

**Social Innovation as Habit Change:
From Individuals to Market Systems**

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La doyenne
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Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic and its responses have exacerbated the unfairness and unsustainability of consumption and production systems worldwide. They have also highlighted the urgency of transforming such systems beyond a narrow focus on technological innovations. However, dominant ways of thinking have curtailed the development of theoretical and practical alternatives and hampered efforts to address complex societal problems on a planetary scale. In response, this theoretical dissertation offers an integrative systemic account of social innovation in consumption and production systems. The dissertation makes three main contributions of relevance to sustainable development. First, it introduces integrative systemics as an alternative to the paradigm wars' disjunctive and reductionist approaches and elaborates its philosophical foundations. Second, it offers new conceptual foundations for studying consumption and production systems, transcending the opposition between behavioral science and practice theories. Third, as an alternative to reductionist and market-centric approaches to social change, it develops a novel model of social innovation as habit change. The dissertation thereby contributes to rethinking consumption and production systems and social innovation interventions with the aim of advancing sustainable development.

Keywords: Social Innovation, Consumption, Production, Sustainable Development

Résumé

La pandémie de COVID-19 et ses réponses ont exacerbé l'iniquité et la non-durabilité des systèmes de consommation et de production dans le monde. Elles ont également souligné l'urgence de transformer ces systèmes au-delà d'une focalisation étroite sur les innovations technologiques. Cependant, les modes de pensée dominants ont freiné le développement d'alternatives théoriques et pratiques et ont entravé les efforts visant à résoudre les problèmes sociétaux complexes à l'échelle planétaire. En réponse, cette thèse théorique propose un compte-rendu systémique intégratif de l'innovation sociale dans les systèmes de consommation et de production. La thèse apporte trois contributions principales pertinentes pour le développement durable. Premièrement, elle présente la systémique intégrative comme une alternative aux approches disjonctives et réductionnistes de la guerre des paradigmes et élabore ses fondements philosophiques. Deuxièmement, elle offre de nouvelles bases conceptuelles pour l'étude des systèmes de consommation et de production, transcendant l'opposition entre les sciences du comportement et les théories de la pratique. Troisièmement, comme alternative aux approches réductionnistes et centrées sur le marché du changement social, elle développe un nouveau modèle d'innovation sociale en tant que changement d'habitude. La thèse contribue ainsi à repenser les systèmes de consommation et de production et les interventions d'innovation sociale dans le but de faire progresser le développement durable.

Mots clés : Innovation sociale, Consommation, Production, Développement durable

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments.....	v
Abstract.....	vii
Résumé.....	ix
Table of Contents.....	xi
List of Tables.....	xv
List of Figures.....	xvii
Chapter 1. Introduction.....	1
Background and Rationale.....	2
Objectives and Approach.....	10
Key Contributions.....	13
Structure of the Dissertation.....	14
Chapter 2. Integrative Systemics.....	17
Semantic and Logical Assumptions.....	21
Modes of Reality.....	21
Meaning.....	24
Truth.....	27
Reasoning.....	30
Ontological Assumptions.....	32
Events and Processes.....	32
Multilevel Systems.....	33
Patterns and Causality.....	35
Epistemological Assumptions.....	38
Realism and the Scientific Method.....	38

Knowledge as Construction	40
Transdisciplinarity and the Unity of Knowledge.....	42
Ethical Assumptions	48
Research Ethics	48
Planetary Humanism.....	51
Conclusion	54
Chapter 3. Consumption and Production: An Integrative Systemic Account	57
A Multilevel Account of Consumption and Production Systems.....	60
A Dispositional Account of Behavior and Habit	71
A Behavioral Account of Practices.....	78
A Practice Account of Resources	85
Conclusion	91
Chapter 4. Social Innovation in Consumption and Production Systems	95
Structure.....	99
Social.....	100
Political	103
Economic	105
Cultural	108
Processes.....	110
Non-Agential and Agential Processes	110
Simulation, Perception, Enaction, and Control.....	113
Environment.....	117
Societal.....	119
Produced	120
Ecological	122

Codified.....	124
Components	127
Social Economy	128
Public Sector	129
Elements of the Population	132
Capitalist Private Sector.....	133
Conclusion	136
Chapter 5. Discussion	137
Theoretical Contributions	137
Integrative Systemics	137
Consumption and Production Systems	145
Social Innovation in Consumption and Production Systems.....	150
Implications for Policy and Practice	156
Limitations and Future Research Opportunities	163
Concluding Remarks.....	168
References.....	171

List of Tables

Table 3.1. Multiple Interpretations of Consumption and Production	70
Table 3.2. Major Divisions of ICATUS 2016.....	84
Table 3.3. A Typology of Resources in the SNA 2008	90

List of Figures

Figure 4.1. The SPEC of Consumption and Production Systems.....	98
Figure 4.2. The SPEC of System Structure.....	100
Figure 4.3. The SPEC of Agential Processes.....	114
Figure 4.4. The SPEC of the Environment	119
Figure 4.5. The SPEC of System Components	128

Chapter 1.

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic and its responses have exacerbated the unfairness and unsustainability of consumption and production systems worldwide (Ashford et al., 2020). They have also highlighted the urgency of transforming such systems. The priority of changing consumption and production patterns has been on the global policy agenda for nearly three decades. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development recognized the need to reduce and eliminate unsustainable production and consumption (United Nations General Assembly, 1992). Rio+20 adopted a ten-year framework of programs on sustainable consumption and production patterns (United Nations, 2012). Since 2015, sustainable consumption and production patterns represent Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 12 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations General Assembly, 2015). Despite the explicit global commitments, even before the COVID-19 pandemic, lack of progress across the SDGs had led to calls for urgent transformation “away from patterns of economic growth, production and consumption that perpetuate deprivations, generate inequalities, deplete the global environmental commons and threaten irreversible damage” (Independent Group of Scientists appointed by the Secretary-General, 2019, p. xxiv). Naidoo and Fisher (2020) estimate that about two-thirds of SDG targets are under threat because of the pandemic, including targets that could help lessen the likelihood and impact of global pandemics.

It has become evident that a narrow focus on technological innovations that ignores the broader societal and planetary dimensions is counterproductive (Varey, 2010). Instead, scholars, practitioners, and policymakers have increasingly looked toward the idea of social innovation for realizing the SDGs (van der Have & Rubalcaba, 2016). While there is a broad consensus that social innovation addresses social problems, there are divergent views on

conceptualizing it beyond the idea that it offers an alternative to technological innovations (Godin, 2015). Researchers have associated the notion of social innovation with changes of varying scope and degree, from micro-social innovations to social reforms and societal transformations (Moulaert, MacCallum, & Hillier, 2013; Moulaert et al., 2017). According to a review of 136 case studies, social innovation has received considerable interest in developing and developed countries to promote good health and wellbeing, partnerships for the goals, and decent work and economic growth (Eichler & Schwarz, 2019). Meanwhile, it has received less attention for the promotion of sustainable consumption and production. The potential of marketing and consumer research to contribute to social innovations for sustainable development remains unfulfilled, notably due to the disjunctive, reductionist, and market-centric approaches prevalent in the field (Moorman et al., 2019; Peracchio et al., 2014; Tadjewski et al., 2014). The current work seeks to contribute to the development of alternatives.

Background and Rationale

Historically, marketing practice is closely associated with globalization and anthropogenic environmental change. Scholars have traced the origin of globalization within human history alternatively to the Bronze Age, the systematic European colonization of the Americas starting in 1492, the industrial revolution, the end of World War II, the rise of multinational corporations, the ascendancy of neoliberalism, or the end of the Cold War (Pieterse, 2016). The earlier periods offer potential dates for the start of the Anthropocene, the human-dominated geological period (Lewis & Maslin, 2015). The last three are correlates of the Great Acceleration, featuring “holistic, comprehensive and interlinked . . . changes simultaneously sweeping across the socio-economic and biophysical spheres of the Earth System, encompassing far more than climate change” (Steffen et al., 2015, p. 82). From the

Bronze Age to the post-Cold War era, the periods correlate with the spread of marketing practice (Barjamovic et al., 2019; Eckhardt & Bengtsson, 2010; Hollander et al., 2005; Twede, 2002). Dholakia and Firat (1998, pp. 103, 108) interpret the most recent version of globalization “in terms of *marketization* and, of course, along with it, of the market ideology of the west or America,” with “the market [becoming] the sole locus of legitimation, thereby forcing the marketization of everything.”

In such a context, marketing and consumer researchers should “present humanity with insightful and feasible alternative ways of living, being, and organizing life that have the potential of relieving humanity from the many ills it faces today” (Firat & Dholakia, 2017a, p. 209). However, contributing to such alternatives will require significant changes in the field’s philosophical and conceptual foundations (MacInnis et al., 2020; Moorman et al., 2019; Peracchio et al., 2014). There is a growing recognition that marketing, “through its market-driven consumption-oriented practices, may have knowingly or unknowingly promoted these unsustainable production-consumption practices” (Sheth & Parvatiyar, 2021, p. 1). Yet, marketing and consumer researchers often ignore systemic issues and assume that expanding markets and rising consumption levels offer win-win solutions to all stakeholders. They act as missionaries for the marketing concept, thus becoming apologists for an unjustifiable status quo (Tadajewski et al., 2014). As a result, scholars outside the field typically find it “noncritical, excessively micro, and compromised by corporate ideologies” (Dholakia, 2012a, p. 221). In challenging dominant ways of thinking, we must contend with an entrepreneurial-neoliberal academic model that venerates productivity, efficiency, competitiveness, narcissistic parochialism, and proselytizing for corporate interests, thus presenting “disconcerting threats to hallowed values such as academic freedom, critical inquiry, and intellectual diversity” (Thompson, 2017a, p. 9). Accordingly, we must recognize that systemic realities hamper the

ability to sustain alternative cooperative and collaborative models and part with the disjunctive and reductionist thinking that has pervaded the field.

The history of marketing and consumer research is a history of paradigm struggle. Differences in underlying assumptions have led to the erection of boundaries between ever-growing numbers of disciplines, subdisciplines, paradigms, and knowledge communities. Political economy separated from moral philosophy in the eighteenth century (Bryson, 1932). In response to the critique of political economy, neoclassical economics emerged as a self-proclaimed science (Marx, 1867/1990; Marshall & Marshall, 1879). The “conceptual constant throughout the history of neoclassical theory since the 1870s,” according to its foremost historian, “has been slavish attempts to slake its physics envy through gorging on half-digested imitations of physical models” (Mirowski, 2013, p. 24). Blasphemers who rejected the neoclassical orthodoxy within economics eventually coalesced under the big tent of heterodox economics (Lee, 2012). Others left economics, with some joining or creating other disciplines. As marketing seceded from economics, Alderson and Cox (1948) stressed that a specialized marketing theory would no longer be necessary if economics became more realistic than its neoclassical mainstream. Instead, marketing theory mimicked neoclassical economics. Three decades later, “marketing thought [was] still profoundly dominated by the perspective of the neoclassical paradigm” (Arndt, 1981, p. 45). Consumer research, the “child of Marketing and an unknown father,” emerged partly as an interdisciplinary escape from the neoclassical paradigm (Belk, 1986, p. 423; Frank, 1974). However, the paradigm continued to haunt consumer research, eventually relegating its status from an interdisciplinary field aspiring for transdisciplinarity to a multidisciplinary subfield of marketing (MacInnis & Folkes, 2010). With the American and Israeli military as leading incubators, the neoclassical emulations of energy in physics have led to the reification of utility independent of experiencers, information independent of interpreters, and thinking processes independent of thinkers (Mirowski, 1999;

Mirowski & Nik-Khah, 2017). Such reifications enable scholars to develop utility functions, information-processing models, and dual-process theories. According to Layton (2016, pp. 2–3), the “danger now is that the field of marketing will fragment into a number of increasingly separate sub-fields, each responding to a narrowly defined range of interests.” On a more hopeful note, the field “will be stronger when we unite to solve [its] most pressing questions and problems” (MacInnis et al., 2020; Moorman et al., 2019, p. 1).

Despite the field’s fragmentation, its theories and models significantly influence decision-makers in policy and practice. Such influence has grown with the consumerization of human beings and the marketization of everyday life (Dholakia, 2014). The COVID-19 pandemic has made understanding behaviors and practices and how to change them more urgent. The advent of the behavioral turn in public policy, whereby policy focus shifted from market systems to market subjects, had already led policymakers to seek the advice of experts on such matters (Berndt, 2015; Datta & Mullainathan, 2014). The behavioral turn promotes social engineering and an experimental approach to policy, notably using randomized control trials (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2012; Reddy, 2012). It universalizes ideas originating in countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, with little attention to asymmetric power relations, social differences, culture, and history (Berndt & Boeckler, 2017). Initially envisaged to inform private practice in developing countries, the market-centric behavioral approach has become mainstream for public policy in developed countries.

Among the terms that have gained prominence in public discourse are social innovation, social marketing, and behavioral economics. The United Kingdom has led the adoption and diffusion of the three terms in policy processes, as illustrated in the stories of three British civil servants: Geoff Mulgan (social innovation), Jeff French (social marketing), and David Halpern (behavioral economics). In 2011, Mulgan, who had previously led the Young Foundation, a social innovation institute, became Chief Executive of the National Endowment for Science,

Technology and the Arts, a non-departmental public body; under his leadership, it moved out of the public sector to become Nesta, a charity. French led the National Social Marketing Centre (NSMC), a non-departmental public body, from its inception in 2006 to 2009, when he became CEO of Strategic Social Marketing Ltd; the NSMC became a community interest company in 2011. Halpern has led the Behavioral Insights Team, also known as the Nudge Unit, since its inception as part of the Cabinet Office in 2010; the unit became a limited company in 2014, with its employees, Nesta, and the government each owning a third of the new company.

The blurring boundaries between scholarship, policy, and practice and between the public and private sectors have facilitated diffusing such terms across the political spectrum. For example, in the United Kingdom, the Labor-led government set up the National Social Marketing Centre in 2006 to apply social marketing insights to public policy. When it took power in 2010, the Conservative party, which had previously criticized social marketing as paternalistic, established the Behavioral Insights Team to apply behavioral economics, ironically under the inspiration of a leading advocate for libertarian paternalism (Moor, 2011; Thaler, 2012). Proponents of libertarian paternalism claim that it “preserves freedom of choice but . . . encourages both private and public institutions to steer people in directions that will promote their own welfare” (Sunstein & Thaler, 2003, p. 1201). As with other forms of paternalism, however, it is not clear “[w]ho defines what is ‘best’ and who determines whether the best is being applied” (Standing, 2000, p. 761fn723). The popularity of libertarian paternalism is partly grounded in the proclaimed empirical evidence for widespread irrationality among humans, although such evidence has been contested (Gigerenzer, 2015).

Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, ‘get the behaviors right’ had become the watchword for policymakers, practitioners, and the public. It came on the heels of disappointing predecessors such as ‘get the prices right,’ ‘get the property rights right,’ and

‘get the institutions right’ (Williamson, 1994). There are good reasons to welcome the change. It may be a sign of increasing realism and attention to the human dimension of the economy (Warde, 2017). It may also be a prelude to ‘get the economic activities right,’ which historians of economic policy have identified as key for successful development (Jomo & Reinert, 2005). Cynics may warn, however, that it risks enabling purported apologists of unbridled capitalism to add an adjective such as ‘social,’ ‘behavioral,’ ‘transformative,’ or ‘sustainable’ to their disciplinary label and rebrand themselves as unsung defenders of the downtrodden, a situation “akin to putting Attila the Hun in charge of the Ministry of Roman Reconstruction” (Reinert, 2011, p. 158).

Indeed, social innovation, social marketing, and behavioral economics are often closely associated with neoliberalism. Social innovation, the introduction of change in “societal and individual behaviour patterns,” is increasingly evoked in the context of the neoliberal restructuring of market relations (André et al., 2016; Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), 2015, p. 30). Social marketing, a “planned approach to social innovation,” “flourishes in political regimes animated by neoliberalism” (Lefebvre, 2012, p. 120; Moor, 2011, p. 315). Behavioral economics, in its neoclassical bent, “intensifies processes of neoliberalization” by “using the state to manage and regulate” populations so that they “more effectively and efficiently conform to market logics and processes” (McMahon, 2014, p. 2). Its underlying libertarian paternalism “continues to support the market-based orthodoxies of neoliberal government” (Pykett et al., 2018, p. 5). According to Thaler (2018, p. 1283), “the idea is to help people make the choice they would select if they were fully informed and . . . unaffected by arousal or temptation.” In other words, the goal is to maintain the market logic of consumer choice while nudging choices in the direction of a cold, calculating ‘rationality’ devoid of any moral sentiments (Hirschman, 1993; Smith, 1790).

In contrast with their current association with neoliberalism, social innovation, social marketing, and behavioral economics have social(ist) origins. Social innovation, in its original sense, is social(ist) transformation. The 1858 book *Social Innovators and their Schemes* had unsympathetic chapters on Saint-Simon, Fourier, Louis Blanc, Proudhon, Emile de Girardin, and the French Revolution of 1848 (Sargant, 1858). Philip Kotler, who coined ‘social marketing,’ is an avowed “life-long socialist and proud of it” (as cited in Brown, 2002, p. 131). Noting that “some of the countries with the happiest people live in countries with Democratic Socialism as the dominant economic model,” Kotler (2015, paras. 6, 8) has highlighted that “[s]ocialists have been early in advancing many of the programs that most Americans now value,” listing twenty such social innovations. As Kotler put it: “[w]e put the word ‘social’ in front of marketing to suggest that not all marketing can be criticized” (Dibb & Carrigan, 2013, p. 1379). However, adding ‘social’ to marketing also meant adding ‘marketing’ to the social. Behavioral economics originally simply meant social economics. The change in terminology from ‘social’ to ‘behavioral’ was for political reasons. Writing for the Ford Foundation in January 1950, Donald G. Marquis expressed concern over the “fairly common confusion of social science with ‘social reform’ or even ‘socialism,’” advocating instead the use of the term ‘behavioral sciences’ (as cited in Pooley, 2016, p. 52). In such a context, John M. Clark, author of the *Preface to Social Economics*, became a “pioneer in the development of a behavioral economics” (Clark, 1936; Hession et al., 1956, p. v).

Transforming the meaning of dissident concepts is characteristic of neoliberal ideology, which produces “systematic inversions: taking concepts and ideas that originated in subversive, even revolutionary rhetoric and transforming it into ways of presenting capitalism itself as subversive and revolutionary” (Graeber, 2011, p. 490). Neoliberalism takes market exchange as the site of verification-falsification for government practice (Foucault, 2004). Central to it are the consumerization of human beings, “the fragmentation of sociality and subjectivity into

communities and identities, the emphasis upon creating active individuals who . . . take responsibility . . . through the exercise of choice, and the organization of socio-political concerns around . . . lifestyles of contentment and consumption” (Rose, 2000, p. 337). With consumerization, culture increasingly becomes consumer culture (Ritzer & Slater, 2001).

Marketing and consumer researchers have also engaged in conceptual inversion. They have adapted approaches developed for market expansion and used them for non-market purposes. Thus, social marketing “seeks to develop and integrate marketing concepts with other approaches to influence behaviors that benefit individuals and communities for the greater social good” (International Social Marketing Association et al., 2013, p. 1; Kotler & Zaltman, 1971). Transformative consumer research “strive[s] to respect, uphold, and improve life in relation to the myriad conditions, demands, potentialities, and effects of consumption” (Mick, 2006). Transformative service research “focuses on improving consumer and societal welfare through service” (Rosenbaum et al., 2011, p. 3). Critical transformative market research seeks to improve the wellbeing of “the full range of market actors, including researchers as well as social and environmental systems” (Tadajewski et al., 2014, p. 1738). Furthermore, consumer culture strategy aims to “impact important social and environmental problems” (Holt, 2017, p. 216).

A fundamental problem with such approaches is that, even when critical, they keep markets and consumers as their main conceptual objects. They thus fail to challenge “the hegemony of the neoliberal capitalocentric discourse that stands as an effective barrier to the widespread mobilization of an economic counterpolitics” (Gibson-Graham, 2006, p. 212n217). Less critical versions involve identifying “‘marketing-like’ problems that could be fruitfully addressed with marketing language and concepts” (Kotler, 2005, p. 114). They broaden the concepts of marketing and consumption to encompass anything resembling the original referents, with science becoming the marketing of ideas (Dholakia et al., 2020; Kotler, 2005;

Kotler & Levy, 1969; Peter & Olson, 1983). If marketing is everything, then resistance is futile. Consequently, market-centric approaches may have unintended adverse effects on the populations they intend to support.

The marketization of society has contributed to raising the profile of marketing and consumer research. However, it does not imply that researchers in the field must promote neoliberal ideology and policy. The field has a critical tradition that the current work seeks to contribute to, including many of the aforementioned social change approaches (Earley, 2015; Maclaran et al., 2007; Tadajewski, 2010). Critical scholars recognize that defining market-centric approaches as benefiting individuals, groups, society, humanity, and ecosystems without any distributional considerations is akin to false advertising. Experience has demonstrated that neoliberal policies favoring low inflation and fiscal restraint, the male breadwinner model, private market forms of provisioning, the individualization of risk, and creditors' interests carry inequality-exacerbating biases (Elson & Cagatay, 2000; Young et al., 2011). Moore (2017, pp. 596–597) warns that the concept of the Anthropocene may serve neoliberalism if all humans are blamed equally for environmental problems, thus concealing the underlying “[i]nequality, commodification, imperialism, patriarchy, [and] racism.” He proposes the concept of the Capitalocene instead. As these discussions suggest, given the intertwinement of ideology, scholarship, policy, and practice, there is a need for marketing and consumer research to change at the philosophical, conceptual, and intervention levels.

Objectives and Approach

When constructing research questions, two main strategies present themselves to researchers (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011). The first is gap spotting, or more precisely, gap construction, whereby researchers position their contribution as filling a gap in the literature. It is the road more traveled. The alternative is problematization, whereby researchers challenge

the assumptions of the literature. It involves identifying a domain of literature, articulating and evaluating its presuppositions, and developing and evaluating alternatives while considering possible audience responses. Engaging in such research is risky: gap construction is the norm and is easier, safer, uncontroversial, legitimizing, relatable, and more publishable in journals, particularly the most cited (Sandberg & Alvesson, 2011).

The current work is an exercise in assumption-challenging research. The main research question is: How should we conceptualize social innovation in consumption and production systems? The question bears on social technology, the application of social science to intervene in society (Derksen & Wierenga, 2013). Unlike the rival concept of social engineering, social technology takes ethics seriously and rejects the view of society as a machine for social engineers to control. Hence, marketing practice is a social technology (Zwick et al., 2008). So are social innovation initiatives, including those informed by social marketing. Because of the prevalence of market-centric and reductionist approaches, a novel model of social innovation is necessary for marketing and consumer research. However, how we think about changing consumption and production systems depends on our philosophical assumptions and our understandings of consumption and production. Therefore, addressing the primary research question necessitates investigating two additional research questions. One question pertains to the philosophy of science of marketing and consumer research: What philosophy of science assumptions should we adopt? The field's paradigm wars have featured disjunctive and reductionist thinking, according to which the presuppositions of one side were necessarily incompatible with those of the other. An alternative to prevailing dualisms would need a meta-point of view of marketing and consumer research's ideas and values that avoids becoming a closed and authoritative metanarrative (Lewis & Kelemen, 2002; Morin, 1991/2008). The other question concerns the conceptual foundations of marketing and consumer research: How should we conceptualize consumption and production systems? Researchers in the field have

built and used an increasingly complex conceptual and terminological repertoire, explaining consumption in such terms as journeys and experiences, habits and habitus, behaviors and practices, and resources of all kinds. However, the growth of the repertoire has also brought confusion, making conceptual elucidation necessary across research traditions (Tähtinen & Havila, 2019).

The three research questions require a conceptual research approach rather than an empirical one. According to Russel W. Belk, “the conceptual form allows greater expansiveness and a greater interdisciplinary span of literature” (Belk et al., 2019, p. 2). Conceptual articles, however, have become an endangered species in the field. Their share in the *Journal of Marketing*, *Journal of Consumer Research*, and *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science* dropped from 21 percent in 1978–1982 to 7 percent in 2003–2007 (Yadav, 2010). Moreover, there is “little taste among the top-tier journals for thoughtful, rigorous conceptual articles that suggest new research directions” (Reibstein et al., 2009, p. 3).

Fortunately, journal editors have become increasingly vocal about the need for more conceptual research in the field, highlighting how the academic publishing system actively discourages them, particularly for doctoral researchers. For example, in an editorial of the *AMS Review*, Vargo and Koskela-Huotari (2020, p. 1) warn that:

Doctoral students are often not taught conceptual writing . . . Conceptual articles . . . are perceived to be more difficult/riskier to write. Editors are often hesitant to publish conceptual articles, especially those that challenge institutionalized thought, either for the fear of jeopardizing their journal’s reputation, or lack of comfort evaluating conceptual articles. Both editors and reviewers are often less comfortable reviewing conceptual-only manuscripts . . . [Moreover, many believe that] conceptual articles are not adequately practical.

In an editorial of the *Journal of Marketing*, Moorman et al. (2019, p. 1) link the paucity of assumption-challenging conceptual research to systemic factors influencing the development of scholarly careers:

Institutional and individual rewards are tilted toward incremental research that safely builds programmatic streams for tenure while a risk-averse journal

review process can easily stamp out innovation. Given these forces, many early-career marketing scholars operate within the safe boundaries of the discipline while pledging to return to innovative opportunities in the later stages of their careers. Unfortunately, most never do.

Among the factors they identify as impeding innovative thinking are the field's fragmentation into self-referential silos in which people interact only with like-minded others who will confirm their preconceptions rather than challenge them, misconceptions about theory and rigor, and privileging narrow specialization over breadth and cross-fertilization.

In an editorial of the *Journal of Consumer Research*, Peracchio et al. (2014, p. vi) forcefully call for integrative research:

While we might break the pieces down for individual study, a full and fully useful understanding will elude us until we (re)assemble our piecemeal knowledge into the whole. Hence, an integrative understanding of consumers is the next great challenge for our field . . . [T]he problem is not theory but is, rather, the occasional kinds of theoretical accounts that are too fussy or too small to matter except as intellectual curiosities. Rather, we would like to see our field assembling its hard-fought knowledge together.

Conceptual-only research thus poses multiple challenges for writers, editors, reviewers, and readers. As a result, doctoral researchers are typically encouraged to avoid it. Nevertheless, the current work does not shy away from it.

Key Contributions

The current work makes several contributions to marketing and consumer research that Chapter 5 details. They fall under three headings. First, the work offers integrative systemics, a set of philosophical assumptions in the lineage of the Radical Enlightenment. It thus provides an alternative to the assumptions dominating the paradigm wars, whether associated with the Conservative Enlightenment or the Counter-Enlightenment. Second, it transcends the opposition between behavioral and practice theories to elucidate the concepts of consumption, production, consumption and production systems, habit(u)s, behavior, practices, resources. Third, it introduces a novel model of social innovation in consumption and production systems,

avoiding the pitfalls of prevalent market-centric and reductionist approaches, and illustrates it with international examples related to sustainable development.

Structure of the Dissertation

Chapter 2 offers integrative systemics as a novel way of thinking for marketing and consumer research. Integrative systemics reconciles a single reality with multiple realities, semantic meaning with pragmatic meaning, and single truth with multiple truths while recognizing the need for deductive, inductive, abductive, and analogical reasoning. It combines a multilevel, systemic, process-relational ontology, a realist constructivist epistemology, and a planetary humanist ethic. It thus offers researchers who seek to address the grand challenges that humanity and the planet face assumptions aligned with such aspirations. The chapter dares to walk through the minefield of the paradigm wars to stimulate a constructive dialogical inquiry into the field's philosophy of science assumptions. Chapter 3 provides an integrative systemic account of consumption and production as a corrective to prioritizing either side or using the terms in an unreflective market-centric manner. It contributes to the theoretical reconciliation of consumption and production by suggesting multiple interpretations of the concepts at different levels. Moreover, against the tendency to consider practice theories as incompatible with behavioral science and macro-level analyses, it offers a dispositional account of behavior and habit, a behavioral account of practices, and a practice account of resources. Chapter 4 provides a novel model of social innovation to guide the design, implementation, analysis, monitoring, and evaluation of social innovations in consumption and production systems. As an alternative to prevailing market-centric approaches, the model draws on a rights-based approach. Instead of focusing on contexts in the Global North, it uses examples from around the world relevant to sustainable development. Finally, Chapter 5

discusses the dissertation's theoretical contributions and practical implications. It also identifies limitations and future research opportunities.

Chapter 2.

Integrative Systemics

What philosophy of science assumptions should we adopt? The current chapter offers integrative systemics as a novel way of thinking for marketing and consumer research, specifying its semantic, logical, ontological, epistemological, and ethical assumptions. Every research project has philosophical presuppositions, whether tacit or explicit, that together reflect a worldview, way of thinking, or paradigm (Hunt & Hansen, 2010; Tadajewski, 2014). Since the paradigm wars, marketing and consumer researchers have typically framed paradigm differences in binary terms as mutually exclusive opposites: quantitative or qualitative, positivistic or humanistic, Cartesian or existential-phenomenological, modernist or postmodernist, Enlightenment or counter-Enlightenment (Brown, 2006; Deshpandé, 1983; Firat & Venkatesh, 1995; Hirschman, 1986; Thompson et al., 1989). In the aftermath of the paradigm wars, the field seems to have moved from conflict to cohabitation concerning philosophical assumptions. During the conflict phase, “a deep, seemingly irrevocable ideological divide separated different paradigmatic camps,” each holding on to its “allegorical tales of good versus evil” (Thompson et al., 1997, p. 147). With the advent of the cohabitation phase, “we now offer platitudes about the value of diversity and breathless endorsements of pluralistic research” (ibid.). The conflict phase, it would seem, featured one side brandishing “nebulous epithets . . . all more obfuscating than clarifying” that “invoke[d] overly coarse and increasingly irrelevant contrasts to a presumed dominant . . . paradigm” (Arnould & Thompson, 2005, p. 868). But, as the story goes, there was “no such paradigm,” and much of the conflict phase involved a series of unfortunate “*misconceptions, misunderstandings, misrepresentations, and mischaracterizations*” (Hunt, 1991, pp. 32, 40).

There is a growing realization, however, that “the field needs to pull off its blinders and uncover new ways of thinking” instead of “relying on mainstream assumptions” (Moorman et al., 2019, p. 2). The reification of paradigms has let researchers down. If paradigms have their basis in sets of assumptions, then changing some postulates may necessitate other changes to ensure the coherence of the conceptual system, but not necessarily the rejection of all the other previously adopted postulates. Moreover, different postulates do not necessarily imply an ‘either/or’ choice: ‘neither’ and ‘both/and’ are also possibilities (Bode & Østergaard, 2013). Approaches presenting a third way have gained traction, notably critical realism and complexity thinking (Askegaard & Linnet, 2011; Brunel, 2015; Easton, 2002, 2010; Peters et al., 2013; Pomiès & Tissier-Desbordes, 2016; Thomas, 2018). Instead of a binary opposition between paradigms, a more fruitful distinction would be between three sets of paradigmatic assumptions that fall broadly in the lineage of three traditions: the Radical Enlightenment, the Conservative Enlightenment, and the Counter-Enlightenment. Historians of thought have given meticulous attention to the content of each of the three traditions. Because our focus is on marketing and consumer research, only a cursory overview is possible here. The Radical Enlightenment promoted universal and equal rights, democracy, and secularism. The Conservative Enlightenment sought to reconcile philosophical-scientific advances with established political, socio-economic, and cultural orders. The Counter-Enlightenment opposed the other two while lumping them together as *the* Enlightenment (Ducheyne, 2017; Israel, 2019). The tradition of the Conservative Enlightenment has a “tendency to dehumanize, to subjugate human desires and impulses to the all-powerful needs of a system, which is itself a creature of human reason” (Blom, 2010, p. 316). It treats people as “nothing but bodies, animals, even machines,” and as such consists in a sub-humanizing form of what Huxley (1947, p. 29) calls ‘nothing-but’ thinking. ‘Nothing-but’ thinking refers to disjunctive and reductionist thinking that construes interdependent elements as separate and reduces multilevel systems to

a single level (Bunge, 2003/2014; Morin, 2008). In the words of Morin (2000), such thinking favors the fragmentation and compartmentalization of knowledge, breaks complex unity into disjointed fragments, isolates problems, separates the conjoined, and flattens the multidimensional into a single dimension. Humanist opposition to ‘nothing-but’ thinking has contributed to rehumanizing marketing and consumer research in the lineage of the Radical Enlightenment, grounded in “a new morality out of this world without enchantment and without ‘ghostly guidance’ from beyond” (Blom, 2010, p. 152). However, some forms of opposition to the sub-humanizing form of ‘nothing-but’ thinking have engendered excesses in the opposite direction. In the tradition of the Counter-Enlightenment, the super-naturalizing form of ‘nothing-but’ thinking seeks to “reenchant the world” by “transpos[ing] theological ideas into a secular vocabulary” (Blom, 2010, pp. 202, 212). The second form of ‘nothing-but’ thinking has led to denying reason, science, explanation, impartiality, generalization, causality, truth, and objective reality while wrongly confining them to positivism (Hunt & Hansen, 2010).

The current chapter proposes integrative systemics as an alternative to the dominant ‘nothing-but’ thinking in its sub-humanizing and super-naturalizing forms. The development of integrative systemics draws on an eclectic approach, in the sense of taking “the most useful concepts, insights, and methods [...], weaving them together into a new narrative” (Diderot, 1751; Peracchio et al., 2014, p. vi). The chapter presents the semantic, logical, ontological, epistemological, and ethical assumptions of integrative systemics. Integrative systemics is consistent with the systemic approach that Alderson (1965/2006) upheld for marketing and with the ideal of “integrative analysis across disciplines” that Frank (1974, p. iv) formulated in the inaugural editorial of the *Journal of Consumer Research*.¹ It offers marketing and consumer researchers a meta-point of view of the field’s prevailing ideas and values, without

¹ The term ‘integrative systemics’ differentiates the approach from non-systemic approaches and from reductionist systemics. It is unrelated to ‘integrative systemic therapy,’ for which ‘systemic’ is about client systems and ‘integrative’ is about moving beyond single therapy models (Russell & Breunlin, 2019).

claiming to provide a closed and authoritative metanarrative to impose on others (Lewis & Kelemen, 2002; Morin, 1991/2008). Integrative systemics notably draws inspiration from the first two laureates of the Ludwig von Bertalanffy Award in Complexity Thinking: Edgar Morin and Mario Bunge. Morin refers to his approach as complex thinking or complex thought, whereas Bunge eventually names his scientific materialism (Bunge, 1974–1989; Morin, 1977–2004). The aim here is not to synthesize their views, which often diverge, but to develop a novel way of thinking informed by their contributions. Complexity thinking is not a unified school, and it is not alone in providing a third way to the dualisms of the paradigm debates. In *Metatheory for the Twenty-First Century*, Hedlund et al. (2016, p. 7) recognize Morin’s complex thought among the “‘heavyweight’ integrative metatheories of our time” alongside critical realism and integral theory, yet Bhaskar (2016) acknowledges the contributors’ limited engagement with it. Although the volume fails to mention Bunge, Bunge’s critical realism preceded Bhaskar’s, informed it, and compares favorably (Bhaskar, 1975/2008, 1993/2008; Bunge, 1973; Kaidesoja, 2009).

Integrative systemics offers a way forward for marketing and consumer researchers who seek to go beyond the ‘nothing-but’ thinking that has dominated the field. It responds to a concrete need: “we need to explicitly recognize the frame of reference we are working in and the metatheoretical assumptions embodied in it. Then we need to make sure it is the perspective we want to adopt!” (Peter et al., 1982/2011, p. 16). Because assumptions from different traditions can coexist in the same person or text, the current chapter refrains from classifying authors or works under broader labels such as positivism and interpretivism and instead focuses on the assumptions. It invites readers to reflect on their preconceptions, make them more explicit, and discuss them constructively.

Semantic and Logical Assumptions

The present section introduces the semantic and logical assumptions of integrative systemics. Semantics deals with meaning and truth, while logic deals with valid reasoning. The section elucidates the concepts of modes of reality, meaning, truth, and reasoning, all central to the paradigm wars, by addressing the relations between objects, signs, and interpretants (Christensen & Askegaard, 2001; Grayson, 2018; Mick, 1986). In doing so, it clarifies how the integrative systemic understanding of each concept compares with previous conceptualizations.

Modes of Reality

The paradigm wars offered scholars the choice between denying objective reality and denying (inter)subjective realities (Firat & Venkatesh, 1995; Hirschman, 1986; Hudson & Ozanne, 1988). Both choices have consequences. Denying objective reality fosters disinformation, deceptions, delusions, fake news, alternative facts, and impunity (McIntyre, 2018). Denying (inter)subjective realities encourages dehumanization, violence, harassment, colonialism, slavery, and genocide (Bain et al., 2014). The alternative to both denials recognizes different modes of reality. Thus, Fleetwood (2005) distinguishes material, ideal, artifactual, and social realities. His classification, however, is problematic. First, it misinterprets the material as natural. Second, although espousing materialism, it denies the materiality of the ideal, the artifactual, and the social. It thus implies that a quarry is artifactual rather than material, that ideal and social entities “contain not one iota of materiality” and that considering patriarchy as both socially and materially real is inconsistent (p. 201). Third, it denies the possibility of direct perception on the ground that material entities are concept mediated, thus falling into intellectualism (Noë, 2009). More generally, it conflates questions

of ontology (materialism or idealism) with those of epistemology (direct perception or concept mediation) and semantics (modes of reality).

The term ‘reality’ is interpretable in at least five different ways, each corresponding to a different mode or level of existence as per the insight of 11th-century scholar Abu Hamid al-Ghazali. Confronting a situation whereby increasing numbers interpreted the Quran literally and rejected it because they deemed specific passages to be falsehoods, al-Ghazali proposed to distinguish five levels of interpretation, each corresponding to a different mode or level of existence, which we can term a) real, b) perceptual, c) imaginary, d) conceptual, and e) semiotic (al-Ghazali, 1993; Sands, 2006). This approach, which Bunge (2016c) reprises seemingly unknowingly, offers a way out from the mutually exclusive understandings of objective and (inter)subjective realities. Objects with real existence exist absolutely. Objects with perceptual existence, such as sunrises and sunsets, are relative to perceivers: the sun is not objectively rising and setting. Objects with imaginary existence are relative to imaginers. Virtual reality, for example, involves imagined perception and imagined action. Thus, users of a space simulator imagine themselves operating a space shuttle in space while they are in a cockpit replica on the ground. We can pretend that fictions have an independent existence, as when we say that Spider-Man joined the Marvel Cinematic Universe. Such pretense is useful for immersive experiences and learning from a broader range of experiences without going through the associated real situations, but it must remain a pretense. The human ability to distinguish reality from imagination emerges early in life and enables conceptual development (Weisberg & Hopkins, 2020). Thus, preschoolers can correctly simulate events that did not occur, reason about counterfactual conditionals, and extend fictional facts to different situations within a fantastical story without exporting that fact to reality. Objects with conceptual existence are relative to conceptualizers; they occur in conceptual systems such as logic and mathematics. Unlike objects with imaginary existence, they are subject to inflexible laws (Bunge, 2016a).

Finally, objects with semiotic existence are relative to interpreters. They are signs, with a sign defined as “something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity” (Peirce, 1994, CP 2.228).

The example of a pen illustrates the different modes of existence. Handwriting involves using an objectively existing pen, which the writers perceive. Even if they have no pen in front of them, writers can imagine a concrete pen, such as a black ballpoint pen. They can think of a pen in the abstract as a concept without imagining it having a specific material, shape, or color. Moreover, they can interpret the concept of a pen to have different meanings. For example, in the expression ‘the pen is mightier than the sword,’ the word ‘pen’ does not denote any objectively existing pen. It stands for something else, such as communication or a free press.

Integrative systemics holds that each mode of existence corresponds to a different mode of reality. A mode of reality encompasses all the objects of a mode of existence. Reality and existence, without further qualification, are absolute and objective. They do not depend on the construal processes of any subject. To distinguish reality proper from other modes of reality, we may refer to it as objective reality. Other modes of reality are relative to one or more construers. They depend on construal – perception, imagination, conceptualization, or interpretation – by one or more subjects. Because construal is construction, objects in such modes of reality are (inter)subjective constructions (Kelly, 1955/1991). Researchers have been prone to confuse the construal of reality with reality itself. For example, researchers who claim their models to be reality deny the possibility of alternative models (Monieson, 1988). Those who disagree with the model have two possible main courses of action. The first is to deny reality, thus opening the possibility for alternative models interpreted as alternative realities. Hence, researchers denying the unity of reality have argued that people construct multiple realities (Firat & Venkatesh, 1995; Hirschman, 1986; Hudson & Ozanne, 1988). In doing so, they reduced reality to its models and ontology to epistemology, thus committing what Bhaskar

(1975/2008) terms the epistemic fallacy. The second course of action is to reject the equivalence between model and reality and propose alternative models that inform efforts to change reality. Such is the position of integrative systemics.

Integrative systemics thus recognizes both “objectively knowable upper-case Reality” and “lower-case, contextual conception of reality, or multiple realities,” without construing either of them as an “alternative, or complement” to the other (Sherry, 2018, p. 54). It accepts as self-evident, except for those prone to Cartesian doubt’s radical skepticism, that reality exists and is unique. It also takes as self-evident, except for those inclined to confuse different modes of reality, that people construct multiple (inter)subjective realities. The following subsection considers the question of meaning.

Meaning

Two understandings of meaning are prevalent in marketing and consumer research. According to Hunt (2010/2015), positivists typically refer to communicative meaning, whereas anti-positivists mainly refer to evaluational meaning. Early versions of hermeneutics refer to the meanings of written texts, whereas later versions interpret the meanings of non-textual ‘texts’ (Arnold & Fischer, 1994). Because scholars holding different understandings of meaning are likely to misunderstand each other, the present subsection offers some conceptual elucidation. It is helpful to distinguish between semantic interpretation or the interpretation of linguistic signs and pragmatic interpretation or the interpretation of everything (Holbrook & O’Shaughnessy, 1988; Moisander, Peñaloza, et al., 2009; Thompson, 1997). In linguistic communication, linguistic signs mediate between signaler and interpreter. Miscommunication may occur when the signaler and the interpreter construe the signs differently. There must be a commonality between the signaler and the interpreter’s construals for communication to be effective. In the terminology of Peirce (1998, EP 2:478), the intentional interpretant and the

effectual interpretant must coincide in the communicational interpretant. The communicational interpretant is a construct, an abstraction from the concrete construals of more than one construer. Through a process of abstraction, we can treat constructs as separate from the construers (Bunge, 2010). The distinction between construals and constructs offers clarifications regarding (inter)subjective constructions. For example, suppose that Jane wakes up to her house on fire and rushes out, shouting, “fire!”. In the context of our example, the house on fire is an objective fact, not a construction; Jane cannot wish it away. Jane’s construal of it, however, is her subjective construction. If she construes the fire as real, then she may take appropriate action; she may construe it as a dream at her peril. We can abstract from her construal process the “fire” construct, which represents the fire event. As an element in a natural language, the English word ‘fire’ is an intersubjective construction. It is a linguistic sign that designates the “fire” construct and denotes the fire event (Bunge, 1974a). The signification of the word ‘fire’ is a composition of designation and meaning. A neighbor who interprets Jane’s distress call correctly may be able to help.

Pragmatic interpretation is possible because entities and events can have primary, secondary, and tertiary properties. Primary properties exist independently of any construer. They include intrinsic properties, which exist independently of others, such as mass or composition, and relational properties relative to non-construing others, such as weight or speed (Bunge, 2016b). Relational properties relative to construers are of two sorts: secondary properties such as colors can be perceived, whereas tertiary properties such as symbolism can be mentally simulated (Rescher, 2017). Thus, it is helpful to understand construal as including perception and simulation, and simulation as encompassing imagination, conceptualization, and interpretation (Hesslow, 2002). Researchers studying pragmatic interpretation have used the term ‘meaning’ to refer to objects’ tertiary properties, signalers’ construals, interpreters’ construals, and common constructs. However, the multiple uses of the term have confused

readers only acquainted with ‘meaning’ in the semantic sense, especially as references to pragmatic meaning often wrongly assume that the different senses are equivalent. Terms that introduce differentiation include ‘meaningful forms’ and ‘potentializing meanings’ for tertiary properties of objects, ‘actualizing meanings’ for construals, and ‘culture’ or the ‘culturally constituted world’ for common constructs (Hannerz, 1992; McCracken, 1989; Mick et al., 2004). Such differentiation suggests a way to unpack statements such as “[p]eople buy things not only for what they can do, but also for what they mean,” by clarifying how people’s construals change across situations and to what extent they differ from others’ construals, without assuming homogeneity (Levy, 1959, p. 118, emphasis removed).

Following Bunge (1974b), semantic interpretation may bear on either linguistic signs or constructs, whereas semantic meaning is a property of constructs only. Moreover, semantic meaning encompasses sense and reference. Specifying the referent(s) can be critical for clarity of thought and mutual understanding. ‘Time travelers using a time machine cannot meet themselves in another time’ refers to time travel, time travelers, and a time machine, irrespective of whether it is true. That is, reference differs from truth domain. The full sense of a construct in a given context is the set of all constructs that logically entail it or logically follow from it in that context (Bunge, 1974a). For example, ‘they are our most valuable consumers’ presupposes consumption, consumers, object(s) of consumption, provider(s), valuation of consumers, valuer(s), valuation standard(s), and differences in the valuation of consumers. It notably implies that the most valuable consumers are more desirable than others and should be prioritized from the standpoint of the provider(s).

To clarify the distinction between semantic and pragmatic interpretation, consider the following question: what is the meaning of COVID-19? A semantic interpretation of the construct could start as follows: “COVID-19 is a disease caused by a new strain of coronavirus. ‘CO’ stands for corona, ‘VI’ for virus, and ‘D’ for disease. Formerly, this disease was referred

to as ‘2019 novel coronavirus’ or ‘2019-nCoV’” (UNICEF et al., 2020, p. 2). A more detailed semantic interpretation would specify the meaning of a coronavirus and what makes COVID-19 different. Thus, semantic meaning is circumscribed. For example, a semantic interpretation of COVID-19 as a type of flu would be mistaken because flu follows from infection by influenza viruses, whereas COVID-19 follows from infection by the SARS-CoV-2 virus. In contrast with the boundedness of semantic interpretation, there are unlimited possible pragmatic interpretations. Those of the COVID-19 object have ranged from being a hoax to signaling the end of the world. When researchers interpret and evaluate others’ signals and interpretations, the inquiry becomes restricted again because the construal and signaling processes of the research subjects occur in reality. Nevertheless, in such cases, intuition and empathy can help (Hirschman, 1986). In agreement with Brown (1999, p. 11), “whether informed readers actually consider the interpreter’s interpretation insightful, irresistible, ineffable, inestimable, or whatever, the theoretical underpinnings of the investigation are always open to question.” But in disagreement with Brown, a wide range of interpretations does not rule out the possibility of evaluating whether they are “true or false or right or wrong” (ibid.). The following section considers the question of truth.

Truth

Whereas some authors have upheld the importance of truth, others have rejected it (Anderson, 1988; Hunt, 1990). Among those recognizing truth, there is a disagreement about whether truth is objective or subjective (Peter & Olson, 1983). Thus, according to Firat and Venkatesh (1995), modernism holds truth to be objective, whereas postmodernism considers truth to be constructed. Given the “disturbing emergence of ‘post-truth,’” it is necessary to rehabilitate truth (Dholakia & Firat, 2018, p. 37). Following al-Ghazali (1993), before denying the meaningfulness or truth of a proposition, interpreters should determine whether it is

meaningful and true at any of the five levels of interpretation. Assignment of truth-value presupposes semantic meaningfulness: a semantically meaningless proposition can be neither true nor false (Bunge, 1974b). A proposition can be semantically meaningless even if expressed by a grammatically correct sentence. For example, ‘Colorless green ideas sleep furiously’ is grammatically correct but semantically nonsensical (Chomsky, 1957/2002). Construing truth as full correspondence with the whole of reality has led some researchers to “disdain any role at all for truth, urging its abandonment” (Hunt, 1991, p. 1). The alternative adopted here is to conceptualize truth as the degree of correspondence between construals, signals, or constructs and one or more aspects of a bounded part of a mode of reality. Although far too deficient compared to a satisfactory theory of truth, such a truth concept has several valuable features. First, it allows for approximate truths that are improvable (Bunge, 1974b). Because non-trivial exact truths are hard to find, “it is a mistake to aim at an unattainable precision. It is better to be vaguely right than exactly wrong” (Read, 1914/2007, p. 310). Second, it specifies that construals, signals, and constructs can be evaluated for their truth value, as illustrated in the previous example of the house on fire. Third, while it specifies a single truth concept, it allows for multiple truths: anything that is true is a truth (Haack, 2005). Fourth, it recognizes that truths cannot be about all aspects of the whole of reality. Accordingly, when evaluating truth claims, it is important to specify the aspect(s) and boundaries under consideration (Raynaud, 2019). Fifth, in line with the principle of checking whether a proposition is meaningful and true at any of the five levels of interpretation, truths refer to a certain mode of reality. We can thus distinguish between factual or objective truth, which relates to objective existence, and other kinds of truth relating to other modes of existence, such as (inter)subjective, formal, fictional, and allegorical truths. For example, ‘Sancho Panza was Don Quixote’s squire’ is not factually true, but true in the context of Miguel de Cervantes’ fiction. The distinction between objective truth that is subject-independent and (inter)subjective truth that is relative to one (or

more) subject(s) is useful even in fictional contexts. Consider the example of the Emperor starting his procession in Hans Christian Andersen's 'The Emperor's New Clothes.' The Emperor's subjective truth was that he was wearing new clothes, the intersubjective truth of people in the street was that they could not see the clothes, and the little child voiced the objective truth that the Emperor had no clothes.

In marketing and consumer research, Shelby D. Hunt has defended the importance of truth and approximate truth (Hunt, 1990, 2012). Pronouncements against truth have often confused objective truth and subjective truth, absolute truth and approximate truth, truth and truth claims, as well as reality and its interpretation. According to the view adopted here, it would be a mistake to deny "the possibility of discovering objective truth" and unwise always to assume that "people really are as they appear to be" (Hirschman, 1986, pp. 242, 244). Moreover, it would be obscurantist to deem truth "an inappropriate objective for science" (Anderson, 1988, p. 405). Rejecting "[t]he idea that there is a truth outside the mirror of language," or assuming that "[s]ince human languages are human creations, so is truth" confuses construals and constructs with linguistic signs and restricts truth to formal truth, which does not consider the relationship between signs and their referents (Arnold & Fischer, 1994, p. 65). A child who gets burned touching a hot pan knows the truth that it happened, even without having the language to express it. Similarly, whereas intersubjective truths are socially constructed, holding that "truth is a social construction" is a mistake (Firat & Venkatesh, 1995, p. 250n258). And the mistake costs lives, as exemplified in the misinformation and disinformation exacerbating climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic (Cook, 2019; Roozenbeek et al., 2020; van der Linden et al., 2020). The wide acceptance of the claim that "in today's post-truth world of fake news, alternative facts and so forth, the ultimate truth is inaccessible" would precipitate calamitous events (Cervellon & Brown, 2018, p. xii). Credulous people who take it seriously would be at risk of injecting disinfectant in their veins

to protect themselves against COVID-19, in line with President Donald Trump's suggestion. Such considerations point to the importance of reasoning, as discussed next.

Reasoning

Scholars often oppose inductive to deductive approaches, considering them as the two alternatives for building theory (Zeithaml et al., 2020). Instead, integrative systemics recognizes that developing theories typically involves the four main kinds of reasoning: induction, abduction, deduction, and analogy (Brown, 2010; Hubbard & Lindsay, 2013a; Mick, 1986; Peirce, 1994, p. CP 7.98; Thomas, 2018). The following example illustrates the differences between them. Consider the statement: "High-quality products are expensive." We can express it as a conditional statement of the form "If A, then B," where A is the antecedent ("The products are of high quality"), and B is the consequent ("The products are expensive"). A and B are about particular instances, whereas "If A, then B" is a generality. We can introduce negation, distinguishing Not-A ("The products are not of high quality") and Not-B ("The products are not expensive"). In our example, induction is the inference of the generality from the particulars ("Now, the products are of high quality. Now, the products are expensive. Hence, high-quality products are likely expensive."). Abduction is the inference of the antecedent from the generality and the consequent ("High-quality products are expensive. Now, the products are expensive. Hence, the products are likely of high quality."). Deduction is the inference of particulars by reference to the generality. Two valid argument forms are affirming the antecedent ("High-quality products are expensive. Now, the products are of high quality. Hence, the products are expensive.") and denying the consequent ("High-quality products are expensive. Now, the products are not expensive. Hence, the products are not of high quality."). Analogy is a process of arguing from similarity in known respects to similarity in other respects. It can combine with induction, abduction, or deduction. For example, using

the generality inferred from the induction process above, we can formulate the following argument from analogy: “High-quality products are likely expensive. Product quality is to price as worker productivity is to wage. Hence, high-productivity workers are likely highly paid.”

Only deductive reasoning has strict principles of validity that, when carefully followed, help ensure logical consistency and avoid logical fallacies and contradictions (Skipper & Hyman, 1987). Two invalid argument forms are affirming the consequent (“High-quality products are expensive. Now, the products are expensive. Hence, the products are of high quality.”) and denying the antecedent (“High-quality products are expensive. Now, the products are not of high quality. Hence, the products are not expensive.”). Valid deductive inferences, however, do not guarantee truth. Invalid inferences may be true, and valid inferences may be false, as in the Garbage In, Garbage Out (GIGO) rule of thumb (Skipper & Hyman, 1990). Thus, in our example for deductive purposes, the starting point was the generality that “High-quality products are expensive.” The truth of the generality needs assessment through empirical investigation; logical means alone cannot determine it. Because none of the four kinds of reasoning guarantees truth, diligent inquiry must resort to all of them. We can relate the four types of reasoning to the four mind-dependent modes of existence. In our example, induction involved the perception of the particulars. Abduction involved the imagination of the antecedent. Deduction involved the use of logic, which is a conceptual system. And analogy involved reinterpreting A and B’s referents (workers, productivity, and wages instead of products, quality, and prices). In the context of marketing and consumer research, Brown and Wijland (2018) offer conceptual clarifications regarding analogical reasoning with reflections on metaphors, similes, and metonymy, and Stephen Brown’s works exemplify the use and examination of analogical thinking (Brown, 2008, 2019). The present section has specified the semantic and logical assumptions of integrative systemics. The following section presents its ontological assumptions.

Ontological Assumptions

Events and Processes

Ontology deals with the nature of being. In their tutorial on process theorization, Giesler and Thompson (2016, p. 498) do not discuss philosophical presuppositions on the view that the “broader ontological and epistemological underpinnings are well documented.” A more accurate assessment is that “there is more than one way to understand process research, with authors explicitly or implicitly adhering to different ontologies and epistemologies” (Abdallah et al., 2019, p. 92; Lucarelli & Giovanardi, 2019; Poulis, 2020). Giesler and Thompson (2016) take process research to mean process narratives, an alternative to variance models. However, they ignore the transversal distinction between process ontologies and substance ontologies, which is more fundamental (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005). The starting point for the ontology of integrative systemics is the notion of event.

Anything that happens or occurs is an event. Events always have relations with other events, such as precedence or simultaneity and separateness or overlap. For example, the financial crisis of 2007–2008 may seem unrelated to the Great American Eclipse of 2017. But because the first event preceded the second, they have a relation of precedence. However, the relation between the two events is non-bonding because the financial crisis did not make a difference for the solar eclipse. More generally, non-bonding relations do not make a difference to the relata (Bunge, 2016b). In contrast, bonding relations make a difference to the relata, with at least one acting on the other(s). Bonding relations go by many names, such as bonds, connections, couplings, links, relationships, or ties. Non-bonding relations may enable bonding relations. For example, the relation of precedence between conception and birth enables the relation of necessity between conception and birth. Except for two limiting cases, events are composed of more basic events and are components of more complex events. The two limiting

cases are basic events, which are composed only of themselves, and the World, which is the totality of events and is not a component of any other event (Romero, 2018). The event ontology of integrative systemics agrees with process ontologies concerning the dynamicity of being. However, unlike some process ontologies, it recognizes the existence of material entities.

Multilevel Systems

Setting aside the two limiting cases of basic events and the World, every event can be considered either as a whole or in terms of its bonded parts. If we consider it in its integrality, an event is an element in a system. If we consider it in terms of its bonded parts, an event is a complex unity, a system (Morin, 1977/2008). A complex unity is a system if each component has a bond with another; otherwise, it is an aggregate (Bunge, 1998). Thus, a society is a system because everyone has a bond with at least someone, whereas the world production of potatoes is an aggregate. A system is both more and less than the sum of its parts (Morin, 1974). The preceding statement is not a logical contradiction. More precisely, a system has at least one emergent qualitative property that its parts lack, and it lacks at least one submergent qualitative property that its parts have (Bunge, 2003/2014). The system is more in at least one respect and less in at least another respect. Specifying a system involves identifying its structure, processes, environment, and components (Bunge, 1998).² A system's structure consists of the totality of relations between its components (internal structure) and between its components and its environment (external structure). The underlying process or mechanism of a system is the set of processes that keep it going (Bunge, 2016a). Rather than using the terms 'events' and

² Bunge's CESM model refers to 'mechanism' as the processes that make a system tick, with a distinction between mechanical and nonmechanical mechanisms. Since readers may associate 'mechanism' with the mechanistic or mechanical, rather than the mechanistic or processual, the term 'processes' seems more judicious.

‘processes’ interchangeably, it is helpful to construe processes as ordered series of events. Accordingly, “just one darn thing after another” is not a process (Rescher, 2000, p. 27).

The concepts of events, processes, systems, emergence, and submergence enable a multilevel conception of reality, in contrast with flat ontologies (Bajde, 2013; Thompson, 2019). A level is a collection of events or entities characterized by a bundle of properties (Bunge, 2013). Basic events can cluster into processes that can have emergent properties at sufficiently large scales, including entification, the emergence of entities. Accordingly, entities, including spacetime itself, “are bundles of events defined by shared properties, which are abstracted from conditions imposed on the events” (Romero, 2018, p. 167). It follows that being is becoming (Bunge, 2010). Everything is a system or an actual or potential component of a system. We can distinguish at least seven levels of reality: eventual, physical, chemical, biological, mental, social, and artifactual (Blitz, 1992; Bunge, 2012; Romero, 2018). For example, artifacts are concrete entities made by human beings with social, mental, biological, chemical, and physical properties. From the physical to the artifactual levels, entities are material. In the Radical Enlightenment tradition, integrative systemics subscribes to substance monism alongside property pluralism (Bunge, 2016b; Israel, 2019). Although their connotations may differ, reality, materiality, changeability, and possession of energy refer to the same objects (Bunge, 2012). Energy is the capacity to generate new events (Romero, 2018). Entities are changeable because, at the most basic level, they are composed of events. From an entity perspective, an event is a change in the state of an entity, whereby the state of an entity is the totality of the entity’s properties at a given instant (Bunge, 2013). A fact is the state or change of state of a material entity. The totality of all material entities is the Universe, and the World or totality of events is its process (Romero, 2018). Reality consists of the Universe both in its actuality and its potentiality. Potentiality is real, objective possibility. Hence entities, including living beings, have both manifest (actual) and dispositional (potential) properties. If

marketers excluded potentiality from their understanding of reality, they would only cater to the actual consumers of their products while ignoring potential consumers, which in most cases would be deemed a misguided business model. Instead, they study patterns and causal relations to anticipate and influence outcomes. Recognizing that reality encompasses actuality and potentiality guards against actualism and differs from Bhaskar's (1975/2008) account. Bhaskar interprets causal structures and generative mechanisms as potentialities in contrast with Bunge's relational understanding of structures and processual understanding of mechanisms. Patterns and causality are the subjects of the following subsection.

Patterns and Causality

The choice for scholars seems to be either to reject causality or to consider that reality can be segregated into causes and effects (Hirschman, 1986; Thomas, 2018). Rejecting causality implies that everything is random, whereas assuming that anything is either cause or effect ignores randomness. Neither assumption is tenable. A deeper understanding of the issue comes from considering the notion of non-events. Non-events are ordinary events, in contrast with extraordinary or outlier events (Morin, 1972). Whether something is an event in the narrow sense depends on what it is compared to, in what respect, and relative to what frame of reference. The frame of reference can be one or more subjects, in which case, whether something is an event is in the eye of the beholder. Black swans are events that “fall outside what you can expect and model, and carry large consequences” (Taleb, 2020, p. 15). For purposes of quantifying the demographic impact of a global pandemic, a single death is a non-event. In terms of the void it leaves behind, the death of a loved one is a significant event. In terms of revenues, a person buying groceries is a non-event for Walmart, whereas a \$1.5 billion production contract awarded by the US Navy is an event for Boeing. More generally, an event is an outlier to a pattern that it does not fit. Marketing and consumer researchers typically refer

to pattern-fitting consumption events as ‘consumption process’ in the singular and to outliers as ‘consumption events.’ Thus, shopping events are outliers occurring on specific days of the year, like Singles’ Day in China or Black Friday and Cyber Monday in the United States. Meanwhile, the shopping process involves phases or stages, such as search, purchase, and post-purchase.

Even outliers, however, fit some pattern(s). Everything happens according to concrete patterns (laws), and nothing comes from nothing (Bunge, 2013). The existence of concrete social patterns undermines both the individualist view of human free will unencumbered by circumstance and the fatalist view of human resignation to circumstance: social patterns emerge from human behaviors and practices and are therefore changeable, although not necessarily as change agents please (Bhattacharyya & Belk, 2019). It is helpful to distinguish between three forms of concrete patterns or laws: causal patterns, probabilistic or stochastic patterns, and patterns that combine causation or order with chance or disorder (Bunge, 2010; Morin, 1977/2008). Thus, when flipping a fair coin, the tossing of the coin is the cause and the landing the effect, but which side the coin lands on is a matter of chance (Bunge, 2009). Taking causation as a relation among events implies that when people say that entity A caused entity B to do E, a more precise statement would be that event C in entity A caused event E in entity B (Bunge, 2006). When a child breaks a vase in a shop, the breakage’s cause is not the child but the child knocking the vase over. Accordingly, an entity acting on and changing the state of another is an agent, and the changed entity is a patient. Moral agents can do right or wrong, whereas moral patients can be the target of right or wrong (Gray & Wegner, 2009; Yam et al., 2019). Thus, non-human entities can have agency, including what is known as object agency (Epp & Price, 2010). However, non-human entities can have moral agency at most by proxy (Bunge, 1989). Accordingly, the moral responsibility and accountability for the consequences of object agency lie with the moral agents responsible for the objects. Examples include

discriminatory treatment in lending because of algorithmic bias and fatalities caused by self-driving cars.

The cause-effect relation is not necessarily unidirectional and linear. Circular causality, also known as reciprocal causation, interaction, or interdependence, is more prevalent than unidirectional causation. Two significant examples of circular causality are feedback loops and recursive loops. Negative feedback loops dampen changes and thus contribute to the balancing of the system. For example, a retailer may knowingly sell defective products. If there is a backlash against the retailer, then it may take corrective action. Positive feedback loops amplify and exacerbate changes and thus contribute to destabilizing the system. If the defective products sell well with no significant adverse reaction, then the retailer may take it as validation. Recursive loops occur when a process causes events like those that caused it, thus generating a similar process. For instance, if selling defective products improves the bottom line, then the result will be taken as validation to sell more faulty products. The effect (improved bottom line) of the action (selling defective products) is also the cause of the action (selling more faulty products). It is an example of a vicious cycle. Positive feedback loops can also be virtuous, as when selling ethical products improves the bottom line, which in turn stimulates the sale of more ethical products. Integrative systemics thus holds that “[r]eal causes exist,” that some but not all events “can be segregated into causes and effects,” that “[m]ultiple, simultaneous shaping” can occur between entities, without these statements being contradictory as previously assumed (Hirschman, 1986, p. 239; Hudson & Ozanne, 1988, p. 509). The discussion of causality closes our discussion of the ontological assumptions of integrative systemics. The following section presents its epistemological assumptions.

Epistemological Assumptions

Realism and the Scientific Method

Epistemology deals with the nature of knowing. The starting point for the epistemology of integrative systemics is that “there is a single knowable reality waiting ‘out there’ to be discovered via the scientific method,” contra Anderson (1986, p. 157). Integrative systemics thus adopts a realist epistemology. Reality without qualification is absolute and objective: it exists independently of people’s construals. Denying reality is wishful thinking: we cannot wish it away (Berger & Luckmann, 1966/1991). Objective knowledge in the sense of knowledge without a knowing subject does not exist. However, objective knowledge that does not adopt the viewpoint of particular subjects and is thus impersonal is possible and desirable; it requires backing by solid evidence and sound theory, even as constructing it may require intersubjective validation (Bunge, 2006; Hunt, 1993). Without objective knowledge, there would be no scientific and technological advances and no accountability for actions. Official positions and consensus opinions, however, do not guarantee objectivity. We may be prone to delusions, and marketing can capitalize on them, notably by the “fostering of delusional consciousness, a consciousness that suppresses the self-interest or class interest of the adopters and supplants it with a consciousness that is either diversionary or deflective or (more insidiously) oppositional and injurious” (Dholakia & Firat, 2016, p. 406).

Properly understood, the scientific method is not a specific technique. A narrow understanding of the scientific method as privileging quantitative over qualitative ‘methods’ should rightly be dismissed (Deshpandé, 1983). While emphasizing a specific technique as the supposed gold standard goes against the scientific method’s ethos, it is prevalent in the field. A 2006 survey of the non-student membership of the Association for Consumer Research revealed that the large majority had expertise in quantitative techniques (69 percent

experiments, 13 percent surveys), compared to 19 percent in qualitative techniques (Kahn, 2007). Mixed-method research has evidenced that the qualitative-quantitative divide is not as clear-cut as often assumed, thereby undermining the basis of scholars' identification by quantitative or qualitative techniques (Creswell & Clark, 2017). Qualitative and quantitative techniques complement and can inform each other. Qualitative data can be quantitized, and quantitative data can be qualitized. Qualitative data are analyzable quantitatively, and quantitative data are analyzable qualitatively. More important is the question of interpretation. Researchers have been bridging the supposed divide, as exemplified in the computer-assisted content analysis of shifts in discourse about casino gambling in the United States since the 1980s (Humphreys, 2010).

For integrative systemics, the adequacy of specific techniques depends on the problems to solve. It is helpful to distinguish between forward and inverse problems. Forward problems involve moving from antecedents to consequents or from causes to effects, whereas inverse problems are more challenging as they require moving from consequents to antecedents or from effects to causes: "the solution of an inverse problem may be multiple or nonexistent; and when the given is observable, its source may be hidden" (Bunge, 2019, p. 495). For example, making predictions using a consumer behavior model is a forward problem, whereas developing explanations of observed consumer behaviors is an inverse problem. Some problems are neither forward nor inverse. Insoluble moral dilemmas, for example, are beyond the scope of the scientific method alone. Beyond specific techniques, the scientific method or approach is that of "diligent inquiry into truth for truth's sake . . . from an impulse to penetrate into the reason of things" (Peirce, 1994, CP 1.44). It involves ensuring the validity of deductions and verifying inductions, abductions, and analogies. Thus, science is akin to an animal walking on four legs: moderate rationalism, moderate empiricism, disciplined imagination, and moderate skepticism (Bunge, 2010; Morin, 1990/2005). The scientific

method as diligent inquiry implies that no clear-cut demarcation exists between ordinary and scientific knowledge. The following subsection discusses knowledge.

Knowledge as Construction

The integrative systemic conceptualization of truth is in line with the central postulates of critical realism as per Bunge (1973): it assumes that things are knowable and that knowledge is partial, fallible, and improvable. Accordingly, we must shun dogmatism. Moreover, knowing is not “an exercise of a ‘reason’ independent of the body,” as in the mind-body dualism of the ‘spectator theory of knowing’ (Dewey, 1929, p. 233). Instead, “knowledge is habit” (Peirce, 1906, p. 496): the “[scientist] and the philosopher like the carpenter, the physician and politician know with their habits not with their ‘consciousness.’ The latter is eventual, not a source” (Dewey, 1922, pp. 182–183). Cognition (perception and simulation) is enactive because its orientation is toward changing material existence; deliberation is not among its defining characteristics. Like all human behavior, cognition emerges from processes distributed across the brain, body, and environment (Gallagher, 2017). Moreover, every inquiry involves interpreter(s), object(s) of inquiry, signs, and interpretation(s) in certain respects (Peirce, 1994, CP 5.283; Whitehead, 1929, p. 23). Since knowledge is partial, interpretation is always in certain respects, and inquiry presupposes knowledge of these aspects. Accordingly, absolute doubt of the Cartesian variety is untenable, and inquiry always has a set of presuppositions, whether implicit or explicit, and whether adequate or not. All knowledge is constructed and fallible, notably because of fundamental uncertainty (Lavoie, 2014). Nevertheless, knowledge is improvable. The realist constructivist epistemology adopted here is in the tradition of Piaget (1967) and should not be confused with a constructivist ontology, which holds that human minds construct the universe. Moreover, since inquiry is an activity of

humans living in society, it may involve a mixture of cooperation and competition (Bunge & Ardila, 1987).

Because the different modes of reasoning involve both particulars and generals, and since everything happens according to concrete patterns, every inquiry involves both idiographic and nomothetic knowledge. Idiographic knowledge is about particulars, whereas nomothetic knowledge is about generals. The claim that “some interpretivists create only idiographic knowledge” follows from construing the nomothetic as about “universal laws” rather than general laws that can vary in their level of generality (Hudson & Ozanne, 1988, pp. 510–511). Thus, Arnould and Thompson’s (2005, p. 869) position that Consumer Culture Theory (CCT) “is not a unified, grand theory, nor does it aspire to such nomothetic claims” is inconsistent with nomothetic statements such as “consumer culture does not determine action as a causal force . . . [but] frames consumers’ horizons of conceivable action, feeling, and thought, making certain patterns of behavior and sense-making interpretations more likely than others.” Because every system has underlying processes, an explanation is a description of these processes (Bunge, 2013). An explanation “typically comes after a pattern (fact) has been empirically determined” (Hubbard & Lindsay, 2013a, p. 1380). Developing an explanation involves “finding or imagining plausible generative mechanisms for the patterns amongst events” (Harré, 1970, p. 125). Explanations should account for “significant sameness [generalization] as well as a failure to obtain significant sameness [boundary conditions]” (Hubbard & Lindsay, 2013b, p. 1393).

Because social facts typically combine objective and (inter)subjective processes, explanations of social facts can combine first-person (egocentric), second-person (as in *Verstehen*), and third-person (impersonal) perspectives. For example, we can investigate the processes underlying a specific population’s subjective and objective poverty and reflect on why, as researchers, the findings may not correspond to our preconceptions. Since people are

not automatons, what they construe makes a difference to what they enact, which can transform objective reality. Accordingly, objective accounts of social facts are impoverished if they ignore (inter)subjectivity, as in classical behaviorist accounts. Moreover, (inter)subjective accounts of social facts are impoverished if they ignore objective facts, as in purely phenomenological accounts (Askegaard & Linnet, 2011). The relative explanatory importance of objective and (inter)subjective factors is inquiry-specific. For example, a person's intention is of little significance for explaining how the person won in a fair lottery, but critical for explaining in court whether a guilty mind accompanied a guilty act because criminal responsibility typically requires both (Dressler, 2015). The disciplinary organization of knowledge has implications for inquiry, which the following section addresses.

Transdisciplinarity and the Unity of Knowledge

The history of science depicts a twofold process of specialization and fragmentation along with hybridization and recombination (Dogan, 1996). Disjunctive and reductionist thinking, overspecialization, and ignorance of other disciplines and the history of thought lead to cyclical patterns (Arndt, 1985). According to Abbott (2001, p. 17), social science “consists mainly of rediscovering the wheel. A generation triumphs over its elders, then calmly resurrects their ideas, pretending all the while to advance the cause of knowledge.” Thompson et al. (1997) consider that when different works converge in their results, the convergence is a welcome indication of validity if the works share the same paradigm. However, they argue that if the works adopt different paradigms, then scholars should treat such convergence skeptically because it may signal conformity to a hegemonic narrative. Drawing on Morin, Askegaard (2018) recognizes two strategies for the unification of knowledge. Following Bunge (2001), we can refer to them as reduction and integration. Unification can take the form of imperialism, such as under “the prevailing paradigm of reductionist, narrowly specified, and fragmented

research” (Reibstein et al., 2009, p. 1). Reductionist projects involve ‘nothing-but’ thinking that reduces all levels of reality to a single level, such as physicalism and biologism, or individualism (micro-reductionism) and holism (macro-reductionism). However, unification can also be integrative (Bunge, 2001). Integrative systemics seeks to contribute to unifying knowledge through integration rather than reduction. Integration requires transcending disciplinary and recognizing reality’s multilevel and multidimensional nature, consistent with the previous section on ontological assumptions. There are three ways to move beyond disciplinary: multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and transdisciplinary. Multidisciplinary involves drawing on more than one discipline without the disciplines interacting. Interdisciplinary involves interaction and mutual enrichment of disciplines. Transdisciplinary “not only cover[s] interactions or reciprocities between specialised research projects,” but places “these relationships within a total system without any firm boundaries between disciplines” (Piaget, 1972, p. 138). It “aims to open all disciplines to that which they share and to that which lies beyond them,” including practitioners, policymakers, activists, and people most affected by the problems and decisions at hand (First World Congress of Transdisciplinarity, 1994; Moulaert, MacCallum, Mehmood, et al., 2013). Transdisciplinary research benefits from “cultivat[ing] a polyvocal fluency, a breadth of intellectual interests, a capacity to see connections among disparate domains and ideas, and a keen interest in learning from others and gaining resources for re-assessing established beliefs and deeply held assumptions” (Thompson, 2017b, p. 11).

Some may protest that paradigm incommensurability prevents the integration of knowledge (Davies & Fitchett, 2005; Tadajewski, 2008). Scholars have referred to incommensurability to mean different things, including untranslatability, incomparability, incompatibility, and irreducibility. Let us consider each concern in turn. According to Kuhn’s later work, paradigm incommensurability is partial untranslatability. It is a semantic problem,

not an ontological or epistemological one. In the semantic sense, when two theories are paradigmatically incommensurable, “there is no language, neutral or otherwise, into which both theories, conceived as sets of sentences, can be translated without residue or loss” (Kuhn, 1982, p. 670). Incommensurability in the sense of untranslatability is a legitimate concern, but we should not exaggerate it. As Kuhn stresses, even when a complete translation is impossible, there can still be a successful interpretation. We can take Kuhn’s idea further. Since translation is an interpretive act, translation ‘without residue or loss’ can seldom exist: there are always subtleties and nuances in one language that another may not adequately capture (Van Nes et al., 2010). Nevertheless, that does not prevent translation and mutual understanding, even as it may be necessary to borrow from other languages, give new significations to old words, or coin new words. In Kuhn’s sense, incommensurability is a misnomer. It refers to the relationship between constructs and linguistic signs, in which measurement plays no role. Untranslatability does not prevent integration, although it highlights the need for conceptual and terminological clarity: the same construct may have different meanings in different frameworks, and multiple frameworks may use differing terms for the same construct.

Incommensurability in the sense of incomparability, as in the idiom of comparing apples to oranges, means referential incommensurability. It is a relevant concern only if the theories have different referents. When theories have referents in common, they are referentially commensurable and thus comparable (Bunge, 1974a). Thus, Anderson (1986) can compare the cognitive, behaviorist, neoclassical economic, and structuralist programs because they have referents in common. In contrast, the kinetic theory of gases and the theory of price determination are referentially incommensurable. Referential incommensurability does not prevent integration, even if such integration may remain at a formal and thus superficial level (Bunge, 1997). For example, gases and prices are referentially incommensurable, but the same mathematical formalisms may describe both, as neoclassical economics suggests. Likewise,

biological cells and national economies are referentially incommensurable, but both are complex systems.

Translatability and referential commensurability do not imply compatibility since “scientists can understand each other perfectly well, yet disagree violently” (Anderson, 1986, p. 158). For example, the fatalistic view of human existence is incompatible with the voluntaristic view. However, it is precisely comparability that enables different assumptions and explanations to compete. Accordingly, appealing to incommensurability in the sense of incomparability among competing theories, postulates, or paradigms is illegitimate. If they were incommensurable in the incomparability sense, then they could not compete. Whereas incompatibility invalidates overarching syntheses, integration remains possible. For example, ‘reality is nothing but objective’ is incompatible with ‘reality is nothing but constructed,’ but such incompatibility did not preclude adopting an integrative view that recognizes both objective reality and constructed (inter)subjective realities without contradiction.

Appeals to incommensurability as irreducibility are well-founded against the reductionist unification of knowledge that disregards differences in the modes and levels of reality. For example, the revolutions of 1848 are irreducible to any of neuronal processes, feelings of injustice, or economic necessity. Bunge (2003/2014) details the failure of the reductionist projects of physicalism, informationism, linguistic imperialism, sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, psychologism, sociologism, economism, politicism, and culturalism, as well as micro-reductionism and macro-reductionism. Within marketing and consumer research, integrative systemics offers an alternative to both micro-reductionist or atomistic approaches such as the Marketing Science Institute’s ‘marketing systemics’ and macro-reductionist or holistic approaches that consider systems only as organic wholes (Alderson, 1965/2006). The rejection of reductionism does not preclude moderate reduction in the sense of studying same-level, bottom-up, and top-down processes (Bunge, 2013). For example,

researchers investigating dietary changes can study their ecological, biological, mental, social, and budgetary dimensions and their interrelations.

Therefore, incommensurability, whether interpreted as incomparability, untranslatability, incompatibility, or irreducibility, does not preclude integration. Nevertheless, gatekeepers acting as “guardians of the faith” who lift paradigms to the “status of uncontested dogma” may still reject integrative research on the inflated claim of paradigm incommensurability to impose conformity (Arndt, 1985, pp. 19–20; Brown et al., 2005; Davies & Fitchett, 2005; Tadajewski, 2008). In such cases, invocations of incommensurability no longer designate semantic or conceptual concerns. Instead, they reflect and reinforce sociological and psychological barriers. As Leaper (2011) argues, scholars often treat paradigms as social identities associated with within-group assimilation and inter-group bias, like religion, nationality, occupation, ethnic group, sexual orientation, or gender. Arndt (1985, p. 19) notes that “researchers are born into orientations and paradigms rather than consciously selecting them” and mainly interact with people whom they construe as sharing their social identity attributes. People who identify strongly with some paradigm may experience challenges to their assumptions by ‘outsiders’ as disrespecting their person, community, or heritage, although they may celebrate similar challenges when introduced by ‘insiders’ (Brown et al., 2005). Such dynamics are not specific to academia. To take a musical example, in the 1950s, “[w]hite cover versions of hits by black musicians, such as Pat Boone’s covers of Little Richard’s records, often outsold the originals; it seems that many Americans wanted black music without the black people in it” (Walser, 1998, p. 358). Because the constructs underpinning paradigms are abstractions from the construal processes of real human beings, such an approach to research evaluation reflects and reinforces exclusionary tendencies based on erroneous assumptions. For example, scholars in Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological tradition who make jibes against psychology and economics, invoking paradigm incommensurability,

ignore that his concepts of habitus, field, and capital have affinities that he acknowledged with the psychology of Jean Piaget, Kurt Lewin, and John Dewey and the economics of Thorstein Veblen, among others (Bourdieu, 2005; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Firat & Dholakia, 2017a; Lizardo, 2004).

Integrative systemics does not claim to offer a comprehensive synthesis that reconciles opposing paradigms. By endorsing transdisciplinarity and discarding artificial disciplinary and disciplining boundaries, it eclectically “assemble[s] pieces working together, rather than in competition,” consistent with the “gold standard” of integrative research (Diderot, 1751; Peracchio et al., 2014, p. viii). When evaluating integrative research, scholars should assess the extent to which the new narrative constitutes a coherent system rather than an incoherent patchwork of other narratives. In doing so, they need to consider how the elements of the new narrative fit together as a system, on its own terms and compared to other narratives. However, unless the new narrative claims to offer an overarching synthesis, they need to combat the impulse of requiring the sources of the new narrative to be mutually compatible. The reason is that elements of a conceptual system are interdependent. As Bourdieu asserts, concepts “can be defined only within the theoretical system they constitute, not in isolation” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 96). The assertion does not imply that concepts are usable only within the system they appeared in first. On the contrary, according to Wacquant (2018), the most fruitful works inspired by Bourdieu have used only parts of his system, whereas those that sought to use it as a whole have struggled. The development of conceptual systems always involves integrating elements from pre-existing systems since no theorization can ignore antecedent knowledge. An integrative approach would need to clarify the significance of its terms and the meaning of its constructs, as it may resort to redefining terms or introducing novel ones. For compatibility, the relevant question is not whether the different antecedent systems work together, as a totalizing narrative would require, but how well the elements of the consequent

system fit together. Similarly, evaluation involves comparing the consequent system to antecedent systems. More generally, relevant criteria for assessment may include conceptual and terminological clarity, logical consistency, correspondence with the facts, compatibility with the bulk of antecedent knowledge, the significance of problems addressed and proposed solutions, as well as scholarly and real-world implications (Bunge, 2012).

Paradigm incommensurability claims have often offered protection against the reductionist unification of science by such programs as economics imperialism (Fine & Milonakis, 2009). A legitimate concern is that deflating paradigm incommensurability may open the door to reductionist imperialism. But such deflation does not imply that scholars will necessarily converge on common views. It only means that if scholars are talking about the same things, then it is possible to compare their ideas and to assess dialogically their potential complementarity, competition, or opposition (Morin, 1991/2008). Rhetorically, rejecting reductionism by referring to reality is more persuasive than reifying paradigms and appealing to ill-defined incommensurability, which often slides into dogmatism. Moreover, imperialism, in academia and beyond, is political and should be addressed as such. Anti-imperialism comes with risks. Rejecting inflated claims of incommensurability is likely to meet political resistance from those in power, particularly those who benefit from keeping the political implicit (Tadajewski, 2008). Scholars can determine how to tackle vested interests depending on their circumstances and dispositions. For integrative systemics, inquiries should be ethical and aspire for planetary humanism, as discussed in the next section.

Ethical Assumptions

Research Ethics

Ethics deals with morality. Increasing numbers of published journal articles are being retracted, including in journals typically classified as 'A' (Retraction Watch, 2020). Reasons

for retraction include unreliable findings because of honest error, blameworthy inaccuracies, and fraudulent, manipulated, or fabricated data. The associated accounts often blame individuals, with only allusions to systemic circumstances. There is a larger story to be told of universities' subjugation to neoliberal capitalist imperatives. Through academic training, "we are socially conditioned to function in this neoliberalized system and, conversely, to accept it, tolerate it, and even embrace it, when our entrepreneurial efforts are rewarded" (Thompson, 2017b, p. 9). There is a need to address the "important and much neglected influence" of "the relationship between power and knowledge production" (Tadajewski, 2006, p. 185). Indeed, the field is "inherently, incorrigibly, irredeemably political," with "[e]very published paper in the principal academic journals . . . an outcome of political horse-trading" (Brown, 2000, p. 365).

Scholars have pressure to differentiate themselves because of competition for attention, including to graduate, find a job, secure promotion or tenure, and publish along the way. As a result, their fields become sites of struggle that favor strategies of distinction, whereby products such as books, journal articles, or conference papers "are predisposed to act differentially, as instruments of distinction" (Bourdieu, 1992/1996, p. 373n333). Behind the struggle for differentiation lies capitalist competition, whereby cutting costs may become necessary to displace competitors. Such pressures are not specific to marketing and consumer research. In a 2002 US national survey of 3,247 scientists, 53 percent of midcareer respondents admitted to yielding to outside influence, such as changing the design, methodology, or results of a study in response to pressure from a funding source, and 66 percent admitted to cutting corners, for instance, to complete a project in a hurry (Martinson et al., 2005). Pressures of the sort are often more substantial in business schools, where the distinction between business and science is even less clear cut, and opportunities for inappropriate monetization abound.

Institutions typically lack the structures to address such issues. Consider the relatively minor question of misquotation. The first sentence of the first article on social marketing refers to Wiebe's question, "Why can't you sell brotherhood like you sell soap?" (as cited in Kotler & Zaltman, 1971, p. 3). The correct quotation from its source is "Why can't you sell brotherhood and rational thinking like you sell soap?" (Wiebe, 1951, p. 679). Unfortunately, the inaccurate quotation is more prevalent than the accurate one, mainly with attribution to Wiebe's text rather than a secondary source. Another example is the assertion that resources "are not static, but expand and contract in response to human wants and human actions," for which there are more misquotations than accurate quotations (Zimmermann, 1951, p. 15). Instead of promoting productivism, which incentivizes cutting corners, the field needs to enable the development of more well-rounded intellectuals who read broadly, including in the history of thought, and who can be 'convergers' across research traditions (O'Hara, 2007; Thompson, 2017b).

Because marketing and consumption have distributional consequences, researchers should openly declare their underlying assumptions, including their social values, in addition to any potential conflicts of interests, thus bringing transparency to factors that shape the field but often remain invisible. Such less visible factors include "power relationships, class hierarchies and conflicts, the privileging of specific class/ gender positions (and their corresponding social interests and preferred vocabularies of description)" (Thompson et al., 1998, p. 110). At its most extreme, epistemic arrogance can facilitate the destruction of diverse ways of knowing associated with inferior people, as in colonialism. Such destruction has been called an 'epistemicide' that has "disempowered [oppressed] societies, rendering them incapable of representing the world as their own in their own terms, and thus of considering the world as susceptible to being changed by their own power and for their own objectives" (de Sousa Santos, 2018, p. 8).

There is a need to reconnect science with consciousness and conscience: scientists must be self-reflective, including about the real-world consequences of their work, and the power of science and technology requires ethical and political control (Morin, 1990). Thus, marketing and consumer researchers need to engage in critical performativity, reflexivity, and denaturalization, notably to counter the ideology that market processes are natural rather than artifactual (Fournier & Grey, 2000; Tadajewski, 2016). Integrative systemics endorses the four sets of institutional imperatives that comprise the ethos of modern science according to Merton (1942/1973): universalism, communism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. Universalism implies that truth claims should be evaluated based on preestablished impersonal criteria, not the characteristics of the people making the claims. Communism involves recognizing that because research findings draw on the intellectual heritage and are the products of social collaboration, they should be in the public domain. The promotion of disinterestedness requires institutional controls that promote intellectual honesty rather than personal or political interests while ensuring the moral accountability of researchers. Finally, organized skepticism refers to temporarily suspending judgment and examining established habits without adherence to dogma. Such imperatives conform with slow science and other cooperative and collaborative research models but are at odds with the entrepreneurial-neoliberal model (Stengers, 2018; Thompson, 2017b). They are also consistent with planetary humanism, which the following subsection addresses.

Planetary Humanism

Marketing and consumer researchers often seek to interest marketing scholars and serve marketers' interests, whereas most people "view marketing as deceptive, manipulative, and generally bad" (MacInnis et al., 2020, p. 21; Sheth et al., 2006). An alternative to the money-centric capitalist viewpoint is the human-centric humanist viewpoint (Varey & Pirson, 2013).

However, because some types of humanism are problematic, many scholars have rejected it, adopting positions such as post-humanism and anti-humanism instead (Campbell et al., 2010; Moisander, Valtonen, et al., 2009). Integrative systemics embraces planetary humanism, which we can summarize as promoting the unity-in-diversity and diversity-in-unity of the planet and humanity (Morin, 2016). It recognizes the unity of human and non-human nature and rejects pseudo-humanisms according to which humans are masters and owners of nature, because humans depend on non-human nature more than the other way around. Accordingly, the quest for the human domination of non-human nature degrades both nature and humanity and reflects a scorched earth ideology, the advancement of which is bound to destroy nature and thus precipitate human self-destruction (Morin & Ceruti, 2014). Ecological consciousness requires openness to philosophies of various parts of the world and striving for truly universal visions.

Integrative systemics rejects the many pseudo-humanisms that consider large groups of humanity as sub-human or non-human. Instead, it holds that “dominant groups can ‘give up’ humanism for the simple fact that their humanity is presumed, while other communities have struggled too long for the humanistic prize” (Gordon, 1998, p. 39). It thus agrees with Cova et al. (2013, p. 222) about the need to reorient theory “back to radical interventions with clear commitments to universal ideals of social justice and egalitarianism.” Pseudo-humanisms typically dehumanize parts of humanity, often those construed as ‘other.’ Marketing and consumer researchers must thus address “gender-based identity politics . . . [and] other forms of injustice and oppression based on class, age, and race among others” (Chatzidakis & Maclaran, 2020, p. 8). For example, the color line “is not only about race; it is also about divisions of humankind into borders of denied humanity” (Gordon, 1998, p. 39). According to Césaire (2009), Negritude has helped the world build a genuine universal humanism. He explains that there can be no humanism without universality and dialogue and no dialogue between a person and a caricature. As Morin points out, the universal humanist principles set

out by the French Revolution remained at the abstract level: colonizers appropriated universalism and humanism and excluded the colonized from their scope (Morin & Ramadan, 2014). Moreover, Western-centric pseudo-humanisms tried to escape the contradiction by describing as ‘adult’ and ‘mature’ modern European people, and as ‘immature’ and ‘infantile’ people of other civilizations considered ‘backward’ and ‘primitive,’ thus justifying their subjugation and extermination (Morin & Ceruti, 2014).

Planetary humanism also recognizes how human activity’s non-human products can come to powerfully dominate human and non-human nature (Morin, 1980/2008). Productivism, capitalism, and excessive specialization contribute to technological advances that extend to human and non-human life the organizational model specific to artificial machines. In response to falling rates of profit, financial capital has stimulated “brand infatuation” and consumer credit expansion while encouraging consumers to “take out home equity loans for everything,” thus exacerbating the housing bubble (Dholakia, 2012b, p. 459). Financial capital and multiple forms of fanaticism are akin to a hydra engaging in multiheaded attacks against humanity at a time when humanity has fallen short in its humanism (Hessel & Morin, 2011). Accordingly, people need to realize that they share a community of planetary destiny, which necessitates reducing the spread of capitalism, the hegemony of profit, and financial lobbies’ power. Because marketing concepts may serve to legitimize neoliberalism and serve the interests of financial capital at the expense of the downtrodden, “[r]ecognizing and confronting the innately ideological character of marketing is an imperative” (Eckhardt et al., 2018, p. 314).

Planetary humanism extols the value and dignity of every human being. Beyond states and unions of states, humans are citizens of the same humanity and home planet (Morin, 2006). Thus, planetary humanism seeks to eclectically draw on cultures across history and geography while recognizing their shortcomings and emancipatory potentialities concerning human

solidarity and unity with nature (Morin, 2011). The alternative economic model it seeks is a fair, ecological, social, and solidarity economy within a plural economy. A plural economy encompasses the social economy, the public sector, and the capitalist private sector, including multinationals, and involves overcoming the capitalist economy's omnipotence by prioritizing strict control over financial capital (Hessel & Morin, 2011). As Dholakia (2012b, p. 459) warns, "if people – qua consumers and citizens – do not take actions to dismantle the voracious behemoth of Finanzkapital," the consequences may be tragic.

Conclusion

The current chapter proposed integrative systemics as a novel way of thinking for marketing and consumer research. It argued that the field's paradigm wars essentially involved assumptions aligned either with the Conservative Enlightenment or the Counter-Enlightenment. Inspired by the works of Mario Bunge and Edgar Morin, it specified the semantic, logical, ontological, epistemological, and ethical assumptions of integrative systemics in the tradition of the Radical Enlightenment. It suggested ways to reconcile a single reality with multiple realities, semantic meaning with pragmatic meaning, and single truth with multiple truths as an alternative to prevalent mutually exclusive accounts. Moreover, in contrast with the opposition of deductive and inductive thinking, it maintained that research typically requires a combination of deductive, inductive, abductive, and analogical reasoning. It further proposed a multilevel, systemic, and process-relational ontology that accounts for materiality and (inter)subjectivity and recognizes the roles of chance and multidirectional causality. Previous accounts often deemed such elements incompatible. Against ontological constructivism and the spectator theory of knowledge, the chapter offered a realist constructivist epistemology and an associated interpretation of the scientific method. It argued for the transdisciplinary integration of knowledge as an alternative to reductionist and

disjunctive approaches that inflated paradigm incommensurability claims have buttressed. It defended science while critiquing its models and calling for more consciousness and conscience in its practice by upholding research ethics and planetary humanism. Together, the assumptions of integrative systemics provide foundations for transcending “divided academic disciplines” and addressing “systemic global problems” (Arnould & Thompson, 2019, p. 113). Integrative systemics is not a paradigm to impose on others but a way to move beyond the trenches of the past. It supports scholars’ endeavors for a more constructive dialogical inquiry into marketing and consumer research assumptions. However, given the incentives in place, readers may wish to decline the invitation because of other engagements. Even then, they should find within the assumptions of integrative systemics elements they can eclectically draw upon to pave new ways forward for their research. The current chapter has specified the assumptions of integrative systemics. The following chapter applies it to rethink the conceptual foundations of consumption and production systems.

Chapter 3.

Consumption and Production: An Integrative Systemic Account

How should we conceptualize consumption and production systems? The current chapter elucidates the concepts of consumption, production, consumption and production systems, behavior, habit(u)s, practices, and resources, drawing on sources ranging from philosophy to international statistical frameworks. Marketing and consumer researchers have built and used an increasingly complex conceptual and terminological repertoire. They have explained consumption in such terms as journeys and experiences, habits and habitus, behaviors and practices, and resources of all kinds. Enriching the repertoire helps denote continually changing realities and designate reflections about them in more precise terms. However, the ever-growing repertoire also increases the likelihood of conceptual confusion: “several key terms are applied, some defined, some not, some different concepts share the same definitions and some same are defined differently” (Tähtinen & Havila, 2019, p. 550). The field still needs to elucidate even basic concepts. “It is a curious fact,” for example, “that those who write about consumption almost never define the term” (Graeber, 2011, p. 491). The observation that consumption research “still lacks theoretical consolidation” remains valid (Warde, 2005, p. 131). Moreover, the focus on consumption has come at the expense of addressing production. Whereas prioritizing consumption over production may have been necessary to remedy the earlier opposite prioritization, “theoretical reconciliation cannot be far away” (Warde, 2017, p. 224).

A significant impediment for theoretical reconciliation and consolidation is the dominance of the productivist neoliberal academic model that fosters disjunctive and reductionist ‘nothing-but’ thinking (Huxley, 1947; Morin, 2000). Marketing and consumer researchers have cultivated the “tendency to think and act in ways . . . continuous with the

ideals of efficiency and competitiveness used to justify [the] neoliberal transformations of the University,” including the “truncation of the intellectual enterprise in the name of efficiency” (Thompson, 2017b, p. 9). Consequently, researchers typically lack time to engage with anything but the most recent or most-cited publications in their narrow specialization (Brown, 2018). Moreover, competition for scarce resources pushes researchers to seek minor, quick, and safe contributions while exaggerating their novelty and difference (Firat & Dholakia, 2017a). Such circumstances impede integrative thinking and conceptual development, thus narrowing researchers’ theoretical and methodological lenses, notably because researchers often ignore the history of thought (Pham, 2013; Tadjewski & Saren, 2008). Researchers are also more likely to use approaches routinely rather than reflectively.

Marketing and consumer researchers are increasingly seeking to address the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), although often adopting problematic lenses (Davies et al., 2020). Shove (2010, pp. 1274, 1275) rightly challenges the assumptions of the prevalent behavioral paradigm, notably that “environmental damage is a consequence of individual action,” that context is “an external causal variable,” and that societal outcomes are attributable solely to “individual behaviour and personal responsibility.” Such assumptions reflect the micro-reductionist individualism prevalent in academia and public policy in the United Kingdom and other countries in the neoliberal era. A nuanced reading of Shove’s seminal text must also acknowledge its shortcomings. It has inspired scholars to reject the ABC model of attitude-behavior-choice as a policy paradigm (Barr & Prillwitz, 2014; Gregson & Crang, 2015). Unbeknownst to those scholars, the model is Shove’s creation. It does not resonate with psychologists, for whom C refers to context, nor does it resonate with neoclassical economists, for whom choices are behaviors influenced by preferences, not attitudes (Guagnano et al., 1995; Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Stern, 2000). When confronted about her misrepresentation by Whitmarsh et al. (2011), Shove (2011) invokes paradigm incommensurability to defend the

claim that “[o]n all the counts that matter, social theories of practice on the one hand, and of behaviour on the other, are like chalk and cheese” (Shove, 2010, p. 1279). Whereas Shove’s critique of the dominant behavioral paradigm is welcome, such a position concerning behavioral theories is problematic. It legitimizes the dominant micro-reductionist, market-centric, variance paradigm as the sole representative of behavioral approaches and creates an artificial divide between practices and behaviors. Practice theories and behavioral theories can compete because they are referentially commensurable. Shove opposes practices to behaviors, yet key references define social practices as behaviors of some kind (Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki, 1996). That is, practices are to behaviors as kinds of cheese are to cheese. Accordingly, their respective theories need not be like chalk and cheese. Instead, there is an opportunity to reconceptualize behaviors and practices to avoid reductionisms and open avenues for theoretical reconciliation.

The current chapter provides an integrative systemic account of consumption and production that transcends the opposition of behavioral and practice theories. Integrative systemics seeks to continue the Radical Enlightenment project, which held needs, passions, and desires as necessary and welcome features of life that, if used well, can contribute to lasting happiness, rather than construing them as opposed to reason as per Conservative Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment views (Holbach, 1774; Israel, 2019). The chapter offers a multilevel account of consumption and production systems, a dispositional account of behavior and habit, a behavioral account of practices, and a practice account of resources. By offering understandings of consumption and production at the eventual, physical, chemical, biological, mental, social, and artifactual levels, the chapter enables breaking with the market-centric accounts that have dominated marketing and consumer research. It also contributes to the theoretical reconciliation of consumption with production and informs discussions around the SDGs. The dispositional account of behavior and habit, which is “opposed to the Cartesian

philosophy of action,” is often prone to misinterpretation (Bourdieu, 2002/2016, p. 44). A significant reason is that the distinction between dispositions and occurrences has been “suppressed by the positivist philosophy of science” (Bunge, 1977, p. 183). The account of behaviors and practices developed here demonstrates the falsity of claiming the “impossibility of producing a single theoretically integrated narrative” (Shove, 2011, p. 263). In addition to reconciling behavioral and practice theories, the chapter associates its conceptualizations with philosophical and statistical conceptual frameworks that enable studying habits, behaviors, practices, and resources at multiple levels.

A Multilevel Account of Consumption and Production Systems

Researchers who use the word ‘consumption’ unreflectively from a market-centric perspective may become unknowing propagators of neoliberalism (Askegaard, 2014; Fitchett et al., 2014; Graeber, 2011). Moreover, those who give primacy to either consumption or production ignore that the same process may be both consumptive and productive (Marx, 1859/1971). The present section considers different possible interpretations of consumption and production processes at the seven levels of reality specified in Chapter 2: eventual, physical, chemical, biological, mental, social, and artifactual (Blitz, 1992; Bunge, 2012; Romero, 2018). As discussed in Chapter 2, a level is a collection of events or entities characterized by a bundle of properties. Because our interest is in consumption and production systems, we need to use the distinction introduced earlier between systems and aggregates: every component of a system has a bond to another, a condition that does not apply in aggregates (Bunge, 1998). Thus, economies are consumption and production systems because no economic actor exists in isolation. In contrast, the aggregate production of corn and the aggregate consumption of sugar do not necessitate bonds among their elements. The distinction between systems and aggregates is essential because, as already discussed, every system has at

least one emergent qualitative property that its parts lack, and it lacks at least one submergent qualitative property that its parts have (Bunge, 2003/2014). For example, biological systems have the property of life that physical systems lack, and artifactual systems have the property of being human-made but lack properties that humans have. We can now consider possible interpretations of consumption and production. In doing so, it will be helpful to provide some illustrations from the SDGs for each level. These illustrations do not imply that any of the goals is achievable at a single level alone. For practical purposes, when working on a particular SDG, the starting point should be identifying all levels of reality relevant for its achievement.

Eventual level.—Following Romero (2018), integrative systemics assumes that material entities are clusters of events and processes and that energy is the capacity to generate new events. At the eventual level, we can conceptualize production as the generation of new events and consumption as the occurrence of events. The eventual level is necessary for a dynamic view of the universe: it makes all material entities changeable, thus enabling material consumption and production. We can capture the eventual level by specifying that consumption and production systems are dynamic all the way down.

Physical level.—We can distinguish a general and a special sense of consumption and production at the physical level. In a general physical sense, both consumption and production coincide in the same energy conversion process, the transformation of energy from one form to another. There are as many kinds of energy as kinds of processes, and the different kinds of energy are mutually equivalent (Bunge, 2012). For example, wind turbines can convert wind energy into electrical energy. Ecological considerations about energy consumption and production, such as references to clean energy in SDG 7, occur at this level. In a special sense, when energy conversion involves macro-physical entities, production refers to their formation, whereas consumption notably refers to their degradation, deterioration, damaging, destruction, or depletion. Accordingly, to consume is “to destroy, to use up, to waste, to exhaust” (Williams,

2015, p. 42). In both the general and special senses, consumption and production processes are consistent with the law of conservation of energy, according to which the total average energy of an isolated concrete object does not change over time (Bunge, 2012). Hence, physical entities are not creations from nothing; they are the products of energy transformation processes, and references to value ‘creation’ are unwarranted in a physical sense. The indicators of SDG 12 on responsible consumption and production mainly refer to this level.

Chemical level.—At the chemical level, consumption and production processes typically refer to chemical reactions that involve rearranging the molecular or ionic structure of substances. The consumption of the initial substances or reactants yields products. For example, the consumption of baking soda (sodium bicarbonate) and vinegar (weak acetic acid) produces water, carbon dioxide, and sodium acetate. Discussions of greenhouse gas emissions concerning SDG 13 on climate change refer to this level.

Biological level.—At the physical and chemical levels, consumption and production can occur without either consumers or producers. In contrast to the physical and chemical levels, at the biological level consumers and producers are identifiable at both the ecological level and the level of organisms. At the ecological level, it is useful to distinguish between autotrophs and heterotrophs (Strong, 2008). Autotrophs produce nutritional organic substances by consuming simple inorganic substances such as carbon dioxide. Autotrophs include chemotrophs and phototrophs, with chemotrophs deriving energy from the oxidation of simple chemical compounds, and phototrophs such as green plants and algae using energy from sunlight to synthesize organic compounds for nutrition. In contrast with autotrophs, heterotrophs derive their nutritional requirements from the consumption of complex organic substances. Heterotrophs encompass biotrophs and saprotrophs. Biotrophs consume living organisms and include herbivores and carnivores. Saprotrophs such as earthworms and maggots feed on dead organic material. Such considerations enable addressing concerns such

as biodiversity, sustainable agriculture, and sustainable diets. For example, worms consume organic waste, increase plant growth, and are high in protein, thus offering an ecological alternative to red meat. The ecological level is particularly relevant for SDG 14 on life below water and SDG 15 on life on land.

We can distinguish consumption and production *of* organisms and consumption and production *by* organisms. Going back to the etymology of the term ‘consumption,’ consumption of organisms means death, whereas production of organisms means ontogeny. Consumption by organisms involves entry into the body, which for human mammals may occur through such routes as inhalation, absorption, ingestion, and injection (US EPA, 1995). Inhalation is the breathing in of gases through the lungs. Absorption can be through the skin or eyes, as when using hand cream or eye drops. Ingestion includes eating and drinking. Injection typically involves using a needle or syringe to put a liquid in the body, like insulin shots. Meanwhile, production encompasses excretion, eliminating metabolic waste from the body. Excretion notably includes exhalation, perspiration, urine, feces, and detoxification. Such processes are central to sustaining healthy human lives and ensuring water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) improvements, in line with SDG 3 on good health and wellbeing and SDG 6 on clean water and sanitation.

At the level of organisms, we can also interpret consumption as total energy expenditure. Its components notably include basal metabolism, metabolic response to food, activity-related energy expenditure, the energy cost of growth, and energy requirements of pregnancy and lactation (United Nations University et al., 2004). For example, the human brain accounts for about 20 percent of the oxygen and calories consumed by the body, although it represents about 2 percent of body weight (Raichle & Gusnard, 2002). At this level, we can understand production as energy intake, which usually occurs because of ingestion, notably of food and drink (and medicine when necessary), and more rarely through injection, like nutrient

injections. Because the rate of change of energy stores is the difference between the energy intake rate and the energy expenditure rate, a chronic imbalance between energy intake and energy expenditure results in obesity (Galgani & Ravussin, 2008). Indicators regarding hunger and malnutrition in SDG 2 relate mainly to the level of organisms.

Mental level.—At the mental level, we can distinguish a higher level of abstraction, in which the products are ideas or information, and a lower level of abstraction, in which the products are experiences, including experiences of ideational, signaling, and interpretative processes. With ideas as products, production refers to the creation of ideas and consumption to the adoption of ideas. When the production and consumption of an idea do not coincide in the same person, the diffusion of ideas links their producers to their consumers (Rogers, 2003). With information as product, production refers to encoding or signaling and consumption to decoding or interpretation (Hall, 2001). With experiences as products, we can understand production as living, the flow of processes that people go through, also known as their journey. Journeys can be collective, as in the case of social movements. We can further construe consumption as experiencing the journey from a first-person perspective, in situ (Allen, 2002). Phenomenologists refer to the ‘for-me-ness’ of experience: “my experiences appear to me” (Guillot, 2017, p. 50). The first-person nature of experience implies that only the experiencing agents have direct access to it. A first-person perspective can be in the plural. A family can recall its shared stories as a collective experience. That is, we can also refer to the ‘for-us-ness’ of experience. A snapshot of experience at any point in time is the experienced situation. Situations are “the units of experience” (Dewey, 1939/2008, p. 29). Experience is “made up of the successive construing of events [and thus] not constituted merely by the succession of events themselves” (Kelly, 1955/1991, p. 52). Such construing has been referred to as giving meaning to the events. It may involve making judgments about value(s), including appreciation

(Warde, 2017). Ideas, information, and experiences are critical for a range of sustainability concerns, notably SDG 4 on quality education and SDG 5 on gender equality.

The conceptualization of journeys and experiences adopted here avoids the consumerist bias associated with much of the experiential consumption literature and provides much-needed conceptual clarity for the consumer journey literature. For example, Holbrook and Hirschman (1982, p. 132) take a one-sided view of the consumption of goods and services as “involving a steady flow of fantasies, feelings, and fun,” ignoring that it can also involve avalanches of harsh realities, cold truths, and wretchedness. However, their one-sidedness was partly in reaction to the one-sidedness of functionalism, which largely ignored the experiential side. Confusingly, Lemon and Verhoef (2016, pp. 71, 74) explain journeys and experiences in terms of each other while defining each as the other: their paper on ‘Understanding Customer Experience Throughout the Customer Journey’ depicts the customer journey as “the process a customer goes through . . . that makes up the customer experience,” and “customer experience as a customer’s ‘journey.’” The conceptualization developed here is also at odds with Pine and Gilmore’s (1999, p. 12) view of an organization as “an experience stager [that] no longer offers goods and services alone but the resulting experience” and Schmitt’s (1999, p. 54) claim that products are “no longer bundles of functional characteristics but rather are means to provide and enhance customer experiences.” From a phenomenological perspective, experiences are not offerings on par with goods and services. Pine and Gilmore (1999, p. 12) view customer experiences as “created within the customer” by enterprises. Such a view recalls the notion of inception in the *Inception* movie, whereby corporations plant ideas in people’s dreams: “This is inception. The seed of the idea we plant will grow in this man’s mind. It’ll change him. It might even come to define him” (Nolan & Nolan, 2010, pp. 84–85). It is more fruitful to consider that an organization influences its stakeholders’ experiences to the extent that it controls their lives. Even then, however, it is the experiencing agents, whether individual or

collective, who produce and consume their experiences. Because no person is an island, journeys are co-produced: others can influence them, and the subsequent changes in the journeys may afford different experiences. Experiences can be neither transferred to others nor directly accessed or created by others; nevertheless, experiencing agents can communicate about them (Gallagher & Varga, 2014).

Social level.—At the social level, we can conceptualize production as the production of goods and services, which involves intermediate consumption, namely the consumption of labor power and means of production (Marx, 1867/1990). Final consumption is the use of goods and services to satisfy individual needs or wants or the community's collective needs (European Commission et al., 2009). Final consumption is thus the production of people by means of people (Graeber, 2011). Collective final consumption may include general public services, defense, public order and safety, economic affairs, environmental protection, and housing and community amenities (European Commission et al., 2009). Consumers, at the social level, are the users of goods and services. We can distinguish different levels of aggregation of consumers and producers: individuals and groups at the micro level, institutional units at the meso level, and sectors and economies at the macro level. The total economy refers to the entire set of resident institutional units, consisting of five institutional sectors: households, non-profit institutions serving households, general government, non-financial corporations, and financial corporations (ibid.). This level is particularly relevant for SDG 5 on gender equality, SDG 8 concerning decent work, SDG 9 on industry, innovation, and infrastructure, SDG 11 on sustainable cities and communities, SDG 16 on peace, justice, and strong institutions, and SDG 17 notably in relation to internet use.

Such consumption and production processes are social because social groups engage in them. However, the goods produced are artifactual; they are products of human activity rather than found in nature. Moreover, institutional units other than households are legal entities and

are thus artifactual, created either for political or production purposes. Even in legal entities, the production and consumption of goods and services are social rather than artifactual because the material processes are fundamentally the same as for individuals or groups. Supporting such a position is the concept of the informal economy, which, according to the International Labour Organization (ILO), refers to all economic activities by workers and economic units not covered or insufficiently covered by formal arrangements, whether in law or practice (ILO, 2015). Informal enterprises are unincorporated and are thus part of households. For example, a family growing vegetables in the informal economy may consume a certain quantity and allocate the rest for others' consumption without clearly separating the two types of activities. Hence, whether production and consumption processes are attributable to formal or informal enterprises does not significantly change their material properties at the social level. The differences arise at the artifactual level. The two main criteria for an enterprise to be formal are whether the enterprise is a separate legal entity independent of its owners and whether it has complete accounts permitting a financial separation of its productive activities from its owners' other activities (Hussmanns, 2004).

Before addressing the artifactual level, to guard against micro-reductionist understandings that consider agents separately from their environment, it is worth noting that while consumption and production are attributable to organisms at the biological, mental, and social levels, they involve changes in both the organism and the environment. Problems arise when the energy required by the organism exceeds the energy available in the environment, as in the depletion of available food reserves in a specific context, or because of social processes such as competition for resources or perceived and actual inequality even when the energy available in the environment suffices, as in the unequal distribution of food reserves. McEwen and Wingfield (2003) refer to the two types of problems as Type 1 and Type 2 allostatic overload. In response to Type 1, a person may go into survival mode (as in food rationing), an

escape response that decreases the energy required or allostatic load, thus restoring a positive energy balance. In response to Type 2, a person may increase her energy consumption as reflected in stress-induced eating; if the situation leading to the overload is transitory, the overload is temporary. Otherwise, it can lead to health concerns such as chronic obesity, hypertension, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease. Because it is partly socially determined, Type 2 allostatic overload “can only be counteracted through learning [to change one’s behavior] and changes in the social structure” (McEwen & Wingfield, 2003, p. 2). Questions of income and property distribution are artifactual, as discussed next.

Artifactual level.—At the artifactual level, we can identify at least three senses of consumption and production. First, in relation to economic value, we can interpret production as referring to creating or transforming economic value, and consumption as referring to extinguishing economic value. Second, in relation to money, we can understand producing as earning and consuming as spending. Third, in relation to market exchange, we can construe production as selling and consumption as buying. Thus, artifactually consumption and production processes involve changes in property and money, both of which are social constructions. For accounting purposes, net value added is the value of output less the values of both intermediate consumption and consumption of fixed capital. Institutional units acquire goods and services when they become the new owners of the goods or upon completion of service delivery (European Commission et al., 2009). Note that the acquisition of services is synonymous with the use of services. In contrast, the acquisition of goods is artifactual because it is a change of ownership that does not involve using the goods, although it may enable such use. Whereas consumption at other levels is a material transformation, at the artifactual level, consumption is a transfer, either of property or financial resources. Actual final consumption measures the amount of consumption goods and services acquired. The System of National Accounts (SNA) defines expenditures on goods and services as the values of the amounts that

buyers pay, or agree to pay, to sellers in exchange for goods or services that sellers provide to them or to other institutional units designated by the buyers (ibid.). Accordingly, at the artifactual level, transactions are the connections between producers and consumers. The artifactual level is particularly relevant for SDG 1 on poverty, SDG 10 on reduced inequalities, SDG 8 concerning economic growth, and SDG 17 on partnerships for the goals. Their indicators notably refer to official development assistance, aid, poverty lines, income, government expenditures, financial flows, remittance costs, recruitment costs, gross domestic product (GDP), all of which are in monetary terms. Table 3.1 presents in summary form a multilevel conceptualization of consumption and production.

TABLE 3.1. MULTIPLE INTERPRETATIONS OF CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION

Levels	Production	Consumption
Artifactual	Creating or transforming economic value	Extinguishing economic value
	Earning	Spending
	Selling	Buying
Social	Producing goods and services	Using goods and services
Mental	Encoding, Signaling	Decoding, Interpreting
	Creating ideas	Adopting ideas
	Experiencing from a first-person perspective	Living, Journey
Biological	Ontogeny	Death
	Excretion	Entry into the body
	Total energy expenditure	Energy intake
Chemical	Chemical reactions	Chemical reactions
Physical	Energy conversion	Energy conversion
	Formation of entities	Degradation, deterioration, damaging, destruction, or depletion of entities
Eventual	Generation of new events	Occurrence of events

Source: Author.

At the social level, final consumption is the production of people by means of people. At the artifactual level, capitalist production is the production of “commodities from commodities (raw materials, machinery, etc.) by means of commodities (the labour power of wage labourers)” (Jackson, 1936, p. 299). A woman playing her drum kit uses it, irrespective of how she got access to it. She may have bought it, rented it, inherited it, received it as a gift, borrowed it, stolen it, or made it herself. As Askegaard (2014) rightly notes, calling such use ‘consumption’ points to market considerations. However, as argued here, consumption in the

sense of use and consumption in the sense of acquisition are two different processes; they occur at different levels. A woman may buy a drum kit but never use it; the transaction still counts as consumption at the artifactual level.

Scholars have recognized that using the terminology of market transactions where they do not exist promulgates the market ideology associated with neoliberalism (Askegaard, 2014; Fitchett et al., 2014; Graeber, 2011). Saying that a man who plays the flute consumes it, even if he made it from a bamboo stick that he fetched himself, serves ideological, not informative, purposes. In societies where the capitalist mode of production prevails, consumption and production systems typically refer to systems of creation, transformation, exchange, transfer, or extinction of economic value (European Commission et al., 2009). Such an interpretation is accurate only at the artifactual level. Flattening all levels to the artifactual naturalizes market processes and outcomes in the service of capitalist ideology (Graeber, 2011). As an alternative, the integrative systemic account offers multiple interpretations of consumption and production processes at different levels. Such an account enables a novel conceptualization of consumption and production systems as dynamic multilevel systems of persons producing goods, services, and waste and using them, with associated physical, chemical, biological, mental, social, and artifactual processes that interplay with the environment. Such a conceptualization requires explicating what people do when they produce and use goods, services, and waste. Accordingly, the following section addresses people's behaviors and habits.

A Dispositional Account of Behavior and Habit

The present section provides a dispositional account of behavior that offers conceptual elucidations of habit and habitus. Based on a review of more than 100 sources and a survey of 174 behavioral scientists, Levitis et al. (2009, p. 108) define behavior as “the internally coordinated responses (actions or inactions) of whole living organisms (individuals or groups)

to internal and/or external stimuli, excluding responses more easily understood as developmental changes.” Drawing on the state-of-the-art in multiple fields of research, for reasons that will become clear, it is helpful to conceptualize human behavior as encompassing parallel simulation, perception, enaction, and control processes that interplay with the environment. Therefore, the integrative systemic study of behavior in consumption and production systems entails paying attention to all levels of reality.

Simulation.—Simulation is mental construction in the absence of direct sensory data. It includes imagination, conceptualization, and interpretation (Barsalou, 2009; Hesslow, 2012; Mullally & Maguire, 2014). Imagination is the production of mental images, notably recall of the past, anticipation of the future, and fantasy. Recall is (re)construction of the past; it does not entail having a copy of the past in a mental drawer. A person may remember the same events differently at different times.

Perception.—Perception includes exteroception, proprioception, and interoception. Perception involves active construction, not the copying of objective reality (Piaget, 1992). Exteroception is the perception of external stimuli, including vision, hearing, touch, smell, and taste. Proprioception is the perception of the position and movement of one’s body. Interoception is the perception of internal stimuli, such as thirst, hunger, and other basic feelings. Interoception is the basis of affect. Affect has both valence and arousal aspects, which are basic features of human experience. According to the theory of constructed emotion, perceiving an emotion involves associating similar experiences of affect with a concept (Barrett, 2017).

Enaction.—Enaction refers to motor behavior, including processes such as posture, locomotion, manual action, and facial action (Adolph & Franchak, 2017). It includes verbal or discursive behavior, which involves the use of language, whether spoken, written, or signed.

Control.—Behavioral control encompasses cognitive (perceptual and simulative) and motor (enactive) control processes and their coordination. It notably covers memory integration, memory retrieval, cognitive flexibility, planning, monitoring, updating, strategy evaluation and application, as well as attention and inhibitory control (Wegmann et al., 2020). Control processes may vary along a multidimensional spectrum ranging from “deliberative behavior controls to the nearly automatic, scarcely conscious control that we associate with acting through habit” (Graybiel, 2008, p. 378). The multidimensionality of deliberation and automaticity implies that processes cannot fall neatly into a specific type.

Behavior always involves interplay with the environment: no behavior can occur without energy exchanges with the environment. From an integrative systemic perspective, organism, environment, and organism-environment are systems. It is a micro-reductionist fallacy to construe an organism detached from any environment and a macro-reductionist fallacy to construe an environment separated from any organism. Our assertion does not mean that a natural, social, or artefactual system ceases to exist in the absence of the organism, but that it becomes an environment only in relation to that which it environs. Organism and environment depend on each other and complement each other (Gibson, 1986/2015). There is a relationship of mutuality (Costall, 2004). Because of the mutuality of organism and environment, a person’s behavior is adaptive, with adaptation understood in a two-fold sense. The first is “adaptation *of* the environment to our activities,” known as niche construction, a broad term that implicitly includes niche destruction (Dewey, 1916, p. 56; Laland et al., 2016; Odling-Smee, 1988). The second is adaptation “*of* our activities *to* the environment,” known as behavioral plasticity, which is a form of phenotypic plasticity (Dewey, 1916, p. 56; Price et al., 2003). Lewin (1935) encapsulates the view that behavior involves interplay between person and environment in the function: $B = f(PE)$. Bourdieu (1988) refers to it as ontological complicity between the two.

From a dispositional perspective, we can add that a person's behavior can only occur if it is compatible with the intrinsic and extrinsic dispositions of the person and the environment and their joint dispositions. Following Vetter (2015), a disposition or potentiality is a graded possibility. Although unobservable, dispositions are real. For a child to eat an apple, the child must have the intrinsic disposition of eating apples, and the apple must have the intrinsic disposition of edibility. Together, the child and the apple have the joint disposition of the child eating the apple. Cristiano Ronaldo has a stronger disposition of recognizability than most people. His recognizability is an extrinsic disposition because it entirely depends on other people recognizing him. If he traveled back in time to the nineteenth century, his recognizability would disappear. Among the dispositions that people have are their habits.

Despite the “*historically* and *contemporarily* pre-eminent role for the concept of habit in marketing theory,” marketing and consumer research “largely fails to acknowledge its foundational status” (Tadajewski, 2019, p. 448). Tadajewski highlights the attention given to the term ‘habit’ in the history of thought, but he does not recognize that different scholars attribute conflicting significations to it. The present section offers an account of habits that avoids significant problems in previous understandings. The starting point is conceptualizing habits as learned behavioral dispositions, “retain[ed] residues of experience of such a nature as to guide, bias, or otherwise influence later behavior” (Campbell, 1963, p. 97). People acquire habits via experience-dependent plasticity, “the capacity to retain and carry over from prior experience factors which modify subsequent activities” (Dewey, 1916, p. 54; Graybiel, 2008).

Accordingly, behavior is said to be habitual to the extent that it relies on habits learned from similar experiences rather than deliberation. The distinction between habitual and non-habitual behavior is more accurately between automatic and deliberative behavior, a distinction that involves multidimensional continua rather than a unidimensional dichotomy (Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018). A person who drinks coffee every morning does it habitually: she relies on her

retained coffee-drinking experiences to shape her coffee drinking. In contrast, a person who drinks coffee for the first time has no such previous experience; yet she still relies on her habits to engage in the behavior, such as how she holds a cup and sips a hot drink. All behaviors thus depend on habits, including habits developed by the fetus before birth. A fetus can retain memory traces of such experiences as parental movements, touch, music, and speech, which can alter the infant's behavior, physiology, and later construal of the universe (Lang et al., 2020): “[o]nly a being with habits could have a mind like ours” (Noë, 2009, p. 98). Moreover, “knowledge is habit” (Peirce, 1906, p. 496). That is, to know something is to have retained residues of experience of that thing that can influence later behavior.

Because of the unity of experience, the aspects of experience retained in habits may involve a combination of simulation, perception, enaction, and control processes. Accordingly, a person's habits are acquired simulative, perceptual, enactive, and control dispositions. Bourdieu (1990) seeks to capture such distinctions using terms such as schemes of perception, conception, thought, appreciation, action, and expression. For example, the habit of eating fast food may encompass multiple aspects of the associated experiences, such as what the person thinks while eating, how she perceives the food, the way she eats it, and whether she pauses to appreciate every bite or gulps it without a second thought. Because different aspects of a person's experiences are interdependent, a person's habits form a system. No habit is independent of all others, and changing a habit typically depends on other habits. For example, habit slips are more likely when the new habit to develop is not well integrated with existing habits (Labrecque et al., 2017). Bourdieu (1993, p. 46) calls a person's system of habits an individual habitus, “a system of dispositions . . . which is the product of all biographical experience, (so that, just as no two individual histories are identical, so no two individual habitus are identical).”

The integrative systemic conceptualization of habit(u)s has several advantages over alternative conceptualizations. It is consistent with the most recent research on habits, even as terminology may vary across disciplines (Balleine & Dezfouli, 2019; Barsalou, 2020; Phillips, 2020). It is also consistent with everyday language: people have habits, whereas behaviors are what people do. In contrast, authors who understand habits as behavioral occurrences of some kind consider that habits are what people do. For Shove (2010, p. 1276), for example, “the idea that habits drive behaviour is really very odd – implying, as it does, that habit is not itself behaviour.” Such confusion is no individual shortcoming. We can trace it back to the historical distinction between an atomistic concept of habit that stresses automaticity and a systemic concept that emphasizes interdependencies between person and environment (Barandiaran & Di Paolo, 2014). As a mechanistic understanding of habit rose to prominence in psychology a century ago, sociologists “purposefully abandoned the venerable concept of habit,” which became “a casualty of sociology’s revolt against behaviorism” (Camic, 1986, pp. 1040, 1071).

In such a context, Bourdieu intentionally avoided the term ‘habits,’ favoring alternatives such as ‘habitus,’ ‘schemes,’ and ‘dispositions’ instead (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Ostrow, 1981). Across his oeuvre, Bourdieu deployed multiple conceptualizations of habitus, many of which are problematic yet still uncritically adopted by scholars, including the notion of habitus as collective tacit knowledge “located in some sort of supraindividual place such as ‘the social’” (Paulson, 2018; Turner, 2014, p. 68). He failed to distinguish between two notions of group habitus, which we can relate to the distinction between aggregate and system: (1) habits similar across individuals of the same group; (2) the joint habits that individuals develop as a group. An example of the first notion is the habit of biking to work or school, an individual disposition that most residents in Copenhagen have. An example of the second notion is the joint habit of carpooling. Although joint habits are emergent properties of a group, each group member must develop habits conducive to group behavior. Such habits may differ

across group members; for example, while we may refer to good transportation habits, the habits of good drivers are not identical with the habits of good passengers.

The integrative systemic conceptualization of habit(u)s is also consistent with people's experiences. It thus contrasts with conceptualizations that impose in their definitions one or more of frequency, repetition, contextual triggering, context stability, and different forms of automaticity, or restricting habitus to group habitus (Arsel & Bean, 2013; Carfagna et al., 2014; Labrecque et al., 2017; Liu-Thompkins & Tam, 2013; Shah et al., 2014; Verplanken & Wood, 2006). Such characterizations often come as justified rejections of overly voluntarist and individualist understandings of behavior. However, going too far in the opposite direction brings about unnecessary conceptual and empirical problems. For example, authors are justified to use frequency and repetition, including in similar contexts, as indicators of habit(u)s, but mistaken to include them in the definition of habit(u)s. The reason is that since dispositions, as potentialities, are unobservable, the evidence for them must be observable in actualities or manifest behaviors. Authors who confine habit(u)s to one or more dimensions of automaticity, including as part of dual-system or dual-process theorizing, use dimensions that are misaligned, internally inconsistent, and empirically unsubstantiated (Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018). There is no doubt that stronger habits can enable people to control related behaviors less deliberately. Scholars, however, should clarify the associated dimensions of automaticity they refer to and validate them empirically rather than including them as necessary features of habit(u)s. The assumption that automaticity, however understood, characterizes habit(u)s and their performance is empirically inaccurate. People can deliberately control their habits, and behaviors are never fully automatic, even in the case of lab rats: "despite the apparent automatic performance of habits, classically considered as outcome-independent and noncognitive, the prefrontal cortex still monitors ongoing contingencies time step by time step, and does so with the capacity to reverse the semiautomatic behavioral expression" (Smith et al., 2012, p. 18937).

The present section has presented integrative systemic accounts of behavior, dispositions, and habit(u)s. The following section proposes a novel conceptualization of practices.

A Behavioral Account of Practices

Practice theorists emphasize the term ‘practice’ but disagree on what the term denotes: “real disagreements exist among them concerning what practices are” (Buch & Schatzki, 2018, p. 2). Shove’s (2010, p. 1279) assertion that efforts to integrate behavioral and practice theories are “doomed to failure” is problematic when neither practices nor behaviors are well defined and when many scholars use both terms interchangeably (Whitmarsh et al., 2011). Defining behavior as observable action, for example, makes it synonymous with practice-as-performance but is at odds with our definition of behavior because it only encompasses enaction (Wilson & Chatterton, 2011). How, then, should we construe practices? An intuitive starting point is that we need to understand ‘practice’ as a count noun rather than a mass noun because we are talking about practices in the plural. There are at least three senses of the mass noun ‘practice.’ They contrast respectively with theory, thought, and lack of practice. First, practice in the sense of reality, as in the expression ‘in practice,’ contrasts with the model of reality, as in the expression ‘in theory.’ Second, practice in the sense of overt behavior contrasts with thought and covert behavior more generally. Third, practice in the sense of doing something repeatedly to develop the skill of doing it contrasts with lack of practice. Neither of the three understandings is compatible with the notion of practices in the plural. Reckwitz (2002, p. 249) thus rejects a combination of the first two senses and affirms that practices mean “something else” than “human action (in contrast to ‘theory’ and mere thinking).” Furthermore, Schatzki (1996, p. 89) recognizes the third sense as “not irrelevant,” yet sets it aside for the discussion of practices, “however vital and practically necessary [it] may be.” From an integrative systemic perspective, theory contrasts with reality, thinking is part of behavior, and

practice in the third sense refers to modifying behaviors and the associated habits. In the three understandings, the mass noun ‘practice’ refers to an undifferentiated unity. In contrast, the count noun ‘practice’ introduces differentiation.

The proposition here is to define the count noun ‘practice’ as ‘class of behavior.’ A class is a “set or category of things having some property or attribute in common and differentiated from others by kind, type, or quality” (Oxford University Press, 2020). Accordingly, ‘practice’ is a count noun that denotes a group of individual instances of behavior. An individual instance of behavior may involve more than one person: a tango performance is an individual instance of behavior, but it takes two to tango. A class of behavior is an aggregate of multiple instances of behavior of the same kind. Because it is an aggregate, a practice is “a temporally unfolding and spatially dispersed nexus of behaviors,” but our definition adds that they must be of the same kind (Schau et al., 2009, p. 31). From the perspective developed here, it would be a mistake to think that two persons separately jogging in different places at different points in time are engaging in two different practices, on the erroneous assumption that each practice is a nexus of a single person’s behaviors. Because both persons engage in behavior of the same kind, both contribute to the same practice. Our formulation thus offers more precision than previous ones. It agrees with Reckwitz (2002, p. 250) that “[t]o say that practices are ‘social practices’ . . . is indeed a tautology,” but only if the practice is widespread and not otherwise. Thus, the first gene-splicing experiment was an instance of a new practice, and it was only after spreading that it now “appears at different locales and at different points of time and is carried out by different body/minds” (ibid.). Our definition thus recognizes the possibility of novel practices, while Reckwitz’s does not.

Moreover, like for the understanding of habit(u)s, there is no need to specify in the definition of practices extraneous properties such as being routinized, in contrast with the definition of practice as “routinized type of behavior” (Reckwitz, 2002, p. 250). Scholars who

take routinization as characteristic of practices hold different understandings of the concept, which may feature repetition by the same individuals, regularity in such repetition, automaticity, lack of awareness, lack of deliberation, or lack of reflection (Echeverri et al., 2012; Fuentes et al., 2019; Holttinen, 2014; Nairn & Spotswood, 2015). Illustrating the undue emphasis on routinization are examples of texts specifying that practices are ‘routinized actions’ but then referring to “routinized practices,” which presumably would be ‘routinized routinized actions’ (La Rocca et al., 2017, p. 190; Thomas & Epp, 2019, p. 583). Such an emphasis is misplaced. Figueiredo and Scaraboto (2016, pp. 511, 514, 527), who understand practices as “routinized actions,” note that “actions . . . performed irregularly . . . do not constitute routinized actions,” and criticize “the practice approach [for] exclud[ing] . . . actions that are not routinized.” The conceptualization proposed here avoids such exclusion.

The definition of practices as classes of behavior is concise, straightforward, and opportune for conceptual clarity in the practice-theoretical literature. The recognition that a person’s behavior involves simulation, perception, enaction, and control processes all interplaying with the environment implies that practices, as classes of behavior, also involve such processes. Prominent practice theorists who exclude people or one or more of these kinds of processes surreptitiously bring them back under another guise. For example, Schatzki (1996, pp. 89, 106) construes a practice as “a temporally unfolding and spatially dispersed nexus of doings and sayings,” “a manifold of doings and sayings (basic actions),” in short, as nexus of motor behaviors. Schatzki (1996, p. 89) then brings non-motor behaviors back as ‘linkages,’ noting that practices “are linked in certain ways” and calling the linkages “the practice’s organization, that is, the understandings, rules, and teleoaffective structure linking the practice’s constituent actions.” Hui et al. (2017a, p. 4) bring them back as ‘suffusing phenomena,’ “providing a kind of atmosphere . . . often intangible in some sense, even though they are grasped by participants, expressed in doings and sayings and materialised in objects.”

In the integrative systemic account, the motor and non-motor behavioral processes underlying practices, including interplay with environment, are as tangible as the practices they compose. Concerning the practice of childcare, for example, child protective services around the world have developed lists of physical and behavioral indicators of child abuse and neglect.

The integrative systemic understanding of practices also resolves conceptual difficulties brought about by “de-centring the human actor” (Shove et al., 2012, p. 22). Schatzki (1996, pp. 90, 102) brings people back as ‘the organization of a practice,’ an all-powerful mistress who “principally coordinates actions by organizing factors that govern participants’ actions,” and “establishes not only that certain actions are correct (in certain situations), but also that other actions are acceptable, even if they are not how one should proceed.” The Schatzkian organizer is analogous to the Walrasian auctioneer of neoclassical economics, “a centralized pricing agent . . . who calls out prices, determines how much of each good would be forthcoming given these prices, and adjusts the prices until excess supply in all markets is zero” (Gintis, 2006, p. 1020). Both lack an adequate concept of emergent patterns in complex systems. “The single individual,” according to Reckwitz (2002, p. 250), “acts as the ‘carrier’ (*Träger*) of . . . practices which need not be coordinated with one another.” Such an understanding fails to distinguish between carrying practices as dispositions and carrying out practices through manifest behaviors. The notion of carrier recalls Marx’s (1867/1990, p. 92) treatment of individuals in *Capital* “only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, the bearers [*Träger*] of particular class-relations and interests.”

Bourdieu (2017, pp. 246–247) was rightly critical of the Althusserian anti-humanist view of the agent as *Träger*, actualization, epiphenomenon, or pure reflection of structure, which fit the tendency of structuralism to make the agent disappear. In Bourdieu’s view, the structuralist readers of Marx fall into the ‘fetishism of social laws.’ Moreover, they adopt an “emanatist vision, which makes a structure . . . into an entelechy developing itself in a process

of self-realization,” and “reduces historical agents to the role of ‘supports’ (*Träger*) of the structure and reduces their actions to mere epiphenomenal manifestations of the structure’s own power to develop itself and to determine and overdetermine other structures” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 41). Porpora (1989) usefully distinguishes between four understandings of social structure: (1) collective rules and resources that structure behavior; (2) lawlike regularities that govern the behavior of social facts; (3) patterns of aggregate behavior that are stable over time; (4) systems of human relationships among social positions. He rightly favors the fourth understanding. However, much of the recent practice literature uses the third understanding of structure but refers to it as practices. In effect, ‘practices’ for many practice theorists play the same role as ‘structure’ for structuralists. Even as the authors aim to provide an alternative to individualist and structuralist accounts, they provide structuralist accounts that relabel social structure in Porpora’s third sense as practices. Bourdieu’s criticism of ‘emanatism’ applies to such accounts. Shove et al. (2012, pp. 120, 156) thus write that “[i]f practices are to survive they need to capture and retain practitioners willing and able to do this integrating and therefore willing and able to keep them alive,” and discuss “how practices maintain and lose their grip and how people become variously faithful and committed carriers.” In short, practices become theological entities, and carrying a practice becomes an act of faith. According to the Pulpit Commentary on Hebrews 10:23, Christian faith depends on the faithful “giv[ing] heed to keeping faith alive in themselves and others especially through the means of the regular Church assemblies.” According to Shove et al. (2012, p. 88), oil transportation “depends on global networks of people capable of faithfully reproducing docking practices when called upon to do so.” The critique developed here does not undermine the valuable insights that adopting “a particular point of view” can provide (Shove et al., 2012, p. 126). However, a particular point of view should be one moment in an analysis that adopts multiple viewpoints. As Ollman (2003, p. 106) explains, when using a vantage point in a specific moment of analysis, the

“qualities that emerge from the use of other vantage points are ignored because for all practical purposes, at this moment in the analysis and for treating this particular problem, they simply don’t exist.” But the analysis itself must use multiple vantage points not to become one-sided. Consequently, our conceptual elucidation enables going beyond such one-sidedness.

The conceptualization developed here is empirically tractable and dispenses with the need for cumbersome terms such as ‘practice-as-entity’ and ‘practice-as-performance’ (Shove & Pantzar, 2007). The two terms refer respectively to a class of behavior and an instance of behavior in that class, in other words, to a definite practice and a definite behavior. Thus, food preparation practices encompass food preparation behaviors. Assigning a specific behavior to a class of behavior depends on the classification criteria used, which can vary in detail and may require discussion among those developing the classification. The International Classification of Activities for Time Use Statistics (ICATUS) of 2016 specifies 165 groups of human activities arranged into 56 divisions and nine major divisions (United Nations Statistics Division, 2017). Practice theorists increasingly recognize the value of analyzing time-use surveys (Plessz & Wahlen, 2020; Southerton et al., 2012). The ICATUS classification uses mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories of all the activities people can undertake in a day. Consistent with our conceptualization, a practice refers to a class of activity and is measured as an aggregate in a particular context, whereas a behavior refers to an individual instance of activity (see Table 3.2).

TABLE 3.2. MAJOR DIVISIONS OF ICATUS 2016

Major Division	Activities
1	Employment and related activities
2	Production of goods for own final use
3	Unpaid domestic services for household and family members
4	Unpaid caregiving services for household and family members
5	Unpaid volunteer, trainee, and other unpaid work
6	Learning
7	Socializing and communication, community participation, and religious practice
8	Culture, leisure, mass-media and sports practices
9	Self-care and maintenance

Source: United Nations Statistics Division (2017).

As per our earlier discussion, the major divisions of activities all involve consumption and production at the general physical and chemical levels. Moreover, all involve consumption at the level of organisms. Self-care and maintenance activities include eating and drinking, which involve consumption at the ecological level and lead to production at the level of organisms. They also encompass personal hygiene and care, including toilet activities, which involve defecation, a form of production of excrements at the ecological level. At the social level, the production of goods and services includes paid work (major division 1) and unpaid work (2 to 5) and is distinguishable from personal activities (6 to 9). It would be tempting to label all personal activities as ‘consumption,’ but there are at least two reasons not to. First, it would be too narrow in some respects since both productive and personal activities typically involve the use of goods and services. Second, it would be too broad in other respects: referring to sleep and related activities as consumption does not make intuitive sense because it is unclear what people consume in such activities. Instead, we may want to refer to personal activities such as resting and sleeping as reproductive. Because the statistical unit of time-use surveys is the individual, ICATUS inadequately captures consumption and production processes at the

artifactual level in the sense of economic flows, although it captures the underlying consumption at the social level, notably shopping. The discussion of behaviors and practices in the present section and the previous one has assumed a distinction between flows and stocks, whereby behaviors and practices are flows. The following section builds on the dispositional account of behavior and habit and the behavioral account of practices to provide a practice account of resources, with resources understood as stocks.

A Practice Account of Resources

The behavioral account of practices has focused on flows such as simulation, perception, enaction, and control processes and interplay with the environment. The present section considers ‘elements’ of practices as a starting point to provide a practice account of resources (Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki, 1996; Shove et al., 2012). According to Reckwitz (2002, p. 249), a practice “consists of several elements, interconnected to one other: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, ‘things’ and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge.” Such an understanding fails to distinguish between doing and having or, more generally, between flows and stocks. The distinction between stocks and flows is central to the SNA, the internationally agreed standard set of recommendations on compiling measures of economic activities (European Commission et al., 2009). Whereas accountants define flows over an interval of time, they define stocks at a specific point in time. Services are flows; goods are stocks. The distinction is also familiar in physics. Kinetic energy is a flow; potential energy is a stock. Stocks include both actualities and potentialities, including dispositions or graded possibilities. Activities, including the use of things, are flows; they are what people do. In contrast, knowledge and things are stocks that people can have, in line with the conceptualization of knowledge as habit. The distinction between stocks and flows clarifies that Reckwitz’s

‘elements’ of practices combine both Schatzki’s (1996) ‘linkages’ of practices, which are flows, and Shove et al.’s (2012) ‘elements’ of practices, namely materials, competences, and meanings, which are stocks.

The practice account of resources relies on the concept of affordances. According to Gibson (1986/2015, p. 119), the “affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill.” It is helpful to construe affordances as joint dispositions of agent and environment. Affordances can be positive for the agent in certain respects and negative in others, depending on how their realization benefits the agent or harms them. In every situation a person faces, there is a field of affordances that lies ahead. For example, potable water affords health-beneficial drinking, whereas polluted water affords health-harming drinking. Even when affordances exist, a person may not be aware of them or may misconstrue them, as when mistaking herbicide for potable water. Whereas at the individual level, the environment provides an individual in a particular situation with a field of affordances, at the aggregate level, the environment provides a population with a landscape of affordances (Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014).

Given the distinction developed in the previous section between behaviors and practices, a field of affordances refers to behavioral possibilities, whereas a landscape of affordances refers to practice possibilities. We can refer to parts of the environment offering positive affordances in certain respects as resources in these respects and parts of the environment offering negative affordances in other respects as liabilities in those respects. For an individual in a thirsty situation, polluted water is a liability: the individual would derive woe from drinking it. At the level of a population, polluted water is also a liability for similar reasons, but it can become a resource if an active water purification plant exists: the population would derive weal from it. Accordingly, whether something is a resource depends on the reference frame, including the agents we relate them to, the relevant practices, and the

evaluation dimensions. Defining resources as offering a field of affordances, meaning behavioral possibilities for individuals, generates conceptual complications. A baby bottle filled with milk would not be a resource for a baby who could not reach or hold it. A television set would not be a resource for a couple who went outside for a walk since they could not watch it from the park. Food would not be a resource for someone asleep because the person could not eat it while sleeping. Consequently, an adequate account of resources requires defining them as offering a landscape of affordances, meaning practice possibilities for a population.

Beyond the focus on humanity, we can consider parts of the system encompassing a species or higher taxon and its environment as resources (liabilities) for the species or higher taxon in certain respects, to the extent that they afford or facilitate (deny or impede) practices that benefit (harm) it in these respects. The notion of a taxon, which biologists use to refer to a taxonomic group of any rank, enables a high level of generality. Such an understanding of resources and liabilities has several implications for practice theory. First, referring to species or higher taxon allows extending the conceptualization of practices beyond the human species, consistent with the multilevel account of consumption and production. For example, clean freshwater is a resource for multitudes of non-human living organisms at the biological level. Second, such an understanding nuances the concepts of resources and liabilities by incorporating graded possibility and multidimensional relationality. A book may be a resource for learning, but not for those who cannot read it. A phonebook is a resource for people looking for phone numbers, but not so for those seeking to study ancient history, for whom the potentiality of spending hours flipping through a phonebook's pages to find Nefertiti's biography may make the phonebook a liability. Third, the conceptualization developed here clarifies that resources need not be appropriated, consistent with the understanding that consumption as appropriation occurs only at the artifactual level. The sun is a resource for many forms of life, but nobody owns it yet. A vacant residential building is a resource because

it affords shelter; denying the homeless access to it does not make it less of a resource. Fourth, the integrative systemic account defines resources in terms of potential beneficiaries. A bicycle is a resource because it affords transportation, but only for those with the habit or acquired disposition to ride it. Fifth, the reference to system parts and environment recognizes the importance of relational structures, including internally, externally, and with the environment. Atoms of hydrogen and oxygen make water only within a specific configuration. Bees of a locality cannot pollinate flowers on a different continent. Silicon does not contribute to computer processing except within a particular configuration.

The integrative systemic account offers an empirically tractable alternative to the “deliberately streamlined approach” that defines practices “by interdependent relations between materials, competences and meanings” (Shove et al., 2012, p. 24). It considers that resources afford practices but do not define them. Taking humanity as the species of interest, we can differentiate three types of resources: biopsychosocial, techno-ecological, and institutional. Biopsychosocial resources refer to humanity, including human bonds and the constituents of human bodies. Every human being is bonded to at least another human being, and human bonds enable cooperation and competition. A single person may not be able to build a dam alone, but an organized group can. Human bodies’ constituents should be understood in a broad sense, including genes, cells, blood, nerves, organs, and habits, to name a few. Some constituents are separable from individual bodies, as in blood transfusion or organ donation. Others, such as habits, are not. Although habits are physically untransferable, they can be learned and taught.

At the biological level, children are products of biological reproductive processes. At the social level, children are products of social reproduction. Social reproduction activities are productive in a general sense. Such activities are work, irrespective of whether the work is paid or unpaid, and whether it yields market or non-market output (United Nations Statistics

Division, 2017). However, economic statistics ignore most of them. The reason is that the SNA operational definition of production uses what is known as the third-party criterion. It considers practices as productive only if it is possible to employ other persons to perform them in one's stead (European Commission et al., 2009). For example, childcare is a productive activity at the social level because it can be entrusted to others. Scholars have raised concerns about the SNA's inconsistent operationalization of the third-party criterion, which is social, and its use of an implicit market criterion that construes production at the artifactual level. The implicit market criterion under-represents women's production practices and those practices characteristic of developing countries (Wood, 1997). For example, because paid surrogate motherhoods exist, pregnancy and motherhood should count as production, but they do not. Unpaid care activities, such as fetching water from a source, count as production only if they are sufficiently widespread. Accordingly, while the SNA is a valuable resource for studying behaviors, practices, and resources, scholars should not adopt its categories uncritically.

Techno-ecological resources refer to those parts of non-human nature that afford beneficial practices. Techno-ecological resources include goods and non-produced (natural or ecological) resources, and both consumables such as food and fuel and durables such as machinery. It is essential to distinguish between techno-ecological resources, which are "derived from and produced by the flow of available energy in Nature" and are thus subject to the laws of thermodynamics, and institutional resources such as finance, which are not (Soddy, 1933, p. 139). In line with our multilevel account, institutional resources notably afford consumption and production at the artifactual level. In Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables*, Jean Valjean stealing bread to feed his sister's children exemplifies how consumption at the artifactual level may be legally necessary to enable and facilitate consumption at other levels. Techno-ecological resources may be owned, including goods and tangible assets, or unowned, as in commons. Owned techno-ecological resources are tangible, whether owned privately or

publicly. In contrast, institutional resources such as contracts, leases, and licenses are often called ‘intangible.’ However, ‘intangible’ assets typically have a tangible dimension, such as written texts. Even oral contracts encoded in the people who agreed to them afford enforcement because of recognition in codified laws.

TABLE 3.3. A TYPOLOGY OF RESOURCES IN THE SNA 2008

	Natural	Produced	Constructed
Techno-ecological	Natural resources (e.g., old-growth forests, fuel reserves, wild animals)	Tangible fixed assets (e.g., machinery and equipment, planted trees) Inventories of goods Valuables (e.g., jewelry, works of art)	
Biopsychosocial			Non-economic assets (e.g., knowledge, skills, and qualifications; reputation)
Institutional		Intellectual property products (e.g., research and development, software) Inventories of services (e.g., work-in-progress, architectural drawings with building yet to be started)	Financial resources Contracts, leases, and licenses Purchased goodwill and marketing assets

Source: Author.

Resources afford practices and can result from practices. Resources may thus be either natural, produced, or constructed. Constructed resources are neither natural like wild animals nor produced like works of art. They are social constructions. Table 3.3 offers a typology of SNA elements for illustrative purposes. It enables scholars to develop alternatives to some elements of the SNA, given that the latter switches inconsistently between the different levels of consumption and production. Hence, scholars may reject the SNA emphasis on artifactual criteria related to market systems and ownership. For example, produced institutional resources include intellectual property products, which can be owned and marketed but exclude indigenous people's knowledge, which is neither owned in the sense of legal property nor marketed, but only bio-psycho-socially constructed. Concerning financial resources, marketing and consumer researchers typically refer to the production of goods and services, but not to money production: money seems already there. However, according to post-Keynesians, every time a bank grants a credit, it produces money (Pettifor, 2017). Because credit expansion is not a material process, we can refer to financial resources as constructed institutional resources.

The distinctions proposed here are specific to the capitalist mode of production. As Fine (1994, p. 392) reminds us, the difference between intermediate and final consumption is relative to a mode of production: "what may be production in one mode of production (humans themselves) may lie outside production in another." He notes that from the perspective of a slave owner, a slave's consumption is "indistinguishable from the productive consumption of a mule or, in modern terms, the fuel that runs a machine!" (ibid.). In the language of our multilevel account of consumption and production, slavery treats people as artifacts.

Conclusion

The current chapter offered an integrative systemic account of consumption and production. It provided a way forward for marketing and consumer researchers who take

seriously the “incredibly reactionary political effect” of the over-encompassing understanding of consumption and the invitation to treat “consumption not as an analytical term but as an ideology to be investigated” (Graeber, 2011, p. 502). Similar concerns apply to production. Against prevalent market-centric understandings, the current chapter conceptualized consumption and production systems as dynamic multilevel systems of persons producing goods, services, and waste and using them, with associated physical, chemical, biological, mental, social, and artifactual processes that interplay with the environment. As an alternative to reductionist and disjunctive accounts, it offered multiple interpretations of consumption and production at various levels, thus contributing to the denaturalization of unsustainable consumption and production patterns, a precondition for recognizing the ability to transform them. The transformation of unsustainable patterns requires changes in habits, behaviors, and practices to ensure the sustainability of the resources composing consumption and production systems. The current chapter offered a dispositional account of behavior and habit, a behavioral account of practices, and a practice account of resources that transcend the opposition between behavioral and practice theories and between habit and habitus. The understanding of habits, behaviors, and practices as encompassing simulation, perception, enaction, and control processes that interplay with the environment offered a necessary alternative to reductionist perspectives.

Moreover, the transdisciplinary approach adopted here integrated insights from multiple fields and traditions, from philosophy to statistical conceptual frameworks, thus enabling multilevel and multimethod analysis in future research. For example, the distinction of simulation, perception, enaction, and control enables an integrative account of individuals. A focus on simulation enables the view of humans as designers. A focus on perception and simulation recognizes that humanity “approaches [its] world through construing it,” leading to viewing humans as construers rather than consumers (Firat & Dholakia, 2017b; Kelly,

1955/1991, p. 12). A focus on enaction is compatible with various views, such as humans as craftspeople, prosumers, or producers (Bruns, 2016; Campbell, 2005; Ritzer & Jurgenson, 2010). A focus on control gives the view of humans as decision-makers. The integrative systemic account of consumption and production developed in the current chapter paves the way for addressing social innovation in consumption and production systems in the next chapter.

Chapter 4.

Social Innovation in Consumption and Production Systems

How should we conceptualize social innovation in consumption and production systems? The current chapter proposes a novel model of social innovation to inform the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of sustainable development interventions. Marketing is a social technology that has contributed to expanding market systems (Derksen & Wierenga, 2013; Zwick et al., 2008). Although marketing and consumer researchers often contribute to market expansion, increasing numbers seek to inform social innovation. Drawing on 252 definitions, Edwards-Schachter and Wallace (2017, p. 73) characterize social innovation as “a collective process of learning involving the distinctive participation of civil society actors aimed to solve a societal need through change in social practices that produce change in social relationships, systems and structures, contributing to large socio-technical change.” Marketing and consumer research has contributed several approaches to social change, including social marketing, transformative consumer research, transformative service research, critical transformative market research, and consumer culture strategy (Holt, 2017; International Social Marketing Association et al., 2013; Kotler & Zaltman, 1971; Mick, 2006; Rosenbaum et al., 2011; Tadjewski et al., 2014). More recent contributions include the SHIFT framework and the change points approach (Watson et al., 2020; White et al., 2019).

However, the field’s social change approaches often adopt narrow theories of change. Davies et al. (2020, pp. 1–2) find the field’s sustainability research “siloes and fragmented,” as well as hampered by “reliance on a small number of specific behavioural theories, an overly isolationist and rational view of the consumer, and a persistent desire to explore niche movements as opposed to more general theories of habitual change.” Researchers tend to reduce reality’s complexity to a single dimension in line with their disciplinary biases (Firat &

Dholakia, 2017a). Narrow understandings of the environment disregard the multidimensional environmental implications of interventions (Peattie, 1999). Moreover, researchers usually take consumers as either agents or subjects of change, rather than both; they typically emphasize either order or disorder instead of understanding them as a duality (Farjoun, 2010; Giesler & Thompson, 2016). Giesler and Fischer (2017) pinpoint three biases in the literature. First, the economic actor bias refers to conceptualizing actors as consumers or producers instead of addressing individuals and institutions' diverse roles (Ertekin & Atik, 2020). Second, the micro-level bias reduces reality to the individual level, with insufficient attention to the multilevel systems that individuals are part of (Askegaard & Linnet, 2011). Third, the variance bias reflects adopting a static view of reality instead of a dynamic view consistent with a process ontology (Poulis, 2020). A fourth bias is market bias, with scholars often failing to question the role of market systems and marketing in theory and practice (Tadajewski, 2018). Works that deviate from such biases remain exceptions rather than the norm in the field, in contrast with the broader sustainability literature, which is more diverse.

Even when used by anti-capitalists, market-centric approaches tend to promote neoliberal ideology and policies. They lead to understanding non-market and non-capitalist processes “primarily with reference to capitalism: as being fundamentally the same as (or modeled upon) capitalism, or as being deficient or substandard imitations; as being opposite to capitalism; as being the complement of capitalism; as existing in capitalism’s space or orbit” (Gibson-Graham, 2006, p. 6). They thus fail to account for essential features of social innovation in consumption and production systems. Such systems arguably rely more on non-market than on market processes (Simon, 1991). People do not identify themselves primarily within economic categories, nor do they think of their lives mainly in market terms. Reductionist and market-centric approaches favor piece-meal change rather than systemic change, except to promote the consumerization of human beings and the marketization of

everything (Chaudhuri & Belk, 2020; Dholakia, 2014). They thus facilitate interrelated financialization, informalization, and globalization processes and worsen inequalities along national, gender, ethnic, racial, and class lines, as exemplified in wars (Peterson, 2008). The unfettered expansion of market systems has met growing resistance around the world. In particular, “the invasion of marketing into the noncommercial arena has been a drama laden with setbacks, oppositions, and victories” (Kotler, 2005, p. 115).

The current chapter elaborates a novel model of social innovation: the Five-SPEC model of social innovation in consumption and production systems. The novelties of the model are many. Instead of narrow disciplinary or sub-disciplinary lenses, the model is transdisciplinary, along the lines developed for integrative systemics in Chapter 2. Beyond market-centric understandings, in line with Chapter 3, it takes a consumption and production system as a dynamic multilevel system of persons producing goods, services, and waste and using them, with associated physical, chemical, biological, mental, social, and artifactual processes that interplay with the environment. Moreover, it recognizes the multiple kinds of environment. In place of assuming all processes to be agential, it acknowledges both agential and non-agential processes. Rather than giving primacy to either agency or structure, the model discerns different types of agency and different kinds of structure. As an alternative to pitting practice change against behavioral change, it considers that underlying both is habit change. Finally, beyond the field’s focus on individuals and the capitalist private sector, it recognizes the importance of the public sector and the social economy.

The Five-SPEC model’s starting point is the insight that identifying a system, whether small like a household, or large like humanity, entails specifying its Structure, Processes, Environment, and Components (SPEC) (Figure 4.1). The four aspects are inseparable and interdependent (Bunge, 2003/2014, 2016a). The following sections present the model’s elements with diverse illustrations of sustainability concerns and related social innovation

interventions. Although the chapter engages with a broad range of literature and offers potential directions for future research, the aim is to help marketing and consumer researchers see the forest for the trees, not to provide a comprehensive literature review.




FIGURE 4.1. THE SPEC OF CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION SYSTEMS

The Five-SPEC model provides an integrative systemic alternative to reductionist and market-centric approaches to social change. It seeks to continue the Radical Enlightenment project, striving for “a society based on mutual respect, without masters and slaves, without oppressors and oppressed,” in which the governing principle is the general will of the community (Blom, 2010, n. p.). Instead of the market-centric view privileged in marketing and consumer research, it adopts a transdisciplinary approach grounded in human rights. The model does not attribute unique agency to any specific actors, nor does it confine actors to specific economic roles or restrict change to a predetermined direction. Moreover, it recognizes structural, processual, environmental, and compositional aspects of social innovation in consumption and production systems rather than focusing on a single aspect. In contrast to the win-win-win assumption underlying many approaches, the model recognizes conflicts,

controversies, contestations, and cooperation regarding distributional issues (Kjellberg et al., 2015). Researchers can use the model to redress the balance of coverage within the field and develop linkages across disciplines, including between behavioral and practice theories. The model can also inform the design, monitoring, and evaluation of social innovation interventions in consumption and production systems.

Structure

Marketing and consumer researchers typically adopt narrow lenses to fit their work within disciplinary or sub-disciplinary boundaries (Ger, 2018). There are increasing calls to move beyond such boundaries (MacInnis et al., 2020; Moorman et al., 2019; Peracchio et al., 2014). Following Bunge (1998), we can conceptualize every consumption and production system as having Social, Political, Economic, and Cultural structures (see Figure 4.2).³ Each structure encompasses the totality of relations of a specific kind, whether internally or between system components and the environment (Bunge, 1998). The SPEC of structure is at odds with the disciplinary biases according to which one of the dimensions is primary (Ger et al., 2018). The four kinds of relations and structures are indivisible and interdependent. Changes in them may contribute to promoting, respecting, protecting, violating, or abusing human rights. Subsuming the civil and political under the political reflects an understanding of the Latin *civis* (citizen) and the Greek *polis* (city) as relating to citizenship in the old sense of inhabiting a city or town, irrespective of legal status. The old sense remains timely, as in the notion of global citizenship.

Social innovations change the structure of systems (Edwards-Schachter & Wallace, 2017). For example, the regular introduction of international labor standards since the

³ Bunge's BEPC model refers to the biological or biopsychological rather than the social. Here, we use 'social' in the narrow sense pertaining to the welfare of society, whereas in Chapter 3's discussion of the social level, the 'social' refers to the broader sense of relating to society and emerges from the biological and the mental, together forming the biopsychosocial.

International Labor Organization's founding in 1919 continues to transform consumption and production systems. The close to 400 standards address issues ranging from regulating working time to preventing violence and harassment. In turn, changes in system structure may facilitate or impede social innovations. The COVID-19 pandemic has brought to light the intrinsic connections between social, political, economic, and cultural relations, notably blurring the boundaries between the personal and the political and between private and public spheres (Sheth, 2020). Whereas it has impeded social innovations that would have required a more conducive environment, it has also ignited social innovations that have transformed how people produce, consume, and live.




FIGURE 4.2. THE SPEC OF SYSTEM STRUCTURE

Social

The social structure refers to the totality of social relations, notably kinship and friendship. The associated human rights include the right to life, health, food, adequate housing, water and sanitation, an adequate standard of living, and protection from violence and

harassment. Marketing and consumer researchers have often interpreted the beneficiaries as consumers and the associated systems of provision as market systems. Such a view is unwarranted, given the importance of non-market provision, including by households, non-profit institutions, and the public sector (Fine et al., 2018). The pandemic has changed the ways people relate to each other, with physical distancing rules redefining friendship, kinship, and intimacy, with detrimental effects on physical and psychological health (Lopes et al., 2020). It has shattered the individualist assumption that a healthy life is solely an individual responsibility, bringing to light the necessity of coordination, cooperation, and solidarity within and across countries (Giesler & Veresiu, 2014; Meah, 2014). The individualist assumption disregards the intrinsic connections between SPEC structures and health inequalities across social groups. Underlying health inequalities are the “unequal distribution of power, income, goods, and services, globally and nationally, the consequent unfairness in the immediate, visible circumstances of people[']s lives . . . and their chances of leading a flourishing life” (Commission on Social Determinants of Health, 2008, p. 1). While the promotion of health consumerism often comes in the name of autonomy, individual autonomy can be exploitative of others, and accordingly autonomy for all is a collective enterprise (Schneider-Kamp & Askegaard, 2020).

COVID-19 has brought to light deficits in existing systems, as highlighted in the disparities of its impact across national, class, racial, and gender lines (Habersaat et al., 2020; Kopel et al., 2020). Most health systems were overwhelmed, even more so in low- and middle-income countries, with a quarter of countries reporting in August 2020 disruptions in potentially life-saving emergency services (World Health Organization, 2020). Three in four countries reported reductions in outpatient care attendance, with additional demand factors such as lockdowns hindering access and related financial difficulties. On the supply side, two-thirds of countries reported cancellation of elective services, with other factors including staff

redeployment to provide COVID-19 relief, unavailability of services owing to closures, and supply-chain difficulties (ibid.). Community-based social economy initiatives have sought to fill the gap. Many are multi-stakeholder cooperatives, an organizational form that brings together workers, beneficiaries, and local governments. Local governments in countries like the United States (US), Turkey, and India, had already begun to include cooperatives as part of their care delivery frameworks (ILO, 2017). The concurrence of healthy food for the wealthy, junk food for the poor, food waste, and food deprivation has revealed the need to refocus food systems on human rights rather than large corporations' interests (Bublitz et al., 2019). Proposed measures include investing in life-enhancing jobs in ecological transportation, food production, and the arts, and transforming agricultural practices to become more local and ecological (Anderson, 2020).

The COVID-19 lockdowns have contributed to an increase in reported incidents of domestic violence, including gender-based violence (Campbell, 2020). For those facing violence at home, social isolation means sharing a living space with people they fear, often without the privacy or freedom to call for help. Support services have faced additional difficulties because emergency hotlines, safe houses, and referrals work best when provided in a supportive environment. Multiple interventions have emerged in response. Distance services have expanded, such as 24/7 confidential websites and hotline services, virtual counseling, telemedicine, and e-filing for domestic violence protection orders. With shelters unable to cope, some hotels have opened their doors to women survivors (Viveiros & Bonomi, 2020). Marketing and consumer researchers have developed critical perspectives to address the multiple dimensions of social structures (Gopaldas & Siebert, 2018; Hein et al., 2016; Saren et al., 2019; Steinfield et al., 2019). Future research can refine such frameworks by adopting a systemic perspective to social structure stability and change and adopting a rights-based approach.

Political

The political structure refers to the totality of political relations, notably political power and control (Arndt, 1983). Associated human rights include the rights to political participation, vote, family, and private life, as well as equal protection of the law against any discrimination, hostility, and violence, and against any incitement to them. They also include the right to freedom of expression, association, speech, thought, conscience, and religion. Even under an allure of neutrality, “marketing theory, the concepts that accompany it, and the practices associated with the subject, are all political, rather than neutral” (Tadajewski, 2018, p. 196). As Warde (2017) rightly notes, critique persists in political movements, exemplifying the intertwinement of the political with the economic, cultural, and social. Social movements typically emerge in the absence of adequate social innovations, and often give the impetus for radical social innovations, yielding new forms of organizing, communicating, producing, and consuming.

It is helpful to distinguish within social movements between the aggregation of individual actions, as in a trending hashtag, and their systemic integration through collective action (Arvidsson & Caliandro, 2015). One does not necessarily translate into the other. For instance, a large number of confirmations on a political rally’s Facebook page does not necessarily lead to a large attendance. Likewise, a well-organized group’s call for a boycott may fail to gather support among individuals. Yet sometimes, the two sides may be mutually supportive. For example, the Arab uprisings started after an informal street vendor immolated himself in response to sustained police harassment in late 2010 (Omeira, 2013). Whereas activists used social media to organize, the movement’s strength was in its real-world collective actions, including mass rallies, sit-ins, teach-ins, and labor strikes. The strategies and slogans of the protestors in Tunisia, like “people want to bring down the regime,” were soon replicated and adapted in other Arab countries and beyond. Organizers of the international Occupy

movement initiated in New York City in late 2011 referred to the Arab uprisings as inspiration. The Occupy movement spread to more than 80 countries worldwide, with “We are the 99 percent” among its prominent slogans. The movement also gave the impetus for different initiatives, such as platform economy workers organizing platform cooperatives. However, political repression in some countries often inspires similar repression in others, as highlighted during the pandemic (Kaye, 2020). Even with the repression of political change, changed habits can still inform social innovations, as exemplified in the rise of social economy enterprises among Tunisia’s youth.

The political structure refers to much more than merely political representations in the highest political offices. Some hailed the presidency of Barack Obama in the US as signaling the end of racism. A nationally representative survey suggests instead that “the impact of prejudice on policy opinion appears to have increased over this time period, even beyond existing findings indicating a spillover of racialization,” suggesting that “Obama’s rise to power increased whites’ perception that blacks threaten their dominant position” (Yadon & Piston, 2019, p. 794). The Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement against police brutality and racially motivated violence against black people started in 2013 with the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter on social media, after the acquittal of 17-year-old black man Trayvon Martin’s killer. The protests gained momentum in the past year around the killing of black people at a time when black communities are disproportionately affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and its social and economic fallouts. The movement has pushed for economic changes, notably shifting budgetary priorities away from the police and toward socially innovative alternatives. Corporations have made announcements supporting the movement, although with contradictory practices (Steinfeld et al., 2019). More recently, tech giants such as IBM, Amazon, and Microsoft have announced they would no longer be selling facial recognition software to law enforcement. Cultural symbols such as statues of slave traders have

been toppled and replaced with BLM symbols. The movement has also spread around the world. In such circumstances, marketing and consumer researchers need to explicitly address the politics of consumption and production, including the strategies of the state, organized groups, and individuals, with more historical contextualization (Coskuner-Balli, 2020; Fine, 2013; Tadajewski et al., 2014).

Economic

The economic structure refers to the totality of economic relations, notably consumption, production, and accumulation. The associated rights include those to consumer protection and decent work. The development of cultural products, organizing, and public interest litigation can contribute to the enactment and enforcement of consumer protection legislation. In the US, for example, Ralph Nader uncovered auto safety deficits in *Unsafe at Any Speed* in 1965, which spurred organizing through watchdog and advocacy groups and political campaigning that prompted the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. In recent decades, consumer rights have become increasingly important, especially with scandals related to prominent multinational corporations operating in multiple legal jurisdictions (Durovic, 2020). The UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection notably address access to essential goods and services, protection of vulnerable and disadvantaged consumers, promotion and protection of the economic interests of consumers, protection of consumer privacy, and sustainable consumption patterns (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2016). More than half of the countries now have consumer protection laws. Cross-country coordination in enforcement can be critical, as exemplified in the European Union.

Decent work refers to “work carried out in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity,” and is enshrined in SDG 8 of the United Nations 2030 Agenda (Somavia, 1999, para. 8). It notably encompasses full, productive, and freely chosen employment,

fundamental principles and rights at work, social protection, and social dialogue. Decent work is at the heart of a human-centric agenda for the economy of the United Nations Consensus on Development for All, a comprehensive alternative to the money-centric agenda of the Washington Consensus (Ortiz & Cummins, 2019). Whereas a money-centric vision focuses on pecuniary indicators such as the stock market or economic growth, a human-centric vision gives more importance to welfare indicators, such as decent work indicators, the human development index, the index of sustainable economic welfare, and the genuine progress indicator (Kalimeris et al., 2020). That is, the economic dimension is inseparable from social, political, and cultural dimensions. Graeber (2012) persuasively demonstrates how debt and debt forgiveness have emerged and evolved across the four dimensions.

To avoid the biases of ‘capitalocentrism,’ it is essential to distinguish economic, market, and capitalist relations (Gibson-Graham, 2006). Economic relations include both market and non-market relations. The market is not a thing, but the property of involving sale at economically significant prices. National statisticians worldwide operationalize the concept of economically significant prices to make the fundamental distinction between market and non-market production. Economically significant prices significantly affect the amounts producers are willing to supply and the amounts purchasers wish to buy (European Commission et al., 2009). In market production, production and marketing are indissociable (Dixon, 1990). The motive of market transactions matters, as illustrated in the increasing interest in the social economy. It is possible to distinguish selling to buy from buying to sell (Marx, 1867/1990). According to Gibson-Graham (2006, p. xxiv), capitalist relations are those “in which nonproducers appropriate surplus labor in value form from free wage laborers.” There can be no capitalist relations without non-capitalist relations. The existence of free wage laborers depends on social reproduction activities, including unpaid care work. For example, within a heterosexual married couple in which the husband works for a wage in an enterprise and the

wife works without pay in the household, “[t]he husband does not buy the labor power of the wife by paying her wages, no exchange of commodities occurs between them, nor does he sell . . . as commodities the use-values she produces” (Fraad et al., 1994, p. 6).

Economic organizing and alliance building are essential to redress power inequalities and address deficits in rights. Unemployed workers have formed unions in the United Kingdom, Australia, and more recently in the US and Tunisia. The largest workers’ cooperative in the US is the Bronx-based Cooperative Home Care Associates, which is staffed mainly by Latina and African American women. During the pandemic, the shortage of personal protective equipment (PPE) led it to cooperate with the Morganton-based Opportunity Threads, a sewing cooperative that retooled its production to sew PPE. Such cooperative initiatives have received legal advice, mentoring, and coaching services from trade unions, community-based organizations, and worker cooperative federations.

Because terms and concepts are not neutral, they carry political weight. For example, calling a social intervention a labor *market* innovation implies that labor is a commodity (Galbraith, 1997). However, according to international labor law, labor is not a commodity. Otherwise, trade union activism would become a monopolistic practice to be broken up, in line with the agenda of regressive capitalist enterprises and repressive governments. In 2020, 85 percent of countries violated the right to strike, and 80 percent violated the right to bargain collectively, with such repression adding to the toll of the COVID-19 pandemic (International Trade Union Confederation, 2020). Marketing and consumer researchers have given significant attention to consumer movements (Gollnhofer et al., 2019; Kozinets & Handelman, 2004; Weijo et al., 2018). Future research will need to give more attention to consumer protection and the relations between consumer and worker interests, particularly in terms of decent work (Alzola, 2018; Dickinson-Delaporte et al., 2020; Larsen & Lawson, 2013).

Cultural

The cultural structure refers to the totality of cultural relations, notably of learning and knowledge sharing. The associated human rights include those to education, to take part in cultural life, enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, and the right of authors to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from their scientific, literary, or artistic productions. Scientific productions comprise scientific publications and innovations, including indigenous and local communities' knowledge, innovations, and practices. Literary or artistic productions encompass poems, novels, paintings, sculptures, musical compositions, theatrical and cinematographic works, performances, and oral traditions. Culture is broader than consumer culture, which refers to market-based cultural relations (Arnould & Thompson, 2005). Consumer culture hinges on consumers' purchasing power and spending (Dholakia & Fırat, 1998). It is particularly relevant for households with high discretionary spending power but less so for those struggling to meet their basic needs. For example, in 2010, household spending on food was less than 13 percent of the household budget in the US, but more than half of the household budget in most countries of the world, up to 71 percent in Burundi and Guinea (World Bank, 2020). There are also significant differences across consumption segments within countries. Because of cultural diffusion, even where consumer culture is less prevalent in practice, the associated ideology and aspirations may still play an important role.

The concept of intersectionality, defined as “the interaction between gender, race, and other categories of difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcomes of these interactions in terms of power,” captures the connection of the cultural with the social, political, and economic (Davis, 2008, p. 68). In the context of social marketing in poorer countries, inattention to intersectionality has led to “a curiously apolitical account [...], removing the colonial and geopolitical origins of the

problems that now confront these nations and are exacerbated by neoliberal policies” (Tadajewski et al., 2014, p. 1735). Ger et al. (2018) call for reflexivity and caution in unpacking cultural assumptions and contextualizing cultural relations within the broader contexts of privilege, inequality, and domination, whether within or between countries.

Cultural change can range from incremental to radical. For example, voluntary simplicity, which aims to decrease consumption through sustainable lifestyles, has received criticism as a “self-centred, narrowly hedonistic philosophy of life available only to a privileged few” (Alexander, 2011, p. 110; Alexander & Ussher, 2012). Radical cultural change may benefit from societal disruptions. Holt and Cameron (2010, p. 186) make a convincing case that “major historical changes that shake up cultural conventions” afford ideological opportunities that “unmoor consumers,” and “prod them to seek out new alternatives.” Cultural change often comes as rejection, return, or both, with differences across groups not reducible to a single dimension such as gender, religion, or class, as illustrated in the Turkish case (Sandıkcı & Ger, 2010; Üstüner & Holt, 2007). With large indigenous populations, Ecuador and Bolivia have integrated the concepts of Sumak Kawsay and Buen Vivir into their constitutions (de Sousa Santos, 2015; Gudynas, 2011). Such commitments resonate with those of the ‘commons’ and ‘commoning’ among critics of the extractivist nature of the capitalist private sector (Veltmeyer & Lau, 2020). Cooperatives can help strengthen traditional livelihoods and generate income and employment opportunities through democratic enterprise development (Roelants et al., 2019). For example, in Mexico, the Union of Indigenous Communities of the Isthmus Region, which sells fair trade products internationally, has established a solidarity fund and set up education structures for its members. Neoliberal advances have come with changes in morals, notably the individualization of responsibility, leading to the emergence of categories such as the bottom-of-the-pyramid, green, health-conscious, and financially literate consumers (Giesler & Veresiu, 2014). However, failures of

the neoliberal model have also contributed to counter-processes shifting the responsibilities to the state or corporations to protect people from themselves, thus pushing the neoliberal agenda while shielding market processes from their societal consequences (Pellandini-Simányi & Conte, 2020). Marketing and consumer researchers have investigated a vast range of cultural topics and increasingly cultural dynamics (Giesler & Thompson, 2016). They can give more attention to scientific, literary, and artistic production and better address linkages with the political-economic context (Brown, 2019; Muñiz et al., 2014; Schroeder, 2005; Venkatesh & Meamber, 2006).

Processes

Non-Agential and Agential Processes

Approaches that focus on individual agency tend to adopt an under-socialized view of individuals as in *homo economicus*, whereas those that seek to decenter human subjects tend to adopt an over-socialized view, as in *homo sociologicus* (Granovetter, 1985; Shove et al., 2012). Integrative systemics recognizes that the processes underlying consumption and production systems are of two types: agential or ‘owned’ and non-agential or ‘unowned’ (Rescher, 1996). Agential processes are attributable to actual, not just nominal, agents. Because a person’s behavior is attributable to her, it encompasses agential processes. People may engage in behaviors individually or collectively. For example, showering is primarily an individual behavior, whereas a labor strike is typically a collective behavior. Collective behaviors involve the distribution of agency across many agents. As noted in Chapter 3, it is helpful to understand practices as classes of behavior. The International Classification of Activities for Time Use Statistics (ICATUS) offers a methodology to classify behaviors into practices (United Nations Statistics Division, 2017). As an illustration, having breakfast, having a sandwich, and eating caviar are all part of the broad practice of eating meals or snacks. Changes at the level of a

practice may come with changes in factors such as the number of practitioners, the time spent on it, availability of related alternatives, ways to perform it, the frequency of performance, and participants' characteristics (Southerton et al., 2012). Whereas practice change necessitates behavior change, behavior change must reach a critical mass to effect practice change.

The extent to which processes are agential depends on the level of analysis. Whereas a household moving from a rural area to a city is an agential process, urbanization is non-agential since it is not attributable to specific agents. Urbanization is instead an emergent process: it is a property of a social system that its parts, namely households, do not have. Dumping toxic waste in a river is an agential process; climate change is a non-agential process that emerges from multilevel interacting processes on a planetary scale. Climate change is anthropogenic because human agential processes have played a primordial role in it (Rosenzweig et al., 2008). Order and disorder are also emergent and depend on the level of analysis. For example, economic growth, which may appear orderly on visualizations plotting it over time, emerges from the disorderly activities of large numbers of actors: "the resulting systemic order is generated in-and-through continual disorder" (Shaikh, 2016, p. 5). Agents can be non-human, whether living, such as animals, or non-living such as algorithms. However, only moral agents can be held accountable for their actions. Moral agents can do right or wrong, whereas moral patients can be the target of right or wrong (Yam et al., 2019). Non-living entities such as computer systems, robots, or autonomous vehicles "are at most moral agents by proxy, for whatever decisions they may derive from instructions received from their programmers" (Bunge, 1989, p. 108). Accordingly, if algorithmic trading aggravates a financial crisis, then those responsible for it are morally responsible for its consequences.

Whereas behavioral scientists focus on behavior change and practice theorists on practice change, underlying both is habit change (Watson et al., 2020; White et al., 2019). As collective learning processes that change social practices, social innovations involve changes

in established habits (Edwards-Schachter & Wallace, 2017). We can consider that habits become established in a society when (a) held for a long time since they were first learned (history); (b) widely held (diffusion); (c) more likely to be performed than possible alternatives in relevant situations (predilection). The extent of a habits' establishment is a societal question. The habit of wearing a hoodie, for example, is well established among young black men in the US in terms of history, diffusion, and predilection. The establishment of a habit within a group does not imply that outsiders agree with it, as exemplified by the 2012 shooting of Trayvon Martin. Some commentators blamed his death on him wearing a hoodie, which they associated with criminality. In response, hoodies became a protest symbol, including in the Million Hoodie March. Meanwhile, tech entrepreneurs' habit of wearing designer hoodies from luxury fashion brands has a shorter history and a narrower diffusion, but typically a wider acceptance by others.

As discussed in Chapter 3, habits are neither behaviors nor practices. They are behavioral dispositions that people learn, “retain[ed] residues of experience of such a nature as to guide, bias, or otherwise influence later behavior” (Campbell, 1963, p. 97). People form habits by grouping together elements of experience, a process known as chunking (Graybiel, 2008). A chunk is “a collection of elements having strong associations with one another, but weak associations with elements within other chunks” (Gobet et al., 2001, p. 236). Chunking helps improve performance by facilitating memorization and retrieval. People chunk their continuous experiences into discrete events of varying timescales, hierarchically integrated into “meaningful, temporally extended, episodic structures, to be later encoded into memory” (Baldassano et al., 2017, p. 718). Because people retain parts of their experiences in their habits, a person's habits are interdependent and form a system, which Bourdieu (1993) has termed an individual habitus. Understanding habits as learned behavioral dispositions differs from two conceptualizations prevalent in the literature: habits as routine behaviors and habits as

automaticity (Liu-Thompkins & Tam, 2013; Murray & Häubl, 2007; Shah et al., 2014; Verplanken & Wood, 2006). It implies that a person's behavior is habitual to the extent that it relies on habits learned from similar experiences rather than deliberation. As retained residues of experience, habits are in individuals, not in some collective entity; but they can hold any aspect of explicit and tacit experiences, whether real, perceptual, imaginary, conceptual, or semiotic, including experiences of interaction and collective action (Bunge, 2016c; Turner, 2014). The introduction of fair trade, for example, entailed changes in the established habits of associated consumers and producers. Its diffusion has involved habit changes among broader sections of the population, changing retail, distribution, and certification practices, although less so in more mainstream organizations that do not generally uphold fair trade principles (Bezençon & Blili, 2009).

Simulation, Perception, Enaction, and Control

In line with Chapter 3, human behaviors and practices encompass parallel Simulation, Perception, Enaction, and Control (SPEC) processes, all interplaying with the environment. The different kinds of processes are intertwined. We can study SPEC processes at different levels of aggregation, from a single individual to humanity. People encode in their habits SPEC processes, including the interplay with the environment, from their first-person perspective (see Figure 4.3). In contrast with the assumptions that they are either all deliberative or all automatic, habit(u)s and SPEC processes can vary in the extent to which they are deliberative, in line with the insight that “the notion of habitus expresses first and foremost the rejection of a whole series of alternatives into which social science . . . has locked itself,” prominently “that of consciousness (or of subject) and of the unconscious” (Bourdieu, 1985, pp. 12–13).




FIGURE 4.3. THE SPEC OF AGENTIAL PROCESSES

Simulation.—People can mentally enact and reenact the real or imagined past, possible futures, and fantasies. Such processes are simulations, mental construction processes in the absence of direct sensory data. Simulation encompasses imagination, conceptualization, and interpretation (Barsalou, 2009; Hesslow, 2012; Mullally & Maguire, 2014). Simulation often complements perception, as when trying to recognize someone from afar.

Perception.—People can perceive external and internal stimuli, their self-movement, and body position. Through perception, people actively construct their subjective reality rather than copying objective reality (Piaget, 1992). The perception of internal stimuli is the basis of affect, which has valence and arousal aspects, as when a person feels very hungry or slightly thirsty. People construct emotions by associating similar experiences of affect with a concept (Barrett, 2017).

Enaction.—Enaction is motor behavior, including verbal or discursive behavior, which involves language, whether spoken, written, or signed, posture, locomotion, manual action, and facial action (Adolph & Franchak, 2017). We can analyze enaction at different levels of aggregation, from a single individual to humanity. Because they build on motor behavior and

influence it, simulation and perception are enactive. For example, whether a person is right-handed, left-handed, or neither partly depends on which arm movement she favored as a fetus, which biases later brain development, and alongside other factors during child development, influences the speed and accuracy of relative hand movements (Michel, 2014). Such preference depends to a lesser extent on differences in the control processes for each hand's use.

Control.—Behavioral control encompasses cognitive (perceptual and simulative) and motor (enactive) control processes and their coordination. Control processes vary along a multidimensional spectrum ranging from deliberation to near automaticity (Graybiel, 2008). The notion of automaticity may encompass one or more of unintentionality, unawareness, uncontrollability, and high efficiency (Bargh, 1994).

Simulation, perception, enaction, and control processes always interplay with the environment. As a collective learning process, social innovation may have as initiator either an individual or a group. In the first case, social innovation can start with “the formation of a new habit by a single individual which is subsequently accepted or learned by other members of his society” (Murdock, 1965, p. 117). For example, National Football League athlete Colin Kaepernick's habit of kneeling during the US national anthem to protest the oppression of black people and people of color has led other athletes and protesters worldwide to adopt the habit as a symbolic initiative. Alternatively, a group may initiate a social innovation in the ‘we-mode.’ Thus, the Hull House that Jane and Ellen Gates Starr co-founded in 1889 in the slums of Chicago, which initiated the US settlement house movement, hosted a community that played a critical role in social innovations and regulations, including the New Deal. They notably addressed child care, child labor, juvenile law, elderly care, women's suffrage, immigrant protections, racial discrimination, anti-sweatshop legislation, working hours, labor organizing, the welfare state, and international peace (Lundblad, 1995; Sklar, 1985). In either case, in the words of Considerant (1842, pp. 166–167), it is the free acceptance of the new

process, the spontaneous imitation of the new combination, that expresses the judgment of humanity. However, adoption of social innovations is typically not “entirely based on separated and sequestered cogitation” but involves “[p]ublic discussion and deliberation,” as exemplified in democratic and inclusive social institutions (Sen, 2011, p. 242).

Collective SPEC processes are not merely sums of individual SPEC processes: “[b]ecause of conditional interactions, the behavior of the aggregate is not simply the sum of the agent actions” (Holland, 2012, p. 2). The processes are non-linear because people interact with each other and their environments and typically construe themselves as belonging to groups (Katona, 1968). In such a context, “reductionism fails in principle” (Gould, 2003, p. 223). A prominent example of collective simulation is participatory sense-making, “whereby individual sense-making processes are affected and new domains of social sense-making can be generated that were not available to each individual on her own” (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007, p. 497). Collective perception occurs when more than one person has exposure to the same stimuli, and each person believes that the other is being exposed to the same stimuli and is engaged in the same task (Richardson et al., 2012). Thus, it can occur even when people are not present in the same physical space, as when they use social media. Collective perception, therefore, involves simulating others’ intentions and actions. Perceiving others’ intentions draws on sensory evidence and expectations informed by prior experience; the more abstract the intentions to infer, the more critical the role of expectations (Chambon et al., 2017). Collective enaction requires simulation and perception in the ‘we-mode,’ “providing each agent with access to a set of descriptions and concepts that would be unavailable from the observational, first-person singular or third-person, perspective” (Gallotti & Frith, 2013, p. 164). In other words, “two (or more) agents must represent [i.e., simulate] a common goal and fulfill two (or more) complementary roles, and switch roles according to context” (Seth et al.,

2016, p. 276). Role-taking and role-switching involve perspective-taking and collective control.

Collective control may vary from the deliberative to the emergent (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). Collective deliberative control involves communication and decision-making among the persons involved, typically on a conscious level (Baumeister et al., 2017). Some participants typically have more power than others to influence the process. In contrast, collective emergent control occurs without or even despite joint decisions. For example, in the early days of traveling libraries, people did not jointly decide how to engage with them. Instead, people reacted to traveling libraries according to others' reactions, whether drawing on earlier experiences or following religious leaders (Passet, 1991). For Lewin (1947, p. 211), group decision is "related to social channels, gates and gatekeepers; to the problem of social perception and planning; and to the relation between motivation and action, and between the individual and the group." Gatekeepers contribute to controlling others' behavior, including in academia (Firat & Dholakia, 2017a). Marketing and consumer researchers have often construed behavioral and practice theories and the concepts of habit and habitus as incompatible, often adopting a micro-reductionist view of behavior and a macro-reductionist view of practices, while upholding the Conservative Enlightenment's mind-body dualism (Kurz et al., 2015; Shove et al., 2012; Watson et al., 2020; White et al., 2019). Future research drawing on the conceptualization developed here can integrate insights from seemingly conflicting theoretical and methodological research streams to inform the human development of sustainable people (Davies et al., 2020).

Environment

Marketing and consumer researchers often adopt a narrow understanding of the environment by ignoring its dynamicity and multiple dimensions or focusing only on the

controllable environment (Askegaard & Linnet, 2011; Barry, 2016; Peattie, 1999). Building on the practice account of resources developed in Chapter 3, we can conceptualize the environment of a consumption and production system as encompassing the Societal environment, the Produced environment, the Ecological environment, and the Codified environment (see Figure 4.4). Biopsychosocial resources external to the system are part of the Societal environment. Produced resources are part of the Produced environment. Natural resources are part of the Ecological environment. Constructed institutional resources are part of the Codified environment. The four kinds of environment are interrelated. For example, there is evidence suggesting that COVID-19 has zoonotic origins, namely that it was transmitted to humans from non-human animals, probably bats (Wu et al., 2020). From the viewpoint of a consumption and production system in which no person has COVID-19, the virus emerged in the ecological environment and spread to the societal environment. Responses to the pandemic have included multiple changes in the codified environment, such as lockdowns, travel bans, mandatory quarantine, and stimulus and compensation packages. The pandemic has also uncovered deficiencies in the codified environment within and across countries, notably inadequate public health laws and insufficient international coordination and cooperation (Parmet & Sinha, 2020). It has had drastic consequences on the societal environment in terms of confirmed cases and death toll, restricted mobility, distance working, more restrictive lifestyles, joblessness, and destitution. In turn, the produced environment has changed drastically, both quantitatively in relation to production cuts and qualitatively in terms of changed production priorities. Social innovations may change the environment of society, and changes in the environment of society may facilitate or impede social innovations.




FIGURE 4.4. THE SPEC OF THE ENVIRONMENT

Societal

The societal environment consists of those sections of society outside the system under consideration. There is always a societal environment to consider, except if the system under consideration is the whole of humanity. The bonds between members of the system and between the members and the societal environment can vary in strength, even as people may misinterpret them by construing the relevant societal environment too narrowly. For example, scholars often prioritize people from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies (Henrich et al., 2010, p. 29). In the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, many believed it irrelevant outside of China. Scholars can expand their societal horizon by “acknowledging and giving a platform for a broad variety of ideas and discussions relating to issues such as migration, slavery, suppression, resistance, representation, difference, race, gender, space and place and responses to Western/Euro-centric discourses” (Gordon et al., 2016, p. 1068).

Changes in the societal environment can spur social innovations, whether through inspiration, organizing, alliance building, learning from others' experiences, or supporting others' initiatives via knowledge sharing, traditional funding, or crowdfunding. For instance, the SADA Women's Cooperative in Gaziantep, Turkey, includes Syrian, Turkish, and Afghan members and engages in various business activities for women from the host and refugee communities (ILO, 2020b). In Bergamo, Italy, the social cooperative Cooperativa Ruah provides hospitality, cultural, solidarity, and support services for asylum seekers and refugees. Such services include reception, employment of disadvantaged people, intercultural training interventions, and accompanying migrants requesting international protection. In addition, it has developed an Italian language learning app, AtayaApp, aimed at illiterate and low-educated migrants. Future research sensitive to the societal environment will need to adopt an international perspective even for local issues, avoid overgeneralization, and orient papers for an international audience, rather than assume its readers to be from WEIRD societies (Pham, 2013; Rapp & Hill, 2015).

Produced

The produced environment consists of goods, services, and residuals or pollutants. Goods and services encompass traditional and digital products. Issues of ownership, possession, access, and control are critical for the produced environment, as exemplified with COVID-19 vaccines. Pollutants include solid waste, effluent discharges to water and soil, and air emission discharges. Unsustainable consumption and production patterns have led to growing amounts of waste, with marketing tactics "complicit in a throwaway culture" (De Coverly et al., 2008, p. 289). Recycling activities cannot cope with the growth pace of waste electrical and electronic equipment or e-waste. In 2019, the world generated 53.6 million metric tons of e-waste, with only 17.4 percent officially documented as properly collected and

recycled (Forti et al., 2020). Within households, Casey et al. (2019) propose that in the Irish case, once no longer used, small e-waste is either placed in storage or abandoned in the home until a life transition, like moving, renovating the house, or a collection campaign, triggers the decision to recycle or discard it. Worldwide, a large amount of e-waste ends up in landfills or is exported to and dumped in less developed countries. In many Global South countries, because formal mechanisms for waste management are limited, most people store their old electronic equipment or leave it to be picked up by informal waste pickers. In Bolivia, for example, the Association of Recycling Collectors and Sorters of La Paz (ARALPAZ) formed in 2006 a cooperative that collects e-waste and other waste and sells it to enterprises for refining and recycling purposes (ILO, 2014).

The COVID-19 pandemic has further accentuated digitization trends, including in education and health, and changed people's relations to the built environment (Bayram et al., 2020; Schwarz et al., 2020). The lockdowns have spurred rethinking about how to ensure healthy and sustainable buildings and construction in terms of urbanism, public spaces, housing, office space, and building and construction technology, taking into account air quality, social distancing, and quarantine needs (Megahed & Ghoneim, 2020). Virtual teams collaborating remotely, meetings via videoconference, teleworking, and work decentralization have become more viable and widespread. Enterprises have had to revisit their human resource strategies and work practices, as even those previously resistant to telework and decentralization have had to engage in them. With physical contact increasingly risky, private life has further moved online. Changing production and consumption processes have led to a drastic boost in the use of digital platforms such as Zoom, Cisco Webex, Microsoft Teams, and Google Hangouts, with some platforms having trouble coping.

In recent years, the sharing economy has received growing attention, particularly shared and collaborative consumption (Belk, 2014a, 2014b; Hamari et al., 2016; Möhlmann, 2015). It

challenges the logic of owning and using resources privately while restricting others' access to them. Although neither existed before 2008, the revenue of brands such as Airbnb and Uber, which offer platforms for hospitality and transportation services, respectively, has been in the billions of US dollars. While often promoted as alternatives, there have been questions regarding such issues as "labor exploitation, race to the bottom dynamics, perverse eco-impacts, unequal access for low-income and minority communities, and the status of regulation and taxation" (Schor, 2016, p. 1). Platform cooperativism has emerged as an alternative (Scholz, 2016; Scholz & Schneider, 2017). Platform cooperatives are online businesses jointly owned and jointly managed by their members. Online applications of cooperatives have gained momentum notably among taxi drivers, domestic workers, and freelance photographers. They have also contributed to more sustainable motorized private transportation, although with limits compared to non-motorized and public transport. Across the US, cooperatives such as Green Taxi Cooperative in Denver and People's Ride in Michigan have their own driver-owned online platforms that compete with platforms such as Uber and Lyft at the local level. Marketing and consumer researchers have traditionally focused on fast-moving consumer goods, technology, and fashion (Dolbec & Fischer, 2015; Dost et al., 2019; Kozinets et al., 2017; Kumar et al., 2016). Future research can give more attention to less 'sexy' products such as waste at the point of production, consumer durables, and fixed assets, from a sustainability perspective.

Ecological

The ecological environment refers to non-human non-produced nature. On a historical scale, unsustainable consumption and production patterns have contributed to the Great Acceleration in socio-economic and Earth system trends, signaling the advent of the Anthropocene, with scientists warning of the possibility of a Great Collapse if such trends continue unchecked (Naomi & Eric, 2014; Steffen et al., 2007). Novel sustainable energy

models have emerged to make the energy transition more democratic, decentralized, efficient, and affordable, with a significant role for cooperatives (Viardot, 2013). Europe has witnessed a growth in citizen-driven renewable energy initiatives challenging the excessive power of multinational energy firms (Hewitt et al., 2019). Grassroots movements have used multiple organizational forms, including Community Development Trusts in Scotland and renewable energy cooperatives such as Som Energia in Spain and Ecopower in Belgium. REScoop.eu, a European federation of about 1,500 renewable energy cooperatives with one million members, promotes energy democracy through representation and support services at multiple governance levels.

The transition toward sustainable food systems will require knowledge integration to develop novel perspectives. As no single actor or breakthrough can be the catalyst for systemic change in isolation, there is a need to combine interventions, from consumer advice, education, and labeling to financial incentives, macroeconomic policy, and legislative measures (Willett et al., 2019). Ecological-inclusive local business models have emerged, often with alliances across regions and institutional sectors. Norese et al. (2020) study multiple cases of ecological innovations involving low-income groups in Sub-Saharan Africa. Such innovations vary in the extent of their social and ecological concerns, partnerships, and strategic orientations. For example, the IMAI Farming Cooperative, a women's cooperative in South Africa, produces pickles from surplus vegetable crop yields. The Muliru Farmers Conservation Group, a community-based organization in Kenya, seeks to relieve threats to the biodiversity of Kakamega Forest by promoting alternative livelihoods around the farm, cultivation of an indigenous plant, and the market production of associated medicinal products.

Sustainable tourism is likely to grow faster after the pandemic-related shocks to the traditional tourism industry. A proposal for a charter for sustainable tourism addresses such issues as social distancing in travel, accommodation, and events, travel and entry restrictions

on tourists, mandatory personal protective equipment, monitoring of the medical and health situation, as well as changes to underlying perspectives, rules, and regulations (Chang et al., 2020). While such efforts can increase the sustainability of tourism, they are likely to meet resistance from proponents of a rapid recovery of the tourism industry through a return to business as usual instead of reforming the sector toward greater fairness and sustainability (Higgins-Desbiolles, 2020). To date, marketing and consumer researchers have focused on information-based point-of-sale interventions, in line with consumerism (Davies et al., 2020). A smaller number have addressed the implications of green, ecofeminist, eco-socialist, ecofascist, and eco-capitalist ideologies (Fontenelle, 2013; Kidwell et al., 2013; Maclaran & Stevens, 2019). The changing context can facilitate more fundamental rethinking and transformation of consumption and production systems toward ecological goals while ensuring fairness.

Codified

The codified environment consists of international law, regional law, national constitutions, legislation, and policies, organizational constitutions, bylaws, and procedures, and other written rules that are guaranteed through formal processes, including official processes (Sen, 2007). It is artifactual, despite the claims of ideologies granting natural or divine origins to certain institutions. Consistent with market fundamentalism, in recent years the Washington Consensus has privileged measures undermining the collective risk pooling of social security systems, cutting or capping the public sector wage bill, casualizing labor, eliminating or reducing subsidies, cutting social protection, making taxes more regressive, privatizing state assets and commons, and further commodifying health (Ortiz & Cummins, 2019). Such measures have depressed incomes and living standards, exacerbated inequality, undermined social cohesion, and increased vulnerabilities to the COVID-19 pandemic. They

have also curtailed the production and distribution of critical products such as the COVID-19 vaccines. More generally, they have made consumption unsustainable in the social and biological senses for the large segments of the population growing poorer and hungrier. Changes in the codified environment can take multiple forms, from changing policy and legislation to producing guidelines for recommended or mandated practice (Michie et al., 2011). They may notably involve changes in financial incentives, such as increasing the taxation or financial costs of undesirable behaviors. Social innovations often involve renegotiating the codified environment among actors representing divergent interests (van Wijk et al., 2019).

Shortcomings in the public and private sector often stimulate social innovation interventions, which paradoxically may legitimize the prevalent codified environment when the underlying structural issues are left unaddressed. Thus, countries like the United Arab Emirates and Qatar have introduced electronic wage transfer systems due to widespread wage violations, particularly among migrant workers. Such initiatives bear the name of ‘wage protection systems’ although they fall short of the provisions of related international labor standards. Moreover, the concerned workers were neither consulted nor allowed to represent themselves freely. Consequently, workers have limited ability for collective monitoring and recourse in case of violations, let alone collective bargaining over wages and minimum wages. More recently, in the United Kingdom, Manchester United footballer Marcus Rashford became a Member of the British Empire for his fight against child food poverty, which came in response to hunger-exacerbating official policy.

The social economy is an essential contributor to social innovation. However, in many countries, notably in Asia, the social economy is still not recognized in legislative and policy frameworks. Most types of social economy institutions often exist in these countries, although they may not consider themselves part of the social economy. With the increasing size,

visibility, and voice of social economy institutions, the codified environment becomes more likely to recognize them on their own terms, notably in specifying their boundaries and ensuring that their legal forms are not used for abusive purposes, as in the case of pseudo cooperatives. Codification of the social economy in Europe (Italy, Spain, France, Portugal, Greece) and Latin America (Mexico, Costa Rica, Brazil, Ecuador) has followed such a path of recognition. Nevertheless, the codified environment can also evolve to enable the emergence and development of the social economy. Even in countries where self-identification may still be lagging, social economy policies have been put in place to promote it, with prominent recent examples in Africa, including Djibouti, Cameroon, and Tunisia.

Sustainable consumption and production patterns and a circular economy require the transformation of waste management systems, in ecological, social, political, economic, and cultural terms, as exemplified in the situation and treatment of waste pickers (Gutberlet et al., 2017). Waste pickers are often among the most precarious and stigmatized sections of the population (Dias, 2016). The privatization of waste management systems has favored the interests of large corporations in the name of ecology and has often contributed to socially regressive policies, legislations, and practices leading to the repression, neglect, or exclusion of informal workers in the sector (Sandhu et al., 2017). In countries where waste management systems are not well developed, waste pickers who collect, sort, and recycle waste are mainly in the informal economy. Despite their vital contributions, they often face a great deal of stigma. With the growing market value for recycled goods such as glass, plastic, cardboard, and paper, some national and local governments have passed restrictive laws that ban or curtail the purchase of recycled goods from waste pickers. Such laws often serve major capitalist private sector actors, who typically have close associates in the public sector (ILO & WIEGO, 2017). Trade unions and waste pickers' organizations have launched joint initiatives to counter socially exclusionary legislation. In Turkey, the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions has

worked with waste pickers' associations and local municipalities to ensure their integration into urban waste management chains. Their partnership, which has contributed to more inclusive local government regulations and practices, came in response to restrictive national-level legislation.

In some cases, social innovation interventions among waste pickers may precede the legislation regulating their employment and contribute to their introduction, monitoring, and enforcement. After years of advocacy by Colombian waste pickers associations, the Colombian Constitutional Court has declared waste pickers 'public service providers of recycling' (Parra, 2020). Waste pickers now receive monthly payments by charging public facilities for the services they provide. Their legal recognition has also ended the stigmatization of waste pickers as 'scavengers' and the criminalization of their work (ILO & WIEGO, 2017). The Bogotá Waste Pickers Association and the National Association of Waste Pickers of Colombia played critical roles in that regard. They mobilized socially, notably through demonstrations, developed alliances, including with intermediaries in the recycling value chain, drafted policy documents, and perhaps most effectively, sought legal recourse and protection through the courts (Parra, 2020). Outside policy-oriented journals, marketing and consumer researchers have given insufficient attention to the codified environment beyond addressing it as part of the research context (Andrews et al., 2014; Fitzgerald & Yench, 2019; Kees et al., 2020). Future research can redress the deficit. It can notably investigate the questions of property and intellectual property rights from a systemic perspective.

Components

The conceptualization of consumption and production systems as a dynamic multilevel system of persons allows distinguishing between natural persons and legal persons, and thus between the elementary composition and the institutional composition of such systems.

Accordingly, we can construe the components of consumption and production systems as the Social economy, the Public sector, the Elements of the population, and the Capitalist private sector (see Figure 4.5). The distinction between the different components remains essential conceptually, even as it is increasingly blurry in practice (Bretos et al., 2020).




FIGURE 4.5. THE SPEC OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS

Social Economy

The social economy consists of democratic, autonomous, and independent economic entities with a social mission, in which the distribution of surpluses is restricted or prohibited (CIRIEC International, 2017). The establishment of social economy institutions often comes in response to needs inadequately addressed by the public and capitalist private sectors. The social economy may notably include cooperatives, mutual benefit societies, associations, foundations, and social enterprises pursuing both economic and social aims and fostering solidarity (ILO, 2009). Despite its importance, marketing and consumer research has given inadequate attention to the social economy, with the exceptions typically focusing on

cooperatives (Talonen et al., 2016; Wells et al., 2019). In 2015, the European Union alone hosted 2.8 million social economy enterprises and organizations, with about 232 million members, 82.8 million volunteers, and 13.6 million paid workers (CIRIEC International, 2017).

Cooperatives are the largest component of the social economy, followed by mutual organizations, associations, and foundations. Global estimates for 2017 suggest that about 280 million persons were employed in or within the scope of cooperatives, representing about a tenth of the world's employed population, mostly in agriculture (CICOPA, 2017). The advent of the COVID-19 pandemic has led to a growing need for social economy products, while the institutions have faced growing challenges. For example, institutions registered as associations and foundations typically do not benefit from the policy measures introduced to support enterprises. Recognition of the imbalances that the unfolding crises have exacerbated has led to calls for a more plural economy that puts people and the planet ahead of profits. The social economy thus constitutes a promising area for future research.

Public Sector

The public sector encompasses the general government and public corporations. Whereas marketing and consumer research has addressed public sector marketing, public sector consumption remains largely invisible, with a few exceptions (Fine et al., 2018). Historically, the public sector has been a significant provider of jobs, goods, services, and innovations, even in areas often attributed to the private sector. For example, the Global Positioning System (GPS), touch screen, voice recognition, and search engine technologies would not have been possible without the public sector's efforts (Mazzucato, 2015). While people often think of social innovation as a private sector initiative, the public sector can also be active in social innovation, as has been the case historically. In the words of Alphonse de

Lamartine (as cited in La Phalange, 1842, p. 327), governments that are not careful engines of social innovation do not deserve to be honored with the name of government. According to a systematic review of 122 studies in recent decades, social innovations in the public sector have involved citizens as co-implementers in about half the reported cases, as co-designers in about a quarter, and as initiators in less than a tenth of cases (Voorberg et al., 2015). Moreover, the most reported outcome was effectiveness gains.

Decades of privatization and austerity measures have significantly reduced the public sector's size and contributions worldwide, although it remains prominent in multiple countries (Ortiz & Cummins, 2019). In 2019, the public sector averaged about a fifth of total employment internationally, from less than 4 percent in Colombia to about 77 percent in Azerbaijan (ILO, 2020a). In most countries, women represent most of the employed in the public sector, whereas men represent the majority in the private sector. Moreover, the gender pay gap is typically smaller in the public sector and social protection, including maternity protection, is more developed. The focus on promoting the capitalist private sector thus carries a gender bias. The pandemic has demonstrated that inadequate investments in public sector capabilities, both as market maker and market shaper, have undermined societal resilience; state capacity thus needs strengthening to adapt and learn better, align public services and citizen needs, govern resilient production systems, and govern data and digital platforms (Mazzucato & Kattel, 2020).

Given the size of the public sector in terms of economic demand, public procurement has a significant role in promoting sustainable development, stimulating demand for ethical products, and generating more decent jobs, including for the most disadvantaged. Socially responsible criteria in public procurement have been used in various regions, including sustainable public procurement, gender-responsive procurement, and public procurement in the context of broad-based black economic empowerment (Sarter, 2020; Shai et al., 2019; Witjes & Lozano, 2016). In South Korea, public procurement contracts to Housing and Welfare Self-

Sufficiency Enterprises (HWSSEs) established by residents in poor areas and social movements have contributed to employment generation and social housing (ILO, 2019). Because HWSSEs have found it increasingly difficult to employ workers from the groups that public policy seeks to support, they have developed technical training and certification for construction sector workers. Given the multidimensionality of sustainability, advances in some dimensions may lead to regression in others. According to a study of sustainable public procurement in fifteen French public hospitals, a focus on the ecological dimension of sustainability privileged a reduced base of suppliers with visible environmental measures, at the detriment of small local businesses (Oruezabala & Rico, 2012).

Social impact bonds are another measure that the public sector can use. They are a form of social outcome contracting whereby public sector entities partner with private investors to finance social interventions, often provided by social economy entities, typically with a prominent role for an intermediary (La Torre et al., 2019). Private investors receive a return on investment that depends on the achievement of social outcomes. In New York City, the Adolescent Behavioral Learning Experience project for 16- to 18-year-old youth held at the Rikers Island jail complex failed to meet its targeted 10 percent drop in recidivism and was terminated early. In Finland, Koto-SIB contributed to the labor insertion of immigrants by offering them language training and internships, reportedly securing jobs for migrants and refugees. Marketing and consumer research's limited attention to public sector consumption and spending is problematic. In 2018, general government final consumption expenditure represented a sixth of the world's gross domestic product (GDP) and government expense more than a quarter of global GDP (World Bank, 2020). Redressing the balance will therefore be critical for future research.

Elements of the Population

The elements of the population comprise natural persons at the individual level and households at the institutional level. The literature on demographic changes and population movements has been growing in marketing and consumer research (Elhajjar & Alesmail, 2019; Huang & Wang, 2018; Shultz et al., 2020; Viswanathan et al., 2021). Changes in the elements of the population, particularly demographic changes, can trigger social innovations or result from them. Social innovation interventions, for example, can contribute to demographic changes. The initial impetus to the behavioral turn in the 1950s concerned human population planning, when a Ford Foundation director secured support for its Behavioral Sciences Program by appealing to the commitment of two Board members' wives to planned parenthood (Harkavy, 2013). The US-based Population Services International, in 1970 a small NGO that worked on family planning in India, has since expanded in scope and geographical coverage to reach an annual budget of more than half a billion dollars (Population Services International, 2014). Dholakia (1984) describes the 'mass camp' approach to the marketing of sterilizations as a major innovation in India in 1971. She recounts how the government-coordinated intervention provided sterilization, primarily vasectomy, to 51 thousand men in a matter of days. The men were mainly from the poorest sections of the population, attracted by the significant incentives offered during their neediest agricultural season, many of whom later regretted their participation.

The rise of mixed migration has significantly changed the composition of the population around the world. A majority of the world's population lives in urban areas, with Africa the only continent where the rural population is larger than the urban. Globally, urbanization is expected to continue increasing in the coming decades. International migrants represent an estimated 3.5 percent of the global population, at about 272 million persons, 74 percent of whom were of working age, with more than half living in Europe and North America

(International Organization for Migration, 2020). Conflicts, economic difficulties, natural disasters, and climate change have increased the number of forcibly displaced people. By the end of 2019, 79.5 million people were forcibly displaced due to persecution, conflict, human rights violations, or violence (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2020). Of these, 45.7 million were internally displaced. Most of the displaced persons come from fragile disaster- or conflict-affected areas. Integration into the host communities can be fraught with challenges, with refugees often confined to ‘temporary’ camps that may last decades (Boenigk et al., 2021). The inadequate facilities and overcrowding have made the forcibly displaced even more vulnerable to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, social innovation initiatives can help bridge the gap. For instance, Multicultural Health Brokers Co-op (MCHB), a worker cooperative in Canada with 75 worker-members who are immigrants and former refugees, helps 2,000 migrant and refugee families each year access a variety of educational and health services, including cross-cultural care training to care providers (ILO, 2020b). Future marketing and consumer research should adopt conceptual lenses that recognize the multidimensionality of human population dynamics and address inequalities, vulnerabilities, and power struggles, with exciting prospects for critically revisiting earlier frameworks (Ger et al., 2018).

Capitalist Private Sector

The capitalist private sector consists of enterprises engaged in market production to generate a profit or other financial gain for their owners or shareholders. It has been the traditional focus of marketing and consumer research. In recent decades, the dominant model of maximizing shareholder value has received criticism for driving social inequalities and accelerating climate disaster, even when claiming to uphold corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Jones & Nisbet, 2011; Lazonick, 2017). In response, the sector has been witnessing a

move toward corporate social innovation (CSI) to improve society beyond CSR's narrow stakeholder approach (Carberry et al., 2019). CSIs go by other names such as 'innovating for shared value' and 'doing well by doing good (DWDG) innovations' (Pfitzer et al., 2013; Varadarajan & Kaul, 2018). Capitalist private enterprises may refer to their initiatives as CSR or CSI even as they cut costs to the detriment of workers and communities. For example, multinational enterprises in the telecommunications sector in many sub-Saharan African countries may rely on informal workers for distributing their products while presenting themselves as pro-poor social enterprises. Behind the façade, corporations are "building long-term, highly profitable infrastructures," whereas informal distributors "are primarily gaining short-term financial benefits and some long-term skills and expertise," as illustrated in the Rwandan context (Mann & Nzayisenga, 2015, p. 34).

The pandemic has exacerbated social inequalities, political polarization, and international tensions while "helping a new bloc of transnational capital, led by the giant tech companies along with finance and the military-industrial complex, to amass ever-greater power" (Robinson, 2020). In particular, the market capitalization of Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Google's parent Alphabet, and Facebook reached record levels. Whereas the capitalist private sector is often symbolically associated with mega-enterprises and multinationals, most enterprises are micro-, small-, or medium-sized. Although entrepreneurship is often promoted as a solution for development problems, as related to the image of the heroic entrepreneur, the empirical reality is that most businesses fail within a few years of their establishment. For example, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, a fifth of new businesses in the US fail within a year of their establishment, two-fifths within three years, and more than half within six years. Smallness, however, can also be an advantage in some cases. For instance, community-supported agriculture (CSA) institutions adapt even their name to the values they commit to, and hope will resonate with consumers. The first CSA

schemes, *teikei*, meaning partnership, were a response by women homemakers concerned about food safety deterioration because of agricultural industrialization in Japan (Kondoh, 2015). CSA schemes' names refer to maintaining small-scale and family farming in France, solidarity agriculture in Germany, solidarity purchasing groups in Italy, and local contract farming in Switzerland (European CSA Research Group, 2016). Underlying the various names is the idea of doing good together, including for others or the environment. Although localness should not be assumed to always lead to desirable outcomes, CSA actors typically associate it with some form of agroecological practices (Born & Purcell, 2006; Wezel et al., 2009).

The United Nations has developed several frameworks to encourage capitalist private sector contributions to sustainable development. Thus, the Global Compact is a voluntary initiative through which businesses can commit to sustainability principles. The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights provide a global standard of expected conduct for all businesses. The Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (MNE Declaration) offers direct guidance to multinational and national enterprises. Although voluntary, such initiatives can contribute to real change. For example, large private sector companies that source products such as cocoa, coffee, tea, sugar, and tobacco need to work toward eradicating child labor in their supply chains (ILO & International Organization of Employers, 2015). In the cocoa industry, most of the biggest private sector companies have made their commitments known through Responsible Sourcing Standards and Corporate Business Principles that refer to child labor. On its website, Nestlé indicates that it will investigate any reports of child labor and act in case of wrongdoing. Despite their usefulness, voluntary initiatives also have significant gaps since they cannot address systemic issues, especially those for which corporate interests may conflict with those of the community. While aiming to reduce child labor is laudable, household poverty is the leading cause of child labor in agriculture. Although low wages for workers and low prices for small producers keep

them poor, raising wages and producer prices is seldom the priority for multinationals. Future research can adopt more macro and critical perspectives, multiple levels of analysis, and transdisciplinary lenses to debunk prevailing ideologies (Dholakia, 2012a).

Conclusion

The current chapter elaborated the Five-SPEC model of social innovation in consumption and production systems to inform the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of interventions to realize the SDGs. Grounded in a transdisciplinary approach and a normative human rights perspective, the model transcends traditional marketing and consumer research boundaries. The chapter illustrated the model's multidirectional and multidimensional structures, processes, environments, and components with examples of various aspects of sustainable development from an international perspective. Scholars, practitioners, and policymakers can use the model to promote human rights instead of narrow economic interests. Because its elements are inseparable and interdependent, the model provides a corrective to disjunctive, reductionist, and market-centric approaches to social change. Scholars and funding agencies can use the model to map existing research on changing consumption and production systems and identify problematic assumptions or gaps in different fields, drawing on the current chapter's indications for future research. The model can also serve as a tool for strategists to ensure that they do not miss critical aspects that may thwart social innovation interventions. The model is compatible with various streams of empirical research. Its use can inform and benefit from qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods, emic and etic approaches, and micro-, meso-, macro-, and multilevel research and interventions. The hope is that readers will use it to promote democracy in all spheres of life.

Chapter 5.

Discussion

The current chapter summarizes the dissertation's theoretical contributions and the implications for policy and practice. It also discusses the limitations of the work and presents possible directions for future research.

Theoretical Contributions

This theoretical dissertation offered an integrative systemic account of social innovation in consumption and production systems. For that purpose, it elaborated the philosophical foundations of integrative systemics and provided an integrative systemic account of consumption and production. Furthermore, the dissertation sought to apply what Peracchio et al. (2014, p. viii) deem the gold standard of integrative research, which is “the most difficult to achieve but could yield the greatest insights,” and typically requires “scholars with a broad perspective, deep knowledge of more than one discipline and, perhaps, a diverse network of colleagues.” Consequently, the dissertation developed novel philosophical and conceptual foundations for marketing and consumer research and rethought social innovation and related interventions to advance sustainable development. Thus, it responded to the call for new ways of thinking and challenging the current boundaries of marketing and consumer research (Moorman et al., 2019).

Integrative Systemics

Concerning the philosophy of science, Chapter 2 argued that the paradigm wars in marketing and consumer research were mainly between two families of assumptions, one aligned with the Conservative Enlightenment and the other with the Counter-Enlightenment. It

proposed integrative systemics as an alternative aligned with the Radical Enlightenment, drawing inspiration from the works of Mario Bunge and Edgar Morin, two giants of complexity thinking (Bunge, 1974–1989; Morin, 1977–2004). No previous work in marketing and consumer research has differentiated the Radical Enlightenment from the Conservative Enlightenment. Critics of the Conservative Enlightenment have rejected the Enlightenment project, although if given a choice, at least some critics would find more affinity with the Radical Enlightenment than with the Counter-Enlightenment. Chapter 2 thus offered scholars a way out from the dualism of the paradigm wars that depicted compatible assumptions as mutually exclusive. However, the reconciliation of apparently opposed presuppositions does not imply the reconciliation of opposite paradigms. If one paradigm supposes ‘A and not B,’ whereas another supposes ‘B and not A,’ then a third paradigm assuming ‘A and B’ is not a synthesis of opposites since it rejects both ‘not B’ and ‘not A.’ Therefore, integrative systemics is an alternative to existing paradigms, not a synthesis of opposites such as positivism and interpretivism. It is a ‘third way’ to the dualism of the paradigm wars that, although critical and realist, differs from ‘critical realism’ in the tradition of Bhaskar.

The dualism of the paradigm wars has led to complications within each camp. For example, the sources Arnould and Thompson (2005) identify as offering the philosophy of science foundations of CCT reject notions such as objective reality, objective truth, and nomothetic knowledge and attribute them to positivism. However, many CCT scholars embrace such ideas in practice, as in calls to contextualize lived experiences within broader systems, study the real behavior of real people, reject post-truth, and generate nomothetic (although not necessarily universal) knowledge (Arnould et al., 2019; Askegaard & Linnet, 2011; Dholakia & Firat, 2018; O’Shaughnessy, 2010). Moreover, there is a significant evolution of CCT in the direction of the Radical Enlightenment. While Arnould and Thompson (2005) specify for CCT assumptions primarily aligned with the Counter-Enlightenment,

Arnould (2017) recognizes the Radical Enlightenment as the model for CCT scholarship today. More recently, drawing on Morin, Askegaard (2021) calls for consumer researchers to dialogue across disciplines beyond prevalent cultural, biological, and other determinisms. Meanwhile, in the other camp of the paradigm wars, proponents of objectivism often rely mainly on subjective data, from opinion surveys to online experiments. Integrative systemics offers scholars facing such tensions a way to reconcile their explicit commitments with their practices.

Previous research has opposed the view that reality is unique and objective to the view that humans construct multiple realities (Firat & Venkatesh, 1995; Hirschman, 1986; Hudson & Ozanne, 1988). Chapter 2 argued that the two views are mutually compatible and that rejecting either can lead to considerable real-world problems. Drawing on 11th-century scholar Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, it distinguished five levels of interpretation, each corresponding to a different mode of existence of objects: a) real, b) perceptual, c) imaginary, d) conceptual, and e) semiotic (al-Ghazali, 1993; Bunge, 2016c). It further refined the notion of modes of reality, whereby each mode of reality encompasses all the objects of a mode of existence. Accordingly, it reconciled a unique objective reality (reality without qualifiers) with multiple (inter)subjective realities while avoiding shortcomings in Fleetwood's (2005) account, which conflates questions of ontology (materialism or idealism) with those of epistemology (direct perception or concept mediation) and semantics (modes of reality).

Researchers have often used 'meaning' in multiple ways without clarifying what they mean, which has contributed to readers' confusion. Distinguishing between semantic meaning, which encompasses sense and reference, and pragmatic meaning, Chapter 2 identified four different interpretations of the latter: objects' tertiary properties, signalers' construals, interpreters' construals, and common constructs. Such an understanding provides a materialist alternative to the meaning transfer model that holds that meaning "begins as something resident in the culturally constituted world . . . then moves to consumer goods and finally to the life of

the consumer” (McCracken, 1989, p. 313). Instead, it deems that ‘meaning transfer’ is said to occur when interpreters construe the objects as signalers intended. Thus, viewers who mentally associate a celebrity with a healthy lifestyle are likely to associate the products that the celebrity endorses with that lifestyle.

Truth has posed a problem for researchers, with some openly rejecting it and others considering it as constructed (Anderson, 1988; Firat & Venkatesh, 1995; Hunt, 1990, 2012). Warning against the dangers of rejecting objective truth amidst a pandemic and in the context of climate change, Chapter 2 conceptualized truth as the degree of correspondence between construals, signals, or constructs and one or more aspects of a bounded part of a mode of reality. While offering a single truth concept, it allows for multiple truths and approximate truths and recognizes that truths cannot be about all aspects of the whole of reality. Specifying that truths refer to a particular mode of reality enables distinguishing between factual or objective truth and other kinds of truth, such as (inter)subjective, formal, fictional, and allegorical truths. While the account rejects the view that power determines truth, it recognizes the role of power in the acceptance of, or resistance against, truth claims. Accordingly, what Foucault (2011) refers to as a regime of truth would be more accurately termed a regime of truth claims. Consequently, the integrative systemic account enables scholars to seek objective truth and defend it without ignoring that such efforts are seldom politically neutral and that prevailing truth claims are not necessarily the closest to the truth.

Whereas researchers have often opposed deductive to inductive reasoning, following Peirce, Chapter 2 suggested that researchers typically use a combination of inductive, abductive, deductive, and analogical reasoning. It also noted that the validity of reasoning does not guarantee truths, except for valid deductions concerning formal truths. Furthermore, it followed Peirce in conceptualizing the scientific method as diligent inquiry into truth for truth’s sake, that involves ensuring the validity of deductions and verifying inductions, abductions,

and analogies, and relies on moderate rationalism, moderate empiricism, disciplined imagination, and moderate skepticism (Bunge, 2010; Morin, 1990/2005; Peirce, 1994). It also recognized the value of different empirical techniques without giving general priority to any. Such an account offers an understanding of the scientific method that avoids proposing a universal demarcation criterion between science and non-science without falling into the claim that science is whatever society calls science (Anderson, 1983; Hunt, 2010/2015).

The field's processual and relational ontologies have focused on narrow aspects of the social or collapsed the social with the non-social (Lucarelli & Giovanardi, 2019). Drawing on previous research, Chapter 2 proposed a novel conceptualization of reality as consisting of at least seven levels: eventual, physical, chemical, biological, mental, social, and artifactual (Blitz, 1992; Bunge, 2012; Romero, 2018). Although addressing some of them, the mobilities paradigm, non-representational theories, and practice theories do not clearly distinguish between levels. Assemblage theories and some versions of practice theories flatten all the levels and notably make no distinction between human and non-human. Unlike such alternatives, the integrative systemic conceptualization is consistent with a non-reductionist transdisciplinary perspective that enables collaborative research beyond existing silos.

Marketing and consumer researchers have disagreed about causality, with some rejecting it and others taking all explanations as causal (Thomas, 2018). The alternative adopted here is to distinguish three forms of concrete patterns or laws open to explanation: causal patterns, probabilistic or stochastic patterns, and patterns that combine causation or order with chance or disorder (Bunge, 2010; Morin, 1977/2008). Accordingly, causality is a relation between events. Moreover, cause-effect relations are not necessarily unidirectional and linear, as the interaction between entities involves circular causality. Although not an original contribution, it is a novel one for the field.

Scholars have opposed constructivism to realism and idiographic to nomothetic knowledge (Arnould & Thompson, 2005; Askegaard & Heilbrunn, 2018). Consistent with epistemological constructivism, integrative systemics takes all knowledge to be constructed while rejecting ontological constructivism, the notion that all reality is constructed. Moreover, consistent with scientific realism, integrative systemics takes knowledge of reality to be possible, fallible, and improvable. It rejects the notion of objective knowledge without a knowing subject. However, it acknowledges the necessity of objectivity in the sense of impersonal knowledge that does not adopt the viewpoint of specific subjects for science, technology, and accountability, while recognizing that what people construe as objective knowledge may be mistaken (Bunge, 2006; Hunt, 1993). In addition, it takes inquiry as involving both idiographic and nomothetic knowledge, noting that those who separate two knowledge orientations violate it in practice because everything happens according to concrete patterns and people know both particulars and generals. It further recognizes that because social facts typically combine objective and (inter)subjective processes, explanations of social facts can combine first-person (egocentric), second-person (as in *Verstehen*), and third-person (impersonal) perspectives and may be impoverished otherwise. Whereas different authors have contributed to the building blocks of the integrative systemic perspective, none has integrated them in such a way (Thomas, 2018).

While some scholars have called for the unification of knowledge instead of its fragmentation, others have asserted that paradigm incommensurability prevents the unification of knowledge, notably referring to epistemological and ontological barriers in that regard (Anderson, 1986; Peracchio et al., 2014; Tadajewski, 2008). While rejecting the reductionist unification of knowledge as a failure in its multiple forms, Chapter 2 endorsed the integrative unification of knowledge, which contributes to convergence between different fields without flattening differences between levels of reality (Bunge, 2003/2014). It recognized the

legitimacy of rejecting imperialist reductionism. However, it rejected paradigm incommensurability claims against integration as unfounded, whether incommensurability is understood as untranslatability, incomparability, incompatibility, or irreducibility. In line with Kuhn's later thinking, incommensurability is partial untranslatability; it is a semantic problem (Kuhn, 1982). Anderson (1986, p. 165) rightly notes that a "barrier to programmatic integration is the fact that the 'meaning' of terms can differ radically across programs," but he mistakes it for an "ontological barrier," rather than a semantic one. Semantic barriers are part of everyday life and do not preclude mutual understanding, irrespective of whether people agree or disagree on various matters. Moreover, as Peracchio et al. (2014) emphasize, integration involves developing a narrative that draws eclectically on others. We should evaluate the new narrative on its own terms, not those of its sources. In terms of compatibility, the relevant question is not whether the different antecedent systems fit together, as a totalizing narrative would require, but how well the integrated elements work together as a system. By offering scholars an alternative to reifying paradigms or treating them as social identities, the views elaborated here can increase tolerance and dampen the biases and meanness of the peer review process (Tadajewski, 2008). Following Bunge (2012), relevant evaluation criteria include conceptual and terminological clarity, logical consistency, correspondence with the facts, compatibility with the bulk of antecedent knowledge, the significance of problems addressed and proposed solutions, as well as scholarly and real-world implications. The account developed here enables marketing and consumer researchers to pursue knowledge integration while rejecting reductionism because of its incompatibility with reality instead of appealing to ill-defined incommensurability.

Scholars have noted that the field has exacerbated problems for humanity and the planet by inadequately addressing ethics and visions for progressive systemic change (Cova et al., 2013; Firat & Dholakia, 2017a; Tadajewski et al., 2014). Chapter 2 endorsed the values of

universalism, communism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism and calls for cooperative research models such as slow science while recognizing the challenges associated with the neoliberal academic model, which incentivizes unethical practices (Merton, 1942/1973; Stengers, 2018; Thompson, 2017a). Moreover, it embraced planetary humanism, recognized that rejecting humanism is unaffordable for those whose humanity is denied, and opposed pseudo-humanisms that dehumanize parts of humanity or pit humans against non-human nature, as in colonialism and ecological destruction (de Sousa Santos, 2018; Gordon, 1998; Morin & Ceruti, 2014). Its account thus contributes to the underpinnings of critical marketing and consumer scholarship.

By recognizing differences between the objective and (inter)subjective, the duality of stability and change, and endorsing planetary humanism alongside the pursuit of truth and objectivity, integrative systemics transcends the four quadrants traditionally used to distinguish functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist, and radical structuralist paradigms (Arndt, 1985; Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Cova et al., 2013; Tadajewski, 2016; Tadajewski et al., 2014). Integrative systemics has elements in common with each of them, without encompassing them all since it also has features that each of the four paradigms rejects. Although the development of integrative systemics engaged with assumptions from multiple paradigms, Chapter 2 avoided claiming to offer a multiparadigm review, multiparadigm research, or metaparadigm theory building. While integrative systemics affords a meta-point of view that “transcends paradigm distinctions to reveal disparity and complementarity,” and “allows alternatives to co-exist,” calling it a metaparadigm may give the wrong impression of “a closed and authoritative metanarrative” (Lewis & Grimes, 1999, p. 673; Lewis & Kelemen, 2002, pp. 261, 267). Chapter 2 sought to avoid such implications by discussing individual assumptions rather than paradigms, refraining from classifying authors or works under broader labels such as positivism

and interpretivism, and emphasizing that scholars can be eclectic in the postulates they adopt rather than endorsing or rejecting paradigms as reified wholes.

Consumption and Production Systems

Researchers who study consumption often oppose it to production, seldom clarifying their understanding of the concepts (Graeber, 2011; Warde, 2017). Moreover, scholars using broadened marketing and consumption concepts have contributed to diffusing neoliberal ideology (Dholakia et al., 2020). Instead, Chapter 3 conceptualized a consumption and production system as a dynamic multilevel system of persons producing goods, services, and waste and using them, with associated physical, chemical, biological, mental, social, and artifactual processes that interplay with the environment. Furthermore, it offered multiple interpretations of consumption and production at different levels, thus enabling more precision in thinking and communication than the catch-all terms of consumption and production. The various interpretations can also inform an integrative systemic understanding of the challenges to sustainable development. Chapter 3 thus offers an alternative to flattening all levels to the artifactual, which naturalizes market processes and outcomes in the service of capitalist ideology (Graeber, 2011).

A prevalent view in the literature is that corporations create positive experiences for individual consumers throughout their journeys (Holbrook & Hirschman, 1982; Lemon & Verhoef, 2016; Pine & Gilmore, 1999). Instead, Chapter 3 conceptualized a person's journey as her life, which she experiences from a first-person perspective. It recognized the possibility of collective journeys and collective experiences, as in families and social movements. It rejected the assumption that all consumption experiences are positive. Moreover, it argued that an organization influences its stakeholders' experiences to the extent that it controls their lives. Even then, the experiencing agents are the producers and consumers of their experiences, and

experiences can be neither transferred to others nor directly accessed or created by others (Gallagher and Varga, 2014). Elucidating the concepts of journeys and experiences thus challenges the assumptions of consumerist ideology.

Researchers often construe consumers as individuals and producers as corporations, although such views have come under criticism, notably for not addressing groups and prosomption processes (MacInnis et al., 2020; Ritzer & Jurgenson, 2010). Chapter 3 argued for a multilevel understanding of consumers and producers that does not confine them to a single economic role. At the social level, it interpreted production as the production of goods and services, and consumption as their use. In line with the System of National Accounts, it distinguished between intermediate and final consumption and between individual and collective consumption. Accordingly, both producers and consumers can be institutional units, sectors, or economies, beyond the usual distinction between individuals and groups (MacInnis et al., 2020). Moreover, it noted that whether formal or informal enterprises engage in such processes makes no fundamental difference at the social level, although it has significant implications at the artifactual level. Chapter 3 rejected the micro-reductionist view of agents separate from their environment, emphasizing that consumption and production processes involve changes in the agent-environment system. No previous work has provided such a multilevel non-reductionist conceptualization of consumers and producers. The chapter enables researchers to go beyond narrow construals of consumers and producers while recognizing the interrelatedness of consumption and production, thus breaking boundaries beyond previous conceptualizations (MacInnis et al., 2020; Moorman et al., 2019).

Scholars have construed behavioral and practice theories as incompatible, even when they have sought to draw on both theoretical families (Shove, 2010; Kurz et al., 2015). Moreover, conceptual confusion abounds regarding habit, habitus, behavior, and practices, even within members of the same research tradition, often indicating insufficient engagement

with the history of thought across disciplines. As an alternative to reductionist understandings of behavior, Chapter 3 proposed construing behaviors as encompassing simulation, perception, enaction, and control processes that interplay with the environment. It showed how SPEC processes enable the integration of different partial views of individuals in the literature, including as designers, construers, craftspeople, prosumers, producers, and decision-makers (Bruns, 2016; Campbell, 2005; Firat & Dholakia, 2017b; Kelly, 1955/1991; Ritzer & Jurgenson, 2010).

Chapter 3 further conceptualized habits as learned behavioral dispositions and habitus as collections of habits (Bourdieu, 1993; Campbell, 1963). Noting that habitus is a multilevel concept, as Bourdieu recognized, it offered a novel distinction between two notions of group habitus: (1) the habits that are similar across individuals of the same group; (2) the joint dispositions that individuals develop as a group. It clarified the distinction between habits and habitual behavior and rejected accounts of habit(u)s as automaticity, routine, or behaviors of some kind. While it recognized that habitual behaviors' reliance on habits might enable more automatic performances with less need for deliberation, it noted problems in the concept of automaticity and the associated empirical evidence. Accounts that take automaticity as a defining characteristic of habit(u)s largely ignore such problems (Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018; Phillips, 2020; Smith et al., 2012). Unlike prevalent alternatives, the conceptualization of habit(u)s developed in Chapter 3 is consistent with the most research developments in cognitive neuroscience, with ancient philosophical traditions, as well as with everyday language (Balleine & Dezfouli, 2019; Barandiaran & Di Paolo, 2014; Barsalou, 2020; Smith & Graybiel, 2016).

Chapter 3's understanding of habit(u)s does not take automaticity as a defining characteristic. Instead, it considers the extent and dimensions of automaticity within the realm of behavioral (cognitive and motor) control (Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018). When people

experience situations similar to those they have experienced before, they can rely on habits encapsulating previous experiences of such situations without much deliberative control. A person who typically has milk and cereals for breakfast does not need much effort deciding what to eat in the morning. Deliberation becomes necessary when confronting a significantly different situation, as when waking up to find that one has run out of milk. By conceptualizing behavior as inseparably encompassing cognition and enaction and involving interplay with the environment, the chapter's dispositional account of behavior offers a novel conceptualization of 4E (enactive, embodied, embedded, and extended) cognition (Menary, 2010).

Practice theorists agree on the importance of the term 'practice,' although they disagree on what it designates, leading to conceptual confusion. Distinguishing between practice and practices, Chapter 3 proposed to construe practices as classes of behavior. It identified problems in prominent conceptualizations of practices and the associated literature (Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki, 1996; Shove et al., 2012). Such problems notably relate to understanding behavior and practices only in terms of motor behavior, confining them to some notion of routine, decentering human subjects, and rejecting the concept of emergence. The chapter showed how such accounts often reintegrate the eliminated aspects under new guises, such as suffusing, the elements of practices, or the organization of practices (Hui et al., 2017a). It demonstrated how the integrative systemic account resolves such problems and is consistent with studying practices with time use surveys (Southerton et al., 2012; United Nations Statistics Division, 2017).

Noting that practice theorists have confused stocks and flows in their accounts of the elements of practices, Chapter 3 provided a novel conceptualization of resources compatible with its dispositional account of behavior and habit and its behavioral account of practices. It argued against a micro-reductionist understanding of resources. Instead, it proposed to consider parts of the system encompassing a species or higher taxon and its environment as resources

(liabilities) for the species or higher taxon in certain respects, to the extent that they afford or facilitate (deny or impede) practices that benefit (harm) it in these respects. Affordances refer to the joint dispositions of the agent and environment (Vetter, 2018). At the individual level, the environment provides an organism in a particular situation with a field of affordances; at the aggregate level, the environment offers a population with a landscape of affordances (Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014). The chapter further distinguished between techno-ecological, biopsychosocial, and institutional resources, and between natural, produced, and constructed resources. Its account is compatible with the critical use of SNA categories for studying macro or ‘large’ phenomena, which practice theorists tend to struggle with (Hui et al., 2017b).

Chapter 3’s account of resources offers a multidimensional interpretation of the notion that “resources are not; they become,” which is critical for the SDGs (Zimmermann, 1964, p. 21). We can distinguish at least three interpretations relating respectively to processes, affordances, and economic valuation. First, material resources become in the sense that they are dynamic entities. The sun is not a fixed entity; it involves a proton-proton fusion process (Bellini et al., 2014). Second, resources become in the landscape-of-affordances sense when they start enabling or facilitating beneficial practices. Such becoming may result from changes in human ability or the environment. The changes may be the product of human activity, but not necessarily. For example, solar energy affords disinfecting water without humans having to transform the sun. Solar energy did not become in the sense of being an artifact. Yet solar energy has become a resource for generating electricity with solar panels; both solar energy and solar panels are resources in the affordances sense. A third sense in which resources become is in the market-centric economic valuation sense when people consider that financial benefits are derivable from them. Thus, in the market-centric sense, stars became a resource when some people started making money from them, as by having others name a star (in the

service providers' database) for a fee (the International Astronomical Union (2018) “*dissociates itself entirely*” from the practice).

Since resources become, they can also become non-resources, which points to different understandings of unsustainability (Campbell et al., 2013). In the first, temporal sense, resources are always in the process of becoming; the process can be neither stopped nor reversed. In the second, affordances sense, resources become non-resources either when agents, the environment, or the agent-environment system lose some of their dispositions. An ancient text written in a lost language does not afford reading; neither does a text written on a parchment that has fully deteriorated. A production plant can become a non-resource for production when its technology becomes obsolete or because of physical decay. In the third, market-centric sense, resources become non-resources when it is no longer possible to make money off them. A private beach that charges money for access becomes a non-resource when a new law grants the public free access. More generally, improving the equity and sustainability of consumption systems may involve market resources becoming non-resources in the market-centric sense while becoming more valuable as resources in the affordances sense. Such considerations are critical when considering the ownership, possession, access, control, and sustainability of resources in theory and practice.

Social Innovation in Consumption and Production Systems

As an alternative to reductionist and market-centric approaches to social change, Chapter 4 offered the Five-SPEC model of social innovation in consumption and production systems. The model's starting point was the insight that identifying a system, whether small like a household, or large like humanity, entails specifying its Structure, Processes, Environment, and Components (Bunge, 2016a). In contrast, other frameworks rely on only some of the defining elements of systems: structuralism on structure, micro-reductionism on

individual agential processes, and practices on aggregate agential processes. The chapter further refined each of the system's SPEC into four additional SPECs, also inseparable and interdependent. A system's structure encompasses Social, Political, Economic, and Cultural relations, consistent with recent critiques (Ger et al., 2018). The chapter distinguished between agential and non-agential processes and explicated the role of emergence across levels of analysis. Drawing on Chapter 3, it specified that agential processes such as behaviors and practices encompass Simulation, Perception, Enaction, and Control, all interplaying with the environment. It also noted that people encode SPEC processes in their habits from a first-person perspective. Chapter 4 further interpreted the environment as including the Societal, Produced, Ecological, and Codified environment. Such an understanding offers a conceptualization of the 'context of context' that distinguishes structural, processual, and environmental aspects (Askegaard & Linnet, 2011). Finally, the chapter took the components of consumption and production systems to include the Social economy, Public sector, the Elements of the population, and Capitalist private sector, consistent with recent research and in contrast with the field's emphasis on the capitalist private sector (Bretos et al., 2020).

For theories of practice, Chapter 4's conceptualization of the societal environment offers a contextual interpretation of the view that "the sources of changed behaviour lie in the development of practices themselves" (Warde, 2005, p. 140). Such a statement would be false if interpreted in a structuralist fashion: because practices are classes of behavior, changed practices emerge from changed behaviors, not the other way around. For example, changes in greeting practices during the pandemic emerged from changes in individual instances of greeting behavior. Referring to practices in the societal environment, meaning outside the system under consideration, verifies Warde's assertion: behaviors within the system can change because of practice changes in the societal environment. Thus, a household's members

may change their greeting behaviors after learning about changes in greeting practices in COVID-vulnerable communities.

The understanding of practices as classes of behavior differs from two main streams of practice theorizing. Micro-oriented practice theorists refer to individual behavior as ‘enacted practice,’ to planned behavior as ‘envisioned practice,’ to the gap between them as ‘practice misalignment,’ and to social norms as ‘social practices’ that exist at a cultural level and provide scripts for individuals to appropriate (Thomas & Epp, 2019). The Five-SPEC model recognizes instead that agents can engage in novel behaviors apart from existing social practices. Moreover, practices emerge from reciprocal action between agents and their environments rather than pre-existing independently.

Meanwhile, macro-oriented practice theorists construe practices at a societal level. The macro view is a necessary corrective to micro-reductionist approaches that construe individuals as isolated, autonomous, independent, and free choosers (Warde, 2014). However, the desire to decenter human actors can lead to the opposite extreme of macro-reductionism, thereby attributing agency to the ‘elements’ or ‘organization’ of practices rather than the practitioners (Schatzki, 1996; Shove et al., 2012). Compared to the specification of systems in terms of structure, processes, environment, and composition, authors in this tradition consider practices as all there is. In contrast with Chapter 4’s multilevel systemic account, they adopt a flat ontology, thereby rejecting the notion of emergent properties (Schatzki, 2016; Shove, 2020). Drawing on the macro stream of practice theorizing, the change points approach introduces the notion of ‘change points,’ “potential site[s] for effecting change in relation to the defined issue of concern” (Watson et al., 2020, p. 5). Although the authors position it as an alternative to standard behavior change approaches, social marketers will recognize change points as ‘target behaviors.’ Overall, the change points approach involves similar steps as the traditional social marketing approach, but without the marketing terminology. Moreover, it features limited

engagement with the social marketing and broader behavior change literatures (Lee & Kotler, 2011; Michie & Johnston, 2012). The Five-SPEC model can help inform users of those and other approaches and enable knowledge development across approaches.

The Five-SPEC model contributes to the behavioral literature, as notably represented in the SHIFT framework, which builds on a review of 280 articles. The SHIFT framework pays attention to Habit formation and Feelings and cognition (White et al., 2019). However, it does not distinguish between perception and simulation nor between behaviors and dispositions. It construes habits as automatic behaviors, adopts a dual-process view of feelings and cognition, and ignores the environment while addressing people's concerns for it. The other elements of the SHIFT framework, namely Social influence, the Individual self, and Tangibility, focus on simulation processes and habits. Thus, the SHIFT framework retains a narrow dualist focus on the simulations of isolated individuals and their automatic behaviors, along with the Cartesian dualist assumption that thinking is emotionless and emotions are irrational. The dualist assumption characterizes dual-system and dual-process theories, which "perpetuate the binary subordination of the automatic, emotionally driven, feminised brain to the ideal of the deliberative, rational, masculinised mind" (Pykett, 2012, p. 227). In contrast, in the Five-SPEC model, emotions combine perceptions and simulations and are thus enactive.

The Five-SPEC model overcomes significant shortcomings of the SHIFT framework. To their credit, White et al. (2019) recognize collective action, control, and perception (concerning abstractness) as challenges to address beyond the SHIFT framework's scope. The elements of the SHIFT framework can fit within the Five-SPEC model, with some reconceptualization. Hence, as learned behavioral dispositions, habits depend not on a stable environment but on similarities in how people experience events and what they retain and recall from their experiences. Different people may construe the same events differently, and such differences can help explain differences in the evolution of their habits. For example, an 80

percent rise in cigarette prices may seem like a disincentive to low-income smokers but not to high-income ones, which raises concerns about the regressivity of cigarette taxes without complementary measures (Lee & Seo, 2020).

The Five-SPEC model of social innovation offers a novel account of the disposition-behavior gap. As a corrective to the individualistic understanding, it addresses the individual and joint dispositions of agents and their environment across situations. For example, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, millions of people worldwide drastically changed their habits to ensure their safety and others' (Sheth, 2020). Many, however, did not. Even when people are positively disposed to engage in a specific behavior, they may not do it. The difference between disposition and behavior goes by many names: attitude-behavior gap, belief-behavior gap, intention-behavior gap, knowledge-attitudes-practice gap, practice misalignment, or value-action gap (Carrington et al., 2014; Olson, 2013; Thomas & Epp, 2019). A variant is the ethical consumption gap, for which the literature has offered two main explanations (Bray et al., 2011; Davies et al., 2012). The first refers to research errors, such as reliance on decontextualized experiments or self-report measures, and the related social desirability and selection biases. The second relates to barriers to decision-making, either about forming appropriate intentions or translating those intentions into behavior.

An emergent stream of research has challenged the notion of the gap for its over-emphasis on individual agency and under-emphasis on systemic factors. Carrington et al. (2016) attribute two ideological functions to the ethical consumption gap. First, it contributes to the individualization of responsibility, with persistent feelings of guilt leading individual consumers to internalize the gap as a personal failing. Second, it legitimizes the capitalist mode of production, promising that ethical consumption can save it from itself. The criticism is valid if we construe consumers as individuals engaging in final consumption. However, such an understanding is too narrow compared to Chapter 3's multilevel conceptualization of

consumers as encompassing individuals, groups, institutional units, sectors, and societies. Moreover, for theoretical reconciliation between production and consumption, it is necessary to recognize the production of goods and services as intermediate consumption, and final consumption as the production of people (Graeber, 2011; Warde, 2017).

When a person's non-discursive behavior does not correspond to her verbal report regarding her dispositions, it would be hasty to attribute the gap to inconsistency. A person may say that she wants to wear a mask in public to protect herself and others against the spread of COVID-19. If we observe her not wearing a mask in public, we should not directly label her as hypocritical. Maybe no masks were available in her area, or she could not afford them, or she thought she could dispense with a mask by practicing social distancing. According to Campbell (1963, p. 160), the literature has historically "confused correlational inconsistency with situational threshold differences." Such an assessment remains relevant. Depending on the situation, the relative ease or difficulty of different aspects of behavior may vary from moment to moment. Given the SPEC processes and drawing on Campbell and Russo (2001), we can distinguish between autonomic reactions that people cannot deliberately control (such as galvanic skin responses), perceptions, simulations, and enaction. For example, making a racist statement caught on tape can create more problems than practicing less visible racial discrimination. The relative ease of verbal reports of perceptions and simulations also varies across situations. A man making a sexist joke may receive laughs from like-minded peers but condemnations from others. References to inconsistency typically ignore the relative difficulty of realizing the dispositions associated with the different SPEC processes.

In every situation, a person faces affordances, behavioral possibilities that can range from the impossible to the necessary (Gibson, 1986/2015). Affordances are joint dispositions of person and environment, or, at a higher level of aggregation, between a consumption and production system and its environment (Vetter, 2018). Thus, a book affords reading, but only

for a person literate in its language. Oil reserves afford extraction, but only with the requisite extraction technologies. Even when affordances exist, people may not be aware of them or may misunderstand them. As learned behavioral dispositions, habits make some aspects of behavior more likely than others, but behavior also depends on other dispositions, whether of the person, the environment, or the person-environment system. It follows that if agents do not act upon their dispositions, the explanation is partly in the affordances they face. In line with the multilevel conceptualization of consumers and producers, the understanding of agents is multilevel and not restricted to individuals.

Such an interpretation offers a conceptualization of the ethical consumption and production gap that does “contain references to larger systemic conditions, apparatuses, and structures,” in contrast with prevalent understandings (Carrington et al., 2016, p. 31). If the situations that people find themselves in do not sufficiently afford the ethical behaviors they desire, the fault lies not with the individual alone but with the person-environment system. Guiltning people for not using personal protective equipment when such equipment is not available, accessible, or affordable may be easier than recognizing the necessity to transform social provision systems, but it is counterproductive and cruel. By adopting the Five-SPEC model of social innovation, future research can investigate the disposition-behavior gap using a systemic perspective that addresses differences and similarities between persons, environments, and their multidimensional interactions across situations, thus providing a more realistic grounding for social interventions.

Implications for Policy and Practice

The times are changing. The backdrop of a global pandemic, multiple crises, conflict, resistance, and renewal makes holding static views of the universe and defending the status quo harder to fathom, except maybe for the well-trained and the strong of faith. The current

work's main implication for policy and practice is to critically engage with the approaches that experts advocate, rather than adopting them uncritically, especially as researchers often adopt market-centric, reductionist, and disjunctive approaches that may ignore ethics, politics, and divergent interests. Integrative systemics, the integrative systemic account of consumption and production, and the Five-SPEC model of social innovation offer correctives to the philosophical, conceptual, and social change approaches prevalent in academia and public discourse. Thus, the dissertation provides foundations for transdisciplinary, multilevel, and multimethod contributions that can inform sustainable development in policy and practice. The current section focuses on some assumption-challenging real-world implications.

Policymakers and practitioners often think of philosophical discussions as impractical and thus irrelevant to their work. However, as argued in Chapter 2, it is crucial to recognize objective reality and (inter)subjective realities, distinguish the different understandings of meaning, adopt a proper truth concept, and use valid forms of reasoning. Otherwise, policies and practices become vulnerable to such ills as misunderstandings, post-truth, alternative facts, dehumanization, deceit, impunity, and unreasonableness. From an integrative systemic perspective, interventions should respect science while recognizing the limits of scientists and strive for planetary humanism even as it may conflict with some entrenched interests. Conflicts should be managed rather than ignored. When seeking advice from social scientists, policymakers and practitioners should ask them to make explicit their assumptions, biases, and potential conflicts of interest. Rather than aiming for conformity, they should encourage diversity of viewpoints and remain open to reconsidering what they take for granted as they determine their course of action. Investing in science, education, care, and decent green jobs, including in the public sector and the social economy, while promoting equality of opportunity and treatment and addressing historical injustices, are priorities consistent with the worldview adopted here. However, because such priorities may conflict in specific contexts, it is necessary

to develop mechanisms for social, political, economic, and cultural democracy as an alternative to relying on experts without involving the groups most affected by the decisions. The institutional mechanisms may vary across the elements of the population, the social economy, the public sector, and the capitalist private sectors, from cooperatives and trade unions to local assemblies and global consultations. They may involve a combination of direct and indirect democracy.

Programs and projects often adopt a linear logic, as reflected in logical frameworks, which is incompatible with the dynamicity that policymakers and practitioners typically face and the complexity, multidirectional and multilevel causality, and uncertainty of the systems with which they interact. Ontological considerations thus reveal the need for alternative frameworks (Jacobs et al., 2010). The recognition of complexity does not make management intractable: it is possible to systematize decisions and actions because of objective patterns that can be monitored, analyzed, and influenced. The recognition of causality is consistent with the ability of policymakers and practitioners to enact change, while the recognition of chance is consistent with the boundedness of such ability and the likelihood of unintended effects. The current work thus offers a more realistic perspective than the prevalent simplistic and unrealistic unidirectional linear logic, and as such, can help reformulate rethinking of planning and accountability frameworks. Persons in charge of programs and projects seldom address uncertainty and tend to focus instead on risk analysis, whereby they can identify the different possible scenarios and estimate their likelihood. As the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated, it will be essential to recognize the possibility of extraordinary events and allow for more flexibility in changing the logic of interventions beyond the linearity of logical frameworks.

The multilevel account of consumption and production systems denaturalizes market systems and enables the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of alternatives to

promote the SDGs, including non-market systems of provision. While it can help develop practical insights about existing systems and how to alter them, it also signals the need for professionals who have diverse theoretical and methodological toolkits. Accordingly, capacity development in different fields and a range of qualitative and quantitative techniques may be necessary to address skill shortages. Chapter 3 illustrated the relevance of specific understandings of consumption and production varies with the SDGs of interest at each level. It will be necessary to study the multiple relevant interpretations of consumption and production at different levels for each SDG for practical purposes. Such study can enable practitioners to adopt a multilevel understanding that informs more fine-grained analyses, plans, and progress monitoring beyond confining sustainable consumption and production to SDG 12. Understanding persons as inseparable from their environment offers a corrective to micro-reductionist accounts that individuals engage in change irrespective of their environment and to macro-reductionist accounts that changing the environment is sufficient, regardless of the individuals. Both reductionisms typically lead to failed interventions. The rejection of the dualism between mind and body also implies that the typical division between thinkers and doers, or between strategy and implementation, is problematic. That is, claiming that a strategy was good but that its implementation was faulty, thus shifting responsibility away from decision-makers, is seldom an adequate explanation: a superior strategy could have better anticipated potential problems and could have included more precautionary measures. The rejection of such dualism also implies that although people may act as leaders or followers in certain respects at different times, leading and following are processes rather than attributes of persons.

In contrast with the capitalocentric understanding of resources mainly in monetary and private ownership terms, the practice account of resources adopts the viewpoint of humanity. It is thus consistent with more equal and sustainable ownership, possession, access, and control

of resources and can contribute to the development of alternatives to the dominant policy narratives. The dispositional account of behavior is also relevant for rethinking employability away from the individualization of responsibility for employment, to include both the person and the environment, with the environment construed as including the societal, produced, ecological, and codified environments. For example, in the absence of adequate jobs, fair recruitment, and fair migration, even the most qualified persons can remain non-employed for long periods despite their readiness to get a job. In a pandemic context, the challenges to securing and maintaining a decent job are multiplied. Accordingly, public policy should prioritize introducing a social protection floor comprising basic social security guarantees for all. The dispositional account of behavior is also relevant for enterprise initiation, development, and failure, moving away from narratives around heroic entrepreneurs and personal failure toward a more balanced understanding consistent with the fact that most new enterprises fail within a few years, even in periods of high economic growth.

The conceptualization of social innovation as habit change offers a much-needed corrective to the understanding of innovations as enterprises, things, or solutions, by placing human processes forefront in their systemic context, without assuming in advance that an intervention will be successful across all evaluation criteria. Accordingly, policymakers, funders, and citizens should not place excessive faith in interventions that ignore such considerations. The understanding of social innovation as habit change also has implications for the design of related interventions. Because habits form systems, interventions to change a particular habit should consider other habits closely bonded to it; otherwise, interventions are likely to prove ineffective. Moreover, habit systems are multilevel within and across individuals, groups, institutional units, sectors, and societies. In line with the recognition of the person-environment system, interventions should consider the individual and joint dispositions of the persons and environments of interest. Counting only on a person's motivation is likely

to fail, except in exacerbating the person's sense of failure. For example, changing the habit of eating fast food after a stressful day is less effective if the focus is solely on the eating behavior without attention to the elements conducive to stress. When people's new or anticipated experiences differ significantly from their habits, they become better disposed to habit change, as in life transitions such as childbirth or moving homes (Verplanken & Wood, 2006). Since people encode SPEC processes in their habits, interventions can vary in the extent to which they necessitate deliberation by the intended beneficiaries, and deliberation itself involves multiple continua. Decision-makers may seek to promote habit change without deliberation. For example, nudging involves changes to the environment without the awareness of the intended beneficiaries, as in changing the default option in official forms (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Nudging can be less democratic when people are not aware that others attempt to influence their habits. However, it can be effective under certain conditions because it does not add demands on people's attention. In addition to the moral problems of deliberately influencing people's habits without their knowledge, there may be economic and political repercussions once the truth comes out. In the Five-SPEC model, deliberation about habits and changes to the environment need not be mutually exclusive alternatives: people may change their environment to change their habits, as when setting up a compost bin at home or developing rail transport infrastructure to decrease car use. Understanding social innovation as habit change thus enables systemic interventions to change the behavior of individuals and the practices of groups and transform market systems, including by altering market processes to ensure greater fairness and sustainability or, as appropriate, replacing market systems with non-market ones.

Understanding behavioral control as involving multiple continua points to the possibility for policymakers and practitioners to encourage the adoption of social innovations by helping decrease the need for deliberation about the desirable behaviors and practices, even

as people engage in them deliberately. One way to do so is to make the desired behaviors and practices compatible with existing habits, making it easier for people to integrate and maintain the change (Labrecque et al., 2017). For example, because interpersonal interaction typically involves non-verbal expression, including facial expressions, in the context of COVID-19, the introduction of artistic masks such as masks depicting the person's face can help make wearing facial masks more in line with people's habits. Another possibility is to encourage people to repeat the desirable behavior in similar situations, preferably while ensuring that they positively evaluate the associated experiences. Songs to sing while washing one's hands are such an example. Favorable evaluations can relate to intrinsic motivation, as when making the behavior enjoyable, or extrinsic motivation, as with using rewards, even if only nominal, as in gamification. The use of escape games for youth to learn about addiction is an example that combines both.

Establishing mechanisms to facilitate deliberation can also promote social innovation and habit change away from problematic behaviors and practices. Helpful techniques include goal setting, introspection, verbal communication, and exposure to novel constructs (Fox & Riconscente, 2008). Goal setting can be either individual, as in personal planning, or collective, as in the demands of social movements. Introspection can involve self-monitoring, as by using diaries or electronic devices at the individual level or holding after-action reviews at the collective level. Verbal communication can include reporting on progress and receiving feedback, notably from electronic devices, peers, experts, or support groups. People exposed to novel constructs can construe their situation using alternative conceptual lenses, thus getting a better grasp of complexity and potentialities. Thinking about constructs such as mansplaining or the capitalocene and reflecting upon the difference between constructs such as 'Black Lives Matter' and 'All Lives Matter' are illustrative examples. Combining different techniques can make habit change more effective. Effective interventions to increase daily fruit and vegetable

consumption, for example, can combine mobile phone health applications for dietary self-monitoring and goal setting with expert feedback (Mandrachia et al., 2019). As cross-sectoral partnerships worldwide demonstrate, interventions to integrate refugees in the local population also need to combine different techniques. The flexibility of the Five-SPEC model enables its use either to update existing approaches to behavioral and practice change, such as logical frameworks and their theories of change, social marketing, nudging, and the change points approach, or as a complement to them. Using the Five-SPEC model of social innovation in a consultative manner, policymakers and practitioners gain a practical tool that is rights-based, easy to recall, and helpful to ensure balance in analysis, design, and implementation of interventions, with the aim of rebalancing society and promoting sustainable development. Disadvantaged groups can also use it to help redress historical injustices through systemic change beyond the prevalent incremental piecemeal approaches. The multiple crises that humanity and the planet are facing have led to rising discourses about ‘a new normal’ and ‘a better normal.’ They provide a timely opportunity for adopting the Five-SPEC model to help strengthen and realize formal commitments. Users of the model can also provide feedback on its usefulness in practice and share ideas on refining it or adapting it as needed.

Limitations and Future Research Opportunities

The approach adopted in the current work brings with it several limitations. The text did not provide any empirical evidence regarding the difference that its propositions can make in practice for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners. While it offered examples to illustrate the arguments and indications for operationalizing certain concepts, it did not engage in systematic operationalization, which is necessary for empirical investigation. Moreover, because it challenged paradigmatic assumptions in the field of marketing and consumer research, from the philosophy of science to the conceptualization of consumption, production,

habit(u)s, practices, behaviors, resources, and social innovation interventions, scholars entrenched in certain positions may meet the current work with misinterpretation, skepticism, disdain, or even outrage. Meanwhile, scholars who embrace integrative systemics may find it challenging to adopt in practice. Changing one's philosophical and conceptual assumptions does not come with a clear roadmap on how to change one's academic habits.

Moreover, the neoliberal academy favors disjunctive and reductionist 'nothing-but' thinking. In business schools, particularly with cuts in funding and student attendance, prioritizing the interests of the capitalist private sector may appear an urgent priority, even if it goes against the promotion of planetary humanism. Editors, reviewers, and other gatekeepers may reject integrative systemics because they do not understand it or dismiss it because they do if they consider it problematic for their interests. Accordingly, publications derived from, or inspired by, the current work may not see the light of day, although less mainstream, more specialized, and practitioner-oriented publication outlets may be more welcoming for them. Nevertheless, giving the field's increasing editorial calls for transdisciplinary, conceptual, and assumption-challenging approaches that address grand challenges, there is hope for positive reception in the leading mainstream outlets as well.

Regarding future research opportunities, the current work helps problematize previously held assumptions about seldom-crossing research streams and generate novel research questions that transcend the boundaries that researchers have erected for themselves. It can inspire researchers to develop alternative assumptions and conceptualizations for schools of thought, the field of marketing and consumer research, or transdisciplinary research (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011). Engagement with international statistical frameworks such as the System of National Accounts and the International Classification of Activities for Time Use Statistics alongside more qualitative approaches offers avenues for mixed-method investigations.

Considering the arguments developed here, researchers may wish to rethink marketing and consumer research as a research field rather than one or more disciplines. According to Coase (1977, p. 204), the boundaries of a research field may be around “common techniques of analysis, a common theory or approach to the subject, or a common subject matter.” The primacy given to technique in marketing and consumer research contrasts with Coase’s (1977, p. 209) view about the “relative unimportance of technique as a basis for the choice of professional groupings,” and the need for “the theory or approach [to be] in large part determined by the subject matter.” A focus on the subject matter can lead to *rethinking marketing and consumer research as a field studying consumption and production systems*. Such rethinking is consistent with the thematic coverage of the literature, the transdisciplinary aspirations of consumer research, and marketing scholars’ yearning to cover non-market processes. It also avoids the pitfalls of the broadening movement, which has led to promoting market ideology in non-market contexts (Dholakia et al., 2020).

Future research can use the current work to further engage with Alderson’s marketing thought, which was transdisciplinary, multilevel, systemic, and oriented toward problem-solving. Researchers can notably update and extend the formal theory of transactions and transvections, which derives 72 definitions from three primitive terms: sets, behavior, and expectations (Alderson & Martin, 1965). Developing formal propositions from the multilevel conceptualization of consumption and production systems and the Five-SPEC model of social innovation can be a starting point in that regard. For example, the current work’s practice account of resources offers a dynamic alternative to Alderson’s more static view of sets. Its dispositional account of behavior and habit(u)s extends Alderson’s understanding, which is more rooted in information processing. The concept of dispositions, including tertiary dispositions that afford simulation by construing subjects, is more fruitful than Alderson’s ‘expectations,’ which encompass values and information.

Researchers who wish to revisit formal theoretical propositions can also engage with Service-Dominant Logic, which develops axiomatic propositions in its most recent version (Vargo & Lusch, 2004, 2008, 2016). Wooliscroft (2008) has already noted its affinities with Alderson's marketing theory, and Hietanen et al. (2018) have demonstrated its need for further engagement with political economy. Readers familiar with Part 1, Volume 1 of Marx's *Capital* will have noticed the striking parallels in presentation, with the substitution of the term 'service' for 'labor,' and disregarding differences in value forms (Marx, 1867/1990). For Marx, labor is the substance of value and socially necessary labor time measures the magnitude of value. For Vargo and Lusch, service is the fundamental basis of exchange (in 2008), and service is the fundamental unit of exchange (in 2004). Marx uncovers how commodity fetishism gives the mutual relations of the producers the form of a social relation between the products. Analogously, Vargo and Lusch assert that indirect exchange masks the fundamental unit and basis of exchange. And by 'service,' they mean 'labor': they use the two terms interchangeably and give them the same definition (Akaka et al., 2008; Vargo et al., 2006). Vargo and Lusch (2008, p. 2) "shift from the use of the (plural) term 'services' (reflecting a special type of output—intangible product) to the (singular) term 'service' (reflecting the process of using one's resources for the benefit of another entity)." Using the same word for both concepts is a recipe for confusion. Scholars in the Service-Dominant Logic tradition should explicitly distinguish service as labor or work (service in the singular, including paid and unpaid work) and service as product (services in the plural, whether market or non-market), without ignoring goods and waste.

Future research will need to give more attention to the conceptualization of value(s). It should distinguish value forms, possibly building on Marx's three-fold distinction between use-value, value, and exchange-value, for example (Dunayevskaya, 1979; Kliman, 2000). Vargo and Lusch (2017, p. 47) seem to point in this direction when they recognize service or labor as

“the source of value.” However, they cannot sufficiently advance because they mix value with subjective use-value, which they deem determined experientially by the beneficiary. Accordingly, conceptualizations should also differentiate (inter)subjective and objective value. Following Graeber (2004, p. 98), (inter)subjective value can refer to “the way actors represent the importance of their own actions to themselves as part of some larger whole.” In that sense, value is simulation. Meanwhile, objective value can refer to the importance of actions relative to impersonal frames of reference, thus integrating dispositional properties from multiple dimensions. For instance, we can assess the value of a diet from the perspectives of the dieters, dieticians, and others, and in terms of the diet’s health and ecological effects. Such indications can help refine accounts of value in market and non-market contexts.

Future research will also need to elucidate the concept of social value, which social innovation creates according to the literature. For Phills et al. (2008, p. 39, emphasis removed), in social innovation, “the value created accrues primarily to society as a whole rather than private individuals.” The Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA) (2011, p. 30) specifies that social innovation aims to “generate primarily social value.” However, it is not clear what social value means. As a starting point, we can understand value as social in at least three possible senses. In a first sense, social value is ‘value according to society:’ society is the agent that does the valuation. In a second sense, social value is ‘value in society:’ social innovations create social value because they are “social in . . . their means . . . [since they] create new social relationships or collaborations” (Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA), 2011, p. 9). In a third sense, social value is ‘value to society:’ the ground of valuation is (pro)social, and social innovations have social value because they are “social in . . . their ends” when they “meet social needs (more effectively than alternatives)” (ibid.). The three senses of social value are compatible with the understanding of social innovation as habit change. They also resonate with the understanding of democracy as government of the people, by the people, for the

people. The fruitfulness of such conceptualization will require further assessment, including through comparative case studies.

Future research can address a crucial question: whether particular social innovations create social value in the three senses. Consider universal education, which Comte (1841, p. 366) calls an immense and happy social innovation. The opposition and resistance it has met from various groups suggest that social innovations need not have social value ‘according to society’ as a whole at any point in time (Soysal & Strang, 1989). Where adopted, universal education is ‘in society’ since it involves changes in established habits and drastically transforms social, political, economic, and cultural structures. It is also ‘to society,’ since it benefits society, both according to its proponents and objectively. In other cases, social innovations may be harmful, as in the case of torture innovations. Accordingly, only the second sense of ‘value in society’ would seem to be a necessary characteristic of social innovations, consistent with understanding social innovation as habit change. These are only preliminary suggestions that will need further scrutiny.

Concluding Remarks

Meeting the grand challenges that the planet and humanity face, such as achieving the SDGs and responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, requires alternatives to ways of thinking prevalent in marketing and consumer research. Readers may wish to interpret the current work as offering philosophical and conceptual foundations that help build marketing as a distinct social science (Maclaran, 2016). Such a view is welcome to the extent that it can contribute to transforming the field. However, from a transdisciplinary viewpoint, the concern is how to go beyond marketing scholarship and contribute to knowledge beyond specific disciplinary and disciplining boundaries. Although marketing and consumer research emerged partly as responses to the shortcomings of the neoclassical economic paradigm, they replicated some of

its flaws. Because reductionist and disjunctive thinking has fomented the field's problems, integrative systemics should provide a way forward. The current work sought to advance the project of the Radical Enlightenment while aiming for interestingness (Davis, 1971). It sought to remain faithful to Diderot's (1751) understanding of eclecticism. In the words of Diderot, the eclectic trample on prejudice, tradition, antiquity, universal consent, authority, and everything that subjugates people's minds. They dare to think for themselves, go back to the clearest general principles, examine them, discuss them, and rely on the testimony of experience and reason. Of all the philosophies they have analyzed impartially, and without reverence, they make their own. The hope is that the current work will inspire scholars, policymakers, and practitioners to become more eclectic in Diderot's sense, whether they endorse, adapt, or challenge the propositions developed here.

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