

**Global Economic Stratification
and the
Evolving Role of China in the Developing World**
*(La Stratification Économique Globale
et le Rôle Évoluant
de la Chine dans les Pays en Développement)*

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Doctoral Thesis

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ABSTRACT

Global Economic Stratification and the Evolving Role of China in the Developing World

This thesis examines global inequality through the lens of global economic stratification and explores how China's upward mobility has impacted both other developing countries, and the structure of the world-economic hierarchy. Through case studies, I analyze the ways in which certain countries adapt to the changing structure of the world-economy and how their responses reflect the global and structural transformations occurring at the world-system level. The approach is mixed quantitative/qualitative and macro-comparative, with an emphasis on interactions within the modern capitalist world-system.

Findings are as follows:

- a) China's movement into the middle stratum of the stratified world-economy has caused a shift away from the classic Wallersteinian trimodal economic distribution; and
- b) that this shift has created an unprecedented over-crowding effect in the semiperiphery. This is generating new systemic pressures that engender the spread of regional and multilateral organizations such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, the ASEAN Free Trade Area and Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas. On the other hand, this systemic pressure can foster a more aggressive and confrontational core-semiperiphery-periphery relationship.
- c) that with these new regional and multilateral organizations, changing notions of national identity and citizenship especially within the transnational capitalist class (particularly with those of Chinese origins) have the potential to affect not only geopolitics but also to further impact the categorical between-country inequality and global stratification.
- d) that Sub-Saharan Africa as a region remained at the bottom of the stratified world-economy;
- e) but there were notable advances at the country level;
- f) that the upward movement of individual SSA countries within the hierarchy were in part, largely due to external factors such as engagement with China and political support from the Occident;
- g) and availability and exploitation of natural resources worked considerably to the benefit of SSA countries.

This thesis attempts to change the direction of the discourse on the rise of China away from questions of hegemonic ascent, to the impact of China's advancement within the structural confines of the modern capitalist world-economy. Current research on global economic stratification have not focused on Sub-Saharan Africa so this is an attempt to rectify this gap in the literature. It also contributes to the growing discourse of China's engagement with the African continent and the Global South.

Keywords: rise of China; China and the Global South; China-Africa relations; Commodified Citizenship; transnational capitalist class;

RESUME

La Stratification Économique Globale et le Rôle Évoluant de la Chine dans les Pays en Développement

Cette thèse examine l'inégalité mondiale dans la perspective de la stratification économique globale et explore l'émergence de la Chine et l'impact de cette émergence sur les pays en développement et sur la structure hiérarchique d'économie mondiale. En utilisant des études de cas, j'analyse la manière dont certains pays s'adaptent à l'évolution de la structure de l'économie mondiale et comment leurs réponses reflètent les transformations structurelles au niveau du système mondial. L'approche est mixte quantitative / qualitative et macro-comparative, en mettant l'accent sur les interactions au sein du système mondial capitaliste moderne.

Les résultats sont les suivants :


- a) le mouvement de la Chine dans la couche intermédiaire de l'économie mondiale stratifiée a provoqué un changement qui s'écarte la classique distribution trimodale Wallersteinienne ; et
- b) que ce changement provoqua la création d'une semipériphérie surchargé, sans précédent. Cela génère de nouvelles pressions systémiques qui engendrent la création des organisations régionales et multilatérales telles que la Banque asiatique d'infrastructure, la Zone de libre-échange de l'ANASE et l'Alliance bolivarienne pour les Amériques. D'autre part, cette pression systémique peut favoriser une relation plus agressive et conflictuelle entre la centre-semipériphérie-périphérie.
- c) qu'avec ces nouvelles organisations régionales et multilatérales, et les notions d'identité nationale et de citoyenneté évolutifs, en particulier au sein de la classe capitaliste transnationale (particulièrement celles d'origine chinoise), peuvent affecter non seulement la géopolitique, mais aussi l'impact de l'inégalité et la stratification globale.
- d) que l'Afrique subsaharienne en tant que région reste au bas de l'économie mondiale stratifiée ;
- e) mais des progrès notables ont été réalisés au niveau des pays ;
- f) que le mouvement positif au sein de la hiérarchie de la structure hiérarchique d'économie mondiale, des différents pays d'Afrique subsaharienne était largement attribuable à des facteurs externes tels que l'engagement avec la Chine et le soutien politique de l'Occident ;
- g) et les pays d'Afrique subsaharienne a profité de la disponibilité et l'exploitation des ressources naturelles.

La thèse tente a changé le discours sur l'émergence de la Chine des questions d'émergence hégémonique, à des discussions sur l'impact de la progression de la Chine à la seine de la structure de l'économie capitaliste mondiale. En plus, l'Afrique subsaharienne ne fait pas partie des recherches sur la stratification économie mondiale donc, la thèse constitue une tentative pour remédier ce déficit.

Mots-clés : émergence de la Chine ; La Chine et l'hémisphère sud ; Relations sino-africaines ; Citoyenneté ; classe capitaliste transnationale


IMPRIMATUR

La Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines de l'Université de Neuchâtel, sur les rapports de M. Christian Suter, directeur de thèse, professeur à l'Université de Neuchâtel ; Prof. Dr. Christopher Chase-Dunn, Distinguished Professor of Sociology, University of California-Riverside ; Dr. Daniel Künzler, University of Fribourg, Department of Social Sciences ; Prof. Dr. Patrick Ziltener, University of Zürich, Institute of Sociology autorise l'impression de la thèse présentée par Mme Marylin Grell-Brisk en laissant à l'auteur la responsabilité des opinions énoncées.



Neuchâtel, le 31 mai 2018

Le doyen
Pierre Alain Mariaux



Acknowledgement

In April 2013, I attended the annual conference of the Political Economy of the World System (PEWS) Section of the American Sociological Association. There, I met my doctoral project supervisor, Professor Christian Suter. It is thanks to Professor's Suter's trust in my ability to work independently, his willingness to be flexible, and his ability to accommodate my needs as a recent mother that has allowed me, not only to pursue my doctoral studies but also to see it to fruition. I cannot thank him enough for the opportunity to pursue a topic that, at the time was seen as either impractical or unfeasible. I am indebted to the PROWEL program—Daniel Künzler and Prof. Monica Budowski, the various experts who provided feedback on my articles and the students in the program. I am immensely grateful to Professor Beverly Silver at the Arrighi Center for Global Studies at Johns Hopkins University for her invitation to spend Spring 2015 at the Center and return for a number of short visits thereafter. The Spring at JHU proved critical to my thesis trajectory thanks to Prof. Silver, and the members of the Global Inequality and Development Research Working Group, specifically Prof. Daniel Pascuiti and Prof. Sahan S. Karatasli. Prof. Silver's academic advice and direction was especially important in conceptualizing the connections between the three articles in my doctoral thesis. Equally important was the guidance I received from Prof. Chris Chase-Dunn at University of California, Riverside's Institute of Research on World Systems (IROWS). Prof. Chase-Dunn's well-needed review and crucial feedback of all the papers, included in the thesis at their various stages, have been tremendously beneficial. The IROWS Emcpit and Setpol Working Groups were invaluable to me, providing a supportive space to discuss, flesh out, and challenge my ideas. Many thanks to Prof. Gene Anderson for sharing his incredible knowledge in anthropology, history, and geography with me. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers of my articles, for their insightful and critical comments. Above all, I thank Philip L and Philip A for their love, patience, kindness, encouragement, support and understanding, without which I could not have realized my thesis. I hope that one day Philip A understands why mommy was "always doing research". Of course, I take full responsibility for this thesis and any shortcomings are mine alone.

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Preface

During my freshman year as an undergraduate, I was introduced to World-Systems Theory in my Western Civilization course. I was immediately drawn to Wallerstein's theory regarding the way in which nation states were connected, the idea of the semiperiphery, and the overall macro-structuralist perspective. It was the only time in my undergraduate career that one of my classes was taught explicitly through the lens of an overarching theory and it would prove to be my only undergraduate exposure to World-Systems Analysis. Over a decade later, I happened to be in the same location as the annual conference of the American Sociological Association's Political Economy of the World System (PEWS) Section and decided to attend. At the time, I had decided to continue my graduate studies and was actively searching for a doctoral program that would allow me to consider the rise of China from a World-Systems perspective. At the conference, two things were striking: 1) the total lack of papers on Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in the world-system; and 2) how little there was on China and its impact on the structure of the world-system.

I met my advisor, Prof. Christian Suter and Prof. Chris Chase-Dunn at this conference. Prof. Suter and I discussed the possibility of my working on a PhD project that dealt with both China and SSA in a major way. He was very encouraging and in November of 2013, I was accepted into the PROWEL doctoral program at the University of Neuchâtel where Prof. Suter was the director of the Institute of Sociology. PROWEL was specifically geared for students working on inequality – globally or within the Swiss borders.

The first couple months of research revealed China's heavy investments in SSA, through massive foreign aid programs which were announced at the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), as well as foreign direct investment both in industry and infrastructure. During this period, China's relationship with Africa was well-covered in the mainstream media (primarily alarmist news publications) but very little analysis was being done in academia. This is no longer the case, of course, and the academic literature on China in Africa is now much richer albeit with its own challenges.

When I originally conceived of the project, it was rather straight forward. Can China overcome the rigid structure of the world-system and move up from its semiperipheral status (which was already contested) to become part of the core? And if so, how? Since China was thoroughly embedded within many SSA countries, could this new relationship help increase or decrease inequality in Africa? I planned on creating an amalgamated dataset that included Gini coefficient data and national economic growth

statistics pre and post China's SSA involvement, with a longitudinal study of rising or diminishing inequality on the continent.

I spent the next six months searching for data and then coming to terms with the fact that the existing macro-economic data on SSA and China that I wanted to use, was severely limited and practically unusable. Morten Jerven's *Poor Numbers* published in mid-2013 excoriating macro-economic statistics on Africa, cemented my fears about using certain data (such as Gini coefficient data) as the basis of a doctoral project. This is despite the incredible work of Frederick Solt and the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) database held by the Harvard Dataverse Network.

In the second half of my first year, two things happened which presented a path forward: 1) In the summer of 2014, I began to examine China's involvement in the Caribbean in the hopes of a potential comparative study. This led to my first ASA paper which I presented the following year and now makes up *Article Three* of my thesis. 2) I shifted focus to how China was affecting the structure of the modern world-system and the implication this had for the rest of the countries in the Global South. I presented my first paper as a graduate student, at a conference honoring Giovanni Arrighi's, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Time*. In the paper, I focused on China's potential to subvert the world-system and usher in a new era in the modern world-system. It was after presenting this paper that I met with Prof. Beverly Silver and was invited to spend time at the Arrighi Center for Global Studies at Johns Hopkins University (JHU). I spent Spring 2015 there as part of the Global Inequality and Development Research Working Group. We revisited the Arrighi and Drangel *Review* article, *Stratification of the World-Economy* and analyzed data from multiple sources in an effort to determine the feasibility of combining them to update Arrighi and Drangel's original experiment, starting with year 0 to present.

Needless to say, it was during my time at JHU that I began to consider inequality vis-à-vis- China and the African continent from a more macro-structural and historical perspective. I was able to conceptualize inequality in terms of global structural stratification following the tradition of Giovanni Arrighi, an important figure in the World-Systems sub-field. I continue to learn from Arrighi, not just from the number of his articles I discover or rediscover each year but also from his intellectual honesty and willingness to adapt to new information and ideas as they emerge from the field.

Introduction

There is a hierarchy in the world-economic system – top-bottom, center-periphery, top-middle-bottom, core-semiperiphery-periphery. Yet, no matter how we describe the shape of this hierarchy, those at the bottom are subordinated to those at the top and where a country falls in this world-economic hierarchy is extremely important. Historically, the stratified world-economic system has been relatively stable in that movement within the hierarchy, especially upward mobility, is extremely challenging and remains atypical (Grell-Brisk 2017; Karatasli 2017; Pittau, Zelli, and Johnson 2010; Silver and Karatasli 2015; Wallerstein 1974a, 1974c).

The primary concern of this thesis is with China's upward mobility in the stratified modern capitalist world-economy and the implication thereof. Empirically, how much has China (also referred to in this thesis as the PRC – People's Republic of China) advanced in the world-economic hierarchy? What impact has that had on the structure of the global distribution of income? How much of an effect has China had on other countries in the semiperipheral and peripheral zones (particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa) of the world-economy? The thesis also examines the way in which these semiperipheral and peripheral countries adapt to the changing structure of the modern capitalist world-system. Although the contemporary rise of China is typically thought of as beginning in the early 1990s, the thesis begins with 1965, taking a more historical perspective especially when examining global structural changes as they relate to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). I employ a world-system perspective to economic stratification, meaning:

- (a) I take global economic stratification, to signify where countries fit in the global economic hierarchy in relation to each other and in terms of the distribution of income between countries. For example,

where does China fall in the hierarchy in relation to Angola, or India, or Ghana and vice versa, and has that changed over time.

(b) I begin with the idea that countries in the global economic hierarchy tend to cluster into three economic zones of core, periphery and semiperiphery.

(c) Global economic hierarchy is generally rigid and structural changes are only observable over long periods of time.

Although I have employed theories from various disciplines, including economics and international relations, to name a few, the overall thesis project is principally influenced by sociologist, Immanuel Wallerstein. In 1974, he published two articles¹ that expounded on two fundamental tenets of what would later be called World-Systems Theory—the foundation of the world-system perspective. In the first article, Wallerstein argues that, for political and politico-economic reasons, the modern capitalist world-economy requires the existence of a semiperiphery, a middle stratum between core and peripheral countries (Wallerstein 1974a). In the other article, he further explains that the semiperiphery is an absolute necessity for the proper functioning of the modern capitalist world-economy. This three-layered structure (core-semiperiphery-periphery), he argues, is the “normal condition” of the world-economy and when this “ceases to be the case, the world-system disintegrates.” Obviously, Wallerstein has since refined his ideas regarding world-systems theory.

However, the concept of the trimodal structure remains essential and fundamental to his theory of the world-system—a theory which posits that all economic, political, social, and cultural relations among the people on the Earth are connected within the structure of a single division of labor but with no overarching political structure. This thesis project tests the persistence and rigidity of this trimodal structure through the analysis of between country income distribution and find that China’s upward

¹ The first article is titled: *Dependence in an Interdependent World: Limited Possibilities of Transformation within the Capitalist World Economy*. The second article is titled: *The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis*.

mobility in just under three decades, was quite remarkable, rising in both economic and political stature on the global stage.

Some of the initial dialogue and work relative to the rise of China, dealt with whether it would be able to break free of the peripheral status (which was accorded it by (Babones and Alvarez-Rivadulla 2007) or its semi-peripheral status (which was accorded it by Chase-Dunn, Kawano, & Brewer (2000), and Wallerstein (1974b), to name a few), to become a competitor to the United States' diminishing hegemonic status (Gulick 2004, 2007, 2011; Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2004; Panitch 2010; Tabb 2008), and/or serve as a new model for capitalist growth (Ramo 2004). However, the articles that make up this thesis asks questions which go beyond the issue of hegemonic ascent and focus on the trimodal world-economic hierarchy and structure itself. What happens when a country like China which makes up close to 20% of the world population moves from peripheral state to semiperipheral state in a matter of a decade–decade and a half? Would it structurally legitimize and stabilize the world-system or would it wreak havoc Arrighi (1994, 2007a)? Or could it possibly cause systemic chaos or a complete reorganization of the system as suggested by Arrighi and Silver (1999).

China in the world-system: Periphery and Semiperiphery Engagement

China's economic success and newfound status as potential leader within the Global South has manifested itself in varying ways. In the Caribbean where China has now convinced many island nations to abandon their foreign relations with the Republic of China, Taiwan, by signing the 'One-China Policy',² it now has another means of affecting the structure of the world-system through changing immigration policies. The sale of citizenship (commodified citizenship), one of the ways countries in the Global South have adapted

² The 'One-China Policy' is a foreign relations approach in which the PRC requires its partners to accept that there is one legitimate government which represents the people of China, and to engage in diplomatic relations with the PRC means breaking relations with the ROC (Taiwan). For China, this became an essential foreign policy requirement. It is based on the idea that "if Taiwan should be alienated from the mainland, China will forever be locked to the west side of the first chain of islands in the West Pacific, and... the essential strategic space for China's rejuvenation will be lost" (Guangqian and Youzhi 2005).

to the changing dynamics of the modern capitalist world-system, can be used to break down or circumnavigate the barriers created by border controls through passport and citizenship measures. From the point of view that nationality and country residency can be a crucial factor to global socio-economic stratification (Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009), commodified citizenship provides the possibility to dramatically influence mobility in the stratified world-system. This is an option that can be of particular utility for the Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC) but has not yet been fully exploited.

I would argue that without its economic success, China would not have been able to convince so many heads of states, including that of Dominica (the focus of *Article Three* in this thesis) to sign this policy. For Dominica, opening diplomatic relations with China and signing the One-China policy allowed the expansion of its commodified citizenship program and although the program is open to any person who can afford it, when the current Dominica government assumed power, it marketed the program primarily at Chinese nationals. This may have been in part due to Dominica's newfound and keen relationship with China and in part, the form with which China approaches its South-South interactions. Still, once Dominica opened diplomatic and trade relations with China, it received significant amounts, up to a third of its GDP, in foreign aid (The American Interest Magazine 2013) and a well-received, renewed interest in its commodified citizenship program. In return, China gained one more ally willing to sign the One-China Policy in the chain of islands in the Caribbean.

Above all, the commodified citizenship program in Dominica (an upper middle income country according to the World Bank) became fully accessible to China's TCC (as conceptualized by Sklair (2000) and expounded on by Robinson (2004)), with access to visa-free travel and potential residency in over 115 countries including the United Kingdom (UK), the European Union (EU) and the Schengen Zone (CBI Unit 2015). Currently, Chinese nationals must submit to the visa application process for the UK, EU, and the Schengen Zone. In fact, the Chinese passport only grants visa-free travel access to 51 countries (Henley & Partners 2017), most of which are in Asia. Commodified citizenship provides the means to break down or

circumnavigate barriers created by through passport, visa, and citizenship measures. Furthermore, although the Dominica version (which is exclusively treated in *Article Three*) initially targeted Chinese nationals, it is easy to see how the commodified citizenship program can be used more completely by the TCC at large.

With China's upward mobility within the stratified world-economy and its growing influence in the Global South, which typically includes most countries within the bounds of the semiperiphery and the periphery, it is essential to raise the question of its impact on Sub-Saharan Africa – one of the most economically depressed region of the world. Very often, the discourse on how SSA is doing economically, revolves around issues of poverty and development and varying arguments about what these terms mean; regional and country-specific case studies that deal with the impact of neoliberal policies³ (Adésinà 2004; Bond and Dor 2003; Caffentzis 2002; Carmody 2007; Hellinger, Hansen-Kuhn, and Fehling 2001; Lubeck 1992); and studies which focus on the political economy of the region or specific countries within the region (Desai 2007; Kaplinsky, McCormick, and Morris 2010). While some research claim that the China-Africa relationship is no different from Western colonial powers (Lyman 2005; Norberg 2006), this is a contested view (Sautman and Hairong 2007) with some African leaders asserting that the China-Africa engagement is different and better than the current Western one (BBC News 2009; Wade 2008; York 2010). Still, equally important in the examination of African advancement is the emphasis of this thesis, which is on the movement of SSA countries within the stratified world-economy and if and how this is affected by the concomitant rise of China.

³ The market being the driver of all socio-economic growth, and the only way to reduce poverty meant that African economic, political and social institutions were to be restructured so as to make the private sector front and center. This neoliberal project in Africa was supposed to be inclusive and open Africa to the global economy; encouraging growth by relying on agriculture and allowing complete control by market mechanisms.

A World-Systems Understanding to Global Economic Stratification

In the early 1970's when Wallerstein began writing on the modern capitalist world-economic system, there were two schools of thought—modernization theorists and dependency theorists—that attempted to make sense and understand the ways in which “development” was occurring in the world and more importantly how and why the capitalist world-system was stratified in such an unequal manner. Wallerstein did not disagree with some of the fundamental tenets of modernization or dependency theory. For example, he absolutely concurred with their assertion that those at the center of the world-economic hierarchy (core) maintained their position through a system of exploitation that sustained the status quo and kept those at the bottom (periphery) from rising. Wallerstein drew on the theory of unequal exchange espoused by Arghiri Emmanuel (1972) and later, Ernest Mandel (Mandel 1975), that the suppression of wages in the periphery allowed for exploitative trade practices by the core. These practices were masked by market processes but were backed by the military and political systems in both the core and periphery. Unequal exchange meant that core countries maintained their position by taking advantage of the low labor cost in the periphery with a net effect of increased capital resources in the core.

He agreed with the unequal-ness of the world-economic system; but he went a step further than dependency theorists concluding that this inequality was a *necessary* condition of the modern capitalist world-economy. Unequal exchanges were “necessary for the expansion of a world market if the primary consideration is profit. Without unequal exchange, it would not be profitable to expand the size of the division of labor. And without such expansion, it would not be profitable to maintain a capitalist world-economy, which would then either disintegrate or revert to the form of a redistributive world empire” (Wallerstein 1974a:5). By arguing that unequal exchange was a necessary condition of the world-economy, Wallerstein was in fact affirming that the system was rigid and the prospects for upward mobility was even more dismal.

At the time that Wallerstein was writing these two articles, both modernization and dependency theorists pursued a highly-dichotomized discourse in which countries tended to be categorized as either backwards or modern; or either rich or poor. Modernization theorists understood the division in the world-economy to be based on whether a country could be considered modern/advanced or traditional/backwards. Modernity was attained through industrialization and for many like W.W. Rostow (1959, 1960), Great Britain was held as the quintessential modern state. Additionally, industrialization tended to be equated with “development”. For modernization theorists, any intermediate position between modernity and backwardness was transitory. Moreover, the whole process of industrialization could be jumpstarted through various means such as the transfer of technology and through direct capital investment.

Dependency theory, which largely emerged out of the discourse generated by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (UN ECLAC) as a counter to modernization theory, focused primarily on the exploitative nature of the division of the world-economy. Countries were either developed or undeveloped but development or under-development was based primarily on a country’s position of center or periphery in the world economy. Dependency theorists (such as Raúl Prebisch and later Andre Gunder-Frank) saw a highly unequal global economy where countries at the center exploited those at the periphery for natural resources and raw materials in order to maintain the center’s wealth and position as well as to keep the peripheral countries in their place. They acknowledged that some countries could find themselves in between center and periphery but the structural pull toward center-ness and peripheral-ness was such that any intermediate position was a transitional one. Underdevelopment itself, was therefore a by-product of the modern capitalist order (Gunder Frank 1979).

Still, it has been shown empirically, that many countries in the periphery were able to modernize/industrialize (measured using the percentage of GDP generated through manufacturing) to the point of catching up or even surpassing the levels of core countries in terms of industrialization (Arrighi

2007b; Arrighi, Silver, and Brewer 2003, 2005). This however, did not result in the leveling of the difference in global economic power or even income distribution between the core and periphery (Arrighi et al. 2003, 2005) as was initially imagined by development scholars (Bell 1973). Many development theorists have since turned away from measuring global inequality in terms of the ability of peripheral countries to “catch up” to the core strictly through national income growth, with most shifting focus on more normative ways such as health and well-being measurements, poverty reduction measures, safe drinking water, etc.

Wallerstein’s substantive theoretical finding at the time, was his conceptualization of the semiperiphery and its crucial role in the modern world-system. Unlike the dependency theorist who saw countries either at the stage of core-ness or peripheral-ness, and the modernist who saw countries as either fully mature or totally backward, Wallerstein held that many countries in the world-system were, permanently or for an extended time period, in an intermediate position—the semiperiphery. For Wallerstein, this persistent global structural stratification went beyond rich-poor comparisons. The semiperiphery was neither, as the dependency theorists saw it (a transitional point) nor as the modernist theorists saw it (a residual effect of the world-system). And, most importantly, the semiperiphery was a permanent fixture of the modern world-system.

According to Wallerstein, in the world-system, core countries benefit significantly from the surplus derived from global commodity chains while peripheral countries see no benefit. The economic activities of core countries are capital-intensive as opposed to the labor-intensive ones of peripheral countries. Furthermore, the core engages in reproductive accumulative strategies as opposed to the primary accumulation strategies of peripheral countries. Unequal exchange then, is enforced by the strong states on the weak ones; that is by the core on the periphery. Wallerstein held that in the world-system, the semiperiphery acts as a stabilizing fixture, engaging in an equal amount of core and peripheral activities, leading them to benefit just enough from global commodity chains to avoid falling back into the periphery

but not enough to move into the core. Furthermore, the semiperiphery is both the exploiter and the exploited.

In the articles, Wallerstein (1974a, 1974d) presented economic-historical evidence for the emergence of the semiperiphery and the trimodal modern capitalist world-economy in the long sixteenth century and claimed that there were limited possibilities for transformation within the system. To put it differently, unlike the modernization theorists whose solution for development is through rapid industrialization, Wallerstein saw a more rigid system with the ability to move from one sector to another (for example, semiperiphery to core) as extremely challenging. In fact, there is a diminishing return with industrialization. As more countries in the world embraced industrialization as a means of moving out of the peripheral zone, the pay-off became less significant.

This is partially due to the fact that unequal exchange was not the only mechanism which produced this rigid and persistently unequal world-economic system conceptualized by Wallerstein. Arrighi for example, argues that unilateral transfers of labor (voluntary (immigration) and involuntary (labor of slaves and prisoners of war)), and capital resources (voluntary (financialization) and involuntary (extortion of capital from colonies)) have also contributed to the formation and continued reproduction of the world-economic system and structural hierarchy (Arrighi 1990). In the case of Latin America, it is particularly striking that both import substitution industrialization and primary/secondary export industrialization, which Wallerstein (1974a, 1979) argues were possible means to move ahead in the world-economy, were ineffective. Still, Wallerstein acknowledges that states *are* able to move from one position to another in the world-economic hierarchy over time. Nonetheless, “the fact that particular states change their position in the world-economy...[however] does not itself change the nature of the system... the key factor to note is that within the capitalist world-economy, all states cannot “develop” simultaneously *by definition*, since the system functions by virtue of having unequal core and peripheral regions” (Wallerstein 1975:24). Again,

he reiterates the intrinsic inequality of, and challenge of upward mobility in, the modern capitalist world-system.

In his 1974 articles, Wallerstein establishes the existence and necessity of the semiperiphery but also discusses the logic of a trimodal system. For Wallerstein, in order for the system to function properly, there must be a concentration of military power by the dominant, a widespread commitment to the system and the three-layered structure defined by a small core, medium semiperiphery, and large periphery. The large periphery allows for the exploitation by both core and semiperipheral states. The results of this thesis project, defies some of these underlying fundamental assumptions of world-systems theory but also reinforces parts of them.

Methods and Data

Based on Wallerstein's world-systems perspective, we know that the semiperiphery is important to the stability of the system. And we know that upward mobility in the world-economic hierarchy is a challenge. However, despite Wallerstein's extensive historical analysis of the development of the modern capitalist world-economic system, his direction on how to empirically determine the exact composition of the core-semiperiphery-periphery remained severely lacking and continues to be a source of debate in the area of world-systems analysis. Even in his early writings on the world-economy, Wallerstein (1974a) was cognizant of the difficulties in identifying semiperipheral states based on the way he had conceptualized them and this is illustrated by his very own query and struggle, "how can we tell a semiperipheral state when we see one" (1974a:5). He did not believe the answer lay in focusing on any one type or particular product since a peripheral product today could end up being a core product tomorrow and vice versa. This is especially true today with the rapid flow of technology across national borders. It is conceivable to view the trimodal world-economic system as a simple heuristic (Chase-Dunn 1989) that allows the categorization and identification of a top-middle-bottom of the world-system, but that is limiting and new methods

continue to emerge that allow for empirically measuring which countries fall within the various sections/zones of the trimodal distribution. Further, an empirical challenge such as this and the resulting attempts to resolve it, can push the field in new and interesting ways, that break new ground, and challenge or confirm the existing order.

Wallerstein (1974d) suggested observing “the wage patterns and margins of profit of particular products at particular moments of time.” Theoretically, this makes sense but poses special empirical challenges. The same is true of Chase-Dunn’s (1984, 1989) suggestion in which he writes that “only carefully operationalized empirical research on changes over time in the global distribution of military power capabilities, state access to resources and level of economic development can resolve this problem” (Chase-Dunn 1989:79).⁴ Furthermore, for Chase-Dunn, the lines clearly demarcating core, semiperiphery and periphery are not rigid but quite fluid. However, many empirical studies have shown that this may not be the case and that significant gaps exist between the core-semiperiphery-periphery zones in the world-economy (Arrighi and Drangel 1986; Babones 2005; Grell-Brisk 2017; Karatasli 2017; Kentor 2000; Snyder and Kick 1979). Even the economic growth literature (Bianchi 1997; Henderson, Parmeter, and Russell 2008; Paap and van Dijk 1998; Pittau et al. 2010) produces evidence to support this. Not only has there been a tendency of countries to cluster into zones/groups such as periphery-semi-periphery-core, but the difficulty of upward mobility has been shown empirically.

In their 1986 inquiry into the stratification of the world-economy Giovanni Arrighi and Jessica Drangel rather effectively, provided empirical evidence to support the general existence of the Wallersteinian three-layered structure over a fifty-year time period. Their ability to successfully track and glean broad systemic changes between 1938 to 1983 (Arrighi and Drangel 1986) is the basis of the empirical study in *Article One* and *Article Two* of this thesis and a starting point to ask specific questions regarding

⁴ Chase-Dunn was at the time responding to Daniel Chirot’s (1977) claim that decolonization eliminated the periphery. Chase-Dunn agrees that although some formerly peripheral countries did become semiperipheral, core states had in fact gained additional power.

drivers of contemporary systemic change. The use of the fairly well accepted Arrighi and Drangel method to determine global economic-stratification, is by no means a rejection of the other empirical studies (Arrighi and Drangel 1986; Babones 2005; Kentor 2000; Mahutga and Smith 2011; Snyder and Kick 1979) into the subject. In fact, all these studies, including this thesis project, can be seen as enriching the sub-field and generally should be seen as complementary and engaging.

In this thesis, the Arrighi and Drangel approach is used to determine where countries fall in the stratification of the world-economy with the focus on a possible 'China-effect' (is it bringing up or bringing down other countries) on the semiperipheral and peripheral countries. This means that the focus is on countries in the 'developing world' including over fifty Sub-Saharan Africa countries and China. A cursory examination of most papers using econometric modeling on large groups of countries in the developing world would demonstrate the well-known fact that much of the empirical economic data (Gini coefficient data for example) for these countries are not reliable, with most studies providing many caveats for interpreting their results.

Therefore, for this thesis project, the Arrighi and Drangel approach is utilized due to its relative ease but primarily because of the reliability of the data that is used (there are only two datasets involved – population and gross national income (GNI) per capita data from the World Bank). The method is clear, straight-forward, it uses a minimal number of variables, uses a strong dataset, and is easily reproducible, despite having a majority of the countries in the study falling in the 'developing world' category. Furthermore, the Arrighi and Drangel approach is reasonable as it allows us to trace the performance of the countries relative to each other over time. This permits one to make historically sound and logical assertions about the relationship between the rise of China and its burgeoning relationship with peripheral and semiperipheral states without resorting to the use of questionable regression methods based on poor data.

So, what exactly is the Arrighi and Drangel method? Arrighi and Drangel's goal (1986) was to ascertain empirically whether the three-layered structure of the world-economy persisted over time and devised a method that calculated global economic stratification using between country income distribution. Their method produced complex and interesting results. The approach uses gross national product (GNP) per capita as a proxy for measuring a state's mix of core-peripheral activities in the world division of labor. They explain, "core activities command aggregate rewards that incorporate most, if not all the overall benefits of the world division of labor, whereas peripheral activities command aggregate rewards that incorporate few, if any, of those benefits... The differences in the command over total benefits of the world division of labor must necessarily be reflected in commensurate differences in the GNP per capita of the states in question" (Arrighi and Drangel 1986:31).

The key to their argument is that if command over total benefits of the world division of labor represents where one falls in the global economic hierarchy, then the GNP per capita is a reasonable measurement to determine stratification. As Arrighi (1990) later explains, core-periphery relations are determined by the systemic outcome of the struggle over benefits of the world division of labor (unequal exchange à la Arrighi and Mandel) and "the capability of a state to appropriate the benefits of the world division of labor is determined primarily by its position... in a hierarchy of wealth" (Arrighi 1990:15). This reiterates the statements of the very first paragraph in this *Introduction* – where a country falls in the world-economic hierarchy is extremely important.

In their study, Arrighi and Drangel use world population as a function of GNP per capita from 1938 to 1983 to test for the stability and persistency of the semiperiphery over time. For the most part, they found trimodality (the existence of the core-semiperiphery-periphery as described by Wallerstein) to exist within the capitalist world-system throughout the time period under review with some years such as 1983 and 1938 as clearly trimodal and other years such as 1965 and 1970 to be less so. Peter J. Taylor (1988), tested the robustness of the Arrighi and Drangel study by keeping the GNP per capita proxy and changing the

“areal base of the data”. That is, instead of aggregating the population data based on nation states/countries, state boundaries were removed and the population rearranged into cells of approximately equal populations. Taylor’s “cell” grouping method is based on John Cole’s (1981) alternative non-state world population data. Taylor found that despite the extreme spatial reorganization of the population data, trimodality persisted; meaning that countries tended to cluster into core-semiperiphery-periphery groupings. Nation-state boundaries could have created a certain artificialness to the GNP per capita statistic given pre- and post-colonial boundary setting. The implication of Taylor’s study is important in that the general structure of the world-economic system remained intact despite the removal of nation-state boundaries.

For Arrighi and Drangel, the GNP per capita was the closest proxy to representing a country’s overall benefit from the world division of labor. The GNI per capita is used in *Article One* and *Article Two*, to determine stratification. GNI although similar to the GNP, measures a country’s *entire* economic growth, and considers income and taxes earned not only at home but also abroad. It is important to note that in this study, the World Bank’s GNI per capita data using the Atlas Method⁵ (the purpose of which, according to the World Bank is to minimize exchange rate fluctuations in cross-country comparisons) is employed.

There are two reasons for using GNI per capita for the articles in this thesis. The first being that the linkages between nation states, corporations, and peoples in the world-economy have become more profound and complex due to globalization and transnationalization in particular (See Robinson (2004, 2010)). The second reason is that countries in the periphery and semiperiphery – the main focus of the thesis – place a strong emphasis on remittances. For China, overseas remittances have always been important but was significantly affected when United States officially banned it in December 1950 (Peterson 2012).

⁵ Atlas Method: a country’s GNI in local currency is converted into United States Dollars (USD) using the Atlas conversion factor (a three-year average of exchange rates to smooth the effects of transitory exchange rate fluctuations, adjusted for the difference between the rate of inflation in the country and that of a number of developed countries (also using a weighted average of those countries’ GDP deflators)). For per capita calculations, the GNI in USD is divided by the country’s mid-year population. According to the World Bank, this is the method used for calculating the old GNP variable and is good for comparing relative size of economies.

However, according to the World Bank's remittances data, in 1990, China received 175 million USD in remittances. By 2000 that figure was at 5,237 million and the estimate for 2010 is 51,300 million and constitutes a significant portion of its GDP (World Bank 2011). The importance of remittances is also critical in SSA where countries see some of the largest receipts of remittances relative to their GDP, and in some cases those remittances represent a major source of foreign exchange (Singh et al. 2010).

In *Article One* of this thesis, which focuses primarily on the rise of China itself and its impact on the trimodal hierarchical structure of global income distribution, the period studied is 1990 to 2015 – a period of time that is equated with the effective rise of contemporary China. In *Article Two* of this thesis, the period of study spans fifty-one years, starting with 1965, a few years post-decolonization, through 2015. In assessing SSA's performance in the contemporary world-system one must take decolonization into consideration to give us some amount of perspective when speaking of the region as a whole and when considering how well or not some countries have progressed in the world-economic hierarchy. Decolonization itself marked a very important point in the world-economy with a substantial increase in the total number of the independent nation-states entering the world-system. This was particularly evident on the African continent. Also, by starting as far back as 1965, historical evidence can be used to make inferences about what is happening in SSA today. On a macro level, one is able to see how much or little the region has changed over the last fifty-one years.

All the data for *Article One* and *Two* comes from the World Bank and the period of study spans 1965 to 2015 (See Appendix Three and Four for the raw and transformed data⁶). Like Arrighi and Drangel the log of the GNI per capita is used, not only because of the skewed nature of the raw GNI per capita data but also because the primary interest is in the relative rather than the absolute differences amongst countries. The fact that the GNI is calculated using the Atlas Method in USD also allows for the

⁶ The transformed data can also be found at the bottom of the page: <https://marilyngrell.com/research/>

measurement of differences in command over world economic resources rather than differences in standards of living.

Each country's population is plotted as a percentage of total world population by its log GNI per capita in intervals of one-tenth. The (population) distribution is then smoothed by a three-interval moving average. It is important to note that time (the period 1965 to 2015) and not geographic space (countries in the study on a year to year basis) is held constant because the study is mostly concerned in movements in the periphery and semiperiphery and there is a general paucity of data for those countries. Therefore, for any given year, all the data points are retained if both population and GNI per capita information is available. Furthermore, since the total population is being examined as a function of GNI, logically, the total world population for any year in the distribution is based only on the total population of the countries included in the study for that year.

Given the results of the Arrighi and Drangel study (1986) the beginning assumption is that of a trimodal distribution but with the understanding that it may not always hold. The priority is to examine the peripheral and semiperipheral economic zones. To track which countries (and in *Article One* and *Two* of this thesis, the focus is on the periphery and semiperipheral zone but especially China and SSA countries) moved from one zone to another in a given year, a cutoff point for each economic zone (i.e. periphery, semiperiphery, core) is established. This is done by first determining the median point (or median cluster of countries) in the distribution for each year. Then, the local minima in the immediate right and left of the median is determined. Those are the cut-off points for the semiperiphery for that specific year.

So, for example, in 1990, the median cluster was 3.45 and the semiperipheral economic zone would be countries falling within the 3.15 to 3.65 cluster; to the right of that would be the general core zone and to the left of that the general periphery zone (see Figure 1.). This also means that it is possible that a country could remain in one particular economic zone from one year to another, but the shape of the distribution and where each country falls in that distribution might change. Starting in 2001, the distribution becomes

chaotic with instances of more than one local minima to the left and right of the median point. In those cases, the lowest of these points is used as the cut-off points for the semiperiphery as shown in Figure 1.

for the 2010 and 2015 distributions⁷.




Figure 1. Cut-off points for economic zones for the years 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2015

For *Article Three* of the thesis, I engage the world-systems perspective in a more nuanced manner.

While *Article One* and *Two* specifically speak to countries’ movements within the stratified world-economy, *Article Three* treats a specific case of China’s involvement in the Global South, Dominica, which occurred as direct result of China’s upward mobility in the world-economy. I employ the macro-historical analysis tool

⁷ The method for determining the general economic zones is applied consistently throughout the study. When multiple modes begin to appear, the method’s limits are tested but remains fairly robust except in two extreme cases – 2004 and 2007 – where the number of clusters within the semiperiphery contracts significantly. This is due to the fact that the lowest local minima to the left is fairly close to the median. Therefore, in 2004 the lower bound is 3.35 (compared to 2.95 in 2003 and 3.05 in 2005) and in 2007, the lower bound is 3.55 (compared to 3.15 in 2006 and 3.25 in 2008).

of world-systems perspective, addressing changes in policy over time, and examining how these policy changes can impact global inequality.

With regards to data for *Article Three*, I use historical evidence available in primary and secondary data sources including data I collected on the commodified citizenship program in Dominica. The data includes name, current country of citizenship, country of origin, country of residency, and date Dominica citizenship was conferred, for all individuals who purchased Dominican citizenship covering the period 1990 to 2015. This data is based solely on what the government has documented and made publicly available based on rules of disclosure. There is no way to check whether or not the government has omitted any data although it is legally required to make the data publicly available. Because of the nature of the citizenship data, a redacted version is available upon request.

Major Findings

Overall, the thesis articles that deal with the movements of countries within the stratified world-economic system, demonstrate that beginning in the 1990s a trimodal distribution based on Wallerstein's initial conceptualization emerges. However, over time, the shape of the distribution veers away from classic trimodality (i.e. small core, medium semiperiphery and large periphery) and toward what appears to be a quad-modal or even a generally multi-modal distribution.




Figure 2. Movement away from Wallersteinian trimodality

As is demonstrated in Figure 2., the 1990 distribution is classically trimodal but as the years progress, the shape of the distribution changes dramatically with the appearance of multiple clusters/modes. Furthermore, more of the world’s population is moving toward the center with majority of this movement happening in the peripheral and lower bounds of the semiperiphery. This movement away to what looks like a multi-modal distribution is even more obvious when we define the boundaries for the semiperiphery, as shown in Figure 1. We are able to visually see that much of the messiness in the distributions, especially in the 2000s involve a pronounced and general move to the middle. China, which experienced significant economic growth well into the 2000s, is a major driver of this change, irrespective of the global economic recession which began circa 2007.

Article One, highlights not only the significant shift from a largely classic trimodal structure but also focuses primarily on the role of China in this transformation. The shift happens as China slowly divorces itself from the initial clusters that included India, and other South Asian countries. Of course,

given the population sizes of both China and India, any movement they make in the world-economic distribution would be significant. But, by 1993, China was no longer in the same cluster of countries as India, with both countries sitting at the top of the peripheral zone –India to the left and China to the right. In the mid-nineties and early 2000s both China and India were perceived as having the potential to exert significant influence on the global stage. Yet, China established a larger role in the global economy, outperforming India almost 3:1 in terms of GNI per capita and GDP per capita, by the end of the 2000s.

Remarkably, China only makes it into the semiperipheral economic zone in 2000. Given its incredible economic growth spurts and changing role in the global economy, one would have expected China to have jumped by leaps and bounds into the semiperipheral economic zone. Yet its movement into the semiperiphery is steady and moderate, highlighting the ever-real difficulty and challenge that many peripheral and semiperipheral countries face in terms of upward mobility. It is not until 2006 that China appears to be fully part of the larger middle stratum and continued to rise in the hierarchy through the end of the study in 2015.

Not only does the study in *Article One* establish the change to a larger semiperiphery, but also demonstrates that the major driver of this change – China – for the most part, takes an almost paternalistic attitude toward the periphery and other semiperipheral states. Whether or not one believes it to be true or sincere, China's official foreign policy attitude toward other developing or underdeveloped countries has been one of post-colonial solidarity and its principles of equality and mutual benefit, diversity, practical results, common progress etc. Naturally, this doctrine of cooperation is couched in China's own desire to continue to climb up in the global political-economic hierarchy and a belief otherwise would be naive. Arguably, it's leaders maintain that extreme inequality is not necessary to moving ahead in a highly stratified world-economy. Since November of 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping have in fact been touting the idea of a multipolar world in which global power is more diffuse. This does not mean that China has

rejected the basic capitalist world-economy. It is an active participant in it, but is interested in a system where power is shared amongst *more* countries or blocs of countries.

Within the last two decades, there has been an increase in multilateral cooperation between semiperipheral states (such as the creation of the BRICS and the BRICS's own bank, the creation of the AIIB), and across semiperipheral and peripheral states (such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)). In light of the above, and today's world-economy, Wallerstein's assertions about "cultural stratification"⁸ may be less convincing. Still, the proliferation of these regional and multilateral organizations seems a necessary adaptation to the changing form of stratification in the world-economy. Semiperipheral and peripheral countries, it would appear, are acutely aware of the ongoing changes in the world-system and have determined it best to protect their own interest with the understanding that regional and multilateral alliances matter.

One very real implication of the larger middle stratum is of a crowding effect with geopolitical implications. With more countries vying for a spot in the middle, some countries will inevitably try to stand out in the crowd. For example, China's increased influence in the global economy has allowed it to increase its military spending; and while it is a distant second, it is *second* only to the United States in terms of its military budget and military spending. China has not used its military for covert operations that involve overthrowing and installing governments, like the US did during the beginning and especially at the height of its hegemonic domination, but it does appear to be emboldened by its military capacity and has taken more aggressive positions in its conflicts. Not only, has it begun to sell and provide military weapons (Abramson and Lasky-Fink 2008; Carmody and Taylor 2010; Sautman and Hairong 2007; Taylor 2005) to regions in conflict in the Global South (such as Sudan) and opened its very first military base abroad in

⁸ Wallerstein (1974d) argued that given the highly unequal nature of the system, a bipolar world would be prone to revolts and volatility. However, the semiperiphery acts as a stabilizing buttress. This is in part due to the tendency of semiperipheral states to see themselves better off than peripheral states and view it in their best interest to support the core in any conflict that arises out of the system's inequality.

Djibouti, it has also heightened its military presence in traditional areas of conflict such as the South China Sea. The geopolitics of the South China Sea is extremely important vis-à-vis this increasing middle stratum of the world-economic system. China's hardline view regarding its claim to sovereignty of strategic islands in the region, and its unwillingness to submit to international rulings on the conflict, places it at odds with some of its semiperipheral peers and their allies, and even Japan (DeCastro 2013; Xu 2014; Yuzawa 2014).

Despite its potential for and sometimes overt efforts at asserting its military dominance amongst peripheral and semiperipheral countries, China has continued its use of soft-power to strengthen its ties with the rest of the Global South. This is quite consistent with the argument that it wants to maintain the world-system's status quo (Hung 2015; Karatasli and Kumral 2017). The emergence of multilateral organizations within the Global South and China's seemingly acceptance of them also supports this view. China may however, find itself at a crossroad in the near future. It has always called for a multipolar world even as the semiperiphery becomes more crowded. Still, other countries in the semiperiphery are also trying to demonstrate their own power and prominence in the world-system, highlighting the fact that moving up and down the world-system hierarchy is also dependent on the nature of the relationship established between states (see Babones (2005)).

Article Three establishes the fact that Dominica's 'citizenship by investment and contribution program' is commodified citizenship and then argues that the program offers a different type of geopolitical currency for China's expanding transnational capitalist class – allowing its members to break down or circumnavigate the barriers created by border controls through passport and citizenship measures. Furthermore, if nationality is a crucial factor to global socio-economic stratification, commodified citizenship offers the possibility to positively influence mobility in the stratified world-system. However, this is also Dominica's way of negotiating the changing dynamics of the world-economy. Having had a monoagriculture economy by virtue of its colonial history, Dominica needed to find ways to

jumpstart its economy in a different direction and one of the many ways it attempted to do this, was through the commodified citizenship program.

Dominica's citizenship program was commodified in that it was monetized and made into a profit-making scheme. To explain, it is rare to find a citizenship-by-naturalization process that does not charge some type of fee. There are typically application fees, biometric fees etc. In Switzerland for example, the whole process could cost up to 2000 CHF depending on the canton through which you are applying for citizenship. Still, citizenship itself is generally thought of as being outside the bounds of capital and profit-making. For instance, while it costs 680 USD to become a citizen of the United States through naturalization, 90% of all fees/charges go toward the operational cost of the US Citizenship and Immigration Services. However, in the case of Dominica, an exchange-value was given to citizenship by linking a price to it (similar to for-profit educational institutions, or toll roads, or private water companies or even privatized healthcare). Citizenship making, which was outside the logic of profit-making and not salable, has now been stripped from any substance and made available for a price.

Citizenship is redefined and reconfigured in a way that allows for profit-making and as a functional way of bypassing the limitations of citizenship laws established by states. By this I mean that for some time laws enacted by the nation-state, limited citizenship for transnationals and individuals of multiple residencies. Since negotiations for any form of 'substantive citizenship' have generally happened below and above the level of the nation-state but only the state could enact laws relating to citizenship (Isin and Turner 2003; Joppke 2007; Macklin 2010; Painter and Philo 1995; Turner 1993), citizenship for the transnational class was problematic. The commodification of citizenship allows this class of individuals the ability to circumvent these issues. If, it is true that transnational denotes economic, social, political and cultural processes that supersede the nation-state (Robinson 2004), then *commodified citizenship* facilitates the flourishing and expansion of the transnational class.

In *Article Three*, I contend that as China becomes more integrated into the global economy, its TCC members must find workarounds to any constraints on their movements. With cheap second citizenship purchased from Dominica, the TCC from China (and in general) can break free of the bonds placed on it by the national laws of some of their counterparts in the West. They could move relatively freely to other Western countries to engage in those economies. Nonini and Ong (1997) maintained that Chinese transnationalists have developed strategies that redefine and overcome efforts to regulate and control their mobility instituted by post-colonial nation-states. This gives the Chinese transnationalist a character of unpredictable wildness (Ong and Nonini 1997). They rework definitions such as that of citizenship, escaping constraints placed on them by nation-state regimes. Dominica's commodified citizenship allows them to do just that. Through Dominica's citizenship for purchase program, the Chinese TCC can therefore set up shop not only in Dominica, but anywhere else the Dominica passport can take them.

The article adds to the literature on citizenship but from the perspective of transnationalization and commodification of citizenship with only Boatca (2016) taking this approach and Abrahamian (2015) who reported on the use of purchased citizenship as a means of control in the United Arab Emirates. It also contributes to the literature on transnationalization and inequality (areas of research which have not specifically addressed commodified citizenship). Other similar works on transnationalization in the Caribbean have focused on the tourist industry (Sprague-Silgado 2017), on security (Watson 2012) or on the role of Caribbean's colonial history on issues of globalization, sovereignty and citizenship (Watson 2015). The novelty of *Article Three* lies in the case study approach that examines an island's response to pressures and changes that are typically experienced by small countries and economies in a highly globalized socio-political-economic system; and how that response can in fact deepen the linkages amongst the various states in that system.

Article Two situates Sub-Saharan Africa within the world-economic hierarchy and relates that to the contemporary rise of China. The article empirically shows that in general, during the period studied

(1965-2015), Sub-Saharan African countries filled up the tail end of the global income distribution but other populous countries such as India, China, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka occupied that part of the distribution too. This meant that for quite some time, most of the world's population have benefited the least from the world division of labor. Still, as the study progressed, more countries moved toward the middle of the distribution with 1999 being the first year that the number of countries in the semiperiphery surpassed that of the periphery.

Although in any kind of hierarchical ordering, there are bound to be those at the bottom and those at the top, one's actual placement in this ordering matters. We know that all Sub-Saharan African countries are in the semiperiphery and periphery; but, most SSA countries are located in the absolute bottom of the periphery. Moreover, year in year out, they fail to move in terms of their position relative to the rest of the world. With respect to their actual placement in the hierarchical ordering, the SSA countries in the semiperipheral zone tend to be more dispersed within the distribution. On the other hand, those in the peripheral zone are stagnated at the bottom of the distribution. And these countries tend to hold the same placement throughout the study.

When we look at individual country performances, a few things stand out.

- 1) some countries eventually move from the bottom of the distribution to the semiperipheral zone and stay there;
- 2) some countries enter at the semiperipheral zone (immediately post-decolonization) and stay there; and
- 3) with the exception of Zimbabwe, whose progress has been sluggish, the countries that move up steadily in the hierarchy are the ones that do so during the period of significant Chinese economic intervention.

Of note too, is the clear link between the SSA countries that are performing well, at a steady pace in the global economic hierarchy, and those with a concentration of natural resources and increasing foreign aid,

investment, and trade with China. For some, this might be a warning sign for possible 'Dutch Disease' or a combination of dependency on China by African governments and exploitation by China of African countries. However, to a certain extent, Bornschier and Trezzini's argument that resource-rich semiperipheral states behave like, and are similar to, peripheral ones (1996), is a better theoretical basis on which to assess this particular aspect of the China-Africa relationship. Bornschier and Trezzini contend that in resource-rich semiperipheral states, the income received from the natural resources go to and are kept by the elites; that there is little to no investment or incentive to invest in infrastructure; and that government legitimacy is obtained through coercive measures. This understanding of 'semiperipheral-ness' does not diminish the work done by these countries to gain semiperipheral status (which includes but is not limited to developing the infrastructure and system to access and sell the natural resources). Instead, it provides a basis from which to comprehend this type of progress.

I would argue that in the beginning of the study's time period, this particular reasoning would be appropriate for those countries entering at the semiperipheral level, such as Zimbabwe and Zambia. However, these countries quickly dropped to peripheral status, which is perhaps an indicator that being resource-rich is not the only problematic issue with these countries. For example, Botswana is also a resource-rich (diamonds) semiperipheral state that has managed to maintain its semiperipheral status while slowly moving upwards in the global economic hierarchy. As I have demonstrated in *Article Two*, given their respective socio-economic and political structures, sometimes, taking a closer look at the internal processes can provide insight and complement macro-structural analyses.

Furthermore, *Article Two* documents that the contemporary upward movement of SSA semiperipheral states appear different from what we saw at the beginning of the study. For one, the upward mobility during the last decade and a half of SSA countries have been slow, steady, with no remarkable downward movement, and a commitment to economic diversity. That is coupled with the fact that China's rise in the world-economy and its engagement in Africa has acted as a beacon for other

semiperipheral and even peripheral states to begin investing in and engaging in trade with SSA. Hence, there is a motivation to not only diversify their economy but also to negotiate better terms of trade with China. Additionally, much of China's foreign direct investment and foreign aid to SSA has been tied to infrastructure projects (Grell-Brisk 2016; Muchapondwar et al. 2014; Will and AidData 2013). Moreover, prior to 2000, China had invested significantly more than the United States in SSA manufacturing compared to natural resources, and continues to do so during this new era of engagement (Ferguson 2003). Still, the use of coercive measures to retain legitimacy remain problematic for many Sub-Saharan African governments.

Overall, the thesis highlights and supports several theories about advancement in a highly stratified world-economy. Firstly, it supports previous work documenting decreasing between country inequality (Andic and Peacock 1961; Beckerman and Bacon 1970; Berry, Bourguignon, and Morrisson 1983; Rati 1989). More specifically, it supports Hung and Kucinskas' (2011) theory that given the populous-ness of some of the world's poorest areas, their higher-than-world-average GDP growth rate, coupled with lower-than-world-average real GDP per capita income, could likely lead to a reduction of global inequality. Although Hung and Kucinskas are primarily discussing China and India, their logic can be extended to Sub-Saharan Africa, which is also home to significant portion of the world population. For example, Nigeria, is the most populous country in Sub-Saharan Africa and ninth in the world; if it continues to move up in the global economic hierarchy, it could significantly impact global between country inequality.

Still, only a small number of Sub-Saharan African countries have experienced high enough GNI growth rates that allowed them to move up in the global economic hierarchy. Furthermore, with SSA's level of integration into the world-economy, the high (sometimes higher than average) economic growth rates appear to be tenuous as they are sensitive to global recessions as we saw with the Nigerian economy (Doya 2016). Still, sluggish growth rates are being experienced across the globe regardless of world-system

position. Yet, the potentially very problematic issue of the oversaturation of natural resource sector-specific foreign direct investment remains.

China's relationship with SSA can be considered a geopolitical alignment and unlike Fukayama's (1992) pronouncement, today, geopolitics has most definitely not been subordinated to economics. As more countries move toward the center of the global economic hierarchy, strategic geopolitical alliances become more and more important. China provided a viable alternative to Western-type foreign aid to many SSA countries while at the same time undermining the West's ally (Taiwan) in the region. This is particularly important for China, who it has been argued, has been positioning itself on the world stage as a model for development (Ramo 2004) and as a leader and voice for the less developed countries across the globe. As with the Bandung Conference in 1955, China has once again established itself as an ally of African development and African freedom from oppressive Western policies. In 1955, it argued that Chinese communism as opposed to Russian communism was a better option for Africa (Grell-Brisk 2016). This strategic alignment with Africa paid off when in 1971 the People's Republic of China (PRC) sought recognition as the representative of China at the UN – a position that had been held by Taiwan. A significant number of the votes in favor of this move, came from African countries. In contemporary international relations, with Africa's immense population and significant natural resources, and an ever increasing warm (as opposed to cold – in the 'cold war' sense of the word) world, aligning itself with Africa is a good wager on the part of China.

Organization of Thesis Articles

The thesis project in general, attempts to change the direction of the discourse on the rise of China away from questions of hegemonic ascent and more toward the impact of China's advancement within the structural confines of the modern capitalist world-economy. The articles update much of the empirical literature on world-systemic and structural change. Furthermore, given that the current research on global

economic stratification have not focused on Sub-Saharan Africa, this thesis project fills a glaring gap in the literature. It also contributes to the growing discourse of China's engagement with the African continent and the Global South.

Reading ahead, the first article focuses on the impact of China's rise within the structural confines of the stratified world-economy and how this has affected the trimodal structure that is essential and fundamental to Immanuel Wallerstein's World-Systems Theory. The essential argument is that the changes in the trimodal structure observed in the 1990s and 2000s (see Figure 2.) were most likely indicative of systemic crisis rather than full transformation to another mode (quad-modal or multi-modal distribution). Driven by the rise of China, we are actually witnessing the movement of more of the world's population to the middle which changes the shape of the distribution but not the fundamental trimodal structure.

The second article speaks to the issue of global structural inequality as it relates to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and the contemporary rise of China as a major actor in the world-economy. The argument there is that although most of SSA countries remain in the tail end of the world-economic distribution, a number of key countries have moved up in this distribution while others languish at the bottom even with significant foreign aid and investment from China. This highlights some of the fundamental challenges to development and advancement within a highly structured and stratified world-economy.

The third article is a case study of commodified citizenship in the Commonwealth of Dominica – an island in the Caribbean that China spent a large sum of foreign aid relative to that country's gross domestic product (GDP). The thrust of this article has to do with the use of commodified citizenship to break down or circumnavigate state-imposed barriers. Commodified citizenship provides the possibility of affecting global inequality through between country mobility.

The *Conclusion* places the articles in perspective; that is, it places the work in a broader context of social science research. It addresses the limitations of the thesis and outlines a path for future research on the evolutionary changes in the structure the world-economy.

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Data Availability

Data for Articles One and Two can be accessed at <https://marilyngrell.com/research/>

Data for Article Three available from the author upon reasonable request. Personal information will be redacted.

Article One

China and Global Economic Stratification in an Interdependent World

ABSTRACT:

This article examines the contemporary rise of China and its new role on the global stage within the context of semiperipheral mobility. Unlike earlier discourse on the rise of China that revolved around questions of hegemonic ascent, the focus here is on the impact of China's advancement within the structural confines of the modern capitalist world economy. What happens when a country like China, which makes up close to 20% of the world's population, moves from peripheral state to semiperipheral state in a short period of time? Immanuel Wallerstein had argued that stratification of the world-economy took the shape of a three-layered structure with majority of the world's population at the bottom, a decidedly smaller middle stratum, and a small percentage at the top of the hierarchy. Through an examination of global economic stratification from 1990 through 2015, China's movement into the semiperiphery is shown to dramatically change the shape of this three-layered structure. This change that sometimes causes the distribution to appear quad-modal or multi-modal is primarily because of the movement of more of the world's population into the middle stratum of the world-economy. This massive movement toward the middle is unprecedented. Furthermore, this new shape of the stratified world economy, will create an increasing amount of pressure on the countries in the middle that may translate into open military aggression and/or at the same time, a rise in regional and multilateral organizations such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas.

Introduction

In April and September of 1974, Immanuel Wallerstein published two articles that expounded on two fundamental tenets of what would later be called World-Systems Theory. In *Dependence in an Interdependent World: Limited Possibilities of Transformation within the Capitalist World Economy* Wallerstein argues that, for political and politico-economic reasons, the modern capitalist world-economy requires the existence of the

semiperiphery, a middle stratum between the core and the periphery. In *The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis*, he further explains that the semiperiphery is an absolute necessity for the proper functioning of the modern capitalist world-economy and even for a world-empire with a redistributive economy. This three-layered structure, he argues, is the “normal condition” of the world-economy and when this “ceases to be the case, the world-system disintegrates.” Obviously, Wallerstein has since refined his ideas regarding world-systems theory. However, the concept of the trimodal structure remains essential and fundamental to his theory of the world-system. In this article, the primary concern is with the impact of the rise of China on this three-layered structure.

Some of the initial dialogue regarding the rise of China dealt with whether China would be able to break free of the peripheral status (which was accorded it by (Babones and Alvarez-Rivadulla 2007)) or its semiperipheral status (which was accorded it by (Chase-dunn et al. 2000; Wallerstein 1974b) to name a few), to become a competitor to the United States’ diminishing hegemonic status (Gulick 2004, 2007, 2011; Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2004; Panitch 2010; Tabb 2008), and/or serve as a new model for capitalist growth (Ramo 2004). However, this article seeks to go beyond the question of hegemonic ascent and focus on the trimodal world-economic structure itself. What happens when a country like China which makes up close to 20% of the world population moves from peripheral state to semiperipheral state in a matter of a decade–decade and a half? Would it structurally legitimize and stabilize the world-system or would it wreak havoc? Arrighi (1994, 2007a); or could it possibly cause systemic chaos or a complete reorganization of the system as suggested by Arrighi and Silver (1999).

This article demonstrates that the rise of China has drastically changed the shape of the stratified world-economy in that, it is no longer a classic trimodal distribution (small core, slightly larger semiperiphery, and most of the world in the periphery). Instead, much of the world’s population (at the country level) has moved to the center. This in turn has created and will continue to produce a new type of pressure on the world-system. With overcrowding in the middle stratum, China and those in the middle,

may be forced to move away from a doctrine of cooperation to one that is more aggressive or even confrontational.

During its rise to economic prominence China sought global legitimization through various means most unambiguously with the obligatory signing of the One-China policy. More recently, it has done so through the establishment of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), marshalling the support of initially reticent Western governments. Although many saw the AIIB was an affront to Bretton Woods Institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China was in fact acting within the rules of the existing system but clearly demonstrating its commitment to a multipolar world. Of note too, is the fact that China has outspent all countries in the semiperiphery, including all its BRICS counterparts (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in military expenditure. Furthermore, its obdurate stance regarding the South-China Sea has become quite problematic in the region especially given its increasing military budget. China appears to be inching toward a more aggressive stance to protect the gains it has made within the last several decades. While it is often fool-hardy to make predictions about the world-system, I would venture to state that systemic crisis will continue and a peaceful reorganization of the system may not be likely.

The article is organized as follows: First, there is a discussion of Wallerstein's understanding of the semiperiphery which he saw as a stabilizing factor in the world-system followed by a brief explanation of the method and data used in our study. Then, some general findings are presented and an in-depth discussion that situates China in the stratified world-economy is subsequently provided. After the presentation of the findings, there is an examination of those findings within the context of Wallerstein's conceptualization of the semiperiphery. The article concludes with some thoughts on macro-political-economic trends.

The semiperiphery in the world-economy

At the time of Wallerstein's writings, there were two schools of thought –modernization theorists and dependency theorists— that attempted to make sense and understand the ways in which “development” was occurring in the world and more importantly how and why the capitalist world-system was stratified in such an unequal manner. Both modernization and dependency theorists pursued a highly-dichotomized discourse in which countries tended to be categorized as either backwards or modern; or either rich or poor. Modernization theorists understood the division in the world-economy to be based on whether a country could be considered modern/advanced or traditional/backwards. Modernity was attained through industrialization and for many like W.W. Rostow (1959, 1960), Great Britain was held as the quintessential modern state. Additionally, modernization and industrialization were equated with “development”. For modernization theorists, any intermediate position between modernity and backwardness was transitory. Moreover, the whole process of industrialization could be jumpstarted through various means such as the transfer of technology and through direct capital investment. Dependency theory, which largely emerged out of discourse generated by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (UN ECLAC) as a counter to modernization theory, focused primarily on the exploitative nature of the division of the world-economy. Countries were either developed or undeveloped but development or underdevelopment was based primarily on a country's position of center or periphery in the world economy. Dependency theorists (such as Raúl Prebisch and later Andre Gunder-Frank) saw a highly unequal global economy where countries at the center exploited those at the periphery for natural resources and raw materials in order to maintain the center's wealth and position as well as to keep the peripheral countries in their place. They acknowledged that some countries could find themselves in between center and periphery but the structural pull toward center-ness and peripheral-ness was such that any intermediate position was a transitional one. Underdevelopment itself, was therefore a by-product of the modern capitalist order (Gunder Frank 1979).

Wallerstein agreed with dependency theorists on the unequal-ness of the world-economic system; but went a step further concluding that this inequality was a necessary condition of the modern capitalist world-economy. Unequal exchanges were “necessary for the expansion of a world market if the primary consideration is profit. Without unequal exchange, it would not be profitable to expand the size of the division of labor. And without such expansion, it would not be profitable to maintain a capitalist world-economy, which would then either disintegrate or revert to the form of a redistributive world empire” (Wallerstein 1974a:5). However, Wallerstein’s real breakthrough was his conceptualization of the semiperiphery and its crucial role in the modern world-system. Unlike the dependency theorist who saw countries either at the stage of core-ness or peripheral-ness, and the modernist who saw countries as either fully mature or totally backward, Wallerstein held that many countries in the world-system were, permanently or for an extended time period, in an intermediate position—the semiperiphery. For Wallerstein, this persistent global structural stratification went beyond rich-poor comparisons. This semiperiphery was neither, as the dependency theorists saw it (a transitional point) nor as the modernist theorists saw it (a residual effect of the world-system). And, most importantly, the semiperiphery was a permanent fixture of the modern world-system.

In the world-system, core countries are those that benefit significantly from the surplus derived from global commodity chains while peripheral countries see no benefit. The economic activities of core countries are capital-intensive as opposed to the labor-intensive ones of peripheral countries. The core engages in reproductive accumulative strategies as opposed to the primary accumulation strategies of peripheral countries. Unequal exchange then is enforced by the strong states on the weak ones; that is by the core on the periphery. In the world-system, the semiperiphery acts as a stabilizing fixture, engaging in an equal amount of core and peripheral activities, leading them to benefit just enough from global commodity chains to avoid falling back into the periphery but not enough to move into the core. Furthermore, the semiperiphery is both the exploiter and the exploited.

Wallerstein provides economic-historical evidence for the emergence of the semiperiphery and the trimodal modern capitalist world-economy and claimed that there were limited possibilities for transformation within the system. To put differently, unlike the modernization theorists whose solution for development is through rapid industrialization, Wallerstein sees a more rigid system with the ability to move from one sector (for example, semiperiphery to core) to another as extremely challenging. And Wallerstein is correct. In fact, there is a diminishing return with industrialization. As more countries in the world embraced industrialization as a means of moving out of the peripheral zone, the pay-off became less significant. In the case of Latin America, it is particularly striking that both import substitution industrialization and primary/secondary export industrialization, which Wallerstein argues were possible means to move ahead in the world-economy, were ineffective. Still, Wallerstein acknowledges that states *are* able to move from one position to another in the world-economic hierarchy over time. He writes, “the fact that particular states change their position in the world-economy...[however] does not itself change the nature of the system... the key factor to note is that within the capitalist world-economy, all states cannot “develop” simultaneously *by definition*, since the system functions by virtue of having unequal core and peripheral regions” (Wallerstein 1975:24).

After establishing the existence of the semiperiphery, in *Rise and Future Demise*, Wallerstein discusses the three mechanisms responsible for the stability, proper functioning and very survival of the trimodal world-system. This includes 1) concentrated military strength of the dominant, 2) widespread commitment to the system, and 3) a system that is three layered in structure). In *Dependence in an Interdependent World* he spends a significant amount of time discussing this third mechanism (why the capitalist world-system needs the semiperiphery) and provides two reasons for this: 1) economic reasons and 2) political-economic reasons. These stabilizing features of the modern capitalist world-system which lie in the semiperiphery, and China’s role in this, is the focus of this article, which will be addressed shortly.

Approach and data

In their 1986 inquiry into the stratification of the world-economy Giovanni Arrighi and Jessica Drangel rather effectively, provided empirical evidence to support the general existence of the three-layered structure over a fifty-year time period. Their ability to adequately track and glean broad systemic changes between 1938 to 1983 is the catalyst for this study and a starting point to ask specific questions regarding drivers of contemporary systemic change. The use of the Arrighi and Drangel method in this study to determine global economic-stratification is by no means a rejection of the other empirical studies (Arrighi and Drangel 1986; Babones 2005; Kentor 2000; Mahutga and Smith 2011; Snyder and Kick 1979) into the subject. In fact, all these studies, including this one, can be seen as enriching the sub-field and generally should be seen as complementary and engaging. For this study, the Arrighi and Drangel method is used to determine global economic stratification for the period 1990 to 2015 – a period of time that is equated with the effective rise of contemporary China.

Empirically demonstrating trimodality (periphery-semiperiphery-core) over time is essential to World-Systems Analysis but this has been a source of consternation for World-systems theorists and analysts. In fact, even Wallerstein (1974a) was cognizant of this challenge illustrated by his very own query “how can we tell a semiperipheral state when we see one” (1974a:5). He did not believe the answer lay in focusing on any one type or particular product since a peripheral product today could end up being a core product tomorrow and vice versa. This is especially true today with the rapid flow of technology across national borders. So, Wallerstein (1974d) suggested observing “the wage patterns and margins of profit of particular products at particular moments of time.” Theoretically, this makes sense but poses special empirical challenges. The same is true of Chase-Dunn’s (1984, 1989) suggestion in which he writes that “only carefully operationalized empirical research on changes over time in the global distribution of military power capabilities, state access to resources and level of economic development can resolve this

problem” (Chase-Dunn 1989:79).⁹ Furthermore, for Chase-Dunn, the lines clearly demarcating core, semiperiphery and periphery were not as rigid and was in fact quite fluid.

As indicated above, Arrighi and Drangel (1986) did take on the challenge of ascertaining empirically whether the three-layered structure of the world-economy persisted over time. They devised a simple and clear method that produced complex and interesting results. Their approach was to use gross national product (GNP) per capita as a proxy for measuring a state’s mix of core-peripheral activities in the world division of labor. They explain, “core activities command aggregate rewards that incorporate most, if not all the overall benefits of the world division of labor, whereas peripheral activities command aggregate rewards that incorporate few, if any, of those benefits... The differences in the command over total benefits of the world division of labor must necessarily be reflected in commensurate differences in the GNP per capita of the states in question” (Arrighi and Drangel 1986:31). The key to their argument is that if command over total benefits of the world division of labor represents where one falls in the global economic hierarchy, then the GNP per capita is a reasonable measurement to determine stratification.

In their study, Arrighi and Drangel use world population as a function of GNP per capita from 1938 to 1983 to test for the stability and persistency of the semiperiphery over time. For the most part, they found trimodality to exist within the capitalist world-system throughout the time period under review with some years such as 1983 and 1938 as clearly trimodal and other years such as 1965 and 1970 to be less so. Peter J. Taylor (1988), tested the robustness of the Arrighi and Drangel study by keeping the GNP per capita proxy and changing the “areal base of the data”. That is, instead of aggregating the population data based on nation states/countries, state boundaries were removed and the population rearranged into cells of approximately equal populations. Taylor’s “cell” grouping method is based on John Cole’s (1981)

⁹ At the time, Chase-Dunn was responding to Daniel Chirot’s (1977) claim that decolonization eliminated the periphery. Chase-Dunn agrees that although some formerly peripheral countries did become semiperipheral, core states had in fact gained additional power.

alternative non-state world population data. Taylor found that despite the extreme spatial reorganization of the population data, trimodality persisted.

For Arrighi and Drangel, the GNP per capita was the closest proxy to representing a country's overall benefit from the world division of labor. The gross national income (GNI) per capita is used in this study. GNI unlike GNP measures a country's entire economic growth, and considers income and taxes earned both at home and abroad. It is important to note that in this study, the World Bank's GNI per capita data using the Atlas Method (the purpose of which, according to the World Bank is to minimize exchange rate fluctuations in cross-country comparisons) is employed.

There are two reasons for using GNI per capita in the study. The first being that the linkages between nation states, corporations, and peoples in the world-economy have become more profound and complex due to globalization and transnationalization in particular (See Robinson (2004, 2010)). The second reason is that countries in the periphery and semiperiphery (the main economic regions on which this paper focuses), place a strong emphasis on remittances. For China, overseas remittances have always been important but was significantly affected when United States officially banned in December 1950 (Peterson 2012). However, according to the World Bank's remittances data, in 1990, China received 175Million USD in remittances. By 2000 that figure was at 5,237Million and the estimate for 2010 is 51,300Million and a significant portion of its GDP (World Bank 2011).

All the data comes from the World Bank and the period of study spans 1990 to 2010. Like Arrighi and Drangel the log of the GNI per capita is used, not only because of the skewed nature of the raw GNI per capita data but also because the primary interest is in the relative rather than the absolute differences amongst countries. The fact that the GNI is calculated using the Atlas Method in USD also allows for the measurement of differences in command over world economic resources rather than differences in standards of living.

Each country's population is plotted as a percentage of total world population by its log GNI per capita in intervals of one-tenth. The (population) distribution is then smoothed by a three-interval moving average. It is important to note that time (the period 1990 to 2010) and not geographic space (countries in the study on a year to year basis) is held constant because the study is mostly concerned in movements in the periphery and semiperiphery and there is a general paucity of data for those countries. Therefore, for any given year, all the data points are retained if both population and GNI per capita information is available. Furthermore, since the total population is being examined as a function of GNI, logically, the total world population for any given year in the distribution is based only on the total population of the countries included in the study for that given year.

At the beginning the study, the assumption is that of a trimodal distribution but with the understanding that it may not always hold. The priority is to examine the peripheral and semiperipheral economic zones. To track which countries (and here the focus is on China) moved from one zone to another, a cutoff point for each economic zone (i.e. periphery, semiperiphery, core) is initially established. This is done by first determining the median point (or median cluster of countries) in the distribution for each year. Then, the local minima in the immediate right and left of the median is determined. Those are the cutoff points for the semiperiphery for that specific year. So, for example, in 1990, the median cluster was 3.45 and the semiperipheral economic zone would be countries falling within the 3.15 to 3.65 cluster; to the right of that would be the general core zone and to the left of that the general periphery zone (see Figure 1). This also means that it is possible that a country could remain in one particular economic zone from one year to another, but the shape of the distribution and where each country falls in that distribution might change. Starting in 2001, the distribution becomes chaotic with instances of more than one local minima to the left

and right of the median point. In those cases, the lowest of these points is used as the cut-off points for the semiperiphery as shown in Figure 1 for the 2010 and 2015 distributions¹⁰.




Figure 1. Cut-off points for economic zones for the years 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2015

During the early years of the study’s time period, the findings support a trimodal distribution consistent with Wallerstein’s World-Systems theory; over time, the shape of the distribution veers away from trimodality and toward a quad-modal or generally multi-modal distribution. This movement away to what looks like a multi-modal distribution is even more obvious given the cut-off points imposed throughout the study. Still, this enables us to visually see that much of the messiness in the distributions especially in the 2000s involves a pronounced and general move to the middle. China, which experienced

¹⁰ The method for determining the general economic zones is applied consistently throughout the study. When multiple modes begin to appear, the method’s limits are tested but remains fairly robust except in two extreme cases – 2004 and 2007 – where the number of clusters within the semiperiphery contracts significantly. This is due to the fact that the lowest local minima to the left is fairly close to the median. Therefore, in 2004 the lower bound is 3.35 (compared to 2.95 in 2003 and 3.05 in 2005) and in 2007, the lower bound is 3.55 (compared to 3.15 in 2006 and 3.25 in 2008).

significant economic growth well into the 2000s, is a major driver of this change, irrespective of the global economic recession which began circa 2007. Within this context, the central concern of this paper, which is to engage with and reconcile Wallerstein's statements regarding the impossibility of the modern capitalist world-system without a semiperiphery and the legitimizing role of the semiperiphery, is pursued. The results of the study force us to stop and re-examine some basic principles of world-systems theory.

China and the stratification of the world-economy

As can be seen in the 1990 distribution of Figure 1., the distribution of the world-economy started out with a classic three-layered structure. Majority of the world is in the periphery and therefore, had the least amount of command over global economic resources. In this first year, not only is China (with 21% of the world population in the study) included in the periphery, but so is India (making up 16% of the world population), and almost all Sub-Saharan African countries. In fact, both China and India are in the same cluster along the distribution (the middle point of the semiperipheral peak) with five Sub-Saharan countries and Guyana.

It is also quite apparent (see Figure 2.) that the world's economic power and influence lay in the core and with a very small percent of the total world population. This, is of course not all that shocking but the numbers are still quite stark. The rest of the world's population was still working through the residual and actual effects of the world-economic crises of the late 1970s which one can argue lingered on well into the early 1990s when our study begins.¹¹

¹¹ Academics have used countless time-frames to determine the major global economic crises from the 1970s to present. For example, José Tapia (2013) has argued that there have been five distinct crises of the world economy – mid 1970s, early 1980s, early 1990s, early 2000s, and the Great Recession of 2007-2009. Others such as Michael Roberts (2015) have argued that in the late 1970s there was a global recession in 1974 a double-dip recession in 1980 and a Long Depression beginning in 2007. Many more have described the global economic woes in terms of the global debt crisis of the 1970s, the saving and loan crisis of the 1980s and the recession which began circa 2007. However, what still remains is that in 1990 when our study begins, majority of the world's population was in the peripheral zone and majority of the world economic power rested with a few countries in the core.

Noteworthy in this initial distribution in the stratified world-economy is India's presence with China in the same cluster of countries. These two populous countries are flanked by SSA countries and Bangladesh to the left and more SSA countries plus Pakistan and Sri Lanka to the right. These are all countries with elevated population figures. Most of these states were desperately dealing with continued economic crises and beginning to implement various economic policies to cope with those crises. Many, submitted to the more powerful core by adopting neoliberal programs in their domestic policies and international relations agendas.




Figure 2. Country positions in the world-economy for the year 1990.¹²

However, within a five-year period the classic trimodal distribution of the world-economy changes rapidly and dramatically. But the defining year is 1996, when although majority of the world's population is in the periphery, the periphery is divided into two distinct blocs with India on one side and China on the

¹² Map generated using the study's data and MS Excel Power Map Add-On.

other. And in 2001, the year after China enters the semiperiphery, the classic trimodal distribution becomes fully undone as witnessed in Figure 3.




Figure 3. China moving out of the periphery into the semiperiphery

In the last three years of the study, an attempt is made to test this movement away from trimodality by applying a 6-degree polynomial regression function (which for all intents and purposes should capture trimodality) to the distributions. The end results were abysmal R-squares of approximately 0.4, 0.36 and 0.48. This change in the distribution is rendered more obvious when the initial 1990 trimodal setting of peripheral and semiperipheral points are held constant. Additionally, it is found that over the study’s time period, a considerable amount of the world’s population moved in the direction of the semiperiphery. This became clear as the study progressed and in 1999, there were eight more countries in the semiperiphery than the periphery. For the first time, in 2000 there is a significantly larger number of countries in semiperiphery than in the periphery (see Figure 4.) and China’s role in this is quite critical as it too, enters the semiperiphery.

Taking the entirety of the study’s time-span, it is obvious that changes are occurring throughout the global economic distribution, particularly in terms of the upper and lower bounds of the semiperipheral distribution. However, most of the significant changes in global stratification is occurring in the peripheral

and semiperipheral zones. It is in those zones that you see multiple modes forming, shifting, and disappearing. Yet, on some level though, this is to be expected. Those with economic power (the core) will pursue policies to maintain the power structure of the status quo. Furthermore, to some extent, Chase-Dunn (1989), Chase-Dunn & Hall (1997) and Chase-Dunn & Grell-Brisk (2016) have all argued that the semiperiphery has always been the seedbed of change in the world-system. Chase-Dunn and Grell-Brisk, for example, maintain that a significant portion of socio-historical systemic transformation happened within the semiperiphery and sometimes even in the periphery and that this is in part due to uneven and combined development that occurs within particular world-systems. It has been argued too, that semiperipheral states and regions are more likely to implement risky new technologies (Toynbee 1946) and invest in organizational innovation (Lattimore 1980).



Figure 4. Country positions in the world-economy for the year 2000.¹³

¹³ Map generated using the study's data and MS Excel Power Map Add-On.

Overall, the study highlights the significant shift from a largely classic trimodal or three-layered structure to something more akin to a quad-modal or generally multi-modal structure. This happens as China slowly divorces itself from the initial clusters that included India, and other South Asian countries. Of course, given the population sizes of both China and India, any movement they make in the world-economic distribution would be significant. But, even by 1993, China was already no longer in the same cluster of countries as India with both countries sitting at the top of the peripheral zone peak with India to the left and China to the right. In the mid-nineties and early 2000s both China and India were seen as having the potential to exert significant influence on the global stage. Yet, China is generally seen as having established a larger role in the global economy than India. And although this might seem obvious, by the end of the 2000s China had outperformed India almost 3:1 in terms of GNI per capita and GDP per capita.

In broader political economic terms, China was able to expand in a way India could not for a number of reasons. The economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping and continued under Jiang Zemin which produced unprecedented growth rates for China, included an initial decentralization and privatization measures. Hung (2016) has argued that the economic reforms should be periodized between those of the 1980s and 1990s since they were so distinct (the first being more market-oriented and the second being more statist). He also argues that these reforms thrived due to the effective groundwork laid by Mao Zedong. While I would not dispute Hung's argumentation, I maintain that the end result is practically the same – economic reforms leading to success and economic growth for China in the 1990s.

On the other hand, India's politico-economic reforms of 1991 were not as effective, producing instead, a continued rise of the elite contrary to the public call for the opposite and a concurrent de-peasantification which contributed to rising inequalities. Kumar (2000) has argued that events such as the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), one of India's largest trading partner at the time, and the first Gulf War, contributed to India's liquidity crisis circa 1990. However, unlike China, much of India's economic reforms in 1991 were driven by structural-adjustment-type initiatives encouraged by the IMF

and World Bank. Industry, trade, and financial sectors along with exchange rates and the capital market were all liberalized and opened (Kumar 2000) with the support of the World Bank and IMF in an effort to solve India's balance of payment crisis and its declining international credit rating. Some such as Kohli (2006), Nagaraj (2003), DeLong (2001), and Rodrik (2002) have argued that the reforms were ineffective or a complete failure. Others like Panagariya (2004) believed that more systemic economic changes implemented in the nineties proved better for the Indian economy. Reasonably, China was already attracting several magnitudes more in FDI than India in the early 1990s along with a considerably larger percent of its GDP in exports and imports in goods and services than India. And China's economic growth was driven by an export-oriented model. Obviously, in both the China and India case, there are also other socio-political issues at play but at the end of the day, it is China that steadily rose up in the stratified world-economy.

Remarkably, it is not until 2000 that China finally makes it into the semiperipheral economic zone. Given its incredible economic growth spurt and changing role in the global economy, one would have expected China to have jumped by leaps and bounds into the semiperipheral economic zone. Yet its movement into the semiperiphery, as can be seen in Figure 5., is steady and moderate, highlighting the ever-real difficulty and challenge that many peripheral and semiperipheral countries face in terms of upward mobility. It is not until 2006 that China appears to be fully part of the larger middle stratum and continued to rise in the hierarchy all through the end of the study in 2015.

This challenge of upward mobility in the world-economic hierarchy is even more pronounced in the case of India. While China jumped two plot points (two full country clusters) ahead by 1995, India remained in the same cluster as it was in 1990. India has moved up in the global economic hierarchy but has never moved out of the peripheral economic zone.




Figure 5. China and India’s movement within the stratified world-economy.

China’s march into the semiperiphery

In thinking about the results of the study, and Wallerstein’s claims about the structure of the world-system, the first thing that comes to mind is Arrighi’s (1994) assertions that given the population of China, any dramatic economic rise would be subversive to the world-system. He writes that “given China’s demographic size, its economic expansion is far more subversive of the global hierarchy of wealth than all of the previous East Asian economic “miracles” put together” (1994:382). And “accommodating the upward mobility of a state that by itself accounts for about one-fifth of the world population is an altogether different matter” (1994:382–83). Arrighi was fundamentally right. As seen in the study, the very shape of the distribution changed with the economic rise of China. This goes back to Wallerstein’s statements on the trimodal distribution which is meant to be interrogated here but leads back to Wallerstein’s own question. “How then, can we tell a semiperipheral state when we see one? To which I would add, based on Wallerstein’s criteria from those two initial articles in 1974, how well does or can China fit the role of semiperipheral state? This also raises questions about the stability of the three-layered structure.

I will start by examining the mechanisms that Wallerstein states are necessary for the political stability of the system. The first of which is the concentration of military strength in the hands of the dominant. As Wallerstein (1974b) and several others including Chase-Dunn have pointed out, a country's military power can go a long way in coercing cooperation and submission. In fact, when thinking of world-systemic hegemony or domination, military power is typically an important feature. All three hegemonies of historical capitalism – Dutch – British – United States – were military powerhouses. Despite questions about the effectiveness of the United States' military, no one can ignore that its military spending/budget is three times more than the second largest military budget in the world – China.

While Wallerstein does not mention the function of military capacity in the semiperiphery, given its role of exploited and exploiter, one can deduce that a semiperipheral country must also have a strong military. The main challenger to the United States' domination after the Second World War was the Soviet Union, which incidentally was also in the semiperiphery for most of the Cold War, spent almost as much, if not more money on its military as the United States (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) and (Higgs 1988; Ostrom and Marra 1986). China is nowhere near those levels but it is still outspending all other major countries in military expenditures. In November of 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a major overhaul to its military in order to make it more combat ready and better prepared for military operations outside its national boundaries that included increasing its military budget (Bloomberg News). And while China's announced in March of 2016 that it would increase its military spending, the total percentage increase is less than the last six years.

One can interpret China's continued increasing military spending, as a commitment to the stable exploitative nature of the modern capitalist world-system (Mearsheimer 2014) but China's continued choice of soft-power in its relationships with the Global South paints a different picture. Still, there is no reason for a semiperipheral state like China not to increase its military, and given the general move toward the middle in terms of global economic stratification, China could simply be feeling the pressure of a

crowded semiperiphery. In fact, how China chooses to use its ever-growing military apparatus will determine either this commitment to the system or a push for radical systemic change. A commitment to the system does not necessarily mean acquiescing to the United States and other core countries. In fact, this could entail China asserting its ideas (such as its state-based market economics) and itself within the semiperiphery and periphery in much the same way that the United States forced its ideas of market-based economics and democracy unto Latin America and the Middle East through overt and covert military action. One could argue that China has already laid the groundwork for this type of behavior within South-East Asia and Africa, but China has preferred other means to influence these regions. Furthermore, forcing a multipolar world through military engagement is not the same as deserting the world-system. In fact, I would argue that a multipolar world could relieve some of the political-economic pressure from the overcrowding in the semiperiphery albeit without the military interventions.

The second mechanism which allows for the relative stability of the world-system is the pervasiveness of an ideological commitment to the system as a whole. This means the full support of the countries in the world-system that believe “their own well-being is wrapped up in the survival of the system” (Wallerstein 1974d). I would argue that the entire post-Mao period has been an example of this commitment. The economic reforms which started with Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin opened China to the rest of the world and ushered in unprecedented economic growth. Since, China’s pseudo-capitalist economic system has been named ‘capitalism with Chinese characteristics’ and ‘state-based capitalism.’ Here, Wallerstein’s argument that nationalization or socialization of all productive enterprises within the bounds of a nation-state is not enough to identify that state as outside the bounds of the capitalist world-system, is quite relevant. “As long as these nations remain part of a capitalist world-economy, they continue to produce for this world market on the basis of the same principles as any other producer” (Wallerstein 1974a). It is therefore easy to see that China through its economic system would be committed to the modern capitalist world-system and contribute to its continued stability and persistence. In fact, scholars

such as Hung (2015), Kumral & Karatasli (2017), and Karatasli (2017) have also argued that China wants and needs to maintain the status quo and the current world-economic structure. That is not to say that Chinese leaders themselves have not called for a multipolar world or for a system where economic power and influence is not concentrated in the Global North. China is heavily invested in the capitalist world-system as it exists. China wants to be part of world-economy but wants a world-system it deems more beneficial to it – and sometimes for the rest of the world.

The third mechanism that Wallerstein (1974d) documents, which creates political stability and durability of the modern capitalist world-economy is the system's three layered structure which he claims, is its "normal condition". He explains that "neither [military] force nor ideological commitment... would suffice were it not for the division of the *majority* (my italics) into the lower stratum and a *smaller* (my italics) middle stratum. Whatever way one interprets the results of this study in terms of macro-economic trends (taken up a little later), the results do show that the middle stratum of the world-economy is growing; meaning that more and more of the world population (at the national level) is finding itself in the middle. However, I would argue that this does not necessarily mean a complete collapse of the trimodal/three-layered structure. Only the shape of the distribution of the stratified world-economy will be different.

This brings us to the role of the semiperiphery. For Wallerstein (1974d), given the small middle stratum, their role would involve some form of inadvertent policing of the system. The small middle is both the exploited (by the core) and the exploiter (of the periphery) making it harder for a coordinated revolt against the core. Wallerstein (1974a) explains that the capitalist world-system needs a semiperipheral sector for two reasons: the first being political and the other politico-economic. The political reasons go back to Wallerstein's idea of "cultural stratification" (Wallerstein 1974d). This means that given the highly unequal nature of the system, a bipolar world would be prone to revolts and volatility. A small semiperiphery would help to stabilize the system because the countries in this middle stratum have a tendency to think of themselves as primarily better off than the periphery (Wallerstein 1974d). The

implication here is that if peripheral countries rose in rebellion against this highly unequal system, the semiperipheral countries would identify with and advocate for the position of the core countries.

Firstly, not only has this study demonstrated an increasingly larger semiperiphery, but the major driver of this change – China – for the most part, takes a completely different attitude toward the periphery and other semiperipheral states. Whether or not one believes it to be true or sincere, China's foreign policy attitude toward other developing or underdeveloped countries has mostly been one guided by post-colonial solidarity and its principles of equality and mutual benefit, diversity, practical results, common progress etc. Naturally, this doctrine of cooperation is couched in China's own desire to continue to climb up in the global political-economic hierarchy. Arguably, it maintains that extreme inequality is not necessary to moving ahead. Since November of 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping have in fact been touting the idea of a multipolar world in which global power is more diffuse. This does not mean a rejection of the basic capitalist world-economy. It simply means that China is interested in a system where power is shared amongst *more* countries or blocs of countries.

Within the last two decades, there has been an increasing amount of multilateral cooperation between not only semiperipheral states (such as the creation of the BRICS and the BRICS's own bank, the creation of the AIIB) but also across semiperipheral and peripheral states such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). In today's world-economy, Wallerstein's "cultural stratification" reasoning, may be less convincing. Still, there has also been a proliferation of these regional and multilateral organizations as a necessary adaptation to the changing form of stratification in the world-economy. It appears that semiperipheral and peripheral countries are acutely aware of the ongoing changes in the world-system and have determined it best to protect their own interest but with the understanding that regional and multilateral alliances matter.

As far as the politico-economic reasons for the periphery, in the first case, Wallerstein (1974a) argues that the absence of a single political authority made it impossible to legislate the general will of the

world-system or curtail the capitalist mode of exploitative production. However, the wage-productivity squeeze in the core, in part due to their strong state machineries, forces capitalist to shift focus to the semiperiphery. Wallerstein (1974a) further argues that, given that semiperipheral states trade or seek to trade with both core and periphery, their economic decisions tend to conform more to state based methods of market control. One can concede here that China more than conforms to this politico-economic semiperipheral role. China has kept strong state control and management of its economy since the 1990s (Hung 2015) including its currency.

By the late nineties and early 2000s when it became clear to the world that China had to be taken seriously at the global level, China had already clearly benefited from this wage-productivity squeeze especially because of its “state-based capitalism” but also because of its large, healthy, and educated population. Many including Lindbaek (1997), Glyn (2006), and Foster et. al. (2011) referred to China as being the world provider of a “reserve army of labor” particularly given China’s exceedingly sizeable population. Lindbaek (1997) claimed that, on the labor supply side of globalization, China “clearly had a reserve army of labor” that would be “released gradually” keeping the wage differential between developed and lesser developed countries high. According to Foster et al., given China’s large labor supply, wages could be suppressed leading to vast amounts of profits for multinational corporations, but also provide a competitive edge for China over other areas of the Global South with massive amounts of low-wage workers.

For others, a significant percentage of China’s population could invariably be seen as a latent reserve army of labor and they attributed China’s rapid economic expansion in the mid 1990s to this phenomenon. Of course, this very idea, like all things Chinese, is also the source of much debate and scrutiny. This seemingly unlimited supply of labor to be tapped into for the non-agrarian industry allowed China a competitive edge in the global value chain. Hung (2016), asserts that China’s ‘reserve army of labor’ developed as a result of Maoist era health and education policy (resulting in a large

population of educated and healthy workers); the unique Chinese system of hukou (that bureaucratically kept the rural workers in the countryside); and the leeching of power from 'township and village enterprises' (TVEs) (that took away the livelihood and earning potential of the rural workers). All these facts helped create an atmosphere in which China could benefit significantly to the wage-productivity squeeze.

Although Wallerstein's arguments regarding the role of the semiperiphery and the countries within may hold true even today, one must also note here that the politico-economic landscape has been considerably transformed and modified by transnationalization, the extent of which Wallerstein could/had not anticipated. The emergence of a transnational capitalist class (TCC) has certainly had an effect on the lack of a single political authority to regulate the capitalist world-economy. Robinson (2004) has argued that the TCC has transcended nation-state boundaries and despite being in competition amongst themselves for cheap labor and access to the means of production have managed to work together to maximize their profits. The implication of an existing TCC is two-fold. First, through the TCC, a single global political authority could emerge. However, this political authority would only seek to curtail the capitalist mode of exploitative production only if the negative effects were so great as to result in plummeting profits.

Despite the fact that the rise of China has changed the shape of the distribution, I would anticipate the persistence of the capitalist world-economy. China does not seek to fundamentally transform the system. Everything China has done, from opening its market, to its major economic reforms and most recently, a supposed move toward domestic consumption to stimulate economic growth (Canton 2015), has been with the goal of profiting from the world-economic system as it stands. It has pursued a strategy that seeks a relative advantage to "develop". Hung (2016) has argued that China will most likely not continue to grow as spectacularly as it did in the nineties and first half of the 2000s. He contends that optimistically, China could stabilize economically and grow at a steady pace or alternatively, it could slide

back into economic decline and backwardness. Given the strength of China's ties with the core and its supposed move to a market directed at domestic consumption, China will hopefully remain somewhere in the middle. It is also possible that its many geopolitical moves around the Global South, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America could boost its chances of remaining in the middle stratum.

China's engagement especially with Sub-Saharan Africa, has implications for the stratified world-economy in terms of unequal exchange and exploitation. In classic world-system analysis, a large periphery is necessary since it is not only exploited by the core, but also by the semiperiphery. Majority of the peripheral countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa – a region that China has spent significant time and resources designed at developing a well-established relationship. This means that China has the advantage of prime access to much of the periphery. Still, this also allows China the unique opportunity to implement alternative modes of accumulation that are less destructive than the current neoliberal order promoted by the West.

Final remarks on macro-political-economic trends

Operationalizing the empirical measurement of the semiperiphery has always been a point of contention in world-systems analysis. This study takes one approach and method. We believe that with this method can reasonably help shed light on questions dealing with the general distribution of the contemporary global-economy. Karatasli (2017) developed an enhanced version of the Arrighi and Drangel approach to study global economic wealth distribution. His study begins from 1500 to 2008, and for the period of his study which overlaps with ours, he found a general transformation of the world-system into a quarto-modal distribution. Karatasli argues that the world-system has undergone several similar such transformations – first being bi-modal, then trimodal and finally quarto-modal – thus implying that there is a strong possibility based on historical evidence for the stability of this quarto-modal type of distribution. However, as observed in this study, with both China and India, along with several SSA countries moving

toward the center, it is more likely that the world-system will return to a tri-modal distribution, albeit one with a larger middle stratum and two smaller extreme points.

Arrighi and Silver (1999) put forth a series of hypothesis regarding the US's hegemonic transition period, one of which was that the bifurcation of military and financial capacity under US hegemony was unique. This bifurcation, they argued, would not reduce the chances of a possibly long period of hegemonic crisis and systemic chaos. I agree, and maintain that this study, in part, demonstrates not only continuing systemic and hegemonic crisis but also, that the current world-economic distribution, with so much of Asia in the middle stratum, is a result of this bifurcation of US military and Asian financial capabilities.

As previously intimated, this larger middle stratum, could have a crowding effect with geopolitical implications. China's increased influence in the global economy has allowed it to also increase its military spending (although a distant second, second nonetheless to the United States' military budget). Although China has not used its military for covert operations that involve overthrowing and installing governments, like the US did during the beginning and especially at the height of its hegemonic domination, it does appear to be emboldened by its military capacity and taken more aggressive positions. Not only, has it begun to sell and provide military weapons to regions in conflict in the Global South (such as Sudan), it has also heightened its military presence in traditional areas of conflict such as the South China Sea. The geopolitics of the South China Sea is extremely important vis-à-vis this increasing middle stratum of the world-economic system. China's hardline view regarding its claim to sovereignty of strategic islands in the region, and its unwillingness to submit to international rulings on the conflict, places it at odds with some of its semiperipheral peers and their allies, and even Japan (DeCastro 2013; Xu 2014; Yuzawa 2014).

The Philippines took its case against China's continued claims to the South China Sea to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Tribunal. In mid-July 2016 in *Philippines v. China*, the court found that China's "historic rights" claim to waters beyond its territorial sea had previously been relinquished, that China's interference in Filipino fishing and oil exploration violated Filipino sovereignty, and that

China's "artificial islands" were also in violation of its obligation not to irreparably damage the marine environment (Batongbacal 2016; Daiss 2016b). In its July 13, 2016 press release, Fitch Ratings – one of the Big Three credit rating agencies – noted that importance of the geopolitics of the South China Sea, claiming that the US's declining influence in Asia plus with China's efforts to expand its presence in the region was "fundamentally changing the region's security paradigm" (Fitch Ratings 2016). Furthermore, that shifts in the regional balance of power meant geopolitical risks that had the "potential to cause significant economic and political instability" (See (Daiss 2016a; Fitch Ratings 2016)). China's reaction was one of anger claiming that the PCA's decision was "naturally null and void" and the People's Daily editorial declared that "the Chinese government and the Chinese people firmly oppose the ruling and will neither acknowledge it nor accept it." While China has not responded by military invasion or open war, it has made a point of displaying its military capacity by engaging in military drills in the South China Sea. Christopher Bodeen reported in the *Navy Times* that just days of the PCA ruling, China closed part of the South China Sea for military exercises (Bodeen 2016).

Despite its potential for and sometimes overt efforts at asserting its military dominance amongst peripheral and semiperipheral countries, China has continued its use of soft-power to strengthen its ties with the rest of the Global South. This is quite consistent with its maintenance of the world-system's status quo (Karatasli and Kumral 2017). The emergence of multilateral organizations within the Global South and China's seemingly acceptance of them supports this view. China may however, find itself at a crossroad in the near future. It has always called for a multipolar world even as the semiperiphery becomes more crowded. Still, other countries in the semiperiphery are also trying to demonstrate their own power and prominence in the world-system, highlighting the fact that moving up and down the world-system hierarchy is also dependent on the nature of the relationship established between states (see (Babones 2005)).

This is particularly so with Russia. Russia, unlike China has used overt military action in recent years – in Georgia (beginning 2008) and Ukraine (beginning 2014), and continues overt and thinly veiled covert military operations in both areas. Unlike China, Russia has called for a bipolar world, one in which it could share power with the United States (although one could argue about the veracity of Russia’s call for “shared” power and the implications of this). I would argue that Russia’s recent behavior in the world-system can also partially be seen as a response to and geopolitical consequence of the reshaping of the stratified world-economy. For the last two and a half decades, China has risen in global prominence economically and politically. Its sphere of influence is not only in South Asia, but also Africa and Latin America. China created the AIIB (which appears to be more successful than the BRICS Bank) to help mitigate the risks involved in investing and providing foreign aid in peripheral and semiperipheral countries. Meanwhile, although Russia did not fall into semiperipheral status, it did lose, or rather Kremlin saw the fall of, the USSR. Now, Russia’s newfound admiration for America and its new anti-China government is perplexing. Still, one can trace modern Sino-Soviet discord as early as the 1950s and the Bandung Conference as the point at which China sought to influence and assert itself, amongst the peripheral states, as the rightful alternative to the existing core establishment. How China responds to Russia’s aggressive posture in the semiperiphery and the US’s inability to deal with its diminished hegemonic status remains to be seen. In today’s high-tech military world, only time will tell. And as Arrighi and Silver (1999) rightly stated, non-catastrophic transition to a new world order is dependent on US’s “adjustment and accommodation to the rising economic power of the East Asian region” (1999:289). I would add, that more than anything, multipolarity is needed in order to secure a peaceful system.

This article has demonstrated that the shape of the distribution of the stratified world-economy has changed dramatically but believe this is indicative of continued systemic crisis not a necessarily full transformation to a different mode of distribution. I argue that although the shape of the distribution sometimes appears quad-modal or multimodal, primarily due to China’s movement within the

distribution, that what we are actually witnessing is the movement of more of the world's population into the middle stratum of world-economy. This massive movement toward the middle is unprecedented. However, despite the appearance of quad-modality or multi-modality, the system will eventually readjust back to a trimodal distribution but will look different; that is, there will be a medium periphery, large semiperiphery, and small core. I also argue that because of this new shape of the distribution, there will be an increasing amount of pressure on the countries in the middle that may translate into open military aggression and at the same time, a rise in regional and multilateral organizations such as the AIIB, ALBA, and AFTA.

The focus here has been primarily on the changing modes of distribution as it relates to China and the semiperiphery. Equally important, are the implications for the periphery. With a much smaller periphery, how does unequal exchange play out? What will exploitation within the world-system look like with this diminished periphery? Will this drive up the value of primary resources that are generally found in the periphery? How can peripheral countries turn this into an advantage to attract either more foreign direct investment or foreign aid? Can they use their diminished status to ramp up the industrialization process and what are the ecological ramifications?

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Article Two

Arrested Development? Sub-Saharan Africa in the Stratified World-Economy 1965-2015

ABSTRACT

The central concern of this paper is with Sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA) standing in the stratified world-economy. Country standings are determined for the period 1965 through 2015, based on the Arrighi and Drangel method of calculating world-system position. We find that the region as a whole remained in the bottom of the global economic hierarchy and was particularly sensitive to macro-economic-historical changes and pressures. Therefore, many countries that were economically depressed immediately post decolonization, remained at the bottom of the distribution and were further stymied by the debt crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The neoliberal economic policies of the 1990s kept most of the region at the bottom of the stratified global economy. At the same time, the study found notable advances at the individual country level that were in part due to external factors such as engagement with China (example Angola) or support from the Occident (Botswana) but also sources and mechanisms internal to these countries (Equatorial Guinea, Botswana). Of note too, is the clear link between the SSA countries that are performing well in the semiperiphery of the global economic hierarchy, and those with a concentration of natural resources.

Introduction

Hierarchy in the world-economy

There is a hierarchy in the world-economic system – top-middle-bottom or core-semiperiphery-periphery. Either way, those at the bottom are subordinated to those at the top. That is the nature of the world-economy. Therefore, where a country falls in the distribution of the world-economy is very important. This paper speaks to the issue of global structural inequality as it relates to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). To that end, the study tries to identify significant changes in global economic stratification vis-à-vis SSA and explores if at all there is a connection to the contemporary rise of China and its recent re-engagement with the continent. This is done by using a world-system perspective to global economic stratification. By this I mean:

- (a) I take global economic stratification, to signify where countries fit in the global economic hierarchy in relation to each other based on their command over the benefits of the world division of labor. For example, where does China fall in the hierarchy in relation to Angola, or India, or Ghana and vice versa, and asks if this changes over time.
- (b) I begin with the idea that countries in the global economic hierarchy tend to cluster into three economic zones of core, semiperiphery, and periphery.
- (c) The global economic hierarchy is generally rigid and structural changes are only observable over medium to long periods of time.

In this study, I use the Arrighi and Drangel method (1986) to determine a country's position in the world-system position. SSA as a region and as individual countries are placed and examined in this context.

Very often, the discourse on how Sub-Saharan Africa is doing economically revolves around issues of poverty and development and varying arguments about what these terms mean. The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Poverty Reduction Strategies which, is at the center of its economic programs to low-income countries (many SSA countries fall into this category), generates a considerable number of working papers on SSA that deal with a range of issues from risk mitigation to poverty spending effectiveness. These working papers are available through the IMF's website (See also IMF Staff Paper on Botswana (2014), Sembene (2015), Bigsten (2014), Bundy et al. (2009)). A significant amount of literature is also available through the World Bank's publication database relevant to questions of development, inequality and poverty that are linked to Sustainable Development Goals (previously labelled Millennium Development Goals) set by the United Nations. There are also SSA regional and country-specific case studies dealing with the impact of neoliberal policies¹⁴ and the effects of the Washington Consensus

¹⁴ The market being the driver of all socio-economic growth, and the only way to reduce poverty meant that African economic, political and social institutions were to be restructured so as to make the private sector front and center. This neoliberal project in Africa was supposed to be inclusive and open Africa to the global economy; encouraging growth by relying on agriculture and allowing complete control by market mechanisms.

(Lubeck (1992), Hellinger et. al (2001), Caffentzis (2002), Bond and Dor (2003), Adésínà (2004), Carmody (2007)). Other studies focus on the political economy of the region or specific countries within the region (Desai (2007), Stedman (1993), Kaplinsky et al (2010)). Yet, while issues regarding 'development' are important for any discourse on SSA, there have been no empirical studies that specifically speak to how SSA is doing in terms of global economic stratification. The world-systems analytical framework is an excellent approach for understanding structural questions of global economic stratification, and even within this perspective, there is very little to no dialogue specific to SSA.

There are several reasons for this. For one, amongst those employing the world-systems perspective, there are still questions regarding the best method to empirically measure how the global economy is stratified. This is not necessarily bad for World-Systems Analysis – vigorous debates within a sub-field allows for the emergence of new, interesting, and creative ideas ((Arrighi and Drangel 1986; Kentor 2000; Nemeth and Smith 1985; Snyder and Kick 1979)). However, this has caused some unnecessary stagnation (See Arrighi (1998)) in the discourse. The study of SSA in terms of global economic stratification can be seen as the collateral damage of this stagnation. More recently, though, Babones (2005), Mahutga and Smith (2011), and Karatasli (2017) have made serious strides in empirical analysis using the world-systems perspective, thus creating space to bring SSA into focus.

Secondly, finding good empirical macro-economic data for SSA is extremely challenging. Notwithstanding the methodological debates within world-system analysis, the biggest barrier to advancing the topic of SSA in global economic stratification is the question of usable data. As such, most studies on SSA countries where macro-economic indicators are key, have become very problematic (Jerven 2013). Then of course, there is the matter of interest. There is certainly interest in how SSA is doing economically witnessed by the number of papers and books written by and for academic institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and especially the World Bank, IMF and the various arms of the United Nations. China's reengagement with SSA is particularly interesting to western academics. For

example, between 2010 and 2015 alone, Deborah Brautigam at the Johns Hopkins School of Applied International Studies has written three books and countless articles on China in Africa. Still, there are no systematic studies on where SSA falls with respect to global economic stratification and the role, *if any*, of China in all of this.

Despite the debates within World-Systems Analysis regarding the best method in measuring global economic stratification, ultimately, the question remains as to whether or not there *should* be a study on how SSA is doing in terms of global economic stratification. The answer is a resounding *Yes!* Furthermore, despite the fact that some methods might be best suited for highlighting certain nuances in world-systems analysis, without doubt, they all capture similar general trends in the changing structure of global economic stratification. For example, although they do not focus specifically on SSA's place in the global economic hierarchy, Kentor (2003), Babones (2005), and Karatasli (2017) all found results similar to ours for the Sub-Saharan African region despite our very different approaches to world-economic stratification. Unlike the other papers, however, the focus is on SSA's shifts in global economic stratification and attention is given to the concomitant rise of China.

The rest of the article is organized into three sections. The first section deals with questions of method, contextualizing the approach and placing it within the world-systems framework. The *Results* section, presents the findings at the regional level followed by a look at individual country results. The *Discussion* section, deals with the issue of a potential correlation between the rise of China and its engagement on the continent and the upward mobility of some SSA countries in the world-economic hierarchy. It is in this section that the individual *extreme* cases (extreme case defined by Seawright & Gerring (2008)) of Zimbabwe and Botswana is presented. The article ends with a brief discussion on macro-historical trends on inequality.

Method and Data

A world-systems approach and questions of method

Given the issues with data that we have mentioned in the *Introduction*, one could consider using the nation-state as the point of departure when thinking about how to approach the question of development (which is in itself a loaded term) or the economic advancement of the Sub-Saharan region. That is, to discuss development or a lack thereof, one could use the state as the unit of analysis, with attention to a country's particular economic, historical and political situation as the *starting point* for any analysis, comparative or otherwise. Indeed, there is an entire discourse on whether the nation-state, individual actors, or transnational corporations, should be the unit of analysis when examining social phenomenon (see works by Anthony Giddens, Benedict Anderson, William Robinson etc. and Wallerstein's response to this in the *Prologue* of the 2011 edition of the *Modern World-System Volume I*). However, the world-systems approach presents us with a different set of lenses. It allows us to see the macro-historical pressures at play in the Sub-Saharan African region vis-à-vis global economic stratification. We can empirically determine where SSA falls in the world-economic hierarchy in relation to the rest of the world.

The world-systems perspective allows us to see the overarching structural interactions and linkages while also taking us beyond simple core-periphery, developed-undeveloped dichotomy which, was the norm for development sociology theorists in the 1970s. Dependency theorists, focused on the exploitative nature of the relationship between the center and periphery while the modernist focused on the fact that some countries were either backwards or modern. Immanuel Wallerstein, who first developed the world-systems perspective, drew on the theory of unequal exchange espoused by Arghiri Emmanuel (1972) and later, Ernest Mandel (1975). For these theorists, the suppression of wages in the periphery allowed for exploitative trade practices by the core that were masked by market processes but were backed by the military and political systems in both the core and periphery. Unequal exchange meant that core countries maintained their position by taking advantage of the low labor cost in the periphery with a net

effect of increased capital resources in the core. Wallerstein agreed with the unequal-ness of the world-economic system; but argued that this inequality was a *necessary* condition of the modern capitalist world-economy. Unequal exchanges were “necessary for the expansion of a world market if the primary consideration is profit. Without unequal exchange, it would not be profitable to expand the size of the division of labor. And without such expansion, it would not be profitable to maintain a capitalist world-economy” (Wallerstein 1974a:5). By arguing that unequal exchange was a necessary condition of the world-economy, Wallerstein was in fact affirming that the system was rigid and the prospects for upward mobility was even more dismal. The key here though, is that Wallerstein believed that this exploitative system was kept in place by the existence of the semiperiphery which also participated in the exploitation of peripheral states and was neither a transitional point nor a residual effect of the world-system.

Conceptually, the world-systems framework is an excellent approach to understanding structural inequality and stratification. However, questions on how to empirically measure the semiperiphery and the stratified world-economy, have been a source of contention for the proponents of the world-systems perspective. This is in part due to Wallerstein’s own ambiguity on how to identify semiperipheral states (1974a) let alone empirically measure country positions. Wallerstein noted that theoretically we could observe ‘the wage patterns and margins of profit of particular products at particular moments of time’ (1979:71). Chase-Dunn (1984, 1989) claimed that ‘only carefully operationalized empirical research on changes over time in the global distribution of military power capabilities, state access to resources and level of economic development can resolve this problem’ (Chase-Dunn 1989:79). Jeffrey Kentor (2000) attempted to measure a country’s place in the world-system; i.e. whether a country fell into the core, periphery, or semi-periphery, based on economic and military power with three dimensions – a country’s economic power (gross domestic product per capita; gross domestic product; total exports; ratio of external foreign investment to internal foreign investment), a country’s military capacity (gross military spending, military exports, ratio of military exports to military imports), and a country’s global dependence (export

commodity variety, foreign debt as a percentage of total GDP, military imports as a percentage of GDP). However, this is a largely unfinished project.

Giovanni Arrighi and Jessica Drangel (1986) developed their own technique to empirically determine global economic stratification within the world-systems framework, which this article follows quite closely. In *The Modern World System*, Wallerstein (1974b) discusses a country's position in the world-system in terms of a country's engagement in "core-type activities" or "peripheral-type activities." But as has been pointed out by Arrighi (1990, 1998; 1986), there is no way to empirically operationalize and identify "peripheral-type" and "core-type" activities as a "core-type"/"peripheral-type" activity today, may change tomorrow.

As such, "core-periphery relations are determined not by particular mixes of activities, but by the systemic outcome of the perennial gale of creative and not-so-creative destruction engendered by the struggle over the benefits of the world division of labor" (Arrighi 1990). Therefore, according to Arrighi and Drangel:

"core activities command aggregate rewards that incorporate most, if not all the overall benefits of the world division of labour, whereas peripheral activities command aggregate rewards that incorporate few, if any, of those benefits. The greater the weight of peripheral activities in the mix falling within the jurisdiction of a given state, the smaller the share of the total benefits of the world division of labor commanded by the residents of that state. And, conversely, the greater the weight of core activities, the larger the share of those benefits commanded by the residents of a state. The differences in the command over total benefits of the world division of labour must necessarily be reflected in commensurate differences in the GNP per capita of the states in question" (Arrighi and Drangel 1986:31).

To explain further, if it is accepted that a country's command of the overall benefits of the world division of labor is an indicator of where that country falls in the world-economic hierarchy, then we must accept the GNP per capita as a proxy. For Arrighi, the GNP (and GNI in this article) per capita is the best proxy for demonstrating a state's mix of "core-type" and "peripheral-type" activities and appropriately captures

“differences in command over world economic resources rather than actual standards of living” (Arrighi and Drangel 1986). Again, it is the *differences in command over world economic resources that tells us how much a country benefits from the world-division of labor*.

Peter J. Taylor (1988), deemed Arrighi and Drangel’s use of GNP per capita proxy as robust even after changing the ‘areal base of the data’. Taylor removed state-bounded populations, instead disaggregating population into equal sized cells, (a method developed by John Cole (1981) within the political geography field). He found that despite severe spatial reorganization of the data, the results were quite similar to Arrighi and Drangel’s.

In their method, Arrighi and Drangel plotted population against GNP per capita to determine the distribution of the world’s population across degrees of “core-ness.” They used the log GNP per capita as they were interested in the relative rather than the absolute differences among states and because they were interested in the differences in command over world economic resources rather than differences in actual standards of living. The population by state (as a percentage of total population) is plotted by the log of GNPPC in USD by intervals of one-tenth. The resulting frequency distribution, is smoothed by means of a three-interval moving average. Again, this article’s study stays true to this method.

The article’s focus is not on the issue of measurement. Our concern is primarily to observe how SSA is doing in the world-economy over time, while remaining cognizant of its reengagement with China. The Arrighi and Drangel approach is utilized due to its relative ease but primarily because of the reliability of the available data (there are only two datasets involved – population and GNI per capita data from the World Bank). Given the challenges faced in obtaining good quality macro-economic data for SSA, the use of two macro variables limits issues of reliability. Furthermore, the Arrighi and Drangel approach is reasonable as it allows us to trace SSA’s performance over time relative to the rest of the world and amongst the countries in the region. One can therefore make historically sound and logical assertions about the

relationship between the rise of China and its burgeoning relationship with SSA without resorting to the use of questionable regression methods based on poor data.

Applying the Arrighi and Drangel approach

One of the main reasons for Arrighi's use of the GNP per capita proxy was his clear understanding of the challenge of empirically identifying and categorizing countries based on their engagement in activities that were "core-like" or "periphery-like." Arrighi and Drangel's theoretical justification for the GNP per capita as the closest proxy to representing a country's overall command of the benefit from the world division of labor is extensive and clear.

For this study, instead of the GNP proxy, the World Bank's gross national income (GNI) per capita is used, which is derived from the Atlas Method (current US\$). According to the World Bank, the Atlas Method, produces a variable that is essentially the old GNP per capita variable. However, in the study, I employ the GNI per capita for two reasons: 1) The interconnectedness between nation states, corporations, and peoples in the world-economy have become deeper and far-reaching with the rise of globalization and transnationalization in particular (Robinson 2004, 2010). 2) Countries in the two zones the chapter focuses on – the periphery and semiperiphery, place a strong emphasis on remittances. It is especially so in SSA where some countries see some of the largest receipts of remittances relative to their gross domestic product (GDP), and in some cases those remittances represent a major source of foreign exchange (Singh et al. 2010).

The data for this study comes from the World Bank. The period of study spans fifty-one years, starting with 1965, a few years post-decolonization, through 2015. In assessing SSA's performance in the contemporary world-system one must take decolonization into consideration to give us some amount of perspective when speaking of the region as a whole and when considering how well or not some countries has progressed in the world-economic hierarchy. Decolonization itself marked a very important point in the world-economy with a substantial increase in the total number of the independent nation-states entering the world-system. This was particularly evident on the African continent. Also, by starting as far

back as 1965, historical evidence can be used to make inferences about what is happening in SSA today. One can see on a macro level, how much or little the region has changed over the last fifty-one years. The log of the GNI per capita is used in the same way as Arrighi and Drangel, not only because of the skewed nature of GNI per capita but also because I am interested in the relative rather than the absolute differences amongst countries.

Given that SSA countries are typically found in the peripheral and semiperipheral economic zones and there is a general paucity of data for those countries, the study's time period (1965 – 2015) is kept constant but the countries included in each year changes depending on the availability of our two main variables. Logically, the total world population for any given year in the distribution is based on the total population of the countries included in the study for that given year. Each state population is plotted as a percentage of total world population by log GNI per capita in intervals of one-tenth. The distribution is then smoothed by a three-interval moving average.

This study diverges from the original Arrighi and Drangel method in that for each year in the study, we affix cut-off points for the different economic zones (See *China and Global Economic Stratification* (2017) for example of this). Again, for each year, each state population is plotted as a percentage of total world population against the log of the GNI per capita in intervals of one-tenth. For each year, the median point of the distribution is calculated. The semiperipheral economic zone is assigned to the area between the two closest local minima points just left and right of the median point.¹⁵ As an example, in Fig.1, for the year 2015 the semiperipheral economic zone are countries falling within the 3.45 to 4.25 clusters.

¹⁵ The distribution becomes more disordered beginning around 2001 and occasionally, there are more than one local minima to the left and right of the median point. When this occurs, the cut-off points for the semiperiphery is the lowest of the local minimas, as can be seen in Figure 1 for the 2015 distributions. This method for establishing the general economic zones is consistent in the study. When multiple modes begin to appear, the method remains fairly robust except in 2004 and 2007, where the number of clusters within the semiperiphery contracts significantly. This is due to the fact that the lowest local minima to the left is fairly close to the median. Therefore, in 2004 the lower bound is 3.35 (compared to 2.95 in 2003 and 3.05 in 2005) and in 2007, the lower bound is 3.55 (compared to 3.15 in 2006 and 3.25 in 2008).




Figure 1. 2015 Economic Zones.

Results

Sub-Saharan Africa in the stratified world-economy

Throughout the study, there are no Sub-Saharan African countries in the core economic zone. Therefore, the study focuses primarily on the peripheral and semiperipheral economic zones of the world-economy. In general, during the entire fifty-one-year time period, Sub-Saharan African countries filled up the tail end of the distribution but other populous countries such as India, China, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka occupied that part of the distribution too. This meant that for quite some time, most of the world's population have benefited the least from the world division of labor. Still, as the study progressed, more countries moved toward the middle of the distribution. 1999 was the first year that the total number of countries in the semiperiphery surpassed that of the periphery. Fig. 2a., and 2b. shows the dramatic movement not only of a greater percentage of the world's population, but also the absolute number of countries moving toward the center of the world-economic hierarchy. This trend toward the middle of the distribution is demonstrated throughout the rest of the study.




Figure 2a. Distribution of world population and countries in the global economic hierarchy 1991. *On the map, countries in red are core, yellow are semiperiphery and green are periphery.




Figure 2b. Distribution of world population and countries in the global economic hierarchy 2010. *On the map, countries in red are core, yellow are semiperiphery and green are periphery.

In 1965, the countries in the semiperipheral economic zone included South Africa (toward the top part of the distribution), Gabon, Seychelles,¹⁶ (both in the middle) Zimbabwe and Zambia (toward the tail end of the distribution). At the bottom of the peripheral zone were Rwanda, Malawi, and Burundi. These countries' initial ranking in the stratified world-economy is significantly influenced by their politico-economic condition at the time of decolonization. For example, when Ian Smith's regime declared independence from the United Kingdom in 1965, Zimbabwe (then named Rhodesia) had an economy that was based on large-scale farming which was competitive in the global markets. This would, in part, explain, Zimbabwe's semi-peripheral ranking at the time. In the case of Seychelles, it had a thriving but primarily agriculture-based economy. However, by the time of its independence in 1976, it was successfully moving toward a tourist-centric and service-oriented (largely financial services) economy. Throughout the study, South Africa, Gabon, and Seychelles remained in the semiperipheral economic zone.

¹⁶ Seychelles had not yet gained full independence from the United Kingdom in 1965. It became a republic within the Commonwealth of Nations on June 29, 1976.

Remarkably, even when the number of countries in the study more than doubled and even tripled, Sub-Saharan African countries continued to carry the bottom of the distribution and predominantly in the periphery. In fact, in the 1990s there is a sharp increase in the number of countries that begin to move into the semiperipheral economic zone. This is in part due to the fact that a number of post-communist/post-Soviet countries enter the world-economy; but even they are entering at a level higher than most SSA countries.

Although in any kind of hierarchical ordering, there are bound to be those at the bottom and those at the top, one's actual placement in this ordering matters. We know that all Sub-Saharan African countries are in the semiperiphery and periphery; but, most SSA countries are located in the absolute bottom of the periphery. Moreover, year in year out, they fail to move in terms of their position relative to the rest of the world. With respect to their actual placement in the hierarchical ordering, the SSA countries in the semiperipheral zone tend to be more dispersed within the distribution. On the other hand, those in the peripheral zone are stagnated at the bottom of the distribution. And these countries tend to hold the same placement throughout the study.

Fig.3 gives a snapshot of the years 1985, 1995, 2005, 2015 which documents how pronounced SSA's stagnated hierarchical placement is in the peripheral economic zone. The region's general lack of movement, is remarkably dreadful given the broad systemic shift toward the middle that became clear post 1995 culminating in 1999 when the number of semiperipheral countries eclipsed that of the periphery.




Figure 3. Position of Sub-Saharan African countries in the periphery 1985, 1995, 2005, 2015.

As is documented in Fig.4., our study found that although the total number of countries from SSA that moved from the periphery to the semi-periphery increased, relative to the rest of the world, those gains are slight, to say the least. If we go back to 1965, SSA countries made up 19% or five out of the 27 countries in the semiperiphery economic zone. This included South Africa, Gabon, Seychelles, Zimbabwe, and Zambia. That same year, SSA made up 58% of the periphery. Twenty years later, they made up 10% of the semiperiphery or four out of forty-one countries. Three of the four countries (South Africa, Gabon, Seychelles) were the same as those from 1965 and are always be part of the semiperiphery throughout the

study. Zambia and Zimbabwe both fell into the periphery – initially, Zambia primarily because of continued falling copper prices (copper was at the center of its economy), and Zimbabwe due to a number of issues that is addressed in the discussion section of the chapter.




Figure 4. Percent of SSA in the periphery and semi-periphery from 1965 through 2015.

In 1985, the periphery consisted of 52% SSA countries. Another twenty years later, SSA still only makes up 12% of the semiperiphery or nine out of seventy-seven and 49% of the periphery or thirty-five out of 71 countries. The total numbers of SSA countries in the semiperiphery did tend to increase very slowly and yet, only one country fell back into the periphery. In 2010, Republic of Congo was at the bottom of the semiperipheral zone and fell out in 2011 but reclaimed a spot in the semiperiphery in 2012 and has continued to remain there. As of 2015 SSA still only make up 14% and 60% of the semiperiphery and periphery respectively.

Country level results

In examining individual country performances, a few things stand out.

- 1) that some countries jump from the bottom of the distribution to the semiperipheral zone and stay there;
- 2) that some countries enter at the semiperipheral zone and stay there; and
- 3) with the exception of Zimbabwe whose progress has been sluggish, the countries that move up steadily in the hierarchy are the ones that do so during the period of renewed Chinese engagement.
- 4) most importantly, the countries that are upwardly mobile in the distribution are resource-rich.

To capture these different types of individual country performances, all countries are ranked hierarchically for the three recent years where the total number of data points were relatively the same. Then for each year, the number of points SSA countries move up or down, is calculated. A partial representative list is displayed in Table 1. As indicated before, there are a few countries that have been in the semiperiphery from the beginning of the study such as Seychelles, Gabon, and South Africa. Additionally, at the time of its independence from South Africa (both partially in 1985 and fully in 1990) Namibia became part of the semiperipheral economic zone and remained there throughout the study. Many of these countries have been in the semiperiphery for some time.

But beginning in 2000, Nigeria, Zambia, Ghana, Angola, Cote D'Ivoire, all began experiencing upward mobility within the stratified global economy. However, of note is the fact that they are also resource-rich countries that share significant trade and foreign investment relations with China.

Table 1. Differences in Rank from 2000 to 2005 and 2005 to 2010 for SSA countries.

Country Name	2000 vs 2005 Difference in Rank	Country Name	2005 vs 2010 Difference in Rank
Seychelles	-2	Seychelles	-7
South Africa	+6	Gabon	-1
Gabon	+12	South Africa	-8
Namibia	-5	Equatorial Guinea	+9
Cabo Verde	-2	Namibia	-7
Equatorial Guinea	+45	Swaziland	-13
Djibouti	-11	Cabo Verde	+2
Gambia, The	-43	Angola	+27
Cote d'Ivoire	-8	Cote d'Ivoire	-6
Zimbabwe	-25	Nigeria	+17
Angola	+17	Zambia	+20
Ghana	-7	Ghana	+20
Zambia	-2	Zimbabwe	-6
Nigeria	11	Gambia, The	+4

Often, natural resource-specific upward mobility within the global economy is minimized and theoretical discussions about these movements tend to be about the resource-curse and the ability for these countries to maintain their growth or mobility. And this is understandable –one only has to look at the case of Zambia and copper. Yet, there is more to this. Without getting into the specifics of natural-resource type (re: gold vs copper or diamonds vs oil) and examples of countries whose economies have remained stable despite being completely dependent on a natural-resource, Bornschier and Trezzini (1996) offer a way to conceptualize these movements. They argue that resource-rich semiperipheral states behave like, and are similar to, peripheral ones. Bornschier and Trezzini contend that in resource-rich semiperipheral states, the income received from the natural resources go to and are kept by the elites; there is little to no investment or incentive to invest in infrastructure; and government legitimacy is obtained through coercive measures.

Discussion

Is there a China factor at play?

It is rather hard to ignore China's involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa and the fact that countries that have been upwardly mobile in the stratified world-economy have strong ties to China. While a regression model could be used to determine how much, if any, China has positively influenced the encouraging gains we see in some SSA countries, I have opted to go with a more macro-historical approach as I have reservations about using multiple SSA macro-economic variables/indicators. For one, articles using statistical modelling to understand 'development' in SSA always need caveats for interpreting their results due to questions surrounding the data (Jerven 2013). This is despite the fact that more and more data is becoming available for the region. Furthermore, although the data on foreign aid and investment from China to SSA is becoming more and more accessible, it is partially deficient¹⁷ and frankly most likely biased.¹⁸ Secondly, by using historical evidence and looking at individual cases, we get a much clearer picture of what is happening in SSA.

Ian Taylor wrote in 1998 that China's position in the UN Security Council could enable China to become a major player on the global stage but that Beijing would need to maintain an active and visible

¹⁷ AidData, which keeps one of the most comprehensive dataset on Chinese foreign aid and FDI, came under a great deal of criticism (primarily from the director of the China-Africa Research Initiative (CARI) at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies) because of a supposed general lack of data verification. This led AidData to pursue 'on-the-ground' verification of its data through in-person interviews and site visits (Muchapondwar et al. 2014). Still, this ground-truthing research was very limited in scope. AidData has also resorted to mining academic papers for data and as a means of verification for their own database; but of course, that has its own problems. China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) is typically also used as a source for FDI information. However, at CARI's 2015 conference, Mao Xiaojing of the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation and MOFCOM, noted that while most Chinese FDI data used in research in the Occident comes from MOFCOM, the data they make available is only the data that the ministry itself collects. Other branches of the Chinese government do not always share data with MOFCOM. This means that their dataset is lacking.

<http://www.sais-cari.org/event-details/2015/4/10/chinese-overseas-finance-conference-2015>

¹⁸ There is an inherent bias in data that is collected from Chinese firms in Africa when the research projects themselves are pre-negotiated with these firms.

interest in Africa, which acts as a support constituency to China's claims as a world leader (Taylor 1998),¹⁹ In 2000 China re-established its engagement in Africa by launching a Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development at its first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Beginning with the first FOCAC, China cancelled 1.2 billion USD worth of debt from a total of 31 African countries and applied approximately 400 tariff exemptions on imports from 29 SSA countries. Economic ties between Beijing and SSA has strengthened since then as per IMF DOT statistics. The United Nations Conference on Trade And Development (UNCTAD) and China's MOFCOM document increasing FDI from China to SSA. Both AidData and data from the China-Africa Project at the Johns Hopkins School of Applied International Studies confirm the significant increases in foreign aid and investment to SSA (Brautigam 2008, 2015; Muchapondwar et al. 2014; Will and AidData 2013).

Paulo Drummond and Estelle Xie Liu determined that China's economic growth generated an increase in investment and aid to SSA and direct trade expansion for China's African partners. More significantly, the authors also found that for resource-rich SSA countries, one percentage point increase in China's domestic investment growth is accompanied by a 0.8% increase in export growth rate (Drummond and Liu 2013). This, legitimates previous claims by several authors (Brautigam 2008, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Kaplinsky et al. 2010; Kobayashi 2008) that China's foreign aid and investment is heavily centered around resource extraction and is also beneficial to SSA. These same authors have also found a link between the concentration of China's foreign trade with that of natural resource concentration in SSA.

¹⁹ Almost twenty years later, Taylor's words still ring true. A recent article in the *Economist*, noted that based on AidData statistics, if African countries voted with China an extra 10% of the time, they would get an 86% bump in official aid on average. If Rwanda, for instance, were to cast its ballot alongside China 93% of the time (instead of its current 67%), its aid from China could jump by 289%.




Figure 5. Concentration of Chinese foreign aid in Sub-Saharan Africa. Accessed May 2015 from AidData.

In our study of the movements in the semiperiphery and periphery zones, it is clear that there is a link between the SSA countries that are performing well at a steady pace in the global economic hierarchy, natural resource concentration and increasing foreign aid, investment, and trade with China. In Fig. 5. we can see the concentration of Chinese foreign aid in SSA, according to AidData. Again, these numbers are most likely lower than the actual amounts spent (see Footnote 5).

In terms of absolute movement from one zone to another, in 2006 Angola moved from our periphery grouping to semiperiphery/ Ghana and Nigeria steadily moved to the top of the periphery and Nigeria finally crossed the threshold into the semiperipheral zone in 2012. Again, these rankings are predicated purely on how these countries are doing in a global economic hierarchy that is based on the country's percent of the total world population as a function of its GNI per capita.

To re-iterate, the results show that those countries who entered the world-economy at the semiperipheral level post decolonization, with the exception of Zimbabwe, remained there. This is no surprise. Wallerstein pointed out on many occasions that the modern capitalist world-system was one wherein movements from one zone to another were challenging at best. The debt-crisis of the 1970s and 1980s along with myriad institutional problems (political and social) kept the SSA countries paralyzed at the bottom.

This study has been able to empirically demonstrate the overall sluggishness of the region in the stratified world-economy, and has observed the link between natural-resource rich countries, Chinese engagement, and upward mobility of individual countries. However, the broad systemic explanations undergirding these movements or lack thereof does not always apply across the board especially in a region so diverse politically, economically, and socially. For example the assumption amongst early development theorist was that foreign direct investments could kick-start the industrialization process and propel a country up the development ladder (See Rostow (1959, 1960) for example). Later theorist examined the link between foreign direct investment and development and found that a number of caveats were necessary for development to occur, particularly the presence of good governance and economic policies (Desai, Foley, and Hines 2007; Dollar and Burnside 2000). And yet, these types of standard explanations do not always apply; and the rigidity of structure of the world-system is not always a sufficient explanation. This is obvious when dealing with the Sub-Saharan region. Individual country's historical and socio-political processes do help understand the movement up and down the global structural hierarchy.

Therefore, this means historicizing and contextualizing the results of this study, which we must understand as a supplement to the empirical evidence of broad systemic changes (which themselves must be historicized). Given the sheer number of countries in the study and the type of results found, there needed to be a means with which to pursue this line of analysis. In this article, the *extreme case* comparison approach as outlined by Seawright and Gerring (2008) is employed. According to the authors, we must

choose one or more cases that exemplify extreme or unusual values relative to the rest of the distribution. The cases should be exploratory and must be understood in comparison to the total sample case. Therefore, it is precisely because of their a-typical qualities that Zimbabwe and Botswana are brought into focus. It is their unusual-ness that brings value to the study, much in the same way that negative cases ((Emigh 1997; Mahoney and Goertz 2004) do.

Like many of the upwardly mobile countries, both Botswana and Zimbabwe have significant amounts of valuable natural resources. In the first case we have no Chinese intervention but upward mobility; in the second case we have Chinese intervention but little mobility; in the first case we have purportedly “good governance” but abnormally high within-country inequality; in the second case there is the assumption of “bad governance” but within-country inequality levels that are typical of the region. Analytically, these cases help highlight the need to consider the agency of the nation-state while still keeping the world-system as the unit of analysis. The cases are meant to compliment and deepen our understanding of structural changes not replace them. The next section is a discussion of two SSA cases that help bring underlying structural issues into focus.

Country in focus - Zimbabwe

Of note is that Zimbabwe received a significant amount of Chinese foreign aid and investment and yet, it remains stagnated in the tail end of the distribution. According to AidData, Zimbabwe has received 3.82 billion US dollars in official Chinese finance. Most of the financing has been allocated in the energy generation and supply, and the agriculture, forestry and fishing sectors (Will and AidData 2013). However, we must keep in mind, that notwithstanding the foreign aid and investment, the total trade between China and Zimbabwe is low compared to other SSA countries and is primarily the export of tobacco to China and the import of manufactured goods in Zimbabwe. It is the only country receiving substantial foreign aid and investment but limited trade.

The impact of foreign aid and its effectiveness have been examined by many authors and could be

applied to the case of Zimbabwe. For example, Dollar and Burnside's (2000) contention that aid effectiveness is increased when the recipient country has good quality state institution can be used to explain Zimbabwe non-progress. Or, McGillivray et. al.'s (2006) discussion on the issue in which they assert that good policy regimes are needed for foreign aid to have a positive impact on the host country's economic growth. Or even Kentor and Boswell (2003) who found that the effectiveness of foreign investment and aid was tied to partner concentration – that is, foreign aid and investment had a positive impact as long as the numbers of partners were diverse. Padraig Carmody (2007) has also argued that changes brought about by neoliberal pressure on the Mugabe government only served to increase the precariousness of the people of Zimbabwe. However, Zimbabwe's case is far more complicated than this. Dollar and Burnside (2000), McGillivray et. al (2006), Kentor and Boswell (2003) and even Carmody's reasoning, in part, might hold true for Zimbabwe, but they can also be held true for some of the other SSA countries in our study that made 'progress'.

Zimbabwe's lack of 'progress' then, must be understood within its own context. Contrary to Carmody, many have argued that structural adjustment programs (SAPs) were not forced onto the Mugabe government but instead, there was a home-grown and domestically supported move for SAPs (Bond 1998; Cliffe 1991; Dashwood 1996; Kayenze 2003). However, that does not negate the destructive impact of SAPs/neoliberal policies on Zimbabwe's poor. Furthermore, in this case, SAPs engendered a critical issue for the Mugabe government – one of legitimacy. SAPs were simply not compatible with Mugabe's one-party government whose legitimacy was virtually grounded on the idea that the government would always support the poor through social programs. Mugabe in turn, tightened his authoritarian grip on the country, accelerating land reforms and threatening to expropriate foreign investments.

Also, adding to the contradictory nature of the Zimbabwean context, is that some authors have suggested that the 1990s was actually an era of strengthening civil society (Moyo et al. 2000; Nordlund 1996) despite the ever increasing authoritarian and non-democratic approach of the Mugabe government.

Of course, it is important to understand that governance and democracy are not one and the same (Stedman 1993). Possibly paramount to discerning the underlying reasons for Zimbabwe's continued economic sluggishness, even after significant foreign aid and foreign direct investment, is the idea put forth by Patrick Bond (1998), that Zimbabwe's capitalist economy during white rule was unevenly developed and inherently unbalanced creating lasting and enduring effects. Or the similar notion of viewing Zimbabwe as an 'enclave and dual economy' suggested by Godfrey Kayenze (2003).

To explain further: When Ian Smith seized power in 1964 and established white minority rule, focus was maintained on large scale commercial farming, manufacturing and mining. In 1980, following independence, these sectors accounted for a sizeable amount of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) and a full fifty-five percent of formal employment (Kayenze 2003). These sectors were controlled by the minority white population post-independence. More crucially though, is the fact that the formal portion of the economy – which Kayenze notes is diverse and dynamic – only accounted for a fifth or one million of the potential labor force (Kayenze 2003).

Bond (1998) however, argued earlier that even though Zimbabwean economic advancement seemed dynamic up until the 1990s, this was not sustainable. This is tied to the fact that the majority of the labor force (which were also black) were either underemployed or in the informal or communal sector (a point that Kayenze (2003) also makes) and the white minority maintained control of the formal economy. For Bond, with majority of the population so poor, and the tendencies of accumulation within capitalist economies, the Zimbabwean economy had a consumption problem – the inability to consume in the formal economy, which in turn lead to fewer options for investment opportunities.

The post-independence economic landscape remained relatively unchanged. Furthermore, post-independence, whites (making up 4.5% of the population) continued to own and control prime agricultural land with blacks possessing land in agricultural zones with poor soil composition for farming and unreliable rainfall (Moyo 1986; Stoneman 1988). Moreover, as late as 2000, whites (making up 0.6% of the

population) still controlled 70% the prime agricultural land (BBC News 2000). Nick Amin (1992) argued that the Mugabe government was essentially complicit in this structure of the economy proven by Mugabe's focus on and successful backing of small scale communal farming instead of pursuing land and economic reforms. Amin's argument also supports later claims by Tor Skalnès (1995) that economic choices made by the government were rational-interest based actions. In an effort to maintain Zimbabwe's post-independence growth, Mugabe pursued economic policies that kept the old structures in place rather than implementing newer and more dynamic ones to fit the changing landscape of his country's economy.

The uneven economic development of Zimbabwe while initially giving the illusion of dynamic economic advancement, did not translate into high employment rates. Exogenous stress (such as world recession, drought) and significant pressure placed on the government to continue this form of 'uneven development' produced a situation that left Zimbabwe with little room for development. Interestingly, the IMF considered Zimbabwe an 'under-borrower' in the 1980s and so the Mugabe government racked up a significant amount of debt very early on. As the 1990s progressed Zimbabwe continued to pursue SAPs, and Mugabe's persistent support of the 'enclave and dual economy' resulted in a crisis of legitimacy for the one-party government. In 2000, ahead of 2002 elections the government decided to fast-track land reforms (The Fast Track Land Reform Programme) resulting in severe international sanctions. But, it was not until 2010 that Mugabe declared that he would expropriate all privately held companies in Zimbabwe if Western sanctions were not removed.

Another dimension to Zimbabwe's lack of progress in the stratified world-economy, has to do with the leadership (political and military elite) of the government and its commitment to maintaining its own power rather than to the people in Zimbabwe. We have already seen that even after Mugabe gained power, he kept the economic structures of the Ian Smith era in place, maintaining the old system of uneven development. The sanctions from 2000 isolated Zimbabwe, resulting in complete economic collapse. In 2003, the Mugabe government adopted a "Look East" policy (Chun 2014). This move brought in foreign

aid and some trade primarily from China but also from Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore and other countries from the Orient, allowing the Mugabe government to function on its own terms (which included human rights abuses). But, this meant that the government now had the finances to continue its militarization of the political and social sphere it had begun in 2000 (Masunungure 2011). Furthermore, because of its diminished liquid revenue (in 2013, there was only \$217 in the government's public account (BBC News 2013)), much of Zimbabwe's trade and funding scheme repayments with China had to be done through payments of diamonds (Farineau 2013), elephant ivory (Taylor 2005) and more recently, through payments in livestock such as young elephants (Somerville 2017)²⁰.

Both payments through diamonds from the Marange area of Zimbabwe and the sale of live animals like elephants, while allowing the government to function have not had a qualitative impact on the economy. In fact, many have argued that this has exacerbated human rights abuses and increased international trade violations. Farineau writes that "Zimbabwe's diamond mining industry has proved to be one of the most horrendously abusive in the world" and much of this is sanctioned by the government (2013:30). Illegal poaching and the smuggling of rhino horns have also been problematic (Nyathi 2017). China has taken a non-interventionist approach with regards to questions of human rights abuse (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN 2008) in the developing world, stating time and again that a country has a right to define what constitutes human rights and how those rights are to be defended. It has also denied the receipt of payments in the form of livestock and ivory.

For China, questions of human rights are to be dealt with by the government of a country and any type of external intervention would be an attack on the sovereignty of said country. This is an interesting

²⁰ Zimbabwe has one of the world's largest reserves of platinum, as well as considerable gold, silver and copper deposits. Due to the lack of infrastructure and funding, these have been left underutilized (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006) and negotiations between Chinese firms and the Zimbabwean government has not been to the advantage of the unemployed population in Zimbabwe (Botha 2006; Smith 2011).

position that seem to benefit the Zimbabwean and Chinese government. First, the government of Zimbabwe consistently violate the rights of its citizens (Farineau 2013) when it comes to mining diamonds that are then used to deliver on payments to the Chinese for foreign aid (which is often in the form of low-interest loans). The Mugabe government also regularly held elections to maintain a semblance of legitimacy while at the same time suppressing any opposition parties. China's claim of non-interference due to its respect for the sovereignty of Zimbabwe is suspect given its initial contribution of small arms to Mugabe to help in Zimbabwe's struggle for independence (Chun 2014; Tull 2006). Not only that, but China has also continued to provide arms (Abramson and Lasky-Fink 2008; Taylor 2005; WikiLeaks 2003) and civilian surveillance technology (WikiLeaks 2003) to the Mugabe government which is known to have been used to suppress Mugabe's opponents. Most recently, it has been argued that China played a significant role in Mugabe's ouster of November 2017 (Vasabjit and Rich 2017).

The internal issues facing Zimbabwe concomitant with external pressure from other African countries and the West has contributed significantly to Zimbabwe's continued stagnation. It is not simply an issue of the 'right democratic policy regimes' or 'good quality state institutions' -an insight that is becoming increasingly clear to others (Chitiyo, Vines, and Vandome 2016). And, it is not surprising that despite increasing Chinese foreign aid and investment, Zimbabwe persists at the tail end of our distribution.

Country in focus - Botswana

Another issue to consider in this discussion of our study's results is that while some countries in SSA or in the general distribution may jump from one zone to another, this is only with regards to their relative command of global economic resources or their total benefits from the global division of labor and this does not really translate into economic advancement for their individual citizens. This means that although some of these countries may be undergoing remarkable economic advancement in terms of global stratification, their *within* country inequality may be on the rise.

According to the United Nations Development Programme's 1996 Human Development Report, when considering a country's development, it is important to consider expansion of employment opportunities and reduction of within country inequality. Botswana then, is a fairly interesting case in our study. Unlike the majority of the countries in SSA, it has not received any significant foreign aid or enjoyed a trade relationship with China. Additionally, it is on the opposite spectrum from Zimbabwe in that it has moved significantly in our distribution.

This is not particularly surprising, of course. The World Bank and IMF has touted Botswana as the quintessential example of democratic and economic development in SSA (International Monetary Fund 2014; World Bank 1989, 1990). Reasons for Botswana's success, despite being surrounded by white regimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa, have fallen into two categories. The first of that of luck. A few short years after gaining its independence from Britain in 1966, massive copper, nickel and diamond deposits were discovered. The diamond mines were developed by De Beers and to date, Botswana is one of the top diamond producers in the world. In addition to the timely discovery and development of Botswana's natural resources, in terms of its agricultural output, unlike Zimbabwe, Botswana enjoyed approximately fifteen years of wet cycles fostering a successful agricultural sector. Finally, unlike so many African countries, Botswana's ethnic population is relatively homogenous – about 79% are Batswana, 78% speak Setswana, and about 72% are Christian. This minimizes ethnic and tribal tensions in Botswana.

The second category for which explanations for Botswana's 'progress' and development are associated with, are its economic and policymaking management. This is typically thought of as being exemplified in Botswana's multiparty, and democratic government. Some authors have argued that Botswana's success has to do with good governance. Stephen R. Lewis (1993) has offered arguments such as Botswana's leaders having developed 'a clear sense of priorities even before independence' (1993:19); or 'tradition and history' (1993:21); or the leadership's 'openness, tempered with humility' (1993:22); or that 'Botswana was not *afflicted* [my italics] by any rigid ideology regarding economic policy at independence'

(1993:23). J. Stephen Morrison (1993) submits Botswana's 'ethos of state action' as another reason for the country's success. The problem here of course is that the authors reify the Batswana and imply that they, the Batswana, are somehow intrinsically better than other Africans – hence their success. There is no reference to the fact that the Batswana were not subjected to cruel white-minority regime rule which marked the social psyche of the neighboring African countries.

The fact is that, unlike Zimbabwe for example, the transition from British protectorate to independence went relatively smooth for Botswana and it was not about being 'afflicted by ideology.' There was a certain amount of continuity in government leadership amongst the elite. This was accompanied by a smooth change to a multiparty democratic system with an inherited market system. It is essential to understand that this came about primarily because harsh white minority rule was absent. Against this background, Botswana's well-institutionalized state management system has been presented as the strong basis for continued economic growth (Collier 2008; Collier and O'Connell 2007). Collier and Gunning (2007) explain that moreover, the government's system of checks and balances has helped this process significantly. The authors also observe that the vetting of public spending projects for honesty through strict rules of competitive proposal tendering and for efficiency through strong technical scrutiny is a vital aspect of the government's system of checks and balances.

The above institutional reasons for understanding Botswana's development is reasonable but is only part of the picture. Exogenous factors – particularly international organizations and foreign governments – have played an active role in Botswana's success. In Zimbabwe, the international community was largely unobtrusive with regards to the country's internal (in)stability and paid more attention to the Mugabe government's role in the region (Laakso 2003). Mugabe's government was 'praised for its policy of tolerance and reconciliation with regard to the white minority' (Laakso 2003:5) vis-à-vis in its capacity as a leading voice in the Southern African Development Co-operation Conference. However, its inner turmoil was, by and large, left unattended.

It has also been argued that the United Kingdom did not provide the Zimbabwean government with promised funds for its land reform programs, which contributed to the lack of economic advancement and later on, the political stability of Zimbabwe (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989). Yet, when Mugabe threatened to aggressively pursue its land reform program, the international community was quick to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe. On the other hand, post-independence, Botswana benefited from large amounts of foreign aid, which enhanced the country's economic prosperity (Molutsi 1993). Molutsi (1993) argues that the receipt of foreign aid was tied to Botswana's burgeoning and domestically supported liberal democracy. He writes, 'Botswana has been fortunate to be one of the leading recipients of both foreign financial assistance and private capital investment. These two sources of support contributed significantly to the establishment of a strong economic base' (Molutsi 1993:53).

As discussed in the beginning of this section, despite its phenomenal national economic advancement, issues of within country inequality have been problematic for Botswana. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) report from 2012 on Botswana reported higher than average economic growth in Botswana but also documented a higher than average Gini coefficient, which represents high within country inequality. The IMF report notes that the country's Gini coefficient was 0.54 in 1985/86 and 0.61 in 1993/94, placing Botswana among the highest levels of inequality in the SSA and in the world (International Monetary Fund 2012). As per the IMF, the poor Gini coefficient figures for Botswana may be due to the calculation method and disparities related to health (Botswana has an HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of almost 25%) and education but it has also been argued that wage earnings is the primary cause of inequality (Okatch, Siddique, and Rammohan 2013).

Arrested Development: SSA in the world-economic system

The results from this study highlight and support several theories about advancement in world-economic stratification. Firstly, the study supports previous work documenting decreasing between country inequality (Andic and Peacock 1961; Beckerman and Bacon 1970; Berry et al. 1983; Rati 1989). More specifically, it supports Hung and Kucinskas' (2011) theory that given the populous-ness of some of the world's poorest areas, their higher-than-world-average GDP growth rate, coupled with lower-than-world-average real GDP per capita income, could likely lead to a reduction of global inequality. Although Hung and Kucinskas are primarily discussing China and India, their logic can be extended to Sub-Saharan Africa, which is also home to significant portion of the world population. For example, Nigeria, is the most populous country in Sub-Saharan Africa and ninth in the world; if it continues to move up in the global economic hierarchy, it could significantly impact global between country inequality.

The issue of course, is that only a small number of Sub-Saharan African countries have experienced high enough GDP growth rates and moved up in the global economic distribution hierarchy. Furthermore, with SSA's level of integration into the world-economy, these high economic growth rates appear to be tenuous at best, and rather sensitive to global recessions as we are currently seeing with the Nigerian economy which, the IMF has predicted will most likely shrink in 2016 (Doya 2016). The World Bank had also forecasted a less than stellar growth rate for Nigeria citing weakness from oil-output disruptions and low oil prices. The reasons behind the predictions for lower economic growth rates for Nigeria is in part related to our next point which is that the SSA countries that have made headway in the global economy are those that are resource-rich countries. This highlights the potentially very problematic issue of the oversaturation of natural resource sector-specific foreign direct investment especially by China in SSA.

It is therefore reasonable to raise the issue of 'Dutch Disease' given the results of this study. In the case of Nigeria, 'services' is the largest and fastest growing sector of its economy making up 50% of its GDP, with 'agriculture' at 23% and 'crude petroleum and natural gas' at 11%. However, if we look at its

trade figures, it is crude petroleum and petroleum gas that accounts for its largest export figures – 87%. Interestingly, Nigeria mostly exports to India, followed by Spain and Brazil but imports mostly from China. Unsurprisingly, 77% of China's imports from Nigeria is crude petroleum and petroleum gas. The question of 'Dutch Disease' becomes more complex because although we can clearly see a heavy reliance on the crude petroleum and gas sector in terms of exports, GDP growth is not solely dependable on that sector. Furthermore, in taking a look at Nigeria's trade partners, we see some amount of diversity. And this makes us view China's engagement with SSA as strategic.

China's relationship with SSA can be considered as being one more of geopolitical alignment and unlike Fukayama's (1992) pronouncement, geopolitics has most definitely not been subordinated to economics. As more countries move toward the center of the global economic distribution, strategic geopolitical alliances become more and more important. China began by providing a viable alternative to Western-type foreign aid to many SSA countries while at the same time undermining the West's ally (Taiwan) in the region. This is particularly important for China who one can argue has been positioning itself on the world stage as a model for development and as a leader and voice for the less developed countries across the globe. As with the Bandung Conference in 1955, China is once again establishing itself as an ally of African development and African freedom from oppressive Western policies. In 1955, it argued that Chinese communism as opposed to Russian communism was a better option for Africa (Grell-Brisk 2016). This strategic alignment with Africa paid off when in 1971 the People's Republic of China (PRC) sought recognition as the representative of China at the UN – a position that had been held by Taiwan. A significant number of the votes in favor of this move, came from African countries. In contemporary international relations, with Africa's immense population and significant natural resources, and an ever increasing warm (as opposed to cold – in the 'cold war' sense of the word) world, aligning itself with Africa is a good wager on the part of China.

Now one of the major actors in the global economy, China continues to call for a multipolar world where influence and power is more diffuse and not concentrated in the West. It has taken an increasingly strong and militaristic stance on its claims in the South China Sea and as Mead (2014) rightly points out, unlike Russia and its limited economic power, China has the strongest geopolitical capability of the rising nations.

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Article Three

Eluding National Boundaries: A case study of commodified citizenship and the transnational capitalist class

ABSTRACT

Commodified citizenship – pay x number of dollars and you can have all the rights of citizenship without any of the traditional duties and obligations – has been on the rise in developing countries since the early 1990s. This article is a case study of such a program on the island-nation of Dominica. Ostensibly established as a means to aid the country in its efforts to move away from a mono-agricultural economy, this article demonstrates that in reality, the government has become fully dependent on the commodified citizenship program, which has become its primary source of quick liquid revenue. Furthermore, we argue that the program can be an excellent tool for the transnational capitalist class which need to work around political restrictions on their cross-border movements. With a growing effort to impede movement across countries and re-entrenchment of national border across the world, efforts to penetrate national border boundaries and established systems of exclusions through the visa processes have prompted creative and alternative routes for cross-border mobility. The contention here, is that commodified citizenship is just one such creative alternative route, and is especially ingenious as it is fully legal and uses the very institutions that seek to hinder mobility.

Introduction

Research Question and Case Selection

In the 1990s a number of developing countries around the world began Citizenship by Investment (CBI) programs, providing citizenships to foreign nationals in exchange for funds ostensibly for development projects (Boatca 2016). The Commonwealth island of Dominica²¹ was one of the many countries that grabbed this opportunity for adding cash to its strained budget and to aid with its push for economic diversification. It made changes to its rules regarding naturalization, waiving the seven-year residency requirement in exchange for a cash payment—essentially commodifying its citizenship. Today, Dominica

²¹ For a snapshot of Dominica's key development indicators, see <https://data.worldbank.org/country/Dominica>.

has the cheapest commodified citizenship program in the Caribbean, one that has been riddled with controversy but touted by the government as the best opportunity to move the country ahead especially during the global economic recession which began circa 2007 (Dominica News Online 2017).

Why and under what circumstances did Dominica choose to adopt the commodified citizenship program and how has it shaped the country's development? Moreover, does commodified citizenship serve a broader purpose in the global political economy, and how? These are the central questions addressed in this article. The article seeks to demonstrate that the commodified citizenship program was implemented to help the country with its economic diversity efforts but the government has become very dependent on that program. Furthermore, from the examination of commodified citizenship in Dominica, we can infer that such a program can offer the freedom of cross-border mobility for the increasing transnational capitalist class. There is a possibility to reshape the global political economy but this has not yet materialized. Although commodified citizenship programs have been on the rise in developing countries, there are practically no studies that look at the inner workings of these programs and very few deal with how they emerge and in what contexts. There are two reasons: (1) the commodified citizenship programs are typically shrouded in secrecy or are procedurally opaque; (2) the surge of these programs within the developing world is relatively new, despite the fact that similar programs have existed in many developed countries (such as the United States under the US Customs and Immigration Services EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program, and until 2014, Canada's Immigrant Investor Program). Therefore, the case study method is appropriate here, as it allows for the focused detailing and contextualization of this iteration of commodified citizenship.

The logic for the case study in this article is based on Robert K Yin's (Yin 1994) methodological strategy and his definition of a case study—an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context (Yin 1984). The Dominica case study affords us the opportunity to view and understand the details of citizenship by investment programs, observe how it emerged within the

Dominica context, and understand the implications within the broader global political economy. This methodological strategy is similar to but not the same as Gerring's *idiographic* case study or *single-outcome studies* (focusing on the unique qualities of a case relative to a larger population) (Gerring 2006). Seawright and Gerring (2008) note that in many instances, scholars rely on pragmatic considerations, such as time, money, expertise, or access in case selection, and recommend certain methodological justifications be presented such as the case's use and representativeness.

Dominica is representative of those islands in the Caribbean that chose to commodify their citizenships. The islands began offering the commodified citizenship program at approximately the same time and all use the same firms (such as Henley & Partners) to market their product. Dominica is politically similar to the other islands in terms of its governing structure (parliamentary system of government); it is economically similar (upper middle income according to the World Bank) and it is a former colony like the other countries offering commodified citizenship. Yet, as noted at the beginning of this section, Dominica offers the cheapest citizenship in the Caribbean, is number one on citizenship by investment rankings (McKay 2017), and the context in which the program began to thrive (China's involvement) makes the case an interesting one.

Background

Based on the sheer number of citizenships sold²², one can argue that it was not until 2014 that the commodified citizenship program really took off. Interestingly, that was the same year that Roosevelt Skerrit and his administration called an early election, dominating the polls, and winning a mandate with broad public support. Yet, it is important to understand that the program's evolution actually began with Skerrit's election as Prime Minister in 2004 and the very public push for Chinese nationals to purchase

²² See Figure 1. More citizenships were sold in 2013 alone compared to the years 1990 to 2003 combined.

Dominican citizenship. This coincided with an about face vis-à-vis Dominica's relationship with the Republic of China (ROC), Taiwan (Chen 2004; People's Republic of Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 2004), and a demonstration of support by the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the form of significant foreign aid (Chen 2004; Dominica Vibes 2014; Jamaican Observer 2015). Following the 2004 election, Prime Minister Skerrit, also Minister of Finance, moved to make the sale of citizenship at once more formalized and yet opaque. The process was streamlined with the creation of the citizenship by investment (CBI) unit with a core group of five (as documented in 2015) making the final decisions regarding approval of citizenships.

With China's growing economic rise and influence in the global economy and in particular, within the developing world, it made sense that the Skerrit administration would push to market Dominican citizenship to Chinese nationals who could afford it. Furthermore, as global economic recession set in, especially in the Global North, countries in the developing world had to be more creative in their responses to the global economy and many turned to the East. In establishing its relationship with China, Dominica's most important contribution would be in the form of geo-political currency, not only with its support of China within various international (such as the United Nation) and regional organizations (the Caribbean Community or CARICOM²³, the Caribbean Basin Initiative²⁴ etc.) but particularly through its commodified citizenship program.

Once Dominica opened diplomatic and trade relations with China, it received a significant amount, up to a third of Dominica's GDP, in foreign aid (The American Interest Magazine 2013) and a renewed interest in its commodified citizenship program. In return, China acquired one more ally willing to sign the

²³ CARICOM is a union of twenty countries whose main objective is economic integration and the coordination of foreign policy. CARICOM is home to 60 million people and includes islands in the Caribbean, Guyana, Suriname, and Belize. <http://caricom.org/about-caricom/who-we-are/>

²⁴ The Caribbean Basin Initiative provides duty-free access to US markets for most goods. <https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/caribbean-basin-initiative-cbi>

One-China Policy²⁵ in the chain of islands in the Caribbean. It also gained an avid supporter in Prime Minister Skerrit who has since been the Chairman of the Organization of the Caribbean States (OECS) and is now the Chairman of CARICOM. I would argue that above all, Dominica's commodified citizenship program, one of the cheapest program in the world, became fully accessible to members of China's emerging Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC) with access to visa-free travel and potential residency in over 115 countries including the United Kingdom, the European Union and the Schengen Zone (CBI Unit 2015). Currently, Chinese nationals must submit to the visa application process for the UK, EU, the Schengen Zone. In fact, the Chinese passport only grants visa-free travel access to 51 countries (Henley & Partners 2017), most of which are in Asia.

While citizenship by payment or investment—*commodified citizenship*—is not exclusive to Dominica, and its commodified citizenship program is open to any person who can afford it, when the current government assumed power, its direct marketing strategy for the commodified citizenship was aimed primarily at Chinese nationals (Dominica Vibes 2014; Douglas 2005; The Sun Dominica 2015; DA Vibes 2015). This may have been in part due to Dominica's newfound and keen relationship with China and in part, the form with which China approaches its South-South interactions. This article explores the idea that as it stands, Dominica's commodified citizenship is a natural tool for the TCC²⁶, allowing its members to break down or circumnavigate the barriers created by border controls through passport and citizenship measures; that some TCC members have taken advantage of relatively cheap and easy access of Dominica's commodified citizenship program; but most have yet to take full advantage of the mobility aspect of their additional citizenship.

²⁵ One-China Policy is a foreign relations approach in which the PRC requires its partners to accept that there is one legitimate government which represents the people of China and to engage in diplomatic relations with the PRC means breaking relations with the ROC (Taiwan). This policy is based on the idea that "if Taiwan should be alienated from the mainland, China will forever be locked to the west side of the first chain of islands in the West Pacific, and... the essential strategic space for China's rejuvenation will be lost" (Guangqian and Youzhi 2005).

²⁶ TCC in this article means those seeking to organize the conditions under which global capital and global system under which it operates, can be furthered within the transnational, interstate, national and local contexts.

Furthermore, from the point of view, that nationality is a crucial factor to global socio-economic stratification (Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009), commodified citizenship provides the possibility to dramatically influence mobility within the stratified world-system. Yet, as it stands, at least in the case of the commodified citizenship program in Dominica, this aspect is left largely under-exploited. It is only recently that significant inroads have been made in terms of “infrastructural development projects”. The program has been used primarily to generate quick cash inflow to cover unanticipated expenses such as storm and hurricane relief and other government pet projects such as its ‘Red Clinic’²⁷ (DNO Staff Writer 2015a). Still, in 2016, it was documented that the commodified citizenship program was one of the country’s biggest revenue generators (Skerrit 2017).

This article does not focus on China’s relationship with Dominica in terms of China’s development strategies²⁸ in the Global South, although there is room for research on this front. Nor does it analyze China’s involvement in Dominica in terms of China’s typically resource-extraction-driven foreign direct investment as this does not apply to its relationship with Dominica. Instead, the emphasis of this article is on the commodified citizenship program itself and its potential use by the Chinese TCC and the TCC in general.

The literature on citizenship is rich and takes into consideration changing individual perceptions of citizenship (Desforges 2005; Gimmler, Højlund, and Kristensen 2011; Joppke 2007; Simon 2013; Studemeyer 2015). This article adds to the citizenship literature but from the perspective of transnationalization and commodification of citizenship with only Boatca (2016) taking this approach and Abrahamian (2015) who reported on the use of purchased citizenship as a means of control in the United Arab Emirates. Other studies concerning multiple citizenships, tend to emphasize changing life courses

²⁷ For an in-depth look at the proliferation of social assistance in the form of ‘Red Clinics’ in the developing world as a response to the neoliberal era, see Kevan Harris and Ben Scully’s paper (Harris and Scully 2015), *A Hidden Counter-Movement?*

²⁸ In the literature, there are already significant discussions on the Beijing Consensus and general China development goals vis-à-vis the Global South (Arrighi and Zhang 2010; Brautigam 2010; Huang 2011; Ramo 2004; Sautman and Hairong 2007; Weiwei 2006; Wild and Mephram 2006).

(Amit 2014) or are discussed from the nation-state point of view and the pressures experienced therein (van Deth 2009; Faist 2007; Macklin 2010). Other similar works on transnationalization in the Caribbean have focused on the tourist industry (Sprague-Silgado 2017), on security (Watson 2012), or on the Caribbean's colonial history and its role in current issues of globalization, sovereignty and citizenship (Watson 2015). This article contributes to both the literature on transnationalization and inequality – areas of research which have not specifically addressed commodified citizenship. Its novelty lies in the case study approach that examines an island-nation's response to pressures and changes typically experienced by small countries and economies in a highly globalized socio-political-economic system. The article demonstrates how that response can in fact deepen the linkages amongst the various states in that system.

As a general roadmap, the article continues with an explanation of what is meant by commodified citizenship and the details of the Dominican version. This is followed by an analysis of the program in the context of the country's broader development strategies; and a subsequent analysis of commodified citizenship with the TCC as its natural consumer, with an eye toward inquiring into the link between the Chinese TCC and Dominica's commodified citizenship program. It closes with an exploration of commodified citizenship as it relates to global socio-economic stratification and the logic of a program that set out to help diversify Dominica's economy only to find itself completely reliant on said program.

Commodification of the Dominica citizenship

Dominica's citizenship by investment and contribution program is *commodified citizenship* in that it is based on the intensive expansion of capital into civic life. That is, the use of capital (money) in obtaining a public good (citizenship) which would normally fall outside the logic of capital. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) is widely held as the birth of the modern nation-state system and with it, the idea of citizenship (membership in an inclusive political community) (Zolberg 2006). For Turner (1986:17–18), the modern understanding of citizenship as a legacy of the French Revolution revolved around the legal status bestowed upon an

individual by a nation-state that involves some level of rights and obligations of citizens. These rights and obligations are allocated to individuals by the authority of the nation-state. At its most basic level (formal) citizenship simply means belonging to a nation-state – a denizen (Turner 1986:17). However, more and more, citizenship is seen as encompassing much more than a legal status but rather, the engagement of individuals and groups to secure, and expand civil, political, social and economic rights within the state (Isin and Nyers 2014; Joppke 2007; Turner 1993:2).

Citizenship rights, which include civil rights (free expression and movements), political rights (participate in elections and seek political office), social rights (welfare, education, health), and economic rights (job market, pursue own enterprise), can differ as they all fall under the auspices of the nation-state. It is the state and state law that shape what a nation's citizenship can entail. Therefore, liberal democracies focus on different aspects of citizenship rights (a heavy reliance on markets to manage social rights but full state control of civil rights) as opposed to social democratic states like northern European countries where citizenship rights are focused on social rights. The same with citizenship obligations – residency, military service, jury duty, taxes and obedience to the laws imposed by the nation-states. As it stands, commodified citizenship without residency requirements, allows for all the “citizenship rights” but none of the citizenship “obligations”, forcing us to rethink the idea and concept of citizenship.

From a purely monetary standpoint, it is rare to find a citizenship-by-naturalization process that does not involve some form of payment or monetary fee, but this is not the same as commodification of citizenship. In the standard citizenship-by-naturalization process, there are typically application fees, biometric fees etc. In Switzerland for example, it could cost up to 2000 CHF depending on the canton through which you are applying for citizenship. Still, citizenship itself is generally thought of as being outside the bounds of capital and profit-making and the fees involved are typically part of the operational cost of the agencies involved. In the United States and Canada, investors are afforded permanent residency with a path to citizenship through the naturalization process. Although it is similar to the citizenship by

investment program in Dominica, the similarity ends with the “investment” aspect of the program. In the US or Canadian programs, the investors live, work, and participate in civic life in the United States or Canada, respectively (at least, that is expected).

However, in Dominica, naturalized citizenship itself has been commodified. An exchange-value was given to citizenship by linking a price to it (similar to for-profit educational institutions, or toll roads, or private water companies or even privatized healthcare). Citizenship making, which was outside the logic of profit-making and not salable, has now been stripped from any substance and made available for a price. Prior to 1990, Dominica’s laws held that citizenship was based on 1) birth in Dominica, 2) ancestry, and 3) through naturalization, which required residency of a minimum of seven years. In 1990, although one could still apply for naturalization after having resided in Dominica for the minimum number of years, Parliament waived the residency requirement. The residency requirement for Dominica citizenship can be waived if an individual makes a dollar ‘donation’ to a) the *Government Fund* or to b) an approved *Real Estate Project*.

In August of 2014, according to CS Global Partners and the official Dominica Citizenship By Investment (CBI) Unit’s websites, the rates for purchasing citizenship were as follows:

A) ‘Donation’ to Government Fund

- A – Single Applicant
Non-refundable investment of US\$100,000
- B – Family Application (one applicant plus spouse)
Non-refundable investment of US\$175,000
- C – Family Application 2 (one applicant plus spouse and two children under age 18)
Non-refundable investment of US\$200,000
- D – Family Application 3 (one applicant plus more than two children under age 18)
Non-refundable investment of US\$200,000 and \$50,000 for each additional person under age 18

B) Real Estate Investment

- US\$ 50,000 for the main applicant
- US\$ 25,000 for the spouse of the main applicant
- US\$ 20,000 for each child of the main applicant under eighteen (18) years of age
- US\$ 50,000 for each dependent of the main applicant above the age of eighteen (18) years, other than his or her spouse.

As of July 2017, the CS Global Partners' website now indicates that the path to citizenship by payment can be made through a) 'contribution' to the *Economic Diversification Fund* or 'investment' in *local pre-approved real estate*. This is a major change as individuals and families purchasing citizenship no longer need to invest in a 'project'. It is now a simple real estate transaction – the purchase of land; and the prices have increased to a flat rate of US\$200,000. As we will discuss later, a 'real-estate project' can be interpreted as a path for development but it is a challenge to construe a 'real-estate investment' as such. In fact, if a third of the citizenships purchased in 2015 involved an existing real-estate *project*, there would be quite a visible infrastructural change on the island.

The process of obtaining citizenship based on a dollar 'donation' (now 'contribution') is currently managed through 33 (up from 18 in 2015) 'authorized agents' (See Table 1) that are approved by the government of Dominica. In addition to these basic fees, for the 'donation' version of the commodified citizenship, there is a US\$3,000 processing fee and US\$7,500 due diligence fee for an adult plus US\$4,000 for dependents aged sixteen and over. For the purchase of real estate, the processing fee is US\$3,000 per applicant; the due diligence fee is US\$7,500 for adult applicants plus US\$4,000 for dependents aged sixteen and over; and the government fees are US\$50,000 for a single adult applicant, US\$75,000 for a family of up to four persons including the applicant, 100,000 for family of up to six persons, and after the sixth person the cost is US\$20,000 for any additional dependent under eighteen and US\$25,000 for dependents over eighteen. This does not include legal fees and other administrative fees. All applications must be submitted through one of the authorized agents even if one is using an attorney, which is typically recommended. Furthermore, all the applications must then be submitted to the small, specialized CBI unit.

Dominica's 'citizenship by investment' is distinctly a citizenship-for-sale program with clearly stated transactional dollar amounts, a well-defined, albeit opaque process through authorized agents, and varying fees associated with this citizenship program. This was cemented when in 2004, the government made the purchase even more enticing by unambiguously stating on the CBI program website that: (1)

there were no property taxes associated with the real estate investment option; (2) that there would be no regulations and taxes on capital gains, wealth, gift, inheritance, or foreign income as a Dominican citizen; (3) that there would be no language requirement to become a citizen; and (4) there would be no regulations to prevent transfer of wealth for whatever reason.

Table 1. List of Authorized Agencies by location of office.

Name of Authorized Agency	Location of Offices
AAA Investor Immigration Ltd.	Roseau
Alick C. Lawrence Chambers/The Nestmann Group Ltd	Roseau
Apex Capital Partners	Roseau and Moscow
Arton Capital (Dominica) Ltd.	Roseau
Bayat Law Group Inc.	Dubai
Belnor Associates Inc.	Roseau
Caribbean Citizenship Inc.	Roseau
Caribbean Commercial & IP Law Practitioners LLP.	Roseau
Passpro Immigration Services	Dubai
Caribbean Consulting Services Ltd.	Roseau
Caribbean Consulting Services Ltd.	Rotterdam
Caribbean-Sino Consulting Services Ltd.	Zicak, Portsmouth
CCP Inc.	Roseau
Citizenship Invest Ltd.	Roseau
CTrust Global Ltd.	Dubai
De Freitas, De Freitas & Johnson Chambers	Roseau
Design Management Ltd.	Roseau
Dominica International Investment Corporation Ltd.	Roseau, Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon,
Duncan G. Stowe	Roseau
Global Citizenship Programs Ltd.	Roseau
Guide Consultants Inc.	Roseau
Harvey Law Group	Roseau
IMT Inc.	Roseau
Lennox Lawrence	Roseau
Lennox Lawrence (Vardikos and Vardikos)	Athens
Lennox Lawrence (Alfred Management and Business Consultancy)	Dubai
Lennox Lawrence (Corporate Solutions)	St. Kitts
Modern Agricultural Ventures Inc.	Roseau
Montreal Management Consultants Est. Ltd.	Morne Daniel, Roseau, Sharjah
NL Citizenship Ltd.	Roseau
Paradise Citizens	Roseau
Savory and Partners	Dubai
Second Citizenship Ltd	Roseau
Sunstone Incorporated – Tranquility Beach Dominica	Roseau
Verlyn Liz-Ann Faustin	Roseau
Whitco Inc.	Roseau

Source: Government of Dominica²⁹ *Citizenship By Investment Unit*

²⁹ <http://cbiu.gov.dm/citizenship/authorised-agents/>

Citizenship is redefined and reconfigured in a way that allows for profit-making and as a functional way of bypassing the limitations of citizenship laws established by states. By this I mean that for some time, laws enacted by the nation-state limited citizenship for transnationals and individuals of multiple residencies. Since negotiations for any form of 'substantive citizenship' have generally happened below and above the level of the nation-state but only the state could enact laws relating to citizenship (Isin and Turner 2003; Joppke 2007; Macklin 2010; Painter and Philo 1995; Turner 1993), citizenship for the transnational class was problematic. The commodification of citizenship allows this class of individuals the opportunity to circumvent these issues. If, it is true that transnational denotes economic, social, political and cultural processes that supersede the nation-state (Robinson 2004), then the *commodified citizenship* facilitates the flourishing and expansion of the transnational class. To be clear, this commodified citizenship is not about participating in a global or world citizenry where an obligation to the world takes precedence to that of specific nation-states (à la Hellenistic Stoics described by Heater (1996). It is about a commitment to the continued economic success of a transnational capitalist class that is overlooked by current citizenship considerations.

In the next two sections, we will look at the reasoning behind Dominica's commodified citizenship and detail the move from Taiwanese to Chinese nationals as its primary target.

Dominica's Commodified Citizenship in Context

Dominica gained its independence from Great Britain in 1978, with an economy based primarily on agriculture. Its principal agricultural export was bananas which, at the time of independence received preferential treatment on the United Kingdom market. Just under a year later, the country was ravaged by Hurricane David and its agricultural sector wiped out. Successive trade tariffs that eroded its preferential treatment and continued natural disasters, forced Dominica to seek new ways to diversify its agricultural sector and its economy, more broadly speaking. Given economies of scale, it was unable to compete on the

open market with produce from Latin America and so Dominica turned to small scale manufacturing, the financial sector, and tourism in an effort to weaken its dependence on agriculture.

Boatca has argued that commodified citizenship in Latin America and the Caribbean can be seen as an “alternative development strategy closely linked to a colonial past” that could “bridge the transition from the export mono culture of colonial economy to diversification production after independence” (Boatca 2016). Still, an examination of the data over time reveal that the Dominica program has been used not as a development strategy per se, but typically as a quick fix to gain a rapid inflow of cash.

Like other Caribbean islands, Dominica inherited a mono-agriculture economy from its colonial past, and since independence has sought to diversify its economy. Equally significant for Dominica’s push away from mono-agriculture was the instability of an agricultural economy that was constantly affected by severe storms, hurricanes and natural hazards including possible volcanic eruption (Benson and Clay 2001, 2003). Dominica, (as with other Caribbean islands) began commodifying its citizenship program in the early 1990s. In the same period, Western European countries were in the process of forming the European Union, which in turn affected the relationship between Great Britain and many of its former colonies in the Caribbean. It became even more obvious that alternatives to mono-agriculture and agriculture in general had to be found. The region saw a big push toward tourism. However, that too is vulnerable to natural hazards such as storms and hurricanes which are often times outside of anyone’s control with consequences that are difficult to mitigate in the economy (Briguglio 1995). This left small scale manufacturing, small export-oriented industry, financial services and investments as more viable alternatives.

Data³⁰ on the commodified citizenship program indicate that the early program attracted mostly Republic of China (ROC), Taiwan (hereon, Taiwan) nationals. In 1992, ninety-three individuals became citizens through the program. Only one of them was not of Taiwanese origin. The following year, eighty-

³⁰ This is part of an ongoing project by the author that began in 2014. The author has collected data (and continues to collect data) on naturalized citizenship in Dominica (including citizenship by cash payment, purchase of real estate and residency). This data includes the names of these citizens, their countries of origin, their countries of residency, and the year they received their citizenship.

one out of eighty-two were of Taiwanese origin. This is not surprising as there was a high number (relative to other foreign-born individuals) of Taiwanese nationals on island due to the Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF)³¹. Furthermore, Dominica had a relatively strong foreign diplomatic relationship with Taiwan which explains, in part, the significant number of citizenship purchases by Taiwanese.

This initial inflow of cash from the commodified citizenship program, went ostensibly to the push for tourism as an alternative to the mono-agriculture economy. Yet, the one project—the expansion of the island’s main airport—that embodied the promotion of tourism as a means to diversify the economy, received no benefit from the citizenship program. Commodified citizenship was initially presented not as a possible new sector or part of an existing sector, but as a way to accumulate cash to support efforts to refocus the economy to alternative, non-agricultural sectors. In the first few years of the program majority of those purchasing Dominican citizenships were Taiwanese nationals living in Taipei, with only three residing in Taichung City, Taiwan, and three in Québec City, Canada.

However, by 1994, of the thirty-eight who purchased Dominica citizenship only three were from Taiwan. This was a marked decline in the total number of citizenships purchased and the total number of purchases by those of Taiwanese origin; thus, highlighting the limitations of the program and the marketing strategy employed by the Dominica government. At some point, one will have maximized the number of individuals who can, or are willing to, purchase citizenship at least in a given time period, particularly if your target market is geographically small and limited. Most of the individuals who purchased citizenship in 1994, actually came from China, an indication that the program leaders were already looking for alternative potential clients. Data from 1996, underscores this point. Of the fifty-six who

³¹ Taiwan ICDF (established in 1996) has its roots in the International Economic Cooperation Development Fund (IECDF), which was started during the height of Taiwan’s economic boom, to provide economic assistance to its developing partner countries. Today, ICDF provides lending and investment, technical cooperation, humanitarian assistance, and international education and training for its partner countries. In the Caribbean, it is part of the ROC’s continuing efforts to preserve its existing foreign relationships with the developing world especially given the increasing Chinese influence in those regions.

purchased citizenship, only 7% were from Taiwan, 44% were from China, 33% from Russia, 5% from Estonia, and 7% from the United States.

It is important to keep in mind that in 1995, Dominica elected a new Prime Minister, Edison James, who continued to push for economic diversification (Edison 1996). However, the decline in numbers for the citizenship for cash program was also affected by the country's pre-occupation with elections and election campaigning. PM James saw the program as a means to help the transition from mono-agriculture to a more diverse agricultural crop. By 1998, there were only fourteen purchases of Dominican citizenships – 9 from China, 4 from Taiwan, and 1 from the United States. In 2000, Dominica was embroiled in its own domestic politics where the commodified citizenship program was a source of immense debate. Edison James was out and a new Prime Minister was elected.

At the global level, China was rising economically and was beginning to flex its newfound power and influence in the developing world.

Dominica's commodified citizenship since 2004

Since 1971, China has required all countries seeking trade and diplomatic relations with it, to adopt the "One-China" policy and it was not until the 2000s that Dominica began to consider turning to China. On March 23, 2004, a few months after assuming office, Dominica's Prime Minister, Roosevelt Skerrit, signed the One-China policy breaking long-held diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Shortly thereafter, the government announced that Beijing had pledged \$110 million USD in grants to Dominica over a six-year period. In addition, the PRC announced that it would provide grants to absorb all costs of finalizing existing Taiwan-financed projects on the island. According to a 2004 IMF report, altogether, the grants amounted to about 50% of Dominica's annual GDP (International Monetary Fund 2004). IMF records show the country's GDP in 2003 as US \$341million and at US \$367 million USD in 2004. Breaking diplomatic ties with Taiwan was financially a significant move for Dominica. The IMF noted that

Taiwan's aid to Dominica had mostly been in the form of loans as opposed to the grants doled out by China. Furthermore, in 2004, Taiwan was Dominica's largest bilateral creditor (International Monetary Fund 2004).

The initial grant offer from Beijing to Dominica was tied to four major infrastructure development projects: a new sports stadium, a new grammar school, the rehabilitation of the main road from the country's capital (Roseau) to its second largest town of Portsmouth, and finally, a major upgrade of the Princess Margaret Hospital – the only major hospital on the island. The first three major projects were completed by 2011. These projects were managed by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), built with Chinese equipment brought in from China, and Chinese workers to perform all labor involved. Essentially the Chinese SOEs provided “turn-key” infrastructure with very little social and/or political intrusion in Dominica and all financial benefits were conferred on those running the Chinese SOEs.

Prime Minister Skerrit, now Chair of Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)³² and previously Chair of CARICOM, continues to tout the PRC's approach to aid and economic relations as the way of the future and the embodiment of South-South relations. Despite the fact that much of the financial dealings between Beijing and Skerrit's government are intentionally concealed from the public, Dominica Ministry of Finance (see Table 2) documented that in 2010 approximately \$7.3 million ECD, \$46 million ECD in 2011, \$44.8 million ECD in 2012 and, \$2.7 million ECD in 2013 was given to the government of Dominica by China. These funds went to building schools, low income housing in the Kalinago Territory (previously named Carib)³³, and a Fire Station at the Melville Hall Airport.

With China's growing involvement in the Caribbean, its relationship with Dominica, details of which are usually secret, remain suspect for some. Therefore, there is a tendency to overstate China's

³² Formed in 1981, the OECS is an inter-governmental organization dedicated to economic harmonization and integration, protection of human and legal rights, and the encouragement of good governance between seven (now 10) countries in the Eastern Caribbean. <http://www.oecs.org/>

³³ Dominica has a small population of indigenous people called the Kalinago. The Carib Territory was established in 1903 by British colonial authorities. The Carib people refer to themselves as the Kalinago People and in 2015 lobbied the government to officially rename the Carib Territory the Kalinago Territory.

intentions, motivation, and influence in Dominica and the Caribbean. In September of 2011, President Bharrat Jagdeo of Guyana, while attending the Third China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum, was quoted in the *Asia Times* online: “In the last 10 years, China's exports have consistently accounted for more than 70% of total trade... In 2008, 93% of Caribbean-China trade consisted of China's exports to the region. The region itself exported significantly (over \$60 million in goods) to China in that year” (Richards 2011). Yet, in the same article it is noted that China was in fact the third largest direct investor in Latin America and the Caribbean, after the United States and the European Union, accounting for only 9% of foreign direct investment in the region. In a discussion on China’s influence in the Caribbean, the Council for Hemispheric Affairs, in 2012, continued to use Jagdeo’s statement as proof of the PRC’s increasing dominance in the region. In December of 2013, Francis Fukayama’s *The American Interest Magazine* online blog post ran a headline: “China Takes Over Island of Dominica.” The article claimed that while the US was distracted with its ongoing problems in the Middle East, China was using its so-called “cabbage strategy”³⁴ in the United States’ back yard – a must-watch trend in China’s growing involvement in the Caribbean (The American Interest Magazine 2013).

³⁴ The idea of a “cabbage strategy” is attributed to Chinese military theorist and member of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, Zhang Zhaozhong. It involves asserting a territorial claim and gradually surrounding the area with multiple layers of security, thus denying access to a rival. The strategy relies on a steady progression of steps to outwit opponents and create new facts on the ground.

Table 2. PRC Grants to Dominica with Project Descriptions

Financial Year	Project Description	Budget in Millions XCD	Actual Exp. in Millions XCD
2009 - 2010	Const. Melville Hall Fire Station	1	0.73
	Reconst. of Portsmouth Secondary School	1.71	1.5
	Rehab. of West Coast Road	5.81	5.81
2010 - 2011	Const. Melville Hall Fire Station	2	1.28
	Rehab. of West Coast Road	44.18	44.18
	Repairs to Primary Schools	0.214	0.214
	Assistance to Farmers affected by Hurricane Tomas	0.28	0.28
	Housing Assistance in LaPlaine	0.045	0.045
2011 - 2012	Const. Melville Hall Fire Station	3	1.93
	Reconst. of Newtown Primary School	0.4	0.376
	Const. Carib Territory Housing Project	1.3	1.29
	Rehab. of West Coast Road	25	41
	Assistance to Layou River Flood Victims	0.37	0.21
2012 - 2013	Const. Carib Territory Housing Project	2.6	1.48
	Const. Melville Hall Fire Station	1.8	1.24
2012 - 2014 (YTD)	Const. Carib Territory Housing Project	1.29	0.84
YTD: 8/2014		90.999	102.405

Source: Dominica Ministry of Finance

As with much of the of the western coverage (both academic and popular) of China’s involvement in the Global South, China is presented as a monolith³⁵ slowly taking over the world. In Dominica, China’s interests are in fact geopolitical through the commodified citizenship, which plays a major role, and through the isolation of Taiwan and the creation of an ally in a historically geopolitical strategic group of islands.

³⁵ That tendency to present China as an all-encompassing entity when studying its relationship with countries both in the Global North and South has been diminishing in academia. A good example, would be C.K. Lee’s article for the *New Left Review* (2014) calling for more sophistication in studying China’s relation to the world.

Table 3. Percent Share of Top Import Partners.

IMPORTS	
2002 Total = \$185M US—5% (\$46.9M) China—5% (\$28.7M) Trinidad and Tobago—11% (\$19.6M) South Korea—7.5% (\$14M) UK—6.7% (\$12.4M) Japan—5.5% (\$10.3M)	2008 Total = \$361M US—32% (\$117M) Trinidad and Tobago—13% (\$48.8M) China—13% (\$48.7M) UK—3.6% (\$12.9M)
2004 Total = \$213M US—27% (\$56.8M) China—12% (\$26.3M) Trinidad and Tobago—11% (\$23.7M) UK—7.7% (\$16.5M) South Korea—4.4% (\$9.31M) France—3.7% (\$7.87M)	2010 Total = \$321M US—30% (\$96.3M) Trinidad and Tobago—10% (\$33.2M) China—9.8% (\$31.4M)
2006 Total = \$272M US—29% (\$79.8M) Trinidad and Tobago—14% (\$37.5M) China—14% (\$37.1M) UK—4% (\$10.9M)	2012 Total = \$258M US—32% (\$82M) Trinidad and Tobago—13% (\$34.4M) China—5.9% (\$15.3M)

Source: the economic complexity observatory calculator May 2018
 (<https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/>)

A look at Dominica’s import-export structure shows very little in the way of preferential treatment or significant impact by China. Cars made up the largest percent of all imports at 6.15% followed by refined petroleum at 4.7%. Food, beverages, tobacco, mineral fuels, lubricants and machinery and transport equipment were the largest commodity import groups of 2012 (Simoes and Hidalgo 2011). Further, in terms of the country’s import and export partner list (see Tables 3 and 4), we find that the increasing trade between Dominica and the rest of the Caribbean islands to be more significant than its trading relationship with China.

Table 4. Percent Share of Top Export Partners.

EXPORTS	
2002 Total = \$68.1M UK—32% (\$21.7M) Jamaica—14% (\$9.59M) US—8.5% (\$5.8M) France—5.9% (\$4.02M) Antigua and Bermuda—5.2% (\$3.5M)	2008 Total = \$97.3M Saudi Arabia—12% (\$11.5M) Vietnam—12% (\$11.2M) Jamaica—7.7% (\$7.5M) UK—7.6% (\$7.38M) France—7.5% (\$7.25M) Trinidad and Tobago—5.2% (\$5.07M)
2004 Total = \$77.1M UK—22% (\$16.8M) Jamaica—12% (\$8.96M) France—10% (\$7.71M) Japan—5.5% (\$4.23M) Antigua and Bermuda—5.4% (\$4.14M)	2010 Total = \$59.2M Jamaica—14% (\$8.3M) UK—7.8% (\$4.64M) France—7.6% (\$4.49M) Trinidad and Tobago—7.4% (\$4.36M) Saudi Arabia—5.7% (\$3.39M)
2006 Total = \$80.9M UK—20% (\$16.4M) Jamaica—10% (\$8.45M) China—9.8% (\$7.9M) Antigua and Bermuda—7.2% (\$5.85M) France—6.5% (\$5.26M)	2012 Total = \$81.4M Jamaica—12% (\$9.74M) Trinidad and Tobago—8.5% (\$6.91M) Saudi Arabia—7.7% (\$6.26M) Sweden—5.6% (\$4.95M)

Source: the economic complexity observatory calculator May 2018
 (<https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/>)

Looking past the issue of trade relations, given Dominica’s relatively small population (at any given point during the last 30 years, between 70-76K) visiting the island’s capital town leaves one with the impression that there is a strong Chinese presence on the island. This is primarily due to the layout of the town and the locations of the Chinese-owned retail shops in Roseau, Dominica’s capital city (See Figure 2.). The main cruise ship berth in Dominica is off of the southern part of Bayfront Street in the capital. The most used street connecting Bayfront Street to the rest of Roseau is King George V Street and it is one of the major thoroughfares in town. Along King George V Street (highlighted in Figure 5.) alone, there are ten Chinese-owned retail shops—more than 70% of all retail shops along the street. This street is also home to the largest department store and two of the main grocery stores in town and on the island.

Given our insights on how the commodified citizenship program works, in the next section, we examine the possible link between commodification of citizenship and cross-border mobility for Chinese TCC and the TCC in general.

Commodified citizenship and the TCC

In Leslie Sklair's early works on transnationalization, he categorizes the TCC in the Third World in terms of four groups: the expatriate Transnational Corporation (TNC) executive and their local affiliates; the globalizing state bureaucrats; capitalist inspired politicians and professionals; and the consumerist elites – merchants involved in promoting consumerism and the North American lifestyle, and free market principles (Sklair 1991:133–36, 2000). Given their cross-border/transnational character, the TCC can therefore be seen as a natural consumer for commodified citizenship.³⁶

So, what are the benefits of purchasing a citizenship from Dominica that makes it a good tool for the TCC? A citizenship purchased from Dominica is for life and can be passed on from one generation to another. The passport issued with citizenship allows for visa-free travel to 115 countries in the world including Great Britain, the European Union and the Schengen Zone (as of May 28, 2015). This is especially desirable for those individuals holding passports to countries with limited travel options based on their first country of citizenship. The current turn in the global political climate, in which national boundaries are being used more and more to shut-out particular segments and groups of people across the globe, makes second citizenships quite desirable. As mentioned earlier, there is also the opportunity for wealth

³⁶ One could also argue that criminals are also natural consumers of commodified citizenship. However, for now, the expectation is that countries like Dominica, that engage in commodified citizenship are doing their due diligence with regards to the sale of citizenships. Of course, like other small island nations engaging in commodified citizenship, Dominica has experienced its share of scandals (such as the Nigerian former Minister of Petroleum Resources, Diezani Alison-Madueke, being issued a diplomatic passport on May 29, 2015, within one month of meeting Dominica's Prime Minister R. Skerrit—Madueke was being investigated for corruption in Great Britain (NCU Media Group 2015); and Alireza Zibahalat Monfared who was carrying a diplomatic passport of Dominica when he was arrested during an international manhunt (Dominica Vibes Online 2017a)) that the Skerrit administration is addressing through a series of policy changes (Zagaris 2017). Both cases, involve diplomatic passports which is mostly left to the discretion of the Prime Minister. This aspect of the commodified citizenship program is important but should be best pursued in a different article due to space limitations here.

and asset protection; and you can legally change your name in Dominica and your second citizenship is not reported to the authorities of the country of origin.

Of the number of benefits, visa/hassle-free travel using the Dominica passport and wealth and asset protection are probably of greatest interest to those purchasing a second citizenship. While the second citizenship might appeal to those concerned with wealth and asset protection, visa/hassle-free travel becomes extremely important to the TCC. Robinson explains that the TCC, while establishing itself as sans national identity, it utilizes state apparatuses to advance its interests even if it means temporarily drawing on a particular regional or cultural identity. This means that the TCC will happily make use of commodified citizenship if this leads to enhancing their economic welfare (Robinson 2004:16–64). Dunaway and Clelland’s analysis of the number of billionaires coming from the semiperiphery, especially Asia and specifically China, demonstrated that TCC membership was exploding (Dunaway and Clelland 2015).

Dominica’s Prime Minister Skerrit has spent a significant amount of time promoting the country’s commodified citizenship in the PRC and at first glance, the PRC’s TCC appeared to be his primary target market (The Sun Dominica 2015). With the PRC donating significant amounts of money to the Skerrit government’s infrastructure projects, such as the rehabilitation of the main hospital, and school buildings etc. (See Table 2 and *The Sun: Dominica* (Green 2013)), the main valuable resource Dominica has to offer is its citizenship program. Dominica’s concerted effort to attract and increase its customer base for the commodified citizenship occurred under the current administration, with the Prime Minister making a number of highly publicized visits to the PRC to promote the program (DNO Staff Writer 2015b; Jamaican Observer 2015; The Sun Dominica 2015; DA Vibes 2015, 2016). Given the prices of the Dominican citizenship, in the long term, the main Chinese beneficiary of the close PRC-Dominica relationship has to be the transnational capitalist class both in China and in the diaspora. After all, the average Chinese in the PRC cannot afford the price for a second citizenship, even if Dominica’s program is one of the most affordable in the world. To be sure, Skerrit understands quite clearly the target market for the commodified

citizenship, given that his trips to the PRC although ostensibly for diplomatic purposes, tend to focus on meeting with the PRC's business and investor communities.

The Chinese TCC is ripe for a targeted marketing campaign for commodified citizenship. According to China's Merchant Bank (CMB), and Bain and Company's report on China's private banking industry from 2011, there was an explosion in the number of Chinese individuals with overseas assets between 2008 and 2010. Furthermore, majority of these individuals are pursuing some form of temporary or permanent residency, including dual citizenship, outside of Mainland China. The report notes that at least 60% of China's high net worth individuals (HNWIs) are considering or considered investment immigration. Given the burst of Chinese HNWIs seeking some form of residency abroad based on investment, many countries (especially the more desirable countries including the US, Canada, and Australia) are increasing the requirements for gaining residency. For example, Canada raised the investment requirement from 800,000 Canadian dollars to 1.6 million Canadian dollars. Dominica, while not being the most sought-after country for residency, have made their citizenship program even more appealing by relaxing the rules of residency and investment opportunities even going as far as creating a new industry for commodified citizenship. The CMB report notes that the HNWIs are seeking immigration for a number of reasons including education of their children; for wealth security; for preparation for retirement; for easy travel abroad; and convenience for overseas investment/business development (China Merchants Bank and Bain and Company 2011).

While China's TCC may not immigrate to Dominica for their children's education, they could use that citizenship as a springboard for entry into other countries. As far as wealth security and convenience for investment/business development, Dominica's program is consistent with those goals. It is reasonable to see Dominica as an opportunity for the TCC to try out business development ideas and a way to gain indispensable experience and knowledge. Bain and Company's 2015 report on the Evolution of China's Private Wealth Market indicate that the trend of seeking investment immigration has not ebbed. In fact, the

ultra HNWIs have found investment immigration even more crucial than the rest of the HNWIs. By making a second citizenship financially appealing, Dominica's commodified citizenship fills an important need for not only China's HNWIs but generally for China's transnational class.

In April 2015, Skerit met privately with a group of Chinese investors in Shanghai to promote second citizenship in Dominica. When asked whether he was concerned about an influx of immigrants to Dominica, Skerit confidently stated that he was not at all worried. Skerit knows quite well that those purchasing a second citizenship in Dominica are not looking to relocate there (The Sun Dominica 2015). This is why the residency requirement was removed in the first place. Citizenship obligations were stripped from citizenship and only the rights remained, making it more appealing for purchase.

To a certain extent, it makes sense that in a globalized economy that there is a shift to commodified citizenship and new and creative ways are found to bypass and evade the restrictions of national borders. As China becomes more integrated into the global economy, the TCC must find workarounds to the constraints on its movements. With cheap second citizenship purchased from Dominica, the Chinese TCC can break free of the bonds placed on it by the national laws of some of their counterparts in the West. They could move relatively freely to other Western countries to engage in those economies. And again, as Robinson (2004, 2014, 2015) notes, the transnational class has no qualms about competition amongst themselves but is still fully committed to global capitalism. He explains that while the BRICS' policy attempts to open up global capitalism to the TCC of their respective elites might clash with the interest of the G-7, those policies would in the end, further transnationalize dominant groups in those countries (Robinson 2014:17).

In other words, the BRICS foster and advance the TCC's class formation and open up space in the global system for more extensive integration and a less asymmetric global capitalism (Robinson 2015). Significant to this discussion here is the fact that of all the BRICS, China has the strongest relationship with Dominica and there is no reason for Dominica not to continue to target Chinese TCC customers for its

commodified citizenship program. Nonini and Ong (1997) observe that Chinese transnationalist have developed strategies that redefine and overcome efforts to regulate and control their mobility instituted by post-colonial nation-states. This gives the Chinese transnationalist a character of unpredictable wildness (Ong and Nonini 1997). They rework definitions like citizenship, allowing them to escape constraints placed on them by nation-state regimes. Dominica's commodified citizenship allows them to do just that. Through Dominica's citizenship for purchase program, the Chinese TCC can therefore set up shop not only in Dominica, but anywhere else the Dominica passport can take them.

Yet, all of the above only works if the Chinese TCC exploits this opportunity. As we will show later, based on the data available, the number of Chinese nationals purchasing citizenships as a percentage of all purchases, was initially high but that has declined in the last few years.

Discussion

So far, in this article, we have seen the logic of the commodified citizenship program –how it is defined, the parameters for purchasing a Dominica citizenship, and how it can benefit the TCC, in particular, those of Chinese origin. We have also briefly looked at how little of the program's revenue had been directed to advance development in Dominica (be it through small scale manufacturing and export-oriented industry, or agricultural diversification).

It was not until May 2015 that an official announcement was made that a five-star Kempinski hotel was to be constructed and opened in Dominica by United Arab Emirates-based developer, Range Development (Staff Writer 2015). In fact, this was the first government-approved real estate project under the commodified citizenship program (Staff Writer 2015). In July 2016, the government indicated that between 150 and 250 Dominicans were to be employed during the construction phase of the hotel (Skerrit 2017). There have been no other government-approved real estate projects under the commodified citizenship program. In the 2016-2017 Government Budget Address, Prime Minister Skerrit also noted two

other planned hotel/resort – Jungle Bay Resort and Bois Cotelette – which were to add to a more modern and competitive tourist industry in Dominica. While these were not specifically linked to and formally approved as part of the citizenship program, they were presented as potential real estate *investments*. The government’s idea of development appears to be concentrated on tourism infrastructure and hotels in particular.

In 2001, there was a clear increase in the number of Dominican citizenship purchased –from 16 in 1998 and 3 in 2000 (see Figure 1 for visual reference of the data presented here). Of the 89 that became citizens in 2001, majority were of Chinese and Russian origin. The decline in 1998, and 2000 may have to do with Dominica’s internal election politics and having tapped out a convenient market (the ROC). Still, the spike in 2001 could be that the government was “catching up” in the processing of applications (as so much of the process is opaque and concealed from the public), but just as likely from having found new and/or additional markets for the citizenship program.

What is particularly interesting is that while the Prime Minister of Dominica had been publicly visiting China, giving talks to Chinese businessmen to promote the citizenship program, and touting the new Dominica-China relationship, it is not the number of Chinese nationals purchasing citizenship that is noteworthy. It is the *total* number of new citizens that is striking. There is no data for 2002 and 2003—Dominica lost two Prime Ministers during this period (both died). In 2004, 16 new citizens were recorded, 22 in 2005, and 47 in 2007.




Figure 1. Total number of citizenships sold
 Source: Data collected by the author for the period 1990-2015.³⁷

There was no further data on citizenship by naturalization until July 2015. The data shows 159 individuals purchased and were granted citizenship—with no documentation of place of origin or domicile—between March 1 to June 25, 2015. However, onomastically, one could deduce Middle Eastern origins for a majority of the new citizens. There was no additional data available until February and again in March 2016. The data collected from February 2016 indicate that between July 1 and December 31, 2015, there were 562 citizenships purchased and granted. This meant that a total of 721 citizenships were purchased in 2015. Keep in mind that according to the official government statistics, there are 70K people residing in Dominica. The data for March 2016 show that 511 citizenships were purchased and granted in

³⁷ The data is collected from the Commonwealth of Dominica Official Gazette, Published by Authority, Roseau, Dominica. Each year, a number of volumes are published documenting official government announcements. The gazettes are mined for data for each year from all the issues beginning with Volume CXVI No. 20 to Volume CXXXIX No. 14. Every first and last name, the country of current citizenship, the country of residence, country of birth, and date registered as a Dominican citizenship through the citizenship by investment (CBI) program are recorded. Figure 1 provides a summary of this data

2013; again, with no documentation of place of origin or domicile. And again, the data suggests that a majority of those new citizens are of Middle Eastern origin. Still, Chinese nationals are well represented in both the list of new citizens in 2013 and 2015 and as before, they are most likely living in China, not Dominica. Nevertheless, having a Dominica passport, while domiciled in China does not prevent a member of the Chinese TCC from traveling to any number of countries, visa-free. That option is always open for a Dominican citizen.

Aside from the obvious questions regarding corruption that arise from this data, which admittedly are huge, three issues stand out. The first and second are related. Where is the money (how much) and is it going toward “development”?³⁸ The truth is that only a select few know exactly how many people really purchase citizenships as there are no real checks-and-balances with regards to the program. The data presented here is based solely on what the government has documented and made available for legal purposes. There is no way to check whether or not data has been omitted.

Infrastructural development outcomes based on dollars received from the commodified citizenship program is open for debate. The Kempinski real-estate project, barely began in 2016 with NH International Limited (a Trinidadian firm) as the main structural contractor. The government announced in April 2016, that it would demolish and renovate a bridge in the west part of Roseau called the West Bridge. Construction was completed in 2017 and was opened to much fanfare on May Day 2017. PM Skerrit stated that this was the first phase of its “gradual and deliberate modernization of Roseau” (Dominica Vibes Online 2017b). It is important to note that until the 2016-2017 budget address, in which the government noted that a total of \$882.4 million was collected under the program with \$356 million collected in tax revenue (Skerrit 2015), there was little to no information on the total revenues received from the commodified citizenship program in the government’s budget speeches. However, in its 2018 country

³⁸ Here I mean development either from the point of view of industrialization/manufacturing as a means of “catching up” (à la Rostow (1959)) or from a poverty reduction/sustainable development perspective.

report (International Monetary Fund 2017), the IMF documents Dominica’s “on-budget” CBI revenues (see Figure 2) based on information from country authorities. Interestingly, it follows a similar pattern to the data collected and reflected in Figure 1.

In the 2011-2012 budget address, a full seven years after Skerrit became Prime Minister, there is no mention of the citizenship program. However, it was noted that agriculture made up approximately 11% of GDP and was reflective of a 10% decrease in 2010. The hotel and restaurant sector grew in 2011 by under 1% and the number of cruise ships visiting the island grew by around 3% (Skerrit 2011). Despite this, tourism has continued to be a major focus of the government; and while the number of international visitors has generally increased, we can see in Figure 3 that the numbers do fluctuate year in, year out




Figure 2. Revenue from the commodified citizenship program. Source: IMF country report, April 2018.




Figure 3. International tourist arrivals to Dominica. Source: World Bank, May 2018.

In 2014, the Skerit administration announced that it had changed some of the rules regarding the citizenship program with an eye toward boosting foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly FDI aimed at tourism infrastructure (Skerit 2014). And in the 2015-2016 budget address, it was announced that the government of Dominica and Morocco were undertaking a joint venture in building a new hotel. As mentioned in the introductory sections of the article, the commodified citizenship program began as a means to generate cash to help primarily with economic diversification including boosting the tourism industry.

Still, refocusing an economy that was primarily agricultural to become primarily based on tourism, is still a dangerous prospect for a small island nation. In August 2015, the agriculture sector was devastated by Tropical Storm Erika. There was severe destruction of much of the island’s infrastructure including hotels. Things have been made worse by Hurricane Maria in 2017, two years later. Tourism continues to be affected by the natural disasters as reflected in the data presented in Figure 3. This is why economic

diversification is so important in the Dominica context. The citizenship program, is subject to political pressures and volatile receipts. The IMPF has indicated that despite the increasing revenue from the commodified citizenship program, if the program was to end (slowly or abruptly), the effect on Dominica's economy would be an unsustainable increase in public debt. It recommended policies geared toward significant debt reduction and savings, as well as a stronger transparency framework for the commodified citizenship program (International Monetary Fund 2017).

The third issue comes from the potential further explosion of the numbers of new citizens of Dominica, and how commodified citizenship can speak to the issue of global inequality. While the commodified citizenship program can benefit factions of the TCC currently domiciled in Dominica, few actually reside there. According to Sklair (1991:134), members of the TCC, especially those of the 'Third World' do not live there for legal reasons but this is changing rapidly. The data on Dominica's commodified citizenship program appear to support this. Those purchasing second citizenships in Dominica have been from middle-income countries (as defined by the World Bank) and have remained domiciled either in their country of origin or in another middle-income country; very few people in the Global North are purchasing second citizenships in the developing world, and this is expected. As Korzeniewicz and Moran (2009) explained, the value of citizenship is directly proportional to a country's location in the stratified world-economy. Zolberg (2006) also argues that by restricting immigration, "core" states in the Westphalian international state system are able to maintain this highly unequal system.

One of Korzeniewicz and Moran's (2009) major argument, is that nationality plays a significant role in where a person falls vis-à-vis other individuals in terms of global inequality; meaning that a member of Mexico's top five percent does not hold the same place in global socio-economic stratification as one of the US's. "Global stratification... does not equal adding up the "elites," "middle classes," and "working class" or "poor" from different countries, as if they all occupied the same objective position. ...[It] involves... intersecting processes in which national identity itself becomes the crucial axis of inequality"

(Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009). Given the three paths to upward mobility for an individual, in terms of global stratification (work within the constraints of within-country inequality and attempt to move up through educational or occupational achievement; work within the bounds of the nation state and increase the gross national income; or move from a low-income country to a high-income country) the authors argue that the last is the most effective and expedient.

The authors also maintain: “A truly free flow of people across the world, in fact, would provide the fastest means for thoroughly transforming the equilibria that characterized global stratification for the past two hundred years” (Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009). Given the above, commodified citizenship could and can play a large role in reducing overall between country inequality. However, this only works if commodified citizenship crosses the North-South divide. For now, the data shows that Dominica’s program mostly attracts nationals from other middle-income countries. The most it can do in terms of overall global inequality would be to help level out the middle strata of the stratified world-economy. For now, though, the reality is that if the Skerrit government is elected out of office, China’s and all others’ access to Dominica’s *commodified citizenship* could end.

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Conclusion

I have presented three articles that examine major changes occurring within the modern capitalist world-economy albeit from slightly different, yet important points of view. Each article takes a region within the semiperiphery and the periphery, into consideration. Overall, the thesis, among many things, supports the idea that when major transformations occur in the world-system, it is in those parts that changes tend to occur—especially the semiperiphery (Chase-dunn and Grell-Brisk 2016; Lattimore 1980; Toynbee 1946). This is a non-trivial finding that persists and cuts across disciplines.

Each of the articles presented were written within the scope of the academic journals they were written for. Yet, the findings have broader implications particularly in the area of world-systems analysis and development studies. A major finding of this thesis project that emerges throughout of all three articles, is the importance of China in the world-economy. Within the context of *Article One* and *Two*, I argued that the dramatic change in the shape of the global income distribution in the stratified world-economy is primarily due to the upward mobility of China, but also because more of the world's population is moving toward the middle of the distribution. Furthermore, that the changes occurring in the 2000s were indicative of continued systemic crisis which was most likely brought on by a lack of a hegemon and not necessarily a full transformation to a different mode of accumulation, or capitalist production and/or distribution. Still, this is only one part of the overall picture as the results of the thesis has implications for other debates in the field.

Scholars have long argued that the modern capitalist world-system and historical political economy conceived by Wallerstein was historically limited (Abu-lughod 1989, 1993; Gunder Frank and Gills 1993a), even Eurocentric (Gunder Frank 1998; Gunder Frank and Gills 1993b), and asserted that world-system (s), even capitalist ones existed prior to the sixteenth century and outside of Europe (Abu-lughod 1989, 1993; Anievas and Niancolu 2015; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1995; Gunder Frank and Gills 1993a). As an example, using primary and secondary source evidence, Abu-lughod (1989) describes the emergence of an extensive trade and capitalist world economic system between 1250 and 1350 long before Wallerstein’s modern capitalist world-system.

This network, Abu-lughod contends, was built on the silk-roads (land and sea routes) which connected China, the Middle East, and Europe, and was indicative of a multi-modal world. She also argues that this world system was not hierarchical and was free of hegemonic domination unlike Wallerstein’s modern capitalist world-economic system.




Figure 1a. Unstable Periphery-Semiperiphery of the world-economic structure 2003-2005




Figure 1b. Unstable Periphery-Semiperiphery of the world-economic structure 2006-2008

In *Article One* and *Two*, and to a certain extent in *Article Three* of this thesis, we see the reflection of this sort of multi-modal world (particularly in the 2000s as shown graphically in Figure 1a. and Figure 1b.), free of hegemonic domination, that is similar (at least superficially) to what Abu-lughod (1989) described in *Before European Hegemony*. The decline of American hegemony (Arrighi 2007a, 2010; Arrighi and Silver 1999; Harris 2003; Wallerstein 2003)³⁹ allows for easy comparison between the period treated in this thesis

³⁹ In March 2017, the leftist magazine *Jacobin*, ran an article by Edward Hunt in which the author argued that the US' dominance on the world stage was far from over, quoting multiple senior government officials from both military and economic spheres about the vitality of the American empire (Hunt 2017). Salvatore Babones has also made similar arguments about the US' non-decline (2017a). During his keynote talk and roundtable discussion at the *Development In The Face Of Global Inequalities. An International, Interdisciplinary Conference*, he pointed to the US' high GDP per capita, its obscenely large military, and its technological advancements compared to the rest of the world, as evidence that "North America is the future" (Babones 2017b). But as any scholar of world-systems theory or Antonio Gramsci would point out, dominance is only one aspect of hegemony.

and Abu-lughod's. But her argument was not simply that a world system existed prior to the one described by Wallerstein or the lack of a hegemon per se. Notably, it was that this hegemon-free era, was somehow marked by relative peace, equally shared power, stability and cooperation amongst the major powers (Abu-lughod 1989:361). This, was emphatically refuted, for example, by Modelski (1990) and Goldberg (1991) who pointed to the fact that Kublai Khan actually ruled a third of the world's population through *conquest*; to Genghis Khan's campaign of death; and to the fact that the *pax mongolica* was "imposed by atrocity and maintained by terror" (Modelski 1990:708). In drawing a comparison between the period in Abu-lughod's study and the current hegemon-free era, it is striking that over the last decade, there has been a spike in state-based conflict (Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016) globally. Yet, it would seem that this is not completely unexpected. In fact, historically, during periods of hegemony the number of state-based conflicts tend to be low (such as during the height of American hegemony).

Notwithstanding the arguments levied against Abu-lughod's assumptions about peace during the period of her study, I maintain here, as I do in *Article One*, that the supposed multimodal world economic structure that we see in the 2000s (Figure 1a. and 1b.) was more indicative of chaos or crisis of hegemony rather than a fundamental shift to a *true* multipolar world that involves shared power or a fundamental shift to a different mode of accumulation. I would also argue that although the shape of the distribution sometimes appears quad-modal or multimodal, it is primarily due to China's movement within the distribution and that what we are actually observing is the unprecedented movement of more of the world's population into the middle stratum of the world-economy. Furthermore, that despite the appearance of quad-modality or multi-modality, the system will eventually readjust back to a trimodal distribution but with a different look – medium periphery, large semiperiphery, and small core. I also argue that because of this new shape of the distribution, there will be an increasing amount of pressure on the countries in the middle that may translate into open military aggression, and at the same time, a rise in

regional and multilateral organizations such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), and ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).

Still, Gunder Frank, like Abu-lughod, conceived of a capitalist world system that was acutely different than Wallerstein's. He maintained that a world system existed much earlier than the long sixteenth century, with China occupying the center. His *World Accumulation* (1978), laid the groundwork for much of his later scholarship (although he later levies claims of Eurocentrism at that particular work). In it he maintained that there has been *one* continuous process of capital accumulation in recent centuries including the pre-industrial capitalist societies. Feudal modes of accumulation or concepts such as primary accumulation was not useful. He reasoned that preindustrial capitalism generated long economic cycles in which a geographical external expansion phase occurred, including the extension of trade and commerce. However, this eventually led to a crisis phase. The expansion phase induced external transformation and the crisis phase led to internal transformation leading to development or underdevelopment in particular regions. In *ReOrient*, Gunder Frank took Abu-lughod's claims about the world-system a bit further, noting that the world economic system was centered in Asia; and not only was China at the center, but that Europe occupied the peripheral economic zone (Gunder Frank 1998). He argued that this was due to the size of China's economy relative to all the other world regions and the fact that for centuries, China held a trade surplus and most of the world's silver.

This was not a new argument for Gunder Frank, who had made earlier similar claims, along with his colleague Barry Gills (Gunder Frank and Gills 1993a). Gunder Frank also expressed another particular point that echoed and expanded earlier arguments made by Abu-lughod: that the rise of the West only occurred after the decline of the East and only due to Europe's exploitation of American money/silver and Europe buying into Asian wealth. Therefore, for Gunder Frank, the rise of contemporary China was simply a return to a Sinocentric world system (Gunder Frank 1998). Arrighi too, saw the possibility of a Sinocentric world economic system but also of multipolarity (Arrighi 2007a, 2010). I tend to agree with Arrighi (2010)

and Arrighi and Silver's (1999) arguments about the *possibility* of a multipolar world even with a return to a trimodal distribution (with a larger semiperiphery). However, I would not go as far as to claim a *return* to a Sinocentric world system. As Chase-Dunn notes, Gunder Frank might have been correct that China was the most powerful and dynamic center until the 18th century but so too were West Asia/Mediterranean and South Asia which means that the period under Frank's study should probably be considered multicore (Chase-dunn 2000). Again, multipolarity appears a lot more *possible* given a lack of a hegemon in the world-system; and as this thesis has demonstrated in all three articles, China appears to be committed to a multipolar world.

Another finding from the empirical work in *Article One* and *Two* is the persistence of the *modes* of distribution or to say it differently, the tendency for clustering or formation of 'convergence clubs' in the distribution. This is consistent with previous studies of global income/wealth distributions (that cut across disciplines and methodological approaches) by Arrighi and Drangel (1986); Bianchi (1997); Babones (2005); Henderson et al. (2008); Pittau et al. (2010); Mahutga and Smith (2011); Grell-Brisk (2017); Karatasli (2017). More importantly, they all found persistent gaps between the modes that could be interpreted as pseudo-boundaries between core-semiperiphery-periphery zones. Again, the articles in this thesis also found these gaps incredibly difficult to overcome. Chase-Dunn (2014) contends that the gaps exists because these studies are endeavoring to empirically establish core-semiperiphery-periphery positionality using the GNP per capita indicator to measure a country's position in the world-economic hierarchy, and that a multidimensional set of power hierarchies would render a more continuous hierarchy.

Jeffrey Kentor (2008) measured a country's place in the world-system; i.e. whether a country fell into the core, periphery, or semi-periphery, based on economic and military power with three dimensions – a country's economic power (gross domestic product per capita; gross domestic product; total exports; ratio of external foreign investment to internal foreign investment), a country's military capacity (gross military spending, military exports, ratio of military exports to military imports), and a country's global

dependence (export commodity variety, foreign debt as a percentage of total GDP, military imports as a percentage of GDP). Conceptually, this is a good starting point to tackle the issue of the gaps between economic zones but it is just that – a starting point. A partial classification was created, but this remains a work in progress.

Pointing to Kentor (2008), Chase-Dunn later writes, “But another way to look at the core/periphery hierarchy is as a multidimensional set of power hierarchies, that includes economic, political and military power forming a continuous hierarchy that is a relatively stable stratification hierarchy in the sense that most of national societies stay in the same position over time, but that also experiences occasional instances of upward and downward mobility?” (Chase-Dunn 2014). This is an interesting point, but does not explain exactly how and why a continuous hierarchy would be produced. Furthermore, this theory has not been tested formally or tackled in any substantive way. Given the fact that all these studies have utilized primarily economic variables and instruments to determine global economic stratification, I am inclined to partially agree with Chase-Dunn that a more continuous hierarchy *might* emerge when hierarchy is determined based on a multidimensional power scale. In an upcoming book chapter with Chase-Dunn, we look at the distribution of military power and also found that gaps exist between the core-semiperiphery-periphery but also a significant gap between hegemon and core (Grell-Brisk and Chase-Dunn 2019).

Moreover, I am hesitant to believe that a more fluid boundary between the three economic zones would mitigate the difficulty of moving from periphery to semiperiphery or from semiperiphery to core. Hence, although a multidimensional hierarchy might produce a more continuous *graph* representing country positions in the world-economic system, the “gaps” between the zones would still theoretically or conceptually be present. Fundamentally then, Wallerstein’s point would hold: “it is not possible... for all states to ‘develop’ simultaneously. The so-called ‘widening gap’ [between core-semiperiphery-periphery] *is not an anomaly but a continuing basic mechanism of the operation of the world-economy...* the some that rise are at the expense of others that decline” (Wallerstein 1974a). This would mean that the gaps exist

regardless of the method used to empirically determine world-economic zones, clusters, 'convergence clubs'. Still, there is much needed work to be done to seriously tackle this issue as these assumptions have not been empirically tested.

Given the scope of the journals the articles were submitted to, another dimension not directly addressed in the articles but underlying all three of them is the issue of China's potential as global hegemonic leader. In *Article One*, I approach this theme in terms of China's role in the semiperiphery including its commitment to the status quo, an idea forwarded not only myself but also by Hung (2015) in discussing China's lead in the new Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank which some decried as a challenge to the World Bank; Kumral and Karatasli (2017) in their discussion of China's treatment of nationalist movements; and international relations scholars who have argued that China is not likely to challenge the current international system (Johnston 2008; Johnston and Ross 2006; Shirk 2007). Added to this, is China's continued use of soft power (Holyk 2011; Nye 2004, 2005) which these authors define as the ability to shape certain preferences without resorting to explicit and overt military-type power.

The question of China's soft power is particularly clear in *Article Three*. Once Dominica broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and signed the *One China* policy it received a significant amount of foreign aid from China and immediately became yet another country taking up the very public pro-China mantra. Dominica's commodified citizenship program became available to Chinese nationals more so than before, allowing China's transnational class, the opportunity to circumvent traditional restrictions on their movement established by foreign countries' national border controls and visa rules. Furthermore, I would argue that after opening diplomatic relations with China, Dominica's commodified citizenship program became significantly more expanded. The government went on numerous promotional campaigns to China which quickly came to include Southeast Asian countries and the Middle East. In a way, opening up to China gave Dominica the ability to see other possibilities to expand their commodified citizenship program making it a mutually beneficial relationship.

The same can be said of China's relationship with Africa which I address in *Article Two*. I argue that the relationship has been beneficial for Africa not only in terms of increasing aid and investment from China but also the fact that other countries (Japan, India, Brazil, Singapore, to name a few) have begun seeking and gaining entry into the African market could mean better terms of trade for African countries. For the most part, the article deals with Sub-Saharan Africa's own movements in the stratified world-economy and with China's growing influence in the region. China's engagement with Africa has garnered much discussion in academia. China's rush to Africa was initially viewed as an effort to gain access to natural resources (Brautigam 2008, 2010, 2011a; Kaplinsky et al. 2010; Kaplinsky and Morris 2009) to support a growing China economy. The structure of China's import from Africa was very biased toward oil-rich and other natural resource-strong African countries (Grell-Brisk 2016; Sandrey 2006).

China's relationship on the African continent is largely seen as an example and result of the Beijing Consensus. Also called the "China Model", it has been touted as an alternative to the Washington Consensus especially with regards to economic development but also as a geopolitical strategy. There are ample studies on the Beijing Consensus (Arrighi and Zhang 2010; Brautigam 2010; Huang 2011; Ramo 2004; Sautman and Hairong 2007; Weiwei 2006; Wild and Mephram 2006); not to mention those on China's typically resource-extraction-driven foreign aid and foreign direct investment in Africa and Latin America (Brautigam 2008; González-Vicente 2013; González-Vincente 2011; Grell-Brisk 2016; Kaplinsky et al. 2010; Kaplinsky and Morris 2009; Koch-Weser 2014; Strauss and Armony 2012).

But, the very notion of a Beijing Consensus is a vague and contested one (Leonard 2006; Weiwei 2006). On some level, when Jose Cooper Ramo (2004) dubbed China's approach to development in the Global South 'the Beijing Consensus', it was an attempt to create a unified economic and international relations perspective for China from a Western point of view. The Beijing Consensus supposedly promote state-based capitalism, export-led growth, and incremental reforms (Halper 2010; Weiwei 2006; Williamson

2012). And more importantly, it is supposed to promote multinational relationships and “a new global order founded on economic relationships” (Dirlik 2011).

When applied to China’s style of foreign aid and development, the Beijing Consensus projects a unified approach which belies China’s nuanced and strategic engagement with the world. For example, the idea that all, if not most Chinese foreign aid and investment projects are performed through state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is now quite pervasive in the Western dialogue regarding China. Those SOEs are seen as agents of a state-centric and Chinese approach to development that relies on the assumption that what worked for China’s economic growth, if replicated, could work anywhere⁴⁰ (Brautigam 2008, 2011b). However, in reality, there is a lot more heterogeneity involved with both SOEs and private companies playing differing roles in developmental projects across the globe. And there is ongoing push back on categorizing China as a monolith when discussing its global development strategy and involvement in the developing world (Lee 2014). As Lee (2014) has explained, the approach to development and investment taken, varies significantly depending on the economic sector and location involved. Therefore, in discussing China’s involvement in Africa, it is imperative that we take a more nuanced approach as I have attempted to do in *Article Two* of this thesis.

With its growing influence on the global stage, China’s interactions in the developing world some have begun to question its moral obligation to intervene on issues such as human and animal rights abuses and violations, and its role in locations of conflict such as Sudan (Carmody and Taylor 2010; Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006; Osondu-Oti 2016; Sautman and Hairong 2007; Taylor 2005; Tull 2006). China’s official position is that every country must determine its own definition of human rights and any intervention on

⁴⁰ Note that this is essentially the same idea promoted by many modernization theorists like Rostow. England was portrayed as the quintessential example of modernization and economic growth due to the industrial revolution. Ergo, every nation can develop if they simply industrialized. There seems to be a double layered rhetoric. On the one hand, you have the “theory” – the West’s attempt at understanding China’s motivations in its foreign policy through its lens hence Beijing Consensus as opposed to Washington consensus. On the other, you have the “mechanism” again modelled on a very Western idea of modernization.

its part would be in violation of said country's sovereignty (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN 2008). To some extent, I challenge this in *Article Two* in the case of China's relationship with Zimbabwe.

Still, no matter how we *label* China's engagement with the rest of the world, it is clear that it is a leading actor on the global stage. Therein lies the major barrier to China's global hegemonic ascendancy. Although the Beijing Consensus is a term that is often used to describe China's foreign policy, it is not an ideology, at least in its current form, that is being deployed or could be used to acquire and maintain hegemony. Hegemony involves not only total domination over production, trade, and finance, but also in the socio-cultural and political sphere. This is accomplished through the effective use of an ideology that creates "a high degree of consensus... in which subordinate classes appear to actively support and subscribe to values... which bind them to, incorporate them into, the prevailing power structure" (Storey 1993:119). This means that the Beijing Consensus has to be utilized not only to convince the developing world of China's hegemonic status, but it also has to persuade Western nation-states too.

Gramsci (1934) notes that during the period where there is a struggle for hegemony, compromises and alliances will be made with subordinate groups to bring them all together under a hegemonic umbrella. Hegemony in Gramscian terms, is more of a process – a wrangling of sorts *for influence* but done in a shrewd, restrained way. This type of hegemony largely suggests a dominant or subordinate group leading through persuasion, with a hint of coercion. It is achieved through exercising power over subordinate groups, but even with power firmly in its grasp, leadership is equally important (1971). Furthermore, gaining hegemony does not involve the total domination of all competing potential replacements of the failing hegemon but rather, it is aligning one's interests (economic, political, social) with that of everyone else. If we suppose the US is the failing hegemon and various countries such as Germany, the US itself and Russia as competitors for hegemony, China would need to convince them to all to follow its lead. As things stand, even while developing extensive trade and economic relationships with

China, Western countries continue to demonized China and politicians are all too happy to use it as a “bogeyman” in domestic politics.

Setting aside the limitations of the Beijing Consensus as a means to effectuate hegemony, China has another potential ideology that could be used in hegemony-making if deployed effectively – *tianxia* 天下. The theory and concept of *tianxia*, which literally means ‘all under heaven’, was developed by Zhao Tingyang in his book *Tianxia Tixi: Shijie Zhidu Zhexue Daolun* [The *Tianxia* System: A Philosophy for the World Institution]. In it, Zhao seeks to advance a Chinese-centric world politics that is qualitatively different from current and past Western ones. He writes: “The historical significance of ‘rethinking China’ lies in recovering China’s own ability to think, reconstruct its world views, values and methodologies, and thinking about China’s future, Chinese concepts about the future and China’s role and responsibilities in the world” (Zhao 2005:7).⁴¹ Zhao, of course, was writing around the same time period when there was a general backlash against New Confucianism,⁴² which was seen as overly influenced by Western political ideas and especially liberal democracy, by a faction of the Chinese elite. This created the ideally-suited atmosphere in which *Tianxia Tixi* became an instant hit in China as it was seen as providing Chinese solutions to global problems (Callahan 2008).

For Zhao, the *tianxia* system involves the marrying of the geographic (all of the physical earth), the psychological (all of the hearts of all of the people in the world), and the institutional (a world political system and institution). All three aspects of *tianxia* are necessary and interdependent ensuring the primacy of the world over nation-states. According to Zhao, the Westphalian notion of government and of the nation-state foisted upon the world by the core Western countries have brought disorder and chaos. The interest of each individual nation-state is therefore held above the interest of the world. Per Zhao, it is

⁴¹ Translated by Zhang Feng (2010).

⁴² New Confucianism is a “neoconservative philosophical movement with religious overtones”(Makeham 2003:2) promoted and/or researched by prominent Chinese intellectuals based in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the United States of America. It advocates an integration of sorts between Confucianist philosophy and Western ideas of rationalism and humanism.

through *tianxia*, that we can transcend the current world dis-order (Callahan 2008). With *tianxia*, the world can be organized like a family, transforming it into a home for all (Zhao 2005:49–61). *Tianxia*, with its geographic and institutional binding of all the people in the world, can create a more inclusive global order that eliminates the very concept of “the Other”. Furthermore, the world institution under *tianxia* can bring order and authority for the entire world. For Zhao, by creating order at the world level, disorder at the lower national level would diminish (basically arguing against internationalism which would still place national interests ahead of world interests). The *tianxia* system thus imagines a world institution that can: 1) make the common interests of the whole a priority over individual interests, so that the benefits of joining the system will always be greater than the benefits of leaving it; 2) create a structure of harmony where individual interests are so interlocking and mutually constituted that anyone’s gain will always result in a gain for others, and anyone’s loss will always lead to a loss for others; and, 3) create common values by being inclusive of all cultures while denying the dominance of any one of them, so as to transform enemies into friends and realize world peace (Zhao 2005:320–21).⁴³

Notwithstanding the criticisms of Zhao’s *tianxia* system, that includes accusations of misunderstanding, misrepresentation and misinterpretation of Chinese texts, leveled at Zhao by his fellow scholars in China (Zhang 2006), he actually uses the primarily contemporary Western concept of Self-Other to explain his vision of a Sinocentric world-order. His analytical framework of China versus the West is the same dichotomized discourse that sociologists in the West has been trying to free themselves of. And as Callahan (2008) suggests, Zhao’s attempt at integrating culture and power is no different than Said’s (1978), and his use of analytical borders are similar to Levinas (2000), Bachelard (1994), Connolly (1991), and Walker (1993). Zhao’s use of Western concepts and ideas, for me, is a testament to the hegemony of Western philosophy throughout the world. His strategic use of ancient Chinese texts were supposed to help him

⁴³ Translated by Zhang Feng (2010).

formulate a new ideology that was wholly Chinese and project Chinese primacy on the world stage. But, what he came up with, was akin to contemporary Western thought, albeit Chinese-centric. I would also argue, that an ideology like *tianxia* which starts off by stating that the world is in chaos primarily due to Western ideology, and claims that a *tianxia* system instituted and ran by China is the only way forward, would find very few takers in the West. Yet, it does have potential if deployed strategically.




Figure 2a. Portugal and Greece in the tail end of the core economic zone.

A final finding not explicitly addressed in the articles in the thesis is that of a diminished periphery and a core that is slowly being affected by the changes (See Figures 1a. and 1b.) happening in the middle to lower-middle section of the global economic hierarchy. As an example, in 2010, although both Greece and Portugal are technically in the world-economic core, they are on the verge of falling out as can be seen

in Figure 2a.; and they do fall out by 2012. In Figure 2b. we show Greece and Portugal outside the core in 2013. Still, as Figure 1a. and 1b. indicates, the core zone has remained fairly stable but the valley/gaps (discussed earlier) between the core and semiperiphery continue to be a possible subject for analysis.




Figure 2b. Portugal and Greece outside the core economic zone.

Looking Ahead: Current Research Trajectories

There are two directions I plan on taking the article on commodified citizenship. I plan to continue working on this topic post-PhD particularly on the composition, location, and numbers of Chinese transnational capitalist class in the Caribbean. How much have they actually benefitted from the commodified citizenship—have they migrated to other islands/countries because of their new citizenships? How much

have they received in terms of trade tariff concessions because of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)⁴⁴ and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)⁴⁵? I also plan on examining the politics of commodified citizenship in developing countries, which has come under intense scrutiny over the last two years.

Chase-Dunn and myself are preparing a book chapter titled *Mind the Gap! Clustered Obstacles to Mobility in the Core/Periphery Hierarchy*. Our main focus, is on a) the persistent gap between the modes in the distribution, which is present regardless of methodology; and b) the inability of countries to make the leap from one mode to another. Arguments have been made across social science disciplines that variables such as economic system, corruption, education, ethno-linguistic fractionalization or the financial structures in a given country can affect its ability to move up or down the stratified world economic distribution. However, we argue that the gaps between modes and the immobility of country clusters are structural characteristics of the modern capitalist world system. That is, these are built-in limitations of the system itself. We take a cross-disciplinary approach, and rely heavily on ecological and systems theory in order to explain why these structural limits exists and attempt to shed light on how, if possible, greater mobility can occur in the modern stratified world economy.

I have tied the major findings of this thesis to the field of Sociology and to the subfield of Political Economy of the World System as well as other disciplines. I have documented the various studies that have found results similar to those of this thesis but hold that this thesis is comprehensive and examines the entire post decolonization period to present. The thesis is an important contribution to the discipline not only in scope but also in terms of the actual geographic area under study.

⁴⁴ CBI provides duty-free access to United States market for most goods. <https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/caribbean-basin-initiative-cbi>

⁴⁵ CARICOM is a union of twenty countries whose main objective is economic integration and the coordination of foreign policy. CARICOM is home to 60 million people and includes islands in the Caribbean, Guyana, Suriname, and Belize. <http://caricom.org/about-caricom/who-we-are/>

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
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
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

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

Appendix 1.



World-Economic distribution based on log GNI per capita as a function of percentage of total world population. 1965 to 2015 at five-year intervals.














Appendix 2.

List of countries categorized by world-economic zones in five-year intervals

1965

Periphery: Algeria, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Côte D'Ivoire, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Philippines, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Rep. of Congo, Niger, Sierra Leone, Papua New Guinea, Madagascar, Thailand, Rep. of Korea, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Sudan, Chad, Benin, India, Kenya, Nigeria, Togo, China, Botswana, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Malawi, Nepal, Rwanda.

Semiperiphery: Greece, Japan, Trinidad and Tobago, Spain Uruguay, Chile, Panama, Singapore, South Africa, Portugal, Mexico, Peru, Belize, Costa Rica, Gabon, Seychelles, Guyana, Colombia, Malaysia, Fiji, Guatemala, Brazil, Ecuador, Zimbabwe, Syrian Arab Republic, Islamic Republic of Iran, Zambia.

Core: Sweden, Canada, Bermuda, Iceland, Australia, Norway, France, Luxembourg, The Bahamas, Finland, Belgium, Netherlands, Israel, Austria, Italy, Argentina, Puerto Rico, R.B. Venezuela.

1970

Periphery: Guyana, Malaysia, Syrian Arab Republic, Guatemala, Seychelles, Dominican Republic, Algeria, Colombia, Oman, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Côte D'Ivoire, Tunisia, Honduras, Rep. of Korea, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Ghana, Liberia, Morocco, Bolivia, Rep. of Congo, Arab Rep. of Egypt, Philippines, Thailand, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Mauritania, Madagascar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Botswana, Niger, Sudan, Chad, Kenya, Togo, Benin, China, India, Central African Republic, The Gambia, Burkina Faso, Indonesia, Lesotho, Burundi, Nepal, Mali, Malawi, Rwanda.

Semiperiphery: Spain, R.B. Venezuela, Singapore, Portugal, Hong Kong SAR, Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, South Africa, Panama, Jamaica, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Gabon, Turkey, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Zambia, Belize Fiji, Islamic Rep. of Iran, Zimbabwe.

Core: United States, Sweden, Canada, Bermuda, Denmark, Kuwait, Australia, New Caledonia, Norway, France, The Bahamas, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Iceland, Finland, French Polynesia, United Kingdom, Italy, Austria, Japan, Israel, Puerto Rico, Greece, Argentina.

1975

Periphery: Guatemala, Côte D'Ivoire, Colombia, Nicaragua, Zambia, Papua New Guinea, Morocco, Rep. of Congo, Bolivia, El Salvador, Botswana, Senegal, Nigeria, Honduras, Philippines, Thailand, Liberia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Cameroon, Mauritania, Arab Rep. of Egypt, Sudan, Ghana, Madagascar, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Togo, Kenya, The Gambia, Indonesia, Lesotho, Niger, Chad, India, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Pakistan, Malawi, Mali, Burundi, Nepal, Rwanda.

Semiperiphery: Honk Kong SAR, R.B. Venezuela, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago, Malta, Uruguay, South Africa, Oman, Cuba, Islamic Rep. of Iran, Mexico, Jamaica, Panama, Brazil, Chile, Fiji Turkey, Ecuador,

Peru, Costa Rica, Syrian Arab Republic, Algeria, Seychelles, Malaysia, Belize, Tunisia, Zimbabwe, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Rep. of Korea.

Core: Monaco, Sweden, Lichtenstein, Kuwait, United States, Norway, Denmark, Canada, Bermuda, Netherlands, Iceland, Andorra, Luxembourg, Australia, Belgium, Germany, France, New Caledonia, Finland, Austria, Virgin Islands (U.S.), Saudi Arabia, French Polynesia, Japan, The Bahamas, United Kingdom, Italy, Israel, Greenland, Greece, Ireland, Spain, Gabon, Argentina, Singapore, Puerto Rico.

1980

Periphery: Morocco, Zimbabwe, Bolivia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Rep. of Congo, Papua New Guinea, Dominica, Nigeria, El Salvador, Guyana, Thailand, Philippines, Honduras, Kiribati, Senegal, Cameroon, Zambia, Nicaragua, Liberia, Arab Rep. of Egypt, Indonesia, Mauritania, Sudan, Kenya, Madagascar, Lesotho, Ghana, Togo, Niger, The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Benin, Pakistan, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, India, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Mali, Chad, Bangladesh, Burundi, China, Malawi, Guinea-Bissau, Nepal.

Semiperiphery: Oman, Iraq, Puerto Rico, Cyprus, Portugal, Argentina, Uruguay, South Africa, Mexico, Suriname, Chile, Islamic Re. of Iran, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Seychelles, Algeria, Costa Rica, Jordan, Rep. of Korea, Fiji, Turkey, Malaysia, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, Syrian Arab Republic, Belize, Tunisia, Mauritius, Jamaica, Colombia, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Côte D'Ivoire, Peru, Botswana.

Core: Monaco, Liechtenstein, Kuwait, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Belgium, Luxembourg, United States, France, Germany, Bermuda, Andorra, Canada, Finland, Austria, Australia, Japan, Greenland, French Polynesia United Kingdom, Ital, Virgin Islands (US), New Caledonia, New Zealand, The Bahamas, Greece, Ireland, Spain, Hong Kong SAR, Israel, Trinidad and Tobago, Singapore, Gabon, Malta, R.B. Venezuela.

1985

Periphery: Mongolia, Belize, Colombia, Dominica, Tunisia, Guatemala, Mauritius, Dominican Republic, Rep. of Congo, Botswana, Vanuatu, Jamaica, Peru, Bolivia, Thailand, Cameroon, Honduras, Zimbabwe, El Salvador, Tonga, Nicaragua, Morocco, Papua New Guinea, Cote D'Ivoire, Arab Rep. of Egypt, Kiribati, Indonesia, Philippines, Guyana, Cabo Verde, Senegal, Lesotho, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Mauritania, Pakistan, Nigeria, Liberia, Ghana, Zambia, Comoros, The Gambia, Kenya, Bhutan, India, Madagascar, China, Central African Rep., Benin, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Togo, Bangladesh, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Uganda, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Equatorial Guinea, Malawi, Nepal.

Semiperiphery: Hong Kong SAR, Israel, Trinidad and Tobago, Ireland, New Caledonia, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Barbados, Macao SAR, Puerto Rico, Gabon, Malta, Islamic Rep. of Iran, R.B. Venezuela, Antigua and Barbuda, Iraq, Argentina, Portugal, Rep. of Korea, Panama, St Kitts and Nevis, Seychelles, South Africa, Algeria, Cuba, Suriname, Mexico, Bulgaria, Malaysia, Ecuador, Jordan, Fiji, Brazil, Costa Rica, Uruguay, St Lucia, Turkey.

Core: Monaco, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Bermuda, United States, Norway, Kuwait, Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Luxembourg, Iceland, Australia, Japan, Finland, Netherlands, Germany, France, Austria, Saudi

Arabia, Virgin Islands (US), Belgium, United Kingdom, French Polynesia, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Italy, Andorra, Singapore, Greenland, Oman.

1990

Periphery: Swaziland, Colombia, Tonga, Vanuatu, Morocco, Guatemala, Cameroon, Rep. of Congo, Syrian Arab Republic, El Salvador, Cabo Verde, Peru, Dominican Republic, Zimbabwe, Papua New Guinea, Cote D'Ivoire, Arab Rep. of Egypt, Bolivia, Kiribati, Philippines, Senegal, Honduras, Albania, Indonesia, Bhutan, Comoros, Angola, Lesotho, Sudan, Mauritania, Sri Lanka, Central African Republic, Guinea, Zambia, Pakistan, Ghana, Togo, Guyana, India, Kenya, Benin, Rwanda, Burkina Faso, China, The Gambia, Uganda, Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Niger, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Chad, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Lao PDR, Mozambique, Malawi, Vietnam.

Semiperiphery: Seychelles, St. Kitts and Nevis, Gabon, Trinidad and Tobago, South Africa, Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico, St. Lucia, Brazil, Cuba, Islamic Rep. of Iran, R.B. Venezuela, Botswana, Mauritius, Malaysia, Algeria, Costa Rica, Panama, Dominica, Turkey, Bulgaria, Chile, Grenada, Belize, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Namibia, Fiji, Jamaica, Ukraine, Thailand, Mongolia, Suriname, Tunisia, Ecuador, Lebanon, Jordan.

Core: Monaco, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Sweden, Japan, Bermuda, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Denmark, United States, Germany, France, Austria, Canada, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, United Kingdom, Australia, Andorra, Greenland, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, The Bahamas, New Zealand, Hong Kong SAR, Ireland, Brunei Darussalam, Spain, Singapore, Israel, Cyprus, Greece, Macao SAR, Barbados, Malta, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Portugal, Iraq, Rep. of Korea, Puerto Rico, Antigua and Barbuda, Oman.

1995

Periphery: Algeria, Jordan, Romania, Cabo Verde, Belarus, Bulgaria, Guatemala, Islamic Rep. of Iran, Suriname, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Vanuatu, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Indonesia, Arab Rep. of Egypt, Ukraine, Solomon Islands, Syrian Arab Republic, Bolivia, Djibouti, The Gambia, , Guyana, Cameroon, Sri Lanka, Cote d'Ivoire, Albania, Lesotho, Honduras, Nicaragua, Turkmenistan, Zimbabwe, Mauritania, Uzbekistan, Senegal, China, Georgia, Bhutan, Comoros, Pakistan, Guinea, Moldova, Angola, Mongolia, Armenia, Rep. of Congo, Azerbaijan, Sudan, Ghana, India, Zambia, Kyrgyz Republic, Benin, Lao PDR, Central African Republic, Bangladesh, Rep. of Yemen, Cambodia, Togo, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Vietnam, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Uganda, Guinea-Bissau, Nepal, Rwanda, Chad, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Eritrea, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi, Burundi, Ethiopia, Dem. Rep. of Congo.

Semiperiphery: Puerto Rico, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Kitts and Nevis, Seychelles, Oman, Palau, Uruguay, Czech Republic, Mexico, Chile, Hungary, Slovak Republic, Malaysia, Gabon, Trinidad and Tobago, South Africa, Brazil, Lebanon, St. Lucia, Mauritius, Costa Rica, Poland, Botswana, Marshall Islands, Panama, Dominica, RB Venezuela, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Belize, Turkey, Thailand, Grenada, Russian Federation, Cuba, Fiji, Namibia, Fed. States of Micronesia, Colombia, Jamaica, Tonga, Ecuador, Peru, Dominican Republic, Tunisia, Swaziland, FYR Macedonia, Paraguay, El Salvador.

Core: Monaco, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Japan, Bermuda, Denmark, Norway, Germany, United States, Austria, Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Iceland, Singapore, Hong Kong SAR, Finland, United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, Kuwait, Greenland, Australia, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Andorra, Ireland, Macao SAR, Brunei Darussalam, New Zealand, Spain, The Bahamas, Israel, Cyprus, Greece, Rep. Korea, Portugal, Bahrain, Malta, Barbados.

2000

Periphery: Bhutan, Djibouti, Georgia, Ukraine, The Gambia, Armenia, Cote d'Ivoire, Uzbekistan, Papua New Guinea, Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Turkmenistan, Lesotho, Rep. of Congo, Indonesia, Mauritania, Senegal, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Mongolia, India, Bangladesh, Comoros, Kenya, Rep. of Yemen, Vietnam, Angola, Benin, Guinea, Moldova, Ghana, Zambia, Sudan, Cambodia, Togo, Tanzania, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Madagascar, Rwanda, Nepal, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Niger, Tajikistan, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Ethiopia.

Semiperiphery: Portugal, Slovenia, Barbados, Bahrain, Rep. of Korea, Malta, Puerto Rico, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Seychelles, Oman, Uruguay, Czech Republic, Palau, Mexico, Slovak Republic, Lebanon, Trinidad and Tobago, Croatia, Chile, Poland, Hungary, St. Lucia, Turkey, Estonia, RB Venezuela, Panama, Mauritius, Grenada, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominica, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Malaysia, Latvia, Jamaica, Lithuania, Belize, South Africa, Gabon, Botswana, Marshall Islands, Dominican Republic, Cuba, Colombia, Tunisia, Fiji, Fed. States of Micronesia, El Salvador, Namibia, Tonga, Thailand, Peru, Suriname, FYR Macedonia, Jordan, Islamic Rep. of Iran, Romania, Russian Federation, Bulgaria, Guatemala, Samoa, Algeria, West Bank and Gaza, Ecuador, Serbia, Swaziland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vanuatu, Arab Rep. of Egypt, Kiribati, Belarus, Morocco, Cabo Verde, Paraguay, Kazakhstan, Philippines, Albania, Solomon Islands, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Syrian Arab Republic, China, Honduras, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Sri Lanka.

Core: Monaco, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Channel Islands, Luxembourg, Norway, United States, Japan, Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Hong Kong SAR, Austria, Finland, Germany, Belgium, France, Ireland, Singapore, Canada, Isle of Man, Italy, Australia, The Bahamas, Greenland, Andorra, Kuwait, Israel, French Polynesia, Spain, Brunei Darussalam, Macao SAR, Cyprus, New Zealand, New Caledonia, Greece.

2005

Periphery: Rep. of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Lesotho, Timor-Leste, Cameroon, Mongolia, Solomon Islands, Moldova, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Pakistan, India, Papua New Guinea, Mauritania, Rep. of Yemen, Vietnam, Nigeria, Comoros, Benin, Sudan, Zambia, Bangladesh, Kenya, Uzbekistan, Ghana, Chad, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Kyrgyz Republic, Mali, Zimbabwe, Haiti, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, Mozambique, Central African Republic, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Nepal, Malawi, Uganda, Madagascar, Rwanda, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Niger, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Ethiopia, Burundi, Liberia.

Semiperiphery: Saudi Arabia, Czech Republic, Antigua and Barbuda, Slovak Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Seychelles, St. Kitts and Nevis, Oman, Hungary, Croatia, Estonia, Palau, Mexico, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Libya, Grenada, Turkey, Chile, Lebanon, Gabon, Mauritius, St. Lucia, Malaysia, Dominica, South Africa, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, RB Venezuela, Costa Rica, Panama, Botswana,

Uruguay, Equatorial Guinea, Argentina, Russian Federation, Cuba, Romania, Jamaica, Brazil, Bulgaria, Tuvalu, Belize, Montenegro, Serbia, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Maldives, Namibia, Suriname, Tunisia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Kazakhstan, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Islamic Rep. of Iran, Ecuador, El Salvador, Belarus, Thailand, Algeria, Albania, Fed. States of Micronesia, Peru, Jordan, Tonga, Swaziland, Samoa, Cabo Verde, Morocco, Guatemala, Vanuatu, Kiribati, China, West Bank and Gaza, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Syrian Arab Republic, Armenia, Philippines, Georgia, Honduras, Azerbaijan, Arab Rep. of Egypt, Paraguay, Bhutan, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Nicaragua, Angola, Guyana, Bolivia, Djibouti.

Core: Monaco, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, Switzerland, Channel Islands, Iceland, Denmark, United States, Sweden, Ireland, Netherlands, San Marino, United Kingdom, Finland, Andorra, Qatar, Japan, Isle of Man, Austria, United Arab Emirates, Belgium, France, Germany, Kuwait, Canada, Italy, Australia, Greenland, Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, Spain, New Zealand, Macao SAR, Cyprus, The Bahamas, Brunei Darussalam, Greece, Israel, Portugal, Slovenia, Rep. of Korea, Bahrain, Puerto Rico, Malta, Barbados.

2010

Periphery: Bhutan, Kiribati, Honduras, Moldova, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Zambia, Uzbekistan, Papua New Guinea, Vietnam, Ghana, India, Rep. of Yemen, Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, Sao Tome and Principe, Cameroon, Lesotho, Mauritania, Pakistan, South Sudan, Senegal, Kenya, Lao PDR, Solomon Islands, Chad, Kyrgyz Republic, Bangladesh, Benin, Comoros, Cambodia, Mali, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Haiti, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Rwanda, Uganda, Guinea-Bissau, Nepal, Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Togo, Malawi, Madagascar, Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Niger, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Liberia, Burundi.

Semiperiphery: Slovenia, Portugal, The Bahamas, Rep. of Korea, Malta, Czech Republic, Oman, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, Puerto Rico, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, St. Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, Latvia, Lithuania, Libya, RB Venezuela, Chile, Uruguay, Seychelles, Russian Federation, Turkey, Brazil, Argentina, Palau, Mexico, Romania, Lebanon, Malaysia, Gabon, Mauritius, Equatorial Guinea, Suriname, Kazakhstan, Costa Rica, Grenada, Panama, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Dominica, St. Lucia, South Africa, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Islamic Rep. of Iran, Belarus, Serbia, Cuba, Colombia, Botswana, Azerbaijan, Maldives, Dominican Republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR, Macedonia, , Tuvalu, Thailand, Jamaica, Algeria, Ecuador, Iraq, Peru, Albania, Namibia, China, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Belize, Jordan, Marshall Islands, Fiji, Angola, Tonga, El Salvador, Kosovo, Cabo Verde, Armenia, Samoa, Georgia, Ukraine, Morocco, Paraguay, Guyana, Fed. States of Micronesia, Timor-Leste, Philippines, Vanuatu, Guatemala, Swaziland, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Arab Rep. of Egypt, West Bank and Gaza, Rep. of Congo, Mongolia.

Core: Bermuda, Norway, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Isle of Man, Qatar, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, United States, Belgium, Australia, Macao SAR, China, Germany, Singapore, Ireland, Canada, France, Japan, Andorra, Kuwait, United Kingdom, Italy, Iceland, United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong SAR, Spain, Cyprus, Israel, New Zealand, Greece.

2015

Periphery: Bhutan, Honduras, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Sudan, Lao PDR, India, Zambia, Ghana, Pakistan, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Cameroon, Tajikistan,

Bangladesh, Kyrgyz Republic, Cambodia, Senegal, Tanzania, Chad, Benin, Zimbabwe, Haiti, Mali, South Sudan, Nepal, Rwanda, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Togo, Guinea, Madagascar, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Niger, Liberia, Malawi, Central African Republic, Burundi.

Semiperiphery: Trinidad and Tobago, Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Oman, Uruguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, Lithuania, Latvia, Barbados, Seychelles, Chile, Antigua and Barbuda, Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Argentina, Palau, Panama, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Malaysia, Costa Rica, Turkey, Brazil, Mexico, Mauritius, Romania, Suriname, Gabon, Grenada, Lebanon, China, Equatorial Guinea, Turkmenistan, St. Lucia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Colombia, Dominica, Maldives, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Azerbaijan, Botswana, Belarus, Peru, Dominican Republic, South Africa, Libya, Ecuador, Thailand, Iraq, Serbia, Namibia, FYR Macedonia, Jamaica, Algeria, Fiji, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jordan, Belize, Albania, Paraguay, Angola, Georgia, Guyana, Tunisia, Kosovo, El Salvador, Samoa, Armenia, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Guatemala, Philippines, Indonesia, Arab Rep. of Egypt, Cabo Verde, Kiribati, Swaziland, Bolivia, Morocco, Nigeria, Ukraine, Rep. of Congo.

Core: Norway, Qatar, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Australia, Denmark, Sweden, United States, Singapore, Iceland, Netherlands, Canada, Austria, Ireland, Finland, Germany, Belgium, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong SAR, Kuwait, France, New Zealand, Japan, Israel, Italy, Spain, Rep. of Korea, Cyprus, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, The Bahamas, Portugal, Bahrain, Greece.