“Keeping Pandora's (ballot) box half-shut”: a comparative inquiry into the institutional limits of external voting in EU Member States
Jean-Thomas Arrighi De Casanova & Derek Hutcheson
| Résumé |
The article compares the institutional constraints that limit the
potential electoral impact of external voting in national
legislative elections in the 28 Member States of the European Union
(EU). It shows that the discrepancy between policy aims and outcomes
can be mainly attributed to a variety of institutional constraints
restricting the scope of the policy (through residence and
professional qualifications); limiting eligible voters’ access to
the ballot (through cumbersome registration procedures and voting
methods); and reducing the electoral weight attributed to their
votes (through distinct modes of representation). It argues that
the discrepancy is at least partly the result of a combination of
electoral and normative concerns about the influence that external
voters could and should have in elections. Institutional
restrictions on the franchise of external citizens may be
interpreted as a way to keep the “Pandora's box” of unexpected
electoral consequences half-shut, by extending the suffrage to a
traditionally excluded electorate while at the same time moderating
the implications. |
| Mots-clés |
external voting, EU, swamping, tipping, access to the ballot |
| Citation | Arrighi de Casanova, J. T., & Hutcheson, D. (2015). “Keeping Pandora's (ballot) box half-shut”: a comparative inquiry into the institutional limits of external voting in EU Member States. Democratization, 22(5), 884-905. |
| Type | Article de périodique (Anglais) |
| Date de publication | 3-2-2015 |
| Nom du périodique | Democratization |
| Volume | 22 |
| Numéro | 5 |
| Pages | 884-905 |
| URL | https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.201... |