PART III-I

Pain in ethics

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BAD BY NATURE

An axiological theory of pain

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This chapter defends an axiological theory of pain according to which pains are bodily episodes that are bad in some way. Section 1 introduces two standard assumptions about pain that the axiological theory constitutively rejects: (i) that pains are essentially tied to consciousness and (ii) that pains are not essentially tied to badness. Section 2 presents the axiological theory by contrast to these and provides a preliminary defense of it. Section 3 introduces the paradox of pain and argues that since the axiological theory takes the location of pain at face value, it needs to grapple with the privacy, self-intimacy and incorrigibility of pain. Sections 4, 5 and 6 explain how the axiological theory may deal with each of these.

Before starting, two methodological caveats are in order. First, the goal is here to understand *what pains are*: we want to spell out the *nature* of pains, that is, their *essence* or *real definition* (Fine 1994). Perhaps that nature is multifaceted: perhaps pains have several essential features. To express these, I shall use the following expressions interchangeably: "one essential feature of pain is to be *F*," "pains are essentially *F*," "part of the nature of pains is to be *F*," "what it is to be a pain is in part to be *F*."[1]

Second, the following purports to shed light on the nature of pain *from the stance of descriptive metaphysics*. One working assumption is therefore that at least part of the nature of pain is correctly captured by our pre-theoretical conceptions. Ordinary thinking about pain cannot be completely misguided (on pain of not being about pain), and may even prove subtler than expected.

1 Two dogmas about pain

Contemporary literature on pain tends to agree on two broad views about the nature of pain. The first may be called "Experience-Dependence":

> Experience-Dependence: Part of the nature of pains is to be either experiences of bodily episodes, or experienced bodily episodes.[2]

That pains are by nature *experiences of bodily episodes* is a view endorsed in the the International Association for the Study of Pain's definition of pain, and constitutes the common denominator of a wide variety of theories of pain such as perceptualism (Armstrong 1993;

Pitcher 1970) evaluativism (Helm 2002; Cutter and Tye 2011; Bain 2013, Chapter 3, this volume) and recent adverbialist accounts (Aydede, Chapter 18, this volume).

The second way to essentially connect pains with experiences is to identify pain with *experienced bodily episodes*. Thus pains may be equated to *experienced physical bodily processes* (Smith et al. 2011), to *mind-dependent bodily sense-data* (Jackson 1977), or to *some experienced* sui generis *bodily pain-quality* on a par with pressures and temperatures. Note that even when reference is made to some physical episodes or qualities which, contrary to sense-data, may exist independently from experiences thereof, pains are not equated to such physical episodes or qualities *simpliciter*, but to such episodes or qualities *qua* experienced.

All in all, the first standard assumption about pain is that if we scrutinize the nature of pain, some experience will always be found, either because pain is itself an experience, or because pain is essentially the object of some experience. Experiences – or mental cognates: consciousness, feeling, perception … – necessarily figure in pain's *definiens*.

The second, perhaps even more widely shared, assumption about pain is that if we scrutinize the nature of pain, no value will ever be found. Pains are essentially non-axiological phenomena. Call that second standard assumption "Value-Independence":

> Value-Independence: It is not part of the nature of pains to be bad.

It is not in the essence of pain to be value-laden. Pain's badness is not part of pain's nature. Value-Independence may be rephrased in the following way. Let us use "painfulness" as a topic-neutral term meant to capture the property, whatever it is, which makes a (bodily or mental) episode be a pain:

> Painfulness: the property, whatever it is, in virtue of which an episode is a pain.

By stipulation, then, *pains are painful episodes*. In this terminology, Value-Independence amounts to saying that *painfulness is not a value*. Is Value-Independence really an orthodox assumption? Two objections may be raised against that proposal.

The first stresses that pains are widely held to be *necessarily* bad. This is true, but it is important to see that pains can be necessarily bad without being essentially bad. Compare with knowledge. Although knowledge is often held to be necessarily good, knowledge is scarcely ever defined in terms of its goodness. The same holds true of pain, following Value-Independence. When philosophers insist that pain is always bad, they do not want to suggest that "being bad" is part of the *definiens* of pain. In Fine's (2002: 271) terms, "[i]t is no part of what it is to be pain that it should be bad." Rather, the nature of pain is held to constitute the *supervenience basis* or *ground* of the badness of pain. It does not include that badness. This standard and often tacit assumption is clearly spelled out by Zangwill (2005: 127): "Pain necessitates (or suffices for) badness even though it is not part of pain's essence (or nature or being or identity) to be bad."

A second objection to the present claim that Value-Independence is orthodox is that *evaluativism*, one chief contemporary theory of pain, does analyze pains in term of values. Evaluativism (Helm 2002; Cutter and Tye 2011; Bain 2013, and Chapter 3, this volume) accounts for pains by appealing to experiences *representing some bodily episodes (disturbances, damages …) as being bad for us*.

It is true indeed that evaluativism uses value-terms in its *analysans* of pain. But, first, these value-terms lie within the scope of a non-factive psychological connective. "Experiencing *x* as bad" does not entail "*x*'s being bad." Hence, although pains, according to evaluativism, are essentially dependent on something *feeling bad*, they are not essentially dependent on anything *being bad*. Second, even when such evaluations are veridical, the value that is then actually exemplified is not a value *of pains*, but *of their object*, of what pains are about – typically, bodily damages (Bain 2013). (See also Chapter 30, this volume.)

Thus Value-Independence is in fact subscribed to even by evaluativists about pain. To claim that it is part of the nature of pain to represent its object as being bad is not to claim that it is part of the nature of pain to be bad. Representing bodily disturbances as bad constitutes, according to the standard evaluativist picture, the supervenience basis or ground of pain's badness. Pain's badness, here again, is a consequence, but not a part, of pain's nature.

On the whole, neither the view that pains are necessarily bad nor evaluativism contradicts Value-Independence. That Value-Independence represents the orthodox view is reflected in the division of labor within the field: psychologists, neuroscientists and philosophers of mind study the nature of pain; moral philosophers and value theorists try to shed light on its value.

By wrapping Experience-Dependence and Value-Independence together, one arrives at a fairly orthodox position about pains that could be called "Pain Psychologism":

> Pain Psychologism: It is in the nature of pains to be experiences or experienced, but it is not in the nature of pains to be bad.

2 The Axiological Theory of Pain

I believe that both Experience-Dependence and Value-Independence are mistaken: pains do not essentially depend on experiences, but they do essentially depend on value. Call this "anti-psychologism" about pain:

> Pain Anti-psychologism: It is neither in the nature of pains to be experiences nor to be experienced, but it is in the nature of pains to be bad.

To get to the version of Pain Anti-psychologism to be defended here, let us first zoom out so as to consider the broader class of *unpleasant or disagreeable sensations*, which includes pains, but also dizziness, tiredness, itches, prickles, nauseas, etc. (Corns 2014). Being painful, accordingly, is only one way of being disagreeable. Trivially, what all disagreeable sensations have in common is that they are disagreeable. Value-Independence holds that disagreeableness is a mental, non-axiological property. I believe, on the contrary, that what all these disagreeable bodily sensations have in common is that they are bad in some way. Disagreeableness is an axiological, non-mental property. More precisely:

> Axiological Theory of Disagreeable Sensations: x is a disagreeable sensation of S $=_{df} x$ is an episode in S's body which is finally, personally and *pro tanto* bad for S.

Disagreeableness is the final, personal, *pro tanto* and negative value of bodily episodes. Let me explain.

To say that pains and other disagreeable sensations are *finally* bad is to say that they are not instrumentally bad: pains are bad in themselves, independently of the value of their effects. Pain may well accrue some instrumental value as well, but such an instrumental value is typically positive.[3]

To say that pains or other disagreeable sensations are *personally* bad, by contrast to being bad *simpliciter*, is to say that their badness is related to the subject of the pain: a pain is bad *for* its subject, in a way it is not for others. Personal values should not be conflated with subjective values: some things may be bad for Julie (a poison, say) without her knowing or experiencing that they are bad for her (Rønnow-Rasmussen 2011). Note that the axiological theory is compatible with many different accounts of final personal values. Pain's badness may be taken to be a primitive non-natural property, analyzed in terms of fitting-attitudes (Rønnow-Rasmussen 2011), in terms of aptness to harm (Cutter and Tye 2011; see Zimmerman 2009 for a defense of the symmetrical view that personal goodness should be analyzed in terms of benefit), etc.

To say that pains or other disagreeable sensations are bad *pro tanto*, by contrast to being bad *in toto*, amounts to saying that pains are not necessarily bad *overall*. Perhaps pains are good or neutral on the whole, that is, all things considered – for instance because of their positive instrumental value. Likewise a medicine may be bad with respect to its taste, but good overall, because it saves life.

This way of characterizing the disvalue of pain and other disagreeable sensations is generally accepted (see, e.g., Goldstein 1989). But, as seen above, the standard take is that such final, personal *pro tanto* negative values are not essential to pain and other disagreeable sensations, but only necessary to them. In accordance with Pain Psychologism, disagreeableness is typically considered a non-axiological, mental property, which constitutes the supervenience basis of pain's disvalue. The Axiological Theory of Disagreeable Sensation maintains by contrast that disagreeableness *is* a negative value, so that being bad is part of what it is to be a disagreeable sensation.

To get an axiological account of *pains* from such an axiological account of disagreeable sensations, one simply needs to specify further the way in which bodily episodes are bad. Disagreeableness, as a personal final *pro tanto* disvalue of bodily episodes, is a thin value. Painfulness, I submit, is a thicker value, a value with more descriptive content. *Being painful is a way of being disagreeable, that is, a way of being finally personally bad.* As there are two main ways to get thick concepts from thin ones (see, e.g., Tappolet 2004; Elstein and Hurka 2009; Roberts 2011), there are two main ways to arrive at painfulness from disagreeableness. The first is to argue that what makes painfulness thicker than disagreeableness cannot be disentangled. Painfulness would be irreducibly thicker than disagreeableness: it would be a primitive thick value of the personal, *pro tanto* final kind. The second is to argue that the descriptive content of painfulness may be disentangled further (for instance, in terms of the kind of bodily episodes it accrues to – some possible candidates being bodily disturbances, damages, disorders, threats thereof, intense pressures, or extreme temperatures). I shall here remain neutral on this issue and will only assume that *painfulness is a thick value falling under the thinner value of disagreeableness.*

> Axiological Theory of Pain: x is a pain of $S =_{df} x$ is an episode in S's body which is finally, personally and *pro tanto* bad in the relevant way for S.

In other words, a pain is a painful bodily episode, where *being painful* is understood as a thick value falling under the thin final personal *pro-tanto* value of *being disagreeable*.

The Axiological Theory of Pain (ATP) is a version of anti-psychologism about pain. The term "experience" does not figure in pain's *definiens*, but the term "badness" does. Using again "painfulness" as a topic-neutral term to denote the property, whatever it is, in virtue of which an episode is a pain, the contrast between the ATP and Pain Psychologism may be represented as follows:


Pain Psychologism
Pain's badness
supervenes on
Painfulness
=non-axiological
mental property
≠Pain's badness
exemplified by
Episode
a pain
Axiological Theory
Painfulness
= axiological
non-mental property
= Pain's badness
exemplified by
Episode
a pain

Figure 27.1

Although unorthodox, the view that algedonic properties such as pleasantness, unpleasantness, disagreeableness or painfulness are value properties is not unprecedented. It has been embraced in various versions by Meinong (1972: 91, 95), Scheler (1973: 97, 105), Hartmann (1932: vol. 1, 131–132; vol. 2, 160), von Wright (1963: ch. 4), Goldstein (1989, 2000), Mendola (1990), Rachels (2000), Hewitt (2008) and Mulligan (2009). Here is von Wright:

> Most writers in the past regard pleasure as either some kind of sensation or as something between sensation and emotion. Moore, Broad, and the non-naturalists in general take it for granted that pleasantness is a "naturalistic" attribute of things and states and not an axiological term. This, I think, is a bad mistake.
>
> *(von Wright 1963: 63)*

Here are two initial motivations in favor of the ATP. The first is that in the standard psychologist picture, painfulness and pains' badness end up being phenomenologically redundant. The badness of a pain is not presented as an additional property, on top of its being a pain. Insofar as phenomenology is a good guide to the nature of pain, the distinction between the pain-making property of pains and the value of pain does not capture any genuine difference:

Premise 1: Our typical experiences of pains present us with pains as they are. (Experiences of pains are not systematically misleading.)
Premise 2: Our typical experiences of pains present us with painfulness – the property, whatever it is, in virtue of which pains are pains. (Pains are experienced as such, not as smells or sounds.)
Premise 3: Our typical experiences of pains present us with pains as being bad. Pains feel bad.
Premise 4: Our typical experiences of pains do not present us with the badness of pains as distinct from, and additional to, their painfulness. Pains are not experienced as being painful and, on top of that, bad.
Conclusion: Pains' badness is not distinct from painfulness.

A similar argument is put forward by Goldstein (2000) with respect to pleasure, to the effect that pleasure's goodness is essential to it.

The second motivation in favor of the ATP is that equating the essential property of pains with a value helps to solve the heterogeneity problem of pains – the problem of identifying what the multifarious kinds of bodily pains have in common: "what is the sensory resemblance between the intense freezing pain of an almost frozen foot and the diffuse hot pain of a sunburned back?" (Clark 2005).

If painfulness is construed as a non-axiological property or quality, this problem seems indeed intractable. But equating painfulness with a value paves the way for a plausible answer: what all bodily pains have in common is being bad for their subject. Clark puts his finger on that solution:

> For my part, when I reflect on these episodes of pain, the only common quality I can find in the feelings so designated seems to be that expressed by the general term "bad" or "aversive."
>
> *(Clark 2005)*

Clark does not endorse the ATP, however; for him, what all pains have in common is that their subject is disposed to avoid them. But it is telling that he naturally uses "bad" to capture the property common to all pains. As it happens, many answers to the heterogeneity problem – what all pains have in common is to be averted, to be worthy of being averted, to be disliked … – echo well-known reductionist strategies with respect to values. A possible diagnosis is that such theories are presenting as a single account what is in fact the conjunction of two theories: an axiological theory of pain surreptitiously parceled with a reductionist theory of values.

In the rest of this chapter, I want to argue that on top of avoiding the phenomenological redundancy of pain's badness, and of providing a neat solution to the heterogeneity problem of pains, the ATP paves the way for a promising way of handling the vexing *paradox of pain*.

3 The ATP and the paradox of pain

Are pains in the mind or in the body? This question raises the famous paradox of pain – acutely described in Hill 2005, Chapter 5, this volume; Aydede 2009, 2013, Chapter 18, this volume; Hardcastle, Chapter 1, this volume. The three following features of pain suggest, initially, that pains should be in the mind:

Privacy: Only the subject of a pain can directly access it. If Julie has a pain, John cannot feel Julie's pain (at least not in the way Julie does; see de Vignemont's Chapter 21, this volume).

Self-Intimacy: Pains are necessarily felt or experienced. If Julie has a pain, Julie feels the pain she has (see Pereplyotchik's Chapter 17, this volume).

Incorrigibility: Feeling or experiencing a pain entails having a pain. If Julie feels that she has a pain, Julie has a pain (*see* Langland-Hassan's Chapter 20, this volume).

But a fourth feature of pains suggests that pains are not mental: namely, pains seem to be *located* in the body. Since mental episodes do not, from a descriptive standpoint, have bodily locations (although their reductive basis may have one in the brain), pain's bodily location runs afoul of the view that pains are mental. The paradox of pain is thus that the Privacy, Self-Intimacy and Incorrigibility of pains seem irreconcilable with their bodily location.

The standard way of handling the paradox is to give priority to the three mental aspects of pains – by endorsing Experience-Dependence – and to try to account, one way or another, for the phenomenon of pain location.

The ATP takes the opposite route: take pain's location at face value, and try to explain Privacy, Self-Intimacy and Incorrigibility in some other way. Rejecting Experience-Dependence on behalf of the location of pain is not an unprecedented move. Stumpf (1928) argues – tracing his view back to Malebranche – that pains are neither experiences nor emotions, but located qualities on a par with sounds and colors. As Bain (2007) usefully recalls, within analytic philosophy, the view that pains are objective conditions of the body has been endorsed or suggested by Cornman (1977), Graham and Stephens (1985) and Newton (1989). More recently, Reuter (2011) and Reuter et al. (2013) have argued on experimental grounds that in the folk conception, pain is an objective bodily condition rather than an experience or *sense-datum* (for discussion, see also Chapter 1). Hill (2005, Chapter 5, this volume) argues that at least one concept of pain is that of a bodily disturbance.

The ATP therefore belongs to the family of theories that equate pains with some objective bodily conditions rather than with mental states. But contrary to other objectivist theories of pain, the ATP equates pains with *value-laden* bodily conditions. Thanks to this, I shall now argue, the ATP is better suited than other objectivist theories to deal with the Privacy, Self-Intimacy and Incorrigibility of pains. More precisely, under the ATP:

- Privacy can be accounted for by relying on the axiological distinction between *personal and impersonal values*;
- Self-Intimacy can be accounted for by appealing to the metaphysical distinction between *modal and essential accounts of ontological dependence.*
- Incorrigibility can be explained away thanks to the psychological distinction between *pain and suffering.*

4 Tackling Privacy

According to the ATP, the value of pain is *personal*: Julie's pain is not bad *simpliciter* (as are moral values) but bad *for her*, in a way it is not bad for Paul. That pain's essential badness is personal is, I suggest, what explains pain's essential Privacy.

To get Privacy from personal badness, one needs to adopt a further but plausible claim about the epistemology of personal values: the only way to directly access the final badness of *x* for Julie is to *be* Julie. Paul can only *indirectly* access what is good for Julie, *by putting himself in Julie's shoes*. Julie has privileged access to what is good for her. Accessing what is good for her requires first empathizing with her (Rønnow-Rasmussen 2011: 60). On this assumption, and since on the ATP personal badness is essential to pains, pain's Privacy holds true of pain in virtue of its axiological constituent. In other words, because it is in the nature of pain to be personally bad, a pain can only be directly accessed by the person for whom it is bad.

It should be stressed that such a proposal by no means entails Experience-Dependence. As stressed above, that her pain is bad for Julie does not entail that Julie's pain is bad in her eyes, nor that she experiences her pain as bad. The ATP entails that pains are person-dependent, not that they are experience-dependent.

The following analogy may help shed light on the present proposal. Pains, as the ATP understands them, share many features with *reflections* – e.g., the reflection of the moon on the sea. Once personal values are recognized as essential ingredients of pains, pains accrue some metaphysical perspectivality and, consequently, some epistemological privacy, which closely resemble those of reflections.

Metaphysically, first, reflections are dependent on a viewpoint. This notwithstanding, reflections are independent of their being experienced. Reflections are not mere appearances in our mind, purely intentional objects. That reflections do not depend on our experiences of them is shown by the following facts: (i) experiences of reflections can be veridical or illusory, (ii) closing one's eyes does not destroy the reflection of the moon at the viewpoint one occupies, (iii) contrary to mind-dependent objects, reflections can be photographed,[4] (iv) reflections may cause warming and even fires. In the very same way that reflections are viewpoint-dependent but experience-independent, pains, thanks to their essential personal value, are subject-dependent but not experience-dependent.

Second, because of their metaphysical perspectivality, reflections are epistemologically private in the sense of being directly accessible only from the very point of view on which they essentially depend. Here again, the analogy with pains is quite strong. In the same way that the reflection of the moon at a viewpoint can only be directly seen from that viewpoint, the badness of a pain for a person can only be directly felt by that person. And in the same way that to access the moon's reflection from Julie's viewpoint one has to imagine oneself occupying Julie's viewpoint, to access Julie's pain one has to put oneself in her shoes. Thus pains – qua personally bad – like reflections, are private without being experience-dependent.

5 Tackling Self-Intimacy

Self-Intimacy, on the face of it, straightforwardly entails Experience-Dependence: if pains cannot exist without being experienced, then, trivially, pains depend on experience.

A first reaction, on behalf of the ATP, is simply to reject Self-Intimacy by defending the possibility of unfelt pains (see, e.g., Palmer 1975; see also Chapters 17 and 20, this volume). Although I sympathize with this line of thought, I am willing to grant Self-Intimacy so as to suggest that, under the ATP, it can be reconciled with Experience-Independence.

The starting idea is that the above argument from Self-Intimacy to Experience-Dependence relies on a flawed conception of ontological dependence (Fine 1995; Lowe 2001; Correia 2006). Suppose, as some old Catholic representations have it, that *God sees everything*. God being a necessary being, this entails that nothing can exist without being seen by God. Yet we do not want to conclude from this that everything is a sense-datum of God, that everything depends on God's seeing. The reason is, to paraphrase Fine (1995), that the *source* of the necessity in question does not lie in the dependent nature of the world, but in the necessary and omniscient nature of God. That x cannot exist without y does not yet establish that x ontologically depends on y. This impossibility has yet to flow from the nature of x.

This paves the way for the following account of Self-Intimacy, compatible with Experience-*In*dependence. Pains are indeed necessarily felt, but the source of this necessity does not lie in pain's nature. Rather, it lies in the pain-tracking nature of consciousness. Consciousness is, with respect to one's pains, like God with respect to the world: it feels all of them. Thus, *the reason why there are no unfelt pains is not that pains are experience-dependent but that consciousness is pain-attracted.*

Why should it be so? Objectivist accounts of pain that accept Value-Independence have no clear answer available. If pains are on a par with sounds, smells, colors or other physical events, there is no reason why consciousness should track pains more than these.[5] If, on the other hand, pains are essentially bad for us, it is no wonder that pains attract consciousness. One of the essential functions of consciousness could be to monitor what is finally (dis) valuable for us.

This proposal faces however the following immediate objection: even if consciousness tracks by nature things that are bad for us, there is no guarantee that such things will lie within its field. Thus something finally bad for Julie may happen in her toe, but because of some nociceptive defect, Julie may fail to experience it. The ATP seems to entail that this finally bad episode would be an unfelt pain, thereby contradicting Self-Intimacy.

Self-Intimacy may however be rescued by restricting what counts as *Julie's body*. One may argue that if something bad for her is going on in Julie's toe, and that she cannot feel it, then this toe is not really *hers*. The parts of our body in which no algedonic sensations can be felt – such as the tips of our hairs, nails or teeth – are in one sense not ours: they do not belong to our *affective body* (de Vignemont and Massin 2015). If dysfunctions of the nociceptive systems modify the boundaries of the body that counts as ours, pain may be necessarily felt without being essentially felt.

6 Tackling Incorrigibility

I have argued that the ATP is compatible with – and even helps explain – Privacy and Self-Intimacy. My proposal for dealing with Incorrigibility – experiencing a pain entails having that pain – is different: I shall argue that Incorrigibility is false but that the ATP helps to disclose the grain of truth underlying it.

The case against Incorrigibility is relatively straightforward. Referred pains – where a pain is felt in another location than the one in which it really is – show that the felt location of a pain can be illusory (Hill 2005). Phantom limb pains – where a pain is felt in an amputated limb – show that experiences of pain can be hallucinatory. Although people suffering from phantom limb pains may well *be in pain*, in a sense to be elucidated soon, they still do not *have a pain*, as compellingly argued by Bain (2007). Pains can be mislocated, and even hallucinated. Incorrigibility, as it stands, should be rejected. (Cf. Chapter 20, this volume.)

If the case against Incorrigibility is so simple, why does Incorrigibility sound so compelling? The motivation underlying it seems to be that when Julie insists, sincerely, that she has an intense pain in her amputated limb, it will not do to reply to her that she's plain wrong. There is something she's right about. What is it?

The ATP points to the following answer. Bad things call for negative affective reactions: injustice calls for indignation; culpability calls for guilt; danger calls for fear, etc. Since pain, according to the ATP, is essentially bad, one is led to wonder: what is the appropriate affective reaction to pain? The answer, I submit, is *suffering*. Pains should be suffered. Enjoying a pain, or being indifferent to it, are incorrect affective responses to pain.

Although they are sometimes conflated or put under the same heading, pain and suffering are categorially distinct (a point urged by Scheler 1973: 105, 256–258, 333–338). Suffering – like fear, admiration, hate – is an emotion: an affective intentional state directed towards some (real or merely apparent) object or episode. Pains – like itches, tickles, nauseas – are non-intentional bodily episodes. Suffering is an attitude, pain is not. Pain is located, suffering is not. Pains are worthy of being suffered; suffering is our fitting affective reaction to pain. Although the distinction between pain and suffering becomes patent once pains are recognized as essentially bad, the ATP is not the only way to get to it. Feldman (2004) has championed the corresponding distinction between attitudinal and sensory pleasures;[6] Hill's distinction (Chapter 5, this volume) between *peripheral pain* and *central state pain* closely matches the distinction between pain and suffering;[7] and clinicians have long been aware that "[i]t is suffering, not pain, that brings patients into doctors' offices in hopes of finding relief" (Loeser 2000; see also Cassell 2004/1995).

With the pain/suffering distinction in hand, it becomes easy to account for the intuition underlying Incorrigibility. When Julie insists, sincerely, that she has an intense pain in her amputated limb, what she says is literally false. She has no pain in her limb, because she has no limb. *But* Julie is genuinely *suffering* from a hallucinatory pain. The plausibility of Incorrigibility relies on a conflation between pain and suffering. One may suffer a pain that one does not have, in the same way that one may fear a danger that one does not face. Suppose Julie hallucinates a tarantula over her head and insists that she is in real danger. She is not infallible about dangers for all that, quite the contrary. But she really is frightened by her hallucinatory perception. Likewise for her phantom limb "pains": she has no pain, but her pain hallucinations prompt genuine suffering. When we say, with an air of paradox, that Julie *is in pain* although she *has no pain*, what we mean is that Julie is genuinely suffering in reaction to a hallucination of pain.

Can we say more about the nature of suffering and its relation to pain? Suffering can be analyzed in terms of evaluative content, or suffering can be equated to some *sui generis* intentional mode. According to evaluative-content accounts of suffering, to suffer a (real or apparent) pain just is to experience/feel/perceive this pain as bad. According to intentional-mode accounts of suffering, to suffer a (real or apparent) pain is a *sui generis* affective attitude directed at the pain, an attitude we embrace in reaction to the pain being experienced as bad. Suffering being an emotion, this debate is an instance of the broader debate within emotions theory, between the so-called perceptualist accounts of emotions – which equate emotions to experiences of value (see, e.g., Tappolet 2000) – and the attitudinal account of emotions, which equates emotions to reactions to experiences of valuable things (see, e.g., Mulligan 2007; Deonna and Teroni 2012).

Without prejudging that complex issue, it may be noticed that pain asymbolia may provide a further reason to embrace the later, intentional-mode account of suffering. Pain asymbolics not only report feeling pain but, even more bafflingly, sometimes describe their pain as *hurting* and *painful* (see, e.g., Grahek 2007: 45; Bain 2014). Distinguishing the experience of the badness of a pain from the normal suffering reaction to it allows us to take these reports at face value. On that proposal asymbolics do experience their pain as bad, but fail to suffer it. *Feeling x as bad* and *suffering x* are distinct: the latter is the normal and correct reaction to the former. Subjects with phantom limb pains suffer from pains they feel, but do not have; patients with pain asymbolia fail to suffer from pains they have and feel.

In sum, equating pains with bodily episodes that are personally bad in a way allows us to (i) straightforwardly account for the location of pains, (ii) avoid the phenomenological redundancy between pain's badness and pain's painfulness, (iii) solve the heterogeneity problem for pains, (iv) explain the privacy of pain, (v) explain the self-intimacy of pain, and (vi) explain away the incorrigibility of pain.

Related topics

Chapter 1: A brief and potted overview on the philosophical theories of pain (Hardcastle)
Chapter 3: Evaluativist accounts of pain's unpleasantness (Bain)
Chapter 5: Fault lines in familiar concepts of pain (Hill)
Chapter 13: Psychogenic pain: old and new (Sullivan)
Chapter 17: Pain and consciousness (Pereplyotchik)

Chapter 18: Pain: perception or introspection? (Aydede)
Chapter 20: Pain and incorrigibility (Langland-Hassan)
Chapter 21: Can I see your pain? An evaluative model of pain perception (de Vignemont)
Chapter 30: Pain and justified evaluative belief (Cowan)

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Notes

1 See Correia 2006 on such generic essentialist statements.

2 I shall eschew talk of consciousness to avoid vexing terminological issues, but the idea may be rephrased by saying that a pain either involves (i) the transitive consciousness of some bodily episode or (ii) a bodily episode of which one is transitively aware. For discussion see also Chapter 17, this volume.

3 The concept of final value is distinct from the concept of intrinsic value. An intrinsic value is a value that supervenes on the intrinsic properties of its bearers. A final value is a value that is not instrumental. Some final values may be extrinsic (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000). This may be the case of disagreeableness: if disagreeableness is a personal value, it supervenes not only on the intrinsic properties of the bodily episodes it accrues to, but also on relations between such episodes and the subject to which that body belongs.

4 As Russell (1914) liked to recall in connection with closely similar examples, "The photograph cannot lie."

5 See Findlay 1961: 177, for a converging argument with respect to the motivational power of pains.

6 Two differences between the present view and that of Feldman are worth noting, though. First, Feldman (2004: 84) uses "disenjoying" instead of "suffering" to express the opposite of "enjoying." Second, while on the present proposal pains are *worthy* of being suffered (but not necessarily so), Feldman maintains that sensory pleasures are *necessarily* enjoyed. See Massin 2013 for an overview of different ways of drawing the sensory/attitudinal pleasures distinction.

7 Although I fully agree with Hill on the distinction, I disagree with him on two more superficial points. First, I disagree that the central affective state corresponds to our concept of *pain*. The concept of *suffering* is the one that captures such a negative mental state. Second and relatedly, I disagree with him that folk psychology fails to distinguish the two algesic concepts. For instance, we speak of "suffering pain" and consider it inappropriate (but not impossible or meaningless) to enjoy pain.

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