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Clément, Fabrice
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Clément, Fabrice
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Professeur ordinaire
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fabrice.clement@unine.ch
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- PublicationAccès libreAffective Social Learning. A Lens for Developing a Fuller Picture of Socialization Processes(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022)
; ; ; - PublicationAccès libreThe rise of affectivism(2021-7-24)
; ; - PublicationAccès libreThe ABC of Social Learning: Affect, Behavior, and Cognition(2021-7-22)
; ; Debates concerning social learning in the behavioral and the developmental cognitive sciences have largely ignored the literature on social influence in the affective sciences despite having arguably the same object of study. We argue that this is a mistake and that no complete model of social learning can exclude an affective aspect. In addition, we argue that including affect can advance the somewhat stagnant debates concerning the unique characteristics of social learning in humans compared to other animals. We first review the two major bodies of literature in nonhuman animals and human development, highlighting the fact that the former has adopted a behavioral approach while the latter has adopted a cognitive approach, leading to irreconcilable differences. We then introduce a novel framework, affective social learning (ASL), that studies the way we learn about value(s). We show that all three approaches are complementary and focus, respectively, on behavior toward; cognitions concerning; and feelings about objects, events, and people in our environment. All three thus contribute to an affective, behavioral, and cognitive (ABC) story of knowledge transmission: the ABC of social learning. In particular, ASL can provide the backbone of an integrative approach to social learning. We argue that this novel perspective on social learning can allow both evolutionary continuity and ontogenetic development by lowering the cognitive thresholds that appear often too complex for other species and nonverbal infants. Yet, it can also explain some of the major achievements only found in human cultures. - PublicationAccès libreAffective Social Learning serves as a quick and flexible complement to TTOM(2020-5-28)
; Although we applaud the general aims of the target article, we argue that Affective Social Learning completes TTOM by pointing out how emotions can provide another route to acquiring culture, a route which may be quicker, more flexible, and even closer to an axiological definition of culture (less about what is, and more about what should be) than TTOM itself. - PublicationAccès libreLooking beyond the static face in emotion recognition: The informative case of interest(2017-3-24)
; ; - PublicationAccès libreLearning from others: emotion appreciation and the informative case of interestThis thesis concerns emotion recognition. More precisely, it concerns how we recognise how other people are feeling and how they are likely to act as a consequence. The introduction considers the orthodox approach to emotion recognition which focuses on facial expression and explains why this can only be a part of the story. In short, if emotions are relational, and, as such, describe the relation between the person and the object they are looking at, then facial expression is only one piece of evidence, among many, that can be used to infer how the other is feeling and what they are going to do next. In chapter 1 (taken from Clément and Dukes, 2013), I point out that there are a number of similar terms that are used to describe inter-relational instances of emotion recognition, instances when onlookers can use the information in the emotional expression for themselves. One example, social referencing, describes how children as young as 12 months old can use the affective information provided in the expression of an other as a guide to how they themselves should behave – whether they should cross a visual cliff or not. In chapters 2 and 3 (taken from Clément and Dukes (2017) and Dukes and Clément (2017) respectively, I distinguish between social referencing and another phenomena, social appraisal, and place them at the heart of a new concept, affective social learning, that brings together various types of such phenomena. In short, while social learning describes how we can use others' actions to learn how to use an object, affective social learning describes how we can use others' expressions to learn how to value an object: should I be frightened of the dog if Sarah is, should I be disgusted by the joke if Deborah is? And this learning can be transgenerational - a conduit for the transmission and perpetuation of cultures of value. For example, if a child is in a football-loving family, a racist family, or a devoutly religious family, the child could pick up on how the family members feel about these 'objects' to learn to appreciate football, hate foreigners or to love a particular deity. In short, picking up this type of affective information about how to value the objects in our environment must be, I argue, more subtle than focusing on facial expression. Having shown, through the example of affective social learning, how the explanatory power of emotion is increased when emotion recognition is considered in this novel way, in Chapter 4 (taken from Reschke, Walle and Dukes, 2017), attention turns here to social cognition. Taking three classic developmental social cognition experiments, I argue that the reported behaviour of the children might be better understood if we consider their appreciation of the relations between the person and the objects and her goals. For example, while it has been shown that 18-month olds will help people open cupboard doors, they may do this because they have understood that the person is frustrated – particularly when the person knocks up against the wardrobe in a repetitive manner while their arms are full of books. Having argued in chapter 1 that the emotion of interest might play a particularly important part in how we learn from others about the value of the objects in our environment, Chapter 5 (taken from Dukes, Clément, Audrin and Mortillaro, 2017) provides evidence that it is only possible for adults to recognise interest in others when the interest is expressed dynamically (in short films) or, even more successfully, when the expression is presented in whole-body form. In other words, and in line with a host of previous evidence in the literature, a static, facial expression of interest is very difficult to recognise without further clues. In chapter 6, we use this information to test how the expression of interest in an adult affects how infants behave. While children aged 9 months seemed insensitive to the expression, 12-month-olds were significantly more likely to choose an object that had previously been looked at with interest rather than one that had previously been ooked at with distinterest. Surprisingly, children aged 15 months were significantly more likely to choose the object that had previously been looked at with disinterest. The thesis concludes by asking how far this idea of using a more relational approach to emotion recognition can go, and whether it would be possible to include other social relations (for example, competition, dominance, cooperation) in the environment to create an even more holistic approach. Résumé Cette thèse porte sur la reconnaissance des émotions. Plus précisément, elle s’intéresse à la manière avec laquelle on parvient à percevoir les sentiments des autres et la manière dont ils sont, par conséquent, susceptibles d’agir. L’introduction explique en quoi l’approche orthodoxe de la reconnaissance des émotions qui se concentre sur les expressions faciales n’est pas exhaustive. En bref, si les émotions sont relationnelles et décrivent par conséquent la relation entre la personne et l’objet qu’elle regarde, alors l’expression faciale n’est qu’un élément de preuve parmi d’autres moyens qui peuvent être utilisés pour comprendre les sentiments de l’autre et sa manière d’agir ensuite. Dans le premier chapitre (pris de Clément and Dukes, 2013), je mets en avant le fait qu’il existe plusieurs termes similaires pour décrire des situations interrelationnelles de reconnaissance des émotions, situations durant lesquelles le spectateur peut utiliser pour lui-même des informations émanant de l’expression émotionnelle d’autrui. Pour donner un exemple, social referencing décrit la manière avec laquelle des enfants dès 12 mois peuvent utiliser une information affective décelée dans l’expression de quelqu’un d’autre pour les guider quant à la manière dont ils doivent eux-mêmes agir. Dans les chapitres 2 et 3, (pris de Clément and Dukes, 2017 et Dukes and Clément, 2017), je fais la distinction entre le social referencing et un autre phénomène, social apprasial, et je les place au coeur d’un nouveau concept, affective social Learning, qui rassemble plusieurs variations de ce même phénomène. En résumé, au même titre que social Learning décrit la manière dont on peut utiliser les actions d’autrui pour apprendre à utiliser un objet, affective social Learning décrit la manière dont on peut utiliser les expressions d’autrui pour apprendre la valeur de l’objet : dois-je avoir peur du chien si Sarah en a peur, devrais-je être dégoûté par cette blague si Deborah l’est ? Et cet apprentissage peut être transgénérationnel – un canal de transmission et de perpétuation de valeurs culturelles. Par exemple, si un enfant grandit dans une famille qui adore le foot, dans une famille raciste, ou une famille très religieuse, l’enfant pourrait alors s’appuyer sur les sentiments des membres de sa famille à l’égard de ces « objets » pour apprendre comment apprécier le football, détester les étrangers ou adorer une certaine divinité. Mon argument est que parvenir à capter ce type d’information affective sur la valeur à accorder à certains objets dans notre environnement ne peut pas reposer uniquement sur la perception de l’expression faciale. Dans le chapitre 4 (pris de Reschke, Walle and Dukes, 2017), je mets en avant une autre manière dont cette approche de la reconnaissance des émotions peut accroître le pouvoir explicatif des émotions. Ayant précédemment montré que c’est le cas pour l’apprentissage social, l’attention est ici portée sur la cognition sociale. En abordant trois expériences classiques sur le développement de la cognition sociale, je démontre que le comportement des enfants ayant été décrit par les auteurs peut être mieux compris si l’on considère leur manière d’appréhender les relations entre la personne et l’objet, ainsi que ses buts. Par exemple, alors qu’il a été démontré que des enfants de 18 mois pouvaient agir d’une manière que l’on pourrait qualifier d’altruiste en aidant d’autres personnes à ouvrir la porte d’une armoire, il se pourrait qu’ils le fassent parce qu’ils ont compris que la personne était frustrée – particulièrement lorsque la personne cogne la porte de l’armoire de manière répétitive en tenant dans ses bras une pile de livres. Ayant défendu dans le premier chapitre que l’émotion de l’intérêt pourrait jouer un rôle particulièrement important dans notre manière d’apprendre par le biais des autres la valeur des objets de notre environnement, le chapitre 5 (pris de Dukes, Clément, Audrin and Mortillaro, 2017) prouve qu’il n’est possible pour les adultes de reconnaître l’intérêt chez les autres que lorsque l’intérêt est exprimé de manière dynamique (dans des films courts) ou, encore mieux, lorsque l’expression est montrée avec le corps présenté en entier. En d’autres termes, et cela confirme ce que l’on peut déjà trouver dans la littérature, une expression faciale statique de l’intérêt est très difficile à reconnaître sans l’apport d’autres indicateurs. Dans le chapitre 6, nous utilisons cette information pour tester comment l’expression de l’intérêt chez un adulte influence le comportement du jeune enfant. Alors que les enfants de 9 mois semblent indifférents à l’expression, les enfants de 12 mois avaient significativement plus tendance à choisir un objet qui avait précédemment été regardé avec intérêt plutôt que celui qui avait été regardé avec désintérêt. Étonnement, les enfants de 15 mois avaient significativement plus tendance à choisir l’objet qui avait été regardé avec désintérêt. La thèse se conclut en demandant jusqu’où une approche plus relationnelle de la reconnaissance des émotions peut aller et s’il est possible d’inclure d’autres types de relations sociales (par exemple, la compétition, la dominance, la coopération) pour créer une approche encore plus holistique.
- PublicationAccès libreSocial Appraisal and Social Referencing: Two Components of Affective Social Learning(2017)
; Social learning is likely to include affective processes: it is necessary for newcomers to discover what value to attach to objects, persons, and events in a given social environment. This learning relies largely on the evaluation of others’ emotional expressions. This study has two objectives. Firstly, we compare two closely related concepts that are employed to describe the use of another person’s appraisal to make sense of a given situation: social appraisal and social referencing. We contend that social referencing constitutes a type of social appraisal. Secondly, we introduce the concept of affective social learning with the hope that it may help to discriminate the different ways in which emotions play a critical role in the processes of socialization. - PublicationAccès libreThe role of interest in the transmission of social values(2013)
; The environment is so rich with information that our cognitive system would be overloaded without a way to evaluate what is relevant for our needs and goals. Appraisal theory has shown how emotions, by ?tagging? the environment with differential values, enable the attribution of our attentional resources to what is most relevant in any given circumstances. Most often, however, the different cues triggering the allocation of attention are thought of as purely individualistic, like physiological needs or past encounters with certain stimuli. This approach is perfectly appropriate for objects, organisms or events that, by their intrinsic properties, affect the organism?s well being. But for humans, many aspects of the environment are culturally or temporally dependent: a soccer game may be highly relevant to some, but not at all to others. This paper contributes to a better understanding of the processes by which different elements of our social environment acquire value through our socialization process. We recruit different concepts proposed by developmental psychologists to shed some light on this social acquisition of relevance. The notion of ?joint attention,? for example, is particularly important to understand how we are sensitive to the other?s focus of attention. Similarly, the term ?social referencing? has been used to describe the process of taking into account the affective reaction to a given stimuli, in order to direct our behavior. At the core of this process, called ?social appraisal? by Manstead, we propose that a specific emotion plays a major role: interest. Someone else?s expression of interest, which seems to be detectable from a very early age, is extremely useful in gauging what is worthy of attention among stimuli that are not inherently interesting. The paper highlights how external sources of information (the life experiences of community members) indicate what is relevant, thus giving access to the social values of that group.