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SPINOZA ON EMOTION AND AKRASIA

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Summary

The objective of this doctoral dissertation is to interpret the explanation of akrasia that the Dutch philosopher Benedictus Spinoza (1632-1677) gives in his work *The Ethics*. One is said to act acratically when one intentionally performs an action that one judges to be worse than another action which one believes one might perform instead. In order to interpret Spinoza's explanation of akrasia, a large part of this dissertation investigates Spinoza's theory of emotion. The first chapter is introductory and outlines Spinoza's categorisation of mental states and his conception of the relation between the mind and the body. The second chapter deals with Spinoza's epistemology and the relation between cognitive mental states and states of the brain. The third chapter argues that Spinoza holds that emotions are non-cognitive mental states that are caused by cognitive mental states. The fourth chapter interprets Spinoza's discussion of the emotions of Joy and Sadness insofar as they are mental states. The fifth chapter suggests that when Spinoza says that the power of our body is increased or decreased when we are joyful or sad, he means that when we are joyful or sad then, at the same time, our heart and perhaps the organs of our digestive system are affected in such a way that our bodily health is increased or decreased. The sixth chapter points to three problems that concern Spinoza's definitions of the psychophysical states of pleasure, pain, cheerfulness and melancholy, and offers slightly altered definitions of these states. The seventh chapter interprets the various aspects of Spinoza's conception of the emotion of Desire, both insofar as it is a state of the mind and insofar it is a state of the body, as well as the relation between the emotion of Desire and man's striving for self-preservation. The eighth chapter discusses what Spinoza writes on the strength of emotions and the way in which we make value judgments in order to finally interpret why it is, according to Spinoza, that 'we so often see the better for ourselves but follow the worse'.

Key words: Spinoza, Emotion, Akrasia (l'Acrasie)

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Abbreviations and translations

I use Edwin Curley's translation of Spinoza's exposition of Descartes's *Principles of Philosophy*, the *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect* (= the *Treatise on the Intellect* = TdIE), the *Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being* (= the *Short Treatise* = KV), the *Ethics*, and letters 1-29. I use Samuel Shirley's translation of Spinoza's other writings.

I refer to passages in Spinoza's *Ethics* by using the following abbreviations:
I, II, III, IV, V = the five parts of the *Ethics*
D (following a roman numeral) = definition
A = axiom
Post. = postulate
P = proposition
D (following P) = the demonstration of a proposition
C = corollary
S = scholium
L = lemma (of IIP13)
1, 2, 3, etc., = the number of an axiom, definition, proposition, etc.
Exp. = explanation
Pref. = preface
App. = appendix
IIIAD = the Appendix of the Third Part of the *Ethics* called 'Definitions of the Emotions'
IIIAGD = the Appendix of the Third Part of the *Ethics* called 'General definition of the Emotions'
For example, IP8S2 stands for the First Part of the *Ethics*, proposition 8, scholium 2.

I refer to passages in Spinoza's other writings by indicating their position (i.e., the volume number, the page number and the line number) in *Spinoza Opera* (edited by Gebhardt) and also by indicating on which page of Curley's *The Collected Works of Spinoza, Volume 1*, Curley's translation of this passage is found. For example, II/14/17 (p.17) stands for Volume II of *Spinoza Opera*, page 14, line 17 (page 17 of Curley's *The Collected Works of Spinoza*).

Introduction

In a well-known article entitled ‘How is Weakness of Will possible?’ Donald Davidson (1980, p.22) writes that we act incontinently when (1) we believe that we may perform action x or action y, (2) judge that, all things considered, it would be better to perform action y than to perform action x, but (3) intentionally perform action x. Spinoza neither uses the expression ‘weakness of will’ nor the expression ‘incontinence’, but in Part IV of the *Ethics* he does attempt to explain why ‘man often sees the better for himself and is still forced to follow the worse’.

The final objective of this work is to interpret Spinoza’s explanation of akratic action. Spinoza’s explanation of akratic action depends heavily on his theory of cognition and emotion, which he expounds in Part II and Part III of the *Ethics*. Interpreting Spinoza’s theory of cognition and emotion is therefore the task that needs to be accomplished first before the final objective of this work can be met. The larger part of this work, in fact, deals with Spinoza’s theory of emotion, hence the title ‘Spinoza on Emotion and Akrasia’.

In the first chapter I set up a framework for the discussion of Spinoza’s theory. I indicate how Spinoza categorises mental states, and I explain how Spinoza’s terminology differs from the terminology that I use to discuss his theory. I also briefly talk about the difficulty of interpreting Spinoza’s theory of the relation between the mind and the body, and I formulate a working principle regarding this relation that will guide my interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of cognition and emotion. This chapter, then, is strictly introductory, and the claims that I here make will be argued for in subsequent chapters.

In the second chapter I discuss Spinoza’s theory of cognition insofar as it is relevant to his theory of emotion. Spinoza argues that the emotions of Joy and Sadness qua mental states are caused by our ideas of things. It is therefore important to understand what Spinoza writes about our ideas of things. We shall see that we have inadequate and adequate ideas. I will spend quite some time explaining how our inadequate and adequate ideas relate to our body, because the states of our body that correspond to our ideas cause our emotions of Joy and Sadness insofar as they are states of our body. I shall show that whereas Spinoza clearly holds that our inadequate ideas correspond to affections of our brain, he at times suggests that our adequate ideas do not correspond to any state of our body. Another subject that will receive much attention in this chapter is Spinoza’s rejection of Descartes’s thesis that there is a

distinction between, on the one hand, having an idea, and, on the other hand, affirming or denying that this idea is true. Interpreting the disagreement between Descartes and Spinoza on the relation between ideas and judgements is necessary for a correct understanding of Spinoza's theory of emotion.

In the third chapter I discuss Spinoza's view on the relation between ideas and emotions. Many eminent scholars have claimed that Spinoza does not think that our ideas and our emotions are distinct mental states, but, rather, that our emotions are somehow part of our ideas. I first show that Spinoza consistently writes that our ideas and our emotions are different mental states. After that, I show that he also quite clearly writes that our emotions are caused by our ideas. Spinoza calls the emotions caused by inadequate ideas 'passions', and the emotions caused by adequate ideas 'actions'. Chapters 4 to 7 deal with Spinoza's theory of emotion.

In the fourth chapter I discuss the mental nature of the emotions of Joy and Sadness. The reason why I discuss Joy and Sadness first, and only then Desire, is that Spinoza suggests that we can only have the emotion of Desire after our idea of something has caused the emotion of Joy or Sadness. In this chapter I attempt to separate what Spinoza writes about the emotions of Joy and Sadness insofar as they are mental states from his constant reference to the human body. The main exercise in this chapter will be to show that many emotions can be explained simply in terms of Joy or Sadness caused by a particular idea. (The others can be explained as kinds of Desire.) The emotions of Gladness, Love and Hope, for example, all consist simply in the emotion of Joy but caused by, respectively, our idea of a past thing, our idea of a present thing, and our idea of a future thing.

In the fifth chapter I discuss the bodily cause and nature of the emotions of Joy and Sadness. Emotions, according to Spinoza, are not only mental states but also bodily states, and insofar as they are bodily states they have a bodily cause. Spinoza only gives us very abstract information about what goes on in our body when we feel joyful or sad, and he is completely silent about what causes this bodily event. Scholars have not been very interested in finding out what Spinoza precisely means when he writes that, when we feel joyful or sad, then, at the same time, 'the power of our body is increased or decreased'. I argue that Spinoza most likely means that, when we feel joyful or sad, then, at the same time, some process goes on in our body that has a beneficial or detrimental effect on our bodily health. On the basis of what Descartes and Hobbes write about this bodily process, and on the basis of what Spinoza himself writes about it in an earlier work, I argue that Spinoza most likely holds that, when we feel joyful or sad, then, at the same time, our heart and perhaps other internal organs are

affected in a way that increases or decreases the health of our body. I also claim that Spinoza most likely holds that this healthy or unhealthy affection of our heart, which constitutes the bodily nature of Joy and Sadness, is caused by the affection of our brain that corresponds to our inadequate idea of something. In other words, when our inadequate idea of something makes us feel joyful or sad, then, at the same time, the state of our brain that corresponds to our inadequate idea causes the healthy or unhealthy affection of our heart that constitutes the bodily nature of our Joy or Sadness.

In the sixth chapter I discuss Spinoza's definitions of Pleasure, Pain, Cheerfulness and Melancholy. Spinoza claims that these states are kinds of Joy and Sadness. I find what Spinoza writes about these states very problematic. I discuss three problems involved in Spinoza's definitions. After that, I propose slight modifications to Spinoza's definitions, and, furthermore, I attempt to show that Spinoza's moral theory, in fact, can be rather well explained with the use of these slightly altered definitions of Pleasure, Pain, Cheerfulness and Melancholy. On the reading that I propose, Spinoza's goal in the *Ethics* is to show us how we can be cheerful, that is, constantly joyful. Although normally my intention in this work is merely to explain Spinoza's theory, in this chapter I thus critically engage with it.

In the seventh chapter I discuss what Spinoza writes about the emotion of Desire. As said, the reason why I discuss Desire only after having discussed Joy and Sadness is that Spinoza suggests that Joy and Sadness cause Desire. I first attempt to reconstruct what Spinoza writes about the emotion of Desire insofar as it is a state of our mind, just as I had done in chapter 4 for Joy and Sadness. We shall see that when our idea of something makes us feel joyful or sad, then we desire to act in a certain way. How we desire to act depends on the nature of the idea that affects us with Joy or Sadness. After having discussed Desire insofar as it is a state of our mind, we shall look at the little that Spinoza writes about Desire insofar as it is a state of our body. When Spinoza rejects Descartes's thesis that we can freely decide how we act, he tells us that the bodily nature of Desire consists in a 'determination of the body'. I argue that he means by this that the bodily nature of Desire consists in some kind of readiness of our muscles that leads up to the movements of our body. Spinoza, then, rejects Descartes's thesis that a decision of the mind can cause the body to move, and argues, instead, that the causes of our bodily movements are located in our body itself and not in our mind. The last subject of this chapter is Spinoza's famous 'conatus doctrine'. The conatus doctrine, famously, says that everything resists its own destruction and strives to persevere in its existence. This principle has received a lot of attention given its metaphysical status. To my knowledge, only two scholars, namely Della Rocca and LeBuffe, have made serious efforts to

explain how this general principle applies to human beings. This is quite surprising because Spinoza only formulates the conatus thesis in order to explain human emotion. I shall not attempt to interpret the conatus thesis insofar as it is supposed to apply to all things, but only insofar as it is supposed to apply to us human beings. Although Spinoza clearly means to build his theory of emotion on the basis of his conatus thesis, I have found it a rather fruitful strategy to first study Spinoza's theory of emotion without the conatus thesis, and then to find out how the conatus might explain emotions.

In the eighth and final chapter I discuss how Spinoza, on the basis of his theory of cognition and emotion, explains akratic action. There will be three steps leading up to my interpretation of Spinoza's explanation of akratic action. The first step consists arguing that the strength of Desire is determined by the strength of the Joy or Sadness by which it is caused, and that the strength of Joy and Sadness is determined by the strength of the idea by which they are caused. The second step consists in arguing that we only act when we have a desire to act, and that we always act when we have a desire to act. The third step consists in arguing that, when we are in a prudent state of mind, we judge that a particular thing is good and that we should pursue it when we believe that it is conducive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run. At this point we will be able to understand why it is, according to Spinoza, that 'man often sees the better for himself and is still forced to follow the worse'.

Chapter 1: The categories of mental states and the mind-body union

In this chapter I establish a theoretical framework for the discussion of Spinoza's theory of cognition and emotion. In section 1 I briefly describe the way in which Spinoza categorises mental states, and I also point to a number of differences between his terminology and the terminology that I use to discuss his theory. In section 2 I briefly explain the difficulty of interpreting Spinoza's theory of the relation between the human mind and the human body, and I formulate a working principle concerning this relation that will guide my interpretation of Spinoza's theory of cognition and emotion.

Section 1: The categories of mental states

Spinoza categorises mental states in the following manner. There are two broad categories of mental states, namely knowledge and emotion. Knowledge is divided into three kinds called (1) 'imagination or opinion', (2) 'reason' and (3) 'intuitive science'. Whereas the first kind of knowledge consists in inadequate ideas (i.e., confused and mutilated ideas), the second kind and the third kind of knowledge consist in adequate ideas (i.e., clear and distinct ideas). Joy, Sadness and Desire are the only emotions that we have. The impression that there are more than three emotions results from our habit of giving these three emotions different names. When, for example, we are sad because another person is sad, we call our Sadness 'Compassion', which gives the false impression that Compassion and Sadness are two different emotions. Emotions are non-cognitive mental states: Joy, Sadness and Desire do not represent anything to us. (The claim that emotions are non-cognitive mental states is highly controversial. I argue for this interpretation in chapter 3.) The following scheme represents Spinoza's categorisation of mental states.

Spinoza's categorisation of mental states

1. Knowledge
    a. Imagination or opinion (inadequate ideas)
    b. Reason (adequate ideas)
    c. Intuitive science (adequate ideas)
2. Emotion
    a. Joy
    b. Sadness
    c. Desire

I shall now make several remarks that concern the differences between Spinoza's terminology and my terminology.

Mental state

Spinoza does not use the term 'mental state', but the term 'mode of thinking' (*modis cogitationis*) and sometimes the word 'thought' (*cogitatio*). Just as all finite bodily things are modes of extension (*modis extensionis*), so are all finite mental things modes of thought. Even sense perceptions and recollections of sense perceptions (which constitute the first kind of knowledge) and emotions are 'modes of thinking' or 'thoughts'. Spinoza inherits this use of the terms 'mode of thinking' and 'thought' from Descartes. When Descartes says that he knows with certainty that he exists whenever he is 'thinking', he means by 'thinking' being aware of any kind of mental state. It does not matter whether our 'thought' (i.e., mode of thinking) is a clear and distinct idea, a sense perception, a recollection, or an emotion: whenever we have a mental state, no matter of what kind, we know with certainty that we exist. Spinoza explains this in his exposition of Descartes's *Principles of Philosophy* (I/145/14, p.234): '*So when he* [i.e., Descartes. CR] *said, I think, all these modes of thinking were understood, viz. doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, not willing, imagining, and sensing*'. And, in the same work (I/149/18, p.238), Spinoza defines the word 'thought' as follows: '*Under the word 'thought' I include everything which is in us and of which we are immediately conscious. So all operations of the will, the intellect, the imagination and the senses are thoughts*'. Although these two passages may suggest that only cognitive mental states are modes of thinking, the following passage from the appendix to this work makes clear that emotions are also modes of thinking: '*Note that by a mode of thinking we understand, as we have already explained in IP15C, all affections of thought, such as*

intellect, joy, imagination, etc.'. To avoid confusion, I shall not use the word 'thought', but the word 'mental state'.

Idea

Spinoza uses the word 'idea' in three different senses. From the widest sense to the narrowest sense these are the following:

(1) In the most general sense the word 'idea' means 'mental state' (i.e., mode of thinking). When used in this sense, therefore, not only adequate ideas (which constitute the second and third kind of knowledge) but also sense perceptions and recollections (which constitute the first kind of knowledge) and even emotions are ideas. So, for example, when in IIID3 Spinoza defines an emotion as a certain kind of bodily affection together with the idea of this bodily affection, he does not mean that an emotion consists in a certain kind of affection of our body together with our knowledge that our body is affected in a certain way, but that an emotion consists in a certain kind of affection of our body together with a corresponding state of our mind.

(2) In a less general sense the word 'idea' means 'cognitive mental state, *or* cognition'. When used in this sense, therefore, only knowledge, but not emotion, consists in ideas. Sense perceptions and recollections of sense perceptions (which constitute the first kind of knowledge) are thus also ideas in this sense. So, for example, instead of saying that I have a visual perception of a tree and a recollection of an auditory perception of a concert, I may say that I have an idea of a tree, and an idea of a past concert.

(2) In the strictest sense the word 'idea' means 'adequate idea'. It seems that Spinoza uses the word 'idea' in the sense of 'adequate idea' when in IID3 he defines an idea as a concept and as an action of the mind, and when in IIP49S he distinguishes images from ideas, that is, mental images from adequate ideas. (I give arguments for this controversial interpretation of these two passages in chapter 2.)

The 3 meanings of the word 'idea'

- Meaning 1: mental state (including emotions)
- Meaning 2: knowledge (including sense perceptions and recollections)
- Meaning 3: adequate idea

Imagination

The ideas that constitute the first kind of knowledge are called '*imaginationes*'. I use the term 'mental image' to translate '*imaginatio*'. Spinoza suggests in IIP17 that he uses the word '*imaginatio*' in two different senses, namely in the sense of (1) any kind of sense perception, and in the sense of (2) a recollection of any kind of sense perception. So, apparently, when he says, for example, that he has an '*imaginatio*' of the rain, he might mean that he sees the rain, that he hears the rain, that he has any other kind of sense perception of the rain, that he has a recollection of a visual perception of the rain, or a recollection of any other kind of sense perception of the rain. This may be confusing because we commonly use the word 'mental image' to refer only to visual perceptions and to recollections of visual perceptions.

Spinoza suggests, furthermore, that he uses the verb 'to imagine' (*imaginari*) in three different senses. He suggests that he uses the verb 'to imagine' to refer to (1) having any kind of sense perception, (2) having a recollection of any kind of sense perception, and even (3) having an opinion. So, apparently, when he says, for example, that he 'imagines' that it rains, he might mean that he has a visual perception of the rain, that he has an auditory perception of the rain, that he has any other kind of sense perception of the rain, that he has a recollection of a visual perception of the rain, that he has a recollection of an auditory perception of the rain, that he has a recollection of any other kind of sense perception of the rain, or even that he *believes* that it rains. I shall very often ask what Spinoza precisely means when, in a passage that I discuss, he uses the verb '*imaginari*'.

The 3 meanings of the verb 'to imagine'

- Meaning 1: to have any kind of sense perception
- Meaning 2: to have a recollection of any kind of sense perception
- Meaning 3: to have an opinion

Imago

Spinoza writes, also in IIP17, that he uses the word '*imago*' to refer to an affection of the human body that corresponds to a mental image. Although he does not explain this when he defines the word '*imago*', such an affection of the human body that corresponds to a mental image is a state of the brain. So, for example, your mental image of the sky corresponds to a certain *imago, or* state of your brain.

This, however, is Spinoza's *official* definition of the word '*imago*'. There are very many passages in which Spinoza does not use the word '*imago*' in the sense of 'a brain state that corresponds to a mental image' but in the sense of an '*imaginatio*', *or* 'mental image'. In this sense your mental image of the sky *is* an *imago*. One example of a passage in which Spinoza uses the word '*imago*' in the sense of '*imaginatio*' is IIIP18 where he writes that we are affected with the same emotion of Joy or Sadness from the *imago* of a past or future thing as from the *imago* of a present thing. A more controversial example is perhaps IIP49S in which Spinoza distinguishes *imagines* from *ideae*, that is, mental images from adequate ideas. (As said, I argue for this interpretation of this passage in chapter 2.)

Emotion

I translate Spinoza's '*affectus*' as 'emotion', rather than as 'affect'. I choose this translation, not only because we commonly use the word 'emotion', rather than the word 'affect', to refer to what Spinoza calls an '*affectus*', but also because the word 'emotion' does not sound like the word 'affection' (*affectio*), whereas the word 'affect' does. It is important to make a clear distinction between what Spinoza calls an '*affectio*' (i.e, an affection) and what he calls an '*affectus*' (i.e., an affect, *or* emotion), because an '*affectus*' (i.e., affect, *or* emotion) is a special kind of '*affectio*' (i.e., affection). Translating '*affectus*' as 'emotion', rather than as 'affect', helps to make this distinction: Saying that 'every emotion is an affection of the human mind, but not every affection of the human mind is an emotion' is clearer than saying that 'every affect is an affection of the human mind, but not every affection of the human mind is an affect'. This becomes even clearer when we translate the word '*affectio*' as 'state': Every emotion is a state of the human mind, but not every state of the human mind is an emotion. Translating '*affectus*' as 'emotion', rather than as 'affect', in order to make the distinction between '*affectus*' and '*affectio*' clearer is not an exaggerated measure, given that, as we shall see, even Spinoza sometimes confuses '*affectus*' and '*affectio*'.

Curley (1985, p.625) writes that the translation of the word '*affectus*' as 'emotion' has the following disadvantages: (1) the word 'emotion' suggests a passive state, while an '*affectus*' may also be an active state; (2) the word 'emotion' suggests a purely mental state, while an '*affectus*' is a psychophysical state; (3) it is 'unnatural' to call Desire an 'emotion', while Desire is an '*affectus*'; and (4) the word 'emotion' does not show the etymological connection between '*affectus*' and '*afficere*' (i.e., 'to affect').

I find none of these 'disadvantages' problematic. First, the word 'emotion' does not connote a passive state, but motion. It is rather the word 'affect' that one associates with passivity, because of its connection with the verb 'to affect'. Secondly, the word 'affect' connotes a mental state just as much as the word 'emotion' does. Thirdly, if we are looking for a *natural* translation of the word '*affectus*', then 'emotion' is a much better candidate than 'affect', given that in everyday language we hardly ever use the word 'affect'. Fourthly, the fact that the translation of the word '*affectus*' as 'emotion' does not show the etymological connection between '*affectus*' and '*afficere*' is actually an advantage, because this etymological connection suggests that an '*affectus*' is a passive state, whereas according to Spinoza, as Curley himself observes, an *affectus* may also be an active state[1].

Section 2: The relation between the mind and the body

As is well known, in the *Short Treatise* and in the *Ethics* Spinoza claims that the human mind is the idea of the human body and that both the human mind and the human body are modes of one substance - the only substance - which Spinoza calls 'God' or 'Nature'. Spinoza surely also held this belief when he wrote the *Treatise on the Intellect* even though he does not mention it explicitly in this work, because he wrote the *Treatise on the Intellect* around the same time that he wrote the *Short Treatise.*

In the *Treatise on the Intellect* and in the *Short Treatise* Spinoza makes quite clear that the human body and the human mind, being the idea of the human body, are numerically distinct things. He writes in *Treatise on the Intellect* (II/14/17, p.17):

> A true idea (for we have a true idea) is something different from its object. For a circle is one thing and an idea of a circle another - the idea of the circle is not something which has a circumference and a center, as the circle does. Nor is an idea of the body the body itself. And since it is something different from its object, it will also be something intelligible through itself; that is, the idea, as far as its formal essence is concerned, can be the object of another objective essence, and this other objective essence in turn will also be, considered in itself, something real and intelligible, and so on, indefinitely. Peter, for example, is something real; but a true idea of Peter is an objective essence of Peter, and something real in itself, and altogether different from Peter himself.

[1] The following scholars also translate '*affectus*' as 'emotion': Wolfson (1934, p.180), Hampshire (1951, p.135), Harris (1973), Delahunty (1985), Scruton (1986, p.79), Hofman (1991, p.170), Gebhart (1999, p.613), Nadler (2006, p.190), Segal (2009). The following scholars agree with one or several of Curley's arguments in support of the claim that this translation is incorrect: Wetlesen (1979, p.101), Della Rocca (1996, p.261), Marshall (2008, p.1).

It might be that the expression 'a true idea of Peter' refers to the idea that another person, for example John, has of Peter. It seems more likely, however, that the term 'a true idea of Peter' refers to the idea that God has of Peter, and that it thus refers to Peter's mind. (This seems to be confirmed by a passage from the *Short Treatise* (I/98/5, p.137) where Spinoza explains that God's idea of Peter's body is Peter's soul, and that God's idea of Paul's body is Paul's soul.) If so, then Spinoza tells us here that the human body and the human mind are both real things and altogether different from each other. Elsewhere in the same work (II/22/20, p.27) Spinoza writes that '[…] *after we know the nature of the soul, we cannot feign that it is square, though there is nothing that cannot be put into words.*' The point is clearly that once we understand that the soul is immaterial we cannot believe that it has corporeal qualities, although, of course, we can say 'The soul is corporeal'. In the footnote to this passage Spinoza writes that '*It often happens that a man recalls this term* soul *to his memory, and at the same time forms some corporeal image. But since these two things are represented together, he easily allows that he imagines and feigns a corporeal soul: because he does not distinguish the name from the thing itself.*' Spinoza evidently means that, although the soul is not corporeal and thus cannot be imagined, some people believe that the soul is corporeal because they imagine something corporeal when they use the word 'soul'; they believe that the thing that they imagine is the soul because they make no distinction between the thing that they imagine and the word 'soul'. And again elsewhere in the same work (II/26/7, p.30) Spinoza writes that some people hold the false belief that '[…] *there are bodies from whose composition alone the intellect is made* […]', by which he clearly means that the intellect is not corporeal. Here Spinoza probably refers to the Stoics, because a little further (II/28/20, p.33) he explains how the Stoics formed the false belief that the mind consists in subtle bodies. In the *Short Treatise* (I/97/1, p.136) Spinoza even writes that '*the soul* […] *has nothing in common with the body*' and, moreover, that the body '*has nothing of thought, and is really distinct from the soul*' (Appendix II, I/118/31, p.154). At the time of writing the *Treatise on the Intellect* and the *Short Treatise* Spinoza thus clearly held that the human mind and the human body are two numerically distinct things.

Although in the *Ethics* Spinoza continues to define the human mind as the idea of the human body, he also makes a couple of claims that strongly suggest that after having written the *Treatise on the Intellect* and the *Short Treatise* he changed his mind and came to the conclusion that the human mind and the human body are not numerically distinct but numerically identical. In IIP7S he writes about substance and its modes: '[…] *the thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, which is now*

comprehended under this attribute, now under that. So also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways.' Whereas in the *Treatise on the Intellect* Spinoza wrote that a circle and the idea of the circle are two different things, in the *Ethics*, right after the passage of IIP7S just quoted, he writes that a circle and its idea are one and the same thing: '[…] *a circle existing in nature and the idea of the existing circle, which is also in God, are one and the same thing, which is explained through different attributes. Therefore, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of Extension, or under the attribute of Thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find one and the same order,* or *one and the same connection of causes, i.e., that the same things follow one another.*' Spinoza's claim that a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing but expressed in two ways implies that the human body and the human mind, which is the idea of the human body, are one and the same thing but expressed in two ways. This is confirmed by IIIP2S: '[…] *the Mind and the Body are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of Thought, now under the attribute of Extension. The result is that the order,* or *connection, of things is one, whether nature is conceived under this attribute or that; hence the order of actions and passions of our Body is, by nature, at one with the order of actions and passions of our Mind.*'

One might argue that the expression that the human mind and the human body are the same thing conceived under different attributes does not necessarily imply that the human body and the human mind are numerically distinct. One might argue that this expression merely means that the human body exists really in the attribute of extension and as a representation in the attribute of thought, or, in other words, that the human mind has objectively what the human body has formally[2]. In the *Treatise on the Intellect* (II/14/21, p.17) Spinoza writes:

> Peter, for example, is something real; but a true idea of Peter is an objective essence of Peter, and something real in itself, and altogether different from Peter himself. So since an idea of Peter is something real, having its own particular essence, it will also be something intelligible, i.e., the object of a second idea, which will have in itself, objectively, whatever the idea of Peter has formally; and in turn, the idea which is [the idea] of the idea of Peter has again its essence, which can also be the object of another idea, and so on indefinitely. Everyone can experience this, when he sees that he knows what Peter is, he also know that he knows, and again, knows that he knows that he knows, etc.

[2] This claim has been argued for by Richard Glauser in a paper, "Réalité formelle, réalité objective, et la thèse de l'identité chez Spinoza. *Ethique* IIp7s" (forthcoming), read at the University of Neuchâtel in March 2012, an earlier version of which he read in 2008 at the ACFAS Conference in Quebec.

As said, it might be that the expression 'a true idea of Peter' refers to the idea that another person, for example John, has of Peter, but it seems more likely that the term 'a true idea of Peter' refers to the idea that God has of Peter, and that it thus refers to Peter's mind. If so, then Spinoza is saying that Peter's mind is an objective essence, that is, an idea, of Peter's body, and as such something real in itself and altogether different from Peter's body. Peter's mind has in itself, objectively, whatever Peter's body has formally. Likewise, the objective essence, that is, the idea, of Peter's mind is something real in itself, and it has objectively what Peter's mind has formally[3]. In the *Short Treatise* (I/119/6, p.154), after having explained that God's intellect contains objectively the formal essences of all bodies, that is, that God has ideas of all bodies, Spinoza writes: '*Therefore, the essence of the soul consists only in the being of an Idea, or objective essence, in the thinking attribute, arising from the essence of an object which in fact exists in Nature.*' The human mind is an idea of the human body, and as such it contains objectively what the human body has formally. That the human mind is united to the body as an idea is united to its object, explains why the human mind changes when the human body changes: '*For as the body is, so is the soul, Idea, knowledge, etc.*' (KV I/53/24, p.96). If Spinoza does not explain these technical terms when he expounds his view on the relation between the human mind and the human body, then this is merely because these terms were commonly understood. Spinoza gives the following definitions in his exposition of Descartes's *Principles of Philosophy* (I/150/1, p 238):

> D3: By *objective reality of an idea* I understand the being of the thing represented by the idea, insofar as it is in the idea. *In the same way, one can speak of objective perfection, or objective artifice, etc. For whatever we perceive as in the objects of the ideas is in the ideas themselves objectively.*
> D4: The same things are said to be *formally* in the objects of the ideas when they are in the objects as we perceive them, and *eminently* when they are in the objects, not indeed as we perceive them, but to such an extent as to be able to take the place of such things. *Note that when I say the cause contains the perfections of its effect eminently, I mean that the cause contains the perfections of the effect more excellently than the effects itself does.* See also A8.

One might argue, then, that when Spinoza writes in the *Ethics* that the human mind and the human body are the same thing but conceived under different attributes he means nothing more than that the human body exists formally, or really, as a body amongst other bodies, but

[3] When speaking about the idea of God, Spinoza writes (TdIE, II/16/26, p.20): '*Moreover, the idea is objectively in the same way as its object is really*'. And likewise (KV, I/16/2, p.62): '*If there is an idea of God, the cause of [this Idea] must exist formally and contain in itself whatever the Idea has objectively. But there is an idea of God.*'

also objectively, as a representation, in the human mind. In IIP21D, in fact, Spinoza writes: '*We have shown that the Mind is united to the Body from the fact that the Body is the object of the Mind (see P12 and 13).*' This suggests that the human mind and the human body are two numerically distinct things that are merely related to each other because the mind represents the body. If the human body and the human mind are the same thing merely in the sense that the human mind represents the human body, then the human body and the human mind are really distinct, rather than numerically identical. When, for example, we look at a painting of Spinoza and say 'That is Spinoza', we do not mean, of course, that the painting wrote the *Ethics*, but that the painting represents the author of the *Ethics*[4]. This interpretation of the claim that the human mind and the human body are the same thing but conceived under different attributes is quite attractive, because it is rather difficult to understand how the human mind and the human body can be numerically identical if the human mind is the idea of the human body. It is rather difficult to understand how a representation can numerically identical with the thing that it represents.

Nonetheless, it is also possible that when Spinoza writes that the human mind and the human body are the same thing but conceived under different attributes he means that the human mind and the human body are numerically identical and that their distinction is not real but merely conceptual. This seems to be confirmed by IVP8S where, after having claimed that our knowledge of good and evil consists in our idea of the emotions of Joy and Sadness, Spinoza writes : '*But this idea is united to the affect in the same way as the Mind is united to the Body (by IIP21), i.e., (as I have shown in IIP21S), this idea is not really distinguished from the affect itself,* or *(by the general Definition of the Affects) from the idea of the Body's affection; it is only conceptually distinguished from it.*' Many scholars, in fact, argue that in the *Ethics* Spinoza holds that the human mind and the human body are numerically one and the same thing[5].

In this work I shall not take a stand in the debate about the question as to whether the human mind and the human body are numerically identical or distinct. I shall hold on to Spinoza's claim that the human mind is the idea of the human body, and I shall thus, as Spinoza does himself, talk about the human mind and the human body *as if* they were two

[4] Radner (1971, p. 347), too, explains this quite clearly: '*In so far as the individual exists formally, it is considered under the attribute of extension. In so far as it exists objectively, it is considered under the attribute of thought*.'

[5] The following scholars argue that the mind and the body are numerically identical things: Wolfson (1934, p.146), Hampshire (1951, p.63; 83), Misrahi (1964, p.63), Gueroult (1968), Radner (1971, p.338), Donagan (1979), Scruton (1986, p.54; 58), Bennett (1994, p.17; 24), James (1997, p.139; 144), Gebhart (1999, p.17), Della Rocca (2008, p.102), Davidson (1999, p.106), Nadler (2006, p.130).

numerically distinct things. Furthermore, I shall adopt as *working principle* the thesis that there is, according to Spinoza, a perfect parallelism between the causal order of finite bodies and the causal order of the finite minds of those finite bodies (i.e., God's ideas of those finite bodies). This parallelism comes down to the claim that (1) there is an idea of every finite body and this idea forms the mind of this body, that (2) every finite body is caused by another finite body, and (3) that every finite mind is caused by another finite mind. The following scheme illustrates this parallelism between the causal order of finite bodies and the causal order of the finite minds of these finite bodies. The arrows in this scheme, and in all schemes to follow, represent causal relations.

Parallelism of finite bodies and their finite minds:	
Attribute of Thought:	mind → mind → mind → mind
Attribute of Extension:	body → body → body → body

For the human body and the human mind, which is the idea of the human body, this parallelism implies the claim that (1) every state of the human mind is the idea of some state of the human body (with as exception ideas of ideas), that (2) there is in the human mind an idea of every state of the human body in the form of a mental state, that (3) every state of the human mind has a mental cause that is either internal or external to the human mind, and that (4) every state of the human body has a bodily cause that is either internal or external to the human body. The causal order of the states of the human body is therefore the same as the causal order of the states of the human mind that form the ideas of these states of the human body. The following scheme illustrates this parallelism between the causal order of mental states and the causal order of bodily states.

Parallelism of mental and bodily states:	
Attribute of Thought:	mental state → mental state → mental state → mental state
Attribute of Extension:	bodily state → bodily state → bodily state → bodily state

Spinoza seems to argue for this kind of parallelism in the following passages from the *Ethics*: IIP3 (which says that of each body there is a mind), IIP5 (which says that a body cannot cause a mind and a mind cannot cause body), IIP6 (which says that a body is caused by another body, and a mind by another mind), IIP7 (which says that the causal order of

bodies is the same as the causal order of the minds of those bodies, and that a body and its mind are one and the same thing conceived under two attributes), IIP12 (which says that the human mind perceives everything that happens in the human body), IIP13 (which says that the human body is the object of the human mind), and IIIP2S (which says that the order of the actions and the passions of the human body is the same as the order of the actions and the passions of the human mind, and that the human body and the human mind are one and the same thing conceived under two attributes).

Most scholars argue that this parallelism between the causal order of finite bodies and the causal order of the finite minds of finite bodies is conceptual rather than ontological, that is, the minds and their states are supposed to be not really but merely conceptually distinct from the bodies and their states[6]. (The two levels represented in the schemes above are, so to speak, fused together.) As said, I leave the question as to whether the mind and the body are really or merely conceptually distinct open.

Although I hold on to Spinoza's claim that the states of the human mind are ideas of states of the human body (with as exception ideas of ideas), I shall most of the time avoid calling mental states 'ideas' of bodily states. Instead I shall speak of the relation between a mental state and a bodily state in terms of correspondence. Rather than saying that a certain mental state is the idea of a certain bodily state, I shall say that a certain mental state *corresponds* to a certain bodily state. Put in these terms, the working principle says that every mental state corresponds to a bodily state (with as exception ideas of ideas), and that every bodily state corresponds to a mental state.

The reformulation of the working principle in terms of correspondence helps to explain what Spinoza does and does not mean when he writes that a certain mental state is an idea of a certain bodily state. I shall give one example. Spinoza says that our sense perceptions are ideas of our body. This might suggest that our sense perceptions somehow represent our own body to us. But this is, of course, not the case. At the moment, for example, I see my computer screen, I feel the touch of my keyboard, I hear my colleague typing next to me, etcetera. *Phenomenally* speaking, my visual perception represents my computer screen, my tactile perception represents my keyboard, and my auditory perception represents my

[6] The following scholars say that the attributes of thought and extension exist parallel to each other, although they do not (seem to) mean by this that the human body and the human mind are numerically different things: Scruton (1986, p.58), Floistad (1994, p.38), Matson (1994, p.71), Beyssade (1999, p.115), Segal (2000, p.12), Youpa (2003, p.478), LeBuffe (2004, p.131), Nadler (2006, p.122), Lin (2006, p.328), Wienand (2009, p.375), Steinberg (2009, p.141), LeBuffe (2010, p.38), Della Rocca (1996, p.215), Della Rocca (2008a, p.90), Della Rocca (2008b, p.29), Steinberg (2009, p.140), Shapiro (2012, p.205).

colleague's typing; none of these sense perceptions represents my own body[7]. (Sometimes a sense perception does represent my own body to me, of course, for example when I look at my own hands while typing this text.) However, *metaphysically* speaking, all my sense perceptions are ideas of my body, because all of them *correspond* to states of my body. All the sense perceptions in the example are ideas of my body, because they all correspond to states of my sense organs and brain[8].

The working principle of a perfect parallelism between the causal order of mental states and the causal order of bodily states, as said, will guide my interpretation of Spinoza's theory of emotion. A large part of my interpretation of Spinoza's theory of emotion consists in an attempt to answer the following four simple questions, which can be easily understood through the scheme above: (1) What is the nature of emotion insofar as it is a mental state?; (2) What is the mental cause of emotion insofar as it is a mental state?; (3) What is the nature of emotion insofar as it is a bodily state; and (4) What is the bodily cause of emotion insofar as it is a bodily state?

Although the working principle of a perfect parallelism between the causal order of mental states and the causal order of bodily states is useful to the exposition of Spinoza's theory of emotion, it may be inaccurate for two reasons. The first reason why this picture of a perfect parallelism may be inaccurate is that it is doubtful whether Spinoza holds that all the states of our body (even, for example, the present state of our pancreas) correspond to a state of our mind. Given that we are not aware of many states of our body, some scholars have argued that the states of our mind that form the ideas of such bodily states are unconscious. I shall not go into this issue because it is not directly relevant to my argument. The second reason why this picture of a perfect parallelism may be inaccurate is that it is doubtful whether Spinoza holds that our adequate ideas correspond to states of our body. This issue is important to my argument, because, for example, if our adequate idea of God affects us with Joy, then the state of our body that correspond to our Joy is supposed to be caused by the state of our body that corresponds to our adequate idea of God. If our adequate idea of God does

[7] LeBuffe (2010, p.64) writes that Spinoza exclusively uses the verb '*repraesentare*' for the relation between a mental image and an external body. Although a mental image is an idea of a bodily state, a mental image does not 'represent' that bodily state. One exception to this rule might be found in the footnote to the passage in the *Short Treatise* (I/102/1, p.140) that says: '*I.e., our soul being an Idea of the body, it has its first being from the body, for it only a representation of the body, both of the whole and of the parts, in the thinking thing.*' I say that this *might* be an exception, because Curley adds that this is generally regarded as a reader's comment. I doubt that it is a reader's comment, because it says that the mind has its *first* being from the body. Spinoza's claim that the human mind is the idea of the body suggests that the mind has its *entire* being from the body. And this is what most scholars believe. If the footnote is not Spinoza's, then it was made by a careful reader.

[8] Bennett (1984, p.155) clarifies this distinction by saying that a mental state is 'directly of' a state of the human body, and 'indirectly of' an external body.

not correspond to any state of our body, then the state of our body that corresponds to our Joy seems to have no cause, which is impossible according to Spinoza's claim that everything has a cause. In the following chapter (section 2, subsection 2) I shall discuss a number of passages in which Spinoza suggests that our adequate ideas do not correspond to states of our body.

Chapter 2: Cognition

Spinoza distinguishes three kinds of knowledge, which, in the Ethics, *he calls: (1) 'opinion, or imagination' (opinio, vel imaginatio); (2) 'reason' (ratio); and (3) 'intuitive science' (scientia intuitiva)*[9]*. He claims that knowledge of the first kind consists in inadequate ideas, and that knowledge of the second and third kind consists in adequate ideas.*

In this chapter I interpret those elements of Spinoza's theory of cognition that are relevant to his theory of emotion. In the first section I discuss what Spinoza writes about inadequate ideas, and in the second section I discuss what he writes about adequate ideas. In these two sections I especially attempt to clarify how our ideas relate to our body. In the third section I interpret Spinoza's claim that all ideas involve judgement.

The reason why we need to discuss Spinoza's theory of cognition before we can discuss his theory of emotion is that, as we shall see in the following chapter, Spinoza holds that our emotions are caused by our cognitions. The claim that our emotions are caused by our cognitions implies that the bodily states that correspond to our emotions are caused by the bodily states that correspond to our cognitions, and it is therefore important in this chapter to find out to which bodily states our cognitions correspond.

Section 1: Inadequate ideas

Spinoza calls the ideas that belong to the first kind of knowledge '*imaginationes*', that is, 'imaginations' or 'mental images'. Mental images are either sense perceptions or recollections of sense perceptions. In subsection 1 I shall discuss what Spinoza writes about sense perception, and in subsection 2 what he writes about recollection. The primary objective here is to interpret in more concrete terms Spinoza's abstract description of what happens in our body when we have a sense perception or a recollection. In subsection 3 I shall discuss Spinoza's apparent thesis that opinions consist in mental images.

[9] Spinoza also talks about three kinds of knowledge in the *Treatise on the Intellect* (II/9/34, p.12), and in the *Short Treatise* (I/54/10, p.97). In the *Treatise on the Intellect* Spinoza does not give these different kinds of knowledge special names. In the *Short Treatise* he calls them: (1) 'belief' but also 'opinion' (Dutch: *geloof* and *waan*); (2) 'belief' but also 'true belief' (*geloof* and *waar geloof*); and (3) 'science' but also 'clear and distinct concept' (*weten* and *klare en onderscheiden bevatting*). Spinoza sometimes counts knowledge of the first kind based on report and knowledge of the first kind based on random experience separately thus ending up with four, rather than three, kinds of knowledge.

Subsection 1: Sense perception

Although Spinoza does not use the term 'sense perception', it is clear that he begins his theory of cognition by explaining sense perception. He writes in IIP14:

> The human Mind is capable of perceiving a great many things, and is the more capable, the more its body can be disposed in a great many ways. Dem.: For the human Body (by Post. 3 and 6) is affected in a great many ways by external bodies, and is disposed to affect external bodies in a great many ways. But the human Mind must perceive everything which happens in the human Body (by P12). Therefore, the human Mind is capable of perceiving a great many things, and is the more capable [, NS: as the human Body is more capable].

Spinoza tells us here that the capacity of the human mind to perceive external bodies depends on the capacity of the human body to be affected by external bodies. Although Spinoza speaks very abstractly of 'the human body', it is evident that the parts of the body that are relevant to sense perception are the sense organs, the nerves and the brain. We do not have a sense perception when any other part of our body is affected by an external body. When, therefore, Spinoza writes that our body can be disposed by external things in a great many ways, he must refer to the fact that our sense organs are affected by external bodies in different ways. Our eyes are affected by external bodies via light, our ears via air vibrations, our skin by direct physical contact, etcetera. And, therefore, when he writes that 'our mind's capacity of perceiving external bodies depends on our body's capacity of being affected by external bodies in a great many ways', he must mean that our mind's capacity of having sense perceptions depends on the capacity of our sense organs to be affected properly by external bodies, as well as on the capacity of our nerves and brain to be affected properly by the affection of our sense organs. For example, our capacity to perceive the world by vision depends on the capacity of our eyes to be affected by external bodies via light, our capacity to perceive the world by sound depends on the capacity of our ears to be affected by external bodies via air vibrations, etcetera, as well as on the capacity of our nerves and brain to be affected properly by these affections of our sense organs.

Notice that the reason that Spinoza gives for the fact that we have sense perceptions of external bodies when external bodies affect our body is that *our mind perceives our body*. If in IIP14 Spinoza indeed refers to our sense organs, nerves and brain by the expression 'our body', then this means that the reason why we have sense perceptions of external bodies when external bodies affect our sense organs, and our nerves and brain via our sense organs, is that our mind perceives the affections of our sense organs, nerves and brain caused by external

bodies. So, for example, when the light reflected from a tree outside our window affects our eyes, then we see the tree because our mind perceives what happens in our eyes, nerves and brain. We see the tree, in other words, because there is in our mind a perception, *or* an 'idea', of the affection of our eyes, nerves and brain. Our sense perceptions of external bodies are strictly speaking, or if you like, metaphysically speaking, not ideas of external bodies but ideas of the affections of our sense organs, nerves and brain caused by external bodies that act on our sense organs. Our visual perception of the tree, for example, is, metaphysically speaking, not an idea of the tree, but an idea of the affection of our eyes, nerves and brain caused by the light coming from the tree[10].

Spinoza continues his theory of sense perception in IIP15:

> The idea that constitutes the formal being [esse] of the human Mind is not simple, but composed of a great many ideas. Dem.: The idea that constitutes the formal being of the human Mind is the idea of a body (by P13), which (by Post. 1) is composed of a great many highly composite Individuals. But of each Individual composing the body, there is necessarily (by P8C) an idea in God. Therefore (by P7), the idea of the human Body is composed of these many ideas of the parts composing the Body, q.e.d.

Spinoza explained earlier, in IIP13A'', that by the term 'individual' he means a composite body, and, in IIP13Post.1, that the human body is composed of many parts that are themselves highly composite. As said, it is evident that the parts of the human body that are relevant to sense perception are the sense organs, the nerves and the brain. Therefore, when Spinoza writes in IIP15 that our mind is composed of many ideas because our mind consists in the ideas of the many parts of our body, he must mean that our mind is composed of many sense perceptions because our mind is composed of ideas of our sense organs, nerves and brain. At the moment, for example, I feel the touch of the keyboard I am typing on, I hear the sounds of the music I am listening to, I see the words on the computer screen I am looking at, etcetera. My mind is composed of all these sense perceptions, Spinoza seems to say, because my mind is composed of the idea of the affection of the skin of my fingers caused by the keyboard, the idea of the affection of my ears caused by the air vibrations coming from the sound boxes, the idea of the affection of my eyes caused by the light reflected from my computer screen, etcetera, as well as the ideas of the affections of my nerves and brain caused by all these affections of my sense organs.

[10] Descartes argues (in his Sixth Meditation, and in principle 96 of his *Principles of Philosophy*) that not the motions in the sense organs, but the motions in the brain cause sensations in the soul. Spinoza, however, writes that the human mind perceives the affections of the human body and the parts that compose the human body, which suggests that it perceives more than just the brain.

Spinoza continues in IIP16:

> The idea of any mode in which the human Body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human Body and at the same time the nature of the external body. Dem.: For all the modes in which a body is affected follow from the nature of the affecting body (by A1'' [II/99]). So the idea of them (by IA4) will necessarily involve the nature of each body. And so the idea of each mode in which the human Body is affected by an external body involves the nature of the human Body and of the external body, q.e.d. Cor.1: From this it follows, first, that the human Mind perceives the nature of a great many bodies together with the nature of its own body. Cor. 2: It follows, second, that the ideas which we have of external bodies indicate the condition of our own body more than the nature of the external bodies. I have explained this by many examples in the Appendix of Part I.

In IIP16C1, then, Spinoza states explicitly what we have already understood from IIP14 and IIP15, namely that we perceive external bodies through the ideas that our mind has of our own body, which, as argued, must mean that we perceive external bodies through the ideas that our mind has of the affections of our sense organs, nerves and brain caused by external bodies. The 'ideas' of the affections of the human body are, of course, sense perceptions, even though Spinoza does not call them 'sense perceptions' here.

We now also learn that the nature of our sense perceptions depends both on the nature of our own body and on the nature of the external bodies that affect our body, and, in fact, more so on the nature of the former than on the nature of the latter. This, then, must mean that the nature of our sense perceptions depends more on the nature of our sense organs, nerves and brain than on the nature of the external bodies that affect them. Spinoza says he has given examples of this in the Appendix of Part I, to which we therefore now turn.

In the Appendix of Part I Spinoza claims that our judgement of the quality of things depends not on the nature of these things themselves but on how they affect us, that is, whether they please or displease us. He writes near the end of the Appendix of Part I (II/82/16, p.445):

> For example, if the motion the nerves receive from objects presented through the eyes is conducive to health, the objects by which it is caused are called beautiful; those which cause a contrary motion are called ugly. Those which move the sense through the nose, they call pleasant-smelling or stinking; through the tongue, sweet or bitter, tasty or tasteless; through touch, hard or soft, rough of smooth, etc.; and finally, those which move the ears are said to produce noise, sound or harmony. […] All of these things show sufficiently that each one has judged things according to the disposition of his brain; or rather, has accepted affections of the imagination as things.

So, for example, whether we perceive an external body as beautiful or ugly does not so much depend on the external body itself, but rather on the effect it has on our eyes, nerves and brain. If the external body affects our eyes, nerves and brain in a way that is conducive to our body's health, then the external body seems beautiful to us, and when it affects our eyes, nerves and brain in a way that is detrimental to our body's health then the external body seems ugly to us. In other words, the beauty or ugliness we perceive in an external body does not so much depend on the nature of the external body itself but more on the nature of our own eyes, nerves and brain.

This passage from the Appendix of Part I is one of the rare instances in which Spinoza speaks in concrete terms about the human body. It confirms the suggestion that when he, in IIP14-16, speaks abstractly of 'the human body', he is thinking of the sense organs, the nerves and the brain. The reference in IIP16 to the Appendix of Part I, and the fact that Spinoza, there, explicitly writes that we have sense perceptions when our sense organs, nerves and brain are affected, also allows us to interpret in more concrete terms the abstract references to the human body that he makes in the postulates that immediately precede IIP14.

Postulates 2, 3 and 5 seem to be particularly relevant to the discussion of sense perception. In the second postulate Spinoza writes: *Some of the individuals of which the human Body is composed are fluid, some soft, and others, finally are hard.*' In the third postulate he writes: '*Some of the individuals composing the human Body, and consequently, the human Body itself, are affected by external bodies in very many ways.*' In the fifth postulate he writes: '*When a fluid part of the human Body is determined by an external body so that it frequently thrusts against a soft part [of the Body], it changes its surface and, as it were, impresses on [the soft part] certain traces of the external body striking against [the fluid part]*.' Spinoza's claim in the Appendix of Part I that we have sense perceptions when our sense organs, nerves and brain are affected, makes it highly likely that he uses the expression 'the soft parts of the human body' to refer to the sense organs and the brain, and the expression 'the fluid parts of the human body' to refer to the animal spirits, which are, to put it in Descartes's words, the finest and most agitated particles of the blood. (The animal spirits, contrary to what the term may suggest, are thus purely physical.)

The somewhat less abstract version of Spinoza's theory of sense perception that emerges from this reading of the Appendix of Part I, IIP14-16 and the postulates which directly precede IIP14, then, is that we have a sense perception of an external body, when our mind perceives the affection of a sense organ, the nerves and the brain that is caused by this external body.

Spinoza's explanation of sense perception is clearly opposed to Descartes's explanation of sense perception. According to Descartes, a sense perception of an external body is caused in the soul by the affection of the brain that has itself been caused by that external body's action on a sense organ. In article 189 of the *Principles of Philosophy*, for example, he writes:

> It must be realized that the human soul, while informing the entire body, nevertheless has its principal seat in the brain; it is here alone that the soul not only understands and imagines but also has sensory awareness. Sensory awareness come about by means of nerves, which stretch like threads from the brain to all the limbs, and are joined together in such a way that hardly any part of the human body can be touched without producing movements in several of the nerve-ends that are scattered around in that area. This movement is then transmitted to the other ends of the nerves which are all grouped in the brain around the seat of the soul, as I explained very fully in Chapter Four of the *Optics*. The result of these movements being set up in the brain by the nerves is that the soul or mind that is closely joined to the brain is affected in various ways, corresponding to the various different sorts of movement. And the various different states of mind, or thoughts, which are the immediate result of these movements are called sensory perceptions, or in ordinary speech, sensations. [Translation by John Cottingham.]

Spinoza, then, denies that the mind's sense perception of an external body is *caused* by the affection of a sense organ, the nerves and the brain. He, as we have seen in IIP14-16, argues that the mind has a sense perception of an external body, not because the affection of the human body causes a sense perception of the external body in the mind, but because the mind perceives, *or* has an idea of, the affection of the human body. In other words, the sense perception of an external body is not caused by the affection of the human body, but *corresponds to* the affection of the human body.

Although Spinoza indicates the bodily cause of the affections of our brain which correspond to our sense perceptions, namely external bodies, he does not point out the mental cause of our sense perceptions. He says that we have a sense perception *at the same time* as our brain is affected in a certain way by an external body that acts on a sense organ. As the affections of our brain are not the cause of our sense perceptions, we still do not know what causes sense perception. We will come back to this point in chapter 5 where we will discuss the bodily and mental cause of Pleasure and Pain.

Subsection 2: Recollection of sense perception

We have seen that in IIP14-16 Spinoza explains that we have sense perceptions of external bodies because our mind perceives the affections of our sense organs, nerves and brain caused by external bodies that act on our sense organs. In IIP17 Spinoza explains what happens once an external body ceases to act on a sense organ of our body:

> If the human Body is affected with a mode that involves the nature of an external body, the human Mind will regard [*contemplabitur*] the same external body as actually existing, or as present to it, until the Body is affected by an affect [*affectu*] that excludes the existence of that body. Dem.: This is evident. For as long as the human Body is so affected, the human Mind (by P12) will regard this affection of the body, i.e., (by P16), it will have the idea of a mode that actually exists, an idea that involves the nature of the external body, i.e., an idea that does not exclude, but posits, the existence or presence of the nature of the external body. And so the Mind (by P16C1) will regard the external body as actually existing, or as present, until it is affected, etc. q.e.d.

The 'mode' that involves the nature of an external body is, of course, an affection of a sense organ, the nerves and the brain caused by an external body that acts on a sense organ. We have seen that the human mind has a sense perception of this external body through its perception of this affection of the human body. Spinoza now formulates this by saying that when the human mind has the idea of this affection, then it '*regards the external body as existing, or as present to it*'. The reason why he introduces this expression is that he wants to explain that the mind continues to have this perception of the external body as long as the affection of the human body, that is, the affection of the brain, continues to exist, even if the external body has ceased to affect the sense organ of the human body. After the external body has ceased to act on the sense organ, we can, of course, no longer properly speak of a 'sense perception'[11].

Spinoza writes that we cease to regard the external body as present only when our body is affected with an '*affectus*' that excludes the existence of the external body. Shapiro (2012a, p.208; 2012b, p.99) claims that Spinoza here uses '*affectus*' in the sense of 'emotion', and she even claims on the basis of this passage that Spinoza characterises imagination as emotion in the Second Part of the *Ethics*. Her interpretation must be mistaken.

IIP17 makes no sense when we read it as saying that we cease to have a perception of an external body only when we are affected with *an emotion* that excludes the existence of

[11] In section 3 we shall see that the phrase 'we regard an external body as present' means more than that we just have a mental image of something. Spinoza argues that our mental image of an external body involves the affirmation that the external body exists outside our mind and that it is as imagined.

that external body. This makes no sense, because our emotions do not pose or exclude the existence of external bodies; only our sense perceptions and recollections of sense perceptions represent external bodies to us. In chapter 5 we shall see that the emotions of Joy and Sadness correspond to an increase or decrease in our bodily health due to an affection of our heart. What would it possibly mean to say that we only cease to have a perception of an external body when our heart is affected in a healthy or unhealthy way, such as to exclude the existence of the external body that we perceive?! Furthermore, as Shapiro observes herself, Spinoza introduces emotion only in the Third Part of the *Ethics*. It is therefore quite unlikely that he is making some obscure claim about emotion here in the Second Part of the *Ethics*.

Although Curley translates '*affectu*' as 'affect', he remarks in a footnote that 'we should probably read 'affection' here'. I contend that we should definitely read 'affection' here. IIP17 only makes sense when we read it as saying that our perception of something corresponds to an affection of our brain and that we only cease to have that perception when our brain is affected with *another affection* that excludes the former affection of our brain, and that corresponds to a perception of another external body. Let me give an example to illustrate that this does make sense: Say I look in one direction. The external bodies that are in front of me reflect light into my eyes, causing a change in my eyes, in my optical nerve and brain, which change in these parts of my body corresponds to my visual perception of the external bodies in front of me. As long as my brain is in this state, I continue to have the visual perception of these external bodies, even if the external bodies themselves were to be removed or destroyed. I now look in another direction. The external bodies that are now in front of me change the affection of my eyes, optical nerve and brain, and I no longer have the visual perception of the former external bodies, but now have a visual perception of the external bodies that are now in front of me.

In a letter he writes to Pieter Balling (letter 17, IV/76/25, p.353) Spinoza gives an example that nicely illustrates the claim that 'when our body (i.e., brain) is affected with an *affection* that involves the nature of an external body, then we regard that external body as present until our body (i.e., brain) is affected with an *affection* that excludes the existence of this external body'. He recounts the following experience:

> One morning, as the sky was already growing light, I woke from a very deep dream to find that the images which had come to me in my dream remained before my eyes as vividly as if the things had been true – especially [the image] of a certain black, scabby Brazilian whom I had never seen before. For the most part this image disappeared when, to divert myself with something else, I fixed my eyes on

> a book or some other object. But as soon as I turned my eyes back away from such an object without fixing my eyes attentively on anything, the same image of the same Black man appeared to me with the same vividness, alternately, until it gradually disappeared from my visual field.

Although the black Brazilian is not standing in his room, Spinoza still 'sees' him, presumably because his brain continues to be affected with the same state. He has to change this state of his brain, by focusing his vision on an object that is actually present in his room, in order to get rid of his perception of the man that he imagines. (Notice that Spinoza uses the word 'image' in the sense of 'mental image'.)

In IIP17, then, Spinoza quite clearly uses the word '*affectus*' not in the sense of 'emotion', but in the sense of 'affection'. We shall see that he sometimes does the same in IIIP14-18. (I say 'sometimes', because in those passages he also uses the word '*affectus*' to refer to Joy and Sadness.) In IIIP18D we even find clear confirmation that he uses the word '*affectus*' there as an equivalent of '*affectio*', because he writes: '*corporis constitutio, seu affectus*'. Given that in IIID3 Spinoza defines emotion as a special kind of affection, he should not have used the word '*affectus*' but the word '*affectio*' as an equivalent of the expression '*constitutio corporis*'. One of the reasons why I translate '*affectus*' as 'emotion', rather than as 'affect', is that one easily confuses 'affect', but not 'emotion', with 'affection'. The fact that even Spinoza confuses '*affectus*' with '*affectio*' shows that this is not an exaggerated measure of precaution.

Let us move on to IIP17C for a more detailed account of what happens in our body when we 'perceive' an external body that is not present:

> Cor.: Although the external bodies by which the human body has once been affected neither exist nor are present, the mind will still be able to regard them as if they were present. Dem.: While external bodies so determine the fluid parts of the human body that they often thrust against the softer parts, they change (by Post. 5) their surfaces with the result (see A2'' after L3) that they are reflected from it in another way than they used to be before, and still later, when the fluid parts, by their spontaneous motion, encounter those new surfaces, they are reflected in the same way as when they were driven against those surfaces by external bodies.

This is actually a different situation from the one we encountered earlier in IIP17. There we continued to have the perception of the external body that had just ceased to act on our sense organ. Here Spinoza explains what happens in our body when we *recollect* a sense perception of an external body that we have once perceived through our senses. As said, the term 'the

fluid parts' must refer to the animal spirits that move through the nerves and the brain, and the term 'the softer parts' must refer to the sense organs and the brain. Spinoza, then, tells us here that when the animal spirits repeatedly affect a part of the brain in the same manner, because the same external body repeatedly acts on a sense organ, then they permanently change the structure of that part of the brain. Therefore, when the animal spirits affect this part of the brain again but now, not because the external body acts again on the sense organ, but because the animal spirits move spontaneously through the body, they affect the brain in the same manner as they did when the external body acted on the sense organ. Spinoza continues:

> Consequently, while, thus affected, they [the animal spirits. CR] continue to move, they will affect the human body [i.e., the brain. CR] with the same mode, concerning which the Mind (by P12) will think again [*de quo mens iterum cogitabit*], i.e. (by P17), the Mind will again regard the external body as present; this will happen as often as the fluid parts of the human body [the animal spirits. CR] encounter the same surfaces by their spontaneous motion. So although the external bodies by which the human Body was once affected do not exist, the Mind will still regard them as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated, q.e.d.'

So, when the animal spirits, by their spontaneous movements[12], hit upon that part of the brain whose structure has been altered due to the frequent action of the external body on the sense organ, and thus affect the brain in the same manner as they did when the external body acted on the sense organ, then the human mind perceives this affection of the brain, and through this perception it regards the external body as present. This is what happens in our body when we, in other words, *recollect* our sense perception of the external body.

Spinoza tells us that he will use the word 'image' (*imago*) to refer to a brain state that has been formed under the influence of an external body that acted on a sense organ:

> Next, to retain the customary words, the affections of the human Body whose ideas present external bodies as present to us, we shall call images of things, even if they do not reproduce the [NS: external] figure of things. And when the Mind regards bodies as present in this way, we shall say it imagines.'

(When Spinoza says that 'the images of things do not reproduce the figures of things' he means, it seems, that when we perceive a tree, for example, then the affection of our brain that

[12] It is interesting that Spinoza talks about the spontaneous movements of the animal spirits as 'actions of the body'. It seems that if the bodily events going on when we imagine things can be classified as actions of the body, then the corresponding mental images should be classified actions of the mind. This, however, is at odds with Spinoza's claim in IIID2 that we act when we are the adequate cause of our mental states and that we are acted on when we are the inadequate cause of our mental states.

corresponds to our visual perception of the tree does not have the shape of a tree.) In IIIP32S Spinoza, once again, explains that the word 'image' refers to the affections of the brain involved in sense perception or recollection: '[…] *the images of things are the very affections of the human Body,* or *modes by which the human Body is affected by external causes, and disposed to do this or that.*' In IIP13Post.5 he uses the term 'traces' (*vestigia)* to refer to the affections of the brain: '*When a fluid part of the human Body* [i.e., the animal spirits. CR] *is determined by an external body so that it frequently thrusts against a soft part [of the Body]* [i.e., the brain. CR], *it changes its surface and, as it were, impresses on [the soft part] certain traces of the external body striking against [the fluid part]*.' In IIIPost.2 he uses the term 'impressions' (*impressiones)* as an equivalent of the term 'traces': '*The human Body can undergo many changes, and nevertheless retain impressions,* or *traces, of the objects (on this see IIPost.5), and consequently, the same images of things.*' According to Spinoza's official definition, then, 'images' are the bodily impressions that the animal spirits make on the brain, or, in other words, the bodily traces that the animal spirits leave on the brain, under the influence of external bodies that act on the sense organs. It should be stressed that this is Spinoza's *official* definition of the word '*imago*', because we have already seen, and will continue to see, that Spinoza often uses the word '*imago*' in the sense of 'mental image', rather than in the sense of 'cerebral image'.

That our mental images correspond to states of our brain which were originally caused by external bodies that acted on our senses, is confirmed by the following passage from the *Cogitata Metaphysica* (I/234/17, p.300):

> Finally, since we are accustomed to depict in our fantasy [*phantasia*] also images [*imagines*] of whatever we understand, it happens that we imagine non-entities positively, as beings. For the mind, considered in itself, since it is a thinking thing, has no greater power of affirming than of denying. But as imagining is nothing but being aware of [*sentire*] traces [*vestigia*] found in the brain from the motions of the spirits aroused in the senses [*in sensibus*] by objects. Such an awareness [*sensatio*] can only be a confused affirmation. Hence it happens that we imagine as if they were beings all those modes which the mind uses for negating, such as blindness, extremity or limit, term, darkness, etc.

Here, then, Spinoza explicitly writes that our mental image of an external body corresponds to traces in our brain originally caused by the animal spirits under the influence of that external body when it acted on our sense organs. We also see that Spinoza uses the word 'image' in the sense of 'mental image', and not in the sense of 'cerebral image'.

Spinoza says in IIP17 that we 'imagine' something when we have an '*imaginatio*', that is, an idea that represents an external body as present to us, even if that external body is not really present. This implies that all sense perceptions and all recollections of sense perceptions are mental images, and that we imagine something when we see, hear, taste, touch, or smell something, and also when we recollect any of these sense perceptions. All sense perceptions and all recollections, after all, represent an external body as present to us.

It is quite clear, then, that when Spinoza writes that he defines the word '*imaginatio*' this way because he wants '*to retain the customary words*', he does not mean that he defines this word in this way because people in the street use this word in this way. In common speech 'to imagine' either means (1) to visualise something, or (2) to have an opinion. No one would say, for example, that he *imagines* the *Ethics* when he sees the *Ethics*, or that he *imagines* a lecture on the *Ethics* when he recollects his auditory perception of a lecture on the *Ethics*. Spinoza, then, means that he defines the word '*imaginatio*' this way because that is customary amongst philosophers. Philosophers use the word '*imaginatio*' to refer not only to recollections of visual perceptions, but to all sense perceptions and recollections of all sense perceptions.

The association of mental images

We have seen that we recollect a sense perception of something when the animal spirits move spontaneously through our brain and reactivate an affection of our brain that was first caused by an external body acting on our senses. In IIP18 Spinoza observes that we also recollect a sense perception of something when we recollect our sense perception of something else that we have associated with the first thing.

> If the human Body [i.e., the sense organs, the nerves and the brain. CR] has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, then when the Mind subsequently imagines one of them, it will immediately recollect the other also. Dem.: The Mind (by P17C) imagines a body because the human Body is affected and disposed as it was affected when certain of its parts [i.e., the sense organs. CR] were struck by the external body itself. But (by hypothesis) the Body was then so disposed that the Mind imagined two [or more] bodies at once; therefore it will now also imagine two [or more] at once, and when the Mind imagines one, it will immediately recollect the other also, q.e.d. Schol.: From this we clearly understand what Memory is. For it is nothing other than a certain connection of ideas involving the nature of things which are outside the human Body – a connection that is in the Mind according to the order and connection of the affections of the human Body.

Spinoza gives a rather undetailed physical explanation of why we recollect a sense perception of something when we recollect our sense perception of something else that we have associated with it. He seems to be saying the following: When we perceive two external bodies through our senses at the same time, then our sense perception of these two external bodies corresponds to a single affection of our brain. When, later on, we perceive once again one of these two external bodies, or when we recollect our sense perception of one of these two bodies, then the affection of our brain that corresponded to our sense perception of these two bodies is reactivated, and we 'perceive' these two external bodies once again together[13]. Spinoza gives an example of this phenomenon in the previously cited letter to Pieter Balling (letter 17, IV/78/10, p.354): '*For example, if, while we are speaking with this or that man, we hear sighs, it will generally happen that when we think again of that same man, the sighs we heard when we spoke with him will come into our memory.*'

Which associations we make is thus a highly subjective matter. It completely depends on our personal experience. In IIP18S Spinoza illustrates this with the following example. When a soldier sees the traces of a horse in the sand, then he will immediately imagine a horse, and pass from the idea of a horse to the idea of a horseman, and from that to the idea of war. But when a farmer sees the same traces in the sand, then he will pass from the idea of a horse to the idea of a plow, and from the idea of a plow to the idea of a field.

Overlapping mental images

Some mental images of external bodies are not only confused ideas because they, as all sense perceptions and recollections, depend heavily on the nature of the human body (that is, the sense organs, the nerves and the brain), but also because they consist in several overlapping recollections. These mental images, Spinoza writes, are confused in the highest degree. Spinoza explains in IIP40C1 that our mental images start to overlap each other when we form too many of them at the same time:

> [..] the human Body [i.e., the brain. CR], being limited, is capable of forming distinctly only a certain number of images at the same time (I have explained what an image is in P17S). If that number is exceeded, the [cerebral. CR] images will begin to be confused, and if the number of images the Body is

[13] In IIIP16 Spinoza seems to presuppose that we also associate two things with each other when we perceive some similarity between them. I associate, for example, the Dalai Lama with my neighbour because they are both Tibetan. I suggest in passing that it is important for Spinoza to show that mental images come to our mind *because they are caused my other mental images*, because he reject Descartes's thesis that we sometimes voluntarily imagine things. Spinoza denies that we sometimes imagine things because we have decided to do so, and he therefore spends quite some time explaining why we imagine things.

> capable of forming distinctly in itself at once is greatly exceeded, they will all be completely confused with one another. Since this is so, it is evident from P17C and P18, that the human Mind will be able to imagine distinctly, at the same time, as many bodies as there can be images formed at once in its body [i.e., the brain. CR]. But when the images in the body are completely confused, the Mind also will imagine all the bodies confusedly, without any distinction, […]

Spinoza's argument in this passage, then, is that, just as the body can form only a limited number of distinct cerebral images at a given moment, so the mind, too, can form only a limited number of distinct mental images of external bodies at a given moment. Just as cerebral images start to overlap when the brain forms too many of them, so do mental images start to overlap when the mind forms too many of them. When our mental images overlap, they are no longer distinct but confused. We may, for example, distinctly imagine one specific friend, perhaps two, but when we try to imagine three friends at the same time, then our mental images of them start to overlap and become blurred.

A little further Spinoza explains that if we form too many mental images of similar things and these images start to overlap, then we will imagine distinctly only those characteristics that these things had in common:

> […] because so many images (e.g., of men) are formed at one time in the human Body [i.e., the brain. CR] that they surpass the power of imagining – not entirely, of course, but still to the point where the Mind can imagine neither slight differences of the singular [men] (such as the color, and size of each one, etc.) nor their determinate number, and imagines distinctly only what they all agree in, insofar as they affect the body [i.e., the sense organs, nerves and brain. CR]. For the body has been affected most [NS: forcefully] by [what is common], since each singular has affected it [by this property]. And [NS: the mind] expresses this by the word man, and predicates it of infinitely many singulars. For as we have said, it cannot imagine a determinate number of singulars.

So, for example, if we try to imagine three friends at the same time, we will be able to imagine distinctly the properties that they have in common, for example a nose, eyes, and so forth, but we will not be able to imagine distinctly the properties that they do not have in common, for example the specific colour or shape of their eyes, nose, etcetera. The reason why we are able to imagine distinctly the properties that our friends have in common, Spinoza says, is that our sense organs have been most often affected by these properties, and thus the affections of our brain that correspond to our mental images of these properties are most vigorous.

Subsection 3: Opinion

In IIP40S2 Spinoza describes the three kinds of knowledge. Let us look at the description of the first kind of knowledge:

> From what has been said above, it is clear that we perceive many things and form universal notions: I. from singular things which have been represented to us through the senses in a way that is mutilated, confused, and without order for the intellect (see IIP29S); for that reason I have been accustomed to call such perceptions knowledge from experience; II. from signs, e.g., from the fact that, having heard or read certain words, we recollect things, and form certain ideas of them, which are like them, and through which we imagine the things (IIP18S). These two ways of regarding things I shall henceforth call knowledge of the first kind, opinion or imagination.

Spinoza says that we perceive things and form universal notions from random experience (i.e., from our own random sense perceptions) and from report (i.e., from the written or spoken word of other people). In IIP40S1 Spinoza gives as examples of universal notions the notions of Man, Horse and Dog, and as examples of transcendental notions, which he certainly includes in the first kind of knowledge, the notions of Being, Thing and Something.

At the end of the previous section we have seen that our mental images of things begin to overlap when the affections of the brain to which they correspond begin to overlap. It is clear that Spinoza believes that this phenomenon is somehow the reason why we form universal and transcendental notions. It is however unclear whether these notions are merely based on such highly confused mental images or whether these notions are themselves such highly confused mental images. It is unclear, for example, whether our notion Dog is merely based on our highly confused mental image of a dog or whether our notion is this highly confused mental image.

It is very interesting that in IIP40S2 Spinoza calls the first kind of knowledge ‘imagination or opinion’. In the *Short Treatise* (I/54/10, p.97) Spinoza calls the first kind of knowledge ‘belief’ (Dutch: *geloof*) and he also calls it ‘opinion’ (*waan*), but he does not it call it there ‘imagination’. In the *Treatise on the Intellect* (II/9/34, p.12) Spinoza does not give the three kinds of knowledge specific names, but he does give some examples of these three kinds of knowledge. As examples of the first kind of knowledge he gives the fact that he knows from report his date of birth and who his parents are, and that he knows from random experience that he will die, that oil is capable of feeding fire, that water is capable of putting fire out, that a dog is a barking animal, and that man is a rational animal. He adds that almost all the knowledge that is useful in life is of the first kind. These examples of knowledge of the

first kind are clearly examples of opinions (i.e., beliefs based on random experience or report), rather than examples of mental images.

It seems most likely that at the time of writing the *Ethics* Spinoza still considers the examples that he gave in the *Treatise on the Intellect* as examples of knowledge of the first kind, because in the *Ethics* he calls the first kind of knowledge 'imagination or opinion'. This raises the question: How does Spinoza see the relation between mental images (i.e., sense perceptions and recollections of sense perceptions) and opinions at the time of writing the *Ethics*?

One might think that the first kind of knowledge does not consist in mental images (i.e., sense perceptions and recollections) but only in opinions based on mental images. One might think, for example, that the universal notions are not themselves mental images but opinions based on highly confused mental images. Our notion Dog, for example, would not be our highly confused mental image of a barking dog, but our opinion that a dog is a barking animal which opinion we have formed because we have perceived many barking dogs. Our knowledge that oil is capable of feeding fire, to give another example, would not be our highly confused mental image of oil feeding fire, but our opinion that oil is capable of feeding fire which opinion we have formed because we have often perceived oil feeding fire. Although this interpretation seems sensible, it must be mistaken, because mental images quite clearly belong to the first kind of knowledge. The mere fact that in the *Ethics* Spinoza calls the first kind of knowledge 'imagination or opinion' makes this quite clear.

Spinoza's remark that he calls knowledge of the first kind 'opinion or imagination' suggests that (1) our opinions consist in mental images, and it suggests that (2) our mental images constitute our opinions. It suggests, in other words, that (1) to believe that *p* is the same thing as having a mental image that represents that *p*, and that (2) to have a mental image that represents that *p* is the same thing as to believe that *p*.

These two claims suggested by Spinoza's remark that he calls knowledge of the first kind 'opinion or imagination' seem false. First, to hold the belief that *p* does not seem to consist in having a mental image that represents that *p*. To believe that it rains outside, for example, does not seem to consist in visualising rain drops falling out of the sky. To believe that our friend is joyful, to give another example, does not seem to consist in visualising him with a smile on his face. Secondly, to have a mental image that represents that *p* does not seem to be the same thing as holding the opinion that *p*. To visualise rain drops falling out of the sky, for example, does not seem to be the same thing as believing that it rains. To visualise

our friend with a smile on his face, to give another example, does not seem to be the same thing as believing that he is joyful.

Although these two claims seem false, there is some evidence, apart from the fact that he calls knowledge of the first kind 'opinion or imagination', that Spinoza in fact holds these two claims. In the third section of this chapter we shall see that in IIP49 Spinoza claims that a mental image involves the judgement that the object represented by the mental image is in reality as it is represented. To have the mental image of a winged horse, Spinoza says there, is to judge that the horse exists and that it has wings. Furthermore, in Chapter 4 we shall see that in the Third Part of the *Ethics* Spinoza does not make a clear distinction between feeling joyful or sad because one imagines that *p* and feeling joyful or sad because one believes that *p*. This seems to mean that to have a mental image that represents that *p* is the same things as to hold the belief that *p*.

Section 2: Adequate ideas

Now that we have discussed inadequate ideas and their relation to the human body, it is time to discuss adequate ideas and their relation to the human body. Subsection 1 I shall very briefly discuss what Spinoza writes about knowledge of the second and third kind, both of which consist in adequate ideas, and in subsection 2 I shall discuss what Spinoza writes about the relation between adequate ideas and the human body.

Subsection 1: Reason and intuitive knowledge

In IIP40S2 Spinoza writes the following about knowledge of the second kind: '*From what has been said above, it is clear that we perceive many things and form universal notions: […] III. Finally from the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of properties of things (see P38C, P39, P39C, and P40). This I call reason and the second kind of knowledge.*' Knowledge of the second kind, then, is based on common notions and adequate ideas of properties of things. In IIP40S1 Spinoza writes that our common notions are the foundations of our reasoning. He already explained in IIP37, IIP38 and IIP39 that we are able to form common notions because our body has certain properties in common with the bodies that affect us. He argued there that if our body has a property in common with an external body that affects our body, and if this is a property of both the parts and the whole of our body as well as a property of the parts and the whole of the external body, then we can only perceive this property adequately. He writes in IIP38C: '*From this it follows that there are certain ideas, or notions, common to all man. For (by L2) all bodies agree in certain*

things, which (by P38) must be perceived adequately, or clearly and distinctly, by all.' Spinoza does not give an example of a common property in IIP37-39 but his reference to L2 gives us a hint as to the nature of these common properties. In L2 Spinoza writes: '*All bodies agree in certain things. Dem.: For all bodies agree that they involve the concept of one and the same attribute (by D1), and in that they can move now more slowly, now more quickly, and absolutely, that now they move, now they are at rest.'* This suggests that we adequately perceive that all bodies are extended and either in motion or at rest, and that on the basis of these adequate perceptions we form the notions of extension, motion and rest. Another example of a property that all finite things have in common we find in IP28 where Spinoza writes that each thing must be determined by another finite thing to exist and to produce effects in a certain and determinate way, because in IIP31D he calls this a common property. Knowledge of the second kind thus consists in ideas of properties that are common to all things and that all things always have, and in ideas deduced from these ideas. Spinoza therefore writes in VP36S that knowledge of the second kind is 'universal knowledge' and in IIP44C2 that reason perceives things under a species of eternity.

About knowledge of the third kind, finally, Spinoza writes in IIP40S2: '*[IV] In addition to these two kinds of knowledge, there is (as I shall show in what follows) another, third kind, which we shall call intuitive knowledge. And this kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the [NS: formal] essence of things.*' Spinoza gives us a little more information about knowledge of third kind in IIP45:

> Each idea of each body, or of each singular thing which actually exists, necessarily involves an eternal and infinite essence of God. Dem.: The idea of a singular thing which actually exists necessarily involves both the essence of the thing and its existence (by P8C). But singular things (by IP15) cannot be conceived without God – on the contrary, because (by P6) they have God for cause insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which the things are modes, their ideas must involve the concept of their attribute (by IA4), i.e. (by ID6), must involve an eternal and infinite essence of God, q.e.d.

Spinoza's demonstration seems little convincing, because it seems very well possible to have an idea of a singular thing without knowing that this thing is caused by God insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which the singular thing is a mode. Someone who does not believe that extension is an attribute of God, for example, will not agree with Spinoza that his idea of a singular body involves the essence of God insofar as he is conceived under the attribute of extension. What Spinoza perhaps means is that singular things cannot be

conceived *adequately* without God, because singular things are modes of attributes and all attributes are attributes of God. Perhaps Spinoza means that once you understand that every attribute is an attribute of God, then you also understand that any singular thing is a mode of God insofar as he is conceived under the attribute of which that singular thing is a mode. Once you understand, for example, that extension is an attribute of God, then you also understand that any singular body is a mode of God insofar as God is conceived under the attribute of extension. However, IIP46 and IIP47 suggest that Spinoza's claim is much bolder than that every *adequate* idea of a singular thing involves the idea of God insofar as he is conceived under the attribute of which the singular things is a mode, because in IIP46 Spinoza says that '*the knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence which each idea involves is adequate and perfect*', and in IIP47 he says that '*the human Mind has an adequate knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence*'. In IIP47S Spinoza even writes: '*From this we see that God's infinite essence and his eternity are known to all. And since all things are in God and are conceived through God, it follows that we can deduce from this knowledge a great many things which we know adequately, and so can form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in P40S2 and of whose excellence and utility we shall speak in Part V. '* This seems to mean that even inadequate ideas of singular things involve the adequate idea of God and that even men who otherwise possess only inadequate ideas know God's eternal and infinite essence adequately and perfectly. Strangely enough, after making this bold claim Spinoza writes: '*But that men do not have so clear a knowledge of God as they do of the common notions comes from the fact that they cannot imagine God, as they can bodies, and that they have joined the name* God *to the images of things which they are used to seeing. Man can hardly avoid this, because they are continually affected by bodies.*' It is difficult to see how the claim that all men have an adequate idea of God and the claim that men do not have such a clear idea of God as they do of the common notions are compatible. However this apparent contradiction is to be resolved, what remains true is that once we have an adequate idea of God, and thus know that every attribute is an attribute of God, then we immediately know that every singular thing is a mode of God conceived under the attribute of which that singular thing is a mode. This seems to be the meaning of Spinoza's statement in IIP40S2 that the third kind of knowledge '*proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the [NS: formal] essence of things.*' The adequate idea of an attribute involves of course the knowledge that this attribute is an attribute of God, and therefore, once one has such an adequate idea of an attribute, then one knows that any singular thing that is a mode of this attribute is, in fact, a mode of God. Spinoza explains

in Part V of the *Ethics* that the knowledge that all singular things are modes of God (i.e., conceiving all singular things through God) brings it about that our ideas of singular things affect us only with Joy and never with Sadness.

Knowledge of the second kind and knowledge of the third kind have in common that they are both active mental states. In this they are opposed to knowledge of the first kind. Spinoza writes in IIP29S:

> I say expressly that the Mind has, not an adequate, but only a confused [NS: and mutilated] knowledge, of itself, of its own Body, and of external bodies, so long as it perceives things from the common order of nature, i.e., so long as it is determined externally, from the fortuitous encounters with things, to regard this or that, and not so long as it is determined internally, from the fact that it regards a number of things at once, to understand their agreements, differences, and oppositions. For so often as it is disposed internally, in this or another way, then it regards things clearly and distinctly, as I shall show bellow.

We have seen in section 1 that inadequate ideas result from the actions of external bodies on the sense organs. The mind is thus acted on and determined externally when it forms inadequate ideas. Spinoza says here in IIP29S that the mind forms adequate ideas when it regards a number of things at once and perceives their differences and commonalities, or when it is disposed internally in another way. The ideas of the differences and commonalities of things that result from comparing different things are of course the ideas that constitute the second kind of knowledge, and the ideas that result from the mind being disposed internally in another way must be the ideas that constitute the third kind of knowledge. So, whereas the mind is acted on and determined externally when it forms inadequate ideas, the mind acts and is determined only internally when it forms adequate ideas.

This leads us, finally, to the very confusing definition of the word 'idea' that Spinoza gives us in IID3: '*By idea I understand a concept of the Mind that the Mind forms because it is a thinking thing. Exp.: I say concept rather than perception, because the word perception seems to indicate that the Mind is acted on by the object. But concept seems to express an action of the Mind.'* In order to understand this definition we must answer two questions. Question one: In which sense does Spinoza use the word 'idea'? Spinoza applies this word to all mental states. Knowledge of the first kind, knowledge of the second kind, knowledge of the third kind, emotions, and even minds are all 'ideas'. Is Spinoza saying that all these different things are concepts? Question 2: What does Spinoza mean by the word 'concept'? He says that the word seems to express an action of the Mind. Does this mean that the word

‘concept’ and the term ‘action of the mind’ are equivalents? What is here defined and what does the definition mean? Many scholars think that by ‘idea’ Spinoza here refers to all mental states, and that by the word ‘concept’ he means ‘an action of the mind’. They reason from there that Spinoza holds that all mental states are actions of the mind. This interpretation is problematic, because, as we have just seen, Spinoza explains that the human mind is determined externally (i.e., it is acted on by other things) when it forms inadequate ideas, and, as we shall see in the following chapter, he also explains that the human mind is determined externally when it forms passive emotions. A way to save this interpretation is by saying that, although all mental states are actions of the mind, the amount of activity involved in mental states is subject to degree. So, for example, although inadequate ideas and adequate ideas are actions of the mind, inadequate ideas involve less activity than adequate ideas. However, this does not seem to save this interpretation, because in IID3 Spinoza says that he does not want to call ideas ‘perceptions’ because this word suggests that the mind is acted on. Even if the mind is somewhat active when it forms inadequate ideas, it is still acted on when it forms inadequate ideas, and therefore, according to IID3, inadequate ideas are not to be called ‘concepts’ but ‘perceptions’. It seems therefore more likely that in IID3 Spinoza uses the word ‘idea’ in the restricted sense of ‘adequate idea’. It seems that Spinoza here simply says that he prefers to call adequate ideas ‘concepts’ rather than ‘perceptions’, because the mind is not acted on, but acts when it forms adequate ideas. This does not imply that inadequate ideas (i.e., mental images) are not ideas. We have seen that in the *Treatise on the Intellect* Spinoza sometimes uses the word ‘idea’ in the sense of ‘true idea’ opposing ideas to mental images, and we shall see that he probably does the same in IIP49. Although in the *Ethics* Spinoza does not explain what he means by the word ‘concept’, he does so in the *Treatise on the Intellect.* He writes at II/24/9 (p.28): ‘[…] *concept, i.e., idea,* or *connection of subject and predicate*’. And at II/35/17 (p.40) he writes explicitly: ‘*concept,* or *definition*’. Spinoza very often uses the word ‘concept’ in paragraph 72 (II/27/12, p.32), and there he simply uses that word in the sense of ‘definition’. We shall see in the following subsection that Spinoza agrees with Descartes that we can form ideas, that is, concepts, of things of which we cannot form mental images.

Subsection 2: Do our adequate ideas correspond to states of our body?

The working principle formulated in chapter 1 says that all mental states correspond to bodily states (with as exception ideas of ideas). We have already seen in the previous section that our inadequate ideas correspond to affections of our brain caused by external bodies acting on our sense organs. According to the working principle our adequate ideas must correspond to certain states of our body, too. Given that our inadequate ideas correspond to affections of our brain, it is only natural to suppose that our adequate ideas also correspond to affections of our brain. If one supposes this, then one must also suppose that there is still an important difference between the states of our brain that correspond to our inadequate ideas and the states of our brain that correspond to our adequate ideas. One must suppose that, whereas our inadequate ideas correspond to states of our brain that have been caused by the actions of external bodies on our sense organs, our adequate ideas correspond to states of our brain that somehow result only from our brain's own activity. One must suppose this, because Spinoza claims that adequate ideas result from the mind's activity alone.

There are a couple of passages that might give one reason to think that our adequate ideas correspond to active states of our brain. A first passage is IIP13S in which Spinoza defines the human mind as the idea of the human body: '*The object of the idea constituting the human Mind is the Body,* or *a certain mode of Extension which actually exists, and nothing else.*' It seems that, if all our mental states are ideas of our body (in the sense that they all correspond to some state of our body), and if our inadequate ideas are ideas of states of our brain, then, surely, our adequate ideas must also be ideas of states of our brain. A second passage is IIP13S in which Spinoza argues that, although all bodies have a mind, the minds of some bodies are more excellent than the minds of other bodies, and the excellence of a mind depends on the excellence of the body of which it is the idea. He then writes: '[…] *in proportion as a Body is more capable than others of doing many things at once, or being acted on in many ways at once, so its Mind is more capable than others of perceiving many things at once. And in proportion as the actions of a body depend more on itself alone, and as other bodies concur with it less in acting, so its mind is more capable of understanding distinctly.*' Perhaps Spinoza means that just as our mind's capacity to form inadequate ideas depends on our brain's capacity to be affected by the actions of external bodies on our sense organs, so our mind's capacity to form adequate ideas depends on our brain's capacity to act independently from the actions of external bodies on our sense organs. A third passage is IIP38-39 in which, as we have seen in the previous subsection, Spinoza claims that our capacity to form common notions somehow depends on the fact that our body has certain

properties in common with other bodies. In IIP39C Spinoza writes: '*From this it follows that the Mind is the more capable of perceiving many things adequately as its Body has many things in common with other bodies.*' Perhaps this is also an indication that adequate ideas, just as inadequate ideas, correspond to states of the brain. A fourth passage is IIIP2S in which Spinoza argues that the order of the actions and passions of our mind is the same as the order of the actions and passions of our body. (This claim is based on IIP7 which says that the order of ideas is the same as the order of things.) Having argued that the human body cannot determine the human mind to thinking and that the human mind cannot determine the human body to motion or rest, Spinoza writes in IIIP2S:

> These things are more clearly understood from what is said in IIP7S, viz. that the Mind and the Body are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of Thought, now under the attribute of extension. The result is that the order, or connection, of things is one, whether nature is conceived under this attribute or that; hence the order of actions and passions of our Body is, by nature, at one with the order of actions and passions of the Mind. This is also evident from the way we have demonstrated IIP12.

Spinoza defines the terms 'action' and 'passion' in IIID3 as emotions of which we are the adequate or inadequate cause, and so IIIP2S seems to say nothing about the relation between ideas and brain states. However, perhaps we may read IIIP2S as saying that the order of active and passive mental states is the same as the order of active and passive bodily states, and in that case IIIP2S seems to imply that our adequate ideas, which are active mental states, must correspond to active bodily states, presumably states of our brain that are the result of our brain's activity alone.

These reasons in favour of the claim that Spinoza holds that our adequate ideas also correspond to certain states of our brain remain, however, extremely speculative. In this subsection I shall show that the *Ethics* also contains a number of passages in which Spinoza actually suggests that our adequate ideas do not correspond to affections of our brain. Before we turn to the *Ethics* we need to have a brief look at what Hobbes and Descartes think about ideas that do not depend on the brain, and what Spinoza himself writes on this topic in his earlier works.

Hobbes and Descartes

Hobbes, Descartes and Spinoza, all hold that our mental images depend, in one way or another, on our brain. Hobbes writes that they are the affections of our brain, Descartes thinks that they are caused by the affections of our brain, and Spinoza thinks that they are ideas of the affections of our brain. Hobbes's objections to Descartes's *Meditations* and Descartes's replies to Hobbes's objections serve well to illustrate Hobbes's and Descartes's disagreement on the question as to whether all our ideas depend on our brain.

Hobbes argues that our mental images are the only ideas that we have. If we do not have a mental image of something, then we do not have an idea of it. When he says that we have an idea of some particular thing, he therefore means that we have a mental image of that thing. Hobbes argues that we cannot have ideas of immaterial things, because immaterial things cannot act on our sense organs and they therefore cannot cause an affection of our brain. We may, on the basis of reasoning, believe that there are certain things of which we cannot form a mental image, but we cannot have ideas of these things. After having given as example that we cannot have an idea of an angel, even though we may believe that angels exist, Hobbes writes in his fifth objection:

> In the same way we have no idea or image corresponding to the sacred name of God. And this is why we are forbidden to worship God in the form of an image; for otherwise we might think that we were conceiving of him who is incapable of being conceived. It seems, then, that there is no idea of God in us. A man born blind, who has often approached fire and felt hot, recognizes that there is something which makes him hot; and when he hears that this is called 'fire' he concludes that fire exists. But he does not know what shape or colour fire has, and has absolutely no idea or image of fire that comes before his mind. The same applies to a man who recognizes that there must be some cause of his image or idea, and that this cause must have a prior cause, and so on; he is finally led to the supposition of some eternal cause which never began to exist and hence cannot have a cause prior to itself, and he concludes that something eternal must necessarily exist. But he has no idea which he can say is the idea of the eternal being; he merely gives the name or label 'God' to the thing that he believes in, or acknowledges to exist.

When we use a word that refers to something that we believe exists but of which we cannot form a mental image, for example the word 'God', then this word does not relate to any idea in our mind. Although we may speak about God and believe that he exists, we do not have an idea of him.

Descartes denies that mental images are the only ideas that we have. He writes in his reply to Hobbes's fourth objection: '*I did explain the difference between imagination and a*

purely mental conception in this very example, where I listed the features of the wax we imagine and those we conceive by using the mind alone.' Here Descartes opposes mental images to another kind of idea which he calls 'purely mental conceptions'. These ideas are 'purely mental' because they do not depend on affections of the brain. Because these ideas do not depend on affections of the brain, Descartes argues, we can have ideas of things of which we cannot form a mental image. The fact that we cannot form a mental image of God does not imply that we cannot form an idea of him. Descartes replies to Hobbes's fifth objection:

> Here [i.e., in Hobbes's objection. CR] my critic wants the term 'idea' to be taken to refer simply to the images of material things which are depicted in the corporeal imagination; and if this is granted, it is easy for him to prove that there can be no proper idea of an angel or of God. But I make it quite clear in several places throughout the book, and in this passage in particular, that I am taking the word 'idea' to refer to whatever is immediately perceived by the mind.

When Descartes speaks of the 'corporeal imagination', he does not, of course, mean that mental images are affections of the brain. He speaks of 'corporeal imagination', because mental images are caused by affections of our brain, whereas pure mental concepts are not.

Referring to Descartes's thesis that not all our ideas depend on our brain, and that we therefore can have ideas of things of which we cannot form a mental image, Spinoza writes in his exposition of Descartes's *Principles of Philosophy* (I/160/1, p.247):

> There are some who deny that they have an idea of God, and who nevertheless (so *they* say) worship and love him. And though you may put before them a definition of God, and God's attributes, you will still gain nothing by it, no more than if you labored to teach a man blind from birth the differences between colors, just as we see them. But unless we should wish to regard them as a new kind of animal, between man and the lower animals, we must not bother too much about their words. How, I ask, can we make the idea of anything known except by propounding its definition and explaining its attributes? Since we offer this concerning the idea of God, there is no reason for us to be delayed by words of men who deny that they have an idea of God merely because they can form no image of him in their brain.

We can have an idea of God, because our idea of God is not a mental image and does not, therefore, depend on our brain. Some people (Hobbes for one) argue that mental images are the only ideas that we have, and thus that all our ideas depend on our brain. They therefore argue that we have no idea of God. You cannot convince these people that they do have a concept of God by giving them a definition of God. In itself, of course, this passage teaches us nothing about Spinoza's opinion, because Spinoza here merely explains Descartes's position.

Nonetheless, we shall now see that in the *Treatise on the Intellect* and in the *Short Treatise* Spinoza quite clearly agrees with Descartes that some of our ideas do not depend on our brain, and that there are good reasons to think that Spinoza continues to hold this belief in the *Ethics.*

The *Treatise on the Intellect* and the *Short Treatise*

The *Treatise on the Intellect* contains many passages in which Spinoza makes clear that whereas inadequate ideas correspond to affections of the brain, adequate ideas, or as he often calls them in this work, 'true ideas', do not correspond to affections of the brain. We find many such passages in paragraph 81 (II/30/35, p.35) to 91 (II/33/31, p.38). Spinoza discusses in these paragraphs memory and its relation to the body.

In paragraph 83 Spinoza explains what recollection and memory consist in: '*What, then, will memory be? Nothing but a sensation of impressions on the brain, together with the thought of a determinate duration of the sensation, which recollection also shows. […] But whether the ideas themselves undergo some corruption, we shall see in [my] Philosophy.*' It is confusing that Spinoza here uses the word 'idea' in the sense of adequate idea, because mental images (i.e., sense perceptions and recollections) are of course ideas as well. What is interesting about this passage for our present purpose is that Spinoza at least suggests that mental images cease to exist at a certain moment because they correspond to impressions on the brain, and that adequate ideas do not cease to exist because they do not correspond to impressions on the brain[14]. In paragraph 84, too, Spinoza suggests that, whereas inadequate ideas depend on motions in the brain, adequate ideas do not:

> In this way, then, we have distinguished between a true idea and other perceptions, and shown that the fictitious, the false, and the other ideas have their origin in the imagination, i.e., in certain sensations that are fortuitous, and (as it were) disconnected; since they do not arise from the very power of the mind, but from external causes, as the body (whether waking or dreaming) receives various motions. But if you wish, take imagination any way you like here, provided it is something different from the intellect, and in which the soul has the nature of something acted on.

[14] Spinoza writes in TdIE (II/22/1, footnote x, p.26): '[…] it will be clear that fiction never makes, or presents to the mind, anything anew, but that only things which are in the brain or the imagination are recalled to memory, and that the mind attends confusedly to all of them at once. Speech and a tree, for example, are recalled to memory, and since the mind attends confusedly, without distinction, it allows that the tree speaks.' Notice that Spinoza here suggests that the imagination is itself corporeal.

Adequate ideas, then, do not have their origin in the imagination but in the intellect. Inadequate ideas depend on the motions in the brain caused by external bodies that randomly act on the sense organs. Adequate ideas do not depend on such motion; they are caused exclusively by the mind's power of thinking. That adequate ideas do not correspond to states of the brain is confirmed by paragraph 91:

> The aim, then, is to have clear and distinct ideas, i.e., such as have been made from the pure mind, and not from fortuitous motions of the body. And then, so that all ideas may be led back to one, we shall strive to connect and order them so that our mind, as far as possible, reproduces objectively the formal character of nature, both as to the whole and as to the parts.

The 'one thought to which all other thoughts lead back' is, of course, the clear and distinct idea of God as an infinite substance. Clear and distinct ideas are made by a *pure mind*, that is, a mind that works independently from the body. Spinoza writes in a footnote to this passage:

> The principal rule of this part (as follows from the first part) is to review all the ideas we discover in us from the pure intellect, so that they are distinguished from those we imagine. This will have to be elicited from the properties of each, i.e., of the imagination and the intellect.

Ideas of the pure intellect, clearly, differ from ideas of the imagination, because they do not depend on affections of the brain. One should therefore be careful to clearly distinguish ideas that depend on the body and ideas that do not. Spinoza writes in paragraph 90:

> We avoid, moreover, another great cause of confusion which prevents the intellect from reflecting on itself – viz. when we do not distinguish between imagination and intellection, we think that the things we more easily imagine are clearer to us, and think we understand what we imagine. Hence, what should be put later we put first, and so the true order of making progress is overturned, and no conclusion is arrived at legitimately.

In the *Short Treatise* we find a number of passages that strongly suggest that at least our adequate idea of God does not correspond to an affection of our brain. The first passage (KV I/53/10, p.96) is rather long and I shall discuss it in three parts:

> From this proportion of motion and rest, then, there comes to exist also this body of ours, of which (no less than of all other things) there must exist a knowledge, Idea, etc., in the thinking thing. This Idea, knowledge, etc., then, is also our soul. But our body had a different proportion of motion and rest when

> we were unborn children, and later when we are dead, it will have still another. Nevertheless, there was before our birth, and will be after our death, an Idea, knowledge, etc., of our body in the thinking thing, as there is now. But it was not, and will not be at all the same, because now it has a different proportion of motion and rest. To produce in substantial thought an Idea, knowledge, mode of thinking, such as [this soul of] ours now is, not just any body whatever is required (for then it would have to be known differently than it is), but one which has this proportion of motion and rest and no other. For as the body is, so is the soul, Idea, knowledge, etc.

This part suggests that the entire human mind is an idea of the human body, and that all states of the human mind are ideas of states of the human body. All the changes of the human mind appear to be a function of changes in the human body. Spinoza seems to deny here that there will be anything left of our mind after we die. Just as our body disintegrates when we die, so, too, it seems, will our mind. But Spinoza continues:

> So if such a body has and preserves it proportion – say of 1 to 3 – the soul and the body will be like ours now are; they will, of course, be constantly subject to change, but not such a great change that it goes beyond the limits of 1 to 3; and as much as it changes, so also the soul changes each time. And this change, which arises in us from the fact that other bodies act on ours, cannot occur without the soul's becoming aware of it, since it, too, changes constantly. And this change [i.e., in the soul] is really what we call sensation.

To our surprise, we now learn that the changes in the human body do not explain everything that happens in the human mind, but only sense perception! It seems, then, that when Spinoza writes that the human soul is the idea of the human body and that the human soul is aware of the changes that occur in the human body due to external bodies affecting the human body, he means that *sense perceptions* (and of course also recollections) correspond to affections of the human body. This leaves open the possibility of there being ideas that do not correspond to affections of the human body. The existence of such ideas seems to be confirmed by the final part of this passage:

> But if other bodies act on ours with such a force that the proportion of motion [to rest] cannot remain 1 to 3, that is death, and a destruction of the soul, insofar as it is only an Idea, knowledge, etc. of a body having this proportion of motion and rest. However, because it is a mode in the thinking substance, it has been able to know and love this [substance] also, as well as that of extension; and uniting itself with these substances (which always remain the same), it has been able to make itself eternal.

We now learn, to our even greater surprise, that not all the states of our mind are ideas of our body, and that not all the states of our mind perish with the destruction of our body, as Spinoza suggested just a moment ago. The mind is destroyed *only* insofar as it is an idea of the human body; it is not destroyed insofar as it is an idea of the attributes of substance. Insofar as the mind is an idea of substance, it will be eternal, just as substance itself.

The second passage of the *Short Treatise* (I/101/23, p.139) that suggests that our adequate idea of God does not correspond to an affection of our brain is the following:

> And because the body is the very first thing our soul becomes aware of – for as we have said, there can be nothing in Nature whose Idea does not exist in the thinking thing, the idea which is the soul of that thing – that thing must, then, necessarily be the first cause of that thing. But this Idea cannot find any rest in the knowledge of the body, without passing over into knowledge of that without which neither the body nor the Idea itself can either exist or be understood. Hence, as soon as it knows that being, it will be united with it by love.

Notice that Spinoza writes that the human body is the *first* thing that the human mind has as object. The *second* thing that the mind may have as its object is substance, that is, the being without which the human body and the human mind cannot exist or be understood[15].

A third passage we find in Chapter 23 of the *Short Treatise* (I/102/30, p.140), which is entitled 'Of the Immortality of the Soul'. Spinoza writes:

> If we once consider attentively what the Soul is, and where its change and duration arise from, we shall easily see whether it is mortal or immortal. We have said, then, that the Soul is an Idea which is in the thinking thing, arising from the existence of a thing which is in Nature. From this it follows that as the duration and change of the thing are, so also the change and duration of the Soul must be. Moreover, we have noted that the Soul can be united either with the body of which it is the Idea or with God, without whom it can neither exist nor be understood. From this, then, one can easily see that: (1) if it is united with the body only, and the body perishes, then it must also perish; for if it lacks the body, which is the foundation of its love, it must perish with it, but that (2) if it is united with another thing, which is, and remains, immutable, then, on the contrary, it will have to remain immutable also.

[15] Spinoza writes in IIP10: '[…] *since (by IIP11 and P13) the first thing that constitutes the essence of the Mind is the idea of an actually existing Bod, the first and principal [tendency] of the striving of our Mind (byP7) is to affirm the existence of our Body.*' This invites the question: 'If this is the *first* striving of our mind, then what is the second?' Here, in the passage of the *Short Treatise*, we may find the answer: perhaps the second striving of the mind is to affirm the existence of God.

Notice that although Spinoza defines the human mind as the idea of the human body, he also writes that the human mind can unite itself with God. It is clear that our mind would not be immortal if our adequate idea of God, too, corresponded to a state of our brain.

The fourth and last passage of the *Short Treatise* (I/121/9, p.156) that confirms that our adequate idea of God does not result from the union of our mind and our body is found at the very end of the Second Appendix. After having explained that the human mind is the idea of the human body, and that, therefore, the human mind changes when the human body changes, Spinoza writes:

> Finally, because we have now explained what feeling is, we can easily see how from this there arises a reflexive Idea, or knowledge of oneself, experience, and reasoning. And from all this (as also because our soul is united with God, and is part of the infinite Idea arising immediately from God) we can see clearly the origin of clear knowledge, and the immortality of the soul. But for the present what we have said will be enough.

Once again, although Spinoza defines the human mind as the idea of the human body, he denies that all the states of the human mind are ideas of the human body. The mind's union with the body only explains why we have sense perceptions (and of course recollections). Clear knowledge, Spinoza says, is not the result of the union of the mind and the body[16].

Two of Spinoza's letters attest that even about four or five years after having written the *Treatise on the Intellect* and the *Short Treatise*, and thus during the early stages of writing the *Ethics*, Spinoza still holds that whereas inadequate ideas depend on the body, adequate ideas do not[17]. In his letter to Willem van Blijenbergh (letter 21, IV/131/2, p.379), dated 28 January 1665, Spinoza writes:

> But what you say – that I make men like elements, plants, and stones by making them so dependent on God – shows sufficiently that you understand my opinion very perversely and confuse things that concern the intellect with [those which concern] the imagination. For if you have perceived with a pure intellect what it is to depend on God, you would certainly not think that things, insofar as they depend on God, are dead, corporeal, and imperfect. Who has ever dared to speak so vilely of the supremely perfect being? On the contrary, you would grasp that for that reason, and to that extent, they are perfect.

[16] In the *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect* Spinoza gives the following example of a belief that he holds on the basis of good reasoning: 'But we infer [one thing] from another in this way: after we clearly perceive that we feel such a body, and no other, then, I say, we infer clearly that the soul is united to the body, which union is the cause of such a sensation: but we cannot understand absolutely from this what that sensation and union are'.

[17] Curley (1985, p.xiii) argues that Spinoza wrote the *Treatise of the Intellect* before September 1661, and that he had thoughts of publishing the *Short Treatise* early in 1662. Curley (1985, p.405) also writes that towards the middle of 1665 Spinoza was near the end of a first draft of the *Ethics*.

> So that we best understand this dependence and necessary operation through God's decree, when we attend not to logs and plants, but to the most intelligible and perfect created things, as is clearly evident from what I have already mentioned above, under the second point about Descartes's view. You ought to have noticed this.

And in his letter to Jean Bouwmeester (letter 37), dated June 1666, Spinoza writes:

> From this it is quite clear what a true method must be and in which it should especially consist, namely, solely in the knowledge of pure intellect and its nature and laws. To acquire this, we must first of all distinguish between intellect and imagination, that is, between true ideas and the others -fictitious, false, doubtful, and, in sum, all ideas which depend only on memory. (Translation by Samuel Shirley.)

The intellect would, of course, not be 'pure' if, like the imagination, it depended on the body. At least until a couple of years after writing the *Treatise on the Intellect* and the *Short Treatise*, and thus at least during the early stages of writing the *Ethics*, then, Spinoza still holds that our adequate ideas do not correspond to affections of our brain.

The *Ethics*

It is arguable whether in the *Ethics* Spinoza still holds that adequate ideas do not correspond to states of the brain. We have seen that there are some reasons to think that Spinoza has changed his mind on this issue and that he now, that is, in the *Ethics*, defends the opposite view. There are, however, also some good reasons to think that Spinoza, in fact, continues to hold that adequate ideas do not correspond to states of the brain.

In the Appendix of Part I of the *Ethics* we find a first passage (II/82/16, p.445) in which Spinoza suggests that our ideas are inadequate when they depend on affections of our brain, and adequate when they do not depend on affections of our brain. After having explained that our esthetical judgements depend on the pleasant or unpleasant effects that external things have on our sense organs, Spinoza writes:

> All of these things show sufficiently that each one has judged things according to the disposition of his brain; or rather, has accepted affections of the imagination as things. So it is no wonder (to note this, too, in passing) that we find so many controversies to have arisen among men, and that they have finally given rise to Scepticism. For although human bodies agree in many things, they still differ in very many. And for that reason what seems good to one, seems bad to another; what seems ordered to one, seems confused to another; what seems pleasing to one, seems displeasing to another, and so on. I pass over the [other notions] here, both because this is not the place to treat them at length, and because

> everyone has experienced this [variability] sufficiently for himself. That is why we have such sayings as 'So many heads, so many attitudes,' 'everyone finds his own judgement more than enough,' 'there are as many differences of brains as of palate.' These proverbs show sufficiently that men judge according to the disposition of their brain, and imagine, rather than understand them. For if men had understood them, the things would at least convince them all, even if they did not attract them all, as the example of mathematics shows. We see, therefore, that all the motions by which ordinary people are accustomed to explain nature are only modes of imagining, and do not indicate the nature of anything, only the constitution of the imagination. And because they have names, as if they were [notions] of beings existing outside the imagination, I call them beings, not of reason, but of imagination. So all the arguments in which people try to use such notions against us can easily be warded off.

I have quoted this passage at length because it suggests quite strongly that even at the time of writing the *Ethics* Spinoza holds that although mental images depend on the brain, adequate ideas do not. There would be no reason for Spinoza to stress, as he does, that mental images correspond to states of our brain, if he held that our adequate ideas, too, corresponded to states of our brain. The whole point of mentioning that mental images correspond to states of the brain is that this explains why they are obscure and confused, and why adequate ideas are clear and distinct. If mental images are confused because they correspond to affections of the brain, then adequate ideas, of course, do not correspond to affections of the brain.

Another relevant passage is IIIP11S:

> In IIP17S we have shown that the idea which constitutes the essence of the Mind involves the existence of the Body so long as the Body itself exists. Next, from what we have shown in IIP8C and its scholium, it follows that the present existence of our Mind depends only on this, that the Mind involves the actual existence of the Body. Finally, we have shown that the power of the Mind by which it imagines things and recollects them also depends on this (see IIP17, P18, P18S), that it involves the actual existence of the Body. From these things it follows that the present existence of the Mind and its power of imagining are taken away as soon as the Mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the Body.

When our mind ceases to affirm our body, Spinoza says, we no longer have *mental images*. It is, of course, highly significant that Spinoza does not tell us what happens to our adequate ideas. Spinoza suggests that a part of our mind is made up of states that correspond to states of our body, and that another part of our mind is made up of states that do not correspond to states of our body. The first part of our mind begins and ceases to exist when our body begins and ceases to exist, but the second part of our mind, Spinoza suggests, continues to exist after the destruction of our body.

In IIP48 and IIP49, finally, Spinoza also suggests that our adequate ideas do not correspond to affections of the brain. He writes at the end of IIP48S:

> […] we must now investigate whether the volitions themselves are anything beyond the very ideas of things. We must investigate, I say, whether there is any other affirmation or negation in the Mind except that which the idea involves, insofar as it is an idea – on this see the following Proposition and also D3 – so that our thought does not fall into pictures. For by ideas I understand, not images that are formed at the back of the eye (and, if you like, in the middle of the brain), but concepts of Thought [NS: or the objective Being of a thing insofar as it consists only in Thought].

In IIP49S he writes, similarly:

> Indeed those who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us from encounters with [NS: external] bodies, are convinced that those ideas of things [NS: which can make no trace in our brains, or] of which we can form no similar image [NS: in our brain] are not ideas, but only fictions which we feign from a free choice of the will.

One might think that, when Spinoza writes that 'ideas are not images formed in the brain, but concepts', he is making a distinction between affections of the brain and their corresponding ideas, and one might thus think that Spinoza holds that all ideas are concepts. This interpretation, however, is improbable, because mental images are ideas but they clearly are not concepts. It seems more likely that Spinoza here means to say that there is a distinction between mental images of things and adequate ideas of things, and that mental images correspond to affections of the brain. If this is indeed what Spinoza means, then it only makes sense to mention that mental images correspond to affections of the brain, if adequate ideas do not correspond to affections of the brain. If Spinoza held that both our mental images and our adequate ideas corresponded to states of our brain, then he could simply have said here that adequate ideas are not mental images.

Spinoza, then, seems to tell us that some people say that mental images are the only ideas that we have. They argue that we cannot have ideas of things of which we cannot form a mental image. They argue, in other words, that we cannot have ideas of things that cannot affect our sense organs and our brain. This is, as we have seen, Hobbes's position. Spinoza, then, seems to agree with Descartes that we do have ideas of things of which cannot form a mental image, and that these ideas do not depend on affections of our brain.

Spinoza might have had a good reason not to state explicitly that adequate ideas do not correspond to states of the brain. Spinoza wants to demonstrate in the *Ethics* that we should live according to the dictates of reason even if we were strictly mortal. In VP41S Spinoza explains that most people only behave morally because of their superstitious hope for eternal reward and fear of eternal punishment. If they believed that the mind dies with the body, then they would live according to their immoderate desires, rather than according to their reason[18]:

> These opinions seem no less absurd to me than if someone, because he does not believe he can nourish his body with good food to eternity, should prefers to fill himself with poisons and other deadly things, or because he sees that the mind is not eternal, or immortal, should prefer to be mindless, and to live without reason. These [common beliefs] are so absurd that they are hardly worth mentioning.

As absurd as these opinions may be, the structure of the *Ethics* appears to be quite affected by them. In order to prove that we should live according to reason even if we were mortal, Spinoza assumes, up until Part Five of the *Ethics* that our mind is entirely destroyed with our body. He writes in VP41:

> Even if we did not know that our Mind is eternal, we would still regard as of the first importance Morality, Religion, and absolutely all the things we have shown (in Part IV) to be related to Tenacity and Nobility. Dem.: The first and only foundation of virtue, *or* of the method of living rightly (by IVP22 and P24) is the seeking of our own advantage. But to determine what reason prescribes as useful, we took no account of the eternity of the Mind, which we only came to know in the Fifth Part. Therefore, though we did not know then that the Mind is eternal, we still regarded as of the first importance the things we showed to be related to Tenacity and Nobility. And so, even if we also did not know this now, we would still regard as of the first importance the same rules of reason, q.e.d.

Up until Part Five of the *Ethics*, then, Spinoza does not say explicitly that adequate ideas do not correspond to affections of the brain. He suggests, in IIP11-13, that he thinks that the entire human mind is an idea of the human body, and on the basis of this assumption he demonstrates that the best way to live is to live rationally. However, once he has completed this task, he writes, at the end of VP20S: '*With this I have completed everything which*

[18] See also the *Short Treatise* (I/108/32, p.146): 'So even if the power of knowledge and divine love did not bring the intellect to an eternal peace, as we have shown, but only to a temporary one, it is our duty to seek even this, since it is such that one who enjoys it would not want to exchange it for anything else in the world. Since this is so, we can, with reason, regard as most absurd what is said by many, who are otherwise considered great theologians: that if the love of God did not lead to eternal life, they would then seek what is best for themselves. As if they could find anything better than God! This is as silly as if a fish (which cannot live outside the water) should say: if no eternal life is to come to me after this life in the water, I want to leave the water for the land. But what else can those who do not know God say to us? '

concerns this present life. […] So it is time to pass to those things which pertain to the Mind's duration without relation to the body.' Spinoza then famously claims that the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the human body and that something of the human mind remains which is eternal. He explains that this eternal part of the human mind consists in the idea that expresses the essence of the human body under a species of eternity, and, what seems to come down to the same thing, that it consists in our knowledge of the second and third kind, that is, in our adequate ideas. This claim is notoriously difficult to understand and I shall not attempt to interpret it here. I merely wish to point out that if the eternal part of our mind consists in our adequate ideas, then our adequate ideas cannot correspond to affections of our brain.

I do not claim to have proven in this subsection that, according to Spinoza, our adequate ideas do not correspond to affections of our brain, but I do think that I have shown that there are serious reasons to think that this is indeed Spinoza's position. The question whether our adequate ideas correspond to affections of our brain is important to Spinoza's theory of emotion for the following reason. Spinoza holds that our adequate idea of God causes the greatest possible Joy, which he calls the intellectual love of God. Now, in chapter 5 we shall see that the emotion of Joy (qua state of our mind) corresponds to a certain state of our body and that this state of our body must have a bodily cause. Given that our love of God consists in the Joy caused by our idea of God, the state of our body that corresponds to our love of God must be caused by the state of our body that corresponds to our idea of God. The problem is that, if our adequate idea of God does not correspond to a state of our body, then the state of our body that corresponds to our love of God does not seem to have a cause.

Section 3: Judgements

In propositions 48 and 49 of Part II of the *Ethics* Spinoza famously argues against Descartes's theory of the will as the faculty by which we form judgements, that is, as the faculty by which we affirm or negate the truth of our ideas. I shall give my own interpretation of Spinoza's theory first and then discuss what several scholars have written about it. (In this particular case I have found this order preferable.)

Descartes makes a distinction between the mental faculty of the understanding and the mental faculty of the will. Whereas the understanding is the mental faculty that enables us to have ideas, the will is the mental faculty that enables us to judge that our ideas are true or false representations of their objects. The will is thus the mental faculty by which we affirm or deny that an idea is a true representation of its object. (Besides that, the will is also the mental

faculty by which we decide to pursue or avoid something of which we have an idea.) Ideas themselves are not beliefs. We do not believe anything when we merely have a representation of something, whether that representation is true or false. We only believe something when we judge that our idea is a true or false representation of its object. Our mental image of the sun, for example, represents the sun as a small bright disc. However, we only believe that the sun is a small bright disc when we affirm that our mental image is a true representation of the sun.

We form a true belief when we judge that an idea that is a true representation of its object is true, and when we judge that an idea that is a false representation of its object is false. We form a false belief when we judge that an idea that is a false representation of its object is true, and when we judge that that an idea that is a true representation of its object is false.

Given that our ideas are not beliefs in themselves, but merely representations of objects, we avoid having false beliefs by not making judgements concerning those ideas that are not clear and distinct. We avoid having false beliefs, in other words, by not affirming or denying that a particular obscure and confused idea is a true or false representation of its object. If we suspend our judgement concerning an idea that is not clear and distinct, then we will at most have a false representation in our mind, but we will not have a false belief.

Whereas we have the power to affirm, or to deny, or neither to affirm nor to deny, that our idea is a true representation of its object when our idea is not a clear and distinct, we do not have this power when our idea is clear and distinct and we perceive it attentively. When our idea is a clear and distinct representation of something and we perceive this idea attentively, then we cannot but affirm that it is a true representation of its object, or, in other words, that the thing is in reality as our idea represents it. This, however, never results in false beliefs, because our clear and distinct ideas are always true representations of their objects. Furthermore, the fact that the mind always affirms the truth of its clear and distinct ideas does not mean that the mind is determined to affirm the truth of its clear and distinct ideas.

Spinoza makes the following four objections to Descartes's theory: (1) Even if judgements were caused by the mental faculty of the will, then the will would not be free but determined to judge or not to judge; (2) Judgements, in fact, are not caused by the mental faculty of the will, because the mind has no faculties; (3) An adequate idea is not distinct from the affirmation that the idea's object is in reality as it is represented by the idea; and (4) An inadequate idea is not distinct from the affirmation that the idea's object is in reality as it is represented by the idea.

(1) The will could not be undetermined. Spinoza's argues in IIP48D that even if the will was indeed the mental faculty that caused judgements about the truth or falsity of ideas, then it would be determined to make these judgements. Everything, Spinoza claims, is the effect of some cause and also the cause of some effect. Nothing is without a cause or without an effect. Therefore, if the mental faculty of the will was indeed the cause of judgements, then it would not be the uncaused cause of judgements. The will, in other words, would not be free, *or* absolute. The will, if it existed, would be determined to judge.

(2) The will is not a faculty of the mind. Spinoza claims in II48S that the will, in fact, is not a mental faculty at all, because the mind does not have faculties. The mind only has singular states. The notion of a mental faculty is an abstract notion, that is, a notion that does not represent a singular existing thing (in this case the alleged mental faculty), but many singular things (in this case the many singular mental states of the same kind). The notion of the understanding refers to all our singular ideas, and the notion of the will refers to all our singular judgements. Given that the mind does not have faculties, Spinoza claims, singular mental states are not caused by mental faculties. Ideas are not caused by the faculty of the understanding, and judgements are not caused by the faculty of the will. Spinoza clarifies this point in a letter to Henry Oldenburg (Letter 2, IV/9/12, p.168): '[…] *the will differs from this or that white thing, as humanity differs from this or that man. So it is as impossible to conceive that the will is the cause of this or that volition as to conceive that humanity is the cause of Peter and Paul. Since the will, then, is only a being of reason and ought not in any way to be called a cause of this or that volition, since particular volitions cannot be called free (because they require a cause in order to exist*') […].' By the term 'volitions' Spinoza here refers to the alleged acts of the will by which we freely affirm or deny the truth of an idea (and perhaps also to the alleged acts of the will by which we freely pursue or avoid things of which we have an idea). Spinoza's point is the same as the one in IIP48: given that mental faculties do not exist, there is no mental faculty that causes judgements, and given that everything is determined, there certainly is no undetermined mental faculty that causes judgements.

(3) An adequate idea involves the affirmation that the thing we conceive is as we conceive it. Spinoza takes as example the concept of a triangle. He writes that we cannot affirm that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles if we do not have the concept of a triangle. He then says that if we have the concept of a triangle then we must affirm that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles. And, on the basis of these two premises, he reasons that because the affirmation can neither exist nor be conceived without the idea, and

because the idea can neither exist nor be conceived without the affirmation, the affirmation and the idea must be identical.

This argument is difficult to accept because Spinoza gives no demonstration of the claim that the idea of something can neither exist nor be conceived without its affirmation. According to Descartes, after all, we can have an idea of something without affirming that this idea is a true representation of its object.

Spinoza's claim becomes somewhat easier to accept when we take into account that: (1) the concept of a triangle represents a triangle as having angles that equal two right angles; (2) the concept of a triangle clearly and distinctly represents a triangle as having angles that equal two right angles; (3) Descartes agrees that if our idea of something is clear and distinct, and if we perceive this idea attentively, then we cannot but affirm that the idea is a true representation of its object. Perhaps Spinoza does not mention these things because these points seemed evident to him.

Descartes, of course, agrees with the first premise which says that we cannot affirm that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles if we do not have the concept of a triangle that represents a triangle as having angles that equal two right angles. We cannot affirm that an idea is true if we do not have an idea, just as we cannot love a thing if we do not have an idea of that thing. Descartes even agrees with the second premise which says that we cannot have the concept of a triangle without affirming that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles, at least not when we perceive this concept attentively, and he agrees with it because the concept of a triangle clearly and distinctly represents a triangle as having angles that equal two right angles. Descartes holds that if our idea of something is clear and distinct, and we perceive it attentively, then we cannot but affirm that the thing is in reality as our idea represents it. Given that our concept of a triangle is clear and distinct, and given that it represents a triangle as having angles that equal two right angles, and assuming that we perceive it attentively, we cannot but affirm that a triangle has two right angles. From here Spinoza merely reasons that, because the concept (of a triangle that represents a triangle as having angles that equal two right angles) cannot exist without the affirmation (that a triangle has angles that equal two right angles), and the affirmation not without the concept, the concept must be identical with the affirmation.

Let us see if this interpretation of Spinoza's argument works with the most important concept of all, namely the concept of God. Descartes agrees that our concept of God clearly and distinctly represents God as an infinite being that exists necessarily. He agrees, of course, that we cannot affirm that this idea is a true representation of God if we do not have the idea

of God. He also agrees that if we have the clear and distinct representation of God as an infinite being that exists necessarily, and if we perceive this idea attentively, then we cannot but affirm that God is an infinite being that exists necessarily. Spinoza merely reasons that if the idea can neither exist nor be conceived without the affirmation, and if the affirmation can neither exist nor be conceived without the idea, then the idea and the affirmation must be identical.

(4) An inadequate idea involves the affirmation that the thing we perceive is as we perceive it. In IIP49S (in his reply to the second objection) Spinoza claims that also when our idea of something is inadequate, then our idea is identical with the affirmation that the object we perceive is in reality as our idea represents it. The example he discusses is that of a mental image of a winged horse. This mental image represents a horse as having wings and as really existing (outside our mind, perhaps a hundred meters in front of our body). He writes:

> Next, I grant that no one is deceived insofar as he perceives, i.e., I grant that the imaginations of the Mind, considered in themselves contain no error. But I deny that a man affirms nothing insofar as he perceives. For what is perceiving a winged horse other than affirming wings of a horse? For if the Mind perceived nothing else except the winged horse, it would regard it as present to itself, and would not have any cause for doubting its existence, or any faculty of dissenting, unless either the imagination of the winged horse were joined to an idea which excluded the existence of the same horse, or the Mind perceived that its idea of the winged horse was inadequate, and then either it will necessarily deny the horse's existence, or it will necessarily doubt it.

Spinoza claims that if we only had in our mind the mental image of a winged horse, which represents the horse as having wings and as walking in front of us, and no mental image of anything else, then we would affirm that there is a horse in front of us and that it has wings. The reason is that to have a mental image that represents a winged horse in front of us is the same thing as to affirm that there is a winged horse in front of us.

But why is this idea identical with the affirmation that it is a true representation of its object? Descartes would say that, given that our mental image of the winged horse is not clear and distinct, we have the power to abstain from judging that our mental image of the winged horse resembles something that exists outside our mind. He would answer Spinoza's rhetorical question 'What is perceiving a winged horse other than affirming wings of a horse?' by saying that imagining a winged horse is just that; it simply consists in having a representation of a horse with wings, but it does not consist in affirming that there is a horse

with wings in front of us. Spinoza really begs the question when he asks: 'What is perceiving a winged horse other than affirming wings of a horse?'

Let us assume with Spinoza that when we have a mental image that represents some object as really existing and as having certain properties, then we affirm that this object exists as we imagine it. Spinoza is right, of course, that we cannot affirm that a mental image is a true representation of its object if we do not have a mental image. Now, from here Spinoza merely reasons that if the affirmation of a mental image can neither exist nor be conceived without the mental image, and if the mental image can neither exist nor be conceived without its affirmation, then, the mental image and its affirmation must be identical.

Let us try this reasoning with another example. Say that we have a mental image that represents the sun as a small bright disc in the sky. Clearly, we cannot affirm that this mental image is a true representation of its object if we do not have the mental image: we cannot affirm that the sun is a small bright disc if we do not have a representation of the sun as a small bright disc. If Spinoza is right, then the reverse is also true: we cannot have a mental image of the sun as a small bright disc without affirming that the sun is a small bright disc (on the condition, of course, that this is the only mental image that we have). If this affirmation can neither exist nor be conceived without this mental image, and if this mental image can neither exist nor be conceived without this affirmation, then the representation of the sun as a small bright disc must be identical with the affirmation that the sun is a small bright disc. In other words, to have a mental image of the sun as a bright small disc is to judge that the sun is a bright small disc.

Whereas Spinoza gives a central place to the claim that an adequate idea is identical with the affirmation of its truth, he makes the claim that an inadequate idea is identical with the affirmation of its truth only in passing. This is surprising because this second claim is of great importance to his theory of emotion, and, therefore, deserves more explanation than it gets in IIP49.

Curley: 'Descartes, Spinoza and the Ethics of Belief' (1975)

Curley writes (see p.170) that, given that Cartesian ideas are supposed not to involve affirmation or negation, and to be the object of affirmation or negation, '*it is natural to feel that the object of an affirmation or denial must be a proposition*'. If Descartes's theory is to be intelligible, then the ideas that we affirm or deny must be propositions. Furthermore, Curley continues (see p.171), '*there seem to be general systematic reasons for regarding Cartesian ideas as propositional*'. Curley refers to Descartes's example that he has two ideas

of the sun; by the first idea the sun appears very small, and by the second idea the sun seems very large. Curley says (see p.171 and 172) that Descartes's claim that 'ideas are like images' implies that both ideas of the sun are '*implicitly propositional*'; both ideas say that something is the case. Curley quotes a passage from a letter to Mersenne (July 1641, *AT* III, 395; *Philosophical Letters*, 106-17) in which Descartes writes that both ideas of the imagination and ideas of the pure mind can be expressed by a single term or by a proposition, and that the difference between an idea of the imagination and an idea of the pure mind only consists in the fact that we conceive the former ideas 'with an image', whereas we do not conceive the latter ideas with an image. Curley then writes (see p.173): '*Both are thoughts which might be expressed in a form of words which involve at least a tentative affirmation: 'It seems to me that…' And so Descartes will quite cheerfully allow that both may be expressed by a proposition. But he also maintains that both may be expressed by a term.*'

Curley writes (see p.178) that Spinoza argues against Descartes '*that belief is not a voluntary action, not something we decide to do*'. He remarks (see p.169) that Spinoza's reasoning in IIP49 (according to which an idea and its affirmation must be identical because the idea cannot exist without the affirmation and the affirmation not without the idea) is unpromising, because Spinoza gives no argument for the crucial claim that the idea of a triangle cannot exist without the affirmation that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles. Now, and this is important, Curley (see p.173) suggests that Spinoza thought that ideas themselves involve affirmation or denial and that ideas themselves are true or false, because they can be expressed by a proposition: '*once we perceive of ideas as being true or false in their own right and as involving, in themselves, an element of assertion there does not seem to be any need for a further act of the will to produce a judgement*'. But, Curley objects to this reasoning (according to which ideas already contain an element of assertion because they can be expressed by a proposition) that an idea need only contain a tentative affirmation: '*Though having an idea (insofar as this is an occurrence relevant to the analysis of judgement) is always having an idea that something is so, it is also always appropriate to paraphrase this by saying that when we have an idea that* p, *then it seems to us that* p. *And it is quite possible for it to seem to us that* p *without our judging that* p. *We can withhold our judgement, all the while allowing that the weight of evidence favors* p. *Indeed, we can even judge not-*p *and yet allow that the evidence favors* p. *This is simply a fact of experience which it would be folly to deny.*' Curley writes (see p.175) that Spinoza replies to this objection in the following way: '*We might put Spinoza's point in the following way. Doubt is inherently a second-order activity. I cannot doubt whether* p, *unless it already seems to me in some*

measure that p. *I cannot 'suspend judgement' unless there is in some sense a judgement to suspend. But equally, I cannot doubt whether* p *unless I already have some existing tendency to believe not*-p, *unless it already seems to me in some measure that* p *is false. These conflicting tendencies are necessary conditions for doubt, and insofar as I am aware of them and find them to be of approximately equal strength, they are sufficient. Suspending judgement – insofar as it is something mental, not the abstention from public pronouncement – is not an action I take as a consequence of finding the arguments pro and con are pretty equally balanced. It is simply the state of finding them to be so.'*

I agree with Curley that we can only affirm or deny the truth of our ideas if we are able to express our ideas by means of a proposition. In order for us to affirm or deny the truth of our idea of a triangle, for example, we must be able to express our idea of a triangle by the proposition that, for example, the angles of a triangle equal two right angles. We can only affirm or deny the truth of our ideas, then, if our ideas represent their objects as having certain properties. Whether the claim that we must be able to express our ideas by means of propositions implies that ideas themselves are propositions, or that they are 'propositional', I do not know. According to Curley (see p.171) even our mental images, for example our visual idea of the sun, are '(implicitly) propositional'. I agree with Curley that we must be able to express our mental image of the sun by the proposition that, for example, the sun is a small bright disc in the sky in order to be able to affirm or negate the truth of our mental image of the sun, but I ignore whether this implies that our mental image of the sun is itself a proposition or propositional. In my interpretation I have simply focussed on the fact that our ideas must represent their objects as having certain properties if we are to be able to affirm or deny their truth.

Curley's suggestion that Spinoza must have thought that ideas involve affirmation because ideas can be expressed by propositions seems quite unconvincing. It seems unlikely, for example, that we must affirm the truth of our mental image of a winged horse merely because we can express our mental image of a winged horse by the proposition that there is a horse with wings in front of us. It seems unlikely that Spinoza thought that the fact, if it is a fact, that we are always able to express our ideas by affirmative or negative propositions implies that we must necessarily affirm the truth of our ideas. I agree with Curley when he says, defending Spinoza, that in order for us to doubt the truth of an idea, we must have the impression that the idea is true, but I do not see at all why this implies that all ideas involve the affirmation of their truth.

Bennett: *A study of Spinoza's Ethics* (1984)

Bennett discusses Spinoza's claim that 'all ideas involve affirmation' in chapter 7 (paragraphs 38 and 39) of his book. He, too, thinks that by 'idea' Spinoza means 'mental proposition' and that by 'affirmation' he means the belief that a proposition is true. The claim that all ideas involve affirmation, then, means that all mental propositions are beliefs.

Descartes argues, Bennett (see p.159) writes, that when we have a mental proposition, we may decide to believe that this proposition is true, or decide to believe that this proposition is false, or decide neither to believe that this proposition is true nor to believe that this proposition is false. We have the capacity, in other words, to voluntarily affirm or deny (the truth of) a proposition, or to suspend our judgement about the truth of this proposition. We can, in other words again, switch our beliefs on and off at will.

Spinoza denies, Bennett writes (see p.162), that believing is an intellectual act that we can choose to perform on a given proposition. When we entertain a proposition, it is not our will (i.e., not what we decide or what we want) that determines whether we believe or disbelieve this proposition. We do not have the capacity to choose whether we believe or disbelieve a proposition.

Spinoza does not only deny that belief is voluntary, Bennett continues (see p.162), but, more importantly, he also denies that a belief is distinct from a proposition. The belief that a proposition is true is not an attitude that we may or may not take toward a proposition. Spinoza contends that propositions have the nature of being beliefs. Spinoza's point is not merely that when we have a propositional thought, then we believe that this thought is true unless we are prevented from doing so, but, more strongly, that such thoughts come into the mind as beliefs (see p.164). We do not have the capacity to merely pretend or fancy that *p* without believing that *p*, because propositions *are* beliefs. Bennett (see p.163) writes:

> He is maintaining that the thought (or idea or imagining) of an F will be present in my mind as the belief that there is an F, unless something blocks me from believing that. Just before this passage, he has spoken of an inexperienced child who somehow acquires a mental picture of a winged horse and, being defenceless against it, 'necessarily regards the horse as present'. A merely entertained proposition, then, rather than being undisturbed by assent or dissent, is a proposition that is subject roughly to equal pulls in both directions. Spinoza has no argument for this, so far as I can see.

Spinoza, Bennett says, provides no argument for the claim that when we imagine something, then we regard this thing as present and believe that this thing exists. There is no reason why

we should agree that a winged-horse sensory state is a belief (see p.167). Bennett (see p.167) concludes:

> Again, we have looked at p49 which seems to say that ideas are beliefs. In p49d Spinoza argues at length for the tame thesis that a certain 'affirmation' about triangles 'involves the concept or idea of a triangle', and then asserts without arguments that conversely 'this idea of a triangle must involve this same affirmation'. It is puzzling that we should be expected to swallow this whole, if 'affirmation' means 'belief'. It is less puzzling if Spinoza has slid into arguing for the more modest thesis that the apparently subpropositional thought *triangle* really has the form *thing with three sides* which should be understood as unfolding into the propositional form *The thing has three sides.*

As said in my discussion of Curley's article, I agree that we must be able to express our ideas by means of propositions if we are to be able to affirm or deny their truth (i.e., our ideas must represent their objects as having certain properties), but I do not know if this implies that ideas must themselves be propositions. I find it surprising that Bennett so easily takes the mental picture of the winged horse to be a proposition.

I agree with Bennett that Spinoza does not give an argument for the claim that the concept of a triangle involves the affirmation that a triangle has angles that equal two right angles. I have suggested that Spinoza did not feel the need to explain that the reason for this is that, as Descartes famously claims, we always affirm the truth of our clear and distinct ideas. Why confused and mutilated ideas should also involve the affirmation of their truth remains an unanswered question.

Cottingham: 'The Intellect, The Will, and the Passions' (1988)

Cottingham's explanation of the disagreement between Descartes and Spinoza on the issue of judgement is similar to that of Curley and Bennett. Descartes holds, Cottingham says, that we may entertain an idea, that is, a proposition, and then affirm or deny this proposition, that is, believe that it is true or false. Spinoza argues that we cannot freely decide to affirm or negate the truth of a proposition, because propositions are affirmations. Spinoza illustrates this, Cottingham says (see p.242), by taking the *proposition that a triangle has angles that equal to two right angles*. One cannot affirm this proposition without having it, and one cannot have this proposition without affirming it. Cottingham (see p.243) writes that, although it is evident that we cannot affirm a proposition without perceiving its content, it is not evident that we cannot perceive a proposition without affirming it.

Cottingham (see p.244) argues that this disagreement between Descartes and Spinoza is not as big as Spinoza makes it seem. Descartes agrees that we often cannot decide to switch on or off a belief. He writes:

> But to suppose that this fact is fatal to Descartes' position is to miss, or to misrepresent, what Descartes is saying about the relation between the intellectual and the will. The fact is that Descartes is quite prepared to allow that there are many cases where believing a proposition is not something which is entirely within the control of the will – and interestingly such cases would include the very type of case which Spinoza takes as illustration – a judgement concerning the elementary properties of a triangle. As several commentators have recognized, Descartes maintains that in the case of clearly and distinctly perceived propositions, I do not have the two-way power to assent or dissent.

As far as clearly and distinctly perceived propositions are concerned, Cottingham concludes, Descartes and Spinoza quite agree that they are inseparable from their affirmation: we cannot have them without affirming them. But even concerning propositions that are not clear and distinct, Cottingham writes (see p.247), Descartes's position is not that different from Spinoza's position. Descartes is not saying that we can simply switch our belief in these propositions off and on. We cannot simply decide to suspend our belief in our opinions. Doubt in these beliefs comes about through consideration of arguments against them. We do not achieve suspension of assent by a direct act of the Will, but by deciding to follow up a certain line of argument which reveals the inadequacy of the grounds for our beliefs. Although this is not exactly what Spinoza says, Cottingham claims (see p.248), it is it is much closer to the Spinozan picture than at first appeared.

Cottingham does not seem realise that his own observation that 'both Descartes and Spinoza hold that clear and distinct ideas are always affirmed' is precisely what explains why Spinoza writes that the idea of a triangle involves its affirmation without justifying this claim. Cottingham's claim that 'Descartes's and Spinoza's positions are not very different from each other because they both claim that clear and distinct ideas are inseparable from their affirmation' shows little appreciation for Spinoza's critique on Descartes's notion of the will. It seems to make considerable difference whether ideas are or are not identical with the affirmation of their truth.

Alan Donagan: 'Homo Cogitat: Spinoza's Doctrine and Some Recent Commentators' (1990)

Donagan criticises Curley's and Bennett's interpretation of ideas as propositions. Donagan suggests that this interpretation is anachronistic; it reads the contemporary thesis that the nature of ideas can be understood by studying their linguistic expressions into what Descartes and Spinoza say about ideas. The contemporary thesis says that ideas must have a propositional structure because we express them in verbal propositions. Donagan suggests that Curley and Bennett attribute to Spinoza the view that ideas are propositions because they are influenced by this contemporary thesis. Bennett takes the fact that Spinoza sometimes expresses an idea in the form of a proposition to show that he thinks of ideas as propositionally structured. But, Donagan writes (see p.104), this is a mistake because Spinoza rejected the thesis that we can understand the nature of ideas by studying their linguistic expressions. Spinoza never writes that ideas are propositions, and he explicitly warns us not to confuse ideas with words.

Donagan argues (see p.104) that Spinoza agrees with Descartes that ideas represent things. When Descartes compares ideas to images he merely means that ideas represent things. He neither means that they are affections of the brain, nor that they exactly represent things as physical drawings represent things. When Spinoza says that ideas are not images, he merely denies that they are affections of the brain; he does not deny that ideas are representations of things. (Donagan says that if Spinoza means to criticise Descartes for saying that ideas are affections of the brain, then he misunderstood Descartes.)

Donagan (see p.106) argues that Descartes and Spinoza considered the claim that ideas represent things to be utterly familiar and problematic. We should not, just because *we* find it difficult to understand how ideas represent things (because we liken ideas not to pictures but to verbal propositions), reject Descartes's and Spinoza's view of ideas as representations of things. We should not ask ourselves what they have to teach us on the assumption that in them human thinking is treated as something explained by linguistic communication.

Descartes holds, Donagan writes (see p.107), that an idea is materially true when it represents a thing as a thing, and materially false when it represents a non-thing as a thing. We form a true belief when we judge that a materially true idea is materially true or when we judge that a materially false idea is materially false, whereas we form a false belief when we judge that a materially true idea is materially false or when we judge that a materially false idea is materially true. Spinoza holds, Donagan writes (see p.108), that all ideas are affirmations. Every idea represents something and affirms that it is materially true. Donagan

writes: 'the idea of a plane figure bounded by straight lines with three interior angles must both affirm its material truth (that something existent corresponds to it), and exclude the idea of such a figure without interior angles equalling two right angels'.

But why does Spinoza argue that ideas involve affirmation? Donagan (see p.108) agrees with Curley that Spinoza merely asserts that an idea involves its affirmation. Donagan rejects Curley's suggestion Spinoza holds that ideas involve affirmation because ideas are propositions. Curley, as we have seen, writes that 'we cannot understand how an idea is supposed to be unlike a material picture but still supposed to represent something, unless ideas are of the sort that they might be expressed by a proposition'. And because ideas are propositions, Curley suggests, they are affirmations or negations. Donagan writes: '[…] while it may be hard for twentieth-century readers to make head or tail of the notion of a spiritualized quasi-image depicting a physical object while having no physical resemblance to it, there is ample evidence that many seventeenth century philosophers thought that notion to be so simple and clear that no further explanation of it was needed. Whatever was Spinoza's reason for asserting that ideas are affirmations, it is most unlikely that it was that the representative character of ideas would be unintelligible if they were not propositions'.

As said, I agree with the claim that our ideas must represent their objects as having certain properties and that it must therefore be possible for us to express them by means of propositions, but I ignore whether this means that ideas must themselves be propositions. I agree with Donagan that Spinoza could not possibly have thought that ideas involve the affirmation of their truth merely because we are able to express our ideas by means of propositions.

Della Rocca: 'The Power of an Idea: Spinoza's Critique of Pure Will (2003)'

Della Rocca's article consists in three parts. I shall briefly summarise each part and directly comment on it.

<u>Part 1: All ideas involve affirmation; if you have an idea, then you affirm this idea.</u> In the first part of his article Della Rocca explains why all ideas involve affirmation. By 'idea' Della Rocca means a mental proposition, such as 'There is water in this cup', or 'Drinking water is good for me'. He writes (see p.202) that in IIP49 Spinoza *presupposes that ideas are inherently propositional in character*. By 'affirming an idea' Della Rocca means believing that an idea is true, for example believing that the mental proposition 'There is water in this cup' is true. So when Della Rocca says that every idea involves affirmation, he means that we cannot have a mental proposition without believing that this mental proposition is true. We

cannot, for example, have the mental proposition 'There is water in this cup' without believing that there is water in the cup. Every idea is thus a belief.

Della Rocca (see p.205-208) explains why we affirm every idea that we have by the following reasoning: Every mental action is a volition, every volition is an affirmation (or denial), every idea is an action, thus every idea is an affirmation. That all mental actions are affirmations, Della Rocca says, is clear from IIP48D where Spinoza treats as equivalent the claim that 'the mind cannot be a free cause of its own actions' and the claim that 'the mind cannot have an absolute faculty of willing and not willing'. Della Rocca writes (see p.206):

> Now at least part of what it is for something to be a willing or volition is for it to cause further states. Thus Spinoza speaks of will as the striving or power of the mind to do certain things. Willings thus give rise to further states and since willings are mental actions, for Spinoza, it follows that mental actions also cause further states. Thus, for Spinoza, the actions of the mind – or its willings – are states that are caused at least in part by the mind and that cause further states of the mind or of other things.

That every volition is an affirmation (or denial) is clear from the fact that in IIP48S Spinoza says that the Will is the faculty of affirming and denying, and the fact that in IIP49 he writes 'volitions, *or* affirmations and negations'. Thus, Della Rocca writes, the mind does nothing but affirm things (see p.206). That all ideas are actions is clear from the fact that in IID3 Spinoza writes that he prefers to call ideas 'concepts', rather than 'perceptions', because the word 'concept' seems to express an action of the mind. Della Rocca writes about IIP49 (see p.207):

> I am suggesting that Spinoza is, in effect, offering here a theory of belief: an idea gets to be an affirmation in virtue of being an action. Given that, for Spinoza, ideas are actions by their very nature, all ideas are, by their very nature, affirmations. Spinoza holds that all ideas involve affirmations simply because he holds, contra Descartes, that all ideas are actions and because he holds, also contra Descartes, that all mental actions are affirmations. Spinoza's anti-Cartesian claim in the second part of 2p49d – the claim that all ideas involve affirmations – is thus not a mere assertion, but is instead a result of two further anti-Cartesian commitments.

Della Rocca then suggests that ideas are affirmations because they cause bodily actions that have as goal the increase in our power of acting. He gives the following examples. If he has the idea that there is water in a cup and the idea that drinking water is beneficial, then these two ideas cause his striving to drink the water. If he has the idea that there is water in the cup and the idea that drinking water is harmful, then these two ideas

cause his striving to avoid the water. Della Rocca asks what happens if he has the idea that drinking water is beneficial, the idea that there is water in the cup, but also the idea that there is no water in the cup. His answer is that in this case his idea that there is water in the cup causes his striving to drink the water, and his idea that there is no water in the cup suppresses his striving to drink the water caused by his idea that there is water in the cup. If his idea that there is water in the cup is the stronger idea, then he puts the cup to his lips, and if his idea that there is no water in the cup is the stronger idea, then he will not put the cup to his lips. However, even though the weaker idea does not result in behaviour, it is still a 'live psychic force' that opposes the striving caused by the stronger idea. He then writes (see p.211):

> I certainly have not shown that all ideas generate strivings in the way that there is water generates striving, but Spinoza does clearly think that all ideas figure into an agent's striving in some way. The water example provides one way of understanding how an idea can do this. I contend that it is, in part at least, because, for Spinoza, all ideas are, in ways such as the one just outlined, bound up with an agent's striving that he sees all ideas as affirmations and invokes 2def3 and the notion of ideas as actions in order to clarify 2p49. His view which ties the property of being a belief or affirmation to an idea's power to cause events regarded by an agent as beneficial to the agent is a very plausible starting point for an account of belief. We have become accustomed to the notion that beliefs are, by their very nature, nothing but representations that guide our activity, that generally cause behaviour beneficial to us or regarded by us as beneficial to us. Spinoza, I believe, was expressing this important insight about the nature of belief in the second part of 2P49d and in its implicit claim that ideas are affirmations because ideas are actions.

First of all, I do not understand why Della Rocca claims that Spinoza presupposes that ideas are propositional in character. The reason is not that he has not read Donagan, because he mentions Donagan in the bibliography of his article.

Secondly, I disagree with Della Rocca's claim that ideas involve affirmation because (1) ideas are actions, and because (2) actions are volitions, and because (3) volitions are affirmations. Concerning (1): As I explained at the end of the previous section, it seems to me that when Spinoza writes in IID3 that he prefers to call ideas concepts rather than perceptions, he is talking about *adequate* ideas alone. When the mind thinks independently, then it forms adequate ideas, which are more suitably called 'concepts' than 'perceptions' given that the mind is active when it forms them. The contrary holds for mental images: when the mind forms ideas because it represents affections of the brain caused by external bodies, then it forms inadequate ideas, which are more suitably called 'perceptions' than 'concepts' given that the mind is acted on when it forms them. If this interpretation is correct, then (1) is false.

And even if (1) were true, that is, even if all ideas were actions of the mind, then Della Rocca would have to explain why Spinoza thinks it acceptable to simply postulate that all ideas are actions. The whole point of IIP49 is to show that all ideas involve judgment, and so Spinoza cannot just assume that ideas are actions. Concerning (2): When Spinoza writes in IIP48 and IIP49 that he will talk about volitions in the sense of judgments, he is not saying that all volitions are judgments. He is merely saying that he will talk about one of the two kinds of actions that Descartes ascribes to the will, namely the action of judging that ideas are true or false, and not the action of choosing to pursue or avoid something.

Thirdly, I also disagree with Della Rocca's claim that ideas are beliefs because ideas have the power to cause actions regarded by an agent as beneficial to the agent. I do not see on what basis Della Rocca claims that all our ideas are somehow tied up with our striving for self-preservation. Della Rocca's reasoning, moreover, seems to have the wrong direction. That an idea leads to action does not explain why it is a belief, but, rather, that an idea is a belief explains why it can lead to action. If I have an idea but I do not believe it is true, then it is unlikely that it will motivate me to do something. Della Rocca's suggestion that the conatus thesis somehow explains why ideas involve affirmation is interesting, but it should be carefully worked out. Spinoza does not mention the conatus in Part Two of the *Ethics*, and if we want to apply it to Spinoza's epistemology then we should exactly state how and why. I think that we may use the conatus thesis to explain why the brain, once affected, will continue to be in the same state until its state is changed by new motions of the animal spirits, and that, therefore, the mind, until that moment, will continue to have the same mental image. The conatus thesis perhaps even allows us to explain the perduration of a mental image without having to refer to the conatus of its corresponding brain state: mental images have a conatus of their own, and so we will continue to have a mental image until it is suppressed or destroyed by a stronger mental image (e.g., a new sense perception). It is important, however, to separate this issue from the question whether a mental image involves the affirmation of its own truth. That a mental image perdures because it has a conatus and because its corresponding brain state has a conatus, does not prove that a mental image involves the affirmation that it is a true representation of its object. The mere fact that a mental image strives to continue to exist does not imply that we also have to believe that it truthfully represents an object outside our mind.

Part 2: An affirmation is simply a matter of having an idea. In the second part of his article Della Rocca explains why affirmations cannot be mental states independent from ideas. He writes (see p.213) that wherever there is an affirmation, there is an idea that suffices for

and indeed fully and exclusively explains that affirmation. According to Della Rocca, Spinoza does not merely mean in IIA3 that we must have an idea in order to have an emotion or in order to make an affirmation, but he means that ideas fully and exclusively account for these emotions and affirmations. He argues that the use of IIA3 in IIP11 shows that this is how IIA3 must be understood. Della Rocca claims that Spinoza says in IIP11 that the idea of the human body is the only thing that constitutes the human mind. Given that this idea is composed of many ideas, the mind is only constituted by ideas. Therefore, ideas fully account for emotions and affirmations. Della Rocca (see p.214) claims that Spinoza uses IIA3 in IIP49D not only to argue that an affirmation requires an idea, but also to argue that if an affirmation exists, its presence is due simply to the presence of a certain idea.

I disagree with Della Rocca's claim that in IIA3 Spinoza implies that if we have an idea then we feel an emotion or make a judgement. Spinoza clearly writes in IIA3 that we can have an idea of something without feeling an emotion. IIP11 does not at all show that Spinoza means in IIA3 that we cannot have an idea without having an emotion or without making a judgement. On the contrary, Spinoza says in IIP11 that an idea of the human body is only the first thing that constitutes the human mind, and, furthermore, he there calls the emotions 'the remaining modes of thought', which, as I shall argue in the following chapter, implies that emotions are not cognitions. Furthermore, it would be unacceptable to simply postulate in an axiom that we must feel an emotion or make a judgement when we have an idea of something. Spinoza explicitly denies that we must feel an emotion every time we have an idea of something, and he wants to prove that we make a judgement every time we have an idea of something, and so he will not simply postulate this in an axiom.

Part 3: Affirmations must be ideas or they would not be mental states. In the third part of his article Della Rocca (see p. 215) explains why affirmations (and emotions) cannot be mental states independent from ideas. If affirmations (and emotions) were not ideas, then nothing would explain why they are modes of thought. Because Spinoza repudiates brute facts, that is, facts that in principle cannot be explained, he wants to explain why affirmations (and emotions) are mental states. Given that ideas are modes of thought, and given that ideas are representational, affirmations (and emotions) cannot be non-representational mental states. (Della Rocca rejects the counter-argument that affirmations are mental states simply because they are conscious states, and the counter-argument that affirmations are mental states because they interact with ideas.)

Although Della Rocca's argument is interesting, there is no textual evidence for it. In the next chapter I shall argue that the emotions of Joy, Sadness and Desire are non-cognitive mental states (but, nonetheless, ideas that represent the human body).

Chapter 3: The mental cause of emotion

Many eminent scholars attribute to Spinoza the thesis that our cognitions and our emotions are not distinct mental states. They argue that our emotions are somehow part of our cognitions. In section 1 I shall present, and disprove, their arguments in favour of this interpretation. In section 2 I shall discuss Bennett's claim that Spinoza is unclear about the relation between our beliefs and our emotions, even though he, Spinoza, tends to think that our emotions are caused by our beliefs. In section 3 I shall show that in many passages Spinoza quite clearly argues that our ideas of things are *distinct from our emotions. In most of these passages Spinoza also claims that, although emotions are distinct from our ideas, we cannot have an emotion without first having an idea. In section 4 I shall discuss the passages in which Spinoza argues that our emotions, insofar as they are mental states, are caused by our ideas of things. The fact that our emotions are caused by our ideas of things, of course, explains why we cannot have an emotion without first having an idea of something. In section 5, finally, I shall suggest a possible explanation for the fact that Spinoza, even though he holds that cognitions and emotions are distinct mental states, sometimes writes that passions are mental images.*

Section 1: Rejection of the cognitivist interpretation

Many scholars write, more or less explicitly, that Spinoza denies that our cognitions and our emotions are different kinds of mental states. They claim that Spinoza reduces emotions to cognitions by defining emotions as 'properties', or 'features', or 'aspects', or 'charges' of cognitions[19]. Surprisingly few of these scholars support this reading with arguments. In this section I shall present and reject the arguments that have been given in favour of this reading.

[19] The following scholars claim, more or less explicitly, that emotions and cognitions are not different kinds of mental states, but without providing an argument for this claim: Couchoud (1924, p.218); Hampshire (1951, p.135); Misrahi (1966, p.85); Moreau (1971, p.3); Parkinson (1972, p.216); Harris (1973, p.118); Bennett (1984, p.256); Delahunty (1985, p.244); Scruton (1986, p.81); Hofmann (1991, p.173); Garrett (1996, p.275); Yirmiyahu (199, p.53); Jarrett (1999, p.13); Renz (2007, p.48).

Amihud Gilead: 'Human Affects as Properties of Cognitions in Spinoza's Philosophical Psychotherapy' (1999)

Gilead claims that Spinoza believes that our emotions are not distinct, individual mental states, but properties of cognitions. He cites IID2, IIA3 and IIP11D as evidence for his interpretation. He writes that some of our cognitions bear an 'emotional charge'. He bases this claim on IVP14. In the first footnote to his article Gilead criticises Bidney, Joachim, Bennett, Hampshire and Neu for not having clarified the relationship between cognitions and emotions. According to Gilead, emotions 'follow from', or 'derive from' or 'arise from' cognitions.

Gilead does not explain how IID2, IIA3 and IIP11D support his claim that emotions are properties of cognitions. Likewise, he does not show how IVP14 supports his claim that some cognitions are 'charged' with an emotion. He merely cites these passages, and leaves it to the reader to find out how they support his theses. In section 3 I shall show that IID2, IIA3 and IIP11D actually support the opposite interpretation, according to which emotions and cognitions are different kinds of mental states. Furthermore, Gilead himself does not clarify the relation between cognitions and emotions by simply repeating the verbs that Spinoza normally uses to describe the relation between a cognition and an emotion (i.e., 'to follow from', 'to derive from', and 'to arise from'). It seems very strange to say that emotions are properties of cognitions, or charges of cognitions, and that, as such, emotions follow from, or derive from, or arise from cognitions. In section 4 I shall show that when Spinoza says that an emotion 'follows from', 'derives from', or 'arises from' our idea of something, he means that our emotion is caused by our idea of something.

Gideon Segal: 'Beyond Subjectivity: Spinoza's Cognitivism of Emotions' (2000)

Segal claims that Spinoza reduces emotions to cognitions. He argues that Spinoza wanted to include only the cognitive aspect of emotions in his psychology but not the non-cognitive aspect of emotions. By the 'cognitive aspect of an emotion' Segal simply means a cognition, and by the 'non-cognitive aspect of an emotion' he means how this cognition feels to us when we have it. The feeling that we have when we have a certain cognition does not constitute a mental state that is distinct from that cognition, but it consists in our awareness of that cognition. Segal writes (see p.3): '*What we feel when we are joyous, envious, etc. is an awareness of a cognitive content specific to each affect.*' Segal claims that Spinoza wanted to reduce emotions to cognitions because he wanted to formulate a scientific psychology. Feelings, Segal suggests, have no place in such a psychology because they cannot be quantified and measured. Feelings are vague inner experiences that cannot be understood

clearly and distinctly. When we think rationally, he says, we compare things with each other in order to determine their similarities and dissimilarities. We are, however, unable to compare our inner experiences of emotions, and so we cannot study them rationally. Segal claims that Descartes's decision to exclude unquantifiable, immeasurable and vague properties of bodies from his physics inspired Spinoza to exclude unquantifiable, immeasurable and vague feelings from his psychology.

Although Segal formulates a reason why Spinoza might have denied, or perhaps should have denied, emotions the status of being distinct mental states, he does not adduce any textual evidence to support his claim that Spinoza did, in fact, reduce emotions to cognitions. Saying that there is a good reason to reduce emotions to cognitions (namely that feelings are vague entities that cannot be the object of rational analysis) does of course not prove that Spinoza reduces emotions to cognitions. Furthermore, I do not see how the conception of emotions as 'the inner awareness of certain cognitions' would result in a more rigorous psychology. We do not get a more rigorous theory of the human mind by refusing to study certain mental phenomena. Just studying cognitions, and disqualifying emotions as 'the inner awareness of certain cognitions', merely results in a psychology that is incomplete.

Micheal Della Rocca: *Spinoza* (2008)

Della Rocca claims that emotions are features of representations. By 'a representation' he means 'a cognition'. He adduces IIA3 and IIP11D, as well as IIIAGD, in support of his claim that emotions are cognitive mental states (see p.120 and p.158). However, his main argument for his claim that emotions cannot be non-cognitive mental states is that non-cognitive mental states do not exist. What all mental states have in common, he writes, is that they represent something (see p.121). Something is only a mental state because it represents something. Representation, he writes, is all there is to emotions (see p.158). Della Rocca also suggests that the fact that in IIP49 Spinoza uses IIA3 in order to demonstrate that affirmations are not distinct mental states but identical with representations proves that emotions are not distinct mental states but identical with representations (see p.123).

Della Rocca does not prove that IIA3, IIP11D and IIIAGD support his claim that emotions are cognitive mental states. He merely refers to them, and leaves it up to the reader to find out how these passages support his interpretation. In section 3 I shall show that IIA3 and IIP11D actually support the interpretation according to which emotions are non-cognitive mental states, and in section 5 I shall suggest a reading of IIIAGD that harmonises it with this interpretation.

Della Rocca's claim that 'emotions cannot be non-representational mental states because all mental states are representational' is false. Spinoza does not typically qualify mental states as 'representations'. He normally reserves the word 'representation' for the relation between a mental image and the external body that is the object of this mental image; our mental images represent external bodies. He does not typically say that our mental states are representations of states of our body. He typically says that our mental states are ideas of states of our body. He defines emotions, too, as ideas of specific states of our body. Now, the fact that Spinoza defines emotions as 'ideas' of certain bodily states does not imply that they are cognitions. When Spinoza writes in IIIP11S that an emotion (that is, Joy or Sadness) is an 'idea' of an increase or decrease in the power of the human body, he means, as I shall argue in chapter 5, that Joy and Sadness are mental states that correspond to an increase or decrease in our bodily health due to a specific kind of bodily process, namely a beneficial or detrimental affection of our heart (and perhaps other internal organs) by the animal spirits. In other words, when we feel joyful or sad, then at the same time our bodily health is increased or decreased due to this bodily process. The emotion of Desire is an 'idea' of the human body in the sense that it is a mental state that corresponds to a specific bodily state, namely, as I shall argue in chapter 7, a determination of the muscles to move the body. So, although emotions are 'ideas' in the sense that they are mental states, they are not cognitions; they are not mental states that represent the world to us.

Finally, Della Rocca's suggestion that the fact that in IIP49 Spinoza uses IIA3 in order to demonstrate that affirmations are not distinct mental states but identical with representations proves that emotions are not distinct mental states but identical with representations is false, too. In IIP49 Spinoza uses IIA3 because it says that an affirmation cannot exist without an idea of something. That an affirmation cannot exist without an idea, however, does not prove that an affirmation is identical with an idea. Spinoza concludes that an affirmation is identical with an idea, not only on the basis of the claim that an affirmation cannot exist without an idea, but also on the basis of the claim that an idea cannot exist without an affirmation. Two things are identical, according to Spinoza, when the one cannot be understood without the other, and *vice versa*. The essence of an idea involves an affirmation, and the essence of an affirmation involves an idea. In order for an *emotion* and an idea to be identical we must always have an emotion when we have an idea, and an idea when we have an emotion. But this is not the case. Although Spinoza writes in IIA3 that we always have an idea when we have an emotion, he there also writes that we do not always have an emotion when we have an idea. Therefore, rather than proving Della Rocca's claim that

emotions must be identical with representations, Spinoza's use of IIA3 in IIP49 actually disproves this claim.

Micheal Della Rocca: 'Rationalism run amok: representation and the reality of the emotions in Spinoza' (2008)

Della Rocca repeats his claim that emotions are representations, but adds that these representations are propositional ideas (see p.31). Because emotions are propositions they can be true or false, justified or unjustified, and susceptible to rational assessment. Della Rocca's gives the following example: '*For example, my love for Henrietta is constituted in part by the thought that she has benefited me, and if I am in fact unjustified in thinking that she has, then one can say that the love I feel toward her is unjustified.*'

Della Rocca writes that Spinoza thinks that emotions are only constituted by representations and that they are not constituted by a representation and some kind of 'quale' or 'feeling' (see p.32). Joy, for example is merely a representation of the body's greater power of acting and not some 'feeling' of Joy. (It is unclear, then, why in the passage just quoted he writes that his love for Henrietta is only *in part* constituted by his thought that she has benefited him.)

Della Rocca does not give an argument for his claim that representations are propositions. He merely writes that Edwin Curley has 'elegantly explained that Spinoza tends to think of representations as propositional' (see p.31). Now, as I said in my discussion of Curley's article in the previous chapter, I agree that we can express our ideas of things by means of propositions because all our ideas of things represent their objects as having certain properties, but I do not know whether this means that our ideas are themselves propositions. Della Rocca's example of his love for Henrietta suggests that he thinks that the ideas that constitute passions are opinions. His love for Henrietta, Della Rocca seems to say, is constituted by his opinion that Henrietta has benefitted him. Now, as I indicated in the previous chapter (section 2, subsection 2) Spinoza does not seem to make a clear distinction between opinions and imaginations. In the *Ethics*, as we shall see in the next chapter, Spinoza gives many examples of cases in which Joy or Sadness has been caused by a mental image, but very few examples of cases in which Joy or Sadness has been caused by an opinion. Therefore, if Della Rocca thinks that the ideas that constitute passions are opinions, such as 'Henrietta has benefitted me', then I think that he is missing an important point, which is that Joy and Sadness can simply be caused by mental images (i.e., sense perceptions and recollections of sense perceptions).

Finally, Della Rocca's example of his love for Henrietta shows that Della Rocca thinks that, according to Spinoza, our love for someone consists in the thought that that person has increased the power of our body. This interpretation of Love is mistaken for at least two reasons. First of all, Spinoza writes that Love is Joy together with the idea of an external cause of this Joy. So, according to Spinoza, Love consists in Joy together with an idea, and it does not consist merely in an idea. Secondly, although the idea that causes an emotion can be true or false, the emotion itself cannot be true or false. Love, therefore, cannot be true or false. I think Spinoza quite agrees with Descartes when he, Spinoza, writes in Part I of the Appendix to his exposition of Descartes's *Principles of Philosophy*: '*Still, these modes of thinking cannot be called ideas, nor can they be said to be true or false, just as love cannot be said to be true or false, but [only] good or bad.*'

Eugene Marshall: 'Spinoza's Cognitive Affects and Their Feel' (2008)

Marshall claims in the first part of his article that all cognitions are propositionally structured judgements. He writes (see p.3) that '*Spinozist ideas are propositional in structure*', and that '*all of our ideas involve an act of affirmation; that is, our ideas are propositionally structured representations that include an affirmation- they are judgements.*' In a footnote to this sentence Marshall explains that he considers all our ideas to be beliefs. He bases his claim that all ideas include an affirmation on IID3. He admits that IIIP1 seems to contradict IID3, but he resolves this contradiction by saying that our mind is also active when it has an inadequate idea, but less active than when it has an adequate idea (see p.4). Marshall claims that by defining all ideas as acts of the mind, *or* concepts, Spinoza must at least imply that all ideas have cognitive or representative content (see p.5). Marshall interprets IIP49 as saying that an affirmation and an idea are identical, because neither of them can exist without the other (see pp.6-8). He claims that by identifying volitions and ideas, Spinoza does not mean that there are only affirmations but no ideas, nor that there are only ideas but no affirmations, but that '*ideas can be conceived in several ways, one cognitive and one volitional*' (see p.9). We may, he writes, '*refer to modes of thought as ideas or as volitions, one referring to their cognitive content, the other to their volitional or affirmative nature* (see p.9).' He adds: '*Considered together, however, they are the affirmation of a representation, which I take to be a judgement.*' Marshall then, in the second part of his article, goes on to claim that Joy and Sadness are identical to cognitions, which, according to him, are propositionally structured and bear a truth value (see p.12). He adduces IVP8, IVP14 and IIIAGD in support of this claim. Marshall claims that we can consider an emotion as a

cognition (which is propositionally structured and has a representational content), or as an affirmation (of this representational content), or (when we consider that the content of this idea involves a change in the power of the body or mind) as an emotion (see p.12). All modes of thought, he claims, are cognitions, that is, judgements (see p.13). He writes: '*when the mind forms some modes of thought, specifically, ideas parallel to changes in the body's power, the mind thereby increases or decreases its own power. These modes of thought are affects. Thus we see that affects are ideas, which are acts in which the mind affirms some propositionally structured, representational idea. I understand this act, in which the mind affirms some proposition, to be a judgement. It should be evident why I claim that Spinoza's theory of affects is strongly cognitivist, as it has been labelled by several Spinoza scholars.*' (In the footnote to this passage Marshall refers to Gilead and Segal.) Marshall gives as example his idea that Peter has harmed him. He thinks that this idea is a representation, and an affirmation, and a judgement, and a belief, and the emotion of Sadness, all at the same time (see p.14). In the third part of his article Marshall rejects Segal's claim that Spinoza excludes 'the feel' of emotions from his psychology. By 'the feel of an emotion' Segal and Marshall both mean how a certain cognition feels to us, and by 'emotion' they mean a cognition. So, for example, the proposition that Peter has harmed him feels a certain way to Marshall. His emotion itself is his cognition 'Peter has harmed me' and the feel of his emotion is how he feels when he entertains this proposition.

Segal and Marshall express their own position rather confusedly when they distinguish an emotion from the feeling of an emotion. I believe that their own position is more clearly expressed by saying that having a cognition sometimes feels a certain way, and that an emotion is how such a cognition feels.

Marshall does not explain why he thinks that all ideas are propositionally structured. Like Della Rocca, Marshall seems to think that passions are constituted by opinions. He seems to say that his Sadness is constituted by his opinion that Peter has harmed him. As I have explained in my discussion of Della Rocca's article just now, I believe that this overlooks the fact that in most of the examples that Spinoza gives our Joy or Sadness is simply caused by a mental image (i.e., a sense perceptions or a recollection of a sense perception) rather than by an opinion.

I disagree with Marshall's claim that all ideas are concepts and active mental states. As I pointed out in the previous chapter (section 2, subsection 1), mental images are ideas but they are neither concepts nor active mental states. Moreover, Spinoza's claim that 'Joy and Sadness are mental states through which the mind affirms an increase or decrease in the

power of the human body' does not mean that Joy and Sadness are cognitive mental states. It merely means that Joy and Sadness are, metaphysically speaking, ideas of an increase or decrease in the power of the human body. Feeling joyful or sad is not the same thing as believing that the power of our body increases or decreases.

Concerning Marshall's claim that all emotions are cognitions, I would like to say that it not enough to merely cite IIIAGD, IVP8 and IVP14 and claim that these propositions show that Spinoza believes that emotions are propositionally structured cognitions. Marshall should have argued that this is the right interpretation of these propositions.

Micheal LeBuffe: 'The Anatomy of the Passions (2009)'

We have seen that Della Rocca and Marshal adduce IIIAGD in support of the claim that emotions are not distinct from our ideas of things but do not explain how IIIAGD supports this claim. In his article 'The Anatomy of the Passions (2009)' LeBuffe, too, claims on the basis of IIIAGD that emotions are not distinct from our ideas of things. He argues that Spinoza's statement that a passion is a confused idea implies that a passion is an idea of the imagination, because in IIP41 Spinoza claims, according to LeBuffe, that all confused ideas are ideas of the imagination. Passions are a specific kind of ideas of the imagination, namely those by which the mind affirms of its body, or of some part of its body, a greater or lesser force of existing than before. A passion represents an external body as present, and it corresponds to an increase or decrease in our power of acting. In section 5 shall offer a reading of IIIAGD that harmonises it with the interpretation according to which emotions are not cognitions, and thus passions not mental images.

Lisa Shapiro: 'How We Experience the World: Passionate Perception in Descartes and Spinoza' (2012)

Shapiro claims that mental images are emotions. (She translates '*imaginatio*' and '*affectus*' as 'imagining' and 'affect', and she holds that sense perceptions are also imaginings (see p.206).) She makes a distinction between the objective content of an idea and the imaginative content of an idea (see p.205-207). By saying that an idea has an objective content she means that an idea represents a state of the human body, and by saying that an idea has an imaginative content she means that an idea represents an external body. She claims that it is 'too simple' to think that (1) emotions do not have an imaginative content, and that (2) mental images do not have as objective content a change in bodily power (see p.210). In other words, it is 'too simple', according to Shapiro, to think that mental images

represent external bodies but emotions do not represent external bodies, and to think that emotions correspond to an increase or decrease in the power of the body but mental images do not correspond to such a bodily event. She gives three reasons why thinking this would be too easy (see p.211). First, emotions must also represent external bodies, because the bodily affections that correspond to the emotions are in the same way caused by external bodies as the bodily affections that correspond to mental images. Secondly, Spinoza does not explicitly write that mental images correspond to bodily affections that do not consist in a change of bodily power, and there is no reason to think that this is what he believed. Thirdly, it is clear that Spinoza believes that mental images involve a change in our bodily power. To support this claim she adduces IIIP12 (which says that the mind strives to imagine those things that increase the power of our body and that so long as the mind imagines something that increases the body's power, the body is affected with a mode that increases its power). She concludes that '*an imagination is properly speaking an affect*'.

That an interpretation is 'easy' does not, of course, mean that it is mistaken. Shapiro herself recognises that IIIpost.1 (which says that some affections of the human body do not change its power) and IIIP13 (which says that love is the emotion of Joy accompanied by an idea of an external cause) suggest that mental images correspond to bodily states that do not consist in a change in bodily power, but she does not attempt to harmonise these passages with her interpretation.

Shapiro's first argument in favour of the reading according to which emotions are mental images is false, because the bodily affections to which mental images correspond are not caused in the same way as the bodily affections to which emotions correspond. The bodily affections that correspond to mental images are affections of our brain. These affections are caused by external bodies in the sense that external bodies act on our sense organs and so determine the animal spirits to affect our brain. The bodily affections that correspond to our emotions of Joy and Sadness are, as I shall argue in chapter 5, affections of our heart that are beneficial or detrimental to our health. These affections are only indirectly caused by external bodies; when an external body causes a brain state, which corresponds to our sense perception of this external body, then this brain state may redirect the course of the animal spirits in such a way that they affect our heart beneficially or detrimentally, which bodily event corresponds to our emotion of Joy or Sadness. The causation of mental images is thus quite different from the causation of emotions. The mental states that correspond to affections of the brain are cognitive, but the mental states that correspond to affections of the heart are non-cognitive.

Shapiro's second argument is puzzling because the fact that Spinoza does *not* write that mental images do not correspond to an increase or decrease in bodily power, evidently, cannot be used as an argument in support of the claim that mental images do correspond to an increase or decrease in bodily power. The only passage that suggests that mental images correspond to a change in bodily power is IIP17 which says that 'if the human body is affected with a mode that involves the nature of an external body, then the human mind will only cease to regard this external body as present when the human body is affected by an '*affectus*' that excludes the presence of this external body'. Shapiro admits that it is tempting to think that Spinoza does not use the word '*affectus*' here in the sense of 'emotion', because he only begins to speak about emotions in the Third Part of the *Ethics* and because he defines emotions there as a *specific* kind of affection, namely one that changes the power of the body (see p.208). But Shapiro still thinks that IIP17 shows that Spinoza believes that mental images correspond to changes in bodily power. I have demonstrated in the previous chapter that in IIP17 Spinoza uses the word '*affectus*' in the sense of 'affection' and not in the sense of 'emotion'. He simply means to say in IIP17 that we continue to have a mental image of a certain thing as long as our brain is in a specific state, and that we only cease to imagine this thing when our brain gets into another state. Spinoza is not saying that we continue to have a mental image of something until we are affected with an emotion that excludes the existence of this thing. This would not mean anything.

I fail to see how IIIP12 proves, as Shapiro's third argument says it does, that mental images themselves correspond to a change in bodily power. In chapter 7 I shall argue that IIIP12 should be interpreted as saying that we try to imagine those things our ideas of which cause Joy. So, for example, I try to imagine a cup of tea because my mental image of a cup of tea makes me joyful. My mental image of a cup of tea corresponds to an affection of my brain, and my Joy corresponds to an increase in my bodily health due to an affection of my heart. My mental image of a cup of tea itself does not correspond to an increase in my bodily health.

Lisa Shapiro: 'Spinoza on Imagination and the Affects' (2012)

Shapiro repeats her claim that mental images are emotions and she repeats the three arguments in support of this claim, but she now also suggests a fourth argument. She claims that in IIP49 Spinoza uses the word 'idea' in the sense of 'mental image'. (IIP49 says that we should distinguish between 'an idea, *or* a concept, of the mind and the images of things we imagine', that ideas involve an affirmation or a negation, and that those who think that we

cannot form an idea of something of which we cannot form an image liken ideas to mute pictures on a panel.) She claims that: '*Spinoza is denying the possibility of merely entertaining an idea of a thing without regarding that thing as present to us, that is, without affirming the existence of that thing. He denies that we can simply consider the content of an idea independently of an attitude we take to that content* (see p.97).' Later on in her article it becomes clear that Shapiro means that we cannot have a mental image of something without feeling an emotion (the so-called 'attitude'). She writes: '*we cannot become aware of any particular thing in the world without our power to act being differentially impacted, that is, without the affects. On this reading it should be clear, that it is no accident or equivocation that Spinoza characterizes imagination as affects in Part II. Furthermore, on this line, our ideas of things are far from being mute pictures on a panel* (see p.99).' All our mental images, Shapiro writes, are essentially affective, and there is only a distinction of reason between the content of a mental image and the manner in which we conceive that content (see p.100).

First of all, it is misleading to claim merely on the basis of IIP17 that Spinoza characterises mental images as emotions in the Second Part of the *Ethics*. Shapiro herself admits that it is possible that Spinoza does not use the word '*affectus*' there in the sense of 'emotion'.

It is true that Spinoza holds that when we have a mental image of something then, *ceteris paribus*, we regard that thing as present. So, for example, if the only mental state I have is an image of my house, then I will regard my house as present, and I will not doubt that my house stands in fact in front of me. But this implies in no way that I must feel an emotion when I have a mental image. Spinoza explicitly writes in IIA3 that we can have an idea of something without having an emotion, and in IIpost.1 he quite clearly says that we can be affected by an external body without having the power of our body changed. Furthermore, it is quite clear from experience that many of our mental images do not cause emotions. I can, for example, see a leaf falling from a tree without feeling sad, or imagine the backside of the moon without feeling joyful. We would be very emotionally unstable and dysfunctional creatures if all our mental images caused an emotion in us. The biological function of emotions is to make us behave in ways that enhance our chances of survival, and emotions would not serve this function if our ideas of all things, even the ones that are strictly irrelevant to our survival, caused emotions.

Finally in IIP49 Spinoza does not only speak about mental images but also about adequate ideas. He argues that to have a concept of something is to affirm that that thing has a certain property, and to affirm that something has a certain property is to have a concept of

that thing. To have a concept of a triangle, for example, is to affirm that the three angles of a triangle add up to two right angles, and to affirm this property of a triangle is to have the concept of a triangle. Spinoza is not saying that if you have a concept of something, then you affirm that the thing of which you have a concept exists. He explicitly states that you can have the concept of a triangle even if there exists no triangle in the world. By saying that we should distinguish between 'ideas, *or* concepts, and the images of things we imagine' Spinoza, it seems to me, explicitly warns us that he is not using the word 'idea' in the sense of 'mental image'.

Section 2: Bennett on cognition as the cause of emotion

Spinoza very often writes that our emotions (of Joy and Sadness) 'follow from', 'derive from', 'arise from', 'are born of', or 'are accompanied by' our cognitions. Many scholars mention this, but almost none of them explains what this means. To my knowledge, only Bennett discusses the possibility that when Spinoza says that emotions follow from cognitions (or when he uses any of the other expressions), he means that emotions are caused by cognitions.

In *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics* (1984) Bennett makes a number of remarks about Spinoza's view on the relation between our cognitions and our emotions. He claims that a good theory of emotion gives cognition a central role (see p.273). When he says 'cognition' he has especially belief in mind. He writes that if belief was not part of emotion, then we could neither say that an emotion is rationally justified or unjustified, nor speak about the object of an emotion. (He says that there may be emotions that do not have an object, because they are not associated with a belief, but these, he says, are exceptions (see p.274).) Bennett claims that there are good reasons to think that emotions do not merely include a belief, but that the belief must cause the rest of the emotion. (By 'the rest of the emotion' he simply means what I call 'emotion', that is, Joy or Sadness. He translates *Laetitia* and *Tristitia* not as 'Joy' and 'Sadness', but as 'pleasure' and 'unpleasure'.) He gives two reasons for this claim. The first reason is that, if we merely say, as Spinoza often does, that an emotion is 'accompanied by' a belief, then we cannot determine the object of an emotion when at the time we have this emotion we have more than one belief. Bennett's example is that if you are angry while thinking about what I said to you and about the weather, then nothing makes it the case that you are angry with me and not with the weather. This is not a problem if we take it to be that the object of an emotion figures in the belief that causes the rest of the emotion. The second reason, if I understand Bennett's point correctly, is that it sometimes happens that

we know what our beliefs are and how we feel, and then discover which feeling has been caused by which belief. Bennett's example is of a man who discovers to his surprise that what he feels towards his brother is jealousy; this man is not discovering how he feels nor what he believes, but which belief has caused the way he feels.

Bennett writes that Spinoza gives belief a central role in his theory of emotion, although not in a consistent manner (see p.274). He mentions that Spinoza alternates between saying that: (1) an emotion is Joy or Sadness that arises from a certain idea (which Bennett thinks points to a causal relationship between an idea and Joy or Sadness); (2) that an emotion is Joy or Sadness accompanied by a certain idea; and (3) that an emotion involves Love or Hate, which are themselves defined in terms of Joy or Sadness accompanied by a certain idea. He also mentions that Spinoza sometimes first defines an emotion as Joy or Sadness arising from a certain idea and then as Joy or Sadness accompanied by a certain idea, or the other way around. He writes (see p.275): '[…] *I can find no significant pattern in all this. Spinoza was apparently not sensitive, in this context anyway, to the difference between 'caused by x' and 'accompanied by x'.*' And he writes (see p.275): '*I submit that he was groping towards the view that emotions are caused by beliefs, but failed to get clear enough in his mind to express it properly.*'

Bennett suggests that Spinoza failed to properly grasp the causal role of belief in emotion, because he makes a mistake in assigning a causal role to belief in his definitions of Love and Hate (see p.275). He takes Hate to illustrate his point. Spinoza defines Hate as 'Sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause', and Bennett interprets this as 'Sadness caused by the belief that some external thing is the cause of this Sadness'. The mistake that Spinoza makes, according to Bennett, is that Hate is not 'Sadness caused by the belief that someone is the cause of our Sadness', but 'Sadness caused by the belief that someone has done something bad'. Bennett argues that because Spinoza mistakenly says that we must believe that someone has caused our Sadness, he overlooks that our Sadness is caused by our belief that someone has done something bad. But, Bennett concludes (see p.276): '*I still think that Spinoza mainly saw emotions as caused by cognitions. I have merely suggested a reason why he did not say this clearly enough and sometimes lost sight of it completely.*'

I disagree with Bennett's claim that Spinoza does not have a consistent view of the relation between cognitions and emotions. In section 4 I shall show that in IIIP1 and IIIP3, and also in the *Short Treatise*, Spinoza argues that our emotions are caused by our ideas of things, and therefore that when he says that emotions follow from ideas (or when he uses any

of the other expressions), he means that emotions are caused by ideas. I agree that things would have been clearer if Spinoza had simply said that emotions are caused by ideas, rather than that emotions follow from ideas.

I also disagree with Bennett's claim that emotions are primarily caused by *beliefs*. In the following chapter we shall see that in the *Ethics* Spinoza typically gives examples of cases in which Joy or Sadness is caused by a mental image, and that he gives only one clear example of a case in which Joy or Sadness is caused by a belief.

Section 3: The distinction between ideas and emotions

In this section I shall show that Spinoza writes in several passages that our ideas of things and our emotions are different mental states, and that we can have an idea of something without feeling an emotion concerning the thing we perceive, but we cannot feel an emotion without having an idea of something.

In the *Ethics* Spinoza makes the claim that our ideas of things and our emotions are different mental states for the first time in IP31D. Here he writes: '*By intellect (as is known through itself) we understand not absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, which mode differs from the others, such as desire, love, etc.* […]'. It seems likely that by 'the intellect' Spinoza here not only means our adequate ideas but also our inadequate ideas. If so, then he says here that our adequate and inadequate ideas of things form one mode of thinking, and that our emotions form another mode of thinking. In other words, our ideas of things form one kind of mental states, and our emotions form another kind of mental states. Our ideas of things and our emotions, then, are different kinds of mental states. We shall see that Spinoza uses the expression 'the other modes of thinking', and very similar expressions, to refer to our emotions in other passages, too.

In IIA3 Spinoza not only repeats that our ideas of things and our emotions are different kinds of mental states, but he now also claims that we can have an idea of something without feeling an emotion regarding that thing, but we cannot feel an emotion without having an idea of something. He writes: '*There are no modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or whatever is designated by the word affects of the mind, unless there is in that same Individual the idea of the thing loved, desired, etc. But there can be an idea, even though there is no other mode of thinking.*' In IIA3 Spinoza clearly mentions two kinds of mental states, namely our ideas of things, for example, our idea of something we love or desire, and our emotions, for example, Love and Desire. As in IP31D, he calls our emotions here 'other modes of thinking', that is, a kind of mental state that differs from our ideas of things. Spinoza, thus,

claims in IIA3 that if a person has an emotion, then he must also have an idea of something. The opposite does not hold; a person does not necessarily feel an emotion whenever he has an idea of something. We can, for example, have an idea of something without loving or hating it, but we cannot feel the emotion of Love or Hate without having an idea of something. Notice that Spinoza does not specify of what kind of idea he is talking, which suggests that his point applies to both adequate and inadequate ideas.

In IIP11 Spinoza also mentions that our ideas of things and our emotions are different kinds of mental states and that we can have an idea of something without feeling an emotion, but we cannot feel an emotion without having an idea of something. IIP11, however, is a rather cryptic proposition:

> The first thing that constitutes the actual being of a human Mind is nothing but the idea of a singular thing which actually exists. Dem.: The essence of man (by IIP10C) is constituted by certain modes of God's attributes, viz. (by IIA2) by modes of thinking, of all of which (by IIA3) the idea [of a singular thing which actually exists. CR] is prior in nature, and when it is given, the other modes (to which the idea [of a singular thing which actually exists. CR] is prior in nature) must be in the same individual (by IIA3). And therefore an idea [of a singular thing which actually exists. CR] is the first thing that constitutes the being of a human Mind.

Notice how Spinoza makes a distinction between, on the one hand, the idea (of a singular thing that actually exists) and, on the other hand, the other modes of thinking. Given that in IP31D and in IIA3 Spinoza uses the term 'the other modes of thinking' to refer to the emotions, it is quite likely that here, in IIP11, he uses this term with the same meaning. Notice as well that Spinoza writes that the idea (of a singular things that actually exists) is prior to the other modes of thinking, and that the other modes of thinking must be in the same individual as the one that is constituted by the idea (of a singular thing that actually exists). If Spinoza indeed uses the term 'the other modes of thinking' to refer to the emotions, then this means that the idea (of a singular thing that actually exists) is prior to the emotions, and that the emotions must be in the same individual as the one that is constituted by the idea (of a singular thing that actually exists). Given that in IIA3 Spinoza writes that we can have an idea without having an emotion but not an emotion without an idea, as well as that an emotion must be in the same individual as the one who has an idea, it is highly likely that in IIP11 Spinoza uses the term 'an idea (of a singular thing that actually exists)' to refer to the human intellect, that is, to our adequate and inadequate ideas. In IIP11, then, Spinoza seems to say that: (1) our intellect is different from our emotions; (2) our intellect is prior to our emotions;

(3) our intellect is therefore the first thing that constitutes our mind and our emotions the second thing that constitutes our mind; and (4) our intellect is an idea of an actually existing singular thing (namely our body). Although Spinoza defines the human intellect as the idea of an actually existing singular thing (namely the human body) and distinguishes the intellect from the emotions, he does not mean to imply that emotions are not ideas of the human body, which, as we shall see in chapter 5, they are.

In the Second Appendix to the *Short Treatise* (I/118/2, p.153) we find a passages that very much resembles IIP11:

> It should also be noted that all the remaining modes, such as Love, Desire, and Joy, have their origin in this first immediate mode, so that if it did not precede them, there could be no Love, Desire, etc. […] And consequently there can be, in the thinking attribute, no other mode which would belong to the essence of the soul of each thing, except the Idea [i.e., the first immediate mode, CR], which must be of such a thing as really existing, and which must exist in the thinking attribute. For such an Idea [i.e., the first immediate mode, CR] brings with it the remaining modes of Love, Desire, etc.

In a footnote to this passage of the *Short Treatise* Spinoza explains that by the expression 'the most immediate mode of the attribute' he means that mode which, in order to exist, needs no other mode in the same attribute. Notice that Spinoza here makes a distinction between, on the one hand, the idea (of a really existing thing) and, on the other hand, the remaining modes. It is clear that he uses the term 'the remaining modes' to refer to the emotions, because he gives Love and Desire as examples. Clearly, then, Spinoza uses the term 'the idea (of a really existing thing)' to refer to the human intellect, and claims that the intellect is the first immediate mode, that it precedes the emotions, and that it does not need emotions in order to exist, which implies that emotions are different from the intellect and that they do need the intellect in order to exist.

Similarly, in the *Treatise on the Intellect* (II/40/1, p.44) Spinoza writes: *'I shall not linger over the other things that are referred to thought, such as love, joy, etc. For they contribute nothing to our present purpose, nor can they be perceived unless the intellect is perceived. For if perception is altogether taken away, then all these are taken away.'* As in IP30, Spinoza here probably uses the term 'the intellect' to refer to both our adequate and inadequate ideas of things; we perceive something when we have an adequate or inadequate idea of this thing. Notice that he calls the emotions 'the other things that are referred to thought', that is, the other kind of mental states, and that the writes that we cannot have an emotion if we do not perceive something, that is, if we do not have an idea of something.

The following table summarises the expressions that Spinoza uses in the passages we have examined to refer to our ideas of things and to our emotions.

Passage	**Ideas of things**	**Emotions**
IP31D	Intellect	the other modes of thinking which differ from the intellect
IIA3	idea of something	other mode of thinking
IIP11	the first thing that constitutes the human mind = the idea (of a singular thing which actually exists)	the other modes (of thinking)
KV (I/118/2)	the first immediate mode = the idea (of such a thing as really existing	the remaining modes, other modes
TdIE (II/40/1)	intellect, perception	the other things that are referred to thought

One might object that the passage from the *Short Treatise* and the passage from the *Treatise on the Intellect* ought not to be used in defending the interpretation according to which Spinoza thinks that ideas and emotions constitute two different kinds of mental states in the *Ethics* because the theory of the *Short Treatise* and the *Treatise on the Intellect* differs on some important points from the theory of the *Ethics*. In reply to this objection I will say that IP31D, IIA3 and IIP11 form sufficient textual evidence in favour of the interpretation according to which Spinoza thinks that ideas and emotions constitute two different kinds of mental states in the *Ethics*, and that the passage from the *Short Treatise* and the passage from the *Treatise on the Intellect* merely show that this was Spinoza's position all along.

Now, Spinoza's claim that our ideas of things and our emotions are different kinds of mental states must imply that emotions are non-cognitive mental states. Adequate and inadequate ideas only constitute one category of mental states because they represent things to us, and therefore emotions can only form another category of mental states if they do not represent things to us.

When I say that emotions are non-cognitive mental states, I do not wish to deny that emotions are ideas of the human body. My point is that, although our emotions are, metaphysically speaking, ideas of our body, phenomenally speaking, they do not represent anything to us. We perceive something by virtue of having an idea of that thing, but we perceive nothing by virtue of having an emotion, although we must perceive something in order to feel an emotion.

Besides the textual evidence in favour of the interpretation according to which Spinoza holds that cognitions and emotions constitute two different kinds of mental states there is also a speculative argument in favour of this interpretation, which is the following. We have seen in the previous chapter that at least our inadequate ideas of things correspond to states of our brain. In chapter 5 I shall argue that our emotions of Joy and Sadness qua mental states correspond to an increase or decrease in our bodily health due to a beneficial or detrimental affection of our heart and perhaps the organs of our digestive system by the animal spirits. In chapter 7 I shall argue that our emotion of Desire qua mental state corresponds to a determination of our muscles. If this interpretation of Spinoza's view on the bodily nature of our emotions is correct, then our mental images and our emotions correspond to distinct bodily states, and for that reason our mental images and our emotions must constitute distinct mental states.

The scholars who argue that, according to Spinoza, emotions are *not* distinct from cognitions do not mention any of the passages that I have just discussed. As we have seen in section 1 of this chapter, they point to other passages in which Spinoza, according to them, argues that emotions are somehow identical with our ideas of things. I believe to have disproven all the arguments in favour of their interpretation with the exception of one, namely the fact that in IIIAGD Spinoza writes that passions are mental images. In section 5 I shall deal with this final argument in favour of the claim that cognitions and emotions are not distinct kinds of mental states. I shall first show that, according to Spinoza, emotions are caused by cognitions.

Section 4: Emotions are caused by our ideas of things

Spinoza argues that our emotions are caused by our ideas of things in IIIP1 and IIIP3[20]. In order to understand IIIP1 and IIIP3 we first need to look at the three definitions that Spinoza gives at the beginning of the Third Part of the *Ethics*.

Spinoza writes in IIID1: '*I call that cause adequate whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it. But I call it partial, or inadequate, if its effect cannot be clearly understood through it alone.*' Spinoza supposes in this definition that a thing must be understood and explained through its cause, and that a thing can be caused by one other thing or by several other things. From this supposition follows that if a thing is caused by only one

[20] In IIIP2 Spinoza rejects Descartes's thesis that we can, by a free decision of our mind, move our body in the way we want, and he argues that our bodily motions are caused by our Desires insofar as they are states of our body. I think Spinoza should have placed his argument of IIIP2 after his argument of IIIP3, so that the relation between his argument of IIIP1 and his argument of IIIP3 would have been immediately clear.

other thing, then this thing must be understood only through that other thing, and that if a thing is caused by several other things, then this thing must be understood through all those other things taken together, and not through any of those other things taken individually. Spinoza calls a thing that causes an effect alone and without the help of other things 'an adequate cause', and he calls a thing that causes an effect not alone but with the help of other things 'an inadequate cause' or a 'partial cause'. For the sake of symmetry, he might also have called a thing that causes an effect alone and without the help of other things a 'total cause'.

Spinoza writes in IIID2: '*I say that we act when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause, i.e. (by D1), when something in us or outside us follows from our nature, which can be clearly and distinctly understood through it alone. On the other hand, I say that we are acted on when something happens in us, or something follows from our nature of which we are only a partial cause.*' In this definition, then, Spinoza says we can be the total cause of things that happen in us or outside us, or we can be the partial cause of things that happen in us or outside us. He does not explain here what he means by the expression 'something that happens in us or outside us', but given that in IIIP1, IIIP2 and IIIP3 he argues that we can be the adequate or inadequate cause of our mental states and of our bodily movements, it is quite clear that by the expression 'things that happen in us' he means our mental states and that by the expression 'things that happen outside us' he means our bodily movements. Because in this chapter we are discussing emotions insofar as they are mental states, I shall focus on Spinoza's claim that we can be the adequate or inadequate cause of our mental states, and ignore here his claim that we can be the adequate or inadequate cause of our bodily movements.

So, in IIID2 Spinoza says that we act when we are the total cause of our mental states, and that we are acted on when we are the partial cause of our mental states. His point is that we cause some of our mental states alone and some of our mental states because other things act on us. He is not saying that we are passive when we are the partial cause of our mental states. That would be a contradiction. When we cause our mental state, then, of course, we are doing something, whether we are the complete or partial cause of our mental state. His point, rather, is that we are not *fully* active when we are the partial cause of our mental state given that, then, we are only causing our mental state because something has acted on us.

In IIID3, finally, Spinoza writes: '[…] *Therefore, if we can be the adequate cause of any of these affections I understand by the Affect an action; otherwise, a passion*[21].' Emotions, Spinoza tells us here, are one kind of mental states that we cause either independently or because something else has acted on us. He says that he calls an emotion of which we are the total, or adequate, cause 'an action', and an emotion of which we are a partial, or inadequate, cause 'a passion'. Emotions, it is worth repeating, are things that we produce.

IIID3 raises two questions. Question 1: How do we produce emotions? Question 2: What has acted on us when we are the partial cause of our emotion? These two questions are answered in IIIP1 and IIIP3. IIIP1 is the more difficult proposition:

> Our Mind does certain things [acts] and undergoes other things, viz. insofar as it has adequate ideas, it necessarily does certain things, and insofar as it has inadequate ideas, it necessarily undergoes other things. Dem.: […] Next, from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (IP36), of which effect God is the adequate cause (see D1), not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered to be affected by that given idea (see IIP9). But if God, insofar as he is affected by an idea that is adequate in someone's Mind, is the cause of an effect, that same Mind is the effect's adequate cause (by IIP11C). Therefore, our Mind (by D2), insofar as it has adequate ideas, necessarily does certain things [acts]. This was the first to be proven. Next, if something necessarily follows from an idea that is adequate in God, not insofar as he has in himself the Mind of one man only, but insofar as he has in himself the minds of other things together with the Mind of that man, that man's Mind (by the same IIP11C) is not its adequate cause but its partial cause. Hence (by D2), insofar as the Mind has inadequate ideas, it necessarily undergoes certain things. This was the second point. Therefore, our Mind, etc., q.e.d. Cor.: From this it follows that the Mind is more liable to passions the more it has inadequate ideas, and conversely, is more active the more it has inadequate ideas.

Spinoza is saying that the human mind causes emotions insofar as it has adequate ideas and insofar as it has inadequate ideas. The 'things that the mind does insofar as it has adequate ideas' are the emotions that the mind causes insofar as it has adequate ideas, and the 'things

[21] I have left out the phrase '*By affect I understand affections of the Body by which the Body's power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections.*', because I shall discuss emotion qua bodily state in chapter 5. I will make two further remarks on this definition: (1) I would say that our inadequate and adequate ideas of things, just like our passive and active emotions, might be called 'actions' and 'passions', too, because the mind causes inadequate ideas when it is acted on by the objects of sense, while it causes its adequate ideas when it is not acted on by the objects of sense. Spinoza, however, does not call our ideas of things 'actions or passions of the mind'; (2) The phrase 'if we can be the adequate cause of any of these affections' might suggest that Spinoza is not convinced that we can be the adequate cause of our emotions. I therefore say that Spinoza *suggests* that we can be the adequate cause of our emotions. It seems clear, however, that Spinoza's entire moral theory is based on the belief that we can be the adequate ideas of our emotions.

that the mind undergoes insofar as it has inadequate ideas' are the emotions that the mind causes insofar as it has inadequate ideas. (It is, perhaps, a little awkward to say that the mind 'does' certain emotions, and it is a little confusing to say that the mind undergoes the emotions that it produces, but let us not argue over that.)

What does it mean to say that the mind causes emotions insofar as it has adequate and inadequate ideas? Given that Spinoza writes that an effect must follow from any given idea, this can only mean that our ideas cause our emotions. Our emotions cannot be effects of our ideas, and thus follow from our ideas, if our ideas do not cause our emotions.

We now understand why Spinoza says in IIID3 that we are the adequate cause of some emotions, which he calls 'actions', and the inadequate cause of other emotions, which he calls 'passions'. We are the adequate cause of the emotions that are caused by our clear and distinct ideas because we are the adequate cause of our clear and distinct ideas. We are the inadequate cause of the emotions that are caused by our obscure and confused ideas because we are the inadequate cause of our obscure and confused ideas.

The fact that our passions are caused by our inadequate ideas explains why we are more liable to passions the more we have inadequate ideas. Spinoza says that we are more active the more we have adequate ideas, but this must surely mean that we have more actions the more we have adequate ideas. If we have the more passions the more we have inadequate ideas because our passions are caused by our inadequate ideas, and if our actions are caused by our adequate ideas, then why would we not have the more actions the more we have adequate ideas?

Spinoza says exactly the same thing in IIIP3 as in IIIP1, but in a more straightforward and comprehensible manner:

> The actions of the Mind arise from adequate ideas alone; the passions depend on inadequate ideas alone. Dem.: The first thing that constitutes the essence of the Mind is nothing but the idea of an actually existing Body (by IIP11 and P13); this idea (by IIP15) is composed of many others, of which some are adequate (IIP38C), and others inadequate (by IIP29C). Therefore, whatever follows from the nature of the Mind and has the Mind as its proximate cause, through which it must be understood, must necessarily follow from an adequate idea or an inadequate one. But insofar as the Mind has inadequate ideas (by P1), it is necessarily acted on. Therefore, the actions of the Mind follow from adequate ideas alone; hence, the Mind is acted on only because it has inadequate ideas.

In IIIP3, then, Spinoza makes absolutely clear that our actions (i.e., our active emotions) are caused by our adequate ideas and our passions by our inadequate ideas. Literally, he says that

our emotions 'arise from', 'depend on', or 'follow from' our ideas of things, but this clearly means that our emotions are caused by our ideas of things, because in IIIP1 we have seen that our emotions are effects of our ideas of things, and here we see that the human mind, insofar as it has ideas of things, is the proximate cause of its emotions. So, when Spinoza writes that our emotions 'depend on', 'arise from', or 'follow from' our ideas of things, he means that our emotions are caused by our ideas of things. In other passages of the *Ethics* Spinoza uses similar expressions to point out the causal relation between our ideas of things and our emotions. He writes, for example, that 'emotions are born of ideas of things', that 'ideas of things produce emotions', and that 'ideas of things affect us with emotions'[22],[23].

We have seen that already in the *Treatise on the Intellect* and in the *Short Treatise* Spinoza claims that our ideas of things and our emotions are different mental states, and that we can have an idea of something without feeling an emotion but not *vice versa*. In the *Treatise on the Intellect* Spinoza does not write that our emotions are caused by our ideas of things, but in the *Short Treatise* (I/54/3, p.96) he quite clearly does. In the first chapter of the Second Part of the *Short Treatise* he writes:

> To begin our discussion of the modes of which man consists, we shall say: 1. What they are, 2. What their effects are, and 3. What their cause is. Regarding the first, let us begin with those which are first known to us, viz. certain perceptions, or the consciousness, of the knowledge of ourselves and of those things that are outside us.

'Knowledge', according to Spinoza, is the mode of thinking of which we are first aware[24]. It concerns, he says, the knowledge of ourselves and of things around us. In other words, the kind of mental states of which we are first aware consists in our ideas. In the second chapter Spinoza mentions the effects of our ideas:

> We shall now come to treat of the effects of the different kinds of knowledge of which we have spoken in the preceding chapter […] From the first, we say, come all the passions which are contrary to good reason; from the second, the good Desires; and from the third, true and genuine Love, with all that

[22] It is strange that at the end of IIIP3 Spinoza says that the mind is only acted on because it has inadequate ideas, rather than that 'the passions of the mind follow from inadequate ideas alone', which is, I think, what he really means to say.

[23] In the previous chapter I have discussed passages that suggest that our adequate ideas do not correspond to states of our body. IIIP3 seems to contradict this claim, because it says that the inadequate and adequate ideas that cause emotions compose the idea of an actually existing body, which idea is the first thing that constitutes the human mind. This seems to mean that our adequate ideas, too, are mental states that correspond to our body.

[24] This seems to corroborate my interpretation of IIP11 according to which Spinoza there claims that that our intellect (i.e., our adequate and inadequate ideas) is the first thing that constitutes our mind and our emotions are the second thing that constitutes our mind.

> comes of that. So we maintain that knowledge is the proximate cause of all the 'Passions' of the Soul. For we consider it quite impossible that if someone neither perceives or knows in any of the preceding ways, he should be able to be moved to love, or Desire, or any other modes of will.[25]

Knowledge, then, Spinoza claims, is the proximate cause of our emotions. Our passions are caused by our knowledge of the first kind, our 'good desires' are caused our knowledge of the second kind, and our 'true and genuine love' is caused by our knowledge of the third kind.

In the passage just cited from the *Short Treatise* Spinoza connects the claim that we cannot feel an emotion without having an idea of something with the claim that every emotion is caused by our idea of something. He seems to be saying that our ideas of things are the cause of our emotions, because we cannot feel an emotion without having an idea of something. The order of this reasoning seems to be reversed; that an emotion cannot exist without an idea of something does not imply that an emotion is caused by an idea of something. What Spinoza means, I think, is that we cannot feel an emotion without having an idea of something, because our emotions are caused by our ideas of things. If our emotions are caused by our ideas of things, then, of course, we cannot feel an emotion without having an idea of something, because an effect cannot exist without its cause. In the passages discussed in section 3 of this chapter (IIA3, IIIP11, TdIE II/40/1 and KV I/118/2) Spinoza merely claims that we cannot feel an emotion without having an idea of something, but he does not argue for this claim. In IIA3 He even simply formulates it as an axiom. It would have been helpful if Spinoza had explained in those passages that we cannot feel an emotion without having an idea of something because every emotion is caused by our idea of something.

When Spinoza says that emotions are caused by our ideas of things, he means, of course, that our emotions *insofar as they are states of our mind* are caused by our ideas of things. Our ideas of things do not cause our emotions *insofar as they are states of our body*. We shall answer the question as to what causes our emotions insofar as they are states of our body in chapter 5.

[25] Likewise, Spinoza writes further on in the *Short Treatise* (I/61/7, p.104): '[…] *we have already indicated how the soul's emotions, its passions and actions, arise from perception. We have divided perception into four kinds: report alone, experience, belief, and clear knowledge. And since we have now seen the effects of all of these, it is evident that the fourth, clear knowledge, is the most perfect of all.*' Clearly, then, when Spinoza says that emotion arises from perception, he means that emotion is caused by perception.

Spinoza's thesis that we cannot feel an emotion without having an idea of something seems to run counter to experience

The claim that we cannot feel an emotion without having an idea of something is not as self-evident as Spinoza presents it. It is, of course, self-evident that we cannot feel an emotion concerning something without having an idea of that thing. We cannot, for example, love a certain thing without having an idea of that thing, or desire to pursue or avoid a certain thing without having an idea of that thing. However, it seems that we quite often feel the emotions of Joy and Sadness without having an idea of anything in particular. Sometimes we are just joyful or sad without knowing why. It is deceiving that in IIA3 Spinoza gives Love and Desire as examples of emotions, rather than Joy, Sadness and Desire, which are, according to himself, the only primary emotions.

In article 94 of *The Passions of the Soul* Descartes seems to recognise that we sometimes just feel joyful or sad without having an idea of something. His explanation of this phenomenon is that in those cases the body is in good health or in bad health, and that, even though we are not thinking of something, this healthy or unhealthy disposition of the body causes Joy or Sadness in our soul:

> Thus, when we are in good health and things are calmer than usual, we feel in ourselves a cheerfulness which results not from any operation of the understanding but solely from impressions formed in the brain by the movements of the spirits. And we feel sad in the same way when our body is indisposed even though we do not know that it is. [Translation by Robert Stoothoff]

This explanation, however, is unacceptable to Spinoza who denies that mental states can be caused by bodily states, and who argues that every mental state must be caused by a mental state. Joy and Sadness cannot be caused by the body, but they must be caused by some mental state.

This, at least, is Spinoza's thesis in the *Ethics*; it may not be his thesis in the *Short Treatise*. Chapter 19 of the *Short Treatise* is quite confusing because in it Spinoza seems at times to affirm and at other times to deny that the human mind and the human body interact with each other. What is of interest to our present discussion is that in one of the passages where he seems to affirm mind-body interaction, he recognises the possibility of feeling an emotion without having an idea of something. Here (TdIE, I/93/19, p.133) he writes:

> And because these spirits can also be moved by the body, and so determined [in their direction], it can often happen that having their motion in one direction because of the body, and in another because of

> the soul, they bring about those anxieties which we often perceive in ourselves, without knowing the reasons why we have them. For otherwise the reasons are usually well known to us.

The possibility of feeling emotions without having ideas is definitely ruled out in the *Ethics*, because there Spinoza completely rejects mind-body interaction. Although I share Spinoza's criticism of Descartes's explanation of objectless Joy and Sadness, his claim that we cannot have any emotion without having an idea of something runs counter to my experience.

Section 5: Why does Spinoza sometimes call passions mental images?

In the first section of this chapter I have presented the arguments given by scholars in favour of the interpretation according to which Spinoza holds that cognitions and emotions do not constitute two distinct kinds of mental states. I have there rejected all these arguments but one, which is that Spinoza writes in the appendix of the Third *Ethics* called 'General Definition of the Emotions' that passions are confused ideas:

> An affect that is called a passion of the mind is a confused idea, by which the mind affirms of its body, or of some part of its body, a greater or lesser force of existing than before, and by which, when it is given, the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another.

We have seen that LeBuffe claims that this means that passions are ideas of the imagination.

It might be objected that the statement that passions are confused ideas does not necessarily mean that they are mental images. Although all mental images are confused ideas, not all confused ideas are mental images. Descartes calls the sensations of hunger, thirst, pleasure, and pain 'confused ideas' or 'confused thoughts' on very many occasions. He clearly does not mean by this that internal sensations are mental images. Spinoza refers to this position of Descartes when he writes in P21 of his *Exposition of Descartes's Principles of Philosophy* (I/149/15, p.261): '*Now we perceive clearly and distinctly (as everyone finds in himself, insofar as he thinks) that extended substance is a sufficient cause of producing in us pleasure, pain and similar ideas,* or *sensations.*' And a little further (I/180/2, p.262): '*Next, we observe that among our sensations, which must be produced in us by extended substance (as we have now demonstrated) there is a great difference, viz. when I say that I sense,* or *see, a tree, and when I say that I am thirsty or in pain.*' The point is clearly that, external sensations are cognitive mental states, that is, they represent some external object, but internal

sensations are non-cognitive mental states. It might be suggested that emotions are confused ideas in the same sense as internal sensations are confused ideas.

However, I agree with LeBuffe that in IIIAGD Spinoza means to say that passions are mental images, because a number of passages later on in the *Ethics* confirm this reading. In IVP9D Spinoza writes clearly that an emotion is a mental image: '*An imagination is an idea by which the Mind considers a thing as present (see its definition in IIP17S), which, nevertheless indicates the constitution of the human Body more than the nature of the external things (by IIP16C2). Ad affect, therefore (by the general definition of the Affects), is an imagination, insofar as [the affect] indicates the constitution of the body.*' In IVP66S he even writes that an emotion is an opinion: '*If these things are compared with those we have shown in this Part up to P18, concerning the powers of the affects, we shall easily see what the difference is between a man who is led only by an affect,* or *by opinion, and one who is led by reason.'* In VP11 he writes that a mental image is an emotion: '*As an image is related to more things, the more frequent it is, or the more often it flourishes, and the more it engages the Mind. Dem.: For as an image,* or *affect, is related to more things, there are more causes by which it can be aroused and encouraged, all of which the Mind (by Hypothesis) considers together with the affect.'* And in VP34D, finally, he writes that a mental image is an emotion: '*An imagination is an idea by which the Mind considers a thing as present (see its Def. in IIP17S), which nevertheless indicates the present constitution of the human Body more than the nature of the external thing (by IIP16C2). An imagination, then, is an affect (by the gen. Def. Aff.), insofar as it indicates the present constitution of the Body.*'

These passages provide a good argument in favour of the cognitivist interpretation of emotions. (To be more precise: they provide a good argument in favour of the cognitivist interpretation of passions; they do not provide a good argument for the cognitivist interpretation of active emotions.) There are only two options to save Spinoza's philosophy from a contradiction: (1) We do not take literally the passages in which Spinoza makes a distinction between our ideas of things and our emotions, and we do not take literally the passages in which he argues that our ideas of things cause our emotions; (2) We do not take literally the passages in which Spinoza says that emotions (or at least passions) are mental images. I do not see any way to justify choosing the first option, but I do have an argument for choosing the second option: Given that the passions of Joy and Sadness are always accompanied by a mental image because they are always caused by a mental image, it is sometimes unnecessary and inconvenient to make the distinction between the passion of Joy or Sadness and the mental image by which it is caused. Spinoza makes the distinction

between ideas and emotions in the Third Part of the *Ethics*, the part in which he analyses emotion. If ideas are distinct from emotions, then, of course, Spinoza cannot blur their distinction in *this* part, and so he does not, except for at the very end, in IIIAGD. The discussion of morality in the Fourth and Fifth Part of the *Ethics*, however, does not always require the distinction between ideas and emotions, and, in fact, is even facilitated by their identification. Spinoza argues there that we are able to moderate our passions by correcting the inadequate ideas that cause passions. The remedy for inadequate ideas is thus at the same time a remedy for passions, and therefore Spinoza, I suggest, sometimes blurs the distinction between inadequate ideas and the passions that they cause. Although IIIAGD belongs to the Third Part of the *Ethics*, it really serves more as an introduction to the Fourth Part than as a conclusion to the Third Part.

This argument for not taking literally the passages in which Spinoza identifies ideas and emotions (or to be more precise, passions and mental images) is supported by the following passage from the *Short Treatise* (I/99/17, p.138) where Spinoza discusses the power reason has over opinions and passions:

> We can easily grasp this, if we take into consideration the causes we have given of opinions, which we said were the causes of all the passions. These [causes] we said, are either report or experience. And because whatever we find in ourselves has more power over us than anything which comes from outside, it follows that Reason can be a cause of the destruction of those opinions[a] which we have only from report (because Reason has not come to us from outside), but not [a cause of destruction] of those which we have through experience.

And in footnote 'a' he writes:

> It will be the same whether we use the word *opinion* here, or *passion.* And so it is clear that we cannot conquer by Reason those which arise in us through experience; for these are nothing else in us but an enjoyment of, or immediate union with, something we judge to be good, and though Reason shows us something that is better, it does not make us enjoy it.

Reason, Spinoza says, may take away the opinions that we have formed on the basis of what we have heard or read, and, at the same time, the passions that are caused by these opinions. Reason has the power to destroy such opinions, or, what comes down to the same thing, to destroy passions caused by such opinions. The distinction between inadequate ideas and passions is here not very relevant.

Chapter 4: The mental nature of Joy and Sadness

In the previous chapter we have seen that our emotions qua mental states are caused by our inadequate and adequate ideas of things. In this chapter I discuss a great number of topics that relate to the mental nature of the emotions of Joy and Sadness. In the first section I discuss Spinoza's claim that Joy, Sadness and Desire are the only emotions that we have, and that all the so-called 'other emotions' are just one of these emotions but given another name. In the second section I discuss Spinoza's claim that Joy and Sadness are not only caused by our ideas of present things, but also by our ideas of past and future things. In the third section I discuss Spinoza's definitions of the secondary emotions of Love & Hate, Gladness & Remorse, and Hope & Fear. In the fourth section I discuss Spinoza's claim that our idea of something may accidentally cause Joy or Sadness when we associate our idea of that thing with an idea of another thing that already caused Joy or Sadness. In the fifth section I show that, according to Spinoza, our idea of something may indirectly cause Joy or Sadness when we have the idea that that thing acts in a positive or negative manner on another thing our idea of which already caused Joy or Sadness. In the sixth section I discuss Spinoza's thesis that we hope that the person we love will be joyful and that the person we hate sad. In the seventh section, finally, I discuss Spinoza's definitions of several important secondary emotions that are kinds of Joy and Sadness, and that were not mentioned in earlier paragraphs. In chapter 6 I discuss the nature of Pleasure, Pain, Cheerfulness and Melancholy, which, according to Spinoza, are kinds of Joy and Sadness.

Spinoza holds that most of our emotions of Joy and Sadness are passions. Most of the time, we feel joyful or sad because we imagine something. We have seen that the term 'mental image' refers to sense perceptions and recollections of sense perceptions, and that the verb 'to imagine' refers both to having a mental image and to having an opinion (i.e., a belief based on random experience or report). Whenever Spinoza writes that we feel joyful or sad because we have a 'mental image of something' or because we 'imagine something', I shall ask the question whether this means that we feel joyful or sad because we have a sense perception of something, or because we have a recollection of something, or because we have the belief that something is the case. Most of the time I shall formulate this question as follows: Do we, in this case, feel joyful or sad because we see something, because we visualise something, or because we believe something?

Section 1: Joy, Sadness and Desire are the only primary emotions

Like Descartes, Spinoza believes that we have only a few emotions and that all the so-called 'other emotions' are merely kinds of these emotions. Descartes calls these emotions 'the primitive emotions'. Spinoza normally calls them 'the primary emotions', although in IIIAD4 he calls them the '*the primitive,* or *the primary, emotions*'. In what follows I shall call the emotions that, according to Spinoza, are not primary emotions 'the secondary emotions', even though Spinoza himself does not use this term.

Whereas Descartes thinks that we have six primary emotions, namely Wonder, Love, Hatred, Desire, Joy and Sadness, Spinoza thinks that there are only three primary emotions, namely Joy, Sadness and Desire (*Laetitia*, *Tristitia* and *Cupiditas*). Spinoza, then, denies that Wonder, Love and Hate are primary emotions. He holds that Wonder is not an emotion at all but merely a state of confusion, and that Love and Hate are kinds of Joy and Sadness.

Spinoza writes in IIIP11S: '[…] *apart from these three* [Joy, Sadness and Desire. CR] *I do not acknowledge any other primary affect. For I shall show in what follows that the rest arise from these three.*' He writes in IIIAD4: '*So as I pointed out in P11S, I recognize only three primitive,* or *primary, affects: Joy, Sadness and Desire. I have spoken of Wonder only because it has become customary for some to indicate the affects derived from these three by other names when they are related to objects we wonder at.*' And in IIIAD48 he writes: '*Furthermore, from the definitions of the affects which we have explained it is clear that they all arise from Desire, Joy, or Sadness – or rather, that they are nothing but these three, each one generally being called by a different name on account of its varying relations and extrinsic denominations*.' The last phrase makes clear that when Spinoza says that the secondary emotions 'derive from', or 'arise from', the primary emotions, he does not mean that the secondary emotions are caused by the primary emotions, but that the secondary emotions are the primary emotions given another name. In a very strict sense, then, we may say that Joy, Sadness and Desire are our only emotions, namely in the sense that all the secondary emotions are but one of these three emotions given another name.

Spinoza writes that we give the primary emotions different names because we consider their relations and extrinsic denominations. He does not tell us explicitly what he means by 'the relations and extrinsic denominations' of Joy, Sadness and Desire, the consideration of which motivates us to give them different names. However, when we study his definitions of secondary emotions, we see that he gives the emotions of Joy and Sadness other names depending on the answer to the question: 'Why do we feel joyful or sad?', and that he gives the emotion of Desire other names depending on the answer to the question:

'What do we desire?'. So, for example, when we feel sad because we imagine that our friend is sad, then Spinoza calls our Sadness 'Compassion', but when we feel sad because we imagine that our enemy is joyful, then he calls our Sadness 'Envy'. To feel the emotion of Compassion simply is to feel the emotion of Sadness because we have the idea that someone we love is sad, and to feel the emotion of Envy simply is to feel the emotion of Sadness because we have the idea that someone we hate is joyful. When, to give another example, we desire to benefit someone who has benefited us, then Spinoza calls our Desire 'Gratitude', but when we desire to hurt someone who has hurt us, then he calls our Desire 'Vengeance'. To feel the emotion of Gratitude simply is to feel the Desire to benefit someone who has benefited us, and to feel the emotion of Vengeance simply is to feel the Desire to hurt someone who has hurt us. There is thus only a conceptual distinction between, for example, the primary emotion of Sadness and the secondary emotion of Compassion, or between the primary emotion of Desire and the secondary emotion of Vengeance.

Recall from the previous chapter that Spinoza claims that our emotions are caused by our ideas of things and that we, therefore, never feel an emotion without having an idea of something. We thus never experience the emotions of Joy, Sadness and Desire without having an idea of something. We are always joyful or sad because we have an idea of something, and we always desire something of which we have an idea.

There is little that can be said to clarify the nature of Joy and Sadness qua mental states. Everyone knows what it feels like to be joyful or sad. Other translations of the words '*laetitia*' and '*tristitia*' have been offered[26], but I think that 'Joy' and 'Sadness' are perfect translations. In everyday language we often use the words 'happy' and 'unhappy' to refer to the emotions that Spinoza calls '*laetitia*' and '*tristitia*'. However, in philosophical discourse 'happiness' is a loaded term, often used to refer to living a wise and successful life, and therefore 'happy' and 'unhappy' are not well suited as translations of '*laetitia*' and '*tristitia*'. When Spinoza says that a person is '*laetus*' or '*tristis*' he simply means that the person is happy or unhappy at the moment, and not that the person is living a successful or unsuccessful life.

[26] In chapter 6 I discuss alternative translations of *Laetitia, Tristitia, Titillatio, Dolor, Hilaritas* and *Melancolia*.

Section 2: Joy and Sadness are caused by our ideas of present, past, and future things.

Spinoza observes in IIIP18 that our emotions of Joy and Sadness are not only caused by our ideas of present things, but also by our ideas of past and future things. Although he does not write this explicitly, the fact that we are sometimes joyful or sad because we have an idea of a past thing or because we have an idea of a future thing proves quite clearly that the emotions of Joy and Sadness are caused by our ideas of external things and not by external things themselves, because the things of the past and the future exist but in our mind. Spinoza writes in IIIP18:

> Man is affected with the same affect of Joy or Sadness from the image of a past or future thing as from the image of a present thing. Dem.: So long as a man is affected by the image of a thing, he will regard the thing as present, even if it does not exist (by IIP17 and P17C); he imagines it as past or future only insofar as its image is joined to the image of a past or future time (see IIP44S). So the image of a thing, considered only in itself, is the same, whether it is related to time past or future, or to the present, […] And so, the affect of Joy or Sadness is the same, whether the image is of a thing past or future, or of a present thing, q.e.d.

Spinoza, then, tells us that there is no difference between the Joy and the Sadness that we feel because we have an idea of a present thing, the Joy and the Sadness that we feel because we have an idea of a past thing, and the Joy and the Sadness that we feel because we have an idea of a future thing. In the demonstration of IIIP18 Spinoza gives a psychophysical explanation of why they do not differ. The psychological aspect of Spinoza's psychophysical explanation is quite simple. The emotions of Joy and Sadness remain the same whether they are caused by our idea of a past, present or future thing, because our idea of something is the same whether we imagine the thing as past, present or future. All our ideas, Spinoza says, represent their objects as actually existing. We only imagine a thing as past or future, because our idea of it is joined to the idea that we have of the past time or of the future time.

Notice that in IIIP18 Spinoza calls our ideas of past, present and future things 'images'. It is quite clear that Spinoza uses the word 'image' here in the sense of 'mental image'. This is important to notice because Spinoza officially defines the word 'image' as the affection of our brain that corresponds to our mental image. Here, in IIIP18, and in many other passages, Spinoza quite clearly uses the word 'image' to refer to an idea that corresponds to an affection of our brain, that is, to refer to a mental image of something.

It seems that mental images may cause in us Joy or Sadness, whether we believe that they accurately represent reality or not. Watching a comedy, for example, makes us feel joyful

and watching a tragedy makes us feel sad, even though we know fully well that they are mere fictional stories. It certainly does not seem to matter whether our belief that our mental image accurately represents reality is true or false. When, for example, we believe that a friend lies seriously injured in the hospital, because he just told us so over the telephone, then we feel sad, even if our friend is pulling off a bad joke.

Section 3: Love & Hate, Gladness & Regret, and Hope & Fear

The discussion of IIIP18 in the previous section allows us to understand Spinoza's definitions of the secondary emotions of Love & Hate, Gladness & Regret, and Hope & Fear (A*mor & Ira, Gaudium & Conscientiae morsus,* and *Spes & Metus*). Before I discuss Spinoza's definitions of these secondary emotions, I would like to present a simplified version of Spinoza's definitions. This simplified version of Spinoza's definitions says that, the emotions of Love and Hate are 'Joy and Sadness caused by our idea of a present thing', the emotions of Gladness and Remorse are 'Joy and Sadness caused by our idea of a past thing', and the emotions of Hope and Fear are 'Joy and Sadness caused by our idea of a future thing'. In other words, according to this simplified version of Spinoza's definitions, we say that we love or hate something when our idea of a present thing makes us joyful or sad, we say that we are glad or remorseful about something when our idea of a past thing makes us joyful or sad, and we say that we hope or fear something when our idea of a future thing makes us joyful or sad.

Spinoza does not define the secondary emotions of Love & Hate, Gladness & Remorse, and Hope & Fear in this straightforward and symmetric manner. In his definitions of these six secondary emotions, he considers also aspects of these emotions other than the location in time of the thing our idea of which makes us joyful or sad, and these other considerations break up the simplicity and symmetry of the definitions that I have just offered. However, I think that having these simplified definitions in mind helps to understand Spinoza's real definitions of Love & Hate, Gladness & Remorse, and Hope & Fear, which I shall discuss now. In my discussion of these secondary emotions I shall refer to the following three schemes.

Scheme 1: Joy and Sadness caused by our idea of a present thing

Our idea of a present thing causes Joy

1. = We **love** the thing.	(IIIP13s)
2. We hope that it continues to exist and fear that it does not continue to exist.	
- We are joyful when we imagine that it continues to exist.	(IIIP19)
- We are sad when we imagine that it does not continue to exist.	(IIIP19)
3. We (are motivated to) believe that the thing makes us joyful.	(no textual evidence)
4. We hope that other things act in such a way that it continues to exist.	
- We love the things that we imagine preserve it.	(Inferred from IIIP22)
- We hate the things that we imagine destroy it.	(Inferred from IIIP22)

Our idea of a present thing causes Sadness.

1. = We **hate** it.	(IIIP13s)
2. We fear that it continues to exist and we hope that it does not continue to exist.	
- We are joyful when we imagine that it does not continue to exist.	(IIIP20)
- We are sad when we imagine that it continues to exist.	(IIIP20)
3. We (are motivated to) believe that the thing makes us sad.	(no textual evidence)
4. We hope that other things act in such a way that it does not continue to exist.	
- We love the things that we imagine destroy it.	(Inferred from IIIP24)
- We hate the things that we imagine preserve it.	(Inferred from IIIP24)

Scheme 2: Joy and Sadness caused by our idea of a past thing

Our idea of a past thing causes Joy.

1. = We are **glad** that it existed.	(IIIP18)
2. We hope that it will exist again and we fear that it will not exist again.	(Inferred from IIIP18) (IIIP36)
- We are joyful when we imagine that it will exist again.	(Inferred from IIIP19)
- We are sad when we imagine that it will not exist again.	(Inferred from IIIP19)
3. We (are motivated to) believe that it would make us joyful if it existed again.	(no textual evidence)
4. We hope that other things will act in such a way that it will exist again.	
- We love the things that act in such a way that it will exist again	(Inferred from IIIP22)
- We hate the things that act in such a way that it will not exist again.	(Inferred from IIIP22)

Our idea of a past thing causes Sadness.

1. = We are **remorseful** that it existed.	(IIIP18)
2. We fear that it will exist again and we hope that it will not exist again.	(Inferred from IIIP18)
- We are joyful when we imagine that it will not exist again.	(Inferred from IIIP20)
- We are sad when we imagine that it will exist again.	(Inferred from IIIP20)
3. We (are motivated to) believe that it would make us sad if it existed again.	(no textual evidence)
4. We hope that other things will act in such a way that it will not exist again.	
- We love the things that act in such a way that it will not exist again	(Inferred from IIIP24)
- We hate the things that act in such a way that it will exist again.	(Inferred from IIIP24)

Scheme 3: Joy and Sadness caused by the idea of a future thing

Our idea of a future thing causes Joy.	
2. = We **hope** that it will exist. (Hence we fear that it will not exist).	(IIIP18)
- We are joyful when we imagine that it will exist.	(Inferred from IIIP19)
- We are sad when we imagine that it will not exist.	(Inferred from IIIP19)
3. We (are motivated to) believe that it would make us joyful if it existed.	(no textual evidence)
4. We hope that other things will act in such a way that it will exist.	
- We love the things that act in such a way that it will exist.	(Inferred from IIIP22)
- We hate the things that act in such a way that it does not exist.	(Inferred from IIIP22)
Our idea of a future thing causes Sadness.	
2. = We **fear** that it will exist. (Hence we hope that it will not exist).	(IIIP18)
- We are sad when we imagine that it will exist.	(Inferred from IIIP20)
- We are joyful when we imagine that it will not exist.	(Inferred from IIIP20)
3. We (are motivated to) believe that the thing would make us sad if it existed.	
4. We hope that other things will act in such a way that it will not exist.	
- We hate the things that act in such a way that it will exist.	(Inferred from IIIP24)
- We love the things that act in such a way that it will not exist.	(Inferred from IIIP24)

Love and Hate

According to the simplified version of Spinoza's definitions, Love is 'Joy caused by our idea of a present thing', and Hate is 'Sadness caused by our idea of a present thing'. According to these simplified definitions, 'to love or to hate something' simply means 'to be affected with Joy or Sadness by our idea of some present thing'. When, for example, we say that we love our friend and that we hate our enemy, we are simply saying that we feel joyful when we see or visualise our friend and that we feel sad when we see or visualise of our enemy. (See scheme 1.1.)

Spinoza does not define the secondary emotion of Love as 'Joy caused by our idea of a present thing', and he does not define the secondary emotion of Hate as 'Sadness caused by our idea of a present thing'. He, rather, writes in IIIP13S: '*Love is nothing but Joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause, and Hate is nothing but Sadness with the accompanying idea of an external cause.*' In IIIAD6 he writes: '*Love is a Joy, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.*', and in IIIAD7: '*Hate is a Sadness, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.*'

Spinoza's definitions of Love and Hate may be interpreted as saying that our Love or Hate for something consists not only in our emotion of Joy or Sadness but also in our idea of something. On this interpretation, for example, my idea of my friend is part of the Love that I feel for my friend, and my idea of my enemy is part of the Hate that I feel for my enemy.

Spinoza's definitions of Love and Hate may also be interpreted as saying that we love or hate something because we believe (*or* have the opinion) that it makes us joyful or sad. On

this interpretation, for example, I love my friend because I believe that my friend is the cause of my Joy, and I hate my enemy because I believe that my enemy is the cause of my Sadness[27].

I reject both interpretations. My argument for rejecting the interpretation that says that Spinoza considers the idea of something to be part of Love and Hate, is that, as we have seen, he writes in IIIAD4 and IIIAD48 that the secondary emotions just are the primary emotions but given another name. He does not write that the secondary emotions are composed of a primary emotion and our idea of something. He does not, for example, write that Love and Hate are composed of Joy or Sadness together with the idea of an external cause; he merely writes that Love and Hate are Joy and Sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Every secondary emotion that is a kind of Joy or Sadness is in fact accompanied by our idea of something, because Joy and Sadness are always caused by our idea of something. We shall see in a moment that Spinoza defines the secondary emotion of Gladness both as 'Joy accompanied by our idea of a past thing that has turned out better than we had hoped' and as 'Joy arisen from our idea of a past thing that has turned out better than we had hoped'.

I have got two reasons for rejecting the interpretation that says that Spinoza means that we love or hate something because we believe (*or* have the opinion) that it makes us joyful or sad. The first argument is that Spinoza constantly defines emotions that are kinds of Joy or Sadness as 'Joy or Sadness arisen from a certain idea of something', rather than as 'Joy or Sadness arisen from a certain belief that something is the case'. Our ideas of temporal things are simply sense perceptions and recollections of sense perceptions[28]. Our ideas of temporal things are not beliefs (*or* opinions). Although, as we shall see, some of our beliefs also cause Joy or Sadness, especially our sense perceptions and our recollections cause Joy and Sadness, and they do so almost independently from our beliefs. I may see a person or visualise a person and instantly feel joyful or sad, without having to think anything about that person. Our Love and Hate for temporal things, then, are not caused by our beliefs but by our mental images. When my dog sees me, he instantly feels joyful, without having to think that I am the nice man that gives him his food. My dog, for all I know, is only endowed with sense perception and recollection, but not with beliefs. I would like to stress that I am not saying that only

[27] Dennett (1984, p.275) thinks that Love is Joy caused by the belief that something makes us joyful. Davidson (1994, p.99) thinks that the 'idea of the external object' is the belief that an external object is the cause of our Joy. Della Rocca (1996, p.221) thinks that we love something when we believe that it increases our power of acting.

[28] I stress that I am talking about temporal things, because our idea of God is not a mental image, but an adequate idea. The secondary emotion Spinoza calls 'Love of God' is the emotion of Joy caused by the adequate idea of God.

mental images cause Joy and Sadness. Beliefs cause Joy and Sadness, too. However, our mental images may cause Joy or Sadness independently from our thoughts.

My second argument for rejecting the interpretation that says that Spinoza holds that Love and Hate are caused by our belief that something makes us joyful or sad, is that this interpretation seems to consider Love and Hate as primary emotions. It suggests that we first feel joyful or sad, then form the belief that a certain thing has caused our Joy or Sadness, and finally feel Love or Hate for the thing we believe caused our Joy or Sadness. On this interpretation of Spinoza's definitions, Love and Hate are not the same emotions as Joy and Sadness. This clearly contradicts Spinoza's claim that Joy, Sadness and Desire are the only primary emotions.

It is much more coherent to interpret Spinoza's definitions of Love and Hate as saying that our Love or Hate for something is nothing more than our emotion of Joy or Sadness caused by our idea of something. When, for example, I see my parents or when I visualise my parents and feel joyful, then I love my parents. In other words, my Love for my parents consists in the Joy that I feel when I see them or visualise them. I may, of course, believe that my parents make me feel joyful, but I do not love my parents because I believe that they make me joyful. Rather, I believe that my parents make me joyful, because when I see them or visualise them I feel joyful, that is, because I love my parents. My dog, when he sees me, also feels joyful, that is, my dog loves me. He does not, however, first feel joyful, then, form the belief that I make him joyful, and finally begin to love me. My dog's Love for me simply is his emotion of Joy arisen from, and hence accompanied by, his mental image of me.

It seems that our belief that something is the cause of our Joy or Sadness is the consequence, rather than the cause, of our Love and Hate for that thing. (See scheme 1.3.) I must stress, however, that Spinoza does not say that we are motivated to believe that something makes us joyful because our idea of that thing affects us with Joy.

Gladness and Regret

We have seen that Spinoza writes that our ideas of past things only differ from our ideas of present things in that they are joined to the idea of a past time. Considered in themselves, our ideas of past things do not differ from our ideas of present things. The Joy or Sadness that is caused by our idea of a past thing, then, does not differ from the Joy or Sadness that is caused by our idea of a present thing. According to my simplified version of Spinoza's definitions, Gladness simply is Joy caused by our idea of a past thing, and Remorse simply is Sadness caused by our idea of a past thing. In other words, we say that we are glad

about some past thing when our idea of that past thing affects us with Joy, and we say that we are remorseful about some past thing when our idea of that past thing affects us with Sadness. (See scheme 2.1.)

According to the simplified version of Spinoza's definitions it is not necessary that the past thing about which we are glad or remorseful made us joyful or sad in the past. This seems true, because it seems quite well possible for us to be glad or remorseful about a past thing (our idea of) which did not make us joyful or sad at the time that it existed. This is clearly the case when the thing (our idea of) which makes us joyful or sad existed before we were born. We may, for example, be remorseful about the First World War. It is even possible for us to be glad about a past thing (our idea of) which made us sad at the time it existed, and to be remorseful about a past thing (our idea of) which made us joyful at the time it existed. We sometimes hear people say, for example, that their former illness was a blessing in disguise because thanks to it they now experience life on a deeper level. In order to feel glad or remorseful about something of the past, (our idea of) it only needs to affect us with Joy or Sadness now. For this same reason, too, we are not glad about something of the past (our idea of) which made us joyful at the time it existed if we are no longer affected with Joy by (our idea of) it now, and we are not remorseful about something of the past (our idea of) which made us sad at the time it existed if we are no longer affected with Sadness by (our idea of) it now.

Let us now consider Spinoza's real definitions of Gladness and Remorse. Spinoza writes in IIIP18S2: '*Finally, Gladness is a Joy which has arisen from the image of a past thing whose outcome we doubted, while Remorse is a Sadness which is opposite to Gladness.*' In IIIAD16 he writes: '*Gladness is a Joy, accompanied by the idea of a past thing that has turned out better than we had hoped*.' And in IIIAD17: '*Remorse is a Sadness, accompanied by the idea of a past thing that has turned out worse than we had hoped*.'

Notice, first of all, that Spinoza calls the idea that we have of a past thing an 'image'. By 'image' Spinoza means here, of course, a mental image, even though he officially defines the word '*imago*' as the state of our brain that corresponds to our mental image. Our idea of a past thing is, of course, not a sense perception or a belief (*or* an opinion); it is a recollection of a visual perception or, perhaps, a combination of several recollected visual perceptions. It seems that our idea of a past thing may also consist in a recollection of a non-visual sense perception, or in a combination of non-visual sense perceptions. My idea of my grandmother, for example, not only includes my recollection of how she looked but also my recollection of what she said, etcetera. But Spinoza standardly talks about mental images.

Notice also that in IIIP18S2 Spinoza writes that Gladness and Remorse are Joy and Sadness *arisen from* our image of a past thing whose outcome we had doubted, while in IIIAD16 and IIIAD17 he says that Gladness and Remorse are Joy and Sadness *accompanied by* the idea of a past thing that has turned out better or worse than we had hoped. I think that this proves that when Spinoza writes that a certain secondary emotion is 'Joy or Sadness accompanied by a certain idea' he implies that this secondary emotion is 'Joy or Sadness arisen from, that is, caused by, a certain idea'. In my discussion of Spinoza's definitions of Love and Hate I argued that Spinoza does not mean that Gladness and Remorse are composed of Joy or Sadness together with the idea of a past thing, but that he means, as he literally writes in IIIP18S2, that Gladness and Remorse are Joy and Sadness arisen from, that is, caused by, our idea of a past thing.

Now, in the simplified version of Spinoza's definitions I did not mention that Gladness is a Joy caused by our idea of a past thing *whose outcome we doubted and that has turned out better than we had hoped*, and that Remorse is a Sadness caused by our idea of a past thing *whose outcome we doubted and that has turned out worse than we had hoped*. In the simplified definitions I did not mention, in other words, that in order to feel glad or remorseful about a past thing, we need to have doubted its outcome and to have had some expectation concerning its outcome. I did not mention this element in my simplified version of Spinoza's definitions, because it seems that, in order to feel joyful or sad about a past thing, we need not have doubted its outcome and have had an expectation concerning its outcome. It seems that we may quite well feel sad by imagining black slavery and feel joyful by imagining the abolition of black slavery, even though we were born after these events occurred and thus were never in a position to have any expectation concerning the outcome of these events. It seems that we may quite well say that we are remorseful about the fact that black people were held as slaves and that we are glad that slavery was abolished.

I do not think that by saying that Gladness and Remorse are 'Joy and Sadness caused by our idea of a past thing *whose outcome we doubted and that has turned out better or worse than we had hoped*', Spinoza means that we cannot feel glad or remorseful about a past thing if we did not have a doubt and an expectation concerning its outcome. I think he simply wants to say that we are *especially prone* to feel glad about some past thing when it has turned out better than we had thought it would, and that we are *especially prone* to feel remorseful about something when it has turned out worse than we had thought it would. In the next section I shall explain why Spinoza finds it important to stress that Gladness and Remorse are intensified by Hope.

It seems that Spinoza's choice of the words 'Gladness' (*Gaudium*) and 'Remorse' (*Conscientiae morsus*) is somewhat unfortunate. If we take again the simplified definitions of these words, then it appears that, whereas 'Joy caused by our idea of a past thing' is quite appropriately called 'Gladness', 'Sadness caused by our idea of a past thing' is better called 'Regret' than 'Remorse'. We rather say, for example, that we regret what happened during the Second World War, than that we are remorseful about it. When we take Spinoza's real definitions of these words, then it appears that 'Joy caused by our idea of a past thing whose outcome is better than we had hoped' is better called 'Relief' than 'Gladness', and that 'Sadness caused by our idea of a past thing whose outcome is worse than we had hoped' is better called 'Disappointment' than 'Remorse'. We rather say, for example, that we are disappointed by yesterday's concert than that we are remorseful about it. It seems that we normally use the word 'Remorse', and especially its Latin original '*Conscientiae morsus*', which of course literally means 'a bite of consciousness', to refer to 'Sadness caused by our idea of our own past behaviour'. We say, for example, that we are remorseful about having offended someone. In the last section of this chapter I shall discuss *this* secondary emotion, that is, 'Sadness caused by our idea of our own past behaviour', which Spinoza calls 'Repentance'. I do not know why Spinoza decided to call 'Sadness caused by our idea of a past thing whose outcome is worse than we had hoped' 'Remorse'. In what follows I will continue to use the word 'Remorse' to refer to 'Sadness caused by our idea of a past thing', even though this is not the meaning we commonly give to this word.

Hope and Fear are Joy or Sadness caused by our idea of a future thing.

We have seen that IIIP18 says that, just as our ideas of past things only differ from our ideas of present things in that they are joined to the idea of the past, so our ideas of future things only differ from ideas of present things in that they are joined to the idea of the future. We have also seen that, just as Joy and Sadness caused by our ideas of past things do not differ from Joy and Sadness caused by our ideas of present things, so Joy and Sadness caused by our ideas of future things do not differ from Joy and Sadness caused by our ideas of present things.

I have simplified Spinoza's definitions of Hope and Fear by defining Hope as 'Joy caused by our idea of a future thing' and Fear as 'Sadness caused by our idea of a future thing'. According to this simplified version of Spinoza's definitions, we hope for some future thing when our idea of it affects us with Joy and we fear some future thing when our idea of it affects us with Sadness. For example, if our idea of our future holiday makes us joyful, then

we hope for our future holiday; our Hope for our future holiday is nothing more than our emotion of Joy caused by our idea of our future holiday.

Let us now look at Spinoza's real definitions of Hope and Fear. Spinoza writes in IIIP18S2: '*For Hope is nothing but an inconstant Joy which has arisen from the image of a future thing or a past thing whose outcome we doubt; Fear, on the other hand, is an inconstant Sadness, which has also arisen from the image of a doubtful thing.*' In IIIAD12 he writes: '*Hope is an inconstant Joy, born of the idea of a future or past thing whose outcome we to some extent doubt.*', and in IIIAD13 he writes: '*Fear is an inconstant Sadness, born of the idea of a future or past thing whose outcome we to some extent doubt.*'

Notice that Spinoza calls our idea of a past thing an 'image', by which he means, of course, a mental image, even though he officially defines the word '*imago*' as the state of our brain that corresponds to our mental image. Our idea of a future thing, then, is a mental image, that is, a recollection of one or several sense perceptions. At first it may seem contradictory to say that our idea of a future thing is a recollection of a sense perception of something, because recollections are of past things. But the contradiction is only apparent. Our ideas of future things are mental images, and all our mental images are sense perceptions of come from sense perceptions. When, for example, I visualise the Apocalypse, I merely recollect a number of visual perceptions that I have had in the past of injured people, dilapidated building, fires, and so forth, creatively combine them, and, as Spinoza puts it, join them to the idea of the future. Our ideas of future things cannot, of course, be sense perceptions.

Notice, too, that Spinoza does not say that Hope and Fear are caused by our *belief* that something will make us joyful or sad. Just as we do not love or hate something because we believe that it makes us joyful or sad, so, too, do we not hope for something or fear something because we believe that it will make us joyful or sad. Although Spinoza does not stress this point himself, in order to feel Hope or Fear, our idea of a future thing must *already* make us joyful or sad. If we merely believe that something will make us joyful or sad in the future, but our idea of it does not affect us with Joy or Sadness at the present moment, then we do not feel Hope or Fear. This argument will be important because it implies that merely believing that something will make us joyful or sad does not establish that we desire to pursue or avoid it (see chapter 7).

It seems that our belief that something will make us joyful or sad is the effect, rather than the cause, of our Hope or Fear. In other words, we believe that something will make us joyful or sad, because we feel joyful or sad when we imagine that future thing. When, for

example, I imagine the Apocalypse I feel sad, that is, I fear the Apocalypse, and this Fear may lead me to believe that I will be sad when the Apocalypse arrives. (See scheme 3.3.) But it also seems that our belief that the thing that we imagine will or will not take place has an intensifying or mitigating effect on the Joy or Sadness that our mental image of that thing causes in us. If, for example, I believe that the Apocalypse will never take place, then I will feel considerably less sad when I imagine it than if I believe that it will take place. Spinoza, however, does not make any of these points.

I wish to stress that I do not deny that our belief that something will make us joyful or sad may cause Joy or Sadness (and hence the desire to pursue or avoid this thing). My claim is that our idea of a future thing may cause Joy or Sadness (and hence the desire to pursue or avoid this thing) independently from what we think about that thing. If I vividly imagine the Apocalypse, for example, then I will feel sad, even if I believe that there will not be an Apocalypse. Nonetheless, our belief that something will make us joyful or sad may, I think, also cause Joy or Sadness (and thus the desire to pursue or avoid this thing). If, for example, a very convincing fortune teller makes me believe that I will win the lottery next week, then this belief will cause great Joy in me, even if I do not imagine myself, covered in confetti, with the winning ticket and a big check in my hands.

Now let us return to Spinoza's definitions of Hope and Fear. Notice that the elements of Spinoza's definition of Hope and Fear that I have left out in the simplified definitions are that Hope and Fear are *inconstant* Joy and Sadness and that this Joy or Sadness is caused by our idea of a past or future thing *whose outcome we doubt*. In other words, what I have left out in my simplified version of Spinoza's definitions is the inconstancy of the Joy or Sadness that these secondary emotions consist in and the doubt that we have concerning the outcome of the future thing. Spinoza also mentions that we may hope for or fear the outcome of a past thing. This does not, of course, mean that we hope for or fear something that is past, because Hope and Fear always concern future things. The consequence of a past event, however, may still lie in the future, and it is the future consequence of a past thing that we may hope for or fear. For example, I may fear the results of a test I made yesterday if I will learn those results tomorrow.

The inconstancy of the Joy or Sadness involved in Hope and Fear is an effect of the doubt we have concerning the outcome of the future thing. Spinoza explains that when we doubt whether something will take place in the future, then we do not only have the idea of it taking place in the future, but also an equally strong idea of it not taking place in the future. When our idea of something taking place in the future causes Joy, then our idea of that thing

not taking place in the future causes Sadness, whereas when our idea of something taking place in the future causes Sadness, then our idea of that thing not taking place in the future causes Joy. In other words, if we hope that something will take place in the future, then we fear that it will not take place in the future, and when we fear that something will take place in the future, then we hope that it will not take place in the future. Therefore, as long as we doubt whether something will take place in the future, we will at the same time, or at least in rapid alternation, feel hopeful and fearful. Spinoza writes in IIIAD13:

> From these definitions it follows that there is neither Hope without Fear, nor Fear without Hope. For he who is suspended in Hope and doubts a thing's outcome is supposed to imagine something that excludes the existence of the future thing. And so to that extent he is saddened (by P19), and consequently while he is suspended in Hope, he fears that the thing [he imagines] will happen. Conversely, he who is in Fear, i.e., who doubts the outcome of a thing he hates, also imagines something that excludes the existence of that thing. And so (by P20) he rejoices, and hence, to that extent has Hope that the thing will not take place.

It is important to remark that in IIIAD13 Spinoza says that to hope for something is *to hope that it will exist*, and that to fear something is to *fear that it will exist*. This point will turn out to be important for the discussion of the emotion of Desire (see chapter 7).

We are now in a better position to understand how Hope and Fear may lead to Gladness and Remorse, which was what Spinoza suggested in his definitions of Gladness and Remorse. When, today, we hope that something will exist tomorrow, then, tomorrow, we will be *especially* sad, that is, remorseful, if it does not exist. When, today, we fear that something will exist tomorrow, then, tomorrow, we will be *especially* joyful, that is glad, if it does not exist. (As said, I would say that in the first case we feel disappointed, rather than remorseful, and that in the second case we feel relieved, rather than glad.)

Although, according to Spinoza, we can never be certain about the future, that is, have an adequate idea of the future, we may be convinced that something will exist or that something will not exist in the future. (See IIIAD15 here below.) When we are absolutely convinced that something will or will not take place in the future, then we do not even consider the possibility that the future will be different from how we imagine it will be. In that case, our Hope that something will exist is not accompanied by the Fear that it will not exist, and our Fear that something will exist is not accompanied by the Hope that it will exist. Spinoza calls 'Joy caused by our idea of a future thing of which we are convinced that it will exist' 'Confidence', and he calls 'Sadness caused by our idea of a future thing of which we

are convinced that it will exist' 'Despair'. In other words, we are confident when we do not doubt that something which we hope for will exist, and we despair when we do not doubt that something which we fear will exist. Spinoza writes in IIIP18S2: '*Next, if the doubt involved in these two affects is removed, Hope becomes Confidence, and Fear Despair – viz. a Joy or Sadness which has arisen from the image of a thing we feared or hoped for.*'[29] And in the explication of IIIAD15:

> Confidence, therefore, is born out of Hope and Despair of Fear, when the cause of doubt concerning the thing's outcome is removed. This happens because man imagines that the past or future thing is there, and regards it as present, or because he imagines other things, excluding the existence of the things that put him in doubt. For though we can never be certain of the outcome of singular things (by IIP31C), it can still happen that we do not doubt their outcome. As we have shown (see IIP49S), it is one thing not to doubt a thing, and another to be certain of it.

Spinoza does not explicitly state that our Hope and Fear for something may be based on our present experiences of Joy and Sadness, that is, on our Love for something or our Hate for something, but he does allude to this fact. He does not literally say that when we love something, then we hope that it will continue to exist and fear that it will not continue to exist. Nor does he literally say that, on the other hand, when we hate something, then we fear that it will continue to exist and hope that it will not continue to exist. But in IIIP19 he does write: '*He who imagines that what he loves is destroyed will be saddened; but he who imagines it to be preserved, will rejoice.*' And in IIIP20: '*He who imagines that what he hates is destroyed will rejoice.*' Now, it seems that we may reformulate the expression 'to be destroyed' as 'to be acted on in such a way that one does not continue to exist', or simply as 'not to continue to exist', and that we may reformulate the expression 'to be preserved' as 'to be acted on in such a way that one continues to exist', or simply as 'to continue to exist'. If so, then he says in IIIP19 that we are sad when we imagine that the thing we love does not continue to exist, and that we are joyful when we imagine that the thing we love continues to exist. And, if so, then Spinoza says in IIIP20 that we are joyful when we imagine that the thing we hate does not continue to exist, which, of course, implies that we are sad when we imagine that the thing we hate continues to exist. This is, of course, the same thing as saying that our idea of the future existence of the thing we love affects us with Joy, and that our idea of the future absence of the thing we love affects us with Sadness, and that, contrariwise, our idea of the future

[29] Notice that Spinoza uses the word 'image' in the sense of 'mental image' and not in the sense of 'the brain state that corresponds to a mental image'.

existence of the thing we hate affects us with Sadness, and that our idea of the future absence of the thing we hate affects us with Joy. And this, of course, in turn, is the same thing as saying that we hope that the thing we love continues to exist and that we fear that it does not continue to exist, while we hope that the thing we hate does not continue to exist and that we fear that the thing we hate continues to exist. (See scheme 1.2.)

It seems that Spinoza would also agree that, just as Hope and Fear may be based on Love and Hate, Hope and Fear may also be based on Gladness and Remorse. For, when we are glad about something, then we hope that it will exist again and fear that it will not exist again, and that when we are remorseful about something, then we fear that it will exist again and hope that it will not exist again. It seems, in other words, that when our idea of a past thing affects us with Joy, then our idea of its future existence also affects us with Joy, while our idea of its future absence affects us with Sadness, and that when our idea of a past thing affects us with Sadness, the our idea of its future existence also affects us with Sadness, while our idea of its future absence affects us with Joy. (See scheme 2.2.)

Although Spinoza does not literally say that Hope and Fear may be based on Gladness and Remorse, his claim that our idea of a past thing represents its object as actually existing, and his claim that we only imagine the thing to be past because our idea of it is joined to our idea of the past, seem to explain quite well how Gladness and Remorse may give rise to Hope and Fear. Gladness and Remorse give rise to Hope and Fear, if our idea of the past thing that affects us with Joy or Sadness is separated from our idea of the past and joined to the idea of the future. Our idea of the thing thus remains the same, and so the Joy or Sadness that it causes, too. This line of reasoning is well supported by IIIP47S:

> This is also the cause of men's rejoicing when they recall some evil now past, and why they enjoy telling of dangers from which they have been freed. For when they imagine a danger, they regard it as future, and are determined to fear it. This determination is restrained anew by the idea of freedom, which they have joined to the idea of the danger, since they have been freed from it. This renders them safe again, and they rejoice again.

Spinoza suggests here that we can imagine that a past thing, about which we are remorseful, will exist in the future. The Sadness that is caused by our idea of this 'future' thing is then called Fear. It is quite clear, therefore, that in IIIP47S Spinoza gives an example of how Remorse can turn into Fear if we imagine the past thing to exist in the future. As Hope and Fear always come hand in hand, Remorse also gives rise to the Hope that the thing we are

remorseful about will not exist again, that is, our idea of the future absence of the past thing our idea of which caused Sadness in us affects us with Joy. That Remorse may give rise to Hope and Fear implies, of course, that Gladness may also give rise to Hope and Fear. Our idea of the future existence of the past thing our idea of which affects us with Joy also affects us with Joy, that is, we hope that the thing we are glad about will exist again, and our idea of the future absence of the past thing our idea of which affects us with Joy affects us with Sadness, that is, we fear that the thing we are glad about will not exist again. Spinoza comes close to saying this when he defines the secondary emotion called 'Longing' (*Desiderium*). He defines this secondary emotion in IIIP36 as 'Sadness caused by our idea of the present and future absence of a past thing our idea of which affects us with Joy', and also as 'Desire to have again the past thing our idea of which affects us with Joy':

> He who recollects a thing by which he was once pleased desires to possess it in the same circumstances as when he first was pleased by it. […] Cor.: Therefore, if the lover has found out that one of those circumstances is lacking, he will be saddened. Dem.: For insofar as he finds that a circumstance is lacking, he imagines something that excludes the existence of this thing. But since, from Love, he desires this thing, or circumstance (by P36), then insofar as he imagines it to be lacking, he will be saddened. Schol.: This Sadness, insofar as it concerns the absence of what we love is called Longing.

It seems that we may hope that something will exist again or fear that a past thing will exist again, whether we believe that that thing will exist again or not. All that is needed in order to hope or fear that a past thing about which we are glad or remorseful will exist again is to imagine that past thing as if it were a future thing. It also seems, however, that the image of such a past thing will cause less Hope or Fear in us if we believe that it will (most likely) not exist in the future. If, for example, our heart-broken man of IIIP36 believes that he will never again be loved by a lady as graceful as the one who has just broken up with him, then, he will probably feel little Joy no matter how vividly he tries to imagine such a future companion. Spinoza, however, does not make any of these points in so many words.

Section 4: Accidental causes of Joy and Sadness

Spinoza observes in IIIP15 that our habit of making associations between our ideas of things greatly increases the number of things our ideas of which cause Joy and Sadness in us:

> Any thing can be the accidental cause of Joy, Sadness, or Desire. Dem.: Suppose the Mind is affected by two affects at once, one of which neither increases nor diminishes its power of acting, while the other either increases or diminishes it (see Post.1). From P14 it is clear that when the Mind is afterwards affected with the former affect as by its true cause, which (by hypothesis) through itself neither increases nor diminishes it power of thinking, it will immediately be affected with the latter also, which increases or diminishes its power of thinking, i.e. (by P11S), with Joy, or Sadness. And so the former thing will be the cause of Joy or Sadness – not through itself, but accidentally. And in the same way it can easily be shown that that thing can be the accidental cause of Desire, q.e.d.

IIIP15 is problematic because Spinoza asks us to think of someone who has two *emotions*, one of which changes his power and the other does not. This makes no sense because both Joy and Sadness consist in a change of power. Spinoza writes in IIID3 that an emotion consists in an affection of the human body that increases or decreases the power of the human body, and the mental state that corresponds to this affection. It is therefore impossible to think of someone who has an *emotion* that does not change his power. What we can think of is someone who has an *affection* that changes his power and another *affection* that does not change his power. In other words, we can think of someone who has one idea of something that causes Joy or Sadness in him, and another idea of something else that does not cause Joy or Sadness in him. Clearly, then, Spinoza means *affectio* but writes *affectus.*

We are now able to understand why things may accidentally cause Joy or Sadness. Say that we watch a television commercial in which a specific car, our idea of which does not affect us with Joy or Sadness, is shown together with a beautiful lady, our idea of whom affects us with Joy. Given that we associate things when we have perceived them together, when we later on see the same car in the street, then the image of the beautiful lady will immediately come to our mind, and hence we will feel joyful. Our visual perception of the car makes us joyful, not in virtue of itself, but accidentally, that is, by causing the mental image of the beautiful lady. Spinoza writes at the end of the passage just quoted that in the same way it can be shown that a thing can become the accidental cause of Desire. Our current example may illustrate how. We desire something when our idea of it affects us with Joy. Before having seen the television commercial, our idea of the car did not affect us with Joy and so we did not desire the car, but after having associated the car with a beautiful lady (our idea of

whom does affect us with Joy and whom we thus do desire) our idea of the car does, although accidentally, affect us with Joy and, hence, with Desire.

This reading of IIIP15 is confirmed by the very corollary of this proposition:

> Cor.: From this alone – that we have regarded [*contemplati sumus*] a thing with an affect of Joy or Sadness, of which it is not itself the efficient cause, we can love it or hate it. Dem.: From this alone it comes about (by P14) that when the Mind afterwards imagines this thing, it is affected with an affect of Joy or Sadness, i.e. (by P11S), that both the power of the Mind and of the Body is increased or diminished. And consequently (by P12), the mind desires to imagine the thing or (by P13C) avoids it, i.e. (by P13S), it love it or hates it, q.e.d.

We can easily illustrate IIIP15C with our current example: Once we have regarded the car with Joy, of which emotion it was not the efficient cause (the beautiful lady was the efficient cause of our Joy), then we will be affected with Joy when we afterwards imagine the car. Given that 'to love something' is 'to be affected with Joy by our idea of that thing', we will love the car and desire it.

In IIIP16 Spinoza reasons in a similar manner that something that does not make us joyful or sad can become the accidental cause of Joy or Sadness when we associate it with something that is the efficient cause of Joy and Sadness, not because we have perceived these two things together, but because we perceive some similarity between the two. In IIIP17 he argues that when we associate something that makes us joyful with something that makes us sad, then the thing that makes us joyful will also, accidentally, come to make us sad, and hence we will not only love it but also hate it.

Section 5: Indirect causes of Joy and Sadness

I would suggest that our idea of something can indirectly cause Joy or Sadness, not only because we have associated it with something our idea of which directly causes Joy or Sadness, but also because we imagine that it preserves or destroys something that we love or hate, or in other words, because we imagine that it acts in such a way that the thing our idea of which causes Joy or Sadness will or will not continue to exist.

I have argued that Spinoza suggests that Hope and Fear may be based on Love and Hate. When we love something, then we hope that it continues to exist, and we fear that it does not continue to exist, whereas when we hate something, then we hope that it does not continue to exist, and we fear that it continues to exist. Clearly, then, our idea of something that we imagine acts in such a way that the thing we love continues to exist will cause Joy,

and our idea of something that we imagine acts in such a way that the thing we love does not continue to exist will cause Sadness, whereas our idea of something that we imagine acts in such a way that the thing we hate continues to exist will cause Sadness, and our idea of something that acts in such a way that the thing we hate does not continue to exist will cause Joy. In other words, we love the thing that we imagine preserves the thing we love or destroys the thing we hate, whereas we hate the thing that we imagine preserves the thing we hate or destroys the thing we love. (See scheme 1.4)

Say, for example, that I love my house, that is, my idea of my house causes Joy in me. Because I love my house, I hope that my house will continue to exist, that is, my idea of the future existence of my house causes Joy. (Contrariwise, because I love my house, I fear that it will not continue to exist, that is, my idea of the future absence of my house causes Sadness.) Now, because I hope that my house will continue to exist, I love the things that I imagine act in such a way that my house continues to exist, and I hate the things that I imagine act in such a way that my house will not continue to exist. I hate, for example, the flood that threatens to inundate my house, and I love the dam of sandbags that protects my house from the flood, that is, my idea of the flood causes Sadness and my idea of the sandbags causes Joy.

The same reasoning works, of course, for Hope and Fear that are not based on Love and Hate. We love a thing that we imagine acts in such a way that a future thing that we hope for will exist, and we love a thing that we imagine acts in such a way that a thing we fear will not exist, whereas we hate a thing that we imagine acts in such a way that a thing we fear will exist, and we love a thing that we imagine acts in such a way that a thing we fear will not exist. (See scheme 3.4)

Furthermore, as Hope and Fear may be based on Gladness and Remorse, this reasoning also works for Hope and Fear that are based on Gladness and Remorse. If we hope that a past thing about which we are glad will exist again, then we love the thing that we imagine acts in such a way that it will exist again, and we hate the thing that we imagine acts in such a way that it will not exist again, whereas when we fear that something about which we are remorseful will exist again, then we love the thing that we imagine acts in such a way that it will not exist again, and we hate the thing that acts in such a way that it will exist again. (See scheme 2.4)

Spinoza himself does not argue, as I have just done, that we love or hate the *thing* that we imagine acts in such a way that a *thing* that we love or hate continues or does not continue to exist, but this argument, as I shall demonstrate in a moment, underlies his claim that we love or hate *someone* that makes *someone* we love or hate joyful or sad.

Now, our idea of the thing we love or hate and also our idea of the thing that we imagine acts positively or negatively on the thing that we love or hate are either sense perceptions or recollections; they are not beliefs (*or* opinions). My idea of my house, my idea of the flood and my idea of the sandbags, for example, are all either sense perceptions or recollections. This is quite clear. What is not clear, however, is what it means to 'imagine' that something acts in such a way that the thing we love or hate will or will not continue to exist. Spinoza suggests that he uses the verb 'to imagine' in the sense of (1) having a sense perception (e.g., to see), (2) having a recollection of a sense perception (e.g., to visualise), and (3) having an opinion. To say *à la Spinoza* that we 'imagine' that something preserves the thing we love, for example, may therefore mean that we see that this is the case, or that we visualise that this is the case, or that we believe that this is the case. All of these three meanings of Spinoza's verb 'to imagine' seem work quite well. I feel joyful, for example, when I see that the sandbags protect my house from the water, when I visualise that they do so, and when I believe that they do so.

Section 6: Joy and Sadness caused by our ideas of persons

So far we have examined what Spinoza writes about Joy and Sadness insofar as these emotions are caused by our idea of a certain *thing*. We are, however, not only affected with Joy and Sadness by our ideas of *things* but also by our ideas of *people*. Spinoza models his theory of the emotions that we feel because we have an idea of *someone* on his theory of the emotions that we feel because we have an idea of *something*. In this section I shall refer to the following scheme:

Scheme 4
Emotions caused by our idea of a person

<u>Our idea of a person causes Joy</u>	
1. = We love the person.	
2. We hope that he himself is joyful.	
- We are joyful when we imagine that he is joyful.	(IIIP21)
- We are sad when we imagine that he is sad.	(IIIP21)
3. We (are motivated to) believe that the person we love makes us joyful.	
4. We hope that others (love him and/or) make him joyful	
- We love those whom we imagine (love him and/or) make him joyful.	(IIIP22)
- We hate those whom we imagine (hate him and/or) make him sad.	(IIIP22) (IIIP45)
<u>Our idea of a person causes Sadness</u>	
1. = We hate the person.	
2. We hope that he himself is sad.	
- We are joyful when we imagine that he is sad.	(IIIP23)
- We are sad when we imagine that he is joyful.	(IIIP23)
3. We (are motivated to) believe that the person we hate makes us sad.	
4. We hope that others (hate him and/or) make him sad	
- We love those whom we imagine (hate him and/or) make him sad.	(IIIP24)
- We hate those whom we imagine (love him and/or) make him joyful.	(IIIP24)

Love and Hate for people

Just as we love or hate something when our idea (i.e., our sense perception or recollection) of that thing makes us feel joyful or sad, so, too, do we love or hate a person when our idea of that person makes us feel joyful or sad. Not only our ideas of other people may make us feel joyful or sad, but our idea of ourselves may make us feel joyful or sad, too. In other words, we may not only love or hate other people, but we may also love or hate ourselves[30]. (See scheme 4.1)

Spinoza not only speaks of the Joy or Sadness that our idea of someone may make us feel, but also of the Joy or Sadness that our idea of someone's actions may make us feel. We may like or dislike the actions of other people and of ourselves, and thus love and hate them for how they behave, or love or hate ourselves for how we behave.

If I was correct in arguing that Spinoza does not hold that we love or hate something because we *believe* that it is the cause of our Joy or Sadness, then he does not hold either that we love or hate someone because we believe that he is, or that his actions are, the cause of our Joy or Sadness. It seems, rather, that our Love or Hate for someone motivates us to believe that he is the cause of our Joy or Sadness. (See scheme 4.3.) Spinoza, however, does not say this in so many words.

[30] See the discussion of the secondary emotions of Self-love and Humility in section 7.

Although Spinoza does not seem to think that we love or hate a person because we *believe* that he makes us joyful or sad, he does write in IIIP40: '*He who imagines he is hated by someone, and believes he has given no cause for hate, will hate the other in return*' Spinoza writes in IIIP41: '*If someone imagines that someone loves him, and does not believe he has given any cause for this, he will love [that person] in return.*' According to Spinoza, then, we love a person when we imagine that he loves us and we believe that we have done nothing to make him love us, and we hate a person when we imagine that he hates us and we believe that we have done nothing to make him sad.

Notice that what seems to cause our Joy or Sadness here in the first place is our *imagination* that a person loves us or hates us. Because Spinoza suggests that he uses the verb 'to imagine' in the sense of (1) 'to see', and (2) 'to visualise', and (3) 'to believe', this might mean that, for example, we feel joyful because we see that someone loves us, or because we visualise that someone loves us, or because we believe that someone loves us. Here, the third meaning of the verb 'to imagine' seems to make the most sense, because it difficult to literally see or visualise that someone loves us. If, indeed, Spinoza means that we love or hate someone because we believe that he loves or hates us, then we have here the first example of a case in which we feel joyful or sad, not because we imagine something, but because we believe something. It is not quite clear whether our belief 'that the person that we imagine loves us has no good reason to love us', or our belief 'that the person that we imagine hates us has no good reason to hate us', also plays a causal role. If it does, then, we have certainly found a first example of a case in which we feel joyful or sad, not because be imagine something, but because we believe something.

The Hope that the person we love will be joyful and that the person we hate will be sad

Although Spinoza builds his theory of the emotions that we feel when we have an idea of someone on his theory of the emotions that we feel when we have an idea of something, there is a very important and interesting difference between some of the emotions that we feel when we have an idea of something and some of the emotions that feel when we have an idea of someone.

Remember that Spinoza argues that, when we love something then we hope that this thing will continue to exist, whereas when we hate something then we hope that this thing will not continue to exist. We have seen that in IIIP19 Spinoza writes that we are joyful when we imagine that the thing we love continues to exist, whereas we are sad when we imagine that the thing we love does not continue to exist. We have also seen that in IIIP20 Spinoza writes

that we are joyful when we imagine that the thing we hate does not continue to exist, which implies, of course, that we are sad when we imagine that the thing we hate continues to exist.

One would expect Spinoza to say that when we love someone then we hope that this person continues to exist, that is, we hope that he goes on living, and that when we hate someone then we hope that this person does not continue to exist, that is, we hope that he dies. But Spinoza does not say this. He says, rather, that when we love someone then we hope that this person will be joyful, and that when we hate someone then we hope that this person will be sad. He writes in IIIP21: '*He who imagines what he loves to be affected with Joy or Sadness will also be affected with Joy or Sadness; and each of those affects will be greater or lesser in the lover as they are greater or lesser in the thing loved.*' And in IIIP23 he writes: '*He who imagines what he hates to be affected with Sadness will rejoice; if, on the other hand, he should imagine it to be affected with Joy, he will be saddened. And both these affects will be greater or lesser, as its contrary is greater or lesser in what he hates.*' It is quite clear that the 'thing' that we love or hate in these propositions is another person, because we imagine this 'thing' to be sad or joyful. We see, then, that Spinoza argues that we are joyful when we imagine that the person we love is joyful and when we imagine that the person we hate is sad, while we are sad when we imagine that the person we love is sad and when we imagine that the person we hate is joyful. (See scheme 4.2)

It is, of course, quite remarkable that in IIIP21 and IIIP23 Spinoza does not speak about 'a *person* we love who is affected with Joy or Sadness' but about 'a *thing* we love that is affected with Joy or Sadness', because, clearly, things cannot be joyful or sad[31]. Spinoza, as said, wants to build his theory of the emotions that we feel when we have the idea of someone on his theory of the emotions that we feel when we have the idea of something. I shall discuss this issue in further detail in chapter 7.

When Spinoza speaks of the case in which we, for example, 'imagine' that someone we love is joyful, it is not quite clear whether he means that we see that someone is joyful, or that we visualise that someone is joyful, or that we believe that someone is joyful. All of these meanings of Spinoza's verb 'to imagine' seem to make sense. I feel joyful when I see that my friend is joyful, when I visualise that he is joyful, but also when I simply believe that he is joyful. Unless Spinoza means that we must literally imagine that our friend is joyful, that is, form a mental picture of our friend dancing with a smile on his face, in order to feel joyful,

[31] Della Rocca (2008, p.156) disagrees. He believes that his frying pan, too, is sometimes joyful and sometimes sad.

then we have found here another example of a situation in which a belief causes Joy or Sadness.

We love or hate some people indirectly

I have argued that Spinoza could have claimed that we hope that other things act in such a way that the thing we love continues to exist and that the thing we hate does not continue to exist. I have argued that he could have claimed that we love the things that we imagine act in such a way that the thing we love continues to exist and that the thing we hate does not continue to exist, whereas we hate the things that we imagine act in such a way that the thing we love does not continue to exist and that the thing we hate continues to exist.

It would have made sense for Spinoza to make this claim, because he does make a similar claim for the case in which we love or hate, not something, but someone. He argues that we hope that other people make the person we love joyful and the person we hate sad. We are joyful when we imagine that other people make the person we love joyful and when we imagine that other people make the person we hate sad, whereas we are sad when we imagine that other people make the person we love sad and when we imagine that people make the person we hate joyful. Spinoza writes in IIIP22: '*If we imagine someone to affect with Joy a thing we love, we shall be affected with Love toward him. If, on the other hand, we imagine him to affect the same thing with Sadness, we shall also be affected with Hate towards him*.' And in IIIP24 he writes: '*If we imagine someone to affect with Joy a thing we hate, we shall be affected with Hate toward him. On the other hand, if we imagine him to affect the same thing with Sadness, we shall be affected with Love toward him.*' In other words, we love the people that we imagine make the person we love joyful and the people that we imagine make the person we hate sad, whereas we hate the people that we imagine make the person we love sad and the people that we imagine make the person we hate joyful. (See scheme 4.4.) In chapter 8 I shall explain the transition Spinoza makes from the thesis that 'we hope that other things act in such a way that the thing we love continues to exist' to the thesis that 'we hope that other people act in such a way that the person we love will be joyful'.

Here, too, when Spinoza writes that we love a person that we 'imagine' makes someone we love joyful, he might mean that we love a person that we see makes someone we love joyful, or that we love a person that we visualise makes someone we love joyful, or that we love a person that we believe makes someone we love joyful. All of these meanings of Spinoza's verb 'to imagine' seem to make sense, and we therefore seem to have another example of a belief that makes us joyful or sad.

Accidental causes of emotion due to imitation

It is easy to understand how our idea of a person may accidentally cause Joy or Sadness when we associate our idea of that person with an idea of something or someone that already causes Joy or Sadness. Not only our habit of associating our ideas of things and persons with each other greatly increases the number of things and people concerning which we feel emotions, but our habit of imitating the emotions of other people does so, too.

When we have the idea of another person being affected with a certain emotion, then that idea automatically causes the emotion we imagine affects that person. So when we see another person being joyful, then we, too, become joyful, and when we see that another person loves something, then we, too, will love that thing. Spinoza writes in IIIP27: '*If we imagine a thing like us, toward which we have had no affect, to be affected with some affect, we are thereby affected with a like affect.*' By the expression 'a thing like us' Spinoza clearly means 'another person'.

We most strongly imitate the emotions of people whom we love, but we also imitate the emotions of people concerning whom we do not have any emotion. We imitate the emotions of people that we hate far less, and, as we have seen, we are actually joyful when they are sad and we are sad when they are joyful. We will, nonetheless, always feel some Sadness when we see that a person we hate is sad, because our imitation of his emotion is automatic. (I do not say 'involuntary' because Spinoza claims that none of our mental and bodily activity is voluntary in the Cartesian sense of the word.) Spinoza writes in IIIP47: '*The Joy which arises from our imagining that a thing we hate is destroyed, or affected with some evil, does not occur without some Sadness of mind. Dem.: This is evident from P27. For insofar as we imagine a thing like us to be affected with Sadness, we are saddened.*'

When we have the idea that another person feels the same emotion regarding something as we feel, then our emotion is intensified because our emotion is then not only caused by our idea of that thing but also by our idea of the other person being affected with the same emotion. So, for example, when listening to a symphony of Beethoven affects us with Joy and we see that this symphony affects another person with Joy, too, then our Joy will be intensified because it is now not only caused by our auditory perception of the symphony but also by our idea that the other person is affected with Joy by the symphony. However, when we have the idea that another person has an emotion concerning something which is opposite to our emotion concerning the same thing, then we gain an emotion that conflicts with the emotion we already had. So, for example, when hearing the symphony of Beethoven affects us with Joy and we then see that this symphony affects another person with Sadness,

then hearing the symphony will affect us with both Joy and Sadness at the same time. Spinoza writes in IIIP31: '*If we imagine that someone loves, desires or hates something we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall thereby love, desire or hate it with greater constancy. But if we imagine that he is averse to what we love, or the opposite [NS: that he loves what we hate], then we shall undergo vacillation of mind.*'

When we imitate a person's Love for something that we cannot possess, then we will often be saddened by our idea of that person, that is, we will hate that person. Our habit of imitating the emotions of other people, then, is not only the reason why we are often compassionate with other people, but it is also the reason why we are often in conflict with other people. Spinoza writes in IIIP27S: *'We see, therefore, that for the most part human nature is so constituted that men pity the unfortunate and envy the fortunate, and (by P32) [envy them] with greater hate the more they love the thing they imagine the other to possess. We see, then, that from the same property of human nature from which it follows that men are compassionate, it also follows that the same men are envious and ambitious.'*

Here, too, when Spinoza speaks about the case in which we 'imagine' that someone is joyful or sad, he could mean that we see that a person is joyful or sad, or that we visualise that a person joyful or sad, or that we believe that a person joyful or sad. Although all of these meanings of Spinoza's verb 'to imagine' seem to work quite well, I think that in order to speak of imitation of another person's emotion, 'to imagine' must here mean 'to see'. We would only say that I imitate my friend's Sadness if I feel sad after having seen that he is sad. We would not say that I imitate my friend's Sadness if I feel sad because I visualise or merely believe that he is sad. This does not mean of course that I will not feel sad when I visualise or believe that he is sad; it just means that in those cases I do not imitate his emotion.

Section 7: Several important secondary emotions that are kinds of Joy or Sadness

We have already looked at Spinoza's definitions of the secondary emotions of Love & Hate, Gladness & Remorse, and Hope & Fear. We shall now examine a number of other important secondary emotions that are kinds of Joy and Sadness. All of these secondary emotions consist in the emotion of Joy or Sadness caused by our idea of someone or by our idea of someone's action. I discuss these secondary emotions not in the order in which Spinoza discusses them, but in the order that makes it easier to interpret them. As said, I shall discuss Pleasure, Pain, Cheerfulness and Melancholy, which, according to Spinoza, are kinds of Joy and Sadness, in chapter 6, and I shall discuss the emotion of Desire and the secondary

emotions that are kinds of Desire in chapter 7. The following scheme is a reproduction of the previous scheme but with addition of the secondary emotions that we shall discuss now.

Scheme 5
Some secondary emotions that are kind of Joy and Sadness

<u>Our idea of a person causes Joy</u>	
1. = We love the person.	
- **Love** (*Amor*)	(IIIP13s)
- **Praise** (*Laus*)	(IIIP29S)
- **Pride** (*Gloria*)	(IIIP30S, IIIAD30)
- **Self-satisfaction** / **Self-love** (*Acquiescentia in se ipso / Philautia*)	(IIIP30, IIIP51, IIIP55; AD25)
2. We hope that he himself is joyful.	
- We are joyful when we imagine that he is joyful.	(IIIP21)
- **Compassion** (*Commiseratio*)	(IIIP22S, IIIAD24)
-We are sad when we imagine that he is sad.	(IIIP21)
- **Compassion or Pity** (*Commiseratio, Misericordia*)	(IIIP22S, IIIAD24)
3. We (are motivated to) believe that the person we love makes us joyful.	
4. We hope that others (love him and/or) make him joyful	
- We love those whom we imagine (love him and/or) make him joyful.	(IIIP22)
- **Favor** (*Favor*)	(IIIP22; IIIAD19)
- We hate those whom we imagine (hate him and/or) make him sad.	(IIIP22) (IIIP45)
- **Indignation** (*Indignatio*)	(IIP22; AD20)
<u>Our idea of a person causes Sadness</u>	
1. = We hate the person.	
- **Hate** (*Odium*)	(IIIP13s)
- **Blame** (*Vituperius*)	(IIIP29S)
- **Shame** (*Pudor*)	(IIIP30S, IIIAD31)
- **Humility** (*Humilitas, Poenitentia*)	(IIIP55; IIIAD26)
2. We hope that he himself is sad.	
- We are joyful when we imagine that he is sad.	(IIIP23)
- **Envy** (*Invidia*)	(IIIP24; IIIAD23)
- We are sad when we imagine that he is joyful.	(IIIP23)
- **Envy** (*Invidia*)	(IIIP24; IIIAD23)
3. We (are motivated to) believe that the person we hate makes us sad.	
4. We hope that others (hate him and/or) make him sad	
- We love those whom we imagine (hate him and/or) make him sad.	(IIIP24)
- We hate those whom we imagine (love him and/or) make him joyful.	(IIIP24)

Compassion and Envy

Recall that, according to Spinoza, we feel joyful when we have the idea that the person we love is joyful and when we have the idea that the person we hate is sad, whereas we are sad when we have the idea that the person we love is sad and when we have the idea that the person we hate is joyful. Recall also that, as we automatically imitate the emotions of other people, we actually do not have to love a person in order to feel joyful (or sad) when we have the idea that he is joyful (or sad). We also feel joyful (or sad) when we see that a person

whom we neither love nor hate is joyful (or sad). We even feel joyful (or sad) when we see that a person we hate is joyful (or sad), although, as said earlier, we primarily feel joyful (or sad) when we have the idea that he is sad (or joyful).

On the basis of this analysis we may easily understand the secondary emotions Spinoza calls '*Commiseratio*', '*Misericordia*' and '*Invidia*', which Curley translates as 'Pity', 'Compassion' and 'Envy'. Spinoza writes in IIIPS22: '[…] *Pity* […] *we can define as Sadness that has arisen from injury to another. By what name we should call the Joy that arises from another's good I do not know.*' In IIIP24 he writes: '[…] *Envy* […] *is* […] *Hate, insofar as it is considered so to dispose a man that he is glad at another's ill fortune and saddened by his good fortune.*' In IIIAD23 he writes: '*Envy is Hate insofar as it so affects a man that he is saddened by another's happiness, and, conversely, glad at his ill fortune. Exp.: To Envy one commonly opposes Compassion, which can therefore (in spite of the meaning of the word) be defined as follows.*' In IIIAD24 he writes: '*Compassion is Love, insofar as it so affects a man that he is glad at another's good fortune, and saddened by his ill fortune. Exp.: As far as Envy is concerned, see P24S and P32S. These are the affects of Joy and Sadness accompanied by the idea of an external thing as cause, either through itself or accidentally.*' It is quite clear that when, in the passages just cited, Spinoza speaks of 'another's good', 'another's happiness', 'another's ill fortune', and 'another's good fortune', he is referring to another person's Joy or Sadness. When, in these passages, he speaks about a person that is *glad* about something, he simply means to speak about a person that is joyful because of something; he is not using the word 'gladness' in the technical sense of 'Joy caused by our idea of a past thing'.

Notice that Spinoza defines Compassion as a form of Love and Envy as a form of Hate. He defines Compassion as the emotion of Love that affects us in such a way that we are joyful when we have the idea that someone else is joyful and sad when we have the idea that someone else is sad. Envy he defines as the emotion of Hate that affects us in such a way that we are joyful when we have the idea that someone else is sad and sad when we have the idea that someone else is joyful.

Spinoza's definitions of Compassion and Envy are problematic for two reasons. The first reason is that, as we have seen, Spinoza argues that all secondary emotions are kinds of Joy, Sadness or Desire, and, thus, that Love and Hate are not primary emotions. Compassion and Envy should therefore be defined as kinds of Joy, Sadness, or Desire. The second reason is that, as we have seen, Love always affects us in such a way that we are joyful when we have the idea that the person we love is joyful and sad when we have the idea that the person

we love is sad, whereas Hate always affects us in such a way that we are joyful when we have the idea that the person we hate is sad and joyful when we have the idea that the person we hate is joyful. If Spinoza wants to define Compassion and Envy as kinds of Love and Hate, then he must define them through a property that sets them apart from other forms of Love and Hate.

What Spinoza must have in mind is that Compassion is 'Joy caused by our idea of another person that is joyful' *and also* 'Sadness caused by our idea of another person that is sad', and that Envy is 'Joy caused by our idea of another person that is sad' *and also* 'Sadness caused by our idea of another person that is joyful'. Spinoza, it seems, means to say that Love affects us with Compassion and that Hate affects us with Envy. In other words, we are compassionate with the person we love, and envious of the person we hate.

If this is indeed what Spinoza has in mind, then we understand why Spinoza writes that he defines Compassion (*Misericordia*) the way he does 'in spite of the word'. Compassion is both to be joyful when someone else is joyful and to be sad when someone else is sad, whereas the word '*Misericordia*' seems to refer exclusively to a kind of Sadness. The word 'Compassion' is somewhat better suited, because, although it normally has the same meaning as the word '*Misericordia*', literally, it merely suggests that we have the same emotion as another person, whether that emotion be Joy or Sadness.

Now, although this is not clear from Spinoza's definitions of Compassion and Envy, in order to be able to be joyful or sad because someone else is joyful or sad, we must of course somehow realise that his person is joyful or sad; if the person is joyful or sad but we do not realise it, then we will not feel joyful or sad. Spinoza should, therefore, have said that Compassion is the Joy we feel when we imagine that a person is joyful.

Praise and Blame

Recall that our idea of another person's action may make us feel joyful or sad. The action our idea of which makes us feel joyful or sad may, of course, be performed by a person who has the desire to make us feel joyful or sad. Hence we may come to love or hate that person.

On the basis of this reasoning we may easily understand the secondary emotions that Spinoza calls '*Laus*' and '*Vituperius*', which Curley translates as 'Praise' and 'Blame'. Spinoza writes in IIIP29S: '[…] *the Joy with which we imagine the action of another by which he has striven to please us I call Praise. On the other hand, the Sadness with which we are averse to this action I call Blame.*' (Spinoza forgets to define Praise and Blame in IIIAD.)

We see, then, that Spinoza defines Praise as 'Joy caused by our idea of a person's attempt to make us joyful', and Blame as 'Sadness caused by our idea of a person's attempt to make us sad'.

I suggest that Spinoza defines Praise and Blame as the emotions of Joy and Sadness, because he wants to show that our emotions motivate our moral judgements, rather than being motivated by our moral judgements. One might think that Praise and Blame are not emotions but the expression of our moral judgement that someone's action is good or bad. One might think that we first judge that a person's action is good or bad, and perhaps express our moral judgement by praising or blaming the person for his action, and only then feel joyful or sad about that person's action. I suggest that by defining Praise as 'Joy caused by our idea of someone's attempt to make us joyful' and Blame as 'Sadness caused by our idea of someone's attempt to make us sad', Spinoza wants to indicate that our moral judgement that a person's action is good or bad, and hence the verbal expression of this judgement, are the mere results of the fact that we are affected with Joy or Sadness by our idea of the other person's action. In other words, we do not feel joyful or sad about someone's action after we have judged that his action is good or bad, but our idea of someone's action first makes us feel joyful or sad and then we judge that his action is good or bad. So, for example, if someone steals my laptop, then I will not first judge that his action is bad and then begin to feel sad, but I will first feel sad and then judge that his action is bad.

Favor and Indignation

Recall, once again, that our idea of another person's action may make us feel joyful or sad. A person's action our idea of which makes us feel joyful or sad may be directed at us, but it may also be directed at someone we love or hate, because, as said, we are joyful when have the idea that a person makes someone we love joyful or someone we hate sad, and that we are sad when we have the idea that a person makes someone we love sad or someone we hate joyful. We love the person who makes someone we love joyful or someone we hate sad, and we hate the person who makes someone we love sad or someone we hate joyful.

As we imitate the emotions of other people, we are also joyful (or sad) when we have the idea that a person makes someone we do not love joyful (or sad). We are even joyful (or sad), although perhaps very slightly, when we have the idea that a person makes someone we hate joyful (or sad).

On the basis of these considerations we easily understand Spinoza's definition of the secondary emotions he calls '*Favor*' and '*Indignatio*', which Curley translates as 'Favor' and

'Indignation'. In IIIP22 Spinoza writes: '*Next, Love toward him who has done good to another we shall call Favor, and Hatred toward him who has done evil to another we shall call Indignation.*' In IIIAD19 Spinoza writes: '*Favor is a Love toward someone who has benefited another.*' And in IIIAD20 he writes: '*Indignation is a Hate toward someone who has done evil to another.*' In IIIP39S Spinoza explains that in these propositions 'to do good or evil to someone' simply means 'to make someone feel joyful or sad'. Favor, then, Spinoza defines as 'Love for a person that makes someone joyful', and Indignation he defines as 'Hate for a person that makes someone sad'.

Earlier I argued that Spinoza's definitions of Compassion and Envy are problematic because he defines these secondary emotions as kinds of Love and Hate, whereas, in my opinion, he would have better defined them as kinds of Joy and Sadness. Spinoza's definitions of Favor and Indignation are problematic for the same reason, as Spinoza defines these secondary emotions, too, as species of Love and Hate.

I think Spinoza would have better defined Favor as 'the Joy that we feel when have the idea that a person makes someone else joyful', and Indignation as 'the Sadness that we feel when we have the idea that a person makes someone sad'. Here, of course, the person that is made joyful or sad is someone whom we love or, at least, do not hate, because, as said, we are joyful (or sad) when a person makes someone whom we hate sad (or joyful). That Spinoza would agree with these definitions is suggested by the fact that he defines Praise and Blame, of which Favor and Indignation are just derivatives, not as kinds of Love and Hate, but as kinds of Joy and Sadness. (Favor is merely Praise of a person who has attempted to make not us but someone else joyful, and Indignation is the opposite of this.)

Although I think Spinoza made a mistake in defining Compassion and Envy as kinds of Love and Hate, I still think that it makes sense that he defines Favor and Indignation as kinds of Love and Hate, and I think that it would have made sense if he had defined Praise and Blame, too, as kinds of Love and Hate. The reason is that we often do not make a distinction between a person and his actions. If our idea of a person's action makes us joyful, then often our idea of that person *as such* makes us joyful. If, in other words, we love what the person does, then we often love him. We only make a distinction between a person and his action when we think that he does not act like himself, that is, when we think that he normally does not behave that way. When someone we love, that is, someone who often makes us joyful, makes us sad, then we will not hate him as a person, but we will dislike his action, and when someone we hate, that is, someone who often makes us sad, makes us joyful, then we will not love him as a person, but we will like his action.

Pride and Shame

In chapter 7 I shall discuss Spinoza's claim that when our idea of a person or a person's action makes us joyful, then we desire to make that person joyful, and when our idea of a person or a person's action makes us sad, then we desire to make that person sad. In other words, we desire to make a person we love joyful, and a person we hate sad. We are, therefore, joyful when we have the idea that we make the person we love joyful and the person we hate sad, whereas we are sad when we have the idea that we make the person we love sad (or not joyful) and the person we hate joyful (or not sad). Now that we have seen Spinoza's definitions of Praise and Blame, we understand that this is the same as saying that we are joyful when we have the idea that we are praised by the person we love and that we are sad when we have the idea that we are blamed by the person we love.

On the basis of this reasoning we easily understand the definitions of the secondary emotions Spinoza calls '*Gloria*' and '*Pudor*', which Curley translates as 'Love of Esteem' and 'Shame'. Spinoza writes in IIIP30S: '[…] *Joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause, we shall call Love of Esteem, and the Sadness contrary to it, Shame – I mean when the Joy or Sadness arise from the fact that the man believes that he is praised or blamed.*' In IIIAD30 he writes: '*Love of esteem is a Joy accompanied by the idea of some action of ours which we imagine that others praise.*' And in IIIAD31 he writes: '*Shame is a Sadness, accompanied by the idea of some action [NS: of ours] which we imagine that others blame.*'

Spinoza, then, calls the Joy that we feel when we have the idea that we make someone joyful '*Gloria*' and he calls the Sadness that we feel when we have the idea that we make someone sad '*Pudor*'. In other words, to feel the emotion of '*Gloria*' is to feel joyful because we have the idea that we are praised, and to feel the emotion of '*Pudor*' is to feel sad because we have the idea that we are blamed. Here we have to keep in mind that the other person Spinoza is talking about is someone whom we love or at least someone whom we do not hate, because (not taking into account our imitation of the emotions of the person we hate) we feel sad, rather than joyful, when we have the idea that we make someone we hate joyful, and we feel joyful, rather than sad, when we have the idea that we make someone we hate sad.

Curley translates the Latin word '*Gloria*' as 'Love of esteem'. This translation is misleading, because Spinoza makes a distinction between praising a person and esteeming a person. In other words, Spinoza makes a distinction between feeling joyful because we have the idea that another person attempts to make us joyful, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to think highly of a person. This distinction is important, because it seems that Spinoza holds that we judge that a person is a good person because our idea of him makes us joyful,

that is, because we love him; we do not love a person because we judge that he is a good person. Spinoza does not make this claim himself, but it follows from his claim that we judge something to be good because we desire it[32]. Curley, in my opinion, would better have translated '*Gloria*' as 'Love of Praise', or 'Pride', or 'Honour'[33].

Immediately before the sentence cited from IIIP30S Spinoza writes: '*Since Love (by P13S) is Joy, accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and Hate is Sadness, accompanied also by the idea of an external cause, this Joy and Sadness are species of Love and Hate. But because Love and Hate are related to external objects, I shall signify these affects by other names.*' Spinoza is here talking about the Joy that we feel when we have the idea that we make the person we love joyful and the Sadness that we feel when we have the idea that we make the person we love sad. Spinoza, thus, wants to say that, in fact, we love ourselves when we have the idea that we make the person we love joyful, and that we hate ourselves when we have the idea that we make the person we love sad. Pride and Shame, he wants to say, are forms of self-love and self-hate. When we feel joyful (or sad) because we have the idea that we make someone joyful (or sad), our idea of ourselves makes us joyful (or sad), and thus we love (or hate) ourselves.

IIIP30S is very important to the interpretation of Spinoza's theory of emotion because there Spinoza writes that Pride is caused by our *belief* that we are praised. As we have seen so far, Spinoza standardly writes that we are joyful or sad because we *imagine* something or because we have a certain *mental image*. We have seen that, although he mentions belief in IIIP40 and IIIP41, it is unclear whether he there assigns a causal role to it. In IIIP30S, however, he clearly assigns a causal role to belief. In IIIP30S we are joyful or sad because we believe that we are praised or blamed. I may, for example, feel joyful because I believe that my grandmother would have liked what I am doing with my life without having to imagine her sitting on a cloud with a smile on her face

[32] The reason is that we are motivated to believe that something is good when we are affected with Joy by our idea of it, and hence, when we desire it. So, we are motivated to believe that someone is a good person when we love him and when we desire to make him joyful.

[33] In the opening passage of the *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect* (II/6/1, p.7) Spinoza writes that there are three things men desire most: wealth, honour and sensual pleasure. It seems that by 'honour' there he refers to the same thing as by 'glory' here, namely being praised by others.

Self-satisfaction and Repentance

Remember that our idea of our own action may make us feel joyful or sad. We may, as we have seen, be joyful because we have made someone joyful, or sad because we have made someone sad. There are, of course, other reasons why we may feel joyful or sad for having acted in a certain way. After having said that he calls Joy and Sadness accompanied by an internal cause '*Gloria*' and '*Pudor*', Spinoza writes: '*I mean when the Joy or Sadness arises from the fact that a man believes that he is praised or blamed. Otherwise, I shall call Joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause, Self-esteem, and the Sadness contrary to it, Repentance.* He writes in IIIP51: '[…] *we easily conceive that a man can often be the cause of his own Sadness and his own Joy, or that he is affected both with Joy and with Sadness, accompanied by the idea of himself as their cause. So we easily understand what Repentance and Self-esteem are: Repentance is Sadness accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause, and Self-esteem is Joy accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause.*'

The Latin word that Curley translates as 'Self-Esteem', in IIIP30 and IIIP51, is '*Acquiescentia in se ipso*'. This translation seems mistaken. Spinoza is here talking about a Joy that we feel when we have acted in a certain way. This Joy is the opposite of the Sadness that we feel when we have acted in a certain way, which Spinoza calls 'Repentance' (*Poenitentia*). To feel Repentance is to feel bad about what we have done. To esteem ourselves is not the same thing as to feel good about what we have done. On Spinoza's account, we esteem ourselves *because* we feel good about what we have done. '*Acquiescentia in se ipso*' is better translated as 'Self-satisfaction'. We say that we are satisfied with ourselves when we are happy with the way we have acted. One might also say that in such a case we are proud of ourselves, but in this context 'Pride' is not a good translation, because Spinoza wants to make a distinction between being satisfied or unsatisfied with our own actions because other people praise or blame them, and being satisfied with our own actions no matter how other people esteem them.

As said earlier, I believe that Spinoza has chosen the wrong word, namely 'remorse', to refer to the emotion of Sadness caused by our idea of a past thing. To my mind, the word 'remorse' refers more or less to the same emotion as the word 'repentance', namely to the emotion of Sadness caused by our idea of our own actions.

Self-love and Humility

Remember that Pride & Shame and Self-satisfaction & Repentance are Joy or Sadness caused by our idea of our own actions. They are, one might say, the Love or the Hate that we feel for ourselves because we consider our own actions. Spinoza writes that we are also joyful or sad when we consider our strength or weakness.

In IIIP55S Spinoza writes: '*This Sadness, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness is called Humility. But Joy arising from considering ourselves* [ex contemplatione nostri]*, is called Self-love or Self-esteem.*' In IIIAD25 he writes: '*Self-esteem is a Joy born of the fact that a man considers* [contemplatur] *himself and his own power of acting.*' And in IIIAD26 he writes: '*Humility is a Sadness born of the fact that a man considers his own lack of power, or weakness.*'

Spinoza, then, calls the Joy that we feel when we consider our own strength he calls Self-love, *or* Self-satisfaction (*Philautia sive Acquiescentia in se ipso*). He just calls the Sadness that we feel when we consider our own weakness 'Humility' (*Humilitas*), but not 'Self-Hatred', even though to think of oneself with Sadness, is, of course, to hate oneself[34].

Self-Love and Humility are the only secondary emotions that Spinoza defines as Joy or Sadness caused by a 'consideration' of something. What does it mean to consider one's strength or weakness? Given that most of our 'strengths' and 'weaknesses', it seems, cannot be visualised, this merely seems to mean 'to believe that one has a certain strength or weakness'. It seems quite impossible to visualise, for example, that one is a good philosopher but a bad singer, whereas it is quite possible to believe these things. We might, therefore, have another example here of a situation in which Joy and Sadness are caused by a certain belief. It must be stressed, however, that IIIP30S is the only passage where Spinoza gives a clear example of a case in which Joy and Sadness are caused by a belief.

It is unclear what Spinoza means here by 'our strength or weakness'. He might be referring to any quality of ourselves (our idea of which) makes us joyful or sad, such as being beautiful or ugly, or being good or bad at reciting poetry from memory. This interpretation would make sense, because people often like, but also dislike, themselves for rather curious reasons. However, it seems that *acquiescentia in se ipso* is not to love oneself for any kind of reason whatsoever, but rather to love oneself because one knows that one is part of Nature, and, as such, a finite and determinate expression of Nature's power. Such a, let us say,

[34] The reason why Spinoza speaks of 'humility' rather than of 'self-hatred' is perhaps that, according to his own theory of emotion, self-hatred, if it existed, would lead to the desire to make oneself sad, which would be an expression of the desire to destroy the things that we hate (see chapter 7). Spinoza, however, argues that everything resists its own destruction, and thus he cannot allow for the existence of self-hatred.

spinozistic understanding of ourselves can perhaps humble us in the sense that it tells us that we do not have any supernatural qualities, such as an immortal personal soul, or the capacity to freely choose what we believe, what we desire and what we do. But, Spinoza seems to say, this true understanding of ourselves tells us that at every moment we fully actualise our capacities, so to speak, and that we can never be anything more than what we are. We are perfect in the sense of being everything that we can be.

Chapter 5: The bodily cause and nature of Joy and Sadness

In the previous chapter we have discussed Spinoza's statements about the emotions of Joy and Sadness insofar as they are mental states. Spinoza believes that the emotions of Joy and Sadness are not only states of our mind but also states of our body, and that, insofar as they are states of our body, they have a bodily cause. In this chapter I answer the question as to what Spinoza thinks is the bodily cause and nature of Joy and Sadness. In chapter 7 I answer the question as to what Spinoza thinks is the bodily cause and nature of Desire. My answers to these questions will remain speculative, because Spinoza, unfortunately, says very little about the bodily nature and the bodily cause of emotions, and the little that he writes about them is highly abstract. Nonetheless, I believe that my speculative answers to these questions considerably clarify Spinoza's theory of emotion.

In the first section of this chapter I interpret in more concrete terms Spinoza's abstract claim that the power of our body is increased or decreased when we feel joyful or sad. I argue that this must mean that when we feel joyful or sad, our bodily health is increased or decreased due to a beneficial or detrimental affection of our heart, and perhaps other internal organs, by the animal spirits. In the second section I discuss how this relates to Spinoza's thesis that the power of our body depends on the parts of our body communicating their motions and rest in a fixed proportion. In the third section I discuss the bodily cause of Joy and Sadness qua bodily states, that is, the bodily cause of the increase or decrease in our health due to an affection of our heart by the animal spirits. I argue that, because Joy and Sadness qua mental states are caused by our ideas of things, Joy and Sadness qua bodily states must be caused by those states of our body that correspond to our ideas of things. In the fourth and final section I interpret Spinoza's claim that Joy and Sadness qua mental states constitute an increase or decrease in the mind's power of thinking. In the next chapter I shall discuss the psychophysical nature of Pleasure, Pain, Cheerfulness and Melancholy which, according to Spinoza, are kinds of Joy and Sadness.

Section 1: The bodily nature of Joy and Sadness

Spinoza makes his first remark about the bodily nature of emotion in IIID3, where he defines what emotion is: '*By affect I understand affections of the Body by which the Body's power of acting is increased or decreased, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections.*' When Spinoza says that an emotion consists in a certain kind of affection of the body, *or* state of the body, and in the 'idea' of that bodily state, he uses the word 'idea' in the sense of 'mental state' and not in the sense of 'cognitive mental state'. He means that our emotions qua mental states correspond to certain states of our body, and that these states of our body constitute our emotions qua bodily states. Our emotions are only 'ideas' of our body in a metaphysical sense; they are not 'ideas' of our body in a phenomenal sense.

Emotions qua bodily states, Spinoza says in IIID3, consist in an affection of the human body by which the power of the body is *increased or decreased*, or *aided or restrained*. Spinoza never explains what the difference is between, on the one hand, an affection of the body by which the power of the body is increased or decreased and, on the other hand, an affection of the body by which the power of the body is aided or restrained. One might speculate that when the power of the body is increased or decreased then the power of the body changes, whereas when the power of the body is aided or restrained it remains the same. But this cannot be what Spinoza has in mind, because according to him, as we shall see in a moment, Joy and Sadness qua bodily states consist in a *transition* of the body from less to more power or from more to less power. Joy and Sadness qua bodily states, in other words, consist in a *change* in the power of the body.

Although here, and in most passages, Spinoza speaks about the body's power of *acting* (*potentia agendi*), he also often speaks about the body's 'power of existing' (*potentia existendi*). Spinoza equates the two terms. I shall merely speak about the 'body's power' without adding the specification 'of acting' or 'of existing'.

Spinoza gives us a little more information about the bodily nature of emotion in IIIP11. Here he tells us that Joy qua bodily state consists in an increase in the power of the body, and that Sadness qua bodily state consists in a decrease in the power of the body. In other words, Joy qua psychophysical state consists in an increase in the power of the body and in the corresponding mental state, and Sadness qua psychophysical state consists in a decrease in the power of the body and in the corresponding mental state. (I shall discuss the first part of IIIP11 later on in this chapter, and the rest of IIIP11 in the next chapter. IIIP11 is a very complicated proposition and I have to interpret it in several steps.) Although in IIID3 Spinoza

seems to define emotion in general, it is clear from IIIP11 that he thinks of Joy and Sadness when, in IIID3, he defines emotion as a state of increased or decreased bodily power and the mental state that corresponds to this bodily state. That Spinoza does not specify the bodily nature of Desire in his definition of emotion in IIID3 does not imply that he believes that Desire is not an emotion. We have seen in the previous chapter that Spinoza recognises Desire as a primitive emotion.

IIID3 and IIIP11 may be interpreted as saying that we feel joyful because *we believe that we become more powerful*, and that we feel sad because we believe that we become less powerful. This interpretation is certainly mistaken. Spinoza clearly means that Joy and Sadness qua mental states correspond to Joy and Sadness qua bodily states, and that Joy and Sadness qua bodily states consist in an increase or decrease in power. In other words, something goes on in our body when we are joyful or sad, and what is going on in our body when we are joyful or sad constitutes an increase or decrease in the power of our body. Spinoza writes that the emotion of Joy or Sadness qua mental state occurs *at the same time* as the power of our body increases or decreases. The mind's being joyful or sad and the body's power being increased or decreased are simultaneous events. It is not the case that the power of our body first changes, that we then become aware of this change, and that we finally become joyful or sad because we know that the power of our body has changed.

Spinoza stresses that the bodily state and the mental state that constitute an emotion occur at the same time in order to make clear that the one is not caused by the other. The emotion qua mental state is, metaphysically speaking, an idea of the emotion qua bodily state. In other words, the emotion qua mental state and the emotion qua bodily state correspond to each other. Spinoza thus rejects Descartes's thesis that Joy and Sadness are sometimes caused in the mind by certain bodily states and that Joy and Sadness sometimes cause certain bodily states. Joy and Sadness, according to Spinoza, consist in the non-cognitive mental states that we refer to when we say that we are joyful or sad and, at the same time, in the increase or decrease in the power of our body that takes place when we are joyful or sad. To put this schematically:

The mental states of Joy and Sadness correspond to an increase or decrease in bodily power	
Attribute of Thought:	Joy or Sadness
Attribute of Extension:	Increase or decrease in bodily power

The claim that Joy and Sadness correspond to a change in bodily power is, to say the least, very abstract. Surprisingly, almost no Spinoza scholar has addressed the question as to what Spinoza concretely means by the term 'bodily power' and what part of the body he thinks gains or loses power when we feel joyful or sad[35]. The failure to ask these basic questions has, in my opinion, led to much confusion.

One might speculate that by 'bodily power' Spinoza means 'muscular power' when he writes that Joy and Sadness qua mental states correspond to a change in bodily power. On second thought, however, it is clear that this cannot be the case, because we do not become more muscular whenever we are joyful and we do not become less muscular whenever we are sad. If that were the case, then bodybuilders would watch comedies instead of going to the gym, and they would be happier people than philosophers, something which no philosopher, and certainly not Spinoza, would claim.

One might also speculate that Joy and Sadness qua mental states correspond to bodily states such as certain facial expressions, certain bodily gestures and postures, laughing, crying, and so forth. However, these kinds of bodily states do not seem to constitute an increase or decrease in bodily power, whatever that might mean, and in any case, Spinoza dismisses these states as being irrelevant. He writes in IIIP59S: '*As for the external affections of the Body, which are observed in the affects – such as trembling, paleness, sobbing, laughter, etc. – I have neglected them, because they are related to the Body only, without any relation to the Mind.*' These affections of the body, Spinoza says, are *external* affections of the body and they are not the ones to which Joy and Sadness qua mental states correspond. Joy and Sadness qua mental states, we may deduce from this passage, must correspond to some *internal* affections of the body.

[35] Della Rocca (1996, p.220) gives as an example of the increase in power that is involved in the emotion of Joy the case in which a prisoner is released from his chains, and the case in which he, Della Rocca, buys a car which enables him to travel faster to work. Nadler (2006, p.200) writes that the following bodily conditions may correspond to Joy and Sadness: injury, sickness, ageing, training (sports), and nutrition. Marshall (2008, p.11) seems to think that Spinoza indicates the external bodily affections as the bodily correlates of our emotions. Hampshire (1951, p.125; 128) and Gebhart (1999, p.618) say that Joy and Sadness correspond to an increase or decrease in 'vitality'. Only Bennett (1984, p.256) suggests that Joy and Sadness correspond to an increase or decrease in bodily health.

In order to make an informed guess as to what Spinoza thinks is the bodily nature of Joy and Sadness we do well to consult Descartes's *The Passions of the Soul*[36]. Descartes argues that the bodily states that cause passions in the soul are caused by the animal spirits. His description of the bodily movements that cause us to feel Joy and Sadness are, of course, particularly relevant here. According to Descartes we feel the passion of Joy when the animal spirits open and enlarge the orifices of the heart, which event leads to the formation of equal and subtle animal spirits, and we feel the passion of Sadness when the animal spirits cause the contrary effects. (See article 190, and articles 102-105.) Descartes's description of the bodily movements that cause us to feel Love and Hate are also relevant, because Spinoza argues that these emotions are kinds of Joy and Sadness. According to Descartes, we feel the passion of Love when the animal spirits affect the stomach, intestines, spleen and liver in such a way that they improve the digestion of food and, hence, the quality of the blood, which improvement causes the heart to produce more heat, and we feel the passion of Hatred when the animal spirits cause the contrary effects. According to Descartes, then, we feel these passions when our *heart* is affected, sometimes together with the *organs of our digestive system*. Important is furthermore that all these changes in the movements of the blood and in the operations of the internal organs are either *beneficial to our health or detrimental to our health*.

It seems highly likely that when Spinoza writes that the bodily nature of the emotions of Joy and Sadness consists in an increase or decrease in bodily power, he is referring to the healthy and unhealthy bodily affections that Descartes believes cause the passions of Joy and Sadness in the soul. It seems highly likely, in other words, that Spinoza believes that we feel the emotion of Joy when the animal spirits affect our heart and perhaps the organs of our digestive system in a way that is conducive to our health, and that we feel the emotion of Sadness when the animal spirits affect our heart and perhaps the organs of our digestive system in a way that is detrimental to our health. The main disagreement between Descartes and Spinoza, then, does not concern the nature of the bodily states that are involved when we feel joyful or sad, but the relation between these bodily states and the emotions qua mental states. Descartes argues that the passions of Joy and Sadness are caused by these bodily states, whereas Spinoza argues that Joy and Sadness are, metaphysically speaking, ideas of these bodily states. According to Spinoza we feel joyful or sad *when* these bodily events occur and not *because* these bodily events occur.

[36] Hobbes, too, argues that emotions qua bodily states consist in affections of the heart that have a beneficial or detrimental effect on the body's health. See section 3 of this chapter.

Although in the *Ethics* Spinoza gives no concrete description of the bodily events that occur when we feel Joy or Sadness, in a footnote of the *Short Treatise* (I/96/14, p. 135) he *does* refer to a specific part of our body that is affected when we feel Joy and Sadness, namely our heart:

> The Sadness is produced in man by an opinion that something bad is happening to him, i.e., the loss of some good. When he has such a perception, the result is that the spirits gather around the heart, and with the help of other parts press against it and enclose it, just the opposite of what happens in joy. The soul in turn is aware of this pressure and is pained. Now, what is it that medicines or wine bring about? This: that by their action they drive these spirits from the heart and make room again. When the soul becomes aware of this, it gets relief in that the opinion that something bad is occurring is diverted by the different proportion of motion and rest which the wine produces; so it turns to something else, in which the intellect finds more satisfaction. This cannot be an immediate action of the wine on the soul, but only an action of the wine on the spirits [and thereby on the soul].[37]

Spinoza, then, tells us in this passage of the *Short Treatise* that we feel sad when the animal spirits press against and enclose the heart, whereas we feel joyful when the animal spirits leave the heart and create space there. This, of course, very much resembles Descartes's description of the bodily states that cause the passions of Joy and Sadness in the soul. It might also be interesting to note that one of the Dutch words that Spinoza uses in the *Short Treatise* to refer to passive emotions is the word '*hartstocht*', which literally means 'urges or stirring of the heart'[38].

Although the theory of emotion that Spinoza defends in the *Short Treatise* differs considerably from the theory of emotion that he defends in the *Ethics*, I see no good reason to suppose that at the time of writing the *Ethics* Spinoza has rejected the thesis that (especially) our heart is affected in a healthy or unhealthy manner by the animal spirits when we feel joyful or sad. From now on, then, I shall suppose that when Spinoza speaks of the power of the body, he is talking about *the health of our body*, and that when he says that we feel joyful or sad when the power of our body is increased or decreased, he is saying that the heart, perhaps with other internal organs, is affected by the animal spirits in a way that increases or decreases the health of the body. To put this schematically:

[37] In the *Short Treatise* Spinoza writes that passions are caused by opinions, rather than by mental images.
[38] See Steenbakkers (2000, p.196)

The mental states of Joy and Sadness correspond to an increase or decrease in bodily health due to an affections of the heart by the animal spirits	
Attribute of Thought:	Joy or Sadness
Attribute of Extension:	Increase or decrease in bodily health due to an affection of the heart

Joy and Sadness, it is important to realise, correspond to a specific increase or decrease in bodily health, namely one that is caused by an affection of the heart, and perhaps other internal organs, by the animal spirits. As we shall see in the next chapter, our health may be increased or decreased in another way, namely by being affected by external bodies, but in such a case we do not feel Joy or Sadness, but Pleasure or Pain.

One wonders why Spinoza is not more informative about the bodily nature of Joy and Sadness. I suggest that the reason for his silence on this topic is that a detailed study of the bodily events involved when we feel Joy and Sadness is unnecessary for his moral theory. Important to his moral theory are the claims that (1) these bodily processes do not cause emotions in the mind, but are represented by the mind in the form of the emotion of Joy and Sadness, and that (2) the health of our body is increased when we feel the emotion of Joy whereas the health of our body is decreased when we feel the emotion of Sadness. Furthermore, Descartes had already made a detailed study of the bodily events involved when we feel emotions, and Spinoza, apparently, did not feel the need to comment on Descartes's physiological study. Supposing that his readers had read Descartes's *The Passions of the Soul*, Spinoza might have thought it unnecessary to explain that by saying that 'Joy and Sadness qua mental states correspond to an increase or decrease in bodily power' he refers to an increase or decrease in bodily health due to *some kind* of beneficial or detrimental affection of the heart and other internal organs that occurs when we feel joyful or sad.

Section 2: The fixed proportion of motion and rest

Although Spinoza does not specify which parts of our body are affected when we feel joyful or sad, he does offer a very abstract physiological theory of what the 'power of the human body', *or*, if I am correct, the health of the human body, consists in. He claims that the existence of our body depends thereon that the smaller bodies that compose our body (I suppose we may think of the cells of our body) 'communicate their motions in a fixed proportion'. Our body becomes less powerful, *or* healthy, when this proportion is disturbed, and our body regains its power, *or* health, when this proportion is restored. The proportion in

which the parts of our body communicate their motion and rest can only be disturbed up to a certain point, after which point our body either completely changes form or disintegrates.

Spinoza does not really explain what it means for the parts of our body to communicate their motions in a fixed ratio, but it is clear that our body only exists if parts cohere[39]. If my arm flew off in one direction and my leg in another, there would be little left of my body. Although Spinoza does not use the word 'coherence', I believe that this theory may be reformulated by saying that the power of our body, *or* its health, depends on the degree of coherence of its composing bodies. The body becomes more powerful, *or* healthy, when its coherence is strengthened, and it becomes less powerful, *or* healthy, when its coherence is weakened, and it disintegrates when its coherence is weakened too much.

Notice that in the passage from the *Short Treatise* that we have discussed in the previous section Spinoza clearly states that the 'proportion of motion and rest' in the body is changed when we feel joyful or sad. He, thus, argues that being joyful is, in principle, beneficial to the power, *or* health, of our body, and that being sad is detrimental to the power, *or* health, of our body. (I say 'in principle', because, as we shall see in the next chapter, being joyful can sometimes be detrimental to the health of our body, and being sad can sometimes be beneficial to the health of our body.) We all know through personal experience that this is true.

Saying that our bodily power, *or* health, is strengthened or weakened when we feel joyful or sad does not imply that we feel joyful or sad whenever our bodily power, *or* health, is strengthened or weakened. Joy and Sadness correspond to a *specific* kind of strengthening or weakening of our health, namely one that is due to an affection of our heart and other internal organs by the animal spirits. In the next chapter I shall argue that Spinoza, unfortunately, does not sufficiently stress this point.

Section 3: The bodily cause of Joy and Sadness

Although Spinoza often suggests that the emotions of Joy and Sadness are caused by external bodies, it is clear that he does not mean that external bodies directly cause the bodily states that constitute Joy and Sadness. There is, after all, no immediate physical contact between the external bodies concerning which we feel joyful or sad and the internal organs of our body whose altered state constitutes Joy or Sadness qua bodily state. Moreover, we very often feel joyful or sad concerning things that do not even exist. This is, for example, the case

[39] Spinoza explains coherence through mechanical principles, that is, bodies pushing each other, rather than attracting each other.

when an idea of a past or future thing makes us joyful or sad. It is also clear that Spinoza denies that our ideas of things cause our emotions of Joy and Sadness qua bodily states, because he denies in general that the human mind can change the state of the human body.

Let me illustrate these two points: Say that I feel sad because I see that my house is on fire. Now, my visual perception of my burning house is the cause of my Sadness only in so far as it is a state of my mind. My visual perception of my burning house is not the cause of the decrease in my health that constitutes my Sadness qua bodily state. Nor is the decrease in my health caused by my burning house. The only way my burning house can influence my bodily health is by warming my skin or by burning my skin. If the fire warms my skin I feel Pleasure, and if it burns my skin I feel Pain, but in neither case do I feel Sadness. Another example: Say that I feel sad because my house burned down yesterday. In this case, the idea that my house burned down yesterday causes my Sadness, but only insofar as it is a state of my mind. The idea that my house burned down yesterday does not affect my heart. Nor is the affection of my heart caused by my house, because my house does not exist anymore.

If Joy and Sadness qua bodily states are neither caused by external bodies, nor by our ideas of things, then what is their cause? Upon reflection it is clear that Joy and Sadness qua bodily states must be caused by the states of our body that correspond to our ideas of things. Therefore, the question 'What is the bodily cause of Joy and Sadness qua bodily states?' can be reformulated as: 'To which states of our body do our ideas of things correspond?'. The following scheme illustrates this question.

Joy and Sadness qua bodily states must be caused by the states our body that correspond to our ideas of things.			
Attribute of Thought:	our idea of something	→	Joy or Sadness
Attribute of Extension:	?	→	increase or decrease in bodily health

We know that our ideas of finite things are mental images, and that our mental images correspond to affections of our brain. We may, therefore, conclude that when our Joy or Sadness is caused by a mental image, then the increase or decrease in our bodily health due to an affection of our heart, which constitutes our Joy or Sadness qua bodily state, is caused by the affection of our brain that corresponds to our mental image. An affection of the brain affects the heart by means of the animal spirits. If, for example, I feel sad because I see that my house is on fire, then the decrease in my bodily health due to an affection of my heart by the animal spirits, which event constitutes my Sadness qua bodily state, is caused by the

affection of my brain that corresponds to my visual perception of my burning house. The following scheme illustrates this.

When Joy or Sadness qua mental state is caused by a mental image, then the increase or decrease in bodily health, which constitutes Joy or Sadness qua bodily state, is caused by the affection of the brain that corresponds to the mental image.			
Attribute of Thought:	mental image	→	Joy or Sadness
Attribute of Extension:	affection of the brain	→	increase or decrease in bodily health

If this reasoning is correct, and if Spinoza indeed thought that 'when a mental image causes Joy or Sadness, then, at the same time, the affection of the brain corresponding to this mental image causes the affection of the heart corresponding to this Joy or Sadness', then Spinoza seems to agree with Hobbes. We have seen in chapter 3 that Hobbes argues that the only ideas that we have are mental images, and that mental images are but motions in the brain caused by the action of external bodies on the body's sense organs. Hobbes argues that this motion in the brain does not stop in the brain, but continues to the heart and, there, has a beneficial or detrimental effect on the vital functions of the body. Emotions are but motions around the heart that are beneficial or detrimental to the vital functions of the body, just as mental images are but motions in the brain. When the motions around the heart is beneficial to the vital motions of the body, then the emotion is called 'pleasure' or 'delight', and when the motions are detrimental, then the emotion is called 'pain' or 'grief'. In the *Leviathan* (Part One, Chapter 6[40]) Hobbes writes:

> As, in sense, that which is really within us, is, as I have said before, only motion, caused by the action of external objects, but in apparence: to the sight, light and colour; to the ear, sound; to the nostril, odour, &c.: so, when the action of the same object is continued from the eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, the real effect there is nothing but motion, or endeavour; which consisteth in appetite, or aversion, to or from the object moving. But the apparence, or sense of that motion, is that we either call delight, or trouble of mind. This motion, which is called appetite, and for the apparence of it delight, and pleasure, seemeth to be a corroboration of vital motion, and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused delight, were not improperly called jucunda, à juvando, from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, molesta, offensive, from hindering, and troubling the motion vital.

[40] *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, vol. III, p.42

And in *Human Nature* (Chapter 7[41]) he writes:

> In the eighth section of the second chapter is shewed, that conceptions and apparitions are nothing really, but motion in some internal substance of the head; which motions not stopping there, but proceeding to the heart, of necessity must there either help or hinder the motion which is called vital; when it helpeth, it is called delight, contentment, or pleasure, which is nothing really but motion about the heart, as conception is nothing but motion in the head: and the objects that cause it are called pleasant or delightful, or by some name equivalent; the Latins have jucundum, a juvando, from helping; and the same delight with reference to the object is called love, but when such motion weakeneth or hindereth the vital motion, the it is called pain; and in relation to that which causeth it, hatred, which the Latins express sometimes by odium and sometimes taedium[42].

Notice that Hobbes writes that the motion coming from the brain can either 'fortify and help or weaken and hinder' the vital motions of the body. This is strikingly similar to Spinoza's claim that Joy and Sadness consist in an affection of the body that either 'increases and aids or decreases and restrains' the power of the body. These two passages also show other similarities with Spinoza's theory of emotion (for example that the emotions of delight and grief are called love and hate in reference to their object, or that delight and grief are the 'apparance' of endeavour, *or* appetite), but it is not my intention here to work out the similarities and dissimilarities, or historical connection, between Hobbes's theory of emotion and Spinoza's theory of emotion. I merely mention Hobbes in passing here in order to suggest that it would not be surprising at all if Spinoza indeed held that 'the affections of the brain corresponding to mental images cause the healthy and unhealthy affections of the heart corresponding to Joy and Sadness', given the circulation of similar theories at the time.

The bodily cause of the Intellectual Love of God

An important question remains unanswered: What happens in our body when our Joy or Sadness is not caused by a mental image, but by an adequate idea? Spinoza only gives one clear example of an emotion that is caused by an adequate idea, and that is the Joy that is caused by our adequate idea of God, or, in other words, our Love for God. Let us, then,

[41] *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, vol. IV, p.30

[42] And, very similarly, Hobbes writes in the following chapter (see *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, vol. IV, p.34): *'Having in the first section of the precedent chapter presupposed, that motion and agitation of the brain which we call conception, to be continued to the heart, and there to be called passion; I have therefor obliged myself, as far forth as I am able, to search out and declare from what conception proceedeth every one of those passions which we commonly take notice of: for, seeing the things that please and displease, are innumerable, and work innumerable ways, men have not taken notice but of a very few, which also are many of them without name.'*

reformulate the question and ask: What happens in our body when our adequate idea of God makes us feel joyful? In chapter 2 I have discussed a number of passages that suggest that our adequate idea of God does not correspond to an affection of our brain. If our adequate idea of God indeed does not correspond to an affection of our brain, then it seems that the state of our body that corresponds to the emotion of Joy that constitutes our intellectual Love of God has no bodily cause. Moreover, in the following passage from the *Short Treatise* (I/201/6, p.140) Spinoza suggests that the intellectual Love of God does not even correspond to a state of our body.

> To grasp this union [of our soul with God. CR] better and infer what it must be, we must consider the effect [of the union] with the body. In this we see how, by knowledge of and passions toward corporeal things, there come to arise in us all those effects which we are constantly aware of in our body, through the motions of the spirits; and so (if once our knowledge and love come to fall on that without which we can neither exist nor be understood, and which is not at all corporeal) the effects arising from this union will, and must, be incomparably greater and more magnificent. For these [effects] must necessarily be commensurate with the thing with which it is united. When we become aware of these effect, we can truly say that we have been born again. For our first birth was when we were united with the body. From this union have arisen the effects and motions of the [animal] spirits. But our other, or second, birth will occur when we become aware in ourselves of the completely different effects of love produced by the knowledge of this incorporeal thing. This [love of God] is as different from [the love of our body] as the incorporeal is from the corporeal, the spirit from the flesh.

When our mind is united with our body, we have ideas of external bodies and hence passions caused by our ideas of external bodies. Our ideas of external bodies and our passions both correspond to bodily processes that involve the animal spirits. However, our idea of God and the love that this idea causes do not correspond to any process in our body. Perhaps this is still Spinoza's thesis in the *Ethics*, because the *Ethics*, as shown in chapter 2, contains passages that suggest that our idea of God does not correspond to an affection of our brain.

Section 4: The mind's perfection and power of thinking

Spinoza claims that Joy and Sadness qua mental states consist in an increase or decrease in the *mind's power of thinking and the mind's perfection*. Spinoza writes in IIIP11:

> The idea of any thing that increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our Body's power of acting, increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our Mind's power of thinking. Dem.: This proposition is evident from IIP7, or also from IIP14. Schol.: We see, then, that the Mind can undergo great changes,

> and pass now to a greater, now to a lesser perfection. These passions, indeed, explain to us the affects of Joy and Sadness. By Joy, therefore, I shall understand in what follows that passion by which the mind passes to a greater perfection. And by Sadness, that passion by which it passes to a lesser perfection.

Notice that Spinoza does not literally say that Joy and Sadness correspond to an increase or decrease in the power of the body. He says that the mind passes to a greater or lesser perfection when it is joyful or sad. But from the context of IIIP11 and many other passages it is clear that he conceives Joy and Sadness as an increase or decrease in the perfection of the mind and the body. He defines Joy and Sadness in IIIAD2 and IIIAD3 in the following manner: '*Joy is a man's passage* [*transitio*] *from a lesser to a greater perfection. Sadness is a man's passage from a greater to a lesser perfection.*' From IIIP11 and from many other passages it is clear that the expression 'the perfection of the mind and the body' means the *mind's power of thinking* and *the body's power of acting*. We already know what the expression 'the body's power of acting' means, namely the body's health. What, then, does the expression 'the mind's power of thinking' mean?

One might speculate that Spinoza here uses the expression 'the mind's power of thinking' to refer to our capacity to understand the world. But this is not the case. Spinoza is not saying that we become more or less intelligent when our bodily health is increased or decreased due to an affection of our heart by the animal spirits. Nor is he saying that we become more or less intelligent when we are joyful or sad. Nor is he making any other claim about a possible relation between the emotions of Joy and Sadness and our capacity to understand the world. Spinoza *does* believe that we become more joyful when we become more intelligent, but this is not the point he is making here.

When Spinoza writes that Joy and Sadness consist in an increase or decrease in the mind's power of thinking, he is applying Descartes's thesis that the perfection of a clear and distinct idea depends on the perfection of its object. So, according to Descartes, the clear and distinct idea of God, for example, is more perfect then the clear and distinct idea of man, because God is more perfect than man. In other words, a clear and distinct idea has objectively the perfection that the thing of which it is an idea has formally.

Now, according to Spinoza, our emotions of Joy and Sadness are ideas of a change in the power, *or* health, of the human body. This, as is clear by now, does not mean that Joy and Sadness are our cognitions of the increase or decrease in our health due to an affection of our heart by the animal spirits. Joy and Sadness do not consist in mental images of our heart being affected by the animal spirits, nor in the belief that our heart is affected by the animal spirits.

It simply means that Joy and Sadness are mental states that correspond to a change in our bodily health due to an affection of our heart by the animal spirits.

Given that the perfection of the human body consists, according to Spinoza, in the power, *or* health, of the human body, Joy and Sadness are ideas of a change in the perfection of the human body. The emotion of Joy is an idea of an increase in the perfection of the body, because Joy corresponds to an increase in the power, *or* health, of the human body. The emotion of Sadness is an idea of a decrease in the perfection of the body, because Sadness corresponds to a decrease in the power, *or* health, of the human body.

Given that the perfection of the human mind consists, according to Spinoza, in the perfection of its object, which is the human body, the perfection of the human mind increases or decreases when it has the emotion of Joy or Sadness, because Joy and Sadness are the mind's ideas representing an increase or decrease in the perfection of the human body. The perfection of the human mind increases or decreases when it represents, through its emotions of Joy and Sadness, an increase or decrease in the perfection of the human body. It is in *this* sense that the mind's power of thinking increases or decreases when it has the emotion of Joy or Sadness. When the mind has the emotion of Joy or Sadness it 'thinks' something, that is, it represents something, that has its perfection increased or decreased, namely the human body. Thus, when Spinoza says that the emotions of Joy and Sadness constitute an increase or decrease in the mind's power of thinking, he is saying nothing more than that the human mind, through its emotions of Joy and Sadness, represents an increase or decrease in the perfection of the body.

Our emotions of Joy and Sadness correspond to affections of our heart and our mental images correspond to affections of our brain. To put it simply, we feel with our heart, not with our brain, and we perceive the world with our brain, not with our heart. Clearly, then, even though the mind's power of thinking increases or decreases when we are joyful or sad in the sense explained above, it is not the case that we are more or less able to perceive or understand the world when we are joyful or sad.

Chapter 6: Pleasure, Pain, Cheerfulness and Melancholy

In the previous chapter I interpreted Spinoza's claim that the emotions of Joy and Sadness qua mental states correspond to an increase or a decrease in the power of the human body (which claim Spinoza makes in IIIP11) as saying that our emotions of Joy and Sadness qua mental states correspond to an increase or decrease in our bodily health due to a beneficial or detrimental affection of our heart (and perhaps other internal organs) by the animal spirits.

In IIIP11 Spinoza defines four other psychophysical states besides Joy and Sadness. He calls these psychophysical states 'Titillatio', 'Dolor', 'Hilaritas' and 'Melancolia', which Curley translates as 'Pleasure', 'Pain', 'Cheerfulness' and 'Melancholy'[43]. Curley's translation suggests that Spinoza uses the words 'Titillatio' and 'Dolor' to refer to the sensations of bodily Pleasure and Pain, and the words 'Hilaritas' and 'Melancolia' to the moods of Cheerfulness and Melancholy.

If Spinoza does indeed use the words 'Titillatio', 'Dolor', 'Hilaritas' and 'Melancolia' to refer to the bodily sensations of Pleasure & Pain and the moods of Cheerfulness & Melancholy, then his conception of Pleasure, Pain, Cheerfulness and Melancholy is problematic for at least three reasons. The first problem concerns the relation between on the one hand Joy & Sadness and on the other hand Pleasure & Pain. The second problem concerns the relation between on the one hand Pleasure & Pain and on the other hand Cheerfulness & Melancholy. The third problem concerns Cheerfulness and Melancholy in particular. After having discussed these problems concerning Spinoza's definitions of 'Titillatio', 'Dolor', 'Hilaritas' and 'Melancolia', I suggest slightly altered definitions of these psychophysical states, and I show that these slightly altered definitions work surprisingly well within Spinoza's moral theory.

[43] The following scholars translate *Laetitia* and *Tristitia* as 'pleasure' and 'pain': Wolfson (1934, p.206), Hampshire (1951, p.125; 143), Harris (1973, p.113), Scruton (1986, p.78), Bennett (1984, p.253; 269) translates *Laetitia* and *Tristitia* as 'pleasure' and 'unpleasure'. Della Rocca (1996, p.262) translates *Laetitia* and *Tristitia* sometimes as 'joy' and 'sadness' and sometimes as 'pleasure' and 'pain'. Translating *Laetitia* and *Tristitia* as 'pleasure' and 'pain' is, as I shall argue, highly confusing. Hampshire (1951, p.125; 143) translates *Hilaritas* as 'entire well-being'. Delahunty (1985, p.232) translates *Hilaritas* as 'diffused sense of well-being'. Such translations of *Hilaritas* are problematic because they suggest that *Hilaritas* is a mood, that is, an objectless emotion, whereas Spinoza, as I have shown in chapter 3, denies the existence of objectless emotions.

Section 1: A first problem concerning Spinoza's definitions

Spinoza introduces Pleasure, Pain, Cheerfulness and Melancholy in IIIP11: '*The affect of Joy which is related to the Mind and Body at once I call Pleasure or Cheerfulness, and that of Sadness, Pain or Melancholy. But it should be noted [NS: here] that Pleasure and Pain are ascribed to a man when one part of him is affected more than the rest, whereas Cheerfulness and Melancholy are ascribed to him when all are equally affected*.' It is clear that the expression 'parts of a man' refers to parts of a man's body, because in IVP43D Spinoza writes: '*Pleasure is Joy which, insofar as it is related to the Body, consists in this, that one (or several) of its parts are affected more than the others (see its Def. in IIIP11S).'*

Notice that Spinoza defines Pleasure in terms of Joy, and Pain in terms of Sadness. Pleasure and Pain, he writes, are the Joy and the Sadness that we feel when the power of one or several parts of our body is increased or decreased (more so than that of other parts of our body). Later on in this chapter we shall see that in IIIAD4 Spinoza calls Pleasure and Pain kinds (*species*) of Joy and Sadness. If, in the previous chapter, I was correct in saying that Spinoza uses the expression 'the power of the body' to refer to the health of the body, then, according to Spinoza, Pleasure and Pain are the Joy and the Sadness that we feel when the health of one or several parts of our body is increased or decreased.

I wish to argue that Spinoza mistakenly defines Pleasure and Pain in terms of Joy and Sadness. Saying that Pleasure & Pain are kinds of Joy & Sadness implies that Pleasure & Pain are emotions, *or*, if you wish, affects. (My objection does not depend on the translation of the word '*affectus*'.) But this is mistaken, because Pleasure & Pain are not emotions, but sense perceptions. Pleasure & Pain differ from Joy & Sadness both insofar as they are mental states and insofar as they are bodily states. Furthermore, the mental and bodily causes of Joy & Sadness and the mental and bodily causes of Pleasure & Pain also differ from each other.

The difference between Pleasure & Pain and Joy & Sadness qua mental states consists at least in the fact that we always feel Pleasure and Pain somewhere in our body, whereas we do not feel Joy and Sadness somewhere in our body. We do sometimes feel certain changes in our body when we feel joyful or sad, but it is also possible to feel joyful or sad without feeling such bodily changes, and, furthermore, we experience our emotions of Joy and Sadness as mental states that are different from our sensations of these bodily changes. For example, we may have tears in our eyes when we are joyful or sad, but we experience our emotion of Joy or Sadness and the sensation of having tears as different mental states. It seems that the feeling of Pleasure & Pain is also different from the feeling of Joy & Sadness apart from the

fact that we feel Pleasure & Pain, but not Joy & Sadness, somewhere in our body, but this difference is difficult to put into words.

The difference between Pleasure & Pain and Joy & Sadness qua bodily states lies therein that Pleasure & Pain consist in an increase or decrease in the health of our body caused by an external body, whereas Joy & Sadness consist in an increase or decrease in the health of our body due to an affection of our heart (and perhaps other internal organs) by the animal spirits. We feel Pleasure but not Joy when, for example, we smell the flagrance of a perfume, take a warm bath, etcetera, while we feel Pain but not Sadness when, for example, we hurt our foot against a table, eat something that upsets our stomach, etcetera. When we have heart aches due to excessive cholesterol, for example, we do not feel Sadness but Pain. We may feel Joy because we know that we feel Pleasure, and we may feel Sadness because we know that we feel Pain, but our emotion of Joy does not correspond to the same bodily state as our sensation of Pleasure, and our emotion of Sadness does not correspond to the same bodily state as our sensation of Pain.

It is quite clear from everyday experience that the parts of our body that are affected when we feel Pleasure & Pain are our sense organs. We do not feel Pleasure or Pain when the health of any other part of our body than our sense organs is affected. Although Spinoza does not write in IIIP11 that we feel Pleasure or Pain when the health of our sense organs is affected, he suggests this near the end of the Appendix of Part I (II/82/16, p.445):

> For example, if the motions the nerves receive from objects presented through the eyes is conducive to health, the objects by which it is caused are called beautiful; those which cause a contrary motion are called ugly. Those which move the sense through the nose, they call pleasant-smelling or stinking; through the tongue, sweet or bitter, tasty or tasteless; through touch, hard or soft, rough of smooth, etc.; and finally, those which move the ears are said to produce noise, sound or harmony.

This passage strongly suggests that when Spinoza writes in IIIP11 that we feel Pleasure & Pain when the power of certain parts of our body is increased or decreased, he means that we feel Pleasure & Pain when the health of a sense organ is increased or decreased.

Pleasure & Pain do not only differ from Joy & Sadness as far as their bodily and mental nature is concerned, but their mental and bodily causes also differ from each other. Joy and Sadness qua mental states are caused by our ideas of things; and the changes in bodily health due to affections of the heart by the animal spirits, which constitute Joy and Sadness qua bodily states, are caused by the states of the brain that correspond to our ideas of things.

(This, at least, is true when Joy and Sadness are caused by our ideas of *finite* things, because, then, our ideas are mental images.)

Clearly, the healthy or unhealthy affection of our sense organ that constitutes our Pleasure or Pain qua bodily state is not caused by an affection of our brain, but by an external body that affects our sense organ in a manner that is beneficial or detrimental to the health of that sense organ.

It is more difficult to discern the mental cause of Pleasure and Pain. In fact, one might think that they do not have a mental cause. Pleasure and Pain seem to just 'pop up' in our mind. However, according to Spinoza's metaphysics, every mental state must have a mental cause. Pleasure and Pain qua mental states can neither be caused by the external body that affects our sense organ in a healthy or unhealthy way, nor can they be caused by the healthy or unhealthy affection of our sense organ itself. When, for example, I cut myself in my finger with a kitchen knife, then the kitchen knife causes my Pain qua bodily state, that is, the kitchen knife causes the injury of my finger, but my Pain qua mental state is neither caused by the kitchen knife, nor by the injury of my finger. The mental cause of Pleasure and Pain certainly is not our idea of the external body that affects our sense organ. I know, for example, that the kitchen knife causes the injury of my finger, but my mental image of the kitchen knife does not cause my feeling of Pain. Merely seeing or visualising the knife cutting my finger does not hurt me. My mental image of a kitchen knife may perhaps make me feel sad if I have often cut myself with one, but my mental image of a kitchen knife cannot make me feel Pain, no matter how often I have cut myself with a kitchen knife. The fact that we are sometimes ignorant of the bodily cause of our Pleasure or Pain shows clearly that Pleasure and Pain are not caused by our ideas of things. If, for example, someone hits me on the back of my head, I feel Pain even though I have no idea of the cause of this Pain.

It is clear, then, that Pleasure and Pain are not kinds of emotions (*or*, if you wish, affects), but kinds of sense perceptions. A possible strategy to discover what Spinoza thinks is the mental cause of Pleasure and Pain, therefore, is to ask what he thinks is the cause of sense perception in general. This strategy, however, fails because Spinoza does not tell us what the mental cause of sense perception is.

Recall that, according to Spinoza, we have a sense perception when an external body affects one of our sense organs, and thus our nerves and our brain. Spinoza thus indicates the bodily cause of sense perception qua bodily state, that is, he indicates the bodily cause of the affection of our sense organs, nerves and brain. Our sense perception qua mental state, however, can neither be caused, according to Spinoza's metaphysics, by the external body

that affects our sense organ, nor by the affection of our brain itself. When, for example, I see a tree, then my visual perception qua mental state is neither caused by the tree nor by the affection of my body that the tree causes.

Although Spinoza does not mention the mental cause of sense perception, his metaphysical claim that every single body in nature is the object of an idea that constitutes the mind of that body suggests that the mental cause of sense perception qua mental state is the mind of the external body that affects a sense organ. It suggests, for example, that my visual perception of the tree outside my window is caused by the mind of that tree.

As is well known, Spinoza believes that not only the human body is the object of an idea, which constitutes the human mind, but each other body, too, is the object of an idea, which constitutes the mind of that body. According to Spinoza there is a distinction between our idea of an external body (which idea is a sense perception or a recollection) and the idea that constitutes the mind of that external body. Our idea of an external body is part of our mind, and it represents, metaphysically speaking, not the external body but an affection of our brain. The idea of an external body that constitutes the mind of the external body is not part of our mind. In IIP17S Spinoza gives an example to illustrate the distinction between our idea of an external body and the idea that constitutes the mind of that external body. He writes that there is a distinction between the idea of Peter that constitutes the mind of Peter and the idea of Peter that is in another man, for example Paul. The first idea of Peter explains directly the essence of the body of Peter and is only present when Peter exists. The second idea of Peter indicates more the constitution of the body of Paul than that of Peter and is present in the mind of Paul as long as Paul's body is affected in this way, even if Peter does not exist.

Given that a sense perception qua bodily state, that is, the affection of a sense organ, the nerves and the brain, is caused by an external body, the mental cause of a sense perception qua mental state must be the mind of the external body that affects the sense organ. The following figure illustrates this.

A sense perception of an external body must be caused by the mind of that external body.			
Attribute of Thought:	mind of external body	→	our perception of the external body
Attribute of Extension:	external body	→	affection of our brain

Although Spinoza never writes explicitly that our sense perceptions qua mental states are caused by the minds of the external bodies that affect our sense organs, he does write explicitly that the existence and the destruction of our mind is caused by the mind of an external body!

That the mind of the human body must be caused by the mind of another body is implied by IIP5-9, which says that a particular body can only be caused by another particular body, and that the mind of a particular body can only be caused by the mind of another particular body. However, it is only in IIIP11, precisely the proposition in which Spinoza defines Pleasure and Pain, that he applies this principle, or so it seems, to the human mind: '*The idea of any thing that increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our Body's power of acting, increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our Mind's power of thinking*'. Notice that 'the thing' that changes our body's power is, of course, a body, because our body only interacts with other bodies and not with our mind or other minds. Recall that Spinoza gives the mental states of Joy, Sadness, Pleasure, Pain, Cheerfulness and Melancholy as examples of changes in the mind's power of thinking.

What does Spinoza refer to in IIIP11 by the expression 'the idea of the thing that changes our body's power'? Either he uses this expression to refer to our idea of the external body that changes our body's power, or he uses this expression to refer to the idea that constitutes the mind of the external body that changes our body's power. So, Spinoza is either saying that Joy, Sadness, Pleasure, Pain, Cheerfulness and Melancholy qua mental states are caused by our idea of the external body that changes our body's power, or he is saying that Joy, Sadness, Pleasure, Pain, Cheerfulness and Melancholy are caused by the mind of the external body that changes our body's power.

That Spinoza uses the expression 'the idea of the external body that changes our body's power' to refer to the mind of an external body that changes our body's power, and not to our idea of an external body that changes our body's power, is strongly suggested by IIIP10: '*An idea that excludes the existence of our Body cannot be in our Mind, but is contrary to it. Dem.: Whatever can destroy our Body cannot be in it (by P5), and so the idea of this thing cannot be in God insofar as he has the idea of our Body (by IIP9C), i.e. (by IIP11 and P13), the idea of this thing cannot be in our Mind.*' This cannot mean that we are incapable of forming an idea of an external body that has the capacity to destroy our body, or that is destroying our body, or that has destroyed our body. It is obvious that we can form an idea of something that has the capacity to destroy our body, for example a gun, and that we can form an idea of something that is destroying our body, for example a lethal poison, and it

is too obvious to mention that we cannot form an idea of something that has destroyed our body. Spinoza, therefore, must mean in IIIP11 that, just as a body that can destroy our body is not part of our body but is an external body, so, too, the mind of this external body is not part of our mind but is an external mind.

If, indeed, Spinoza tells us IIIP10 that the mind of a body that destroys our body is an external mind, then he tells us in IIIP11 that the mind of the external body that changes the power of our body changes the power of our mind. This reading of IIIP11 is confirmed by what Spinoza says in IIIP11S:

> In IIP17S we have shown that the idea which constitutes the essence of the Mind involves the existence of the Body so long as the Body itself exists. Next, from what we have shown in IIP8C and its scholium, it follows that the present existence of our Mind depends only on this, that the Mind involves the actual existence of the Body. Finally, we have shown that the power of the Mind by which it imagines things and recollects them also depends on this (see IIP17, P18, P18S), that it involves the actual existence of the Body. From these things it follows that the present existence of the Mind and its power of imagining are taken away as soon as the Mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the Body. But the cause of the Mind's ceasing to affirm this existence of the Body cannot be the Mind itself (by P4), nor also that the Body ceases to exist. For (by IIP6) the cause of the Mind's affirming the Body's existence is not that the Body has begun to exist. So by the same reasoning, it does not cease to affirm the Body's existence because the Body ceases to exist, but (by IIP8) this [sc. ceasing to affirm the Body's existence] arises from another idea which excludes the present existence of our body, and consequently of our Mind, and which is thus contrary to the idea that constitutes our Mind's essence.

In chapter 2 I have shown that the *Ethics* contains some passages that suggest that adequate ideas do not correspond to affections of the brain. One of these passages is IIIP11S, because here Spinoza writes that when our mind ceases to affirm our body, then we no longer have mental images, but he does not tell us what happens to our adequate ideas. Spinoza, then, suggests here that a part of our mind consists of states that correspond to states of our body and that another part of our mind consists of states that do not correspond to states of our body. He claims that, although the first part of our mind begins and ceases to exist when our body begins and ceases to exist, it does not begin and cease to exist *because* our body begins to exist. Rather, it is the mind of the external body that creates or destroys our body that creates or destroys the first part of our mind. The part of our mind that does not correspond to our body, Spinoza suggests, continues to exist after the destruction of our body.

Spinoza does not explain how an external mind can create or destroy the corruptible part of our mind. In IIP7 he even seems to admit that he cannot explain how minds interact

with each other. There he argues that God only causes a particular body insofar as he is affected by another particular body, and God only causes the mind of the former particular body insofar as he is affected by the mind of the latter particular body. He argues, in other words, that a particular body is only caused by another particular body, and that a particular mind is only caused by another particular mind. But he concludes this proposition by saying: '*For the present, I cannot explain these matters more clearly.*'

Spinoza, then, thinks that the corruptible part of our mind is created and destroyed by the mind of another body, although he cannot explain how this happens. He also believes that external minds can increase or decrease the power of our mind, for, as we have seen, at the beginning of IIIP11 he writes: '*The idea of any thing that increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our Body's power of acting, increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our Mind's power of thinking.*'

Given that Spinoza defines Pleasure and Pain as an increase or decrease in the power of the body and the mind, he must have held that the mental cause of Pleasure and Pain is the mind of the external body that increases or decreases the power of our body. In other words, when an external body increases or decreases the health of our body, then, at the same time, the mind of this external body causes us to feel Pleasure or Pain. The following figure illustrates this.

Pleasure and Pain *qua mental states* are caused by the mind of the external body that increases or decreases the health of a part of our body			
Attribute of Thought:	mind of external body	→	Pleasure or Pain qua mental states
Attribute of Extension:	external body	→	beneficial or detrimental affection of a sense organ

But now a problem arises. If Spinoza uses the expression 'the idea of an external body that changes the power of the human body' to refer to the mind of such a body, and not to our idea of such a body, then IIP11 not only suggests that Pleasure and Pain qua mental states are caused by external minds, but also that Joy and Sadness qua mental states are caused by external minds. But this is false, because Joy and Sadness are caused by *our ideas* of external bodies, and not by the minds of external bodies.

Once again, Spinoza either uses the expression 'the idea of the thing that changes our body's power' to refer to our idea of the external body that changes our body's power, or he uses the expression to refer to the mind of the external body that changes our body's power.

And so Spinoza is either saying in IIIP11 that Joy, Sadness, Pleasure, Pain, Cheerfulness and Melancholy qua mental states are caused by our idea of the external body that changes our body's power, or he is saying that Joy, Sadness, Pleasure, Pain, Cheerfulness and Melancholy are caused by the mind of the external body that changes our body's power. Both options are equally problematic. Pleasure and Pain are not caused by our ideas, and Joy and Sadness are not caused by other minds.

Furthermore, although Joy and Sadness are caused by our ideas, they are not necessarily caused by our ideas of things that increase or decrease the power of our body. We are not only joyful or sad when we have an idea of something that causes us to feel Pleasure or Pain. We very often feel joyful or sad regarding something that has no direct physical contact with us, and thus cannot make us feel Pleasure or Pain. So, for example, if I am sad because I think that I am writing a bad chapter, then my Sadness is not caused by something that decreases the power of my body. Of course, when I feel sad because I think that I am writing a bad chapter, then the power of my body decreases, but this decrease is evidently not caused by the chapter itself.

I cannot but conclude that Spinoza has a confused conception of the relation between Joy & Sadness and Pleasure & Pain. That Spinoza confuses the relation between Pleasure & Pain and Joy & Sadness is also evidenced by the following passage from the Second Appendix of the *Short Treatise* (I/120/19, p.155):

> The human body, then, is nothing but a certain proportion of motion and rest. So this existing proportion's objective essence in the thinking attribute is the soul of the body. Hence when one of these modes (motion and rest) changes, either by increasing or decreasing, the Idea also changes correspondingly. For example, if the rest happens to increase, and the motion to decrease, the pain or sadness we call 'cold' is thereby produced. On the other hand, if this increase occurs in the motion, then the pain we call 'heat' is thereby produced. And so when the degrees of motion and rest are not equal in all parts of our body, but some have more motion and rest than others, there arises a difference of feeling (e.g., from this comes the different kind of pain we feel when we are struck with a little stick in the eyes or on the hands). When the external causes which bring changes about differ in themselves, and do not all have the same effects, there arises a difference of feeling in one and the same part (e.g., the difference of feeling from a blow with a piece of wood or iron on the same hand). And again, if the change which happens in a part is a cause of its returning to its original proportion, from this there arises the joy we call peace, pleasurable activity, and cheerfulness (Dutch: rust, vermaakelyke oeffening, en vroolykeid) [44].

[44] The passage continues as follows: '*Finally, because we have now explained what feeling is, we can easily see how from this there arises a reflexive Idea, or knowledge of oneself, experience, and reasoning. And from all this*

Spinoza says here that we feel 'Pain or Sadness' when an external body disturbs the proportion of motion and rest somewhere in our body, and that we feel Joy when this proportion is restored. This is clearly mistaken. Spinoza should have said that we feel Pain when an external body disturbs the proportion of motion and rest somewhere in our body, and that we feel Pleasure when this proportion is restored.

Descartes's distinction between Pleasure & Pain and Joy & Sadness

Descartes argues that Pleasure and Pain are not emotions but perceptions of internal states of our body[45]. They fall within the same category as, for example, sensations of hunger and cold. Pleasure and Pain have in common with passive emotions that they are mental states caused by the body, but Pleasure and Pain are not passive emotions. Pain and Pleasure, Descartes says, are sensations that we relate to our body and not to our mind, that is, we perceive them as if they were in our body. This is not to deny that Pain and Pleasure are mental states. It simply means that we feel Pleasure and Pain in our body. We are mistaken if we think that the Pleasure or Pain that we feel is located in our body[46]. Passive emotions, such as the passions of Joy and Sadness, are also caused by the body, but we relate them to our mind and not to our body, that is, we feel them as if they were in our soul itself[47]. Pleasure may lead to Joy, and Pain may lead to Sadness. We are normally joyful when we experience Pleasure, and we are normally sad when we experience Pain. But Descartes warns us not to confound the sensations of Pleasure and Pain with the emotions of Joy and Sadness. He writes[48]:

> Thus, when we are in good health and things are calmer than usual, we feel in ourselves a cheerfulness which results not from any operation of the understanding but solely from impressions formed in the brain by the movements of the spirits. And we feel sad in the same way when our body is indisposed even though we do not know that it is. Indeed, titillation of the senses is followed so closely by joy, and pain by sadness, that most people make no distinction between the two. Nevertheless they differ so

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(as also because our soul is united with God, and is a part of the infinite Idea arising immediately from God) we can see clearly the origin of clear knowledge, and the immortality of the soul. But for the present what we have said will be enough.' So, although Spinoza first suggests that our entire mind is constituted by states that correspond to states of our body, he then makes clear that our adequate ideas do not correspond to states of our body.

[45] *The Passions of the Soul*, article 24
[46] *The Principles of Philosophy*, principle 68
[47] *The Passions of the Soul*, article 25
[48] *The Passions of the Soul*, article 94

> markedly that we may sometimes suffer pains with joy, and receive titillating sensations which displease us. [Translation by Robert Stoothoff]

Given Descartes's warning not to confound Pleasure with Joy and Pain with Sadness, and given that Descartes seems to be quite right about their distinction, it is rather surprising that Spinoza defines Pleasure as a species of Joy and Pain as a species of Sadness without giving any reason for this definition[49].

Section 2: A second problem concerning Spinoza's definitions

A second problem concerning Spinoza's definition of Pleasure, Pain, Cheerfulness and Melancholy is the following. Spinoza suggests in IIIP11 that the only distinction between on the one hand Pleasure & Pain and on the other hand Cheerfulness & Melancholy consists therein that Pleasure & Pain qua mental states correspond to a change in the power of one or several parts of the human body, whereas Cheerfulness & Melancholy qua mental states correspond to a change in the power of all the parts of the human body. The problem here is that if we felt Pleasure or Pain when the power of some part of our body is increased or decreased, then we would not feel Cheerfulness or Melancholy, but simply a lot of Pleasure or Pain when the power of all the parts of our body is increased or decreased. When, for example, I burn my hand at the stove, then, indeed, I feel Pain, but when I burn my entire body because I am sun bathing for too long, then I do not feel Melancholy, but simply Pain all over my body. The mere quantitative distinction between on the one hand Pleasure & Pain qua bodily states and on the other hand Cheerfulness & Melancholy qua bodily states implies a mere quantitative distinction between on the one hand the feeling of Pleasure & Pain and on the other hand the feeling of Cheerfulness & Melancholy. However, in reality, the distinction between on the one hand the feeling of Pleasure & Pain and on the other hand the feeling of Cheerfulness & Melancholy is not quantitative but qualitative. To feel cheerful is not the same as feeling a great deal of Pleasure and to feel melancholic is not the same as feeling a great deal of Pain. To feel cheerful is the same as feeling much Joy, and to feel melancholic is the same as feeling much Sadness.

[49] Descartes makes an interesting observation concerning Pain that Spinoza does not mention. According to Descartes, Pain sometimes gives us Joy when it is not excessive, and so conveys to the mind the message that the body is strong and healthy enough to resist such attacks. For the same reason we sometimes experience Joy when we are threatened by danger.

Section 3: A third problem concerning Spinoza's definitions

A third problem concerning Spinoza's definition of Pleasure, Pain, Cheerfulness and Melancholy is posed by Spinoza's remark in IIIAD3 that these states are chiefly related to the body. Spinoza writes in IIIAD3: '*As for the definitions of Cheerfulness, Pleasure, Melancholy, and Pain, I omit them, because they are chiefly related to the Body* [ad Corpus potissimum referuntur]*, and are only Species* [Species] *of Joy or Sadness.'* Spinoza's statement that Pleasure, Pain, Cheerfulness and Melancholy relate chiefly to the body seems to imply that they relate more to the body than to the mind[50]. If this is indeed implied, then IIIAD3 suggests that Pleasure, Pain, Cheerfulness and Melancholy are different from other forms of Joy and Sadness, such as Love, Hate, Hope and Fear, in that the former relate more to the body, while the latter relate more to the mind.

IIIAD3 is only slightly problematic as far as Pleasure & Pain and Joy & Sadness are concerned. To be very strict, a psychophysical state, such as Pleasure & Pain and Joy & Sadness, cannot be said to relate more to the body than to the mind or *vice versa*. Pleasure & Pain and Joy & Sadness are as much mental states as they are bodily states. Nonetheless, we may understand why Spinoza would say that Pleasure and Pain relate chiefly to the body, because it is obvious that Pleasure and Pain have a bodily cause and that we always feel them somewhere in our body. It is less obvious that Pleasure and Pain have a mental cause as well. We may also understand why Spinoza would say that Joy and Sadness relate more to the mind than to the body, because it is obvious that Joy and Sadness have a mental cause and that they are mental states. It is less obvious that Joy and Sadness have a bodily cause and a bodily nature as well. We do not feel Joy and Sadness, contrary to Pleasure and Pain, somewhere in our body.

The claim that Cheerfulness and Melancholy relate more to the body than to the mind may at first also seem to be rather unproblematic, because throughout history people have explained Melancholy as some kind of imbalance of bodily humours, just as people nowadays often explain depression as some kind of imbalance of hormones and neurotransmitters. (Melancholy, nonetheless, has also been explained by cultural, religious and artistic factors.) Melancholy, furthermore, has very recognisable bodily expressions; paleness, slow movements, loss of appetite, insomnia, slow speech, etcetera. Cheerfulness, as an affective

[50] Wienand (2009, p.370) suggests that by saying that Cheerfulness relates chiefly to the body, Spinoza might mean that Cheerfulness does not relate only to the mind but also to the body. It seems unlikely that this is what Spinoza means, because 1) saying that a state refers chiefly to the body is very different from saying that a state refers also to the body, and 2) all the emotions that Spinoza discusses in IIIAD also relate to the body, so the reason why Spinoza does not discuss Cheerfulness in IIIAD cannot be that it also refers to the body.

state caused by a balance of humours, has historically received less attention than Melancholy, perhaps because there are not that many cheerful people around, as Spinoza suggests in IIIP44S when he writes that Cheerfulness is 'more easily conceived than observed'; it is easy to understand what Cheerfulness is, but it is difficult to be cheerful.

Furthermore, the claim that Cheerfulness and Melancholy relate more to the body than to the mind may at first seem to be unproblematic, because it fits well with the definition of Cheerfulness and Melancholy as moods. Moods are generally taken to be affective states that, contrary to emotions, do not have clear intentional objects. On the account of these definitions, Cheerfulness and Melancholy simply consist in a general and unmotivated feeling of Joy or Sadness. A cheerful or melancholic person just is joyful or sad, and he is not joyful or sad for any specific reason. Rather than being caused by our ideas of things, moods colour our perception of the world and our thoughts about it. For the cheerful person the glass is half full, for the melancholic person it is half empty. The cheerful person discovers reasons to be joyful even when he finds himself in difficult circumstances, while the melancholic person finds reasons to be sad even when fortune favours him.

However, Spinoza cannot have thought of Cheerfulness and Melancholy as Joy and Sadness without any clear object, or as Joy and Sadness caused by a balance or imbalance of bodily humours. Spinoza defines Cheerfulness and Melancholy as species of Joy and Sadness. Joy and Sadness are caused by our ideas of things, and we therefore cannot feel joyful or sad without having an idea of something. Joy and Sadness correspond to a specific kind of increase or decrease in the health of our body, but they are not caused by such a state of our body. Even if Cheerfulness and Melancholy were not species of Joy and Sadness, then they still could not have been caused by the body, according to Spinoza's metaphysics. Why, then, Spinoza claims that Cheerfulness and Melancholy relate chiefly to the body is quite puzzling[51].

Section 4: Slightly altered definitions

I believe to have demonstrated that Spinoza's definitions of Pleasure, Pain, Cheerfulness and Melancholy are confusing if not mistaken. I wish to suggest that Spinoza should have argued the following:

[51] In a letter to Pieter Balling (see letter 17, IV/77/10, p.353) Spinoza writes: '*We find by experience that fevers and other corporeal changes are causes of madness, and that those whose blood is thick imagine nothing but quarrels, troubles, killings, and things like these.*' Although this passage suggests that Spinoza holds that Cheerfulness and Melancholy may caused by certain bodily states, this cannot be his official position, because his metaphysics tells us that the human body cannot have a causal effect on the human mind.

(1) Pleasure and Pain are kinds of sense perceptions. As bodily states they consist in an increase or decrease in the health of a sense organ caused an external body. As mental states they are caused by the mind of that external body. When the health of many parts of our body is increased or decreased then we feel healthy or sick. There is thus a quantitative distinction between on the one hand Pleasure & Pain qua bodily states and Health & Sickness qua bodily states. (This does not translate into a quantitative distinction between on the one hand Pleasure & Pain qua mental states and Health & Sickness qua mental states, because, for example, feeling healthy is not the same thing as feeling a lot of Pleasure.)

(2) Joy and Sadness are kinds of emotions. As mental states they are caused by our idea of something. As bodily states they consist in a healthy or unhealthy affection of the heart (and perhaps other internal organs) caused by an affection of the brain that corresponds to our idea of something. *When our ideas of many (or all) things make us joyful or sad, then we feel cheerful or melancholic*. Cheerfulness and Melancholy qua bodily states consist in a greater increase or decrease in health than Joy and Sadness. There is thus a quantitative distinction between on the one hand Joy & Sadness and on the other hand Cheerfulness & Melancholy, both qua mental states and qua bodily states.

Pleasure, Pain, Health and Sickness, then, differ from Joy, Sadness, Cheerfulness and Melancholy both in their psychophysical nature and in their psychophysical causes. Nonetheless, all these psychophysical states are experienced as either agreeable or disagreeable, and all these psychophysical states consist in an increase or a decrease in the health of the body.

Section 5: These altered definitions work well within Spinoza's moral theory

I now wish to show that these minor modifications of Spinoza's definitions are very helpful to understanding his moral theory. It is not my intention to discuss Spinoza's moral theory in detail, but I wish merely to show how the most important elements of his moral theory can be understood through the concepts of Pleasure, Pain, Health & Sickness, and Joy, Sadness, Cheerfulness & Melancholy, such as I have defined them. Remember that I have defined Cheerfulness and Melancholy as 'Joy or Sadness caused by our ideas of many things', ignoring that Spinoza writes in IIIAD3 that these states relate more to the body than to the mind.

Spinoza, I believe, simply wants to teach us how to maximise the Joy in our life and how to minimise the Sadness in our life. Given that we are all determined to desire to

experience Joy, he wants to teach us how to obtain what we naturally desire. He does not want to tell us that we should do something that we do not desire to do.

Joy, then, according to Spinoza, is the only thing that is itself good for us, and Sadness is the only thing that is itself bad for us[52]. Other things are good or bad for us because they bring us Joy or Sadness. In other words, Joy and Sadness are directly good or bad for us and other things are indirectly good or bad for us[53]. Spinoza writes in IVP41: '*Joy is not directly evil, but good; Sadness, on the other hand, is directly evil. Dem.: Joy (by IIIP11 and P11S) is an affect by which the body's power of acting is increased or aided. Sadness, on the other hand, is an affect by which the body's power of acting is diminished or restrained. And so (by P38) joy is directly good, etc. q.e.d.*'

Although Joy and Sadness are always good or bad for us when we consider them in themselves, they are not always good or bad when we consider their effects on the total amount of Joy that we experience in our life. Whether something is good or bad for us does not depend on the question whether it brings us Joy or Sadness, but on the question whether it maximises or minimises the total amount of Joy that we experience in our life.

From this it is clear that Cheerfulness, understood as 'Joy caused by our ideas of many or all things', is always good, and Melancholy, understood as 'Sadness caused our ideas of many or all things', always bad. Being cheerful, then, simply means to be constantly joyful, and being melancholic, simply means to be constantly sad. Cheerfulness is a Joy that is never troubled by Sadness, and Melancholy a Sadness that is never relieved by Joy. Spinoza writes in IVP42D:

> Cheerfulness (see its Def. in IIIP11S) is a Joy which, insofar as it is related to the Body, consists in this, that all the parts of the Body are equally affected. I.e. (by IIIP11), the Body's power of acting is increased or aided, so that all of its parts maintain the same proportion of motion and rest to one another. And so (byP39), Cheerfulness is always good, and cannot be excessive. But Melancholy (see its Def., also in IIIP11S) is a Sadness, which, insofar as it is related to the Body, consists in this, that the Body's power of acting is absolutely diminished or restrained. And so (by P18) it is always evil, q.e.d.

If Spinoza had defined Cheerfulness as 'Joy caused by our ideas of all things', or as 'constant Joy', then he could have said that whatever leads to Cheerfulness is indirectly (i.e.,

[52] Spinoza denies that something can ever be good or bad without being good or bad for something or someone. Being good or bad is a relational property.

[53] It is not quite clear to me what Spinoza means by 'directly'. I have here interpreted it as meaning 'not instrumentally'. Joy is directly good, while things that bring us Joy are instrumentally good. Joy is the goal and other things are the means. Another, equally valid, interpretation of 'directly' is that Joy is in itself considered always good for us, but it is bad for us when it leads us away from Cheerfulness.

instrumentally) good for us, and whatever leads us away from Cheerfulness is indirectly (i.e., instrumentally) bad for us. Although Spinoza does not formulate it this way, I think that we can safely say that Spinoza's goal in the *Ethics* is to teach us how to be cheerful[54].

We all know that something that brings us Joy may lead us away from Cheerfulness, and that something that brings us Sadness may lead us to Cheerfulness. Some things bring us Joy now but also more Sadness later, and some things bring us Sadness now but also more Joy later. Given that whether something is good or bad for us does not depend on the question whether it brings us Joy or Sadness, but on the question whether it increases or decreases the total amount of Joy that we experience in our life, the things that bring us Joy now but also more Sadness later are bad for us, and the things that bring us Sadness now but more Joy later are good for us.

Practical reason simply consists in our knowledge of what we should do in order to maximise the total amount of Joy in our life, that is, to be cheerful[55]. Two of the most basic and abstract commands of practical reason, therefore, say that 'if something brings you Joy now, but also greater Sadness in the future, then avoid it' and 'if something brings you Sadness now, but also more Joy in the future, then pursue it'. Practical reason, then, has a long-term perspective. Spinoza writes in IVP65C: '*From the guidance of reason, we shall follow a lesser evil as a greater good, and pass over a lesser good which is the cause of a greater evil. For the evil which is here called lesser is really good, and the good which is here called lesser, on the other hand, is evil.*' And he writes in IVP66: '*From the guidance of reason we want a greater future good in preference to a lesser present one, and a lesser present evil in preference to a greater future one.*' This is easier said than done. Although we all want to be cheerful, we often pursue things that bring us Joy now but also more Sadness in

[54] According to my reading the ultimate goal of morality is Cheerfulness. (Spinoza uses the expression 'ultimate goal' [*finis ultimus*] in IVApp.4.) This reading of Spinoza's moral theory sits uncomfortably with the many passages that suggest that the ultimate goal of morality is not Cheerfulness, but adequate knowledge (of God, oneself and other things), and with the many passages that suggest that the ultimate goal of morality is neither Cheerfulness nor adequate knowledge, but self-preservation and bodily power. In the main text I explain why adequate knowledge and bodily power are instrumentally good if the ultimate goal of morality is Cheerfulness.
If adequate knowledge is the ultimate goal of morality, then bodily health is instrumentally good because we need to perceive the world through our senses in order to be able to think about it. However, if the ultimate goal of morality is adequate knowledge, then it is unclear to me why Cheerfulness would be instrumentally good. If bodily power is the ultimate goal of morality, then Cheerfulness is instrumentally good because it corresponds to an overall increase in bodily power. However, if bodily power is the ultimate goal of morality, then it is unclear to me why adequate knowledge would be instrumentally good. On this last point: LeBuffe (2005) defends the claim that adequate knowledge of God, and hence of oneself, contributes greatly to our biological self-preservation.

[55] The commands of reason, then, are hypothetical. They say: If you desire to be cheerful, then pursue object x and avoid object y, but if you do not want to be cheerful, then do whatever you like.

the future, and we often avoid things that bring us Sadness now but also more Joy in the future.

Spinoza observes that there are three things that people normally pursue, namely riches, praise and pleasure[56]. A life in pursuit of these things, however, Spinoza argues, is not a cheerful one. When we live a life in pursuit of these things we will be most of the time sad, for many reasons: we do not have what we desire; we are afraid that we will not have what we desire; we do never have enough of what we desire; we are afraid to lose what we have; we get annoyed by what we have; we lose what we had; we are jealous of others who have what we desire; we are in conflict with others who desire what we have; and so forth. The Joy that these things bring us is short-lived and often accompanied or followed by Sadness.

The only thing that always brings us Joy and is never accompanied or followed by Sadness is, according to Spinoza, adequate knowledge of Nature. Adequate knowledge of Nature also brings us more Joy than wealth, praise and pleasure can bring us. Furthermore, it can be freely shared with others without any loss. In fact, the more we share our knowledge with others the more we acquire knowledge. There can thus be no envy, but only cooperation between people whose greatest desire is to understand the world adequately. Given that adequate knowledge of Nature brings us the greatest and most constant Joy, Spinoza calls it the greatest good. The best life is thus a life of contemplation.

Nature, Spinoza famously argues, is infinite and eternal. Finite and temporal things exist *in* Nature. They are completely determined by Nature's laws of cause and effect. Nature as a whole and everything within Nature could not have been any different from what they are. Even we, both our body and our mind, are completely determined by Nature's laws. We do not possess the capacity to freely choose our actions, our beliefs and our emotions. Nature has not been created by a personal God, and thus it cannot be said to be perfect or imperfect in the sense of being or not being in accordance with God's desires. Nature can only be said to be perfect in the sense that it always produces all the effects it can possibly produce. It always realises its full potential. It never fails to be everything it can be.

Spinoza argues that our adequate idea of Nature can only cause Joy. Given that the emotion of Love simply consists in being affected with Joy by our idea of something, we can only love Nature. Spinoza calls our Love for Nature an intellectual Love, because our idea of

[56] See TdIE (II/5/26, p.7) and KV (I/63/22, p.106). I have translated the Latin '*honor*' and the Dutch '*eer*' as 'praise', because Spinoza refers to that emotion here in the TdIE and in the KV. Curley translates 'honor', which is, I agree, a correct literal translation of '*honor*' and '*eer*'. In a footnote to the passage of the KV, however, Curley shows that he is sensitive to the suggestion that Spinoza uses the word '*eer*' in the depreciative sense of 'praise' because he writes: '*eer* = *honor* or *gloria*?' I think that it is quite clear that it refers to being praised by others *for reasons good or bad*.

Nature is not a mental image, but an adequate idea. We cannot perceive Nature, in its infinity, through our senses; we can only conceive Nature through our intellect. Spinoza believes that the adequate idea of Nature causes a greater Joy than our idea of any corruptible thing. This Joy, furthermore, is perfectly constant, because Nature never changes. Love for Nature can never turn into a Hate for Nature, provided that our idea of it is adequate.

Spinoza argues that once we have grasped the essence of Nature, then our ideas of all finite things will cause Joy in us. If Spinoza had defined Cheerfulness as 'Joy caused by our ideas of many things', then he could have said that our idea of Nature makes us cheerful. Our idea of Nature makes us cheerful, in the sense I have defined it, because it allows us to conceive all corruptible things as part of Nature. If we associate our idea of a particular thing, which in itself does not cause Joy, with our idea of Nature, which does cause Joy, then our idea of that particular thing will also come to cause Joy. In this way our ideas of all particular things will come to cause Joy, because all particular things are part of Nature[57].

That Cheerfulness results from a life in search of adequate knowledge is hinted at by Spinoza in a letter that he writes to van Blyenbergh (Letter 21, IV/126/25, p.25) in which he speaks of his trust in reason's capacity to understand reality unaided by Holy Scripture:

> And I am well aware that, when I have found a solid demonstration, I cannot fall into such thoughts that I can ever doubt it. So I am completely satisfied with what the intellect shows me, and entertain no suspicion that I have been deceived in that or that Sacred Scripture can contradict it (even though I do not investigate it). For the truth does not contradict the truth, as I have already clearly indicated in my Appendix. (I cannot cite the chapter [I/265/30] for I do not have the book here with me in the country.) And if even once I found that the fruits which I have already gathered from the natural intellect were false, they would still make me happy, since I enjoy them and seek to pass my life, not in sorrow and sighing, but in peace, joy and cheerfulness. By doing so, I climb a step higher. Meanwhile I recognize something which gives me the greatest satisfaction and peace of mind: that all things happen as they do by the power of a supremely perfect Being and by his immutable decree[58].

[57] Wienand (1999, p.375) notices that Spinoza's remark that Cheerfulness relates chiefly to the body (see IIIAD3) seems incompatible with his characterisation of Cheerfulness as an emotion that results from intellectual activity. She (p.379) argues that Cheerfulness becomes Blessedness and Self-satisfaction when we have a true idea of God and ourselves.

[58] I would translate the sentence in the middle as follows: *And even if I should once find out that the fruits that I have already gathered from the natural intellect were false, that would make me fortunate, because I profit from it, and I try to go through life not in sorrow and sighing, but in tranquillity, joy and cheerfulness, and so I repeatedly make progress*. See the French translation of Maxime Rovere (*Spinoza : Correspondance*, p.159) : *Et même si, un jour, les fruits que j'ai récoltés jusqu'ici grâce à mon intellect naturel, je m'apercevais qu'ils sont faux, cela me rendrait heureux ! des lors que là est mon plaisir, et que je m'applique à traverser la vie non dans les plaintes et les gémissements, mais dans la tranquillité, la joie et les rires, et que régulièrement, je franchis une nouvelle étape.*

Spinoza famously calls Nature 'God'. His idea of God, as is well known, has little in common with the idea of God put forward by Judaism and Christianity. Spinoza holds that the idea of God described by Judaism and Christianity is based on people's imagination. Jews and Christians imagine God, for example, as a heavenly king, or judge, or father. Spinoza seems to suggest that, whereas his idea of God makes men cheerful, the Judaic and Christian idea of God makes men melancholic, when he writes in IVP45S: '*Nothing forbids our pleasure* [delectari] *except a savage and sad superstition. For why is it more proper to relieve our hunger and our thirst than to rid ourselves of melancholy?*'

Section 6: The importance of Health to a life in pursuit of knowledge

If we live a life in pursuit of adequate knowledge then we desire all other things only in that form or measure in which they serve a life in pursuit of adequate knowledge. We shall desire wealth only insofar as it allows us to live comfortably. We shall not desire praise, but only true friendship and peace. We shall desire Pleasure only insofar as it contributes to our general Health and we shall not avoid Pain if it contributes to our general health[59].

Because I am discussing Pleasure, Pain, Health and Sickness in this chapter, I shall now discuss IVP38 and IVP39, in which Spinoza, although he does not formulate it this way, explains the importance of Health. Spinoza refers to these two propositions in IVP41 to IVP43.

Spinoza tells us in IVP38 that things are useful to us when they enable our body to be affected in many ways, and that they are detrimental to us when they disable our body to be affected in many ways. He writes in IVP38: '*Whatever so disposes the human Body that it can be affected in a great many ways, or renders it capable of affecting external Bodies in a great many ways, is useful to man; the more it renders the Body capable of being affected in a great many ways, or affecting other bodies, the more useful it is; on the other hand, what renders the Body less capable of these things is harmful.*' From IIP14 it is quite clear that Spinoza uses the expression 'the body is affected by external bodies' to refer to the affections of the sense organs by external bodies, and thus to explain sense perception. He writes in IIP14: '*The human Mind is capable of perceiving a great many things, and is the more capable, the more its body can be disposed in a great many ways.*' Spinoza's claim that things are

[59] In the *Treatise on the Intellect* (II/9/28, p.12) Spinoza mentions three rules according to which he decides to live during the process of emending his intellect. The second rule says: '*To enjoy pleasure just so far as suffices for safeguarding our health*'. The third rule says: '*Finally, to seek money, or anything else, just so far as suffices for sustaining life and health, and conforming to those customs of the community that do not conflict with our aim.*'

beneficial or detrimental to us when they enable or disable our body to be affected in a great many ways, then, is Spinoza's abstract way of saying that things are beneficial or detrimental to us when they improve or deteriorate the functioning of our sense organs.

In the IVP38D Spinoza writes: '*The more the Body is rendered capable of these things, the more the Mind is rendered capable of perceiving (by IIP14). And so what disposes the Body in this way, and renders it capable of these things, is necessarily good, or useful (by P26 and P27), and the more useful the more capable of these things it renders the Body. On the other hand, (by converse of IIp14, and by P26 and P27), it is more harmful if it renders the body less capable of these things, q.e.d.*' Spinoza, here, says that it follows from IVP26 and IVP27 that something is good or bad when it improves or deteriorates the functioning of our sense organs, and, by doing so, makes us more or less capable of perceiving the world through our senses. In IVP26 and IVP27 Spinoza had explained that the only thing that we know with certainty to be good is what leads to understanding [*ad intelligendum*] and that the only thing we know with certainty to be bad is what prevents understanding. Understanding the world adequately always makes us joyful, while other things, such as wealth, praise and pleasure, sometimes make us joyful and sometimes sad. Whatever helps us to understand the world adequately is thus certainly good, and whatever hinders us from understanding the world adequately is thus certainly bad. We can never be certain whether something that helps us to obtain wealth, praise or pleasure is good, because wealth, praise and pleasure sometimes make us joyful, but often sad. Now, one of the things that help us to understand the world adequately is sense perception. It is impossible to think about the world, adequately or inadequately, if we cannot perceive it through our senses. Spinoza writes in IVP38D that something is good or bad when it improves or deteriorates the functioning of our sense organs, because without sense perception is it impossible to adequately understand the world, and because without adequate understanding of the world we can never be cheerful.

Spinoza writes in IV39: '*Those things are good which bring about the preservation of the proportion of motion and rest the human Body's parts have to one another; on the other hand, those things are evil which bring it about that the parts of the human Body have a different proportion of motion and rest to one another*.' In IVP39 Spinoza reminds us that the form of the human body is constituted by many smaller bodies that communicate their motion in a fixed ratio (see IIP13Post.1), and that the human body needs a great many other bodies in order to maintain this fixed ratio (see IIP13Post.4). I have argued in the previous chapter that Spinoza uses the concept of a fixed proportion of motion and rest of the parts of the human body to explain the health of the human body. Sickness, then, consists in a disturbance of this

fixed proportion. Thus, when Spinoza writes that the human body needs many other bodies in order to maintain this fixed proportion, he simply means that in order to maintain the health of our body we need to eat, drink, protect ourselves from the elements by clothing and housing, etcetera. And so, when he writes in IVP39 that things are good or evil when they preserve or destroy the fixed proportion of our body, he simply means that things are good or evil when they are beneficial or detrimental to our health. In IVApp.27 he expresses this point rather clearly:

> The principal advantage which we derive from things outside us – apart from the experience and knowledge we acquire from observing them and changing them from one form into another – lies in the preservation of our body. That is why those things are most useful to us which can feed and maintain it, so that all its parts can perform their function [*officio*] properly. For the more the Body is capable of affecting, and being affected by, external bodies in a great many ways, the more the Mind is capable of thinking (see P38 and P39). But there seem to be very few things of this kind in nature. So to nourish the body in the way required, it is necessary to use many different kinds of food. Indeed, the human Body is composed of a great many parts of different natures, which require continuous and varied food so that the whole Body may be equally capable of everything which can follow from its nature, and consequently, so that the Mind may also be equally capable of conceiving many things.

Spinoza, however, does not seem to value health in and for itself, but really only because, when we are healthy, we are more able to perceive the world through our senses, and hence more able to understand the world (and thus be cheerful). This, at least, is suggested by the fact that Spinoza argues that things are good or bad when they preserve or disturb the fixed proportion, *because when this proportion remains fixed our body is more capable of being affected in many different ways*. Spinoza writes at the end of the first part of IVP39D that things that preserve the health of the body '*bring it about that the human Body can be affected in many ways, and that it can affect external bodies in many ways (by IIPost.3 and 6). So they are good* .' And at the end of the second part of IVP39D he writes: '[some] *things which bring it about that* [...] *the body is destroyed, and hence rendered completely incapable of being affected in many ways. So (by P38), they are evil, q.e.d.*' In the passage from IVApp.27 Spinoza also seems to value health because it serves the acquisition of knowledge.

Spinoza, then, values health because he values sense perception, and he values sense perception because he values adequate understanding of the world, and he values adequate understanding of the world, because he values Cheerfulness.

IVP40 is not important to our present discussion. In this proposition Spinoza argues that things are good or bad when they promote or threaten peace within society. This proposition clearly should have preceded IVP38, because from IVP29 up to IVP38 Spinoza discusses topics related to social relations. We have already discussed IVP41, where Spinoza says that Joy is directly good and Sadness bad, as well as IVP42, where Spinoza says that Cheerfulness is always good and Melancholy always bad. So let us move on to IVP43 where Spinoza speaks about the value of Pleasure and Pain:

> Pleasure can be excessive and evil, whereas Pain can be good insofar as the Pleasure, or Joy, is evil. Dem.: Pleasure is a Joy which, insofar as it is related to the Body, consists in this, that one (or several) of its parts are affected more than the others (see its Def. in IIIP11S). The power of this affect can be so great that it surpasses the other actions of the Body (by P6), remains stubbornly fixed in the Body, and so prevents the Body from being capable of being affected in a great many other ways. Hence (by P38), it can be evil. Pain, on the other hand, which is a Sadness, cannot be good, considered in itself alone (by P41). But because its force and growth are defined by the power of an external cause compared with our power (by P5), we can conceive infinite degrees and modes of the powers of this affect (by P3). And so we can conceive it to be such that it can restrain Pain, so that it is not excessive, and thereby prevent the body from being rendered less capable (by the first part of this proposition). To that extent, therefore, it will be good, q.e.d.

Spinoza's point seems to be that, although Pleasure corresponds to an increase in the health of some part of the body, and is in that respect always a good, when Pleasure is immoderate it harms the general Health of the body, and when it does, it is really an evil. Pain corresponds to a decrease in the health of some part of the body, and is in that respect always an evil, but Pain may counteract an immoderate Pleasure and improve the general Health of the body, and when it does, it is really a good. Unfortunately, Spinoza does not give an example of this principle.

Spinoza not only warns us against immoderate Pleasure because it harms our general bodily Health, but also for another reason, which is that when our desire for Pleasure is immoderate, then we are unable to think clearly and distinctly, and live a contemplative life. He writes in TdIE (II/6/2, p.8): *For as far as sensual pleasure is concerned, the mind is so caught up in it, as if at peace in a [true] good, that it is quite prevented from thinking of anything else. But after the enjoyment of sensual pleasure is past, the greatest sadness follows. If this does not completely engross, still it thoroughly confuses and dullens the mind.*' Spinoza's point about Pleasure also extends to the other two things people desire most often,

and often immoderately, namely Praise and Wealth. When our desires for Praise and Wealth are immoderate, we are incapable of thinking about anything else, and thus of being being cheerful, that is, constantly joyful. Spinoza writes in IVP44S: '*Cheerfulness, which I have said is good, is more easily conceived than observed. For the affects by which we are daily torn are generally related to a part of the Body which is affected more than the others. Generally, then, the affects are excessive, and occupy the Mind in the consideration of only one object so much that it cannot think of others.*' Lust, Ambition and Greed (i.e., immoderate desire for Pleasure, Praise and Wealth) are thus bad desires because they lead us away from Cheerfulness.

Chapter 7: The mental and bodily nature of Desire

So far we have discussed Spinoza's theory of Joy and Sadness, both insofar as they are states of our mind and insofar as they are states of our body. Insofar as they are states of our mind, Joy and Sadness are non-cognitive states that are caused by our adequate and inadequate ideas. (Adequate ideas only cause Joy.) Insofar as they are states of our body, Joy and Sadness consist in an increase or decrease in our health due to an affection of our heart, and perhaps other internal organs, by the animal spirits. When a mental image causes Joy or Sadness, then the affection of the brain that corresponds to this mental image causes, by means of the animal spirits, the increase or decrease in bodily health that corresponds to this emotion. It is doubtful whether Spinoza thinks that adequate ideas and the Joy that they cause also correspond to bodily states.

In this chapter I discuss Spinoza's theory of Desire. Desire is the third and last primary emotion that Spinoza recognises. In the first section of this chapter I describe Spinoza's theory of the mental cause and nature of Desire. The approach of this section is similar to that of the discussion of Joy and Sadness qua mental states in chapter 4. In the second section I discuss Bennett's claim that Spinoza rejects every kind of teleological explanation of human action. In the third section I discuss Spinoza's rejection of Descartes's thesis that the human mind has the capacity to move the human body, and in this section I also answer the question as to what the bodily nature of Desire consists in. In the fourth section I discuss Della Rocca's interpretation and LeBuffe's interpretation of the relation between Desire and the Conatus, or *the striving to persevere in one's existence. In the fourth section I offer an alternative interpretation of this relation. In the fifth section I explain the relation between our desire to preserve the things that we love and our desire to make the people whom we love joyful. In the sixth section I discuss the relation between, on the one hand, the desire to act in such a way that the thing we love continues to exist, and, on the other hand, the desire to make the person we love joyful.*

Section 1: The mental cause and the mental nature of Desire

The mental cause of Desire

Spinoza seems to believe that we are only affected with the emotion of Desire when our idea of something has caused Joy or Sadness. Desire, he seems to think, is always caused by the emotion of Joy or Sadness, which, in turn, are always caused by our idea of something. Admittedly, Spinoza never explicitly makes the claim that we cannot feel the emotion of Desire without having first been affected with Joy or Sadness by our idea of something, but the following four facts strongly suggest that this is what he believes: (1) In Part Three of the *Ethics* Spinoza defines most of the secondary emotions that are kinds of Desire after he has defined the secondary emotions that are kinds of Joy or Sadness. (2) In the Appendix of Part Three of the *Ethics*, too, Spinoza defines the secondary emotions that are kinds of Desire after he has defined the secondary emotions that are kinds of Joy or Sadness. (3) There are very many passages in which Spinoza speaks about a Desire that follows from Joy or Sadness[60]. (See, for example, IIIP12, IIIP13, IIIP15, IIIP33, IIIP37, IIIP38, IVP15, IVP18, IVP44, IVP58, IVP59S, IVP60, IVP61, IVP63, IVapp30, and VP4S.) (4) Spinoza writes in IIIP37, IIIP44 and IVP15 that the strength of a Desire that is born from Joy or Sadness depends on the strength of that emotion of Joy or Sadness.

Although these facts do not imply necessarily that Desire is always caused by Joy and Sadness, they at least suggest that this is indeed the case. In what follows I shall assume that Spinoza holds that the emotion of Desire is caused by the emotion of Joy or the emotion of Sadness.

The mental nature of Desire

Spinoza's theory of Desire is very complex, and to find a way into its complexity, I start by making two slightly inaccurate claims. The first claim is that, according to Spinoza, every desire is a desire to do something. The object of Desire is always some bodily movement, *or* action[61]. (Spinoza writes in IIIAD1: '*Desire is man's very essence, insofar as it is conceived to be determined, from any given affection of it, to do something.*' And in IVP59 he writes that '[…] *Desire (by Def. Aff. 1) is nothing but the striving to act itself*'.) This means

[60] LeBuffe (2009, p.208) writes that it is typical of Spinoza's presentation of desires in the *Ethics* that they arise from joy or sadness.

[61] In this chapter I use the word 'action' to refer to the bodily movements that we desire to perform and not to emotions caused by adequate ideas.

that we do not desire things. So, for example, we do not desire a cup of coffee or a sports car, but to drink coffee or to drive a sports car. And we do not, for example, desire to get rich while sleeping, but we hope to get rich while sleeping, that is, the idea of getting rich while sleeping makes us joyful. The second claim is that, according to Spinoza, what we desire to do depends on the kind of thing our idea of which makes us joyful or sad. If our idea of coffee makes us joyful then we desire to drink coffee, and if our idea of a sports car makes us joyful, then we desire to drive a sports car. As said, these two claims are slightly inaccurate. Later on in this discussion I shall explain why they are so and how they are to be corrected.

In the discussion of the mental nature of Joy and Sadness in chapter 4 we have seen that, according to Spinoza, Joy or Sadness may be caused by our idea of a present thing, our idea of a past thing, our idea of a future thing, and our idea of a person. In each of these four cases what we desire to do is different. I shall first discuss what we desire to do when our idea of a present thing makes us joyful or sad, then what we desire to do when our idea of a future thing makes us joyful or sad, then what we desire to do when our idea of a past thing makes us joyful or sad, and finally what we desire to do when our idea of a person makes us joyful or sad. I shall refer to the following four schemes which are reproductions of the ones given in chapter 4, with addition of the conclusions of this section (see point 5 in every scheme).

Scheme 1: Joy and Sadness caused by our idea of a present thing

Our idea of a present thing causes Joy

1. = We **love** the thing. (IIIP13s)
2. We hope that it continues to exist and fear that it does not continue to exist.
   - We are joyful when we imagine that it continues to exist. (IIIP19)
   - We are sad when we imagine that it does not continue to exist. (IIIP19)
3. We (are motivated to) believe that the thing makes us joyful. (no textual evidence)
4. We hope that other things act in such a way that it continues to exist.
   - We love the things that we imagine preserve it. (Inferred from IIIP22)
   - We hate the things that we imagine destroy it. (Inferred from IIIP22)
5. We desire to act in such a way that it continues to exist. (IIIP13s)
   - We are joyful when we imagine that we preserve it.
   - We are sad when we imagine that we do not preserve it.

Our idea of a present thing causes Sadness.

1. = We **hate** it. (IIIP13s)
2. We fear that it continues to exist and we hope that it does not continue to exist.
   - We are joyful when we imagine that it does not continue to exist. (IIIP20)
   - We are sad when we imagine that it continues to exist. (IIIP20)
3. We (are motivated to) believe that the thing makes us sad. (no textual evidence)
4. We hope that other things act in such a way that it does not continue to exist.
   - We love the things that we imagine destroy it. (Inferred from IIIP24)
   - We hate the things that we imagine preserve it. (Inferred from IIIP24)
5. We desire to act in such a way that is does not continue to exist. (IIIP13s)
   - We are sad when we imagine that we do not destroy it.
   - We are joyful when we imagine that we destroy it.

Scheme 2: Joy and Sadness caused by our idea of a past thing

Our idea of a past thing causes Joy.

1. = We are **glad** that it existed. (IIIP18)
2. We hope that it will exist again and we fear that it will not exist again. (Inferred from IIIP18) (IIIP36)
   - We are joyful when we imagine that it will exist again. (Inferred from IIIP19)
   - We are sad when we imagine that it will not exist again. (Inferred from IIIP19)
3. We (are motivated to) believe that it would make us joyful if it existed again. (no textual evidence)
4. We hope that other things will act in such a way that it will exist again.
   - We love the things that act in such a way that it will exist again (Inferred from IIIP22)
   - We hate the things that act in such a way that it will not exist again. (Inferred from IIIP22)
5. We desire to act in such a way that it will exist again. (IIIP36)
   - We are joyful when we imagine that we act in such a way that it will exist again.
   - We are sad when we imagine that we do not act in such a way that it will exist again.

Our idea of a past thing causes Sadness.

1. = We are **remorseful** that it existed. (IIIP18)
2. We fear that it will exist again and we hope that it will not exist again. (Inferred from IIIP18)
   - We are joyful when we imagine that it will not exist again. (Inferred from IIIP20)
   - We are sad when we imagine that it will exist again. (Inferred from IIIP20)
3. We (are motivated to) believe that it would make us sad if it existed again. (no textual evidence)
4. We hope that other things will act in such a way that it will not exist again.
   - We love the things that act in such a way that it will not exist again (Inferred from IIIP24)
   - We hate the things that act in such a way that it will exist again. (Inferred from IIIP24)
5. We desire to act in such a way that it will not exist again. (Inferred from IIIP36)
   - We are joyful when we imagine that we act in such a way that it will not exist again.
   - We are sad when we imagine that we do not act in such a way that it will not exist again.

Scheme 3: Joy and Sadness caused by the idea of a future thing

Our idea of a future thing causes Joy.

2. = We **hope** that it will exist. (Hence we fear that it will not exist). (IIIP18)
   - We are joyful when we imagine that it will exist. (Inferred from IIIP19)
   - We are sad when we imagine that it will not exist. (Inferred from IIIP19)
3. We (are motivated to) believe that it would make us joyful if it existed. (no textual evidence)
4. We hope that other things will act in such a way that it will exist.
   - We love the things that act in such a way that it will exist. (Inferred from IIIP22)
   - We hate the things that act in such a way that it does not exist. (Inferred from IIIP22)
5. We desire to act in such a way that it will exist. (Inferred from IIIP28)
   - We are joyful when we imagine that we act in such a way that it will exist.
   - We are sad when we think that we do not act in such a way that it will exist.

Our idea of a future thing causes Sadness.

2. = We **fear** that it will exist. (Hence we hope that it will not exist). (IIIP18)
   - We are sad when we imagine that it will exist. (Inferred from IIIP20)
   - We are joyful when we imagine that it will not exist. (Inferred from IIIP20)
3. We (are motivated to) believe that the thing would make us sad if it existed.
4. We hope that other things will act in such a way that it will not exist.
   - We hate the things that act in such a way that it will exist. (Inferred from IIIP24)
   - We love the things that act in such a way that it will not exist. (Inferred from IIIP24)
5. We desire to act in such a way that it will not exist. (Inferred from IIIP28)
   - We are joyful when we imagine that we act in such a way that it will not exist.
   - We are sad when we imagine that we do not act in such a way that it will not exist.

Scheme 4
Emotions caused by our idea of a person

Our idea of a person causes Joy

1. = We love the person.
2. We hope that he himself is joyful.
- We are joyful when we imagine that he is joyful. (IIIP21)
- We are sad when we imagine that he is sad. (IIIP21)
3. We (are motivated to) believe that the person we love makes us joyful.
4. We hope that others (love him and/or) make him joyful
- We love those whom we imagine (love him and/or) make him joyful. (IIIP22)
- We hate those whom we imagine (hate him and/or) make him sad. (IIIP22) (IIIP45)
5. We desire to make him joyful and hence love us. (IIIP33, IIIP39)
- We are joyful when we imagine that we make him joyful. (IIIP39)
- We are sad when we imagine that we do not make him joyful. (IIIP39, IIIP42)

Our idea of a person causes Sadness

1. = We hate the person.
2. We hope that he himself is sad.
- We are joyful when we imagine that he is sad. (IIIP23)
- We are sad when we imagine that he is joyful. (IIIP23)
3. We (are motivated to) believe that the person we hate makes us sad.
4. We hope that others (hate him and/or) make him sad
- We love those whom we imagine (hate him and/or) make him sad. (IIIP24)
- We hate those whom we imagine (love him and/or) make him joyful. (IIIP24)
5. We desire to make him sad. (IIIP39)
- We are joyful when we imagine that we make him sad.
- We are sad when we imagine that we make him joyful.

Desire caused by Love and Hate

Spinoza typically gives examples of desires that are caused by Love or Hate. In chapter 4 I have explained Spinoza's definitions of Love and Hate as saying that Love and Hate are the emotions of Joy and Sadness caused by our idea of a present thing. Our Love for something is nothing more than our Joy caused by our idea of that thing, and our Hate for something is nothing more than our Sadness caused by our idea of that thing. Spinoza, thus, typically gives examples of desires that relate to present things our ideas of which make us joyful or sad. After having defined Love and Hate he writes in IIIP13S: '*We see, then, that one who loves necessarily strives to have present and preserve the thing he loves; and on the other hand, one who hates strives to remove and destroy the thing he hates.*'

In IIIP13S, then, Spinoza writes that our Love for something causes the desire to preserve the thing we love, and that our Hate for something causes the desire to destroy the thing we hate[62]. Our desire to preserve the thing we love is thus simply caused by the Joy that is caused by our idea of that thing, and our desire to destroy the thing we hate is thus simply caused by the Sadness that is caused by our idea of that thing. In other words, when our idea of something affects us with Joy, then this Joy causes the desire to preserve this thing, and when our idea of something affects us with Sadness, then this Sadness causes the desire to destroy this thing. So, for example, if my idea of this paragraph makes me joyful, then I will desire to preserve it by saving it on my computer's hard disk, but if my idea of this paragraph makes me sad, then I will desire to destroy it by deleting it.

Given that 'to preserve something' means the same as 'to act in such a way that something continues to exist' and given that 'to destroy something' means the same as 'to act in such a way that something does not continue to exist', we may reformulate the above by saying that, according to Spinoza, we desire to act in such a way that the thing we love continues to exist, and that we desire to act in such a way that the thing we hate does not continue to exist. The reason why I want to reformulate Spinoza's phrase 'we desire to preserve the thing we love and to destroy the thing we hate' as 'we desire to act in such a way that the thing we love continues to exist and the thing we hate does not continue to exist' is that this reformulation will show that, according to Spinoza, the nature of Desire remains the same whether it follows from Love or Hate, or from Hope or Fear, or from Gladness or Remorse.

[62] I ignore here that Spinoza also writes that we desire to have the thing we love present and that we desire to remove the thing we hate, because these desires seem to play no role in Spinoza's theory of emotion. Spinoza bases his claim that we desire to make the person we love joyful and the person we hate sad on his claim that we desire to preserve the thing we love and to destroy the thing we hate.

Spinoza does not say it explicitly, but if, in chapter 4, I was correct in arguing that we do not love or hate something because we *believe* (*or* hold the opinion) that it is the cause of our Joy or Sadness, then, according to Spinoza, we do not desire to act in such a way that the thing we love or hate will or will not continue to exist because we *believe* that this thing is the cause of our Joy or Sadness. Desire, in other words, is not caused by our belief (*or* opinion) that something makes us joyful or sad, but by the Joy or Sadness that is caused by our idea of this thing. So, for example, my desire to act in such a way that my garden continues to exist by gardening it is not caused by my belief that my garden makes me joyful, but by the Joy that I feel when I see or visualise my garden. To put this schematically:

Incorrect reading:

Belief: 'This thing makes me joyful' → Desire to act in such a way that the thing continues to exist

Correct reading:

Idea of something → Joy → Desire to act in such a way that the thing continues to exist

My point here is not to deny that some of our beliefs cause emotions in us, but rather that it is possible for us to desire to act in such a way that the thing we love or hate will or will not continue to exist without believing that this thing makes us joyful or sad. Let me illustrate this point with an analogy: Suppose that a mother dog loves her puppies and that she desires to take care of them. In IIIP57S Spinoza attributes sense perception and emotion to animals, and denies them thought. Spinoza, then, would explain the dog's emotions of Love and Desire by saying that the dog's mental images of her puppies cause the emotion of Joy and that her emotion of Joy causes the desire to act in such a way that her puppies will continue to exist, for example, by feeding them and protecting them from other animals. The mother dog does not love her puppies, and she does not desire to care of them, because she believes that they make her joyful. Likewise, it seems, when our idea of some present thing causes Joy or Sadness, *or* Love or Hate, then we immediately desire to preserve or destroy this thing, without first having to form the belief that this thing makes us joyful or sad.

Desire caused by Hope and Fear

I shall now argue that, according to Spinoza, the emotion of Desire is not only caused by Love and Hate but also by Hope and Fear. Although he does not write explicitly that Hope and Fear cause Desire, he does suggest this in IIIP28. In section 4 and 5 of this chapter we shall see that IIIP28 is a very important proposition in the debate on the relation between Desire and the *conatus*. Unfortunately, the meaning of IIIP28 is also quite ambiguous.

Spinoza writes in IIIP28: '*We strive to further the occurrence of whatever we imagine will lead to Joy, and to avert or destroy what we imagine is contrary to it,* or *will lead to Sadness.*' Given that 'to further the occurrence of something' means the same thing as 'to act in such a way that something will exist', and given that 'to avert something' means the same as 'to act in such a way that something will not exist', we may reformulate IIIP28 by saying that, according to Spinoza, when we imagine that something will lead to Joy, then we desire to act in such a way that it will exist, and that when we imagine that something will lead to Sadness, then we desire to act in such a way that it will not exist.

One possible reading of IIIP28 is that it says that when we *believe* that something will make us joyful, then we desire to act in such a way that it will exist, and as saying that when we believe that something will make us sad, then we desire to act in such a way that it will not exist. There are two things to notice about this reading: (1) it takes 'to imagine' to mean 'to believe', and (2) it suggests that the emotion of Desire may be directly caused by a belief that we have about something without us first having been affected with Joy or Sadness [63].

Given that IIIP28 is the only passage in the *Ethics* that suggests that Desire may be directly caused by our belief that something will make us joyful or sad, and given that, on the contrary, there are many passages in which Desire is caused by Joy and Sadness, I would like to offer an alternative reading of IIIP28. According to this alternative reading, IIIP28 says that Hope causes the desire to act in such a way that the thing we hope for will exist, and that Fear causes the desire to act in such a way that the thing we fear will not exist. We have seen in chapter 4 that to hope for something is not the same thing as to believe that something will make us joyful, and that to fear something is not the same thing as to believe that something will make us sad. To hope for something means to be affected with Joy by our idea of a future thing, and to fear something means to be affected with Sadness by our idea of a future thing. According to this alternative reading, then, IIIP28 says that when our idea of a future thing affects us with Joy then we desire to act in such a way that this thing will exist, and that when

[63] Jarrett (1999, p.12), for example, translates '*imaginamur*' as 'we believe', without providing any justification.

our idea of a future thing affects us with Sadness, then we desire to act in such a way that this thing will not exist. (See scheme 3.5) So, for example, if my idea of an apple pie makes me joyful, then I will desire to act in such a way that the apple pie will exist, that is, I will desire to make an apple pie. However, if I merely believe that an apple pie will make me joyful, but I am not already affected with Joy by my idea of an apple pie, then I will not have the desire to make an apple pie. To put this schematically:

Incorrect reading:
Belief: 'This future thing will make me joyful' → Desire to act in such a way that the thing will exist
Correct reading:
Idea of a future thing → Joy → Desire to act in such a way that the thing will exist

Here, too, my point is not to deny that some of our beliefs cause emotions, but rather that we do not desire to act in such a way that something will or will not exist in the future unless our idea of that thing already makes us joyful or sad, that is, unless we hope for it or fear it. It is even possible for us to desire to act in such a way that something will exist or will not exist even though we believe that this thing will not increase or decrease the total amount of Joy we feel in our life. My mental image of myself sitting in the dentist's chair, for example, affects me with Sadness, and my Sadness, *or* Fear, affects me with the desire to act in such a way that I will not be sitting in the dentist's chair by cancelling my appointment. Although I believe that I will be sad when I sit in the dentist's chair, I do not believe that the total amount of Joy I feel in my life will decrease if I go to the dentist. On the contrary, I believe that the total amount of Joy that I feel in my life will increase if I go to the dentist.

Nonetheless, it seems that, in order for us to desire to act in such a way that something will or will not exist, we must believe that it is possible that the future thing we hope for or fear might exist in the future. Say, for example, that I vividly imagine that tomorrow burglars will break into my house and steal all my precious possessions. If this imaginary scene causes Sadness, and I thus fear that it will happen, then this Sadness, *or* Fear, will cause the desire to act in such a way that this will not happen, for example by installing a security system in my house. It cannot come this far, however, unless I have the belief that the chances that burglars will break into my house are very high. If I believe that it is impossible that burglars will break into my house, then the imaginary scene of burglars breaking into my house will cause no emotion no matter how vividly I imagine these things.

Desire caused by Gladness and Remorse

I will now argue that Gladness and Remorse, too, cause the emotion of Desire. Remember that in chapter 4 I have argued that Gladness and Remorse are nothing more than Joy and Sadness caused by our idea of a past thing, and that Spinoza suggests that Hope and Fear may be based on Gladness and Remorse. If we are glad about something, then we hope that it will exist again and fear that it will not exist again, while if we are remorseful about something, then we hope that it will not exist again and fear that it will exist again. If, just now, I was correct in arguing that, according to Spinoza, Desire is not only caused by Love and Hate, but also by Hope and Fear, then it follows that Spinoza would also agree that Desire is caused by Gladness and Remorse if these two emotions give rise to Hope and Fear. If we are glad about something and we hope that it will exist again, then we will desire to act in such a way that it will exist again, and if we are remorseful about something and we fear that it will exist again, then we will desire to act in such a way that it will not exist again. Spinoza seems to recognise this when he writes in IIIP36: '*He who recollects a thing by which he was once pleased desires to possess it in the same circumstances as when he first was pleased by it.*' (See scheme 2.4.)

It seems that we do not desire to act in such a way that the past thing about which we are glad or remorseful will or will not exist again, unless we imagine that that thing might exist again in the future. Gladness and Remorse must first give rise to Hope or Fear if they are to cause Desire. We have to consider the past thing about which we are glad or remorseful as a future thing, and so turn Gladness or Remorse into Hope or Fear, before we will feel the desire to act in such a way that the past thing will or will not exist again. (An indication of this is that in IIIP36 Spinoza refers to IIIP28.) So, for example, if I am glad about the last apple pie that I made, then I will only desire to make such a pie again if I imagine it as if it existed in the future, and thus if I hope for the apple pie to exist again.

It also seems that if we find it impossible to believe that the past thing about which we are glad will exist again, then we will not desire to act in such a way that it will exist again. If we find it impossible to believe that the past thing about which we are remorseful will exist again, then we will not desire to act in such a way that it will not exist again. So, for example, if I am glad about the last apple pie I made, but I find it impossible to believe that I may make such a pie again, for example because I lack the necessary ingredients and kitchen equipment, then I will not desire to make an apple pie.

Here, too, the desire to act in such a way that some past thing will or will not exist again cannot be caused by the mere belief that it would make us joyful or sad if it existed

again. This Desire must be caused by the Joy or Sadness that we feel when we imagine the past thing as existing in the future. To put this schematically:

Incorrect reading:

Belief: 'This past thing will make me joyful if it will exist again.' → Desire to act in such a way that the thing will exist again

Correct reading:

Idea of a past thing imagined as existing in the future → Joy → Desire to act in such a way that the thing will exist again

Love and Hate, too, only cause Desire if they first cause Hope and Fear

Although Spinoza does not say this, it seems that Love and Hate, too, can only cause Desire if they first cause Hope or Fear. Desire is always a Desire to act, and our actions always concern future states of affairs. We evidently cannot change the past or the immediate present by our actions. Even when we say that we want to do something now, we mean, of course, that we want to do that thing in the immediate future, because by saying that we want to do something now we imply that we are not doing it at the present moment.

It seems, then, that in order for Love and Hate to cause the Desire to act in such a way that the thing we love or hate will or will not continue to exist, we first have to imagine the present thing we love or hate as existing in the future, and so hope or fear that the thing we love or hate will or will not continue to exist.

I argued that if we find it impossible to believe that the past thing about which we are glad will exist again, and therefore do not hope that it will exist again, then we will not desire to act in such a way that it will exist again. (If we find it impossible to believe that the thing about which we are remorseful will exist again, and therefore do not fear that it will exist again, then we will not desire to act in such a way that it will not exist again.) Likewise, then, if we find it impossible to believe that the thing we love will continue to exist, and therefore do not hope that it will continue to exist, then we will not desire to act in such a way that it will continue to exist. (If we find it impossible to believe that the thing we hate continues to exist, and therefore do not fear that it will continue to exist, then we will not desire to act in such a way that it will not continue to exist.)

The nature of Desire remains the same whether it follows from Love, Hate, Gladness, Remorse, Hope or Fear.

Notice how the reformulation of the phrase 'we desire to preserve the thing we love and to destroy the thing we hate' as 'we desire to act in such a way that the thing we love will continue to exist and that the thing we hate will not continue to exist' and the reformulation of the phrase 'we desire to further the occurrence of the thing we hope for and to avert the occurrence of the thing we fear' as 'we desire to act in such a way that the thing we hope for will exist and that the thing we fear will not exist' makes it easier to see that the nature of Desire remains the same whether it follows from Love or Hate, or from Hope or Fear, or, for that matter, from Gladness or Remorse. When we love something, then we desire to act in such a way that it will continue to exist; when we hope for something, then we desire to act in such a way that it will exist; and when we are glad about something, then we desire to act in such a way that it will exist again. When we hate something, then we desire to act in such a way that it will not continue to exist; when we fear something, then we desire to act in such a way that it will not exist; and when we are remorseful about something, then we desire to act in such a way that it will not exist again.

We are joyful when we imagine that we preserve the thing we love.

In section 6 of this chapter we shall see that Spinoza argues that we desire to make the people we love joyful and the people we hate sad, because we desire to preserve the things we love and to destroy the things we hate. Spinoza, then, builds his theory of the emotions we feel concerning people on his theory of the emotions that we feel concerning things. Now, according to Spinoza, we feel joyful when we imagine that we make the person we love joyful, we feel sad when we imagine that we do not make the person we love joyful, we feel joyful when we imagine that we make the person we hate sad, and we feel sad when we imagine that we do not make the person we hate sad. (I ignore for the moment the question whether 'to imagine' here means 'to visualise' or 'to believe'. See scheme 4.5.) Given that Spinoza wants to build his theory of the emotions that we feel concerning people on his theory of the emotions that we feel concerning things, he could have made similar claims for cases in which our desire relates, not to a person we love or hate, but to a thing we love or hate.

Spinoza could have added to IIIP13S that, if we desire to act in such a way that the thing we love continues to exist and that the thing we hate does not continue to exist, then we are joyful when we imagine that we act in such a way that the thing we love will continue to

exist or that the thing we hate will not continue to exist, and then we are sad when we imagine that we do not act in such a way that the thing we are love will continue to exist or that the thing we hate will not continue to exist. (See scheme 1.5)

Similarly, Spinoza could have added to IIIP28 that, if we desire to act in such a way that the thing we hope for will exist and the thing we fear will not exist, then we are joyful when we imagine that we act in such a way that the thing we hope for will exist or that the thing we fear will not exist, and then we are sad when we imagine that we do not act in such a way that the thing we hope for will exist or that the thing we fear will not exist. (See scheme 3.5)

And, finally, Spinoza could have argued that if we desire to act in such a way that the thing we are glad about will exist again or that the thing we are remorseful about will not exist again, then we are joyful when we imagine that we act in such a way that the thing we are glad about will exist again or that the thing we are remorseful about will not exist again, while we are sad when we imagine that we do not act in such a way that the thing we are glad about will exist again or that the thing we are remorseful about will not exist again. (See scheme 2.5)

The Desire to make the person we love joyful and the person we hate sad

Spinoza observes that if we love someone then we desire to make that person joyful, and if we hate someone then we desire to make that person sad. He writes in IIIP39: '*He who hates someone will strive to do evil to him,* […] *and on the other hand, he who loves someone will strive to benefit him by the same law.*' By doing good or evil to someone Spinoza here simply means making someone joyful or sad. In IIIP39S Spinoza writes: '*By good here I understand every kind of Joy, and whatever leads to it, and especially what satisfies any kind of longing, whatever that may be. And by evil [I understand here] every kind of Sadness, and especially what frustrates longing.*' Spinoza says that by good or evil he simply means something that makes one joyful or sad *here*, because in Part IV of the *Ethics*, where he develops his moral theory, he explains that something is only really good or bad when it increases or decreases the total amount of Joy in our lives. Something is not good for us when it makes us joyful now but more sad in the future, and something is not bad for us when it makes us sad now but more joyful in the future. In IIIP39, then, Spinoza says that if our idea of someone makes us joyful, then we desire to make that person joyful, and if our idea of a person makes us sad, then we desire to make that person sad. So, for example, when I see or

visualise my friends, then I am affected with Joy, and my Joy, *or* Love, causes the Desire to make them joyful.

Notice, then, that what we desire to do when we love or hate someone is different from what we desire to do when we love or hate something. When we love or hate something then we desire to preserve it or destroy it, but when we love or hate someone then we desire to make that person joyful or sad. In section 6 of this chapter we shall see that Spinoza believes that we desire to make the person we love joyful and the person we hate sad, *because* we desire to preserve the thing we love and to destroy the thing we hate.

Egoism

Notice that in IIIP39 Spinoza is not saying that we desire to make other people joyful when we believe that this is in our own advantage. He is not saying, for example, that I desire to make my friends joyful because I believe that if I make them joyful then they will also make me joyful, or because I believe that making my friends joyful makes me joyful. Spinoza is often said to have argued that we human beings are egotists and only desire to make other people joyful when we believe that by doing so they will make us joyful, or because we believe that making other people joyful will make us joyful. If that were the case then, for example, I only desire to buy my friends a beer if I believe that they will buy me a beer in return, and I only desire to give a dollar to the beggar in the street if I believe that this will make me feel good about myself. I do not deny that Spinoza thought that we often desire to make other people joyful on the basis of such egotistic calculations, but I deny that this is how Spinoza generally explains our Desire to make other people joyful. Spinoza simply says in IIIP39 that if our idea of someone affects us with Joy or Sadness, then this Joy or Sadness, *or* Love or Hate, affects us with the Desire to make this person joyful or sad. Although we may desire to make someone joyful because we believe that this will somehow increase our own happiness, our desire to make the people we love joyful is not generally motivated by such a belief about our own interest. Our desire to make the people we love joyful is motivated by our love for those people, that is, by the Joy with which we are affected by our idea of them.

Secondary emotions that are kinds of the Desire to make someone joyful or sad

Spinoza mentions a number of secondary emotions that are kinds of the desire to make a person joyful or sad. These secondary emotions are easy to understand and I shall therefore merely mention them, but not comment on them. Thankfulness, *or* Gratitude[64], is our desire to make a person joyful, because he has made us joyful. Benevolence[65] is our desire to make someone joyful, because we pity him. Human kindness or Courtesy[66] is our general desire to make people joyful. Nobility[67] is our Desire to help other people and to be friends with other people according to the rule of reason. Anger[68] is our desire to make someone we hate sad. Vengeance[69] is our desire to make someone sad, because he has made us sad. Cruelty, *or* Severity[70], is someone else's desire to make a person we love sad.

Are these the only desires that we have?

We have seen that if our idea of something affects us with Joy or Sadness, then we desire to act in such a way that this thing will exist, and that if our idea of someone affects us with Joy or Sadness, then we desire to make that person joyful or sad. Although these are the only two desires that play an official role in Spinoza's theory of emotion, Spinoza clearly cannot have held that these are the only two desires that we have. Say, for example, that my idea of my cup of coffee makes me joyful. According to Spinoza, it seems, I must therefore desire to act in such a way that my cup of coffee continues to exist. But this is precisely not what I desire to do, because I desire to drink my coffee, which makes it disappear. Or, to give another example, say that my idea of my sports car makes me joyful. According to Spinoza, it seems, I must therefore desire to act in such a way that my sports car continues to exist. But, although I may enjoy taking care of my car, what I really desire to do is to drive it.

There are a few passages in Part Three of the *Ethics* in which Spinoza talks about a desire that is not a desire to perform a certain action, but rather a desire for a certain object. In IIIP36, for example, Spinoza speaks about a desire to possess again the object that once pleased us. More importantly, in IIIP56 Spinoza defines the secondary emotions of Gluttony,

[64] *Gratia sive Gratitudo*. See IIIP40 and AD34.
[65] *Benevolentia*. See IIIP37 and IIIAD35.
[66] *Humanitas seu Modestia*. See IIIP39 and IIIAD43.
[67] *Generositas*. See IIIP59.
[68] *Ira*. See IIIP40 and IIIAD36.
[69] *Vindicta.* See IIIP40 and IIIAD37.
[70] *Crudelitas seu Saevitia*. See IIIP40 and IIIAD38.

Drunkenness, Lust, Greed and Ambition[71] as immoderate forms desires for food, alcohol, pleasure, money and praise.

Section 2: Bennett on teleological action

In his article 'Teleology and Spinoza's Conatus' (1983)[72], Jonathan Bennett claims that Spinoza rejects *any* kind of teleological explanation of goal-oriented human action (see p.1). Bennett mentions one teleological explanation of goal-oriented human action that Spinoza rejects, and he mentions three other teleological explanations of goal-oriented human action that Spinoza would have rejected had he thought of them.

The first teleological explanation of goal-oriented human action says that, if we act in order to reach a goal, then our action is caused by that goal. Bennett gives the following example: If we raise our hand to deflect a stone that has been thrown at our face, then our action of raising our hand is caused by the deflection of the stone. Spinoza rejects this kind of teleological explanation of goal-oriented human action, Bennett says, because a future event cannot cause a present event (see p.1). The deflection of the stone is a future event in relation to the raising of our hand, and so the raising of our hand cannot be caused by the deflection of the stone. This kind of teleological explanation inverses the causal order. The raising of our hand is not caused by the deflection of the stone, but rather the other way around, the raising of our hand causes the deflection of the stone.

The second teleological explanation of goal-oriented human action says that, if we act in order to reach a goal, then our action is caused by our thought of that goal. If, for example, we raise our hand in order to deflect the stone that has been thrown at our face, then our action of raising our hand is caused by our thought of the deflection of the stone. Bennett says that Spinoza would reject this explanation because he denies that the mind and the body can interact with each other.

The third teleological explanation of goal-oriented human action, which is an adaptation of the second explanation just mentioned, says that if we act in order to reach a goal, then our action is caused by the state of our brain that corresponds to our thought of that goal. If, for example, we raise our hand in order to deflect the stone that has been thrown at our face, then our action of raising our hand is caused by the state of our brain that corresponds to our thought of the deflection of the stone. Bennett says that he does not know

[71] Latin: *Luxuria*, *Ebrietas*, *Libido*, *Avaritia*, *Ambitio*. See IIIP56 and AD44-48.
[72] The page indications I mention here refer to Bennett's article as it is found on his personal website, and not as it is published in the journal 'Midwest Studies in Philosophy'.

whether Spinoza explicitly thought about this teleological explanation of goal-oriented human action, but Spinoza, Bennett says, would have rejected this explanation (see p.3 and p.4). The reason why, according to Bennett, Spinoza would have rejected this explanation is that Spinoza believes that the state of our brain that causes our action does not cause our action through its property of being a representation of a goal, but through its intrinsic properties, such as the shapes, sizes, positions and velocities of its particles. (Bennett says that the state of our brain that corresponds to our thought of a goal can also be said to be a representation of that goal.) So, for example, the state of our brain that causes the raising of our hand does not cause the raising of our hand through its property of being a representation of the deflection of the stone, but through its intrinsic properties, such as such as the shapes, sizes, positions and velocities of its particles.

The fourth teleological explanation of goal-oriented human action says that, if we act in order to reach a goal, then our action is caused by the state of our body that corresponds to our desire for that goal. If, for example, I desire to eat an apple, then my action of eating an apple is caused by my desire to eat an apple qua state of my body. In other words, the state of my body that corresponds to my desire to eat an apple causes my action of eating an apple. Bennett says (p.7) that Spinoza would also have rejected this explanation of human action, for the same reason as he would have rejected the second teleological explanation: the bodily state that corresponds to our desire to do something does not cause our action through its property of being a desire to do something, but only through its intrinsic properties. So, for example, if we desire to eat an apple, then the state of our body that corresponds to this desire does not cause our action of eating an apple through its property of being a desire to eat an apple, but only through its intrinsic properties

Having claimed that Spinoza would reject these four teleological explanations of goal-oriented human actions, Bennett then goes on to argue that Spinoza's theory of the *conatus* actually is a teleological explanation of action (see p.7). He says that Spinoza makes the claim 'If doing something (anything whatsoever) will contribute to the survival of an individual, then that individual will do that'. Bennett argues that Spinoza comes to this conclusion by illegitimately inversing the order of the claim 'If an individual does something, then this will contribute to the survival of this individual'. Although the claim 'If an individual does something, then this will contribute to the survival of this individual' is not teleological, the claim 'If doing something will contribute to the survival of an individual, then that individual will do that' is teleological. Bennett writes that Spinoza '*is trying to arrive at something that he has implicitly forbidden to everyone; and so it has to be developed in a twisted, tangled,*

illegitimate manner. I do not, of course, mean that Spinoza knew that that is what he was doing' (see p.11).

Bennett holds that Spinoza makes the claim 'If doing something will contribute to the survival of a man, then that man will (try to) do that' (see p.10). (The precision that, if something will contribute to our survival, then we try do to that, which implies that we might fail doing that, is not important to Bennett's argument that Spinoza's claim is teleological.) Bennett says that IIIP9S, IIIP12 and IIIP13, and nine other propositions derived from IIIP12 and IIIP13, all have this form. Bennett claims, furthermore, that '*in parts 4 and 5 Spinoza is clearly relying on a doctrine of self-interest that is openly teleological and predictive of behavior*'. In his book *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics* (1984), Bennett refers to IVP21, IVP22C, IVP25 in support of this claim[73].

I agree with Bennett's claim that Spinoza would reject the first three explanations of goal-oriented human behaviour that he mentions, so I have nothing to say about that. (I would only say that I do not see why explanations 2 and 3 are *teleological* explanations of goal-oriented human action. Not future things, but our ideas of future things play a role in these explanations, and so the causation of action that these explanations refer to is not teleological but efficient.) However, Bennett's claim that Spinoza would reject the fourth teleological explanation of goal-oriented human behaviour (which says that our goal-oriented actions are caused by the bodily states that correspond to our Desire to perform that action) is problematic. It is not quite clear to me whether Bennett denies that desires qua bodily states cause actions, or whether he denies that desires qua bodily states cause actions in virtue of their representational properties. In the next section of this chapter I shall show that Spinoza does think that our actions are caused by our desires qua bodily states. Of course they do so in virtue of their physical properties and not through their representational properties; bodily states only have physical properties[74].

Bennett's claim that Spinoza holds that 'If doing something will contribute to the survival of a man, then that man will (try to) do that' is in my opinion false. I shall suggest in section 5 of this chapter that Spinoza believes that we normally pursue things that are beneficial to our health, because our emotional mechanism (which makes us desire to pursue

[73] Bennett's claim that Spinoza rejects all kinds of teleology has received criticism from Curley (1990), Della Rocca (1996), Jarrett (1999), Garrett (1999), and Lin (2006)

[74] Lin says that Bennett holds that the representational property, or the content, of an idea depends on the causal history of this idea, and so constitutes an extrinsic property. But if that is so, then what is an intrinsic property of an idea? The shape of a body also depends on its causal history, but that does not make in an extrinsic property. I fail to understand the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic properties of mental and bodily modes.

something when our mental image of it causes Joy in us) leads to pleasure-seeking and pain-avoiding behaviour. This more nuanced interpretation of Spinoza's view on the way in which we human beings (unintentionally) strive to continue to exist explains the obvious fact that we often pursue things that are bad for our health and often avoid things that are good for our health.

Section 3: Desire qua bodily state

Now that we know the mental cause and nature of the emotion of Desire, I shall answer the question: What is the bodily cause and nature of Desire? The difficulty in answering this question is that, whereas Spinoza is very abstract about the bodily nature of Joy and Sadness, he is almost completely silent about the bodily nature of Desire. There is, to my knowledge, only one passage in which Spinoza says something about the bodily nature of Desire, and that passage is IIIP2.

The general theme of IIIP2 is Spinoza's rejection of Descartes's thesis that the human mind, by its faculty of the Will, can cause the human body to move in the way it wants[75]. In this section I shall, therefore, not only discuss the bodily nature of Desire, but also Spinoza's rejection of Descartes's thesis that we are able, by exercising our Will, to move our body in the way we want.

Descartes thinks that a desire to perform a bodily movement and a decision to perform a bodily movement are different kinds of mental states. A desire to perform a bodily movement is a passion of the mind, that is, an emotion caused in the mind by the body. A decision to perform a bodily movement is an action of the mind. A decision of the mind is a volition, that is, an act of the mental faculty of the Will. I may, for example, run away from some danger because I desire to do so or because I decide to do so. My mind is only the cause of my running away if I want to run away. Otherwise my running away has its cause in the mechanics of the body itself, and in that case my desire to run away is merely my mind's perception of my body's inclination to run away. Descartes claims that if desire inclines us to perform some bodily movement, then we can often decide not to perform this bodily movement. If, for example, we desire to run away from some danger, then we can decide not to run away. Descartes claims, furthermore, that we can freely decide how we move our body.

[75] In IIIP2 Spinoza also rejects Descartes's thesis that some of our emotions, namely the passions, are caused in the mind by the body. Spinoza thinks that passions are not caused by the body but by inadequate ideas of things. Most of IIIP2, however, is about Spinoza's rejection of Descartes's thesis that the mind can determine the body to motion.

Our decision to move our body in a certain way, in other words, is not caused by something else.

Spinoza rejects Descartes's thesis for two reasons. First, Spinoza denies, in general, that it is possible that something does not have a cause. Therefore, even if some of the movements of our body were caused by decisions of our mind, then these decisions would not be free, *or* uncaused, acts of our mind, but they would also have a cause. Secondly, Spinoza denies that the human mind can cause the body to move. According to Spinoza, a mode can only interact with modes of the same attribute. A mental mode, for example, can only interact with other mental modes, and a bodily mode only with other bodily modes. The movements of the human body, therefore, cannot be caused by the human mind[76]. Spinoza writes in IIIP2:

> Next, the motion and rest of the Body must arise from another body, which has also been determined to motion or rest by another; and absolutely, whatever arises in the body must have arisen from God insofar as he is considered to be affected by some mode of Extension, and not insofar as he is considered to be affected by some mode of thinking (also by IIP6), i.e., it cannot arise from the Mind, which (by IIP11) is a mode of thinking.[77]

Spinoza mentions two objections against his rejection of the thesis that the human mind can freely decide how to move the human body. The first objection says that we know from experience that without a decision of the mind the body remains almost motionless and is incapable of doing ingenious things like making buildings and paintings. The cause of these bodily movements, so the objection concludes, must be a decision of the mind. The second objection says that experience teaches us that we can decide to do something or not to do something. We can, for example, decide to talk or not to talk. The decision of the mind that makes the body perform a movement, this objection says, must thus be a free decision.

Spinoza replies to the first objection by saying that we have too little knowledge of the human body to tell what the body can or cannot do on its own. The human body is a very complex machine and no one, he says, can explain all its functions. The fact that animals are

[76] Davidson (1999, p.104) claims that the point of IIIP2 is not to deny that that mental states can *cause* bodily states, but to deny that mental states can *explain* bodily states. Davidson cannot take literally Spinoza's claim that 'the motion of a body arises from another body and not from the mind', because, according to Davidson, the human mind and the human body are numerically identical things. He says that, if a body causes bodily motion and a body is numerically identical with a mind, then a mind causes bodily motion. I am able to take IIIP2 literally, because, according to my interpretation, the human mind and the human body are not numerically identical things.

[77] Notice that Spinoza clearly uses the verb 'to arise from' in the sense of 'to be caused by' when he says that the motion of the body cannot arise from the mind. This confirms my thesis that when Spinoza writes that Joy and Sadness arise from our ideas of things, he means that Joy and Sadness are caused by our ideas of things.

able to do things we do not know how to do, and the fact that sometimes people do many things in their sleep show that a body can perform many complex movements without a decision of the mind.

Spinoza replies to the second objection by saying that people only think that they freely decide how they act because they do not know the cause of their actions. He gives some examples of cases wherein someone believes that he freely decides how he behaves whereas it is clear to observers that he is fully determined to behave in this way by his desires. Spinoza writes:

> So the infant believes he freely wants (*velle*) the milk; the angry child that he wants vengeance; and the timid, flight. So the drunk believes it is from a free decision of the Mind that he speaks the things he later, when sober, wishes (*vellet*) he had not said. So the madman, the chatterbox the child, and a great many people of this kind believe they speak from a free decision of the Mind, when really they cannot contain their impulse to speak.

Spinoza quite clearly implies that everyone who believes that he performs a bodily movement by a free decision of his mind is mistaken. He continues:

> So experience itself, no less clearly than reason, teaches that […] the decisions of the Mind are nothing but the appetites themselves, which therefore vary as the disposition of the Body varies. For each one governs everything from his affect; those who are torn by contrary affects do not know that they want (*velint*), and those who are not moved by any affect are very easily driven here and there. All these things show clearly that both the decision of the Mind and the appetite and the determination of the Body by nature exist together – or rather are one and the same thing, which we call a decision when it is considered under, and explained through, the attribute of Thought, and which we call a determination when it is considered under the attribute of Extension and deduced from the laws of motion and rest.

That Spinoza speaks in this passage about 'appetite', rather than about 'desire' should not confuse us. Spinoza writes in the second part of IIIP9S: '*Between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so far as they are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly be thus defined: Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof.'* Although Spinoza thus indicates a slight difference in the common use of the words 'appetite' and 'desire', he himself really uses them as equivalents[78].

[78] Della Rocca (1996, p.216) seems to agree. He writes that it is best to view Desire simply as Appetite, that is, as the striving of a human being.

So in the first part of the passage from IIIP2 just quoted Spinoza argues that a decision of the mind to move the body in a certain way is the same thing as a desire of the mind to move the body in a certain way. In the second part of this passage he argues that the decision or desire to move the body in a certain way is the same thing as the body's determination to move in a certain way.

It seems clear that what Spinoza means is that our impression that we can move our body by a free decision of our mind is really just an illusion. Our bodily movements are always caused by our Desires qua states of our body. Desire qua bodily state consists in a determination of our body to perform a certain movement. So when, for example, I have the desire to lift my left hand, then this Desire qua mental state corresponds to the determination of my body to raise my left hand, which determination is, of course, my Desire qua state of my body. When someone says that he 'wants' to do something, then this can really only mean that he desires to do something. So, for example, when the angry child says that he has taken vengeance because he 'wanted to', then this does not mean that his bodily action was caused by a free decision of his mind, but merely that this action was caused by his desire (qua state of his body). And, for example, when the timid man says that he fled the dangerous situation because he 'wanted to', then this does not mean that his bodily action was caused by a free decision of his mind, but merely that this action was caused by his desire (qua state of his body). The angry child and the timid man may believe that they freely decided to do what they wanted to do, but in reality their bodily action was caused by their desire (qua state of their body), which had determinate causes.

Spinoza does not say this explicitly, but I think we may reasonably conclude that the body's determination to act in a certain way is located in the muscles, because it is only by our muscles that we move our body. The emotion of Desire qua bodily state, then, consists in the determination of our muscles to move our body.

The question arises: What causes the determination of our muscles to move our body? Well, as I argued that Desire qua mental state is caused by Joy and Sadness qua mental states, and that Joy and Sadness qua bodily states consist in an increase or decrease in our health due to an affection of our heart (and perhaps other internal organs), I think that we may conclude that Spinoza must have thought that Desire qua bodily state, that is, the determination of our muscles to move our body, must be caused by Joy or Sadness qua bodily state, that is, the increase or decrease in our health due to an affection of our heart. The following figure illustrates this:

Desire qua mental state is caused by Joy or Sadness, and Desire qua bodily state is caused by the affection of our heart that corresponds to our Joy or Sadness.			
Attribute of Thought:	idea of a finite thing	→ Joy or Sadness	→ Desire
Attribute of Extension:	brain state	→ affection of the heart	→ determination of muscles

'The conatus is called Will when related only to the mind.'

In the first part of IIIP9S Spinoza says the following about the striving to persevere in one's existence: '*When this striving is related only to the Mind, it is called Will; but when it is related to the Mind and Body together, it is called Appetite.*'[79] It is quite obvious from the context of IIIP9S that in this proposition Spinoza does not use the term 'Will' to refer to the Cartesian mental faculty of the Will insofar as that faculty is supposed to enable us make affirmations and negations. Spinoza, as we have seen, discusses *this* function that Descartes ascribes to the Will in IIP48 and IIP49. In IIIP9S, therefore, Spinoza is not saying that the affirmation that our ideas involves is somehow a function of our striving to stay alive. Spinoza uses the term 'Will' here to refer to the Cartesian mental faculty of the Will insofar as it is alleged to enable us to decide how to move our body. Thus, when Spinoza says that to persevere in one's existence is called 'Will' when related only to the human mind, he has in mind the point he made in IIIP2, which is that what Cartesians call 'a free decision, *or* volition, of the mind to move the body' is nothing more than the emotion of Desire.

Section 4: Della Rocca and LeBuffe on the relation between Desire and the Conatus

In IIIP4-IIIP6 Spinoza develops the general argument that everything strives to resist its destruction and to persevere in its being. Everything, in other words, strives to continue to exist. The Latin expression for 'the striving to persevere in one's being' is '*conatus perseverandi in suo esse*', and in secondary literature this striving is referred to as 'the *conatus*'.

Spinoza's general claim that all beings strive for their preservation implies that we human beings strive for our preservation. Although many scholars have discussed Spinoza's general claim that all beings strive for their preservation, not many of them have discussed Spinoza's specific claim that we human beings strive for our preservation. I shall here discuss

[79] Many scholars mention this puzzling passage without explaining it. See Wolfson (1934, p.203), Harris (1973, p.112), Wetlesen (1979, p.83), Delahunty (1985, p.221), Scruton (1986, p.61), James (1997, p.146), Della Rocca (1996, p.214), Nadler (2006, p.202), Della Rocca (2008, p.153)

what Della Rocca and LeBuffe write about Spinoza's application of his general claim that all beings strive to persevere in their existence to human beings. I shall not discuss the various interpretations of Spinoza's general claim that all beings strive to persevere in their existence[80].

Michael Della Rocca

In the first part of his article **'**Spinoza's Metaphysical Psychology', Michael Della Rocca (1996) discusses Spinoza's abstract metaphysical principle that all beings strive to persevere in their existence, and in the second part of his article he discusses how Spinoza applies this abstract principle to human psychology. I only comment on the second part of his article.

Della Rocca identifies three elements of Spinoza's theory of emotion that threaten Spinoza's naturalism, that is, his thesis that human beings do not fundamentally differ from any other thing in Nature. The first element concerns the importance of belief for the human emotion of Desire, the second element concerns the importance of belief for the human emotions of Joy and Sadness, and the third element concerns the (apparent) fact that some of our actions have no immediate reward. I shall summarise what Della Rocca says about these three elements of Spinoza's theory of emotion that he thinks threaten Spinoza's naturalism. Directly after the summary of what Della Rocca says about each element, I shall make an objection.

1) Concerning the importance of belief for Desire.

Della Rocca argues that Spinoza's claim that all beings strive to preserve themselves and to increase their power of acting implies that we human beings desire to preserve ourselves and to increase our power of acting (see p.216). Della Rocca writes that Spinoza's general claim 'If doing something will increase an individual's power of acting, then this individual will strive to do that' implies the specific claim 'If doing something will increase a man's power of acting, then this man will do that'. Della Rocca remarks that in order for the claim 'If doing something would increase a man's power of acting, then this man will do that' to be true, we must at least add the condition 'and if this man is aware that doing so would increase his power of acting'. To illustrate this point Della Rocca gives the example that if taking a specific drug increases a man's power of acting, then this man will only take this drug if he knows that it will increase his power of acting; if the man does not know that taking

[80] See Bennett (1983), Bennett (1984), Curley's reaction (1988, p.107-115), Garber (1997), Della Rocca (1996), Garrett (2002), Lin (2004), Della Rocca (2008)

the drug increases his power of acting, then the man will not take it (see p.218). Della Rocca writes that Spinoza, indeed, sometimes, namely in IIIP28 and IVP19, writes that 'If a man believes or imagines or judges that doing something will increase his power of acting, then this man will do that'.

Della Rocca argues that although from the perspective of human psychology the introduction of this condition (i.e., a belief concerning the effect of an action on our power of acting) makes the application of the *conatus* to human desire more credible, from a metaphysical perspective the introduction of this condition is problematic, because everything strives for self-preservation but only human beings are able to think, and so the introduction of belief in the explanation of how human beings strive for self-preservation threatens Spinoza's naturalism. As said, by Spinoza's naturalism Della Rocca means Spinoza's claim that we human beings are not fundamentally different from anything else in Nature. We, too, are modes of Nature and determined by the laws of Nature. Della Rocca thinks that Spinoza's description of how we human beings strive to increase our power of acting should be identical to his description of how all things strive to increase their power of acting. Belief should not play a role in Spinoza's description of how we human beings strive to increase our power of acting, because it does not play a role in his description of how all other things strive to increase their power of acting.

First of all, I would like to say that it is confusing to first argue that Spinoza should not have said *p* (i.e., that we desire to do something when it increases our bodily power) but *q* (i.e., that we desire to do something when we believe that it increases our bodily power), and then argue that Spinoza should not to have said *q* either because *q* contradicts his claim *r* (i.e., that we human beings are not fundamentally different from other things). What Della Rocca should have said is that he disagrees with Spinoza's claim *p* (i.e., that we desire to do something when it increases our bodily power), and that he, Della Rocca, would like to correct it by making claim *q* (i.e., that we desire to do something when we believe that it increases our bodily power), and finally warn that Spinoza does not and cannot make claim *q* because it contradicts his claim *r* (i.e., that we human beings are not fundamentally different from other things).

Concerning Della Rocca's claim that belief should not play a role in the way we human beings strive to continue to exist because this claim goes against naturalism, I would like to say that naturalism would be quite an absurd thesis if it said that belief does not play a role in human behaviour because the laws that govern our behaviour are the same as the laws that govern the behaviour of other things, and other things do not have beliefs. Naturalism is

not the thesis that things in nature do not differ at all from each other. Naturalism is the thesis that human beings do not have the supernatural powers and properties that revealed religion ascribes to them. Naturalism denies that human beings are immortal souls; that they possess the power to override the deterministic rules of nature by freely deciding how they behave; that they are the crown of God's creation; that nature has been created for man's enjoyment; that he is born in sin because Adam disobeyed God's will; and other such beliefs. Now, I am not saying that belief plays a role in the way we human beings strive to stay alive, in fact, in the next section I will argue that belief does not play a principal role in the way we strive to continue to exist. I am only saying that it does not make sense to argue that Spinoza does not claim and could not have claimed that belief plays a role in the way we human beings strive to continue to exist, because there are things that strive to continue to exist which do not have beliefs. Della Rocca's argument implies that sense perception and emotion cannot play a role in the way we human beings strive to continue to exist either, because there are things that strive to continue to exist which do not have sense perceptions and emotions.

Finally, it is important to remark that Della Rocca is mistaken when he claims that Spinoza sometimes, namely in IIIP28 and IVP19, writes that 'If a man believes or imagines or judges that doing something will increase his power of acting, then this man will do that'. In neither of these propositions does Spinoza say something to the effect that our desire to act is caused by a belief, and in neither of these propositions does he say something to the effect that we desire something that increases our power of acting. In IIIP28 Spinoza writes that we desire to further the occurrence of what we imagine will bring Joy, and in IVP19 he writes that we desire what we judge to be good. I will discuss IIIP28 in the next section of this chapter, and IVP19 in the following chapter. I shall prove that in neither of these propositions Spinoza implies that belief plays a role in the way we human beings strive to continue to exist.

2) Concerning the importance of belief for Joy and Sadness.

Della Rocca proceeds to explain the nature of Joy and Sadness (see p.219). He writes that, according to Spinoza, when we feel joyful or sad, then at the same time, our body's power of acting is increased or decreased. Della Rocca objects to this that whether we feel joyful or sad does not depend on whether our body's power of acting factually changes, but on whether we believe that our body's power of acting changes (see p.220). If we do not believe that our body's power of acting changes, Della Rocca says, we will not feel joyful or sad, whether our body's power of acting factually changes or not. Della Rocca gives the example of a prisoner who is freed from his chains and whose bodily power is therefore

increased. This prisoner will only feel joyful if he believes that his power of acting is increased because he is released from his chains; if he is released from his chains, but he is unaware of this fact, then he will not feel joyful, and if he believes that he is released from his chains while in reality he is not then he will feel joyful even though his power of acting is not increased. Joy and Sadness, then, Della Rocca concludes, should be explained as functions of our belief that our body's power of acting is increased or decreased; if we believe that our body's power of acting is increased, then we feel joyful, and if we believe that our body's power of acting is decreased, then we feel sad (see p.221). Here, too, Della Rocca claims that although the introduction of belief makes Spinoza's account of, in this case, Joy and Sadness more credible, it also makes it less naturalistic because only human beings have beliefs while all things are supposed to undergo changes in their power of acting, and thus to feel joyful and sad.

Della Rocca then turns to the emotions of Love and Hate in order to corroborate his claim that we do not feel joyful or sad because something factually increases or decreases our power of acting, but because we believe that something increases or decreases our power of acting, and that this is not in line with Spinoza's naturalism (see p.221). I will not explain how Della Rocca thinks his interpretation of Love and Hate corroborates his claim about Joy and Sadness, because I find that his interpretation of Love and Hate confuses rather than corroborates his claim about Joy and Sadness, but I will summarise his interpretation of Love and Hate itself because it differs considerably from my interpretation.

Della Rocca seems to interpret Spinoza's definitions of Love and Hate as saying that we love or hate something when we know that that thing increases or decreases our power of acting. He gives the following example to explain Love. He buys a car, which purchase increases his power of acting because his car enables him to travel more quickly from home to work. Given that his car increases his power of acting he experiences Joy. If he knows that his car has increased his power of acting, then he comes to love the car. Della Rocca then says that Spinoza sometimes deviates from this definition of Love and Hate by saying that we love or hate something when we *believe* that that thing increases or decreases our power of acting, independently from the question whether this thing factually increases or decreases our power of acting. The difference is that in the former case we love or hate something because that thing factually changes our power of acting, whereas in the latter case we love or hate something because we believe that thing changes our power of acting.

First of all I would like to say, once again, that it is confusing to first argue that Spinoza should not have made claim *p* (i.e., that we feel joyful or sad because our bodily

power is increased or decreased), but claim *q* (i.e., that we feel joyful or sad because we believe that our bodily power is increased or decreased), and then argue that Spinoza should not have made claim *q* either because claim *q* contradict his claim *r* (i.e., that we human beings are not fundamentally different from other things). Likewise, it is confusing to first argue that Spinoza should not have made claim *p* (i.e., that we love or hate something because this thing has increased or decreased our bodily power), but claim *q* (i.e., that we love or hate something because we believe that this thing has increased or decreased our bodily power), and then argue that Spinoza should not to have said *q* either because claim *q* contradict his claim *r* (i.e., that we human beings are not fundamentally different from other things).

Secondly, concerning Della Rocca's claim that we feel joyful or sad, not because our bodily power is increased or decreased, but because we believe that our bodily power is increased or decreased, I think that Della Rocca misunderstands what Spinoza means when he writes that the power of our body is increased or decreased when we feel joyful or sad. As I have argued in chapter 5, Spinoza means that Joy and Sadness qua bodily states consist in an increase or decrease in our bodily health due to a beneficial or detrimental affection of our heart (and perhaps other internal organs). He does not mean, for example, that we feel joyful when our bodily power is increased because we buy a car. Our idea of our car may, of course, make us feel joyful, but we do not feel joyful because the car increases our bodily power. There is no need at all for the introduction of belief to explain the increase or decrease in our bodily health involved in Joy and Sadness.

Thirdly, I would like to point out that Della Rocca's interpretation of Love and Hate turns Love and Hate into primary emotions. Della Rocca says that we feel joyful or sad when we believe that something has increased or decreased our power of acting, and that we love or hate something when we believe that it has increased or decreased our power of acting. On his account, Love is not a kind of Joy and Hate is not a kind of Sadness. This clearly goes against Spinoza's thesis that only Joy, Sadness and Desire are primary emotions.

3) Concerning the (apparent) fact that some of our actions have no immediate reward:

Della Rocca finally discusses what he calls 'prudential desire', or 'future-directed desire', and claims that Spinoza denies the existence of this kind of desire (see p.223). Della Rocca speaks of a 'prudential desire' when we desire to do something now because we believe that this action will later increase our Joy, or because we believe that this action will later diminish our Sadness. So in this situation our belief that doing something now will later increase our Joy or diminish our Sadness causes a desire to act, and this desire to act causes our action. What is important about this situation is that performing the action now will not

increase our Joy or diminish our Sadness at this moment when we perform the action, but much later in time. Della Rocca gives the example where, in order to avoid being in pain tomorrow, he needs to take medication now. In this example his belief that by now taking the medication he avoids being in pain tomorrow causes a desire to take the medication now, and this desire causes him to now take the medication. Taking the medication has no effect on his level of Joy and Sadness now, but only on his level of Joy and Sadness tomorrow.

Della Rocca claims that Spinoza *should* not accept the claim 'When we believe that doing something will increase our power of acting, then we will desire to do it', because this claim goes against his naturalism. Human desire must work according to the same principles as the striving of all things, but non-human things do not act in order to obtain benefits in the future (see p.223). Non-human things, according to Della Rocca, only do something if that immediately increases their power of acting. And so Spinoza *should* only accept the claim 'If, and only if, doing something will immediately increase our power of acting, then we will do that'.

Della Rocca writes that he thinks that Spinoza *would* deny that we have and act on prudential desires, that is, that we desire to do something now because we believe that it will increase our level of Joy in the future (see p.226). He then sets out to explain how Spinoza *would* explain away apparent cases in which we desire to do something now because we believe that it will increase our level of Joy in the future. Della Rocca uses as example the case in which we appear to desire to take medication now, because we believe that by doing so we will avoid being in pain tomorrow (see p.227). But, he says, his argument also works for cases in which we, apparently, desire to do something now because we believe that doing so will bring us pleasure tomorrow. Della Rocca writes that Spinoza *would* explain away this apparent case of prudential desire by using his argument that 1) the *anticipation* that we will be in pain tomorrow is itself painful, and his argument that 2) when we are in pain now, we strive to remove that pain. When it appears that we act on a desire to do something now because we *anticipate* that by acting thus we will not be in pain tomorrow, what actually happens is that, we strive to remove the pain we currently feel because we *anticipate* that we will be in pain tomorrow[81]. So, our *anticipation* that we will be in pain tomorrow causes us to

[81] In his book *Spinoza* (2008), Della Rocca gives two reasons why the anticipation of pain is itself painful: 1) We have associated pain with our idea of the future thing that we believe will bring us pain, because this thing has pained us in the past (see p.168); 2) We feel pain because we imitate our future self who is in pain (see p.169). I have some sympathy for the first reason Della Rocca gives, although I think that our idea of something that has caused us pain in the past does not get associated with pain, but with Sadness. I will explain this in the next section of this chapter. The argument that we imitate our future self who is in pain, however, seems unconvincing.

feel pain now, and it is our current pain that we strive to remove; we are not striving to prevent tomorrow's pain.

Question: How do we normally remove the pain that we currently feel because we anticipate tomorrow's pain? Answer: By doing something that we believe will avert tomorrow's pain. The belief that we have done something that averts tomorrow's pain removes the current pain of anticipation. So, to take the example of the medication: If we anticipate that we will be in pain tomorrow, then this anticipation is already painful. Our belief that by taking medication now we will not be in pain tomorrow does not cause a desire to take the medication. But our belief that we remove our current pain of anticipation by taking the medicine now, so that we know that we will not be in pain tomorrow and thus will stop anticipating this pain, does cause a desire to take the medication now. In other words, we take the medication not because we believe that in this way we will not be in pain tomorrow, but because we believe that in this way we will no longer experience the pain of anticipating tomorrow's pain. So, what initially appeared to be a desire to do something that will prevent future pain turns out to be a desire to remove current pain. Della Rocca writes (see p.228):

> The same conclusion would apply to other apparent cases. Thus we can see that 1) Spinoza's view that our striving is wholly directed to the removal of current pain (if we are in pain) and 2) his account of anticipation both lead to the conclusion that there are no genuine cases of future-directed striving. At least in respect of such striving, there is, for Spinoza, no fundamental difference between human beings and objects such as the stone in the sling.

After all this, Della Rocca then *criticises* the solution that he believes Spinoza would give in order to explain away apparent cases in which we desire to do something now because it will increase our Joy in the future. Della Rocca criticises this solution because it threatens Spinoza's naturalism for another reason (see p.230). (The first reason was that it goes against naturalism to say that human beings sometimes desire to do things which have a reward only in the future, because all non-human things only do things that have an immediate reward.) This solution, which Della Rocca ascribes to Spinoza, is not naturalistic because the notion of anticipation plays a role in it. The solution said that when we anticipate future pain, then this anticipation already causes pain, and we desire to remove this pain of anticipation by doing something that will avert the future pain. To anticipate future pain simply means to believe that we will be in pain in the future. But, Della Rocca repeats, belief should not play a role in human desire, because non-human things also have a *conatus*, but they cannot think.

I shall, for clarity's sake, resume Della Rocca's argument. Spinoza would have rejected claim (1) '*If we believe that performing a certain action will avert tomorrow's pain, then we will desire to perform this action'*. Spinoza would have rejected claim (1), because he holds claim (2) '*The behaviour of all things is regulated by the same laws*', and because he holds claim (3) '*Non-human things only perform actions that have immediate rewards*'. Spinoza would, as an alternative to claim (1) have come up with claim (4) '*If we feel pain now because we believe that we will be in pain tomorrow, and if we believe that performing a certain action will prevent us from tomorrow's pain, then we will desire to perform this action, not because we believe that this action will prevent us from tomorrow's pain, but because we believe that by performing this action we will stop feeling the pain that is caused by our belief that we will be in pain tomorrow'*. But Spinoza should not make claim (4) because it goes against claim (2). Claim (4) goes against claim (2), because it says that belief plays a role in the way we human beings strive to continue to exist, and this is ruled out by claim (2) because belief does not play a role in the way non-human things strive to continue to exist.

First of all, I would like to say that it is confusing to first argue that Spinoza cannot accept the existence of prudential desires because prudential desires are not naturalistic, then ascribe a certain explanation of what appear to be prudential desires to Spinoza, and finally criticise Spinoza for this alternative solution because it is not naturalistic either.

Secondly, I do not know on what basis Della Rocca makes claim (3) '*Non-human things only perform actions that have immediate rewards'*, but even if this claim were to be ascribed to Spinoza, then I still would not see why Spinoza's naturalism obliges him to apply it to human beings. Spinoza's claim that human beings do not have supernatural properties and powers does not oblige him to deny that we cannot desire to perform actions that have their reward in the future.

Thirdly, I would have liked Della Rocca to explain his contention that claim (4) would also work as an explanation of cases in which we apparently desire to perform an action because we believe that this action will bring it about that something will make us feel *pleasure* in the future, rather than that something will not bring us pain in the future. Perhaps Della Rocca has this in mind: (4') '*If we feel pleasure now because we believe that we will feel pleasure tomorrow, and if we believe that performing a certain action will establish that we feel pleasure tomorrow, then we will desire to perform this action, not because we believe that this action will establish that we feel pleasure tomorrow, but because we believe that by performing this action we will continue to feel the pleasure that is caused by our belief that*

we will feel pleasure tomorrow'. I do not want to make the same mistake as Della Rocca, that is, criticising him for a claim that I think he would have made, but if (4') is what Della Rocca has in mind, then I would object to (4') that if we feel pleasure because we believe that we will feel pleasure tomorrow, than we will *ceteris paribus* do nothing but enjoy our pleasure now and sit and wait for tomorrow's pleasure.

Finally, I wish to object to Della Rocca's claim (4) that it confuses Pleasure & Pain and Joy & Sadness. When we anticipate tomorrow's pain, then we do not, as Della Rocca says, feel pain, but Sadness. The belief that we will be in pain tomorrow cannot literally be painful. Beliefs may hurt our feelings, but they do not cause Pain. (I ignore the possibility of psychosomatic pains.)

I shall mention two claims that are relevant in the context of this discussion that Della Rocca makes in his book *Spinoza* (2008). His first claim is that whereas Spinoza thinks that all non-human things only strive to persevere in their existence, he thinks that human beings also desire to increase their power of acting (see p.154). Della Rocca bases this claim on IIIP13, and he thinks that this goes against Spinoza's naturalism. His second claim is that, according to Spinoza, we not only desire to preserve ourselves and to increase our power of acting, but we also desire Joy (see p.160). He writes (see p.159):

> For Spinoza, as we have seen, all human desire is to some extent – i.e. to the extent to which we are in ourselves – directed at our self-preservation and at increasing our power of acting. Given the definitions of joy and sadness, this amounts to the view that in all we do we always to some extent desire not only our continuation in existence but also our own joy or happiness. Thus for Spinoza, there can be no desire that is totally divorced from a concern with our self-interest. In particular, there can be no desire to do something simply because it is the right thing to do, irrespective of any connection the action may have to our own joy or preservation.

Concerning Della Rocca's first claim I wish to say that I do not see why he thinks that, according to Spinoza, non-human things do not desire to increase their power, and that, even if they did not, then I still would not see why it would go against naturalism to claim that human beings do not only desire to continue to exist, but also to increase their power. Concerning Della Rocca's second claim I would like to say that Della Rocca does not explain how (1) a desire to increase one's power, (2) a desire to feel Joy, and (3) a desire to continue to exist, relate to one another. It is quite possible to imagine situations in which these desires conflict with each other. If, for example, I desire to become stronger, then I can take steroids in order to satisfy this desire. But the idea of steroids may make me sad, and taking steroids

will certainly not increase my life span. In the following section I shall explain how these three desires relate to each other.

Michael LeBuffe: 'Why Spinoza Tells People to Try to Preserve Their Being (2004)'

In his article 'Why Spinoza Tells People to Try to Preserve Their Being (2004)', LeBuffe sets out to resolve Spinoza's apparently contradicting claims that (1) we always strive to preserve our being (see IIIP6 and IIIP9), and (2) that we often desire many things other than our self-preservation (see, for example, IIIP56D, IVP20, IVP44S). In section 1 of his article LeBuffe argues that when we are the total cause of an effect, then this effect will be our self-preservation, but when we are a partial cause of an effect, then this effect may be something other than our self-preservation. In section 2 he claims that we do not always consciously desire to persevere in our being. In section 3 he shows that conscious mental states play an important role in Spinoza's moral theory. In section 4 he argues that we consciously desire things that we anticipate will lead to *Laetitia* (which, LeBuffe says, roughly means pleasure) and we consciously desire to avoid or destroy things that we anticipate will lead to *Tristitia* (which, LeBuffe says, roughly means suffering). In section 5 he claims that we sometimes associate *Laetitia* with objects that do not help us to persevere in our being. I shall summarise the main points of sections 1, 2, 4 and 5, and comment on these points after the summary of each section.

In section 1 LeBuffe (p.122) says that IIIP9 consists in the following three claims: (1) The mind, both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and insofar as it has confused ideas, strives to persevere in its being; (2) the mind does so for an indefinite duration; and (3) the mind is conscious of its striving. LeBuffe denies that (1) gives a comprehensive theory of conscious desire; he denies that we always, whether our ideas are adequate or inadequate, consciously desire our self-preservation. He proves this on the basis of IIIP1D, IIIP3D, IIIP4 and IIIP6.

IIIP1D, according to LeBuffe (p.124), states that if an effect follows from an idea in the human mind, then the human mind (and not the idea) is the cause of the effect that follows from the idea. If the idea is adequate, then the human mind is the adequate cause of the effect that follows from the idea, whereas if the idea is inadequate, then the human mind is a partial cause of the effect that follows from the idea. IIIP3D, LeBuffe (p.125) says, states that whatever the human mind does insofar as it is affected by external causes (i.e., as a partial cause), it does by means of inadequate ideas, and that whatever the mind does insofar as it is not affected by external causes (i.e., as a total cause) it does by means of its adequate ideas.

IIIP4, LeBuffe (p.125) writes, states that nothing but an external cause can destroy a thing, and IIIP6 states that if a thing is not affected by external causes, then that thing can only produce its own perseverance in being.

On the basis of these propositions, LeBuffe (p.126) makes the following two claims: (1) Wherever the mind causes effects by means of adequate ideas, i.e., as a total cause, it perseveres in its being; (2) Wherever the mind causes effects by means of inadequate ideas, i.e., as a partial cause, it may be destroyed. LeBuffe calls the first claim the 'Human Activity Thesis*', and the second claim the 'Human Passivity Thesis*'. The Human Passivity Thesis*, then, says that the human mind may, with the help of an external cause, produce its own destruction.

LeBuffe's reading of IIIP1 and IIIP3 seems problematic. In chapter 3 I have shown that when Spinoza writes in IIIP1 that the mind does certain things insofar as it has adequate ideas, and that is undergoes other things insofar as it has inadequate ideas, he means that the mind causes actions (i.e., active emotions) insofar as it has adequate ideas, and passions insofar as it has inadequate ideas. In IIIP3 Spinoza explains this more clearly, and in IIIP2 he provides the context for this claim, which is his rejection of Descartes's thesis that passions are caused in the mind by the body. When Lebuffe reads IIIP3 as saying that '*whatever* the mind does, it does by means of adequate or inadequate ideas', he seemingly does not take into account the fact that Spinoza is talking about the causation of emotions. LeBuffe, of course, takes IIIP1 and IIIP3 so general, because he wants to reason on the basis of these propositions that the mind causes its *preservation* by means of its adequate ideas, and possibly its *destruction* by means of its inadequate ideas. Given that IIIP1 and IIIP3 are about the causation of emotions, and not about the causation of anything whatsoever, emotion should play an important role in this reasoning.

LeBuffe stresses that when the human mind does something by means of its adequate or inadequate ideas, then the cause of this effect is the human mind, and not its ideas. I disagree. It is true that Spinoza writes that the human mind is the cause of the effects of its adequate and inadequate ideas, but he also writes that actions and passions follow from adequate and inadequate ideas. How can emotions be effects of and follow from ideas, if ideas are not the cause of emotions?

In section 2 LeBuffe (p.128) says that when, in IIIP9, Spinoza writes that the mind is conscious of its striving to persevere in its being, he may mean two things: (1) the mind knows, or believes, that it strives to persevere in its being, or (2) its striving to persevere in its being somehow affects the mind's conscious desires, but the mind does not know, or does not

believe, that it strives to persevere in its being. Lebuffe calls the use of the word 'conscious' in the first reading 'intensional', and the use of this word in the second reading 'extensional'. LeBuffe (p.129) shows that Spinoza sometimes clearly uses the word 'conscious' in the extensional sense. He mentions VP34S (which says that some people are conscious of the eternity of their mind, but confuse it with duration) and IIIP30D (which says that man is conscious of himself through the affections by which he is determined to act).

LeBuffe (p.129) defends the second reading of IIIP9. He writes that '*even if I strive for self-preservation and that striving affects my conscious desires in some way, it is not necessarily true that I have any knowledge of or beliefs about striving. In particular, it is not necessarily true that the objects of striving, self-preservation, is the object of my conscious desire.*' LeBuffe's argument in favour of this reading is that in IIIP9D Spinoza refers to propositions that indicate that the mind's knowledge of itself is limited and susceptible to error. IIIP9D refers to IIP23, and IIP23 refers to IIP19. IIP19 states that the mind only knows the affections of the human body, and IIP23 states that the human mind only knows itself insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body. Given that IIIP9D is based on propositions that point to the limitations of the mind's knowledge of itself, IIIP9 should not be read as saying that the mind *knows* that it strives for self-preservation, but rather as saying that its striving for self-preservation affects the mind's conscious awareness in some way.

I agree with LeBuffe that Spinoza does not hold that we always consciously desire our self-preservation; we do not desire things because we believe that they are useful to our self-preservation. I have shown in the first section of this chapter that he holds that we consciously desire to perform certain actions because our ideas of things affect us with Joy or Sadness. Self-preservation, or our thought of our self-preservation, does not play any role in this account. I know of no better strategy than the one LeBuffe offers to explain away the fact that in IIIP9 Spinoza appears to say that we consciously desire our self-preservation.

In section 4 LeBuffe (p.135) says that IIIP28 explains what we consciously desire. IIIP28, according to LeBuffe, states that 'human beings will desire any object if they imagine that, in the presence of that object, they will experience *laetitia*; conversely, they will be averse to any object if they imagine that, in the presence of that object, they will experience *tristitia.*' LeBuffe interprets this as saying that we desire *all and only those objects* that we imagine will bring *laetitia* and we are averse to all and only those objects that we imagine will bring *tristitia*. LeBuffe uses the verb 'to imagine' here as an equivalent of the verb 'to anticipate'; desire involves the anticipation of *laetitia* or *tristitia* in some object.

LeBuffe's argument for this reading of IIIP28 is that, although there are some passages in which Spinoza talks about the emotion of Desire without mentioning the anticipation of *laetitia* or *tristitia*, every detailed description of a type of desire includes the anticipation of either *laetitia* or *tristitia*: the desire to preserve or destroy something is associated with Love and Hate; Benevolence is associated with Pity; Cruelty is associated with Hate, Ambition and Humaneness are associated with Love; Anger and Vindictiveness are associated with Hate; Graciousness or Gratitude is associated with Love; Gluttony, Lust and Greed are associated with Love. Given that Pity, Love and Hate are kinds of Joy and Sadness, all these secondary emotions are associated with Joy and Sadness. IIIP28, then, shows that Spinoza does not limit the possible objects of desire to those that aid our self-preservation.

I do not quite understand why LeBuffe does not translate '*laetitia*' and '*tristitia*'. At the beginning of his article he says that these words 'roughly' mean pleasure and suffering. I have argued that '*laetitia*' and '*tristitia*' refer to the emotions of Joy and Sadness, and that '*titillatio*' and '*dolor*' refer to the bodily sensations of Pleasure and Pain. LeBuffe's definition of '*laetitia*' and '*tristitia*' is ambiguous because the words 'pleasure' and 'suffering' may refer to both Joy and Sadness, and to Pleasure and Pain. It is difficult to judge whether LeBuffe's interpretation is correct without knowing what he thinks Spinoza precisely means by '*laetitia*' and '*tristitia*'. In order to understand what it means that 'IIIP28 says that we desire or averse to an object if we anticipate *laetitia* or *tristitia* in it', we need to understand exactly what *laetitia* and *tristitia* are.

Furthermore, I would like to learn what LeBuffe thinks happens precisely when we 'imagine, or anticipate, *laetitia* in an object'. We have seen that Della Rocca takes this to mean that we *believe* that something will make us joyful. I have argued that we do not desire something when we merely believe that it will make us joyful; we only desire something if our idea of it affects us with Joy. I have also argued that when our idea of something affects us with Joy, and we thus desire it, then we are motivated to believe that it will make us joyful, but we do not *necessarily* believe that the thing we desire will make us joyful; perhaps we have no belief about it at all, or perhaps we even believe that it will not make us joyful. So, on my interpretation, we do not desire things *because* we anticipate *laetitia* in them.

In section 5 LeBuffe (p.140) argues that the expectation of *laetitia* or *tristitia* in an object may be 'warranted or unwarranted'; the object that we desire may or may not bring us *laetitia*, and the object that we are averse to may or may not bring us *tristitia*. We may expect *laetitia* or *tristitia* in an object that will not bring us *laetitia* or *tristitia*. Only objects that increase the mind's striving to persevere in being bring *laetitia*, and only objects that decrease

this striving bring *tristitia.* Therefore, if we desire something, because we anticipate *laetitia* in it, and we obtain the object we desire, then we will only experience *laetitia* if the object increases our mind's striving.

Our anticipation of *laetitia* in an object, then, may be an adequate or inadequate idea. If our anticipation of *laetitia* in an object is an adequate idea, and if we obtain this object, then our mind's striving is increased and we experience *laetitia*. However, if our anticipation of *laetitia* in an object is an inadequate idea, and if we obtain this object, then our mind's striving may not be increased and we may not experience *laetitia*. So, for example, if the greedy man desires and obtains money, then he will only experience *laetitia* if the money increases his mind's striving to persevere in being, and if the money does not increase his mind's striving to persevere in being, then the he does not obtain what he imagined money would bring him, that is, *laetitia*.

Given that LeBuffe says that our anticipation of *laetitia* in an object may be an adequate or inadequate idea, he seems to hold that 'to imagine or to anticipate *laetitia* in an object', means 'to *believe* that something will bring us *laetitia*. As said, I do not think that the mere belief that something will bring us Joy causes a desire for this object; we must already be affected with Joy by our idea of the object before we desire it. LeBuffe argues that every detailed description of a kind of desire involves the anticipation of *laetitia* or *tristitia.* I disagree. Every detailed description of a kind of desire says that the desire in question arises from (or whatever equivalent verb is used) a kind of Joy or Sadness, but no detailed description of a kind of desire says that the desire in question arises from the *anticipation* of Joy or Sadness. Only IIIP28 suggests that the mere belief that something will make us joyful or sad causes the emotion of Desire.

Furthermore, here, too, it is difficult to understand LeBuffe's interpretation without knowing what '*laetitia*' and '*tristitia*' mean precisely. Saying that we experience '*laetitia*' and '*tristitia*' when the striving of our mind to persevere in its being is increased or decreased by an object does not help as long as we do not understand what it means for an object to increase or decrease the mind's striving for self-preservation. How does money, for example, increase or decrease the striving of the greedy man's mind? Moreover, we also need to know how the mind's striving to persevere in its being is related to the body's preservation. Say that the greedy man gets his money. Let us accept that the money increases the striving for self-preservation of the greedy man's mind and that he thus feels *laetitia.* How does this aid the preservation of the greedy man's *body*? If we do not answer these questions, Spinoza's theory of the way we strive for self-preservation remains quite unintelligible.

Section 5: The relation between Desire and the striving for self-preservation

I shall interpret Spinoza's view on the way we human beings strive for our self-preservation in three steps. In the first subsection I shall argue that in IIIP12 and IIIP13 Spinoza does not mean that we intentionally desire to imagine things that we believe increase the power of our body and to imagine things that exclude the things that we believe decrease the power of our body. I shall argue that Spinoza, rather, means that by desiring to imagine something our idea of which affects us with Joy, we, whether we know it or not, increase our bodily health, because the emotion of Joy qua bodily state consists in an increase in our bodily health due to a beneficial affection of our heart (and perhaps other internal organs). Likewise, by desiring to imagine the absence of the thing our idea of which makes us sad, we, whether we know it or not, increase our bodily health. In the second subsection I shall argue that in IIIP28 Spinoza claims that our desire to imagine the presence of a thing our idea of which makes us joyful corresponds to our bodily action that has as goal that this thing will exist. Likewise, our desire to imagine the absence of the thing our idea of which makes us sad corresponds to our bodily action that has as goal that this thing will not exist. In the third subsection, finally, I shall suggest that this emotional mechanism, which makes us desire to pursue the things our ideas of which affect us with Joy and which makes us desire to avoid the things our ideas of which affect us with Sadness, normally contributes to our self-preservation, because it results in pleasure-seeking and pain-avoiding behaviour. The emotional mechanism results in pleasure-seeking and pain-avoiding behaviour because once an external body has affected us with pleasure or pain, and we have observed this, then from then on our idea of that thing affects us with Joy or Sadness, and thus with the desire to pursue or avoid it. Pleasure-seeking and pain-avoiding behaviour normally contribute to our self-preservation because the sensations of pleasure and pain correspond to an increase or decrease in the health of a part of our body. Unfortunately, this emotional mechanism is not perfect, and sometimes it even motivates us to engage in self-destructive behaviour.

Subsection 5.1: We desire to imagine things our ideas of which affect us with Joy, and when we imagine something our idea of which affects us with Joy, then our bodily health increases.

Spinoza derives his theory of human desire from his theory of the *conatus* in IIIP12 and IIIP13. In IIIP12 Spinoza writes: *'The Mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things that increase or aid the Body's power of acting.'* And in IIIP13 he writes: '*When the Mind imagines those things that diminish or restrain the Body's power of acting, it strives, as*

far as it can, to recollect things that exclude their existence.' In chapter 5 I argued that Spinoza uses the term 'the power of the body' to refer to the body's health.

Notice that in IIIP12 and IIIP13 Spinoza is not saying that we desire to pursue things that we believe increase the power of our body and that we desire to avoid things that we believe decrease the power of our body. Spinoza, in other words, is not saying that we desire to pursue things that we believe increase our bodily health and that we desire to avoid things that we believe decrease our bodily health. He does not mention anything here concerning pursuit and avoidance, nor concerning our beliefs about the effects that things have on our health. Rather, he says that we strive to imagine things that increase the power of our body, and that, if we imagine something that decreases the power of our body, then we strive to imagine something else that excludes that thing. He says, in other words, that we strive to imagine things that increase our bodily health, and that, if we imagine something that decreases our bodily health, then we strive to imagine something else that excludes that thing.

In interpreting IIIP12 and IIIP13 we must take into account what Spinoza writes in the scholium of IIIP13: '*From this we understand clearly what Love and Hate are. Love is nothing but Joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause, and Hate is nothing but Sadness with the accompanying idea of an external cause. We see, then, that one who loves necessarily strives to have present and preserve the thing he loves; and on the other hand, one who hates strives to remove and destroy the thing he hates.*' Surprisingly, Spinoza does not say that Love is Joy with the accompanying idea of something that increases the power of our body and that Hate is Sadness with the accompanying idea of something that decreases the power of our body. He certainly does not say that we love something when we believe that it increases the power of our body and that we hate something when we believe that it decreases the power of our body. He says that our Love or Hate for something is our emotion of Joy or Sadness 'accompanied by our idea of an external cause'.

In chapter 4 I interpreted Spinoza's definitions of Love and Hate as saying that Love and Hate are nothing more than the emotions of Joy and Sadness caused by our idea of a present thing. We say that we love something when our idea of it affects us with Joy and we say that we hate something when our idea of it affects us with Sadness. So, for example, my Love for my friends consists in the Joy that I feel when I see them or imagine them, and my Hate for my enemies consists in the Sadness that I feel when I see them or imagine them. It is possible, and in many cases likely, that we believe that the thing we love makes us joyful and that we believe that the thing we hate makes us sad, but we do not love or hate things because

we believe that they make us joyful or sad. Our Love or Hate for something simply consists in the Joy or Sadness that our idea of that thing causes in us.

If my interpretation of Spinoza's definitions of Love and Hate is correct, then in IIIP13S Spinoza is not saying that we desire to preserve something when we believe that it increases our body's power and that we desire to destroy something when we believe that it decreases our body's power, but, rather, that we desire to preserve something when our idea of it affects us with Joy and that we desire to destroy something when our idea of it affects us with Sadness. A shorter way of saying this is that we desire to preserve the things we love and to destroy the things we hate[82]. (In section 1 of this chapter I reformulated this as 'We desire to act in such a way that the thing we love or hate will or will not continue to exist', because this formula is better suited to also talk about desires that we have when our idea of a past or future thing affects us with Joy or Sadness.)

Spinoza, then, says in IIIP13S that we clearly see how from the thesis – let us call it 'thesis A' – that 'we strive to imagine things that increase the power of our body and that we strive to imagine things that exclude things that decrease the power of our body', follows the thesis – let us call it 'thesis B'- that 'we strive to preserve things our ideas of which affect us with Joy and that we strive to destroy things our ideas of which affect us with Sadness'.

How thesis A leads to thesis B, however, is not clear at all. First of all, thesis A speaks about things that increase or decrease the power of our body, whereas thesis B speaks about things our ideas of which affect us with Joy or Sadness. Let us call this the first difference between theses A and B. Secondly, thesis A speaks about a desire to imagine something, whereas thesis B speaks about a desire to perform a certain bodily action, namely that of preserving or destroying something. Let us call this the second difference between theses A and B. To put this schematically:

[82] IIIP28 confirms that we need to read IIIP12 as saying that we strive to imagine things that make us joyful. I shall discuss IIIP28 in a moment.

Thesis A:

- We strive **to imagine** things that **increase the power of our body**.
- We strive to imagine things that exclude things that decrease the power of our body

Thesis B:

- We strive **to preserve** things our ideas of **which affect us with Joy**.
- We strive to destroy things our ideas of which affect us with Sadness.

Differences between A and B

1. 'things that increase or decrease our body's power' vs. 'things that affect us with Joy or Sadness'
2. 'to imagine' vs. 'to preserve or to destroy'

In order to understand Spinoza's view on how human beings strive for self-preservation we need to resolve the two differences between thesis A and thesis B. I shall now propose a solution to the first difference, and in the next subsection I shall propose a solution to the second difference.

Why does Spinoza speak about things that increase the power of our body in thesis A, but about things our ideas of which affect us with Joy in thesis B? I propose the following solution to this first difference between theses A and B.

In chapter 5 I argued that when Spinoza writes in IIIP11 that the emotions of Joy and Sadness correspond to an increase or decrease in the power of our body, he must mean that the emotions of Joy and Sadness correspond to an increase or decrease in our bodily health due to an affection of our heart by the animal spirits. I argued that Spinoza must have thought that when our idea of some finite thing makes us joyful or sad, then, at the same time, the state of our brain that corresponds to our idea of that thing redirects the course of the animal spirits in such a way that the animal spirits affect our heart (and perhaps other internal organs) in a manner that has a beneficial or detrimental effect on our bodily health.

Now, I believe that in IIIP12 and IIIP13 Spinoza means that by intentionally trying to imagine things our ideas of which affect us with Joy, we unintentionally increase the power of our body. What we intentionally desire to imagine are not things that increase the power of our body, but things our ideas of which affect us with Joy (i.e., things we love, or are glad about, or hope for)[83]. So, for example, I do not intentionally desire to imagine vitamin pills,

[83] In IIIP15D, for example, Spinoza says that when our idea of something causes Joy because we have associated this thing with another thing that already caused Joy, then we desire to imagine it. In IIIP15D, then, Spinoza says that we intentionally desire to imagine something that affects us with Joy, and not that we intentionally desire to imagine something that increases of the power of our body.

visits to the doctor, etcetera, but I intentionally desire to imagine my last holiday, my lovely girlfriend, etcetera. However, perhaps without us knowing it, the power of our body is increased when we imagine things our ideas of which affect us with Joy.

This solution to the first difference between theses A and B does not imply that Spinoza thinks that every future thing our idea of which affects us with Joy will always actually bring us Joy once present. Say, for example, that my idea of tomorrow's concert causes Joy, and that I therefore desire to imagine tomorrow's concert. When I imagine tomorrow's concert and feel joyful, then, at the same time, perhaps without me knowing it, my health is improved. In this sense, when I try to imagine tomorrow's concert, I am trying to imagine something my idea of which increases my health. None of this, however, implies that tomorrow's concert will actually bring me Joy; perhaps it turns out to be a very poor concert or perhaps it will even be cancelled. (But I will not try to imagine these possibilities, because doing so makes me sad.)

This solution to the first difference between theses A and B neither implies that Spinoza thinks that every future thing our idea of which affects us with Joy will always improve our health. Say, for example, that my idea of a cigarette causes Joy, and that I therefore desire to imagine myself smoking a cigarette. When I imagine myself smoking a cigarette and feel joyful, then, at the same time, perhaps without me knowing it, my health is improved. In this sense, when I try to imagine myself smoking a cigarette I am trying to imagine something my idea of which improves my health. None of this, however, implies that smoking a cigarette is ever good for my health. (In chapter 6 I explained that the physical act of smoking a cigarette does not give me Joy or Sadness, but pleasure or pain, and that my idea of smoking a cigarette does not give me pleasure or pain, but Joy or Sadness. Now, if the physical act of smoking a cigarette gives me pleasure, then, Spinoza would argue, it effectively improves my bodily health, but only in some part of my body, while it also harms my general bodily health.)

So, to reiterate, what we intentionally desire to imagine are not things that increase our health, but things our ideas of which affect us with Joy. We try not to imagine things that affect us with Sadness, but when we do, then we try to imagine something that excludes the thing our idea of which makes us sad. So, for example, a student tries not to imagine that he will fail next week's test, because imagining that makes him sad, but when the idea of the possibility of failing the test comes up in his mind, he tries to imagine things that might prevent him from failing the test, like a cheat sheet.

Subsection 5.2: Our desire to imagine the presence of a thing corresponds to our bodily action that has as goal that this thing will exist. Our desire to imagine the absence of a thing corresponds to our bodily action that has as goal that this thing will not exist.

The second difference between theses A and thesis B is more difficult to resolve. It is difficult to see how the thesis 'We desire to imagine things our ideas of which affect us with Joy' leads to the thesis 'We desire to act in such a way that the things our ideas of which affect us with Joy will continue to exist'. It is more difficult to see, in other words, how the argument that 'We desire to imagine things that we love' leads to the argument that 'We desire to preserve the things we love'. Say, for example, that my idea of my car makes me joyful, and that I therefore desire to imagine my car. How, then, does it follow from this that I desire to preserve my car?

We find the answer to this question in IIIP28D[84]. IIIP28 is a highly important but also a highly problematic proposition. I shall first discuss III28, then the first part of the demonstration of IIIP28, and finally the second part of the demonstration of IIIP28D.

Spinoza writes in IIIP28: '*We strive to further the occurrence of whatever we imagine will lead to Joy, and to avert or destroy what we imagine is contrary to it,* or *will lead to Sadness.* In section 1 of this chapter I admitted that Spinoza seems to say here that when we believe that something will lead to Joy, then we desire to act in such a way that it will exist. This suggests that we do not need to be already affected with Joy by our idea of a future thing in order to desire to act in such a way that it will exist; simply believing that it will lead to Joy is sufficient to elicit the desire to act in such a way that it will exist. So, for example, I do not need to be affected with Joy by my idea of my upcoming holiday in order to desire to act in such a way that it will take place; simply believing that my upcoming holiday will make me joyful is enough to cause the desire to prepare it. However, I argued, there are several reasons that suggest that Spinoza denies that the mere belief that something will make us joyful or sad can cause a Desire to act in such a way that that thing will or will not exist. I therefore suggested that what Spinoza means to say in IIIP28 is: 'When our idea of a future thing affects us with Joy then we desire to act in such a way that this thing will exist, and when our idea of a future thing affects us with Sadness, then we desire to act in such a way that this thing will not exist.'

[84] From IIIP14 up and to IIIP27 Spinoza discusses topics that relate to the emotions of Joy and Sadness. He only picks up his discussion of the emotion of Desire in IIIP28. This is one of the reasons why I believe that, according to Spinoza, we are only affected with the emotion of Desire after we have been affected with the emotion of Joy or the emotion of Sadness.

In chapter 4 I explained that the emotion of Hope is nothing more than our emotion of Joy when caused by our idea of a future thing, and that our emotion of Fear is nothing more than our emotion of Sadness when caused by our idea of a future thing. In other words, we say that we hope for or fear something when our idea of a future thing affects us with Joy or Sadness. Although we may be motivated to believe that the thing we hope for or fear will make us joyful or sad, we do not hope for or fear something because we believe that it will make us joyful or sad. So, the reading of IIIP28 that I propose, can be reformulated as saying that we desire to act in such a way that the thing we hope for will exist, and that we desire to act in such a way that the thing we fear will not exist.

The first part of IIIP28D

With this interpretation of IIIP28 in mind, let us look at the first part of IIIP28D, in which Spinoza talks about things that bring us Joy:

> We strive to imagine, as far as we can, what we imagine will lead to Joy (by P12), i.e. (by P17), we strive, as far as we can, to regard it as present, or as actually existing. But the Mind's striving, or power of thinking, is equal to and one in nature with the Body's striving, or power of acting (as clearly follows from IIP7C and P11C). Therefore, we strive absolutely, or (what, by P9S, is the same) want [*appetimus*] and intend [*intendimus*] that it should exist. This was the first point.

Notice, first of all, that IIIP28D confirms that we need to interpret III12 as saying that we desire to imagine what will lead to Joy, and not as saying what it literally says, namely that we desire to imagine what will increase the power of our body!

If it is true that, according to Spinoza, we only desire to act when our idea of something has affected us with Joy or Sadness, then Spinoza's argument in the first part of IIIP28D seems to be that when we try to imagine something our idea of which affects us with Joy, then, at the same time, our body tries to act in such a way that the thing we try to imagine will exist. So, for example, when I try to imagine my upcoming holiday in Greece, then, at the same time, my body tries to act in such a way that my holiday will take place, say, by buying a flight ticket. In other words, my mental effort to imagine something corresponds to my bodily effort to establish the future existence of the thing I try to imagine. To put this schematically:

The mind's desire to imagine something corresponds to the body's effort to make it exist.	
Attribute of Thought:	Mind's desire to imagine something the idea of which causes Joy
Attribute of Extension:	Body's effort to act in such a way that this thing will exist

Although in IIIP28 and in the first part of IIIP28D Spinoza only speaks about our desire to act in such a way that a future thing we hope for will exist, it seems likely that the point he makes also applies to our desire to act in such a way that a present thing we love continues to exist. It seems likely, that is, that our desire to imagine the thing we love corresponds to our body's effort to preserve the thing we love, just as our desire to imagine the future thing we hope for corresponds to our body's effort to act in such a way that this thing will exist.

If, indeed, our desire to imagine the thing we love corresponds to our body's effort to preserve the thing we love, then we have here found the solution to the second difference between thesis A and B. In thesis A Spinoza says that we desire to imagine things that increase our body's power, by which he means that we desire to imagine things our ideas of which affect us with Joy, and in thesis B he say that we desire to preserve the things that affect us with Joy, because he thinks that when the mind strives to imagine something, then the body strives to preserve that thing.

The second part of IIIP28D

In the second part of IIIP28D one would expect Spinoza to give an explanation of the desire to avert the occurrence of the things we imagine will bring Sadness, and one would expect this explanation to be similar to the explanation he has given of the desire to further the occurrence of the things we imagine will bring Joy. But this is not precisely what we get:

> Next, if we imagine that what we believe [*credimus*] to be the cause of Sadness, i.e. (by P13S), what we hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (by P20), and so (by the first part of this [NS: proposition]) we shall strive to destroy it, or (by P13) to avert it from ourselves, so that we shall not regard it as present. This was the second point. Therefore, [we strive to further the occurrence of] whatever we imagine will lead to Joy, etc., q.e.d.'

There are several reasons why I find the second part of IIIP28D confusing. The first reason is that Spinoza suggests that we hate something because we believe that it is the cause of our

Sadness. I interpreted Spinoza's definition of Hate as saying that Hate is Sadness caused by our idea of something. In other words, we call Sadness 'Hate' when it is caused by our idea of something. So, for example, if we feel sad when we see our enemy, then we call our Sadness 'Hate', and say that we hate our enemy. According to this interpretation, we do not hate something because we believe that it makes us sad. Up till now this interpretation of Hate (and of Love) has proven to work very well, and it seems unreasonable to reject it solely on the basis of one passage in which Spinoza suggests that we hate something because we believe that it makes us sad. As I explained in chapter 4, if we hate something because we believe that it makes us sad, then Hate is a primitive emotion, but, according to Spinoza, Hate is a species of Sadness. Spinoza, moreover, does not literally say that we hate something because we believe that it makes us sad. At most, he suggests that to hate something is the same as to believe that it makes us sad. But this cannot be what he means either, because to hate something is to have a certain emotion, and not just to have a certain belief. I suggest that what Spinoza means is that we believe that something makes us sad because we hate it, that is, because our idea of it makes us sad. In other words, our Hate for something, that is, our Sadness caused by our idea of that thing, motivates us to believe that that thing makes us sad.

The second reason why I find the second part of IIIP28D confusing is that Spinoza here primarily talks about present things our ideas of which make us sad (i.e., something we hate), whereas in the first part of IIIP28D Spinoza only talks about future things our ideas of which make us joyful (i.e., things we hope for). One would have expected Spinoza to say something to the effect that we are affected with Joy by our idea of the future absence of the thing we fear. Instead, he says that we are affected with Joy by the idea of the destruction of the thing we hate, and that we therefore desire to imagine the destruction of the thing we hate.

The third reason why I find the second part of IIIP28D confusing is that Spinoza does not say that our desire to imagine the destruction of the thing we hate corresponds to our bodily action of destroying this thing. Spinoza should have said this because his claim that 'our striving to imagine the thing we love corresponds to our bodily action that has as goal that this thing will continue to exist' is crucially important. In the second part of IIIP28D Spinoza should have made the same point about our desire to imagine the destruction of the thing we hate.

The fourth reason why I find the second part of IIIP28D confusing is that Spinoza says that we desire to destroy the thing that we hate in order not to imagine it. This seems to mean that we first desire to not imagine the thing we hate, and then desire, as a means to satisfy the first desire, to destroy the thing we hate. If this is indeed what Spinoza means, then two

questions arise. Question one: Why did Spinoza not say in the first part of IIIP28D that we desire to imagine the thing we love, and then desire, as a means to satisfy the first desire, to act in such a way that this thing will exist? Question two: Does our desire not to imagine the thing we hate correspond to our bodily action of destroying this thing, or does our desire to destroy the thing we hate correspond to our bodily action of destroying this thing?

How, then, are we to understand the desire to act in such a way that the things our ideas of which make us sad will not exist? How, in other words, are we to understand the desire to destroy the things we hate and the desire to avert the occurrence of the things we fear? I would like to offer the following suggestion:

It seems to me that in the second part of IIIP28D Spinoza should have written something like the following: 'If our idea of something makes us sad, then our idea of the absence of this thing makes us joyful. (If the thing our idea of which makes us sad already exists, then its future absence implies its destruction.) We therefore desire to imagine the absence of something our idea of which makes us sad. But because the mind's power of acting is the same as the body's power of acting, our mind's desire to imagine the absence of the thing our idea of which affects us with Sadness corresponds to our body's action that has as goal that this thing will not (continue to) exist.' So, for example, if my idea of tomorrow's family dinner makes me sad, then my idea of it not taking place makes me joyful and so I desire to imagine that it will be cancelled. My desire to imagine the cancellation of tomorrow's family dinner corresponds to my bodily action of cancelling tomorrow's dinner. Or, to give an example in which the thing my idea of which makes me sad already exists, if my idea of my dissertation makes me sad, then my idea of the destruction of my dissertation makes me joyful and so I desire to imagine its destruction. My desire to imagine the destruction of my dissertation corresponds to my bodily action of throwing my dissertation out of the window.

Does our desire to imagine something really correspond to a bodily action?

The claim 'Our desire to imagine the existence or non-existence of something corresponds to our bodily action that establishes that that thing will or will not exist' does not seem very credible. It does not seem to be the case, for example, that my desire to imagine my upcoming holiday in Greece, which I desire to imagine because I hope for it, corresponds to my bodily action of buying a flight ticket. And it neither seems to be the case, to give another example, that my desire to imagine the cancellation of tomorrow's family dinner corresponds to my bodily action of calling up my family members to tell them the dinner is off.

What Spinoza could have said, instead, is that our desire to imagine something our idea of which affects us with Joy leads to the desire to act in such a way that this thing will exist, and that it is *this* desire that corresponds to our bodily action that establishes that the thing will exist. So, for example, when my idea of my upcoming holiday affects me with Joy, then I desire to imagine my holiday. My desire to imagine my holiday leads to my desire to act in such a way that my holiday will take place by buying a flight ticket, and it is *this* desire that corresponds to my bodily action of buying a flight ticket. And, for example, when my idea of tomorrow's family dinner makes me sad, then my idea of its cancellation makes me joyful so I desire to imagine its cancellation. My desire to imagine the cancellation of tomorrow's family dinner leads to my desire to cancel it, and it is this desire that corresponds to my bodily action of cancelling it.

Spinoza normally speaks about a desire to preserve or destroy something we love or hate, rather than about a desire to imagine the preservation or destruction of something we love or hate. I suggest that Spinoza's claim in the first part of IIIP28D according to which 'our bodily action that has as goal that something will exist corresponds to our desire to imagine that thing' is an extreme strategy to avoid all appearance of interaction between the mind and the body.

Subsection 5.3: This emotional mechanism normally contributes to our self-preservation because it results in pleasure-seeking and pain-avoiding behaviour.

How precisely is our self-preservation favoured by this emotional mechanism, which makes us strive to act in such a way that the things our ideas of which affect us with Joy or Sadness will or will not exist in the future? It is obvious that if the things our ideas of which affect us with Joy do not contribute to our health, then this emotional mechanism will not in the least favour our self-preservation. If, for example, only our ideas of singing and dancing affect us with Joy, but not our ideas of drinking, eating and sleeping, then we will sing and dance all the time, and never drink, eat and sleep.

In order to explain how the emotional mechanism favours our survival I would like to suggest a thesis that Spinoza might have held but never articulated. This thesis says the following: Normally, our ideas of things that are good for our health cause Joy, and thus by desiring to act in such a way that the things our ideas of which cause Joy will exist in the future we normally act in such a way that that our health is improved. Likewise, normally, our ideas of things that are bad for our health cause Sadness, and thus by desiring to act in such a

way that the things our ideas of which cause Sadness will not exist in the future we normally act in such a way that our health is not diminished.

The things our ideas of which affect us with Joy or Sadness are normally good or bad for our health, because of the process by which emotions are first formed. Imagine a new-born baby. When an external body affects the baby in a beneficial or detrimental manner, then the baby feels Pleasure or Pain. Maybe it observes the external body that affects its body, or maybe it does not, but in any case the baby will immediately feel the desire, caused by its Pleasure or Pain, to move its body in such a way that the external body continues or ceases to affect it. The baby does not need to be capable of forming the belief that the external body it observes is the cause of its Pleasure or Pain. It desires to act in such a way that the external body continues or ceases to affect it without any higher-order thinking. Say, for example, that we put the baby in a bathtub. If the water has the right temperature, then the baby feels Pleasure, but if it is too cold or hot, then the baby feels Pain. The baby's sensation of Pleasure will directly cause a desire to stay in the water, and the baby's sensation of Pain will directly cause a desire to get out of the water. The baby's desire to stay in the water or to get out of the water is not caused by its belief that the water is the cause of its Pleasure or Pain.

Now, and here comes Nature's trick, so to speak, if the baby has seen the external body while the external body affected it with Pleasure or Pain, then the baby's mental image of the external body will from now on affect it with Joy or Sadness. So from now on, every time the baby sees (and recognises) or merely imagines the external body, it feels Joy or Sadness. And therefore, from now on, every time the baby sees or merely imagines the external body, it feels the desire to act in such a way that it will or will not be affected by the external body. So, if the water had the right temperature, then the baby will feel Joy the next time it sees the bathtub, and this Joy will cause the desire to get into the water, but when the water did not have the right temperature, then the baby will feel Sadness the next time it sees the bathtub and this Sadness will cause the desire to stay out of the water.

The baby would not feel this desire if it had merely formed the belief that the water was the cause of its Pleasure or Pain. In order to feel this desire the baby's idea of the water must cause Joy or Sadness. In this way the baby, by desiring to act in such a way that it is or is not affected by the water because its idea of the water affects it with Joy or Sadness, desires, unintentionally, to act in such a way that it is or is not affected by something that would most likely cause it to feel Pleasure or Pain.

Now, this Pleasure-seeking and Pain-avoiding behaviour, which is caused by the emotional mechanism, is in general conducive to the baby's survival. Pleasure and Pain, as we

have seen in chapter 6, correspond to an increase or a decrease in the health of a part of the body, and so, in principle, it is good for the baby's general health to be affected with Pleasure and bad to be affected with Pain.

Although the baby has an in-built emotional mechanism that favours its survival, there are, of course, innumerable ways in which the baby can do something that is bad for its health or omit doing something that is good for its health. An obvious reason may be that the baby has not yet been affected by something that would affect it with Pleasure or Pain, and so its idea of this thing does not affect it with Joy or Sadness, and therefore it does not desire to act in such a way that it is or is not affected by it. If, for example, the baby has not yet seen a milk bottle, then the baby's visual perception of it does not yet cause Joy, and so the baby will not feel a desire to drink from it, even though this would give it Pleasure.

A more interesting reason is that Pleasure is not always good for the baby's general health and that Pain is not always bad for the baby's general health. Pleasure and Pain only correspond to an increase or decrease in the health of a part of our body; they do not correspond to an increase or decrease in the general health of our body. Sometimes Pleasure actually corresponds to a decrease in general bodily health and Pain in an increase in general bodily health. But the baby does not care about that. The baby's behaviour is not caused by its beliefs about which things will affect it with Pleasure or Pain, let alone by its beliefs about which things will be good for its health. Its behaviour is caused by its actual sensations of Pleasure and Pain, and by the emotions of Joy and Sadness with which some of its ideas affect it. Say, for example, that we need to vaccinate the baby. If the baby sees the needle while the needle affects it with Pain, then from then on the baby's mental image of the needle will cause Sadness. So the next time the baby sees a needle it will cry and try to get away. It will not reason that the pain involved in its vaccination contributes to its general health, and is thus to be endured stoically.

Section 6: The relation between the desire to act in such a way that the thing we love continues to exist and the desire to make the person we love joyful.

In chapter 4 I presented Spinoza's theory as saying: (1a) If our idea of some present thing affects us with Joy, then we are affected with Joy by the idea that this thing will continue to exist and with Sadness by our idea that this thing will not continue exist. In other words, we hope that the thing we love will continue to exist and we fear that it will not continue to exist; and (1b) If our idea of a person affects us with Joy, then we are affected with Joy by our idea that this person will be joyful and with Sadness by our idea that this

person will be sad. In other words, we hope that the person we love will be joyful and we fear that he will be sad. (*Mutatis mutandis* for things and people that we hate.)

In this chapter I have shown that (2a) If our idea of some present thing affects us with Joy, then we desire to act in such a way that this thing will continue to exist. In other words, we desire to preserve the thing we love; and (2b) If our idea of a person affects us with Joy, then we desire to act in such a way that this person will be joyful. In other words, we desire to make the person we love joyful. (*Mutatis mutandis* for things and people that we hate.)

Here two questions arise. The first question is how does Spinoza see the relation between claim (1a) and claim (1b)? Why is it that we hope that the thing we love continues to exist, but hope that the person we love will be joyful? Why do we not hope that the person we love continues to exist? The second question is how does Spinoza go from claim (2a) to claim (2b)? Why is it that we desire to preserve the thing we love, but desire to make the person we love joyful? Why do we not desire to preserve the person we love? (*Mutatis mutandis* for things and people that we hate. So, why do we not hope that the person we hate dies, and why do we not desire to kill the person we hate?)

I shall first show that Spinoza argues for claim (1b) on the basis of claim (1a), and then that he argues for claim (2b) on the basis of claim (2a). In other words, I shall first show that Spinoza argues that we hope that the person we love will be joyful because, when we love something, then we hope that it continues to exist, and then show that Spinoza argues that we desire to make the person we love joyful because, when we love something, then we desire to preserve it.

Spinoza deduces claim (1b) from (1a) in IIIP19-24. That is, in IIIP19-24 he deduces his argument that ‘we are joyful when we have the idea that someone we love is joyful’ from his argument that ‘we are joyful when we have the idea that the thing we love continues to exist’. In IIIP19, IIIP21 and IIIP22 Spinoza speaks about things that we love, people that we love, and people that make someone we love joyful or sad. In IIIP20, IIIP23 and IIIP24 Spinoza speaks about things that we hate, people that we hate, and people that make someone we hate joyful or sad. I shall first discuss IIIP19, IIIP21 and IIIP22, and then IIIP20, IIIP23 and IIIP24.

In IIIP19 Spinoza writes:

> He who imagines that what he loves is destroyed will be saddened; but he who imagines it to be preserved, will rejoice. Dem.: Insofar as it can, the Mind strives to imagine those things that increase or aid the Body’s power of acting (by P12), i.e. (by P13S), those it loves. But the imagination is aided by

> what posits the existence of a thing, and on the other hand, is restrained by what excludes the existence of a thing (by IIP17). Therefore, the images of things that posit the existence of a thing loved aid the Mind's striving to imagine the thing loved, i.e. (by P11S), affect the Mind with Joy. On the other hand, those which exclude the existence of a thing loved restrain the same striving of the Mind, i.e. (by P11S), affect the Mind with Sadness. Therefore, he who imagines that what he loves is destroyed will be saddened, etc., q.e.d.[85]

Spinoza begins IIIP19D by saying that we strive to imagine the things that increase the power of our body. I have explained that Spinoza must mean by this that we strive to imagine things our ideas of which affect us with Joy. A shorter way of saying this is that we strive to imagine things we love. Our striving to imagine something we love, Spinoza argues now, is facilitated by our idea of something that 'posits the existence' of the thing we love, and hence when we imagine something that posits the existence of something we love, we feel Joy. Contrariwise, Spinoza argues, our striving to imagine something that we love is frustrated by our idea of something that 'excludes the existence' of the thing we love, and hence when we imagine something that excludes the existence of something we love, then we feel Sadness. What does Spinoza mean by the expression 'to posit or to exclude the existence of something'?

It seems that this expression might refer to anything that we imagine acts in such a way that the thing we love (or hope for) will exist or will not exist in the future. If, for example, I love my clean and safe neighbourhood, then I will be affected with Joy by my idea of anything and anyone that I imagine contributes to my neighbourhood staying clean and safe, for example, the garbage collector and the police who regularly pass through my neighbourhood. Contrariwise, I will be affected with Sadness by my idea of anything and anyone that I imagine makes my neighbourhood dirty and dangerous, for example, the children who do not throw their garbage in the bin and the drug dealer on the corner of the street. Given that 'to love or to hate something' means the same thing as 'to be affected with Joy or Sadness by our idea of that thing', I love the garbage collector and the police, and hate the children and the drug dealer.

Spinoza, however, as becomes clear in IIIP21, has something specific in mind as to what 'posits or excludes the existence of the thing we love':

[85] Notice three things: 1) It seems that the verb 'to imagine' may mean 'to see', 'to visualise' or 'to believe'; 2) Spinoza uses the word 'image' in the sense of 'mental image', and not in the sense of 'affection of the brain'; 3) our 'idea' of the thing or person loved or hated is a mental image. The three remarks also apply to the other propositions I discuss in this paragraph.

> He who imagines what he loves to be affected with Joy or Sadness will also be affected with Joy or Sadness; and each of those affects will be greater or lesser in the lover as they are greater or lesser in the thing loved. Dem.: The images of things (as we have demonstrated in P19) which posit the existence of a thing loved aid the striving by which the mind strives to imagine the thing loved. But Joy posits the existence of the thing joyous thing, and posits more existence, the greater the affect of Joy is. For (by IIIP11S) it is a transition to a greater perfection. Therefore, the image in the lover of the thing's Joy aids his Mind's striving, i.e., (by P11S), affects the lover with Joy, and the more so, the greater this affect was in the thing loved. This was the first thing to be proved. Next, insofar as a thing is affected with Sadness, it is destroyed, and the more so, the greater the Sadness with which it is affected (by P11S). So (by P19) he who imagines what he loves to be affected with Sadness, will also be affected with Sadness, and the more so, the greater this affect was in the thing loved, q.e.d.

When, therefore, Spinoza writes in IIIP19 that we are affected with Joy or Sadness by our idea of something that posits or excludes the existence of the thing we love, he is not thinking about external bodies that posit or exclude the existence or the thing we love, although the argument is general and also works for external bodies, but about Joy and Sadness! Joy and Sadness, Spinoza writes in IIIP21 posit or exclude the existence of a person, and thus we are affected with Joy or Sadness by our idea that the person, whom we love and thus try to imagine, is joyful or sad.

Spinoza, finally, in IIIP22, argues that we love the person who makes the person we love joyful and that we hate the person who makes the person we love sad. This is easy to understand, because we know that to love or to hate something is to be affected with Joy or Sadness by our idea of that thing.

In IIIP20, 23 and 24 Spinoza applies the same reasoning to things we hate, people we hate, and people who affect people we hate. In IIIP13 Spinoza argued that we try to imagine things that exclude the existence of the things our ideas of which make us sad. A shorter way of saying this is that we try to imagine things that destroy the things we hate. In IIIP20 Spinoza argues that we are therefore affected with Joy by our idea of something that we imagine excludes the existence of the thing we hate. Spinoza does not say this, but this implies of course that we are affected with Sadness by our idea of something that we imagine posits the existence of the thing we hate. Spinoza's argument in IIIP20 is general and applies to anything. To return to my previous example, I am affected with Joy by my idea of the mothers of my neighbourhood who tell their children to throw their garbage in the bin, and by my idea of the police who arrest the drug dealer. Although Spinoza's argument of IIIP20 is general, in IIIP23 it becomes clear that Spinoza has something specific in mind as to what

posits or excludes the existence of the thing we hate, namely Joy and Sadness. If we try to imagine something that excludes the existence of the person we hate, then we are affected with Joy by our idea that the person we hate is sad, and we are affected with Sadness by our idea that the person we hate is joyful, because Joy poses and Sadness excludes the existence of the person we hate. Spinoza, finally, in IIIP24, argues that we love the person who makes the person we hate sad, and we hate the person who makes the person we hate joyful.

Although Spinoza's strategy to deduce the argument that 'we hope that someone we love will be joyful' from the argument that 'we hope that something we love will continue to exist' is quite ingenious, I think it fails. Let us accept Spinoza's argument that we try to imagine the things that we love, and that, therefore, we are affected with Joy by our idea of something that poses the existence of something we love. Let us also accept Spinoza's argument that the emotion of Joy corresponds to an increase in our power to exist, that is, in an increase in our health. What follows from these two arguments is that what we really hope for is that the person we love is healthy, and that we hope that the person we love is joyful only when we know that Joy corresponds to an increase in bodily health; if we do not know that Joy corresponds to an increase in bodily health, then we do not hope that the person we love will be joyful.

This is clearly mistaken. We do not hope that a person we love is joyful, because we hope that he will continue to exist and because we know that he continues to exist if he is joyful. Clearly, this cannot be Spinoza's point. His point must be that, somehow, by intentionally hoping that a person we love is joyful, we unintentionally hope that he continues to exist, just as, by intentionally desiring to act in such a way that the thing our idea of which affects us with Joy will exist, we unintentionally desire to act in such a way that our health is increased.

I believe to have given a reasonable justification for Spinoza's claim that by intentionally desiring to act in such a way that the thing our idea of which affects us with Joy will exist, we unintentionally desire to act in such a way that our health is increased. However, I do not know how to justify the claim that by intentionally hoping that a person we love is joyful, we unintentionally hope that he continues to exist. I certainly do not think that Spinoza justifies this claim.

I shall now discuss how Spinoza deduces the argument that 'we desire to make the person we love joyful' from the argument that 'we desire to preserve the thing we love'. To be more precise: Spinoza deduces the argument that 'we desire to make the person we hate

sad' from the argument that 'we desire to destroy the thing we hate'. He does so in IIIP39, where he writes:

> He who hates someone will strive to do evil to him, unless he fears that a greater evil to himself will arise from this; and on the other hand, he who loves someone will strive to benefit him by the same law. Dem.: To hate someone (by E3p13s) is to imagine him as the cause of [NS: one's] Sadness; and so (by E3p28), he who hates someone will strive to remove or destroy him. But if from that he fears something sadder, or (what is the same) a greater evil to himself, and he believes [*credit*] that he can avoid this sadness by not doing to the one he hates the evil he was contemplating, he will desire to abstain from doing evil (by the same P28) – and that (by P37) with a greater striving than that by which he was bound to do evil. So this greater striving will prevail, as we maintained. The second part of this demonstration proceeds in the same way.[86]

In the IIIP39S Spinoza explains, as is already quite clear from IIIP39 itself, that 'here', that is, in the context of Part 3 of the *Ethics*, by the word 'evil' he means any kind of Sadness, and that by the word 'good' he means any kind of Joy. Spinoza says 'here', because in Part 4 of the *Ethics* he will explain that according him not every kind of Joy is good and not every kind of Sadness is evil. According to his own moral theory, Joy and Sadness can be both either good or bad depending on whether they lead to or away from Cheerfulness. But here, by saying that we desire to do evil to someone we hate and good to someone we love, Spinoza simply means that we desire to make someone we hate sad and someone we love joyful. Now, Spinoza sets out to demonstrate claim that we desire to make a person we hate sad, and he says that the claim that we desire to make a person we love joyful is demonstrated in the same way.

When we look closely, however, we see that Spinoza does not really demonstrate that we desire to make a person we hate sad. He merely claims that it follows from IIIP28 that we desire to act in such a way that a person we hate will not continue to exist. This is true, but it does not prove that we desire to make a person we hate sad. Spinoza, clearly, should have added, as he did in IIIP21, that Sadness excludes the existence of a person.

It seems that the thesis that Spinoza has in mind, but does not completely work out, is that from the argument that 'we desire to destroy the thing we hate' and from the argument

[86] Notice that Spinoza writes that to hate someone is to imagine that person as the cause of one's Sadness. This cannot be literally true, because Hate is not a mental image (nor a belief) but an emotion. Notice as well that Spinoza suggests that the mere belief that by not doing something we planned to do we avoid being sad causes a desire not to do what we planned to do. This contradicts my claim that Desire is always caused by Joy or Sadness. It also contradicts my claim that every desire is a desire to do something. I do not know how, within Spinoza's system, to make sense of a desire not to do something.

that ‘Sadness excludes the existence of a person’ follows the argument that ‘we desire to make someone we hate sad’. (And likewise: from the argument that ‘we desire to preserve the thing we love’ and the argument that ‘Joy poses the existence of a person’ follows the argument that ‘we desire to make someone we love joyful’.) This, at least, is suggested by the fact that in IIIP20 and IIIP23 Spinoza demonstrated the argument that ‘we hope that the person we hate will be sad’ on the basis of the argument that ‘we hope that the thing we hate will be destroyed’ and the argument that ‘Sadness excludes the existence of a person’. (And likewise by the fact that in IIIP19 and IIIP21 Spinoza demonstrated the argument that ‘we hope that the person we love will be joyful’ on the basis of the argument that ‘we hope that the thing we love will be preserved’ and the argument that ‘Joy poses the existence of a person’.)

Spinoza’s point, of course, cannot be that we intentionally desire to prolong the life of everyone who makes us joyful and that we desire to shorten the life of everyone who makes us sad. We do not, as a rule, desire to bring fruit baskets to the people we love and we do not desire to kill the people we hate. What we do desire, as a rule, is to make the people we love joyful and the people we hate sad. Spinoza’s point must be that when we intentionally make someone joyful, we unintentionally increase his bodily health, and that when we intentionally make someone sad, we unintentionally decrease his bodily health, because, as we have seen in chapter 5, Joy and Sadness correspond to an increase or decrease in bodily health.

But then the question arises: If we intentionally desire to act in such a way that something will exist if our idea of it affects with Joy and intentionally desire to act in such a way that something will not exist if our idea of it affects us with Sadness, then why do we only unintentionally desire to act in such a way that a person will continue to exist if our idea of him affects us with Joy and unintentionally desire to act in such a way that a person will not continue to exist if our idea of him affects us with Sadness? If, in other words, we intentionally desire to preserve something we love and to destroy something we hate, then why do we not, also, intentionally desire to preserve a person we love and destroy a person we hate? I think that Spinoza does not answer this question.

The second striving of the human mind

In this chapter I have tried to explain how we human beings strive for self-preservation insofar as we are organisms. I have not explored Spinoza’s claim that the human mind, in order to exist, unites itself with the human body, or with God. Spinoza writes in IIIP10 that the first striving of the mind is to affirm the existence of the body. He does not say here that

the second striving of the mind is to affirm the existence of God, because he wants to show that his moral theory is valid even of the basis on the assumption that the human mind is destroyed with the human body. I suggest that when Spinoza writes in IIIP9 that the mind strives to persevere in its being insofar as it has inadequate ideas and insofar as it has adequate ideas, he means that the human mind only exist when it represents something. He writes in the *Short Treatise* (I/62/19, p.105) that '*if we knew nothing, certainly we also were nothing*'. The mind, therefore, gets its first existence in virtue of being a representation of the human body; when it unites itself with the body it has inadequate ideas. The mind is reborn when it begins to represent God; when it unites itself with God it has adequate ideas.

Chapter 8: Akrasia

As said in the introduction, Donald Davidson (1980, p.22) writes that we act incontinently when (1) we believe that we may perform action x or action y, (2) judge that, all things considered, it would be better to perform action y than to perform action x, but (3) intentionally perform action x. In this final chapter I shall interpret why it is, according to Spinoza, that 'man often sees the better for himself and is still forced to follow the worse'. My interpretation of Spinoza's theory of akrasia will be based on my interpretation of his theory of cognition and emotion.

In the previous chapter we have seen that when our idea of something affects us with Joy or Sadness, then we desire to act in such a way that this thing will or will not exist, and that when our idea of someone affects us with Joy or Sadness, then we desire to make this person joyful or sad. Spinoza seems to accept that we do not only have these two desires but also the desire to pursue the things our ideas of which affect us with Joy and to avoid the things our ideas of which affect us with Sadness. The desire to pursue and avoid things seems particularly relevant in the context of akrasia.

In section 1 of this chapter I shall discuss the interpretations of Spinoza's theory of akrasia that have already been put forward by Spinoza scholars. In sections 2, 3 and 4 I build up to my own interpretation of Spinoza's theory of akrasia. In section 2 I answer the question: What determines the strength of the emotion of Desire? In section 3 I answer the question: What is the relation between the emotion of Desire and overt behaviour? In section 4 I answer the question: How does the emotion of Desire relate to our value judgements (i.e., a judgement that something is good or bad) and to our practical judgements (i.e., a judgement that we should pursue or avoid something)? Based on the answers to these three questions, I analyse in section 5 why, according to Spinoza, it often happens that we see the better for ourselves and are still forced to pursue the worse. In section 6, finally, I attempt to answer the question as to what it means for us to act rationally or irrationally.

Section 1: Existing interpretations of Spinoza's theory of akratic action

In this section I discuss the interpretations of Spinoza's theory of akrasia that have been put forward by Olli Koistinen, Michael Della Rocca, Martin Lin and Eugene Marshall[87].

Olli Koistinen (1996): 'Weakness of Will in Spinoza's Theory of Human Motivation'

Koistinen writes that we manifest weakness of will if and only if (1) we intentionally do something that goes against our better judgement, and (2) we believe we are free to choose the better alternative. He thinks that Spinoza has a plausible theory of weakness of will.

Koistinen (see p.12 and 13) writes that Spinoza argues in IIIP2 that a mental decision to perform a certain action is nothing more than a desire to perform that action, and also that mental decisions are nothing but ideas, which are propositional affirmations and negations. Koistinen quotes the passage from IIIP3S in which Spinoza writes: '*it must be granted that this decision of the mind which is believed to be free is not distinguished by the imagination itself, or the memory, nor is it anything beyond that affirmation which the idea, insofar as it is an idea, necessarily involves.*' Koistinen (see p.13) reasons that if mental decisions are desires, and if mental decisions are ideas, then desires are ideas. However, that every desire is an idea does not imply that every idea is a desire. The idea of eating rotten apples, for example, is not necessarily a desire to eat rotten apples. In order to explain what makes an idea a desire, Koistinen interprets IIIP28, which says that we strive to further the occurrence of whatever we imagine leads to *laetitia* and to avert or destroy whatever we imagine is contrary to it, or will lead to *tristitia*. Koistinen translates '*laetitia*' and '*tristitita*' as 'pleasure' and 'pain', and he reads IIIP28 as saying that the idea of doing x is a desire for doing *x* just in case the idea (or imagination) of doing x gives pleasure to the agent. Desires are pleasure giving ideas. We only desire to do *x* if an only if we imagine that doing *x* gives us pleasure. Koistinen claims that it is clear, from IIIP2 and IIIP28, that we always act on our desires and that we only desire to perform those actions that we imagine give us pleasure.

Koistinen (see p.12 and 15) writes that Spinoza argues in IIIP9 that we judge the things that we desire to be good, and in IVD1 and IVD2 that everything that is useful to us gives us pleasure and everything that is bad for us leads to pain. On the basis of these passages, Koistinen claims (see p.15), IIIP28 leads to the principle that we strive to further the occurrence of whatever we imagine is good and to avert or destroy whatever we imagine is

[87] Soyarslan considers to what extent intuitive knowledge is liable to akrasia. (cfr. Sanem Soyarslan. 2014. 'The Susceptibility of Intuitive Knowledge to Akrasia in Spinoza's Ethical Thought'. *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 22 (4): 725-747). I do not discuss her article, because I shall not consider the relation between intuitive knowledge and akrasia.

bad. This means that we desire to do what appears good to us and to avoid what appears bad to us. Therefore, if doing *x* appears to us better than doing *y*, then we will not choose *y*.

However, Koistinen argues (see p.16), the claim that 'if doing *x* appears to us better than doing *y*, then we will not choose *y*' is not the same as the claim that 'if we judge that *x* is better than *y*, then we do not choose *y*'. If doing *x* appears to us better than doing *y*, we may judge that doing *y* is better than doing *x*. Our actions, however, are motivated by what appears best to us, and not by what we judge to be best. It happens, therefore, that doing *x* appears to us better than doing *y*, and that we therefore do *x*, but we judge that doing *y* is better than doing *x*. In such a case, then, we act against our value judgement. Koistinen (see p.17) gives the example of Jones who is in a bar and who is about to order his fourth beer. Jones judges that it would be best to go home, because he knows from experience that a fourth beer will ruin his next day. However, the fine beer, the nice music and the interesting conversation make it appear that it is best to stay and continue drinking. Because his actions are motivated by his value-appearances, Jones goes against his value-judgement and orders his fourth beer.

Typically, Koistinen concludes, our value-judgements are in line with our value-appearances; we typically judge that the best thing to do is what appears to be the best thing to do. However, when we act weak-willedly what appears to us the best alternative is not the alternative that we judge to be the best.

I shall not repeat my interpretation of IIIP28 and compare it to Koistinen's interpretation. I merely wish to make two observations: (1) Koistinen does not seem to make a distinction between interpreting IIIP28 as saying that we desire to further the occurrence of things that we imagine will give us pleasure, and interpreting IIIP28 as saying that we desire to perform a certain action when our idea of performing that action gives us pleasure. I have argued that this distinction is quite important, because the mere belief that something will make us joyful does not motivate us to pursue this thing; we only pursue something if our idea of it affects us with Joy. (2) Koistinen translates '*laetitia*' and '*tristitia*' as 'pleasure' and 'pain'. I have argued that '*laetitia*' and '*tristitia*' should be translated as 'Joy' and 'Sadness', because our ideas of things may affect us with Joy or Sadness, but not with pleasure or pain.

I have two questions concerning Koistinen's interpretation of Spinoza's theory of akrasia. The first question is: Why do value-appearances motivate us to act whereas value-judgements do not? Although this difference between value-appearances and value-judgements is essential to his interpretation, Koistinen does not seem to give an argument for it. The second question is: When do we judge that doing *y* is better than doing *x*, even though doing *x* appears to us better than doing *y*? Koistinen says that something appears good to us

when we imagine that it will bring us pleasure, and that we desire something when it appears good to us. Now, in IIIP9 Spinoza writes quite clearly that we judge things to be good because we desire them. It seems, therefore, impossible that we judge that something is bad even though it appears good to us and thus even though we desire it; if we desire it, then we judge it to be good.

Michael Della Rocca (1996): 'Spinoza's metaphysical psychology'

In the section 'Irrational action' of his article, Della Rocca (see p.237) writes that we behave irrationally when we have desires for performing two incompatible actions, and we intentionally perform one of these actions even though we believe that our interest is better served in the long run by performing the other action. Spinoza's explanation of irrational action, Della Rocca says (see p.238), turns on his claim that the anticipation of pain is itself painful.

Spinoza explains in IVP9, Della Rocca says (see p.238), that the pain that we feel now in anticipation of tomorrow's pain is weaker than tomorrow's pain. It is clear that the stronger a pain, the more strongly it motivates us to do something to remove this pain. Therefore, the pain that we feel now in anticipation of tomorrow's pain motivates us less to remove the pain that we feel now than the pain that we will feel tomorrow will motivate us to remove the pain that we will feel tomorrow.

Spinoza explains in IVP10, Della Rocca says (see p.239), that the pain that we feel now because we anticipate being in pain tomorrow is weaker than the pain that we feel now because we anticipate being in pain the day after tomorrow. The strength of the pain of anticipation is, in part, a function of the temporal distance from the present of the anticipated pain.

But Spinoza *would* also hold, Della Rocca writes, that the pain of anticipation is also a function of the size of the anticipated pain. He *would* hold that the pain that we feel now because we anticipate being tortured tomorrow is stronger than the pain that we feel now because we anticipate being scratched tomorrow. This is evident from IIIP37D where Spinoza writes that the stronger our sadness, the greater the power of acting with which we strive to remove our sadness.

Irrational action occurs when we feel pain now because we anticipate two pains that differ both with regard to their temporal distance and size. Della Rocca gives as example the case in which he is about to eat spicy food, and anticipates that this will give him pleasure due to the food's taste, but also anticipates that this will give him pain due to indigestion. He

knows that the pain will be stronger than the pleasure. If the temporal distance of the anticipated pleasure or pain did not matter to the strength of the pleasure of pain of anticipation, then he would feel less pleasure by anticipating the pleasure due to the food's taste than he would feel pain by anticipating the pain due to indigestion. But the temporal distance of the anticipated pleasure or pain does matter. The pleasure that he feels because he anticipates the pleasure due to the food's taste may be stronger than the pain that he feels because he anticipates the pain due to indigestion, because the anticipated pleasure will be experienced upon eating the food and the indigestion only later in the evening. If this is the case, then he will eat the spicy food even though he knows that he will experience less pleasure due to the food's taste than that he will feel pain due to indigestion. In such a case, then, we act irrationally. Della Rocca writes (see p.241):

> In his account of irrational action, Spinoza appeals to temporal disparities of the kind I have just been discussing (see, for example, 4p60s and 4ap30). Further, his claim that there can be irrational action is made in 4p17s immediately after he elaborates his view that an anticipated affect is stronger than the affect of anticipation. These two facts indicate that the above explanation of irrational action is the one Spinoza has in mind.

However, Della Rocca concludes (see p.242), Spinoza does not justify IVP9's claim that 'the pain that we feel because we anticipate a pain is weaker than the pain that we anticipate'. And so, '*a key element of Spinoza's account of irrational action is without adequate grounding in his system*'.

I have discussed Della Rocca's theory of the anticipation of pain in the previous chapter, so I shall not repeat my arguments against it here. Della Rocca interprets IVP9 as saying that the pain that we feel now in anticipation of tomorrow's pain is weaker than tomorrow's pain. Literally, IVP9 says that an affect whose cause we imagine to be with us in the present is stronger than if we did not imagine it to be with us. I shall interpret this as saying that the emotions of Joy and Sadness are stronger when caused by our ideas of present things than when caused by our ideas of absent things (e.g., our ideas of past and future things).

Della Rocca says that IVP9 does not justify the claim that 'the pain that we feel because we anticipate a pain is weaker than the pain that we anticipate'. I shall show that Spinoza actually gives a rather interesting justification of the claim that 'the emotions of Joy and Sadness are stronger when caused by our ideas of present things than when caused by our

ideas of absent things (e.g., our ideas of past and future things)'. The justification is that in order to imagine something to be absent, we have to imagine another thing that excludes its existence, and when we do so, our mental image of the first thing weakens. Because our mental images of absent things are weaker than our mental images of present things, the emotions of Joy and Sadness are weaker when caused by a mental image of an absent thing than when caused by a mental image of a present thing.

Della Rocca, finally, says that we act irrationally when we have desires for two competing actions and we intentionally perform the action that we believe serves our long-term interest the least. This implies, of course, that we act rationally when we have desires for two competing actions and we intentionally perform the action that we believe serves our long-term interest the most. I think that it would have been worthwhile to explain what it means for us to believe that something will be in our long-term interest. People often consider very strange things to be in their interest, and we would not say that they act rationally every time they perform the action that they believe serves their interest the most.

Martin Lin (2006): 'Spinoza's account of Akrasia'

Lin (see p.397) argues that Spinoza's explanation of akrasia is based on the following three psychological principles: (1) The intensity of our desires for future goods decreases the longer we expect to have to wait for them. This is how Lin reads IVP10. (2) Rational desires, i.e., those desire that arise from a true knowledge of good and evil, are sometimes weaker than desires that arise from irrational passions. This is how Lin reads IVP15. (3) The motivational power of our rational desires for future goods decreases the longer we expect to have to wait for them.

Lin (see p.397) says that it is possible to have a rational idea that pushes us to do *x* and an irrational idea that pushes us to do *y* (where *x* and *y* are incompatible actions). If the good at which *x* aims is further in the future than the good at which *y* aims, then our irrational idea is more intense than our rational idea. If this is the case then we act against our better judgement.

Lin (see p.402) argues that Spinoza's claim that 'ideas involve affirmation' means that ideas are causally efficacious and produce effects; they either produce other ideas or overt actions. The causal power of ideas, furthermore, is a function of the conatus, so the actions that follow from an idea conduce to the preservation of the mind's existence. Ideas are belief-like and they carry with them dispositions to act; every idea is a belief and a desire (see

p.413). (Lin bases this account on Della Rocca's article 'The Power of an Idea'.) The power of ideas to cause actions does not depend on their rationality but on their intensity.

Lin seems to say that ideas can be more or less rational, and that an idea's degree of rationality depends on the degree to which it leads to our greatest profit in the long run. He writes (see p.405):

> So we can compare two competing ideas – for example, my idea which represents a slice of chocolate cake and which motivates me to eat it, and my idea which represents good health in the future and which pushes me to abstain from eating it – with respect to their relative rationality. The idea which owes more of its power to the laws of my ability to preserve myself, is more rational than the idea which owes more of its power to the power of external causes. In this case, neither idea is adequate, strictly speaking. So both can represent a particular state and some particular time. But the idea of good health may still be more rational than my idea of the chocolate cake if it depends more on the laws of my own nature. In that case, if I then go ahead and eat the cake, I will have acted akratically since the less rational idea has defeated the more rational idea. If I abstain, I act rationally insofar as the more rational idea has defeated the less rational idea.

In chapter 2 I have discussed Della Rocca's interpretation of the relation between ideas, judgements and the conatus. I shall not repeat my arguments against this interpretation here. It should be clear by now that ideas are not desires and that ideas do not cause overt actions. Furthermore, I disagree with Lin's claim that ideas can be more or less rational. We have seen in chapter 2 that Spinoza makes a clear distinction between inadequate ideas, which make up the first kind of knowledge, and adequate ideas, which make up the second and third kind of knowledge. There is no indication that some ideas fall in between these three categories. It seems quite clear that both Lin's idea of a chocolate cake and his idea of his own health belong to knowledge of the first kind, and that they are thus inadequate ideas.

Eugene Marshall (2008): 'Spinoza on the Problem of Akrasia'

Marshall (see p.42) defines akratic action as voluntary irrational behaviour, or as voluntary action performed against one's better judgement. (It is irrational, he says, to act against one's better judgement.) Marshall describes two different explanations of akratic action that he finds unsatisfactory. He then describes how Spinoza explains akrasia and he argues that Spinoza's explanation is superior to the other two.

The first explanation says that during akrasia one's desire is stronger than one's cognitive faculties. Here desire is considered to be entirely non-cognitive and corporeal in

nature. The akratic agent knows what he ought to do but he is overpowered by some brute desire. According to Marshal this is not a satisfying description of akrasia because it does not do justice to the voluntary nature of akrasia. When a person loses control of himself because he is overwhelmed by a physical impulse, he is not acting voluntarily.

The second explanation is the one Marshall ascribes to Donald Davidson. Marshall explains Davidson's explanation as follows: Davidson reacts to Richard Hare's theory of prescriptivism. Hare argues that when we judge that we ought to perform a certain action then we will in fact perform this action (unless we are physically or psychologically unable to perform this action). Judging something to be the best thing to do is like issuing an imperative to oneself. On Hare's account akrasia is not possible because when we judge something to be the best thing to do then we will in fact do it. Davidson disagrees with Hare and says that it is possible for a person not to do what he judges to be better. Davidson makes a distinction between conditional and unconditional judgements. A conditional value judgement says that doing *x* is better than doing *y* given a certain reason. An unconditional value judgement says that doing *x* is better than doing *y*, or perhaps more simply, that it would be best to do *x*, without mentioning a reason. Davidson claims that only conditional value judgements force us to act. In the case of akrasia, we make the conditional judgement that doing *x* is better than doing *y* given a certain reason, but also the unconditional judgement that that doing *y* is better than doing *x*. Given that we act on our conditional judgements, in such a case we akratically act against our unconditional judgement. Marshal argues that Davidson's theory of akrasia is not satisfactory because it does not do justice to the fact that an action is akratic when it goes against our best judgement and not simply against one of the value judgements we might have. If Davidson denies that it is possible that we act against our unconditional value judgement, then he essentially denies the possibility of akrasia.

Marshall believes that Spinoza's explanation of akrasia is superior to the two just mentioned. He explains Spinoza's theory as follows (see p.46). All mental modes are ideas, and all ideas are beliefs that represent that something is the case. Ideas that represent states of affairs that concern our well-being are emotions. Emotions are thus not non-cognitive, brute phenomena. When Spinoza argues that knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the emotion of joy or sadness, he does not mean to reduce knowledge of good and evil to non-cognitive emotions. Instead he means that ideas can have an affective dimension. Emotions are beliefs about objects or states of affairs that we take to bear on our well-being, and these emotions sometimes cause us to act. Our representations of beneficial or harmful actions are at the same

time beliefs and desires, and these mental states cause actions. They are motivating beliefs, like a practical judgement combined with a motivating desire.

Spinoza's explanation of akrasia, according to Marshall (see p.48) is roughly the following: We judge that doing *x* is in our long-term interest and we judge that doing *y* would be pleasurable or beneficial in some other way. Both judgements are desires. In the case of akrasia our judgement that doing *x* is in our long-term interest, i.e., our desire to do *x*, is overpowered by our judgement that doing *y* would be pleasurable or beneficial in some other way, i.e., by our desire to do *y*.

Marshall claims that a practical judgement is rational when it is reached through rational deliberation and when it takes into consideration our long-term, overall good. Spinoza *would* call rational judgements 'adequate ideas'. The desire that these rational practical judgements involve are rational, too. A practical judgement is irrational when it is not reached through rational deliberation and when it does not take into account our long-term, overall good. Spinoza *might* call these judgements 'inadequate'. Affects corresponding to irrational practical judgements are irrational.

Marshall writes (see p.50) on the basis of IIIP9:

> […] if we correctly judge that something will benefit us, we shall feel some desire to so act. But if we mistake something harmful for something beneficial, we shall also desire it. And if we perceive some attractive feature of an otherwise harmful action, we may feel some desire to do it. What's more, to represent something as increasing our power is to represent it as bringing us some sort of pleasure or happiness. Spinoza calls this feeling laetitia, which he uses broadly to refer to pleasure, happiness, and joy. Therefore, if something brings us joy, pleasure, or happiness, it thereby increases our power in a certain respect. This is not simple hedonism, however, for things may bring us joy, happiness, or pleasure in ways that temporarily increase our power, but decrease it in the long run, or that bring us power in a certain regard only, but not overall. In short, when something makes us happy, it does so because it increases our power at that time in a certain respect. And if something makes us sad, it does so because, at the moment, it decreases our power. And if such feelings cause us to act, then Spinoza defines those feelings, or affects, as desires. For example, if an affect of joy becomes associated with eating cookies, then, in certain circumstances, the traces of that pleasure may cause us to act. When this occurs, we say that a desire for cookies moved us.

Unfortunately, the motivational strength of our practical judgements does not depend on their rationality, but on the strength of the affects that they involve. A person may make an irrational practical judgement and a rational practical judgement at the same time. Marshall writes (see p.51):

> A complex interaction of factors may determine the strength of these desires. When we are hungry, for example, the sight of a delicious slice of pie might lead us to judge that the pie would bring us great pleasure. In forming this judgement, we also thus desire to eat the pie, according to the conatus doctrine. Now, it may be that we also judge that refraining would bring us pleasure, albeit of a delayed kind. Thus we have two competing judgements about the pie, both of which spur us to action, but only one of which involves our long-term or overall well-being. These two affects may come into conflict an experience of synchronic akrasia.

If the desire involved in his irrational practical judgement is stronger than the desire involved in his rational practical judgement, then he will act on his irrational practical judgement and he will thus act against his rational practical judgement.

Marshall argues that Spinoza's theory of akrasia is more successful than the two opposing theories mentioned at the beginning. Contrary to the theory that conceives akrasia as the case in which a non-cognitive desire overpowers reason, Spinoza's theory is able to explain akrasia as voluntary action because it describes desire as an inadequate value judgement. And contrary to Davidson's theory, Spinoza's theory explains how a person can act against his own best value judgement.

Essential to Marshall's interpretation of Spinoza's theory of akrasia is the claim that our judgement that performing a certain action will have a certain long-term or short-term benefit is not only a judgement, but also a desire to perform this action. Marshall's example is that his judgement that eating a pie will give him immediate pleasure is a desire to eat the pie and his judgement that not eating the pie will give him a 'delayed pleasure' is a desire not to eat the pie. Just as Lin, Marshall is heavily influenced by Della Rocca's article 'The Power of an Idea' which I have discussed in chapter 2. On my interpretation there is a clear distinction between judging that performing a certain action will be in our interest, whether that be long-term or short-term, and desiring to perform this action. We may, for example, judge that it will be in our long-term interest to go to the dentist without having any desire to go to the dentist. Ideas about the effects of actions that we might perform are merely predictions, that is, opinions or mental images; they are not desires.

Section 2: The strength of Desire (Step 1)

The first step leading up to my interpretation of Spinoza's theory of akrasia consists in answering the question: What determines the strength of the emotion of Desire? We have seen in the previous chapter that Desire is caused by Joy and Sadness. The strength of a Desire, therefore, depends on the strength of the Joy or Sadness by which it is caused. Spinoza makes this claim in IIIP37:

> The Desire that arises from Sadness or Joy, and from Hatred or Love, is greater, the greater the affect is. Dem.: Sadness diminishes or restrains a man's power of acting (by P11S), i.e., (by P7), diminishes or restrains the striving by which a man strives to persevere in his being; so it is contrary to this striving (by P5), and all a man affected by Sadness strives for is to remove Sadness. But (by the definition of Sadness) the greater the Sadness, the greater is the part of the man's power of acting to which it is necessarily opposed. Therefore, the greater the Sadness, the greater the power of acting with which the man will strive to remove the Sadness, i.e., (by P9S), the greater the desire, or appetite, with which he will strive to remove the Sadness. Next, since Joy (by the same P11S) increases or aids man's power of acting, it is easily demonstrated in the same way that the man affected with Joy desires nothing but to preserve it, and does so with the greater Desire, as the Joy is greater. Finally, since Hate and Love are themselves the affects of Sadness or Joy, it follows in the same way that the striving, or appetite, or Desire which arises from Hate or Love will be greater as the Hate and Love are greater, q.e.d.

When Spinoza says that 'the strength of a desire that arises from Joy or Sadness depends on the strength of the affect', he clearly uses the verb 'to arise from' in the sense of 'to be caused by', and the expression 'the strength of the affect' in the sense of 'the strength of the Joy or Sadness'. Although this phrase leaves open the possibility that the emotion of Desire may also be caused by something else than the emotions of Joy and Sadness (e.g., a belief that something will bring Joy or Sadness), I have argued in the previous chapter that the emotion of Desire, in fact, is always caused by the emotions of Joy or Sadness.

Spinoza, then, tells us in IIIP37 that the stronger the Joy or Sadness, the stronger the Desire that they cause. He takes as example the case in which our idea of some *present* thing makes us joyful or sad; he takes as example the case in which we love or hate something. The more our idea of a present thing makes us joyful, the more we desire to stay joyful, and the more our idea of a present thing makes us sad, the more we desire to cease to be sad. We have seen in the last chapter that we bring this about by preserving the thing our idea of which makes us joyful, and by destroying the thing our idea of which makes us sad. Therefore, the more something makes us joyful or sad, the more effort we will put in bringing it about that this thing continues to make us joyful or ceases to make us sad.

Although Spinoza only takes as example the case in which our idea of a *present* thing makes us joyful or sad in order to show that the strength of Desire depends on the Joy or Sadness by which it is caused, his point also applies to cases in which our idea of a future thing makes us joyful or sad. Just as the strength of a desire that is caused by Love or Hate depends on the strength of that emotion of Love or Hate, so the strength of a desire that is caused by Hope or Fear depends on the strength of that emotion of Hope or Fear. The more our idea of some future thing makes us joyful or sad, the more we desire to act in such a way that this thing will or will not exist.

Now that we know that the strength of Desire depends on the strength of the Joy or Sadness by which it is caused, we have to ask the question: What determines the strength of Joy and Sadness? The answer is evident: The strength of Joy and Sadness depends on the strength of the idea by which they are caused.

In IVP9 and IVP10 Spinoza mentions one important factor that determines the strength of an idea, and thus the strength of the emotion of Joy or Sadness that it causes, namely the imagined location in time of the thing that we imagine[88]. In IVP9 he writes:

> An affect whose cause we imagine to be with us in the present is stronger than if we did not imagine it to be with us. Dem.: An imagination is an idea by which the Mind considers a thing as present (see its definition in IIP17S), which nevertheless indicates the constitution of the human Body more than the nature of the external thing (by IIP16C2). An affect, therefore (by the general Definition of the Affects), is an imagination, insofar as [the affect] indicates the constitution of the body. But an imagination (by IIP17) is more intense so long as we imagine nothing that excludes the present existence of the external thing. Hence, an affect whose cause we imagine to be with us in the present is more intense, or stronger, than if we did not imagine it to be with us, q.e.d. Schol.: I said above (in IIIP18) that when we imagine a future or past thing, we are affected with the same affect as if we were imagining something present; but I expressly warned then that this is true insofar as we attend to the thing's image only. For it is of the same nature whether we imagine the thing as present or not. But I did not deny that it is made weaker when we consider as present to us other things, which exclude the present existence of the future thing. I neglected to point this out then, because I had decided to treat the powers of the affects in this Part. Cor.: Other things being equal, the image of a future or past thing (i.e., of a thing we consider in relation to a future or past time, the present being excluded) is weaker than the image of a present thing; and consequently, and affect toward a future or past thing is milder, other things equal, than an affect toward a present thing.

[88] It is quite confusing that in IVP3-IVP5 Spinoza suggests that external bodies directly cause Joy and Sadness, and that the power of Joy and Sadness therefore depends on the force with which external bodies act on the human body. Joy and Sadness are, of course, not directly caused by external bodies; they are directly caused by our ideas of external bodies, as is confirmed by IVP6-IVP13.

We have seen in chapter 4 that by the expression ‘an emotion toward a past, present or future thing’ Spinoza refers to the emotion of Joy or Sadness caused by our idea of a past, present or future thing. He calls our Joy and Sadness ‘Gladness’ and ‘Remorse’ when they are caused by our idea of a past thing, he calls them ‘Love’ and ‘Hate’ when they are caused by our idea of a present thing, and he calls them ‘Hope’ and ‘Fear’ when they are caused by our idea of a future thing. Joy and Sadness are the same emotions whether they are caused by our idea of a past thing, our idea of a present thing, or our idea of a future thing, because our idea of something is the same whether we imagine that thing to be past, present or future. However, as we learn now, the strength of Joy and Sadness is not the same when they are caused by our idea of a past thing, our idea of a present thing, or our idea of a future thing.

IVP9 is rather problematic because Spinoza writes here literally that an emotion is a mental image according to IIIAGD. In chapter 3, however, we have seen that mental images and emotions are distinct mental states, and that mental images cause emotions. The only way to make sense of IVP9 is by reading it as saying that an emotion is stronger when caused by our mental image of something that we imagine to be present than when caused by our mental image of something that we imagine to be absent. An emotion is stronger when caused by a mental image of a present thing than when caused by a mental image of an absent thing, because a mental image of a present thing is stronger than a mental image of an absent thing.

The question arises: If every mental image represents its object as present, then how is it possible to imagine that something, of which we have a mental image, is absent? Spinoza gives the answer to this question at the end of IVP9D. We imagine that something, of which we have a mental image, is absent when we have a mental image of another thing that excludes the existence of the first thing. Imagine, if you like, a scabby Brazilian. If this were the only mental image that you had, then you would regard the Brazilian as present. We have seen in chapter 2 that mental images involve the affirmation that the thing imagined is in reality as we imagine it. The only reason why you regard the Brazilian as absent is because you have another mental image, for example a visual perception of this text, that excludes the presence of the Brazilian, and that is much stronger than your mental image of the Brazilian. Our mental image of something weakens when we imagine another thing that excludes its existence. Your mental image of the Brazilian, for example, is weakened by your visual perception of this text. Mental images of present things are thus stronger than mental images of past and future things, because when we imagine something to be past or future then we imagine other things that exclude the presence of this thing.

Given that our mental image of a past or future thing is weaker than our mental image of a present thing, the emotions of Joy and Sadness are weaker when they are caused by our mental image of a past or future thing then when they are caused by our mental image of a present thing. Spinoza continues in IVP10:

> We are affected more intensely toward a future thing which we imagine will quickly be present, than if we imagined the time when it will exist to be further from the present. We are also affected more intensely by the memory of a thing we imagine to be not long past, than if we imagined it to be long past. Dem.: Insofar as we imagine that a thing will quickly be present, or is not long past, we thereby imagine something that excludes the presence of the thing less than if we imagined that the time when it will exist were further from the present, or that it were far in the past (as is known through itself). Schol.: From what we noted at D6, it follows that we are still affected equally mildly toward objects separated from the present by an interval of time longer than that we can determine by imagining, even though we may understand that they are separated from one another by a long interval of time.

When the distance in time of the thing imagined increases, then the strength of our mental image of this thing decreases. Therefore, when the distance in time of the thing imagined increases, the strength of the Joy or Sadness caused by our mental image of this thing decreases, too. The emotions of Joy and Sadness are stronger when caused by a mental image of something that we imagine existed in the recent past than when caused by a mental image of something that we imagine existed in the remote past. The emotions of Joy and Sadness are stronger when caused by a mental image of something that we imagine will exist in the near future than when caused by our mental image of something that we imagine will exist in the remote future. The reason for this is that our mental image of something that existed in the recent past is stronger than our mental image of something that existed in the remote past, and that our mental image of something that will exist in the near future is stronger than our idea of something that will exist in the remote future.

The question arises: If all mental images represent their object as existing at the present moment, then how is it possible to imagine that something existed in the recent past rather than in the remote past, and how is it possible to imagine that something will exist in the near future rather than in the remote future? Spinoza gives the answer to this question at the end of IVP10D. We imagine that something existed in the recent past because we imagine another thing that excludes its existence, but not so much that we imagine that it existed in the remote past. Likewise, we imagine that something will exist in the near future because we

imagine another thing that excludes its existence, but not so much that we imagine that it will exist in the remote future.

Unfortunately, Spinoza does not explain how our mental image of something can exclude our mental image of another thing to different degrees. We may speculate that when we imagine that something existed in the remote past, then we imagine *more things* that exclude its existence than when we imagine that it existed in the recent past. When, for example, I imagine that something existed last week then I imagine more things that exclude its existence than when I imagine that it existed yesterday. Likewise, when we imagine that something will exist in the remote future then we imagine more things that exclude its existence than when we imagine that it will exist in the near future.

To summarise: The less distant the imagined location in time of the thing that we imagine, the stronger our mental image of that thing, and thus the stronger the emotion of Joy or Sadness caused by our mental image of that thing.

In IVP11-12 Spinoza mentions a factor that determines the strength of our ideas of future things specifically. This factor, then, also determines the strength of the emotions of Joy and Sadness caused by our ideas of future things. Spinoza explains that Joy and Sadness are stronger when caused by our idea of a possible future thing than when caused by a contingent future thing.

In order to understand this claim we first have to look at IVD3 and IVD4. Spinoza writes in IVD3: '*I call singular things contingent insofar as we find nothing, while we attend only to their essence, which necessarily posits their existence or which necessarily excludes it.*', and in IVD4: '*I call the same singular things possible, insofar as, while we attend to the causes from which they must be produced, we do not know whether those causes are determined to produce them. In IP33S1 I drew no distinction between the possible and the contingent, because there was no need there to distinguish them accurately*'.

It may seem that Spinoza says that there are contingent and possible things. But this is not what he means. Spinoza explains in IP33 that the present existence of all things is either necessary or impossible, and that the necessity or impossibility of the present existence of something depends either on the essence of that thing or on the presence or absence of its causes.

Nature is the only thing whose existence is necessary due to its own essence. It is impossible for Nature not to exist. To the category of things whose present existence is impossible due to their own essence belong 'things' such as square circles, material souls, and so forth. All finite things that exist at the present moment exist necessarily, not in virtue of

their own essence, but because they have been necessarily caused by other finite things. All finite things that do not exist at the present moment, and whose essences are not contradictory, do necessarily not exist because the finite things that would have caused them did not exist. The following scheme illustrates this:

	Present existence is necessary	**Present existence is impossible**
Due to its own essence	Nature	Square circles, etc.
Due to its cause	Finite things that exist at the present moment	Finite things that do not exist at the present moment

Just as the present state of the world is entirely determined, so will be the future state of the world. The things that will exist in the future will necessarily exist, and the things that will not exist in the future will necessarily not exist. However, we can never know with certainty whether it is necessary that a certain finite thing will exist in the future, or whether it is impossible that this finite thing will exist in the future (unless, of course, we know that its essence is contradictory). Spinoza writes in IP33 that he calls a finite thing that does not presently exist but of which he has an idea 'contingent' or 'possible' when it seems to him that this thing might exist in the future:

> But a thing is called contingent only because of a defect of our knowledge. For if we do not know that the thing's essence involves a contradiction, or if we do not know very well that its essence does not involve a contradiction, and nevertheless can affirm nothing certainly about its existence, because the order of causes is hidden from us, it can never seem to us either necessary or impossible. So we call it contingent or possible.

When we know that the essence of a finite thing is contradictory, then we know with certainty, of course, that it will never exist. We know with certainty, for example, that there will never be square circles and material souls. But when it seems to us that the essence of a finite thing that does not presently exist, but of which we have an idea, is not contradictory, then we can never say with certainty whether it is necessary that it will exist in the future or whether it is impossible that it will exist in the future. We do not have certain knowledge of the future; all we have are conjectures. Although the future existence of a finite thing is necessary or impossible in reality, it is 'possible' or 'contingent' from our perspective.

It is important to understand that Spinoza only calls things that do not presently exist 'possible' or 'contingent'. If something presently exists, then it exists necessarily, either due to its own essence or due to its causes. This may be somewhat confusing for two reasons. The

first reason is that one might argue that if something exists at the present moment, whether due to its own nature or due to its causes, then its existence is possible; if its existence were not possible, then it would be impossible, and hence the thing would not exist. This is not how Spinoza uses the words ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’. Spinoza applies the word ‘possible’ to things that he thinks might exist in the future. He does not call presently existing things ‘possible’. This does not mean that the existence of presently existing finite things is impossible; it merely means that their present existence is necessary. The second reason is that one might argue that all presently existing finite things are contingent because their essence does not involve existence; if they were not contingent, then their essence would involve existence and they would exist necessarily in virtue of their own essence. This is not how Spinoza uses the word ‘contingent’. Spinoza applies the word ‘contingent’ to things that he thinks might exist in the future. He does not call presently existing finite things ‘contingent’. This does not mean that presently existing finite things exist necessarily in virtue of their own essence; it merely means that they exist necessarily in virtue of their causes.

In IVD4 Spinoza gives an extra meaning to the word ‘possible’. He says (in a somewhat obscure manner) that he calls the future existence of something ‘possible’ when he has some reason to think that the thing will exist, although he is still not certain whether it will exist or not. When we have reason to think that some finite thing will exist, then, of course, we also think that the nature of this thing is not contradictory. If we think that the nature of some finite thing is contradictory, then we think that its future existence is impossible. So when we have reason to think that some finite thing will exist in the future, then we think that it is contingent. When Spinoza calls some finite thing ‘contingent’ he means that he thinks that the thing might exist in the future although he has no reason to think that it will exist in the future. When he calls some finite thing ‘possible’ he means that he has reason to think that it will exist in the future. For example, I would call world peace ‘contingent’ because I think that it might exist in the future, but I would not call it ‘possible’ because I have no reason to think that it will exist in the future.

To summarise: Spinoza calls a finite thing ‘necessary’ when it exists at the present moment. He calls a finite thing ‘contingent’ when it does not exist at the present moment and when he has no reason to think that it will or will not exist in the future. And he calls a finite thing ‘possible’ when it does not exist at the present moment and when he has some reason to think that it will exist in the future.

Now that we understand this terminology, let us look at IVP11-12 where Spinoza explains why the strength of Joy and Sadness differs when they are caused by our idea of a present thing, a contingent future thing, or a possible future thing. He writes in IVP11:

> An affect toward a thing we imagine as necessary is more intense, other things equal, than one toward a thing we imagine as possible or contingent, or not necessary. Dem.: Insofar as we imagine a thing to be necessary, we affirm its existence. On the other hand, we deny its existence insofar as we imagine it not to be necessary (by IP33S1), and therefore (by P9), an affect toward a necessary thing is more intense, other things equal, than toward one not necessary, q.e.d.

As said, when we imagine something to be necessary, then we imagine that it exists at the present moment, and when we imagine something to be possible or contingent, then we imagine that it is future and thus presently absent. Given that our mental images of present things are stronger than our mental images of absent things, our mental image of something that we imagine to be necessary is stronger than our mental image of something that we imagine to be contingent or possible. Given that the strength of Joy and Sadness depends on the strength of the mental images by which they are caused, Joy and Sadness are stronger when caused by a mental image of something we imagine to be present and thus necessary than when they are caused by a mental image of something that we imagine to be contingent or possible and thus absent. In other words, we feel more joyful or sad regarding presently existing things than regarding future things. Spinoza continues in IVP12:

> An affect toward a thing which we know does not exist in the present, and which we imagine as possible, is more intense, other things being equal, than one toward a contingent thing. Dem.: Insofar as we imagine a thing as contingent, we are not affected by an image of another thing that posits the thing's existence (by D3); but on the other hand (according to the hypothesis), we imagine certain things that exclude its present existence. But insofar as we imagine a thing in the future to be possible, we imagine certain things that posit its existence (by D4), i.e., (by IIIP18) which encourage Hope or Fear. And so an affect toward a possible thing is more violent [, other things being equal, than one toward a contingent thing], q.e.d.

Spinoza's reasoning is as interesting as it is brief. We know that when we imagine something to be absent then we imagine something else that excludes its present existence. When we imagine something to be future and thus absent, therefore, we imagine something else that excludes its present existence. This clearly implies that when we imagine a future thing to be contingent or possible (i.e., when we think that it might exist in the future), then we imagine

something else that excludes its present existence. Now comes the interesting part: When we imagine some future thing to be possible (i.e., when we have some reason to think that it will exist), then we also imagine something else that *poses* its existence. In other words, the reason why we think that something will exist in the future is because we have a mental image of another thing that might cause its existence. When we imagine some future thing to be merely contingent, then we do not imagine something else that might cause its existence. Therefore, our mental image of something that we imagine to be possible is stronger than our mental image of something that we imagine to be contingent. In other words, our mental image of some future thing is stronger when we have some reason to think that this thing will exist in the future then when we have no reason to think that it will exist in the future.

Given that our mental images of future possible things are stronger than our mental images of future contingent things, the emotions of Joy and Sadness are stronger when they are caused by a mental image of a future possible thing, than when they are caused by a mental image of a future contingent thing. In other words, we feel more joyful or sad regarding something that might exist in the future when we have some reason to think that it will exist than when we have no reason to think that it will exist[89].

The following scheme illustrates when one idea is stronger than another idea. The symbol > means 'is stronger than'.

idea of a present thing > idea of an absent thing
idea of a present thing > idea of a thing of the recent past > idea of a thing of the remote past
idea of a present thing > idea of a thing of the near future > idea of a thing of the remote future
idea of a present thing > idea of a possible thing > idea of a contingent thing

[89]In IVP13 Spinoza explains that Joy and Sadness are stronger when caused by a mental image of a past thing than when caused by our mental image of a future contingent thing. I do not discuss this proposition because it seems irrelevant to the explanation of akrasia.

Section 3: Desire and action (Step 2)

The second step leading up to my interpretation of Spinoza's theory of akrasia consists in answering the question: What is the relation between our desires and our overt actions? A principle that Spinoza does not formulate explicitly, but that, nonetheless, seems to be fundamental to his view on the relation between the emotion of Desire and overt actions is the following: *We always and only act when we have a desire to act, and we always and only have a desire to act when our idea of something affects us with Joy or Sadness*.

When we apply this principle to the desire to act in such a way that something will or will not exist, then it says that we always and only attempt to act in such a way that something will or will not exist when we desire to act in such a way that it will or will not exist, and that we always and only desire to act in such a way that it will or will not exist when our idea of it has affected us with Joy or Sadness. If our idea of something affects us with Joy or Sadness, then we will desire to act in such a way that it will or will not exist, and if we desire to act in such a way that it will or will not exist, then we will attempt to act in such a way that it will or will not exist. If our idea of something does not affect us with Joy or Sadness, then we will not desire to act in such a way that it will or will not exist, and if we do not desire to act in such a way that it will or will not exist, then we will not attempt to act in such a way that it will or will not exist.

When we apply this principle to the desire to make someone joyful or sad, then it says that we always and only attempt to make someone joyful or sad when we desire to make him joyful or sad, and that we always and only desire to make someone joyful or sad when our idea of him has affected us with Joy or Sadness. If our idea of someone affects us with Joy or Sadness, then we will desire to make him joyful or sad, and if we desire to make someone joyful or sad, then we will attempt to make him joyful or sad. If our idea of someone does not affect us with Joy or Sadness, then we will not desire to make him joyful or sad, and if we do not desire to make someone joyful or sad, then we will not attempt to make him joyful or sad.

When we apply this principle to the desire to pursue or avoid something, then it says that we always and only pursue or avoid something when we desire to pursue or avoid it, and that we always and only desire to pursue or avoid something when our idea of it has affected us with Joy or Sadness. If our idea of something affects us with Joy or Sadness, then we will desire to pursue or avoid it, and if we desire to pursue or avoid it, then we will pursue or avoid it. If our idea of something does not affect us with Joy or Sadness, then we will not desire to pursue or avoid it, and if we do not desire to pursue or avoid it, then we will not pursue or avoid it.

There is one exception to the part of this principle that says that 'we always act when we have a desire to act': *We do not act on a desire if and only if we have a stronger conflicting desire. When we have conflicting desires, then we always act on the strongest desire.*

What are conflicting desires? In a weak sense, two desires conflict when we cannot act on them at the same time. You cannot, for example, at the same time act on your desire to read this section and act on your desire to take a break. In a strong sense, two desires conflict when the satisfaction of the one implies that the other can never be satisfied. Your desire to read this text and your desire to take a break do not conflict in this strong sense, because you can first read this text and then take a break or the other way around.

In the following four scenarios we have two desires that conflict in the strong sense. In the first scenario we have two conflicting desires regarding one and the same thing (called 'thing A'). In the other three scenarios we have two conflicting desires regarding two different things (called 'thing A' and 'thing B'). In each of these scenarios our desires are desires to pursue or avoid something. Let us see how we would act in each of these scenarios according to the principle formulated just now.

Scenario (1): Our idea of thing A causes both Joy and Sadness and we thus desire to pursue thing A and we also desire to avoid thing A. (Our idea of one and the same thing may cause both Joy and Sadness when we consider different aspects of this thing.) Clearly, we cannot pursue and also avoid thing A. In this scenario we pursue thing A if our idea of it causes more Joy than Sadness, because then our desire to pursue it is stronger than our desire to avoid it. In this scenario we avoid thing A if our idea of it causes more Sadness than Joy, because then our desire to avoid it is stronger than our desire to pursue it.

Scenario (2): Our ideas of thing A and thing B both cause Joy, and we thus desire to pursue both thing A and thing B. However, the situation is such that we can never pursue them both. In this scenario we pursue the thing our idea of which causes the strongest Joy, because our desire to pursue this thing is the strongest.

Scenario (3): Our ideas of thing A and thing B cause Sadness, and we thus desire to avoid both thing A and thing B. However, the situation is such that we can never avoid them both. In this scenario we avoid the thing our idea of which causes the strongest Sadness, because our desire to avoid this thing is the strongest.

Scenario (4): Our idea of thing A causes Joy and we thus desire to pursue thing A, and our idea of thing B causes Sadness and we thus desire to avoid thing B. However, the situation is such that if we pursue thing A then we can never avoid thing B, and if we avoid

thing B then we can never pursue thing A. In this scenario we pursue thing A if the Joy that our idea of it causes is stronger than the Sadness that our idea of thing B causes, because then our desire to pursue thing A will be stronger than our desire to avoid thing B. In this scenario we avoid thing B if the Sadness that our idea of it causes is stronger than the Joy that our idea of thing A causes, because then our desire to avoid thing B is stronger than our desire to pursue thing A.

These scenarios can be easily adapted so that they fit the desire to act in such a way that something will or will not exist, or the desire to make someone joyful or sad. When, for example, our idea of one and the same person causes Joy and Sadness (i.e., if we love and hate the same person), and we thus desire to make him joyful and also to make him sad, then we attempt to make him joyful when our idea of him causes more Joy than Sadness (i.e., when love him more than we hate him), but we attempt to make him sad when our idea of him causes more Sadness than Joy (i.e., when we hate him more than we love him). If our ideas of two persons cause Joy (i.e., if we love two persons), and we thus desire to make them both joyful, but the situation is such that we can never make them both joyful (because, for example, they hate each other), then we attempt to make that person joyful our idea of whom causes the strongest Joy (i.e., the person we love most), because our desire to make that person joyful is stronger than our desire to make the other person joyful.

We see, then, that in all these scenarios our actual behaviour is caused by our strongest desire, and that our strongest desire is the one that is caused by the strongest emotion of Joy or Sadness. In the previous section we have seen that the strength of Joy and Sadness are determined by the strength of the idea by which they are caused, and we have studied two important factors that determine the strength of an idea, namely the imagined distance in time of the thing we imagine, and the imagined modal status of the thing we imagine. This helps us to understand how the scenarios described above may occur. Scenarios (2), (3) and (4) occur when thing A and thing B differ in their imagined distance in time, or in their imagined modal states, or in both. When they differ in one of these respects, then our ideas of them differ in strength, and then the emotions of Joy or Sadness caused by our ideas of them also differ in strength, and then the desires caused by these emotions of Joy or Sadness differ in strength, too. In scenario (2), for example, we will pursue the thing that we imagine is closest to the present, or the thing whose future existence we are most convinced of. In scenario (4) we will pursue thing A if we imagine that it is closer to the present than thing B, or when we imagine that the future existence of thing A is possible whereas the future existence of thing B is contingent.

Section 4: Desire, value judgement and practical judgement (Step 3)

The third step leading up to my interpretation of Spinoza's theory of akrasia consists in answering the question: How do our value judgements and practical judgements relate to our desires?[90] Spinoza claims in IIIP9S that we do not desire to pursue or avoid something because we judge it to be good or bad, but we judge something to be good or bad because we desire to pursue or avoid it:

> From all this, then, it is clear that we neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it.

It is arguable whether it is indeed clear from what Spinoza has said up to IIIP9 that we do not desire something because we judge it to be good, but judge something to be good because we desire it. However, given that we have studied Spinoza's claim that we desire to pursue or avoid something because our idea of it affects us with Joy or Sadness, let us assume that it is indeed clear that we do not desire to pursue or avoid something because we judge that this thing is good or bad. Let us concentrate, rather, on the additional claim that we judge something to be good or bad because we desire to pursue or avoid it. Spinoza illustrates this claim in IIIP39S:

> […] For we have shown above (in P9S) that we desire nothing because we judge it to be good, but on the contrary, we call it good because we desire it. Consequently, what we are averse of we call evil. So each one, from his own affect, judges, or evaluates, what is good and what is bad, what is better and what is worse, and finally, what is best and what is worst. So the greedy man judges an abundance of money to be the best, and poverty worst. The ambitious man desires nothing so much as Esteem and dreads nothing so much as Shame. To the Envious nothing is more agreeable than another's unhappiness, and nothing more burdensome than another's happiness. And so, each one, from his own affect, judges a thing good or bad, useful or useless.

A greedy person, Spinoza says, does not desire to pursue money the most because he judges money to be the best thing there is, but, on the contrary, he judges money to be the best thing there is because he desires to pursue money the most. He does not desire to avoid poverty the

[90] In this section I shall not go into the question as to what Spinoza himself believes to be good or bad. To some degree I have tried to answer this question in chapter 6. Here I am merely concerned with Spinoza's claim that people judge things to be good because they desire them.

most because he judges poverty to be the worst thing there is, but, on the contrary, he judges poverty to be the worst thing there is because he desires to avoid poverty the most.

We know that the greedy person desires to pursue money the most because his idea of money affects him with the strongest Joy, and that he desires to avoid poverty the most because his idea of poverty affects him with the strongest Sadness. This allows us to understand that the greedy person does not judge money to be the best thing merely because he desires to pursue money the most, but, more fundamentally, because his idea of money affects him with the strongest Joy. He does not judge poverty to be the worst thing merely because he desires to avoid it the most, but, more fundamentally, because his idea of poverty affects him with the strongest Sadness. Nothing makes the greedy person more joyful than the idea of money, and nothing makes him sadder than the idea of poverty, and that is why he judges money to be the best thing and poverty to be the worst thing.

It is easy to see how this reasoning works for the person who desires and values, not wealth, but popularity or pleasure, which are the other two things most people desire the most. The ambitious person does not desire to pursue popularity (or praise, glory, fame, adoration, etcetera) the most because he judges it to be the best thing, but, on the contrary, he judges popularity to be the best thing because he desires to pursue it the most, and, more fundamentally, because his idea of popularity affects him with the strongest Joy. He judges unpopularity to be the worst thing because he desires to avoid it the most, and he desires to avoid it the most because his idea of it affects him with the strongest Sadness. The person who is affected with the strongest Joy by the idea of pleasure desires to pursue pleasure the most, and therefore judges pleasure to be the best thing. His idea of pain (or, more likely, the absence of pleasure) affects him with the strongest Sadness, and he therefore desires to avoid that the most, and thus judges that to be the worst thing.

The same must be true for the stoic. The stoic judges peace of mind to be the best thing because he desires to pursue that the most, and he desires to pursue that the most because nothing makes him more joyful than having a peaceful mind. He judges the passions to be the worst things because he desires to avoid them the most, and he desires to avoid them the most because nothing makes him sadder than having a troubled mind.

In IVP19 Spinoza seems to contradict his claim that we judge things to be good because we desire them:

> From the laws of his own nature, everyone necessarily wants, or is repelled by, what he judges to be good or evil. Dem.: Knowledge of good and evil (by P8) is itself an affect of Joy or Sadness, insofar as

> we are conscious of it. And therefore (by IIIP28), everyone necessarily wants what he judges to be good, and conversely, is repelled by what he judges to be evil. But this appetite is nothing but the very essence, or nature, of man (by the Definition of Appetite; see IIIP9S and Def. Aff. I). Therefore, everyone, from the laws of his own nature, necessarily, wants or is repelled by, etc., q.e.d.

The contradiction is merely apparent. Spinoza is not suddenly saying that we desire to pursue or avoid something because we judge it to be good or bad. He is merely saying that, given that we judge something to be good or bad because we desire to pursue or avoid it (and more fundamentally, because our idea of it affects us with Joy or Sadness), we desire to pursue or avoid things that we judge to be good or bad. Our value judgements are explained by our emotions, and not the other way around. Given that the greedy many judges money to be the best thing because he desires to pursue money the most (and more fundamentally, because his idea of money affects him with the strongest Joy), the greedy man desires to pursue the thing that he judges to be best.

It depends on our personal constitution what gives us the strongest Joy or Sadness, and thus what we desire to pursue or avoid the most, and thus what we judge to be the best or the worst thing. Given that we are all somewhat differently constituted, some of us are affected with the strongest Joy by wealth, others by popularity, others by pleasure, and again others by tranquillity. We therefore all desire to pursue different things, and we all judge the thing that we desire the most to be the best thing there is.

The miser, for example, does not understand why the sensualist spends all his money on trivial pleasures. The sensualist does not understand why the miser does not spend his money. The popular person does not understand why the miser and the sensualist throw away their good name. And the stoic shakes his head when he sees the others painstakingly pursue their empty ‘goods’. None of them desires what he desires because he judges it to be good; every one of them judges to be good what he judges to be good because he desires it. And what every one of them desires is not a matter of personal choice, but a matter of personal constitution. One’s personal constitution, however, is subject to change. Spinoza writes in IIIP51:

> Different men can be affected differently by one and the same object; and one and the same man can be affected differently at different times by one and the same object. […] Schol.: We see, then, that it can happen that what the one loves, the other hates, what the one fears, the other does not, and that one and the same man may now love what before he hated, and now dare what before he was too timid for.

> Next, because each one judges from his own affect what is good and what is bad, what is better and what worse (by P39S) it follows that men can vary as much in judgement as in affect.

The sensualist has satisfied his lusts and decides to live like the stoic for a day. The stoic gets bored and asks the sensualist if he wants to join him to the theatre. The miser finds himself unusually concerned with his reputation and offers to pay the tickets. Our emotions change, and thus do our value judgements.

The principle, then, is clear: We judge that thing to be best our idea of which affects us with the strongest Joy and which we thus desire to pursue the most. We judge that thing to be worst our idea of which affects us with the strongest Sadness and which we thus desire to avoid the most. The 'things' we are talking about here are things like wealth, popularity, pleasure, and tranquillity.

Now a crucial question arises: Does Spinoza mean that we *always* judge to be good the things that we desire to pursue, and that we always judge to be bad the things that we desire to avoid? In other words, do we always judge to be good those things our ideas of which affect us with Joy, and do we always judge to be bad those things our ideas of which affect us with Sadness? Do we never desire to pursue things that we judge to be bad, and do we never desire to avoid things that we judge to be good?

The answer must be 'no', because in the preface of Part IV of the *Ethics* Spinoza writes that we often see what is best and pursue what is worst:

> Man's lack of power to moderate and restrain the affects I call Bondage. For the man who is subject to affects is under the control, not of himself, but of fortune, in whose power he so greatly is that often, though he sees the better for himself, he is still forced to follow the worse. In this Part, I have undertaken to demonstrate the cause of this, and what there is of good and evil in the affects.

Clearly, if we always judged to be good the things that we desire to pursue, then we would never desire to pursue something that we judge to be bad, and if we always judged to be bad the things that we desire to avoid, then we would never desire to avoid something that we judge to be good.

It happens, of course, that we immediately and without reflection judge something to be good or bad merely because our idea of it affects us with Joy or Sadness, and thus merely because we desire to pursue or avoid it. We see a splendid car and immediately judge that it would be good to have that car, merely because we are affected with Joy by the sight of the car, and thus merely because we desire to possess the car.

However, Spinoza cannot have thought that we make value judgements this impulsively all the time. It is indisputable that we all deliberate often what we should pursue and what we should avoid in order to obtain what we love the most in the long run. I suggest that when Spinoza says that we judge something to be good because we desire it, he merely means that 'what we judge to be the highest good is determined by what affects us with the greatest Joy'. I suggest that Spinoza does not deny that we often, when we are in a more prudent state of mind, *judge to be good those particular things that we believe are conducive to obtaining more of our personal highest good in the long run, and to be bad those particular things that we believe are obstructive to obtaining more of our personal highest good in the long run*. Spinoza seems to say as much in IVP37S2:

> Everyone exists by the highest right of nature, and consequently everyone, by the highest right of nature, does those things that follow from the necessity of his nature. So everyone, by the highest right of nature, judges what is good and what is evil, considers his own advantage according to his own temperament (see P19 and P20) [*sua utilitati ex suo ingenio consulit*], avenges himself (see IIIP40C2), and strives to preserve what he loves and destroy what he hates (see IIIP28). […] everyone who is in a state of nature considers [*consulit*] only his own advantage, and decides [*descernit*] what is good and what is evil from his own temperament, and only insofar as he takes into account his own advantage [*et nemini, nisi sibi soli, obtemperare lege ulla tenetur*].

The claim that 'everyone considers what is in his own advantage' suggests that everyone, at least at times, deliberates on what is good or bad for him in the long term. The miser, for example, deliberates on what he must pursue and what he must avoid in order to make more money in the long run. When he is in a more prudent state of mind, he judges those particular things to be good that he believes are conducive to making more money in the long run, and he judges that he should pursue these things. He judges those particular things to be bad that he believes are obstructive to making more money in the long run, and he judges that he should avoid these things. The ambitious man, to give another example, deliberates on what he must pursue and what he must avoid in order to become more popular in the long run. When he is in a more prudent state of mind, he judges those particular things to be good that he believes are conducive to obtaining more popularity in the long run, and he judges that he should pursue these things. He judges those particular things to be bad that he believes are obstructive to becoming more popular in the long run, and he judges that he should avoid these things. In IVP58S Spinoza writes about the ambitious man: '[…] *he who exults at being esteemed by the multitude is made anxious daily, strives, sacrifices, and schemes in order to*

preserve his reputation.' That the ambitious man 'sacrifices' and 'schemes' indicates, of course, that he, at least at times, deliberates on the best course of action and that he does not always act on mere impulse.

It seems quite undeniable that, on the basis of our personal experience, we all formulate general rules that help us judge whether a particular thing is conducive or obstructive to obtaining more of what we love the most in the long run, and thus judge whether this thing is good or bad for us, and thus judge whether we should pursue or avoid this thing. The sensualist, for example, has formulated the general rule that when the bartender takes away his keys it is time to call it a night. The stoic, to give another example, has formulated the general rule that he must refuse gifts unless that offends the other person too much.

There are of course several factors that determine the accuracy of our judgement that a particular thing will be conducive or obstructive to obtaining more of what we love the most in the long run, and thus our judgement that this thing is good or bad, and thus our judgement that we should pursue or avoid this thing. The accuracy of these judgements may be influenced, for example, by (1) the amount of time during which we deliberate, (2) our experience with this kind of particular thing or situation, (3) our intelligence, and (4) the advice that we get from others. Someone who has more time to deliberate, more experience, more intelligence and better advice normally makes better plans to get what he wants in the long run than someone who has less time, less experience, less intelligence and worst advice. A chess player will make better moves the more time he has to make calculations, the more experience he has with the game, the smarter he is, and the better advice he gets.

It is of crucial importance that value judgements and practical judgements, whether made in an impulsive or prudent state of mind, never determine how we feel about a particular thing, and thus they never determine how we act. It can therefore happen that we judge that something is bad because we believe that it is obstructive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run, and thus judge that we should avoid this thing, even though our idea of it affects us with Joy, and thus even though we desire to pursue it. Likewise, it can happen that we judge that something is good because we believe that it is conducive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run, and thus judge that we should pursue it, even though our idea of it affects us with Sadness, and thus even though we desire to avoid it. When the miser, for example, is in a more prudent state of mind, he judges that the illegal business deal is a bad thing, and thus that he should avoid it, because he believes that it will be obstructive to making more money in the long run, even though his idea of the illegal business deal affects

him with Joy, and thus even though he desires to pursue the deal. In the next section we shall explore such situations in which our emotions cause us to perform actions that we judge we should not perform.

Section 5: Acting intentionally against our practical judgement

In section 2 I have shown that, according to Spinoza, the strength of a desire is determined by the strength of the emotion of Joy or Sadness by which it is caused, and that the strength of the emotions of Joy and Sadness is determined by the strength of the idea by which they are caused. The strength of our idea of something weakens when we have an idea of another thing that excludes the existence of the first thing. This explains why the strength of our idea of something weakens when its imagined distance in time increases, and why our idea of a future thing that we imagine to be contingent is weaker than our idea of a future thing that we imagine to be possible. This was the first step leading up to my interpretation of Spinoza's theory of akrasia.

In section 3 I have attributed to Spinoza the principle that we always and only act when we have a desire to act, and we always and only desire to act when our idea of something affects us with Joy or Sadness. The only exception to the rule that we always act when we have a desire to act is that we do not act on a desire when we have a stronger conflicting desire; when we have conflicting desires, then we always act on the strongest desire. This was the second step leading up to my interpretation of Spinoza's theory of akrasia.

In section 4 I have suggested that, although Spinoza writes that we judge something to be good because we desire to pursue it, he does not mean that we judge to be good everything that affects us with Joy and thus everything that we desire to pursue. When we are more prudent, we judge that a particular thing is bad, and thus that we should avoid it, when we believe that it is obstructive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run, even if our idea of it affects us with Joy, and thus even if we desire to pursue it. Likewise, when we are more prudent, we judge that a particular thing is good, and thus that we should pursue it, when we believe that it is conducive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run, even if our idea of it affects us with Sadness, and thus even if we desire to avoid it. Whether we are in a prudent state of mind or in an impulsive state of mind, our value judgements and our practical judgements never determine how we feel about a certain thing, and thus they never determine how we act. This was the third step leading up to my interpretation of Spinoza's theory of akrasia.

Let us finally look at the propositions in which Spinoza talks directly about akrasia. He writes in IVP14:

> No affect can be restrained by the true knowledge of good and evil insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect. Dem.: An affect is an idea by which the Mind affirms of its Body a greater or lesser force of existing than before (by the general Definition of the Affects). So (by P1), it has nothing positive which could be removed by the presence of the true. Consequently the true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as it is true, cannot restrain an affect. But insofar as it is an affect (see P8), it can restrain an affect, if it is stronger than it.

What is true knowledge of good and evil? Clearly, Spinoza is talking about the *adequate* knowledge that a certain thing is good or bad for us. True knowledge of good and evil, in other words, consists in knowing what reason tells us to pursue or avoid. In chapter 6 I have indicated that Spinoza is not completely clear as to why things are ultimately good or bad for us. It is not completely clear if, according to reason, we should ultimately strive for (1) Joy, or (2) bodily power, or (3) adequate knowledge. I have argued for the interpretation according to which things are good or bad for us when they increase or decrease the total amount of Joy that we experience in our lives. Reason, in other words, tells us to pursue those things that lead to Cheerfulness and to avoid those things that lead away from Cheerfulness. According to this interpretation bodily power and adequate knowledge are only instrumentally good, that is, they are only good because they lead to Cheerfulness.

Here, for the purpose of understanding why we sometimes act akratically, I want to sidestep the problem of interpreting what adequate knowledge of good and evil consists in. I want to suggest that we may interpret the expression 'true knowledge of good and evil' in a less strict sense, namely in the sense of 'a true belief that some particular thing will be conducive or obstructive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run'. The miser, for example, may be right in believing that the illegal business deal will be obstructive to making more money in the long run. If he closes the deal he will in fact be arrested and sentenced for ten years in prison. His judgement that the illegal deal is bad and his judgement that he should avoid the illegal deal are true. The miser, to give another example, may also be right in believing that the alternative, legal business deal will be conducive to making more money in the long. If he closes this deal he will make less money than when he closes the illegal deal, but he will stay out of prison and keep his profit. His judgment that the legal deal is good and his judgement that he should pursue this deal are true. This example shows that a true belief that some particular thing will be conducive or obstructive to obtaining more of what we love

in the long run does not necessarily constitute true knowledge of good or evil in the strict sense.

Now, if we take true knowledge of good and evil to consist in a true belief that something will be conducive or obstructive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run, rather than taking it in the strict sense of adequate knowledge that something is good or bad for us, then what does it mean that 'an affect cannot be restrained by the true knowledge of good and evil insofar as it is true'? It means that our true belief that something is bad because it is obstructive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run cannot by itself restrain our desire to pursue this thing. His true belief that the illegal business deal is bad because it is obstructive to making more money in the long run, for example, cannot by itself take away the miser's desire to pursue this deal. Likewise, our true belief that something is good because it is conducive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run cannot restrain our desire to avoid this thing. His true belief that the legal deal is good because it is conducive to obtaining more money in the long run, for example, cannot by itself take away the miser's desire to refuse this deal.

And if we take true knowledge of good and evil to consist in a true belief that something will be conducive or obstructive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run, then what does it mean that an affect *can be* restrained by the knowledge of good and evil insofar as it is considered an emotion? It means that a desire to pursue something that we know will be obstructive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run *can be* restrained by a conflicting and stronger desire for something that we know will be conducive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run. The miser's desire to pursue the illegal business deal, for example, cannot be restrained by his mere knowledge that it is bad for him, but it can be restrained by his conflicting and stronger desire to avoid imprisonment. Likewise our desire to avoid something that we know to be good because it will be conducive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run can be restrained by a conflicting and stronger desire for something that we know will be conducive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run. The miser's desire to avoid the legal deal, for example, cannot be restrained by his mere knowledge that this deal is good for him, but it can be restrained by his conflicting and stronger desire to stay out of prison.

Spinoza writes in IVP16:

> A Desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as this knowledge concerns the future, can be quite easily restrained or extinguished by a Desire for the pleasure of the moment. Dem.:

> An affect toward a thing we imagine as future is milder than one toward a present thing (by P9C). But a Desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil, even if this knowledge concerns things which are good now, can be restrained or extinguished by some rash Desire (by P15, whose demonstration is universal). Therefore, a Desire which arises from the same knowledge, insofar as this concerns a future thing, can be quite easily restrained or extinguished, etc., q.e.d

What is a desire that arises from true knowledge of good and evil? If we take true knowledge of good and evil to consist in a true belief that something will be conducive or obstructive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run, then it is a desire that arises from the emotion of Joy caused by our idea of something that we know is conducive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run, or a desire that arises from the emotion of Sadness caused by our idea of something that we know is obstructive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run. The miser's desire to pursue the legal deal, which has arisen from the Joy caused by his idea of the profit coming from this deal and from his idea of staying out of prison, is a desire that has arisen from true knowledge of a good. The miser's desire to avoid the illegal deal, which has arisen from the Sadness caused by his idea of imprisonment, is a desire arisen from true knowledge of an evil.

If we may read these passages in this way, then it is not difficult to see how a desire for some future thing that we know will be conducive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run can be restrained by a desire for a present pleasure. Our ideas of future things are weaker than our ideas of present things, and thus Joy and Sadness are weaker when caused by an idea of a future thing than when caused by an idea of a present thing, and thus a desire for a future thing is weaker than a desire for a present thing. The miser's idea of quickly gaining a lot of money by closing the illegal deal, for example, is stronger than his idea of slowly gaining money by a series of minor legal deals. Therefore, his Joy caused the first idea is stronger than his Joy caused by the second idea, and thus his desire to pursue the illegal deal is stronger than his desire to pursue the series of minor legal deals.

It seems that Spinoza makes exactly the same claim in IVP17:

> A Desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as this concerns contingent things, can be restrained much more easily still by a Desire for things which are present. Dem.: This Proposition is demonstrated in the same way as the preceding one, from P12C. Schol.: With this I believe I have shown the cause why men are moved more by opinion than by true reason, and why the true knowledge of good and evil arouses disturbances of the mind, and often yields to lust of every kind. Hence the verse of the Poet: '… *video meliora, proboque, deteriora sequor*…' […]

We have seen that Spinoza calls something 'contingent' when he knows that it does not exist at the present moment and when he has no reason to think that it will exist or will not exist in the future. It seems, therefore, that Spinoza simply repeats what he said in IVP16, namely that a desire for some future thing (which might or might not exist and) that we know will be conducive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run (if indeed it will exist) can be restrained by desire for a present thing.

Spinoza's explanation of akrasia, then, is this: Sometimes we find ourselves in a situation in which we have to choose between pursuing a present good and pursuing a future good, and we know that the future good is better for us. In such cases we often pursue the present lesser good, instead of the future greater good, because our ideas of present things are stronger than our ideas of future things, Joy caused by our ideas of present things stronger than Joy caused by our ideas of future things, and our desires to pursue present things stronger than our desires to pursue future things.

It might be useful to consider a number of different situations in which we see the better thing and pursue the worse thing. In the following four scenarios we judge that two things are good or bad because we believe that they are conducive or obstructive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run, and we thus judge that we should pursue or avoid them. The value judgements and practical judgements in these scenarios, then, are not made impulsively but after deliberation. The task will be to find out, with the help of the principles of Spinoza's theory, when we act according to our practical judgement and when we do not.

Scenario (1): We judge that, although both thing A and thing B are good considered in themselves, thing A is better than thing B. The situation is such that we cannot pursue thing A and pursue thing B. We therefore judge that we should pursue thing A and not thing B. In this scenario we only pursue thing A and not thing B, and thus act as we judge we should, if our idea of thing A causes more Joy than our idea of thing B. If our idea of thing B causes more Joy than our idea of thing A, then we do not pursue thing A but thing B, and we thus do not act as we judge we should.

Example: The greedy person, who works as a free-lance business consultant, is offered two similar jobs that will both take him a month. The first job pays him $3000 after the work is done, and the second $2500 in advance. He judges that the first job is better given that it will earn him more money, and he therefore judges that he should accept the first job and refuse the second. If his idea of the first job affects him with more Joy than his idea of the second job, then his desire to pursue the first job will be stronger than his desire to pursue the second job, and he will thus act according to his practical judgement. However, if his idea of

the second job affects him with more Joy than his idea of the first job, then his desire to pursue the second job will be stronger, and he will thus act against his practical judgement. It is likely that his idea of gaining $2500 immediately is stronger than his idea of gaining $3000 in a month, because the first idea is an idea of a present thing and the second idea is an idea of a future thing.

Scenario (2): We judge that, although both thing A and thing B are bad considered in themselves, thing A is worse than thing B. The situation is such that we cannot avoid thing A and also avoid thing B. We therefore judge that we should avoid thing A and not thing B. In this scenario we only avoid thing A and not thing B, and thus act as we judge we should, if our idea of thing A causes more Sadness than our idea of thing B. If our idea of thing B causes more Sadness than our idea of thing A, then we do not avoid thing A but thing B, and we thus do not act as we judge we should.

Example: The popular politician has to make a choice between publicly admitting he has an extra-marital affair and quitting his job for 'health reasons'. He judges that both a public scandal and stepping down are harmful to his popularity, but after much reflection he judges that a public scandal would be worse. If his idea of a public scandal affects him with more Sadness than his idea of early retirement then he will desire to avoid public humiliation more strongly than to avoid leaving the public scene, and he will thus act according to his practical judgement. However, if the contrary is the case, then he will stay in office and thus act against his practical judgement. The politician's Sadness caused by his idea of stepping down may be stronger than his Sadness caused by his idea of a public scandal when he considers the scandal to be merely a 'contingent future thing'; that is, when he suspects that the public will not be at all upset by the news of his extra-marital affair.

Scenario (3): We judge that, although thing A is good in itself and thing B is bad in itself, thing A is more of a good than thing B is an evil. The situation is such that we cannot pursue thing A and also avoid thing B. We therefore judge that we should pursue thing A and not avoid thing B. In this scenario we only pursue thing A and do not avoid thing B, and thus act as we judge we should, if our idea of thing A causes more Joy than our idea of thing B causes Sadness. If our idea of thing B causes more Sadness than our idea of thing A causes Joy, then we do not pursue thing A but we avoid thing B, and we thus do not act as we judge we should.

Example: The stoic, who earns his money grinding lenses in his room in the country side, is offered a prestigious professorship. On the one hand he judges that the job of professor is a good thing and thus that he should pursue it, because it allows him to train more

people to become rational citizens than his current job. On the other hand he judges that the job of professor is a bad thing and thus that he should avoid it, because it implies a hectic daily schedule and probably a limitation of his freedom of speech. After much deliberation he judges that the job of professor is more of a good thing than a bad thing, and thus that he should pursue it. If his idea of instructing the younger generation how to be free men affects him with more Joy than his idea of daily disturbances affects him with Sadness, then he will pursue the job, and thus act according to his practical judgement. However, if his idea of the job affects him with more Sadness than Joy, then he will avoid the job, and thus act against his practical judgement.

Scenario (4): We judge that, although thing A is bad in itself and thing B is good in itself, thing A is more of an evil than thing B is a good. The situation is such that we cannot avoid thing A and also pursue thing B. We therefore judge that we should avoid thing A and not pursue thing B. In this scenario we only avoid thing A and do not pursue thing B, and thus act as we judge we should, if our idea of thing A causes more Sadness than our idea of thing B causes Joy. If our idea of thing B causes more Joy than our idea of thing A causes Sadness, then we do not avoid thing A but we pursue thing B, and we thus do not act as we judge we should.

Example: The doctor tells the sensualist that if he will not quit smoking he will die of lung cancer within five years. The sensualist has to choose between avoiding lung cancer and pursuing the pleasures of tobacco. He judges that dying of lung cancer is much more of a bad thing than the pleasure of tobacco is a good thing, and he thus judges that he should avoid premature death rather than pursue this kind of pleasure. If his idea of dying from cancer affects him with more Sadness than his idea of smoking cigarettes affects him with Joy, then he will stop smoking and thus act according to his practical judgement. If is idea of smoking cigarettes affects him with more Joy than his idea of dying prematurely affects him with Sadness, then he will continue smoking and thus act against his practical judgement.

Section 6: Acting intentionally against our rational practical judgement

We have just seen that Spinoza writes in IVP17S: '*With this I believe I have shown the cause why men are moved more by opinion than by true reason, and why the true knowledge of good and evil arouses disturbances of the mind, and often yields to lust of every kind.*' Likewise, he writes in writes in IVP18S: '*With these few words I have explained the causes of man's lack of power and inconstancy* [inconstantia], *and why men do not observe the precepts of reason.*' I finish this chapter by asking the question: When are our value judgements, our practical judgements, our desires and our actions rational and when are they irrational? This question is far more difficult to answer than one would expect given that Spinoza wants to show in the *Ethics* how reason may moderate the passions.

One might argue that our belief that some particular thing will be conducive or obstructive to what we love in the long run (on which our value judgement that this thing is good or bad, and our practical judgement that we should pursue or avoid this thing are based) must be a rational belief. One might argue that if our belief that some particular thing will be conducive or obstructive to what we love in the long run is not a rational belief, then our value judgement (that this thing is good or bad) and our practical judgement (that we should pursue or avoid this thing) are not rational judgements. And if our value judgement and practical judgement are not rational judgements, then our desire (to pursue or avoid this thing) and our action (of pursuit or avoidance) are not rational either.

However, value judgements, practical judgements, desires and actions can never be rational in this strict sense, because we cannot rationally know whether a particular thing will be conducive or obstructive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run. Our ideas of finite things are mental images, and we can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the future. Spinoza writes in IVP62S:

> If we could have adequate knowledge of the duration of things, and determine by reason their times of existing, we would regard future things with the same affect as present ones, and the Mind would want the good it conceived as future just as it wants the good it conceives as present. Hence, it would necessarily neglect a lesser present good for a greater future one, and what would be good in the present, but the cause of some future ill, it would not want at all, as we shall soon demonstrate. But we can have only a quite inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (by IIP31) and we determine their times of existing only by the imagination (by IIP44S), which is not equally affected by the image of a present thing and the image of a future one. That is why the true knowledge of good and evil is only abstract, or universal, and the judgement we make concerning the order of things and the connection of causes, so that we may be able to determine what in the present is good or evil for us, is imaginary,

> rather than real. And so it is no wonder if the Desire that arises from a knowledge of good and evil, insofar as this looks to the future, can be rather easily restrained by a Desire for the pleasures of the moment. On this, see P16.

Our opinion that some particular thing will be conducive or obstructive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run may be well-informed; we may have spent much time deliberating, we may have much experience with this particular kind of thing, we may be very intelligent, and we may have gotten expert advice, but it remains an opinion, nonetheless.

If the general outline of Spinoza's moral theory that I put forward in chapter 6 is correct, then Spinoza holds that something is good or bad for us when it increases or decreases the total amount of Joy in our life. On this interpretation, the task of practical reason is to find out what we need to pursue and what we need to avoid in order to experience as much Joy in our life as possible. It is rational to judge a thing to be good or bad when we believe that it will increase or decrease the total amount of Joy in our life, and it is rational to judge that we should pursue or avoid such a thing. To judge otherwise would be irrational. Our desires and our actions are rational or irrational when they agree or disagree with our rational value judgements and our rational practical judgements. It is rational to pursue something that we believe will increase the total amount of Joy in our life, and to avoid something that we believe will decrease the total amount of Joy in our life. Spinoza writes in IVP65: '*From the guidance of reason, we shall follow the greater of two goods or the lesser of two evils.*' If there are two things that we believe will bring us Joy but the situation is such that we cannot pursue them both, then it is rational to pursue the thing that we believe will increase the total amount of Joy in our life the most. If there are two things that we believe will bring us Sadness but the situation is such that we cannot avoid them both, then it is rational to avoid the thing that we believe will decrease the total amount of Joy in our life the most. To do the opposite would be irrational. Spinoza writes in IVP66: '*From the guidance of reason we want a greater future good in preference to a lesser present one, and a lesser present evil in preference to a greater future one.*' If there is something that we believe will make us joyful soon, and another thing that we believe will make us even more joyful in the distant future, and the situation is such that we cannot pursue them both, then it is rational to pursue the future thing because we believe that it will increase the total amount of Joy in our life the most. If there is something that we believe will make us sad soon, and another thing that we believe will make us even sadder in the distant future, and the situation is such that we cannot avoid them both, then it is rational not to avoid the present thing because we believe

that it will decrease the total amount of Joy in our life the least. To do the opposite would be irrational.

If this explanation of what makes value judgements, practical judgements, desires and actions rational or irrational is correct, then we act irrationally in all the cases in which we act against our practical judgement that we should take a certain course of action because we believe that it will lead to the greatest increase of Joy in our life or to the smallest decrease of Joy in our life[91]. As Spinoza writes under heading 31 of the Appendix to Part IV of the *Ethics*: '[…] *as we are affected with a greater Joy, we pass to a greater perfection, and consequently participate more in the divine nature.*'

[91] It is not quite clear, however, whether reason indeed demands from us that we pursue those things that we believe will increase the total amount of Joy in our life, and that we avoid those things that we believe decrease the total amount of Joy in our life. Spinoza writes in IVP18S that reason demands from us (1) that we love ourselves, (2) that we seek our own advantage, (3) that we seek what is useful to us, (4) that we seek what will lead us to greater perfection, and (5) that we preserve ourselves. One wishes that reason were more specific in its demands. In chapter 6 I have made a case for the argument that the purpose of Spinoza's moral theory is to teach us how to be cheerful.

Conclusion

The final objective of this work has been to interpret why it is, according to Spinoza, that we often act akratically. To conclude this work I shall summarise the most important points of my interpretation of Spinoza's explanation of akratic action:

Our ideas and our emotions form two different kinds of mental states. Some of our ideas are inadequate (i.e., obscure and confused), and others are adequate (i.e., clear and distinct). Whereas the mind is acted on when it has inadequate ideas, it acts when it has adequate ideas.

Our emotions are caused by our ideas. When an emotion is caused by an inadequate idea, then it is called a 'passion' in order to indicate that the mind is acted on when it undergoes such an emotion. The mind is acted on when it undergoes an emotion that is caused by one of its inadequate ideas because the mind is acted on when it has an inadequate idea. When an emotion is caused by an adequate idea, then it is called an 'action' in order to indicate that the mind acts when it produces such an emotion. The mind acts when it has an emotion that is caused by one of its adequate ideas because the mind acts when it has an adequate idea.

Joy, Sadness and Desire are the only primary emotions. All the non-primary emotions are merely one of these primary emotions but given another name. Joy and Sadness are directly caused by our ideas. Some of our ideas cause Joy or Sadness. Desire is only indirectly caused by our ideas because it is directly caused by Joy and Sadness. We only have a desire when our idea of something causes Joy or Sadness, and we always have a desire when our idea of something causes Joy or Sadness.

The strength of an idea determines the strength of the Joy or Sadness that it causes, and the strength of Joy or Sadness determines the strength of the Desire that is causes. The strength of our idea of something diminishes when we have an idea of another thing that excludes the existence of the first thing. This explains why our idea of a future thing is weaker than our idea of a present thing, and thus why Joy or Sadness caused by our idea of a future thing is weaker than Joy or Sadness caused by our idea of a present thing, and thus why our desire concerning a future thing is weaker than our desire concerning a present thing.

Desire is always a desire to act. What action we desire to perform depends on the nature of the thing our idea of which causes Joy or Sadness. The desire to pursue the things

our ideas of which cause Joy and the desire to avoid the things our ideas of which cause Sadness are relevant to Spinoza's explanation of akrasia. We always and only act when we have a desire to act, and we always and only desire to act when our idea of something affects us with Joy or Sadness. The only exception to the rule that we always act on a desire is that we do not act on a desire when we have a stronger conflicting desire; when we have conflicting desires, then we always act on the strongest desire.

When we are in a prudent state of mind, we judge that a particular thing is bad, and thus that we should avoid it, when we believe that it is obstructive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run, even if our idea of it affects us with Joy, and thus even if we desire to pursue it. Likewise, when we are prudent, we judge that a particular thing is good, and thus that we should pursue it, when we believe that it is conducive to obtaining more of what we love in the long run, even if our idea of it affects us with Sadness, and thus even if we desire to avoid it. Whether we are in a prudent state of mind or in an impulsive state of mind, our value judgements and our practical judgements never determine how we feel about things, and thus they never determine how we act.

Sometimes we find ourselves in a situation in which we have to choose between pursuing some present thing that we judge to be a good and pursuing some future thing that we judge to be an even greater good. In such cases we often pursue the present lesser good instead of the future greater good, because our idea of the present thing is stronger than our idea of the future thing, and thus our idea of the present thing causes a greater Joy than our idea of the future thing, and thus our desire to pursue the present thing is stronger than our desire to pursue the future thing. In such situations, then, even though we see what is better for ourselves, we are still forced to pursue the worse.

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