


Consenting to Exclude? Empirical Patterns of Democracy and Immigrant Integration Policy

Anita Manatschal & Julian Bernauer


To cite this article: Anita Manatschal & Julian Bernauer (2016) Consenting to Exclude? Empirical Patterns of Democracy and Immigrant Integration Policy, *West European Politics*, 39:2, 183-204, DOI: [10.1080/01402382.2015.1046669](https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1046669)



To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1046669>

 View supplementary material 

 Published online: 11 Jun 2015.

 Submit your article to this journal 

 Article views: 577

 View related articles 

 View Crossmark data 

Consenting to Exclude? Empirical Patterns of Democracy and Immigrant Integration Policy

ANITA MANATSCHAL and JULIAN BERNAUER

Studies explaining immigrant integration policies commonly focus on single aspects such as right-populist party politics or the immigration legacy of a country. This neglects the overall character of the democratic system within which policy-making unfolds. Research on empirical patterns of democracy, in turn, suggests that consensus democracies pursue 'kinder and gentler' policies and outperform majoritarian democracies in terms of minority representation. The article tests whether this conclusion holds for the specific group of immigrant minorities and analyses the relationship between patterns of democracy and immigrant integration policy using a new dataset on empirical democracies in 30 European and North American countries. Simultaneously estimating the character of democratic systems in terms of power dispersion and its effect on integration policies, the analysis reveals a distinct 'Janus-faced' pattern: while proportional power dispersion tends to coincide with more inclusive immigrant integration policies, pronounced veto structures tend to foster exclusion.

Keywords: empirical patterns of democracy; immigrant integration policy; right-populist parties; immigration legacy; Bayesian measurement and outcome models

When explaining immigrant integration regimes, migration research commonly focuses on single aspects such as right-populist party politics or the immigration legacy of a country. Classical studies on integration and citizenship regimes in France, Germany, Great Britain or Switzerland demonstrate for instance that frameworks of immigrant incorporation are shaped by the immigration history of a country and are thus both path dependent and relatively stable over time (Brubaker 1992; Favell 2001; Ireland 1994). More recently, these findings are contrasted by quantitative-comparative approaches, highlighting the more dynamic aspects of integration regimes and pointing for instance at the role of (especially right-populist, but also leftist) party ideology in formulating policies of immigrant integration (Howard 2010; Janoski 2010; Koopmans *et al.* 2012; Mudde 2008). Yet policy-making does not occur in an

Correspondence Address: anita.manatschal@ipw.unibe.ch

experimental-like context with clearly identifiable treatment variables. More likely, it is the result of diverging and competing interests which are embedded in a constraining or promoting political-institutional democratic framework. Existing studies on integration regimes hardly ever consider the character of the democratic system at large within which integration policy-making unfolds.

Research on empirical patterns of democracy, in turn, suggests that consensus democracies pursue ‘kinder and gentler’ policies and outperform majoritarian democracies in terms of minority representation (Lijphart 2012). This raises the question whether the inclusive nature of consensus democracy also applies to the often neglected group of immigrant minorities, which is by no means as evident as it might seem. On the one hand, immigrants generally represent non-territorial minorities and are often ineligible to vote, which obviously restricts their potential for political participation and influence. On the other hand, immigrants constitute the fastest growing minority in contemporary immigration states. One notable consequence of this development is the steady increase of the immigrant voter share among local and national electorates. As recent studies show, immigrants have distinct policy preferences which affect policy-making (Koopmans *et al.* 2012; Leal 2007; Vernby 2013). Based on these considerations, we expect that democratic institutions are decisive in shaping the opportunities for, and hurdles to, immigrant interest representation by policy-makers, which in turn is reflected in policy outputs. By assessing how the empirical character of democracy affects immigrant integration policies, the present paper explicitly addresses this research gap.

Besides contributing to the literature on the determinants of integration regimes, this study provides important theoretical and empirical advances for the research on empirical patterns of democracy. Studies on the performance of empirical patterns of democracy focus predominantly on the ‘executive-parties’ dimension (Lijphart 1999, 2012) at the expense of other aspects of democracy such as federalism or direct democracy. This study accounts for the full empirical patterns of democracy by specifying three latent dimensions: proportional power dispersion (executive-parties dimension in Lijphart 2012), representative-veto power dispersion (federal-unitary dimension in Lijphart 2012), and direct democratic power dispersion (Tsebelis 2002; Vatter 2009).


To analyse the relationship between patterns of democracy and immigrant integration policies in 30 European and North American countries empirically, we rely on the *Migrant Integration Policy Index* (MIPEX) and a fresh political-institutional database. The results of our simultaneous measurement and outcome model highlight the relevance of political-institutional conditions: proportional power dispersion produces more inclusive immigrant integration policies, while veto players such as representative-veto power dispersion and direct democracy tend to lead to exclusion. These findings have implications for research on multicultural democracies. Firstly, power dispersion does not per se produce more inclusive policies for immigrant minority representation, but only regarding party systems and executives (i.e. proportional power dispersion). Secondly, the finding that not only direct democracy but also

federalism (in conjunction with other veto players) results in more exclusionist integration policies clearly challenges the notion of the latter as a stronghold of minority interests when it comes to immigrants.

Patterns of Democracy and Immigrant Integration Policy

In order to study the effects of empirical patterns of democracy on immigrant integration policies, we rely on a framework unifying existing theories of empirical democracy. Prior approaches have described political-institutional configurations in terms of ‘consensus vs. majoritarian democracy’ (Lijphart 1999, 2012), ‘centripetal governance’ (Gerring *et al.* 2005), ‘PR–majority rule’ (McGann and Latner 2012), or ‘veto players’ (Roller 2005; Tsebelis 2002). At the same time, methodological and theoretical contributions point to the need to formulate a micro-foundation, specify the exact role and nature of the political-institutional context, and provide a consistent measurement strategy (Ganghof 2005; Scharpf 1997; Treier and Jackman 2008).

We propose a model which contains these elements (see Figure 1). Partly drawing on Lijphart (1999, 2012), we first specify a latent variable of ‘proportional power dispersion’, measured using cabinet type, the effective number of parties, and the disproportionality of the electoral system. Proportional power dispersion is used as the focal explanatory factor for the inclusiveness of immigrant integration policies. We consider two further latent dimensions of the



character of democracy in ‘representative-veto’ and ‘direct’ power dispersion. The former is measured using a series of indicators on representative-democratic veto players such as federalism, bicameralism, and judicial review, while the latter introduces direct democracy as a distinct additional element of power dispersion (cf. Tsebelis 2002; Vatter 2009).

In line with international studies (Castles and Davidson 2000; Koopmans *et al.* 2012; Waldrauch and Hofinger 1997), our theoretical conceptualisation of integration policy departs from the idea of immigrants’ ease or difficulty of access to certain rights and obligations in relevant areas. Thereby, we focus on integration policy outputs as the direct result of the policy-making process, as opposed to policy outcomes (Helbling 2013). The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which is used in this article, captures integration policy outputs along seven policy areas (Huddleston *et al.* 2011): access to nationality, political participation, labour market mobility, family reunion, anti-discrimination, long-term residence, and education. We prefer the MIPEX over other indices because it covers different areas of integration policy in a comprehensive manner, exhibits a good degree of convergent validity (Helbling 2013), and is available for a sufficiently large number of countries. However, given our focus on policy outputs and our empirical-analytical approach, we do not adopt the normative stance of the MIPEX project where high values – i.e. more liberal and inclusive integration policies – are automatically considered more conducive to immigrant integration. Instead, we are primarily interested in explaining variations of policy outputs ranging from more exclusive or restrictive to more inclusive or liberal, as expressed by the index. Nevertheless, we will return to this normative question in our concluding discussion. A more detailed description of the MIPEX is provided in the empirical section.

The theoretical core of our argument assumes that frameworks of integration policy are more than just legal regulations, as they embody collective concepts of inclusion, by defining who belongs to a specific community and who does not. As such, integration policy outputs represent common cultural and historically rooted understandings of immigrant rights and obligations (Favell 2001; Giugni and Passy 2003; Manatschal 2012). Applied to the present research, we expect that empirical patterns of democracy shape the overall integration philosophy of a country. By relying on the comprehensive MIPEX rather than single policy areas we cover more than only smaller or larger parts of this philosophy.

Drawing on the model presented in Figure 1, we expect that the political-institutional context constitutes distinct incentive structures for rational actors, resulting in direct effects on integration policy at the macro level. This perspective is in line with an actor-centred rational choice institutionalism (Immergut 1998; Scharpf 1997). Consequently, we assume that rational-instrumental political elites (and voters) who seek office (or certain policies), calculate costs and benefits, form preferences, and act accordingly, affecting the final policy output. In the following, we explore and substantiate potential

mechanisms linking patterns of democracy, actor preferences and actions, and immigrant integration policy outputs.

According to Lijphart (2012: 274f), consensus democracies (in terms of an ‘executives-parties’ dimension) are ‘kinder and gentler’ regarding policies affecting the welfare state and other areas, and are better at representing minorities compared to majoritarian democracies. As he does not test effects on immigrant integration policies directly, it is unclear whether the argument applies to this dependent variable as well. Given Lijphart’s (2012: 255, 274) rather general statements about the positive effects of consensus democracy on the inclusion of minorities, his perspective might well imply that the spirit of consensus spills over to ‘out-groups’ and non-voters as well. Yet, from a rational-instrumental theoretical rationale, one crucial condition for the mechanisms of consensus democracy to fully unfold is missing in this case. Depending on the dominant citizenship regime (e.g. *jus soli*, *jus sanguinis*), the group of immigrants comprises a smaller or larger share of ineligible individuals without political participation rights. As a consequence, office-seeking politicians have reduced incentives to appeal directly to this group. From this perspective, proportional power dispersion (Lijphart’s ‘executives-parties dimension’) as well as veto players (including voters in referendums) would provide little incentive to pursue inclusive or liberal immigrant integration policies:

Hypothesis 0: Power dispersion does not affect immigrant integration policies.

While this plausible interpretation serves as a baseline, it probably does not live up to the reality of contemporary immigration societies. In all countries under consideration, immigrants represent the fastest growing minority group, comprising an ever-increasing number of immigrant voters. For example, according to recent estimates of Koopmans *et al.* (2012), in 2008 the immigrant voter share amounted to 11.9 per cent of the national electorate in Switzerland, and 10.3 per cent in the Netherlands.¹ This development has implications for the representation of immigrant interests in terms of descriptive representation as well as in terms of politicians’ responsiveness to immigrant concerns: on the one hand, and similar to representatives of other minorities, the odds are higher for eligible immigrants to be elected as politicians (and potentially participate in the executive) in systems with strong proportional power dispersion (i.e. more consensual democracies, cf. Bochsler and Bernauer 2011).² We are not able to test this claim empirically, yet several studies suggest that descriptive immigrant representation also involves improved substantial representation of immigrant interests (cf. Bird *et al.* 2011; Bloemraad 2013: 655). As a consequence, we expect politicians with an immigrant background to generally favour more inclusive immigrant integration policies. On the other hand, an increasing number of studies report that immigrant voters make a difference in policy-making. Not only does a higher immigrant voter share coincide with more liberal integration policies (Koopmans *et al.* 2012), but, due to distinct policy preferences of immigrant voters (cf.

Leal 2007), it also affects public policies addressing the overall population (Vernby 2013). Suffrage prompts policy-makers to be more responsive to immigrant interests, stimulating efforts in policy areas relevant to immigrants (Vernby 2013: 17). In particular, smaller parties, which are favoured by proportional power dispersion, should attempt to mobilise this voter potential if their ideology is compatible with inclusive immigrant integration policies. In sum, in democracies exhibiting a high degree of proportional power dispersion, it seems rational for politicians to consider immigrant issues for descriptive (immigrant politicians) and/or strategic (immigrant and native politicians) reasons, leading us to revise parts of the expectations formulated in Hypothesis 0:

Hypothesis 1: Proportional power dispersion leads to more inclusive immigrant integration policies.

Does the argument that consensus democracy in terms of proportional power dispersion potentially produces more inclusive immigrant integration policies also hold when we turn to the often neglected aspects of representative-veto (Lijphart's 'federal-unitary' dimension) and direct power (direct democracy) dispersion? Existing research on integration policy in federal states does not provide a unanimous answer to this question, as it rather focuses on processes of policy devolution to the subnational level (Joppke and Seidle 2012; Spiro 2002). The literature on minorities, in turn, suggests that elements of representative-veto power dispersion can be highly inclusive. Especially territorial minorities who live concentrated in geographically delineated areas, such as ethnic or linguistic minorities in Canada, Belgium, or Switzerland, are traditionally better off in federal compared to unitary democracies. Federalism provides access to various institutional channels (e.g. bicameralism) to make interests heard at the national level (Doorenspleet and Pellikaan 2013; Horowitz 2007; Norris 2008).

Unlike traditional ethnic minorities, immigrants generally represent no territorial minorities (cf. Bloemraad 2013).³ Accordingly, the conventional channels of interest representation for territorial or autochthonous minorities cannot be used, leading to less representation and protection in federal countries (Linder 2011). It can even be argued that immigrant interests go by the board when variegated minority interests compete for consideration in the national policy-making arena in federal and decentralised countries. Unitary and centralised states, by contrast, might do a better job in representing the population's interests in a comprehensive and inclusive manner. This is also similar to what Gerring *et al.* (2005: 570) suggest when claiming that proportional-centralist ('centripetalist') systems bring together diverse groups and perspectives to a common meeting-ground under conditions of voluntary choice (cf. McGann and Latner 2012). Therefore, we expect that representative-democratic veto structures outside party systems and executives hamper immigrant interests:

Hypothesis 2: *Representative-veto power dispersion leads to more exclusive immigrant integration policies.*

Summing up Hypotheses 1 and 2, we expect no uniform relationship between patterns of democracy and integration policy, but rather that different aspects of the political-institutional context confront rational actors with contrasting or ‘Janus-faced’ incentive structures (Vatter and Freitag 2002). Similar to representative-veto power dispersion, direct democracy (direct power dispersion) might have an exclusionary effect on immigrants. Numerous studies report an immediate negative effect of direct democracy on the expansion of immigrant rights. Out-groups such as immigrant minorities are disproportionately affected by anti-minority, or pro-majority popular verdicts (Hainmüller and Hangartner 2013; Liu *et al.* 2014; Vatter *et al.* 2014). Theoretically, the anti-immigrant minority bias of direct democracy relates to the fact that direct democracy is more prone to a tyranny of the majority than representative systems (Schmidt 2000: 363). More specifically, direct democratic systems formulate policies which are closer to the interests of the median voter than representative systems (Gerber 1996). Median voters, in turn, are more sceptical toward immigrant minorities than members of parliament, since the broad public does not participate in the deliberative decision-making process in parliaments, which could help to overcome prejudice and fear towards strangers (Bächtiger *et al.* 2005, Danaci 2011: 45–6). Thus, assuming self-centred voters who base their voting decision on individual cost and benefit calculations, direct democracy should coincide with restrictive policy-making in the area of immigration (cf. Kriesi 2006: 220):

Hypothesis 3: *Direct power dispersion leads to more exclusive immigrant integration policies.*

Departing from the main theoretical argument, we side-note a number of other dominant explanatory factors we will account for. Several studies report a restrictive impact of ideology in the form of right-wing or right-wing populist parties on immigrant policy-making through voter support or government participation (Howard 2010; Koopmans *et al.* 2012; Mudde 2008). Leftist parties holding office, in turn, are considered the most important allies of immigrants, leading to more inclusive immigrant policies (Howard 2010; Janoski 2010). This interpretation is further supported by the increasing literature on immigrants’ political attitudes and behaviour which shows that – although immigrants are far from being a homogeneous group in this respect – immigrant voters are often inclined to favour leftist parties (Dancygier and Saunders 2006).

To be sure, political institutions and party systems are not independent of each other, institutions can be endogenous, and smaller parties such as right-wing (but also left-wing) populist parties are more successful in democratic systems with strong power dispersion via proportional electoral rules, large party systems, coalition governments, and federalism (Hakhverdian and Kopp

2007). Yet the expectation is that the political-institutional traits described above are the dominant causal factors, and that different forms of power dispersion have contrasting effects on immigrant integration policy in part independent of party politics. We include party ideology in our analyses to test this assumption, and we also run supplementary models to test potential interactions between institutions and party ideology. In addition, we also test potential interactions between patterns of democracy, following the rationale of a ‘centripetal’ concept of democracy (Gerring *et al.* 2005), which expects the most inclusive and effective government performance out of proportional systems without strong veto players.

Further policy-specific context factors accounted for are the historical immigration legacy to account for the path dependency of integration regimes (Brubaker 1992; Favell 2001; Ireland 1994; Manatschal 2012), the share of immigrants, and economic conditions (cf. Figure 1 as well as Koopmans *et al.* 2012). As argued above, we expect that rational politicians consider immigrant issues for strategic reasons, leading to the expectation that a higher share of (in particular eligible) immigrants triggers more liberal integration policies (cf. Koopmans *et al.* 2012). By contrast, it might also be argued that larger immigrant shares are perceived as an economic or cultural threat, coinciding with more restrictive integration policies (cf. Campbell *et al.* 2006). Finally, economic downturn may spur anti-immigrant sentiments towards resident immigrants (Koopmans *et al.* 2012; Olzak 1992).

Empirical Evidence: Consenting to Exclude?

We now turn to the empirical part of our study of the nexus between political-institutional configurations and immigrant integration policy. The dependent variable is the Migrant Integration Policy Index. In its latest, 2010 edition the MIPEX captures 148 indicators in seven areas and covers access to nationality, political participation, labour market mobility, family reunion, anti-discrimination, long-term residence, and education.⁴

Although the MIPEX faces some limitations – for instance it does not capture policies regulating cultural differences such as religious minority rights (cf. Banting *et al.* 2006; Manatschal and Stadelmann-Steffen 2013) – it still constitutes one of the most suitable measurements at hand for the present purpose. Most importantly, only the MIPEX offers comprehensive data on integration regimes for all 30 countries in our study.⁵ The convergent validity of the MIPEX is fairly high, demonstrated by its clear correlation with other indices measuring integration and citizenship policies (Helbling 2013). We focus on the overall MIPEX score instead of its single dimensions, as the composite index reflects the overall integration strategy of a country, constituting the core of our theoretical argument. Additional robustness checks using single MIPEX dimensions largely underpin this assumption (see Online Appendix), as these do not yield very distinct results. There are no signs for systematic patterns of compensability between single policy dimensions.

The design of the analysis is cross-sectional, using the MIPEX 2010 measures for a number of reasons. First, the third wave of the project is the most encompassing, allowing us to compile a sample with complete data for 30 countries. Second, the three waves available (2004, 2007, and 2010) are not sufficient for credible longitudinal analysis. The measures used in the first wave differ strongly from later versions, and the variance between the second and third wave is limited. Third, a measurement as of 2010 allows us to make full use of a new dataset capturing patterns of democracy between 1990 and 2010. The third wave of the MIPEX covers currently 34 countries, of which we analyse 30 mainly European states plus the United States and Canada (see Table 1). We exclude Malta, for which data on the share of migrants is missing, and Japan, which has proven to be an influential outlier in additional statistical analyses (not presented), most likely due to idiosyncratic reasons.⁶ In the sample, the MIPEX ranges from 31 to 83 (theoretical range: 0–100), with a mean of 55. The overall MIPEX score reflects the average degree to which immigrants are treated as different or equal compared to native citizens (Huddleston *et al.* 2011). Thereby, higher (i.e. more inclusive) values can stand for explicit regulations fostering immigrant inclusion (e.g. MIPEX ‘anti-discrimination’ strand), low obstacles for immigrants (e.g. ‘access to nationality’ strand), or equal treatment of immigrants and natives (e.g. ‘labour market mobility’ strand).⁷

Empirical patterns of democracy serve as the focal explanatory variables. Our analysis does not rely on additive indices (Lijphart 2012), but a more sophisticated and convenient simultaneous Bayesian measurement and outcome model, which effectively estimates the full macro part of Figure 1 in a single

TABLE 1
IMMIGRATION LEGACY

Immigration category	Immigration type	Countries
Classical immigration states	Settler states	USA, Canada, Australia
Post-World War II immigration states	Former guest worker countries	Switzerland, Austria, Luxembourg, Finland
	...of which (to a smaller or greater extent) are former colonial states	Netherlands, United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Norway
Recent immigration states	Former sender countries	Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Ireland
	Post-communist states	Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania

Source: Own illustration based on existing literature, cf. Castles and Miller (1993); Hammar (1985); Janoski (2010).

step (see the Online Appendix for details). The model closely reflects the assumption that several latent dimensions of democracy shape integration policies. It features a theoretically derived, confirmatory measurement model which accounts for the varying measurement levels of the political-institutional indicators, their varying degrees of discriminatory power in indicating latent power dispersion, and uncertainty in the country scores estimated (Treier and Jackman 2008). Three theoretically specified latent dimensions of democracy – proportional, representative-veto, and direct power dispersion (see Figure 1) – are measured using nine indicators, including electoral disproportionality, the effective number of parties, cabinet type, federalism, decentralisation, bicameralism, constitutional rigidity, judicial review, and direct democracy (see Table A1 in the Appendix for details). The political-institutional variables are measured (yearly) for the whole period 1990–2010, as institutions do not shape policies immediately, and which also maximises the amount of information available.


We include a number of standard control variables (cf. Koopmans *et al.* 2012). Political-ideological factors, and in particular populism, are often cited as strong predictors of restrictive integration policies. We use both the share of populist/far-right (as opposed to conservative, social democratic, liberal, and other) parties in parliament and the share of right-wing (not only populist/far-right) parties in the executive (Armingeon *et al.* 2012).⁸ The strength of right-wing parties in the executive captures the ability of parties to affect policy-making directly in line with their ideology, while the seat shares of populist parties arguably measure both the presence and credibility of anti-immigrant platforms and indirectly also the attitudes towards the issue in the population.

An explanation emphasising path dependency and maybe a certain ‘culture’ of integration are historical integration regimes, which we code in Table 1 based on existing literature (Castles and Miller 1993; Hammar 1985; Janoski 2010). Some countries, in our sample the United States, Australia, and Canada, have been historically defined by immigration, and can hence be described as ‘settler states’. Others are ‘guest worker’ countries, including Switzerland, Germany, and Norway. The remaining cases in our sample can be subsumed under the label of ‘recent immigration states’, which comprises former emitting – i.e. ‘sender’ – countries such as Spain or Ireland, as well as post-communist countries in central and eastern Europe. We expect countries with a younger history of immigration to display more restrictive immigrant integration policies.

The share of immigrants is a further factor potentially driving integration regimes. Our definition of immigrants as foreign-born implies that this category also comprises naturalised and *jus soli* immigrant citizens (OECD/Dumont *et al.* 2010).⁹ Finally, we control for the level of economic development, taking the log of the GDP as we expect declining returns from higher levels (Quality of Government Data Set).¹⁰ See the Appendix (Table A2) for descriptive statistics.

The findings of the statistical model are presented in Figure 2.¹¹ We rely on a Bayesian regression of MIPEX scores on the dimensions of power

FIGURE 2
BAYESIAN MODEL OF PATTERNS AND INTEGRATION POLICIES



Notes: $N = 30$; 602 country years for the measurement model of patterns. Bayesian estimations using R and JAGS; means of posterior distribution and 95/80 per cent highest posterior density intervals reported. Estimates of country scores on the latent dimensions of power dispersion, intercepts and variances omitted. Direct democracy centred. The baseline group for immigration legacy pools 'recent immigration' and 'guest states', which are too similar to be discerned empirically by the models. Item discrimination parameters in the 'Patterns' part of the model not standardised

dispersion including the control variables specified.¹² The model also provides posterior distributions of the parameters used to indicate statistical confidence. The measurement part of the model ('Patterns' section in Figure 2) shows

considerable fit with the data, with all of the indicators used mapping clearly on the latent variables of proportional and representative-veto power dispersion.¹³ Regarding the explanation of MIPEX scores ('Integration policy' section in Figure 2) the results suggest that democratic institutions together with economic development are the only systematic determinants of integration regimes. More prominently discussed variables such as government ideology or a country's immigration legacy have no explanatory power, at least given this sample.¹⁴

The results support our expectation that democracy provides Janus-faced incentive structures. In line with Hypotheses 1 and 2, proportional power dispersion tends to yield more inclusive integration policies, while representative-veto power dispersion tends to lead to more exclusion. Direct democracy shows the expected negative sign (Hypothesis 3). Following an interpretation of parameters as distributions instead of (questionable) cut-off criteria of statistical significance, we can in Bayesian terms conclude that proportional, representative-veto and direct power dispersion have a considerable probability to affect immigrant integration regimes in a contradictory manner.¹⁵ The baseline Hypothesis 0, expecting no effects of the empirical character of political systems on integration regimes due to a lack of electoral incentives, appears unlikely in the light of this evidence. Furthermore, an alternative model (see Online Appendix) does not yield any evidence for an interaction between proportional and representative-veto power dispersion.

In more substantial terms, our results reflect a general pattern which we observe, to a smaller or greater extent, in the 30 countries under consideration, and which already evolves from a mere descriptive look at single countries. Based on our data, we can see that the countries which score highest on MIPEX are indeed concentrated in the area denoting high proportional power dispersion (e.g. consensual governments and fragmented party systems) and low representative-veto power dispersion (e.g. unitary states), which is perfectly in line with our Hypotheses 1 and 2 (cf. Figure A1 in the Appendix for proportional power dispersion, see also Lijphart 2012: 244). Notable exceptions include the US and Canada, with rather high MIPEX scores, but low proportional and high representative-veto power dispersion. In these particular cases, the countries' historical legacy as settler states may play a more crucial role when it comes to explaining contemporary integration policy outputs than patterns of democracy. Overall, the results of our Bayesian analyses are a realistic representation of this systematic, but not crystal clear relationship which is based on a limited, non-random sample.

To be sure, these conclusions are obtained while pursuing a conservative modelling strategy, which considers the measurement uncertainty of the estimated country scores of power dispersion to avoid overconfidence (Treier and Jackman 2008). In line with this, more conventional frequentist models (OLS regression with additive indices; see Online Appendix) more clearly report 'statistically significant' effects of proportional and veto power dispersion. From all these comprehensive empirical tests – our simultaneous Bayesian approach,

the more conventional frequentist variant, as well as the additional robustness tests – the same Janus-faced pattern between democracy and integration policy emerges.

Discussion

By addressing the question whether patterns of democracy affect immigrant integration policies, this paper unites two hitherto unrelated research traditions. Inspired by research on empirical patterns of democracy, we rely on a more unified theory, capturing power dispersion in terms of executives and parties as well as regimes of representative-democratic and direct-democratic veto players. We relate these concepts to immigrant integration policies, formulating a set of expectations regarding potential contradictory effects. Migration research guides our selection of additional context-specific determinants of integration regimes. This comprehensive approach allows us to account for the contested nature of policy-making, which ultimately is not the result of clearly identifiable treatment variables, but of diverging and competing interests which are embedded in a potentially constraining institutional democratic framework.

The results of simultaneous measurement and outcome models for 30 European and North American countries provide substantial evidence that institutions dispersing democratic power matter for the nature of immigrant integration policies. The political-institutional variables rank among the strongest predictors of integration policies. Furthermore, our analysis indicates that latent dimensions of democratic power dispersion confront political elites with contrasting or ‘Janus-faced’ incentive structures. While proportional power dispersion coincides with more inclusive immigrant integration policies, representative and direct veto power dispersion are associated with more exclusion. Notably, variables more prominently discussed in migration research, such as right-populist ideology or a country’s immigration legacy, lose their explanatory power once we account for the political-institutional character of democracy.

In the light of the conservative measurement and modelling approach applied and the multiple robustness tests, the findings can be considered to reflect a realistic picture of the ‘Janus-faced’ tendency between patterns of democracy and integration policy. Similar variegating outcomes of democratic institutions are reported in Vatter and Freitag (2002) for the public sector, showing that proportional power dispersion expands state intervention, whereas direct democratic and federalist veto structures curb public policy. Thus, while contrasting incentive structures might be inherent to democratic institutions to a certain extent, the findings reported here for the specific field of immigrant integration policy has important implications for research on multicultural democracies.

The empirical-analytical approach of this paper notwithstanding, it is a crucial normative question for potential larger implications of our findings whether inclusive integration policies are really ‘better’. Basically, this question is either

the subject of empirical-analytical studies focusing on outcomes of integration policy, or of explicitly normative-oriented, theoretical studies. Policy outcome studies provide no simple and straightforward answer: while liberal integration policies may indeed be favourable when it comes to immigrant pupils' educational performance (Manatschal and Stadelmann-Steffen 2013), liberal and hence more inclusive integration policies seem to perform worse than more restrictive ones in the area of immigrants' labour market integration (Koopmans 2010). From the perspective of immigrants, though, inclusive integration policies are most likely perceived as 'kinder and gentler', as they treat immigrants in a more equal manner compared to natives. Normatively, the equal treatment of all members of a state, and particularly equal access to political participation, are fundamental premises of democratic theory (Dahl 1989). In this view, the quality of 'multicultural democracy' depends on the political inclusion and participation of immigrants (Morales and Giugni 2011).

Bearing this normative discussion in mind, our results shed more light on the neglected role democratic institutions play in the formulation of policies in the area of immigrant integration. They also qualify existing insights regarding the performance of empirical democracy regarding the integration of certain minorities. Consensus democracies indeed appear kinder and gentler regarding immigrant minorities, as they coincide with more inclusive integration policies. Yet this result holds only for the dimension of proportional power dispersion. A contrary finding is obtained for direct and representative-veto power dispersion, which are associated with more exclusive integration policies. As our study suggests, immigrants are not only less protected and represented in federal countries than traditional minorities (Linder 2011), but what improves the representation of autochthonous territorial minorities might be bad for new immigrant minorities. This result clearly challenges the common notion of federalism as an integrative device for minority interest representation. Finally, our finding that direct democracy coincides with more exclusive integration policies corroborates insights from studies showing that immigrants are disproportionately affected by anti-minority, or pro-majority popular verdicts (Hainmüller and Hangartner 2013; Liu *et al.* 2014; Vatter *et al.* 2014).

Future research has to show whether the distinct tendency reported here is replicable when considering alternative aspects of integration policy such as cultural rights and obligations (e.g. religious minority rights, obligations regarding cultural integration), or alternative policy fields such as immigration instead of immigrant integration policy. While we find no compensatory pattern between single dimensions of integration policy, future studies could nevertheless test whether political actors are more responsive to immigrants in certain fields of integration policy than in others. Overall, empirical patterns of democracy seem to set incentives for political elites to integrate or exclude groups such as immigrants comprising eligible individuals and non-voters alike. Against the background of permanent global migration streams and ever-increasing shares of immigrant populations, it seems likely that these incentives will be augmented in the future. Our findings suggest that political institutions

are not neutral towards immigrants. Political research on multicultural democracies should therefore not restrict itself to questions of party ideology, but also take into account the larger political-institutional setting.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Supplemental Data

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1046669>.

Notes

1. Due to the quite common provision of local voting rights to immigrants (e.g. EU citizens residing in another member state), immigrant voter shares are even higher considering local electorates (e.g. 17.5 per cent in Sweden, 14.3 per cent in Belgium). These shares are steadily increasing over time at both the national and local levels (Koopmans *et al.* 2012).
2. For a more nuanced discussion on the relationship between electoral systems and ethnic minority representation see Bloemraad (2013).
3. This applies foremost to the national level, since there are no predominantly immigrant regions in the countries under consideration. The situation is slightly different at the local policy level, where immigrants often live geographically concentrated in urban communities (cf. Verby 2013: 18).
4. Source: <http://www.mipex.eu/>; last accessed on 19 September 2014.
5. Other quantitative datasets such as those provided by the European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship would also cover at least the European countries under consideration. Yet the latter does not capture integration regimes in the same comprehensive manner as MIPEX, as it is restricted to the aspects of citizenship and electoral rights (see <http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases>, last accessed 19 September 2014). The same holds for the Civic Integration Policy Index (CIVIX), which captures the aspect of civic integration requirements across the EU-15 countries (Wallace Goodman 2010).
6. Similar to the publication of the overall MIPEX III results (Huddleston *et al.* 2011), we decided to exclude Japan (MIPEX score of 33) from our sample, the only country from the Asiatic immigration context, which differs in several ways from the European and North American immigration experience. The findings are robust to the exclusion of other potential outliers such as Switzerland, though (model available upon request).
7. In certain instances, MIPEX policy manifestations may represent a ‘hands-off’ state approach, which would weaken our theoretical argument. However, it is difficult to judge whether no explicit policy means really hands-off or whether it reflects official intention. What matters in our context is that ‘no regulation’ can mean both, inclusive (e.g. no differential treatment of immigrants and natives in accessing public employment) or exclusive integration policies (e.g. no explicit anti-discrimination legislation). Consequently, we expect that this potential factor would not systematically bias our results.
8. We tested alternative models (not reported) with the share of left-wing parties in the executive (cf. Howard 2010; Janoski 2010; Koopmans *et al.* 2012), which does not alter any of the conclusions.
9. We refrain from including the share of voters among immigrants, as measurement is complex and requires major data collection efforts (see the Appendix to Koopmans *et al.* 2012 for an

- attempt), and because our theoretical argument draws on immigrant vote shares but has observable implications at the macro-level of political institutions and the MIPEX. Furthermore, the share of immigrants in general at least captures the potential of voters.
10. Teorell, Jan, Nicholas Charron, Marcus Samanni, Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein (2012): The Quality of Government Dataset, version 6Apr11. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>; downloaded 14 November 2012.
 11. The simulation chains mix well, indicating convergence, and there is little sign of autocorrelation or non-normal distributions of simulated parameters.
 12. In addition to this unconditional model, we tested several interaction models combining single dimensions of democratic power dispersion (including direct democracy) with the share of immigrants or the strength of populism, without systematic results.
 13. In further analyses on a more encompassing sample (not reported), we compared alternative (one-, two-, or three-dimensional) specifications, supporting the choice of the measurement model presented in Figure 1. The model also yields country scores (see Figure A1 in the Appendix to this article) on the latent dimensions of proportional and veto power dispersion, which are assumed to produce the observed indicator values of each country, weighed by the item discrimination parameters reported in Figure 2. The country scores show some face validity and are used as explanatory variables.
 14. In additional models without the political-institutional explanations (see Online Appendix), other control variables with systematic influence are, in line with prominent explanations in migration research, populism (negative) but also immigration history (positive sign for guest and settler states). These findings point to some correlations between political institutions, economic development, immigration history, and populism.
 15. The Bayesian modelling and interpretation framework does fit the nature of the sample well, which is both small and not based on (hypothetically repeated) random selection (see Jackman 2009: xxxiii). In this context, there are no judgements on the statistical significance of the findings in terms of *p*-values, but direct probability statements about the distribution of parameters are possible.

Notes on Contributors

Anita Manatschal is a postdoctoral researcher and lecturer at the Chair of Political Sociology, Berne University, Switzerland. Her research embraces migration, civic engagement, and comparative policy research. It has appeared in journals such as *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *Rationality and Society*, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *Comparative European Politics*, *Acta Sociologica* as well as in various edited volumes. [anita.manatschal@ipw.unibe.ch]

Julian Bernauer is a postdoctoral researcher and lecturer at the Institute of Political Science, Berne University, Switzerland. His research interests include political representation, empirical patterns of democracy and quantitative methodology. Recent publications have appeared in *Comparative Political Studies*, *European Journal of Political Research* and *Electoral Studies*. [julian.bernauer@ipw.unibe.ch]

References

- Armingeon, Klaus, Laura Knöpfel, David Weisstanner, and Sarah Engler (2012). *Comparative Political Data Set III 1990–2012*. Bern: Institute of Political Science, University of Bern.
- Bächtiger, André, Markus Spörndli, Marco Steenbergen, and Jürg Steiner (2005). 'The Deliberative Dimensions of Legislatures', *Acta Politica*, 40:2, 225–38.

- Banting, Keith, Richard Johnston, Will Kymlicka, and Stuart Soroka (2006). 'Do Multiculturalism Policies Erode the Welfare State? An Empirical Analysis', in Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (eds.), *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 49–91.
- Bird, Karen, Thomas Saalfeld, and Andreas M. Wüst (2011). *The Political Representation of Immigrants and Minorities*. London: Routledge.
- Bloemraad, Irene (2013). 'Accessing the Corridors of Power: Puzzles and Pathways to Understanding Minority Representation', *West European Politics*, 36:3, 652–70.
- Bochsler, Daniel, and Julian Bernauer (2011). 'Electoral Entry and Success of Ethnic Minority Parties in Central and Eastern Europe: A Hierarchical Selection Model', *Electoral Studies*, 30:4, 738–55.
- Brubaker, Rogers (1992). *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Campbell, Andrea Louise, Cara Wong, and Jack Citrin (2006). "'Racial Threat", Partisan Climate, and Direct Democracy: Contextual Effects in Three Californian Initiatives', *Political Behavior*, 28:2, 129–50.
- Castles, Stephen, and Alastair Davidson (2000). *Citizenship and Migration. Globalization and the Politics of Belonging*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Castles, Stephen, and Mark J. Miller (1993). *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. London: Macmillan.
- Dahl, Robert A. (1989). *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Danaci, Deniz (2011). 'Theoretische Grundlagen' [Theoretical Foundation], in Vatter, Adrian (ed.) *Vom Schächt- zum Minarettverbot. Religiöse Minderheiten in der direkten Demokratie [From the Prohibition of Kosher Slaughtering to the Prohibition of the Construction of Minarets: Religious Minorities in Direct Democracies]*. Zürich: NZZ Verlag, 35–47.
- Dancygier, Rafaela, and Elizabeth N. Saunders (2006). 'A New Electorate? Comparing Preferences and Partisanship between Immigrants and Natives', *American Journal of Political Science*, 50:4, 962–81.
- Doorenspleet, Renske, and Huib Pellikaan (2013). 'Which Type of Democracy Performs Best?', *Acta Politica*, 48, 237–67.
- Dumont, Jean-Christophe, Gilles Spielvogel, and Sarah Widmaier (2010). 'International Migrants in Developed, Emerging and Developing Countries: An Extended Profile', *OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No.114*.
- Favell, Adrian (2001). *Philosophies of Integration. Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Ganghof, Steffen (2005). 'Normative Modelle, institutionelle Typen und beobachtbare Verhaltensmuster: Ein Vorschlag zum Vergleich parlamentarischer Demokratien' [Normative models, Institutional Types and Observable Behavioural Patterns: A Proposal of how to Compare Parliamentary Democracies], *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 46:3, 406–31.
- Gerber, Elisabeth R. (1996). 'Legislative Responses to the Threat of Popular Initiatives', *American Journal of Political Science*, 40:1, 99–128.
- Gerring, John, Strom C. Thacker, and Carola Moreno (2005). 'Centripetal Democratic Governance: A Theory and Global Inquiry', *American Political Science Review*, 99:4, 567–81.
- Giugni, Marco, and Florence Passy (2003). 'Staatsbürgerschaftsmodelle und Mobilisierung der Immigranten in der Schweiz und in Frankreich in Hinblick auf politische Gelegenheitsstrukturen' [Models of Citizenship and the Mobilization of Immigrants in Switzerland and France in the Light of Political Opportunity Structures], in Wicker, Hans-Rudolf et al. (eds.), *Migration und die Schweiz*. Zürich: Seismo, 109–38.
- Hainmüller, Jens, and Dominik Hangartner (2013). 'Who Gets a Swiss Passport? A Natural Experiment in Immigrant Discrimination', *American Political Science Review*, 107:1, 159–87.
- Hakhverdian, Armèn, and Christel Kopp (2007). 'Consensus Democracy and Support for Populist Parties in Western Europe', *Acta Politica*, 42, 401–20.
- Hammar, Thomas, ed. (1985). *European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Helbling, Marc (2013). 'Validating Integration and Citizenship Policy Indices', *Comparative European Politics*, 11:5, 555–76.
- Horowitz, Donald L. (2007). 'The Many Uses of Federalism', *Drake Law Review*, 55, 953–66.
- Howard, Marc Morjé (2010). 'The Impact of the Far Right on Citizenship Policy in Europe: Explaining Continuity and Change', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36:5, 735–51.
- Huddleston, Thomas, Jan Niessen, Eadaoin Ni Chaoimh, and Emilie White (2011). *Migrant Integration Policy Index III*. Brussels: British Council and Migration Policy Group.
- Immergut, Ellen M. (1998). 'The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism', *Politics and Society*, 26:1, 5–34.
- Ireland, Patrick (1994). *The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity. Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Jackman, Simon (2009). *Bayesian Analysis for the Social Sciences*. Chichester: Wiley.
- Janoski, Thomas (2010). *The Ironies of Citizenship. Naturalization and Integration in Industrialized Countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Joppke, Christian, and Leslie F. Seidle (2012). *Immigrant Integration in Federal Countries*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Koopmans, Ruud (2010). 'Tradeoffs between Equality and Difference: Immigrant Integration, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State in Cross-National Perspective', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36:1, 1–26.
- Koopmans, Ruud, Ines Michaelowski, and Stine Waibel (2012). 'Citizenship Rights for Immigrants: National Political Processes and Cross-National Convergence in Western Europe, 1980–2008', *American Journal of Sociology*, 117:4, 1202–45.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter (2006). 'Commentary on Part IV; Influence: Members or Challengers?', in Marco Giugni and Florence Passy (eds.), *Dialogues on Migration Policy*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 215–22.
- Leal, David L. (2007). 'Latino Public Opinion: Does It Exist?', in Espino Rodolfo et al. (eds.), *Latino Politics: Identity, Mobilization, and Representation*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 23–48.
- Lijphart, Arend (1999). *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, 1st ed. Yale: Yale University Press.
- Lijphart, Arend (2012). *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, 2nd ed. Yale: Yale University Press.
- Linder, Wolf (2011). 'Multicultural Switzerland and the Challenge of Immigration', *Journal of Minority Studies*, 5:3, 201–25.
- Liu, Amy H., Anand Edward Sokhey, Joshua B. Kennedy, and Annie Miller (2014). 'Immigrant Threat and National Salience: Understanding the "English Official" Movement in the United States', *Research and Politics*, 1:1, 1–8.
- Manatschal, Anita (2012). 'Path Dependent or Dynamic? Cantonal Integration Policies between Regional Citizenship Traditions and Right Populist Party Politics', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 35:2, 281–97.
- Manatschal, Anita, and Isabelle Stadelmann-Steffen (2013). 'Cantonal Variations of Integration Policy and Their Impact on Immigrant Educational Inequality', *Comparative European Politics*, 11:5, 671–95.
- McGann, Anthony J., and Michael Latner (2012). 'The Calculus of Consensus Democracy: Rethinking Patterns of Democracy without Veto Players', *Comparative Political Studies*, 46:7, 823–50.
- Morales, Laura, and Marco Giugni (2011). *Social Capital, Political Participation and Migration in Europe. Making Multicultural Democracy Work?* Houndmills: Palgrave.
- Mudde, Cas (2008). 'Radikale Parteien in Europa' [Radical Parties in Europe], *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 47, 12–9.
- Norris, Pippa (2008). *Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Olzak, Susan (1992). *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Roller, Edeltraud (2005). *The Performance of Democracies. Political Institutions and Public Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Scharpf, Fritz (1997). *Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centred Institutionalism in Policy Research*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Schmidt, Manfred G. (2000). *Demokratietheorien*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Siaroff, Alan (2009). *Comparing Political Regimes. A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics*, 2nd ed. North York, NY: UTP.
- Spiro, Peter J. (2002). 'Federalism and Immigration: Models and Trends', *International Social Science Journal*, 53:167, 67–73.
- Treier, Shawn, and Simon Jackman (2008). 'Democracy as a Latent Variable', *American Journal of Political Science*, 52:1, 201–17.
- Tsebelis, George (2002). *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Vatter, Adrian (2009). 'Lijphart Expanded: Three Dimensions of Democracy in Advanced Oecd Societies?', *European Political Science Review*, 1:1, 125–54.
- Vatter, Adrian, and Markus Freitag (2002). 'Die Janusköpfigkeit von Verhandlungsdemokratien. Zur Wirkung von Konkordanz, direkter Demokratie und dezentralen Entscheidungsstrukturen auf den öffentlichen Sektor der Schweizer Kantone' [The Janus Face of Negotiation Democracy. The Effects of Consensus Democracy, Direct Democracy and Decentralization on State Intervention in Swiss Cantons], *Swiss Political Science Review*, 8:2, 53–80.
- Vatter, Adrian, Isabelle Stadelmann-Steffen, and Deniz Danaci (2014). 'Who Supports Minority Rights in Popular Votes? Empirical Evidence from Switzerland', *Electoral Studies*, 36, 1–14.
- Vernby, Kare (2013). 'Inclusion and Public Policy: Evidence from Sweden's Introduction of Non-citizen Suffrage', *American Journal of Political Science*, 57:1, 15–29.
- Waldrauch, Harald, and Christoph Hofinger (1997). 'An Index to Measure the Legal Obstacles to the Integration of Migrants', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 23:2, 271–85.
- Wallace Goodman, Sara (2010). 'Integration Requirements for Integration's Sake? Identifying, Categorizing and Comparing Civic Integration Policies', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36:5, 753–72.

APPENDIX

TABLE A1
POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONAL INDICATORS AND MAIN SOURCES
CONSULTED

Indicators	Main sources
<i>Proportional power dispersion (~ 'executives-parties' dimension)</i>	
<i>(1) Cabinet type</i>	
Ordinal (yearly) contrast between one-party minimal winning, multi-party minimal winning, minority, and oversized cabinets	Armingeon, Klaus; Romana Careja; David Weisstanner; Sarah Engler; Panajotis Potosidis; Marlène Gerber. Comparative Political Data Set III 1990–2010, Institute of Political Science, University of Berne 2012; accessed on 27 September 2012; Teorell, Jan, Nicholas Charron, Marcus Samanni, Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein (2012): The Quality of Government Dataset, version 6Apr11. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se ; downloaded 14 November 2012.
<i>(2) Party system</i>	
Effective number of parliamentary parties	Gallagher, Michael (2012): Election indices dataset, retrieved from http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/index.php , accessed 16 January 2013; other sources.
<i>(3) Electoral system</i>	
Gallagher index of electoral disproportionality	See party system.
<i>Representative-veto power dispersion (~ 'federal-unitary' dimension)</i>	
<i>(4) Constitutional federalism</i>	
Territorial power sharing (federal, semi-federal, and unitary)	Lijphart (2012: 178); Lundell, Krister and Lauri Karvonen (2003): A Comparative Data Set on Political Institutions. Abo Akademi, Department of Political Science, Finland, received in 2007; other sources.
<i>(5) Fiscal decentralisation</i>	
Share of subnational in total taxes	Armingeon <i>et al.</i> (2012); Teorell, Jan, Nicholas Charron, Marcus Samanni, Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein (2012): The Quality of Government Dataset, version 6Apr11. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se ; downloaded 14 November 2012; World Bank (http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm , accessed 21 January 2013).
<i>(6) Bicameralism</i>	
Classification by power symmetry and partisan congruence (four categories)	Armingeon <i>et al.</i> (2012); Lundell, Krister and Lauri Karvonen (2003): A Comparative Data Set on Political Institutions. Abo Akademi, Department of Political Science, Finland, received in 2007; other sources.

(Continued)

TABLE A1
(Continued)

Indicators	Main sources
(7) <i>Constitutional rigidity</i> Ordinal index considering the required majorities for change	Siaroff (2009: 218).
(8) <i>Judicial review</i> Ordinal index of strength	Lijphart (2012: 215); Siaroff (2009: 218); other sources.
<i>Direct power dispersion</i> (9) <i>Direct Democracy</i> Index of direct democratic power dispersion (initiatives and referendums)	Our own calculations mainly based on the data from the Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (C2D), Zurich, http://www.c2d.ch/ and the IRI/DI Navigator to Direct Democracy (under construction), http://direct-democracy-navigator.org/countries , both accessed repeatedly in June 2013; other sources.


Note: A detailed codebook with a full description of the measures and sources is available from the authors.

TABLE A2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
MIPEX	54.6	13.1	31	83
Proportional power dispersion	0.0	1.8	-2.6	5.2
Veto-representative power dispersion	0	2.8	-4.5	6.6
Direct power dispersion	0.2	4.2	-3.9	15.3
GDP (log)	11.8	1.8	8.6	15.8
Right government	46.3	36.2	0	100
Immigrant share	11.4	8.6	0.4	36.6
Populist share (parl.)	5.9	8.0	0	28.9
History: settler state	0.1	.3	0	1
History: guest state	0.4	.5	0	1

Sources: see text. $N = 30$.

FIGURE A1
ESTIMATED MANIFESTATIONS OF PROPORTIONAL POWER
DISPERSION



Notes: Estimation based on Model 2; posterior means with 95 per cent highest density interval reported.