International Criminal Responsibility of the Individual: A Quantum Leap for Man's Humanity

Properly speaking, international criminal responsibility is not a new
chapter of public international law, but rather the recent revival of an old
chapter of the Law of Nations. In the recent past, we have seen the
emergence of ad hoc international criminal tribunals, that is with a limited
competence, as established in their statutes.(1) Instead, today’s International Criminal Court enjoys, within its statutory (treaty) limits, a general jurisdiction; it is thus a permanent organ of a general character, mirroring the ICJ in matters of international criminal law. It will also be in charge of the international criminal responsibility of the individuals.
In contrast with the two previous approaches, based on ‘right’, we will
deal here with ‘obligations’ that are bestowed upon the individual, that is,
international obligations not to commit some acts characterized as crimina
iuris gentium. PIL deals with the individual by prohibiting the perpetration of such crimes. The individual is therefore construed as the passive subject within international legal relations; he must account – before municipal and international courts alike – for his misdeeds (violation of international obligations) committed against States as well as other individuals.(2) Thus, if, from the angle of international human rights protection, responsibility involved an active personality, in this case the personality is deemed to be passive.
Aside from international “crimes” of the States whose existence remains
to be carefully considered,(3) international law contemplates the existence of certain categories of crimes committed by individuals acting either
individually, or as State organs. Still, only a few of these violations are
susceptible to be prosecuted and punished on the international plane while
others are only prosecuted and punished by national jurisdictions.
The revolutionary developments which have punctuated this province of
PIL from the second half of the Twentieth century onwards, severely
stepping into one of the core elements of the State reserved domain (of
criminal repression), show that the individual must also be considered as an international subject in this domain, as long as he is directly prosecuted and tried by an international judiciary mechanism.