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Dimitrakakis, Christos

Nom
Dimitrakakis, Christos
Affiliation principale
Fonction
Professor
Email
christos.dimitrakakis@unine.ch
Identifiants
https://libra.unine.ch/handle/123456789/30936
_
0000-0002-5367-5189

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  • Publication
    Accès libre
    Environment Design for Inverse Reinforcement Learning
    (2022)
    Thomas Kleine Buening
    ;
    Dimitrakakis, Christos 
    The task of learning a reward function from expert demonstrations suffers from high sample complexity as well as inherent limitations to what can be learned from demonstrations in a given environment. As the samples used for reward learning require human input, which is generally expensive, much effort has been dedicated towards designing more sample-efficient algorithms. Moreover, even with abundant data, current methods can still fail to learn insightful reward functions that are robust to minor changes in the environment dynamics. We approach these challenges differently than prior work by improving the sample-efficiency as well as the robustness of learned rewards through adaptively designing a sequence of demonstration environments for the expert to act in. We formalise a framework for this environment design process in which learner and expert repeatedly interact, and construct algorithms that actively seek information about the rewards by carefully curating environments for the human to demonstrate the task in.
  • Publication
    Accès libre
    On Meritocracy in Optimal Set Selection
    (2021-02-23T20:36:36Z)
    Thomas Kleine Buening
    ;
    Meirav Segal
    ;
    Debabrota Basu
    ;
    Dimitrakakis, Christos 
    ;
    Anne-Marie George
    Typically, merit is defined with respect to some intrinsic measure of worth. We instead consider a setting where an individual's worth is \emph{relative}: when a Decision Maker (DM) selects a set of individuals from a population to maximise expected utility, it is natural to consider the \emph{Expected Marginal Contribution} (EMC) of each person to the utility. We show that this notion satisfies an axiomatic definition of fairness for this setting. We also show that for certain policy structures, this notion of fairness is aligned with maximising expected utility, while for linear utility functions it is identical to the Shapley value. However, for certain natural policies, such as those that select individuals with a specific set of attributes (e.g. high enough test scores for college admissions), there is a trade-off between meritocracy and utility maximisation. We analyse the effect of constraints on the policy on both utility and fairness in extensive experiments based on college admissions and outcomes in Norwegian universities.