"'Unless I put my hand into his side, I will not believe'. The E"pistemic Privilege of Touch
Author(s)
de Vignemont, Frédérique
Editor(s)
Gatzia, Dimitria
Brogaard, Berit
Publisher
New York: Oxford University Press
Date issued
2020
In
The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception
From page
165
To page
188
Subjects
touch
mind-independence
resistance
effort
depersonalization
bodily awareness
feeling of presence
feeling of reality
force
Abstract
Touch seems to enjoy some epistemic advantage over the other senses when it comes to attest to the reality of external objects. The question is not whether only what appears in tactile experiences is real. It is that only whether appears in tactile experiences feels real to the subject. In this chapter we first clarify how exactly the rather vague idea of an epistemic advantage of touch over the other senses should be interpreted. We then defend a “muscular thesis”, to the effect that only the experience of resistance to our motor efforts, as it arises in effortful touch, presents us with the independent existence of some causally empowered object. We finally consider whether this muscular thesis applies to the perception of our own body.
Publication type
book part
File(s)