In search of a more solid theoretical base and conceptualization of the measurement for cantonal integration policies, a first inspection of the data has been carried out. A factor analysis of all the components measured at the cantonal level revealed a pattern which does not correspond to the two-dimensional model presented in table 1. Instead, four factors resulted from the analysis presented in table 2.

Table 2 - Factor analysis based on components of MIPEX and CRI

Component	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
political participation	0.857	-0.111	0.037	0.114
access to nationality	0.598	0.362	0.024	-0.314
religious rights I	0.185	-0.679	-0.045	-0.065
religious rights II	0.257	0.492	-0.410	-0.014
labour market access	0.104	-0.012	0.710	0.041
cultural requirements for natural.	0.263	0.134	0.286	0.540
anti discrimination	0.353	-0.077	-0.303	0.404
family reunion	0.288	-0.002	0.074	-0.476

Note: Principal factor analysis, varimax-rotated (orthogonal). Extraction of factors according to scree-test. Due to the negative correlation of the indicators of the component “religious rights outside public institutions”, this component will be split up and the two variables will be treated and analyzed separately. *Religious rights I* stands for the “tendency for legal recognition of minorities’ religions”, *religious rights II* for the “allowance for Islamic burials”.

As could be expected, the factor loadings suggest that the components measure more subtle theoretical dimensions, which could rather be captured by different categories of rights or, as in the case of the cultural component, rights and obligations.¹⁴ In any case, a measurement based on the theoretical concept of rights and obligations would better correspond to the definitions of citizenship and integration policy presented above. Therefore, the components

¹³ By now, Islam is considered to be the second biggest religion after the Christian confessions not only in Europe but also in Switzerland (Hunter 2002; Mahnig 2000a:102).

¹⁴ It seems important to note that obligations are negatively correlated to rights. More rights mean less restrictive integration policies while more obligations stand for more restrictive integration policies. This fact has been considered in the coding of the respective variables measuring the category of cultural obligations.

were aggregated along their highest factor loadings, creating thereby the following categories¹⁵: Factor one stands for political and civic rights while factor two represents religious rights. Factor three denotes socio-structural rights and factor four comprises cultural rights and obligations.¹⁶ In a next step, the four categories were aggregated to a comprehensive additive index, measuring cantonal integration policies. Together with the four categories of rights, this index built the base for the following empirical analyses.

Empirical Findings

Table 3 offers an overview of the bivariate correlations with the different categories of rights and obligations. According to the expectation, pronounced negative correlations of the variables electoral strength of the SVP and xenophobic direct democratic decisions appeared in the two central categories of civic-political rights and cultural rights and obligations. The negative correlation, expressing a tendency to more restrictive cantonal integration policies, turned out to be particularly strong and highly significant in the case of the xenophobic direct democratic decisions variable, with values of $r = -0.8$ in the case of civic-political rights and $r = -0.63$ for cultural rights and obligations. Whereas the variable electoral strength of the SVP shows only in the cultural category a significant negative correlation. On the other hand, the remaining categories of socio-structural rights as well as the two components of religious rights revealed no clear pattern of correlations and the variables of the central hypotheses were only partly negatively correlated. Seemingly, these categories are not in the same way exposed to the influence of the popular will as the two central categories civic-political rights and cultural rights and obligations. This observation may be particularly surprising in the case of religious rights, endorsing the assumption that cultural and religious rights are indeed different theoretical categories at Switzerland's subnational level as could be observed in table 2.

¹⁵ The results of the factor analysis did not prove to be stable enough for an index-creation based on factor scores. Instead, an additive index-creation has been applied. For more information on the index-creation see illustration in table 8 in the appendix.

¹⁶ With the component “anti-discrimination” as the only component loading on another dimension as provided in Koopmans. However, the component seems to better fit under the cultural category.

Table 3 – Bivariate correlations between categories of rights and obligations and independent and control variables

<i>Categories</i>	civic-political	cultural	socio-structural	religious I	religious II	N
SVP vote	-0.28	-0.46 *	0.08	-0.22	-0.02	25
xen. DD output	-0.80 ***	-0.63 ***	-0.11	-0.06	-0.33	26
SVP government	0.38	0.07	-0.21	0.15	0.34	12
urbanization	0.40 *	0.19	-0.17	-0.19	0.55 **	26
foreign pop.	0.53 **	0.19	-0.2	-0.03	0.46 *	26
linguistic region	0.59 **	0.55 **	0.28	0.15	-0.07	26

Note: The variable „governmental share of the SVP“ is negatively skewed and exhibits many cases with value zero, why the logarithm of this variable has been used for the statistical analyses. All the coefficients are Pearson's correlations coefficients, except for the dummy for the linguistic regions, where the eta-coefficient has been applied. *: $p < 0.05$; **: $p < 0.01$; ***: $p < 0.001$.

As expected, the control for the governmental influence of the SVP did not display a negative correlation. Except in the category of socio-structural rights this variable shows weak positive correlations in all the models, why it will be excluded from the subsequent analysis. The remaining controls exhibited a similar pattern as the independent variables: As expected, they were clearly positively correlated and significant with the central category civic-political rights, whereas only the linguistic region yielded significant coefficients in both central categories. Again no clear pattern emerged in the remaining categories. However, the significant positive correlations of the controls urbanization and foreign population with the category religious rights II point to the fact that Islamic burials are likely to be allowed in cantons with considerable demand, which is true for urban cantons.¹⁷

Based on the results of the bivariate correlations multiple OLS-regression models have been calculated.¹⁸ The analyses started at the level of rights- and obligation-categories of citizenship as dependent variable. Based on the findings from the individual category-level, subsequent multiple regression analyses have been carried out with the aggregated integration-index as dependent variable. On the whole, the results of the multivariate regression models corroborated the findings of the bivariate correlations. The variable measuring xenophobic direct democratic decisions turned out to be the only significant variable across all the models and variables. The models with the dependent variables civic-political rights and cultural rights and obligations reported in tables 4 and 5 yielded the only significant results across all the models. For both categories, the variable pointed in the expected negative direction. In the

¹⁷ In Switzerland, the majority of foreigners live in cities, while the vast majority (95 %) of all the Muslims are immigrants with the status of foreigners (Mahnig 2000a:102).

¹⁸ For all the multiple regression-models influential cases (cantons) were identified with cooks-d statistics. An elimination of influential cases (cooks $d > 4/n$) only slightly fostered already significant results. Therefore, all the models are based on the full sample of available cantons.

regression based on civic-political rights the highly significant coefficient ($p < 0.001$) remained significant at the five percent level even when controls were included into the model. The electoral support of the SVP shows only with the cultural category in table 5 negative coefficients in line with the expectation, although not at a significant level.

Table 4 – Multiple OLS-regression with civic-political category as dependent variable

variable	model 1	model 2
SVP vote	0.007 (0.59)	0.007 (0.48)
xenoph. DD output	-0.039 *** (-4.45)	-0.038 * (-2.40)
urbanization	-	0.000 (-0.03)
foreign pop.	-	0.001 (0.04)
linguistic region	-	-0.004 (-0.01)
F-Test	21.66 ***	5.88 **
R ²	0.63	0.63
N	25	25

Table 5 – Multiple OLS-regression with cultural category as dependent variable

variable	model 1	model 2
SVP vote	-0.017 (-1.27)	-0.012 (-0.74)
xenoph. DD output	-0.027 * (-2.63)	-0.042 (-1.66)
urbanization	-	-0.000 (-0.04)
foreign pop.	-	-0.032 (-1.10)
linguistic region	-	-1.120 (-0.19)
F-Test	8.75 **	5.06 **
R ²	0.41	0.47
N	25	25

Notes for tables 4 and 5: N=25 cases; Appenzell Inner Rhodes (AI) is the only missing case, since there are no parties elected in parliament and hence no vote-share of the SVP is available; reported values are unstandardized coefficients (t-values in brackets); *: $p < 0.05$; **: $p < 0.01$; ***: $p < 0.001$; robust standard errors (hc3) were calculated to deal with heteroscedasticity (Long/Ervin 2003); Multicollinearity was tested for by the computation of uncentred variance inflation factors (VIF). In all models VIF values were markedly below the critical threshold of 10 (Wooldridge 2009:99).

Similar regression-models with the remaining categories of rights (socio-structural and religious) did not yield significant nor consistent results and the model-fits (R^2) vary from negligible three to modest 43 percent.¹⁹ Neither the controls included into the models for the urban and foreign population nor the dummy for the linguistic regions reached significant or consistent coefficients in any one of the models. The expected positive correlation which could be observed in table 3 disappeared altogether when the controls were included into multiple regression models.

Finally, corresponding regression analyses have been calculated with the comprehensive integration index as dependent variable displayed in table 6. In concordance with the findings presented so far, the variable denoting xenophobic direct democratic decisions yielded the only significant coefficient pointing in the expected negative direction. When controls were included into the model the coefficient remained negative and even significant at the one percent level. The coefficient for the electoral support of the SVP on the other hand shows the expected negative sign, yet it remains insignificant. A glance over all the models calculated so far reveals that the variable xenophobic direct democratic decisions appears as the strongest negative predictor of cantonal integration policies.

Table 6 – OLS regressions with comprehensive integration index as dependent variable

variable	model 1	model 2
SVP vote	-0.003 (-0.50)	-0.002 (-0.32)
xenoph. DD output	-0.022 *** (-5.33)	-0.021 * (-2.57)
urbanization	-	0.000 (0.12)
foreign pop.	-	-0.002 (-0.24)
linguistic region	-	0.052 (0.28)
F-Test	19.81 ***	9.57 ***
R^2	0.74	0.74
N	25	25

Note: N=25 cases; Appenzell Inner Rhodes (AI) is the only missing case, since there are no parties elected in parliament and hence no vote-share of the SVP is available; reported values are unstandardized coefficients (t-values in brackets); *: $p < 0.05$; **: $p < 0.01$; ***: $p < 0.001$; robust standard errors (hc3) were calculated to deal with heteroscedasticity (Long/Ervin 2003); Multicollinearity was tested for by the computation of uncentred variance inflation factors (VIF). In all models VIF values were markedly below the critical threshold of 10 (Wooldridge 2009:99).

¹⁹ The corresponding models are presented in tables 9 to 11 in the appendix.

In order to check the strong findings obtained for the variable xenophobic direct democratic decision, one last modified model of table 6 has been calculated (see table 6.b below). In spite of the restriction regarding a potential sample bias discussed previously in this paper, survey data have been used for this step. Instead of the results of the popular vote, the average of cantonal answers to the item “same opportunities for foreigners and Swiss citizens” has been inserted into the regression model. The results can be read as a confirmation of the results obtained so far: popular skepticism towards immigrants yields a highly significant negative coefficient with the comprehensive integration index in both models with and without control variables. More important, in this last regression the SVP vote-variable and the linguistic dummy both display for the first time significant coefficients pointing into the expected direction. While the negative coefficient for the SVP is significant at the five percent level and only in the model without controls, the linguistic control-dummy exhibits now a strong positive coefficient significant at the one percent level.

Table 6.b – OLS regressions with comprehensive integration index and xenophobia


variable	model 1	model 2
SVP vote	-0.015 * (-2.14)	-0.001 (-0.24)
xenophobia	-0.022 *** (-3.69)	-0.018 ** (-2.99)
urbanization	-	0.002 (1.02)
foreign pop.	-	0.002 (0.21)
linguistic region	-	0.499 ** (3.02)
F-Test	9.65 ***	16.38 ***
R ²	0.42	0.74
N	25	25

Note: N=25 cases; Appenzell Inner Rhodes (AI) is the only missing case, since there are no parties elected in parliament and hence no vote-share of the SVP is available; reported values are unstandardized coefficients (t-values in brackets); *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001; robust standard errors (hc3) were calculated to deal with heteroscedasticity (Long/Ervin 2003); Multicollinearity was tested for by the computation of uncentred variance inflation factors (VIF). In all models VIF values were markedly below the critical threshold of 10 (Wooldridge 2009:99).

A glance at a two dimensional map based on the two central citizenship categories civic-political rights and cultural rights and obligations strongly fosters this last observation of a clear cultural-linguistic pattern. Figure 1 contains the respective scatter plot, where a clustering of the French speaking cantons (GE, FR, VD, JU and NE) in the upper right quadrant de-

noting the liberal and multicultural pole is discernible while the conservative rural Swiss cantons lie closest to the lower left quadrant which stands for the restrictive and assimilationist pole of citizenship.²⁰ The position of Valais (VS), the French speaking canton next to the central-rural Swiss cantons, might be explained with its relative geographic closeness to the respective cantons. In line with Brubakers assumption this regional shaping is particularly salient on the civic-political dimension. It can be read as a strong corroboration of a shaping of the respective regional approaches to civic-political rights along Frances less restrictive *jus soli* and Germanys restrictive and assimilationist former *jus sanguinis* conception of citizenship respectively. Ticino (TI), the only Italian speaking canton of Switzerland, lies just between the two regional clusters.

Figure 1 – Two dimensional map of citizenship rights and obligations



²⁰ For a comparison with Koopman's typology of citizenship regimes see figure 2 in the appendix.

Discussion

The central aim of this paper was to assess the impact of radical right parties and xenophobic direct democratic decisions on cantonal integration policies. A glance over the findings strongly supports the assumption of a restrictive impact of xenophobic tendencies in the population expressed through direct democratic decisions. Yet, the strong significance of the negative coefficient of this variable was contrasted by the only partially significant coefficients for the remaining variables of interest, strength of the SVP and cultural-linguistic region. A closer look at the regression models based on ballot and survey data presented in tables 6 and 6.b suggests that the respective variables, although they did not yield critical levels of multicollinearity in any of the regression models, do not fully comply with the criteria of independence. The strong negative impact of xenophobic tendencies expressed at the ballot might cover the restrictive effect of the SVP, which reaches only significance in the model with the xenophobic attitude of the population captured by survey data. A look at the bivariate correlations of all the independent and control variables furthermore reveals a strong negative correlation of the cultural dummy with both central independent variables xenophobic direct democratic decision and SVP vote.

Accordingly, the findings of this paper can be read as a preliminary corroboration of the initial hypotheses: the higher the degree of xenophobia in a canton, the more restrictive its integration policies. In this sense, Lavenex' conclusion at Switzerland's national level of a central impact of xenophobia on immigration policy outputs can be similarly applied to the subnational level (Lavenex 2006:656). Regarding the comparatively weak restrictive impact of the SVP, two considerations will be made here: First, compared to the local level (see Helbling/Kriesi 2009; Helbling 2008), the party-political circumstances at the cantonal level appear to be more complex. Although the SVP is famous for its decisive anti-immigrant stance all over Switzerland it seems that the interests of the cantonal sections of the party are still too diverse in order to be fully comparable. Scholars often describe the pronounced federal fragmentation of Swiss parties as a characteristic trait: While Linder calls them “children of their cantons” (Linder 2005:81), Ladner (2006:236) mentions the temptation to speak of 26 instead of one Swiss party system. The recent development of the Conservative Democratic Party (BDP) may be illustrative to this point: The foundation of the BDP was induced by former SVP members from the cantonal sections Bern and Grisons who defected from the party in 2007. Only one year later the BDP was founded at the national Swiss level.

However, and this is the second and more important caveat already mentioned above, the assumption of an independent impact of the SVP variable and the variable xenophobic direct

democratic decision turned out to be too simplistic. Instead, the two variables are very likely to be linked, not only among themselves but also with the apparently preceding effect of the cultural region. While the linguistic control-dummy yielded only in the last regression model a significant positive coefficient, a look at the two dimensional citizenship map in figure 1 undeniably revealed the clear impact of this variable on cantonal integration policies. In line with the expectation, the French speaking cantons exhibit less restrictive integration policies fitting thereby closer to the French conception of citizenship. The German speaking cantons on the other hand display more similarities to the assimilationist German understanding of citizenship. This interconnectedness of independent and control variables should be accounted for and analyzed in more detail in further investigations.

The analyses at the individual category level depicted that a restrictive impact of xenophobic direct democratic decisions could only be observed in the case of the comprehensive integration policy index as well as the two central citizenship-categories civic-political and cultural rights and obligations. No similar pattern could be discerned for the categories socio-structural and religious rights. With regard to socio-structural rights these findings are less surprising. Without neglecting real situations of competition over scarce jobs between nationals and foreigners, it is only reasonable to assume that issues such as the access to the labor market or schools is politically not as contested as civic, political or cultural rights.²¹ More surprising is the finding that in Switzerland religious rights constitute a proper category which appears to be far less contested than cultural rights.

However, these results coincide with the findings of similar case studies in the field of cultural anthropology. In her studies on Islamic burials in selected urban Swiss cantons, Richner (2006) could observe that the political elite is anxious to avoid a polarization of the public opinion by a politicization of the topic through the media and radical right parties which would impede pragmatic and constructive solutions. The author therefore concludes, that the political elite prefers to discuss such contested issues as Islamic burials in closed sessions in order to find pragmatic solutions for the specific cases (Richner 2006:160). The same could be true for the topic of a legal recognition of non-Christian religions such as Islam. Yet, direct democracy could still yield an indirect effect on legislation concerning minorities religions, for instance when legislatures respond to the mere threat of direct legislation.²² A similar ef-

²¹ A look at current recruitment strategies of cantonal police departments furthermore reveals that the shift to less rigid employment requirements for foreigners is very often a consequence of the lack of manpower in the police service as occurred in Basel-City. See article in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, „Wenig Ausländer in Verwaltungen“, 23th of September 2009, p.23.


²² For indirect effects of direct democracy on minorities legislation in the US see for example Gerber 1996; Gerber and Hug 2001a&b and Bochsler and Hug 2009. Assumptions of an indirect restrictive effect of direct democracy on Swiss migration policies can be found in Giugni und Passy 2006:15; Helbling 2009:8; Mahng 2004:32;

fect could be accounted for in Christmann's (2009:22) analysis of cantonal parliamentary debates concerning the legal recognition of minority religions.

Subnational variations among integration policies in federal states have longtime been neglected by scholars of citizenship and migration studies. The present paper shows that an investigation at the comparative subnational level is potentially illustrative by revealing valuable insights on the determinant forces impacting on the formulation of respective policies. Future investigations at the subnational level could reveal more on the mechanisms how exactly xenophobic tendencies in the population impact on cantonal policy outputs. Such an endeavor should elaborate more on the connection between xenophobic attitudes in the population and their translation into direct democratic decision outputs or electoral support of the SVP. Furthermore, these attitudes need to be embedded into a cultural context, as the cultural-linguistic variable suggests. Complexer models than multiple regression models, such as simple path models, seem more promising to account for this interconnectedness of the variables and their underlying causal relationship.

Appendix

Figure 2 – Two dimensional conception of citizenship



Sources: Own illustration, based on Koopmans (cf. Koopmans/Kriesi 1997:298; Koopmans/Statham 2000; Koopmans 2003b:208ff; Koopmans 2005:10).

Table 7 – Operationalization of independent and control variables

variable	operationalization	source
SVP vote	electoral support of the SVP in cantonal parliamentary elections	BADAC
direct democracy	cantonal rejection rate of national vote on „regular naturalization and facilitated naturalization for second generation immigrants“ from September the 26 th 2004.	Swiss Federal Office
SVP government	SVP-share of cantonal governmental seats	Swiss Federal Statistical Office (BFS), own calculations
urbanization	cantonal degree of urbanization (2001)	BADAC
foreign population	cantonal share of foreign nationals (2003)	BADAC, own calculations
linguistic region	regional Dummy denoting Switzerland's French and German speaking cantons	own assignment
xenophobia	cantonal average of the survey-item “equal opportunities for foreigners and swiss citizens”	SELECTS 2003

Note: According to the design of the study as a cross-sectional comparison, the independent and control variables were collected at a preceding point in time (t-1). Since the time span covered by the indicators of the dependent variable(s) lasts from 2005-2008, for the two SVP variables parliamentary and governmental elections up to 2004 and before were considered.

Table 8 – Conceptualization and operationalization of dependent variable(s): cantonal integration policies

international level		subnational level		
international indices	components	operationalization at Switzerland's subnational level	corresponding categories of rights and obligations	comprehensive index
<i>MIPEX migrants integration policy index</i> (formal-legal dimension of citizenship)	labor market access	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> migrants access to job in cantonal administration, teaching position, police service or judiciary 	<i>socio-structural rights</i>	cantonal integration policy index
	long-term residence	-		
	political participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> right of foreigners to vote existence of foreigners-commission 	<i>civic-political rights</i>	
	access to nationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> period of residence charges facilitated procedure right of appeal 		
	family reunion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> cantonal interpretation of the criteria “appropriate living place” different criteria for EU- / third country nationals 	<i>cultural rights and obligations</i>	
	anti-discrimination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> anti-discrimination prescription in constitution anti-discrimination prescription in cantonal laws 		
<i>CRI cultural rights index</i> (cultural dimension of citizenship)	cultural requirements for naturalization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> cultural assessment-criteria (degree of integration) for naturalization cantonal implementation of “integration agreement” 	<i>religious rights I & II</i>	
	religious rights outside public institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> allowance for Islamic burials legal tendency for recognition of minorities religions 		
	cultural rights in publ. inst.			
	political representation rights	-		
	affirmative action			

Note: The theoretical conceptualization and operationalization of the international indices is based on the works of Koopmans et al. (2003; 2005; 2008), while the MIPEX was founded and institutionalized by the British Council and the Migration Policy Group (see <http://www.integrationindex.eu>; last consultation: 17.07.2009). Time span covered with dependent variable(s): 2005-2008. Data sources: BFM 2006; BFM 2008; Christmann 2009; EKM 2007 a&b; TAK 2005; TAK 2009; cantonal constitutions and citizenship laws; own investigations in cantonal migration offices.

Table 9 – OLS regressions with socio-structural category as dependent variable

variable	model 1	model 2
SVP vote	0.011 (0.59)	0.028 (1.19)
xenoph. DD output	-0.009 (-0.69)	-0.04 (-0.11)
urbanization	-	0.001 (0.16)
foreign pop.	-	-0.040 (-1.55)
linguistic region	-	0.857 (0.83)
F-Test	0.35	0.62
R ²	0.03	0.29
N	25	25

Table 10 – OLS regressions with religious category I as dependent variable

variable	model 1	model 2
SVP vote	-0.028 (-1.01)	-0.024 (-0.76)
xenoph. DD output	0.006 (0.37)	-0.005 (-0.13)
urbanization	-	-0.012 (-1.08)
foreign pop.	-	0.019 (0.46)
linguistic region	-	-0.151 (-0.17)
F-Test	0.51	0.41
R ²	0.05	0.11
N	25	25

Notes for tables 9 and 10: N=25 cases; Appenzell Inner Rhodes (AI) is the only missing case, since there are no parties elected in parliament and hence no vote-share of the SVP is available; reported values are unstandardized coefficients (t-values in brackets); *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001; robust standard errors (hc3) were calculated to deal with heteroscedasticity (Long/Ervin 2003); Multicollinearity was tested for by the computation of uncentred variance inflation factors (VIF). In all models VIF values were markedly below the critical threshold of 10 (Wooldridge 2009:99).

Table 11 – OLS regressions with religious category II as dependent variable

variable	model 1	model 2
SVP vote	0.017 (0.69)	-0.012 (-0.48)
xenoph. DD output	-0.029 (-1.30)	-0.049 (-1.04)
urbanization	-	0.007 (1.11)
foreign pop.	-	0.019 (0.29)
linguistic region	-	-1.568 (-1.89)
F-Test	0.85	4.1 *
R ²	0.12	0.43
N	25	25

Note: N=25 cases; Appenzell Inner Rhodes (AI) is the only missing case, since there are no parties elected in parliament and hence no vote-share of the SVP is available; reported values are unstandardized coefficients (t-values in brackets); *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001; robust standard errors (hc3) were calculated to deal with heteroscedasticity (Long/Ervin 2003); Multicollinearity was tested for by the computation of uncentred variance inflation factors (VIF). In all models VIF values were markedly below the critical threshold of 10 (Wooldridge 2009:99).

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Abbreviations

BDP Conservative Democratic Party (“Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei”)

SVP Swiss People's Party (“Schweizerische Volkspartei”)

Swiss cantons

AG Argovia

AI Appenzell Inner Rhodes

AR Appenzell Outer Rhodes

BE Berne

BL Basel-Country

BS Basel-City

FR Fribourg

GE Geneva

GL Glarus

GR Grisons

JU Jura

LU Lucerne

NE Neuchâtel

NW Nidwald

OW Obwald

SG St. Gall

SH Schaffhausen

SO Solothurn

SZ Schwyz

TG Thurgovia

TI Ticino

UR Uri

VD Vaud

VS Valais

ZG Zug

ZH Zürich