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Zuberbühler, Klaus

Nom
Zuberbühler, Klaus
Affiliation principale
Fonction
Professeur ordinaire
Email
klaus.zuberbuehler@unine.ch
Identifiants
https://libra.unine.ch/handle/123456789/670
_
0000-0001-8378-088X

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  • Publication
    Accès libre
    Juvenile vervet monkeys rely on others when responding to danger
    (2023)
    Tecla Mohr
    ;
    Van De Waal, Erica 
    ;
    Zuberbühler, Klaus 
    ;
    Mercier, Stéphanie 
    AbstractPrimate alarm calls are mainly hardwired but individuals need to adapt their calling behaviours according to the situation. Such learning necessitates recognising locally relevant dangers and may take place via their own experience or by observing others. To investigate monkeys alarm calling behaviour, we carried out a field experiment in which we exposed juvenile vervet monkeys to unfamiliar raptor models in the presence of audiences that differed in experience and reliability. We used audience age as a proxy for experience and relatedness as a proxy for reliability, while quantifying audience reactions to the models. We found a negative correlation between alarm call production and callers’ age. Adults never alarm called, compared to juveniles. We found no overall effect of audience composition and size, with juveniles calling more when with siblings than mothers or unrelated individuals. Finally, concerning audience reactions to the models, we observed juveniles remained silent with vigilant mothers and only alarm called with ignoring mothers, whereas we observed the opposite for siblings: juveniles remained silent with ignoring siblings and called with vigilant siblings. Despite the small sample size, juvenile vervet monkeys, confronted with unfamiliar and potentially dangerous raptors, seem to rely on others to decide whether to alarm call, demonstrating that the choice of the model may play an important key role in the ontogeny of primate alarm call behaviour.
  • Publication
    Accès libre
    Call combinations and compositional processing in wild chimpanzees
    (2023)
    Maël Leroux
    ;
    Anne M. Schel
    ;
    Claudia Wilke
    ;
    Bosco Chandia
    ;
    Zuberbühler, Klaus 
    ;
    Katie E. Slocombe
    ;
    Simon W. Townsend
    Abstract : Through syntax, i.e., the combination of words into larger phrases, language can express a limitless number of messages. Data in great apes, our closest-living relatives, are central to the reconstruction of syntax’s phylogenetic origins, yet are currently lacking. Here, we provide evidence for syntactic-like structuring in chimpanzee communication. Chimpanzees produce “alarm-huus” when surprised and “waa-barks” when potentially recruiting conspecifics during aggression or hunting. Anecdotal data suggested chimpanzees combine these calls specifically when encountering snakes. Using snake presentations, we confirm call combinations are produced when individuals encounter snakes and find that more individuals join the caller after hearing the combination. To test the meaning-bearing nature of the call combination, we use playbacks of artificially-constructed call combinations and both independent calls. Chimpanzees react most strongly to call combinations, showing longer looking responses, compared with both independent calls. We propose the “alarm-huu + waa-bark” represents a compositional syntactic-like structure, where the meaning of the call combination is derived from the meaning of its parts. Our work suggests that compositional structures may not have evolved de novo in the human lineage, but that the cognitive building-blocks facilitating syntax may have been present in our last common ancestor with chimpanzees.
  • Publication
    Accès libre
    Evidence of joint commitment in great apes' natural joint actions.
    (2021-12-01T00:00:00Z)
    Heesen, Raphaela 
    ;
    Zuberbühler, Klaus 
    ;
    Bangerter, Adrian 
    ;
    Iglesias, Katia 
    ;
    Rossano, Federico
    ;
    Pajot, Aude
    ;
    Guéry, Jean-Pascal
    ;
    Genty, Emilie 
    Human joint action seems special, as it is grounded in joint commitment-a sense of mutual obligation participants feel towards each other. Comparative research with humans and non-human great apes has typically investigated joint commitment by experimentally interrupting joint actions to study subjects' resumption strategies. However, such experimental interruptions are human-induced, and thus the question remains of how great apes naturally handle interruptions. Here, we focus on naturally occurring interruptions of joint actions, grooming and play, in bonobos and chimpanzees. Similar to humans, both species frequently resumed interrupted joint actions (and the previous behaviours, like grooming the same body part region or playing the same play type) with their previous partners and at the previous location. Yet, the probability of resumption attempts was unaffected by social bonds or rank. Our data suggest that great apes experience something akin to joint commitment, for which we discuss possible evolutionary origins.
  • Publication
    Accès libre
    Assessing joint commitment as a process in great apes.
    (2021-08-20T00:00:00Z)
    Heesen, Raphaela 
    ;
    Bangerter, Adrian 
    ;
    Zuberbühler, Klaus 
    ;
    Iglesias, Katia 
    ;
    Neumann, Christof 
    ;
    Pajot, Aude
    ;
    Perrenoud, Laura
    ;
    Guéry, Jean-Pascal
    ;
    Rossano, Federico
    ;
    Genty, Emilie 
    Many social animals interact jointly, but only humans experience a specific sense of obligation toward their co-participants, a . However, joint commitment is not only a mental state but also a that reveals itself in the coordination efforts deployed during entry and exit phases of joint action. Here, we investigated the presence and duration of such phases in  = 1,242 natural play and grooming interactions of captive chimpanzees and bonobos. The apes frequently exchanged mutual gaze and communicative signals prior to and after engaging in joint activities with conspecifics, demonstrating entry and exit phases comparable to those of human joint activities. Although rank effects were less clear, phases in bonobos were more moderated by friendship compared to phases in chimpanzees, suggesting bonobos were more likely to reflect patterns analogous to human "face management". This suggests that joint commitment as process was already present in our last common ancestor with .
  • Publication
    Accès libre
  • Publication
    Accès libre
    How apes get into and out of joint actions: Shared intentionality as an interactional achievement
    (2020)
    Genty, Emilie 
    ;
    Heesen, Raphaela 
    ;
    Guéry, Jean-Pascal
    ;
    Rossano, Federico
    ;
    Zuberbühler, Klaus 
    ;
    Bangerter, Adrian 
    Compared to other animals, humans appear to have a special motivation to share experiences and mental states with others (Clark, 2006; Grice, 1975), which enables them to enter a condition of ‘we’ or shared intentionality (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005). Shared intentionality has been suggested to be an evolutionary response to unique problems faced in complex joint action coordination (Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005) and to be unique to humans (Tomasello, 2014). The theoretical and empirical bases for this claim, however, present several issues and inconsistencies. Here, we suggest that shared intentionality can be approached as an interactional achievement, and that by studying how our closest relatives, the great apes, coordinate joint action with conspecifics, we might demonstrate some correlate abilities of shared intentionality, such as the appreciation of joint commitment. We provide seven examples from bonobo joint activities to illustrate our framework.
  • Publication
    Accès libre
    Intentional communication in primates
    (2018)
    Zuberbühler, Klaus 
    Human communication, including language, is the product of underlying intentions that are purposely expressed, epistemically monitored and flexibly interpreted. A main question in science has been about the evolutionary origins of this cognitive capacity. One way to address the problem is by studying the natural communication of animals, particularly nonhuman primates. As everything in biology, evolutionary transitions are gradual events, suggesting that intention may also have evolved in different stages as a function of increasing brainpower and cognitive complexity. In this chapter, I review empirical work on primate communication, which suggests that goal-directed intentional communication is well within the scope of animals, while simple mind-directed intentionality may be restricted to great apes and humans and shared intentionality may be an exclusively human capacity.
  • Publication
    Accès libre
    Social play as joint action: A framework to study the evolution of shared intentionality as an interactional achievement.
    (2017-12-01T00:00:00Z)
    Heesen, Raphaela 
    ;
    Genty, Emilie 
    ;
    Rossano, Federico
    ;
    Zuberbühler, Klaus 
    ;
    Bangerter, Adrian 
    Social play has a complex, cooperative nature that requires substantial coordination. This has led researchers to use social games to study cognitive abilities like shared intentionality, the skill and motivation to share goals and intentions with others during joint action. We expand this proposal by considering play as a joint action and examining how shared intentionality is achieved during human joint action. We describe how humans get into, conduct, and get out of joint actions together in an orderly way, thereby constructing the state of "togetherness" characteristic of shared intentionality. These processes play out as three main phases, the opening (where participants are ratified and joint commitments are established), the main body (where progress, ongoing commitments, and possible role reversals are coordinated), and the closing (where the intention to terminate the action is coordinated and where participants take leave of each other). We use this process in humans as a framework for examining how various animal species get into, maintain, and get out of play bouts. This comparative approach constitutes an alternative measure of those species' possession of shared intentionality. Using this framework, we review the play literature on human children and different social species of mammals and birds in search of behavioral markers of shared intentionality in the coordination of play bouts. We discuss how our approach could shed light on the evolution of the special human motivation to cooperate and share psychological states with others.