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Abstract
As part of a theoretical and friendly dialogue that we have developed over the years (Marková et al., 2020, 2022; Zittoun, 2017), we both realised that our newly published books appeared almost simultaneously at the same publisher (Marková, 2023; Zittoun, 2024). To pursue this dialogue, we proposed to review each other's book, and we then had a dialogue on these two reviews. The present "dialogical review" has thus three parts: the first part presents some of the points emerging from our dialogue; the second part is the review of Ivana Marková's *The making of a dialogical theory. Social representations and communication* (2023) by Tania Zittoun; and the third is the review of Tania Zittoun's *Pleasure of thinking* (2024) by of Ivana Marková.

Introduction to a dialogical reviewing process

As part of a theoretical and friendly dialogue that we have developed over the years (Marková et al., 2020, 2022; Zittoun, 2017), we both realised that our newly published books appeared almost simultaneously at the same publisher (Marková, 2023; Zittoun, 2024). To pursue this dialogue, we proposed to review each other's book, a proposition welcome by the editor of this journal, whom we thank here. We read the other's book, and wrote our reviews independently; when we exchanged these, we were struck by a few facts.

First, although we work on very different phenomena and with different scopes, both our books have adopted a dialogical epistemology (Marková, 2016), which means that both books consider thinking and knowing as processes that are cocreated by selves and others (rather than being products of individual minds). Also, both embrace a trans-disciplinary stance (Stenner, 2014), bringing in dialogue diverse orientations within psychology, diverse social sciences, as well as other cultural domains – philosophy,

science, and the arts – as only way to build a complex and integrative understanding of humans in society.

Second, we both identified a series of interrelated points that currently demand special attention in the development of a social theory or a sociocultural theory in psychology. These include:

- the problem of apprehending and modelling human sociocultural phenomena, and ethical problems they raise;
- the importance of time and temporalities in constructing sociocultural theories;
- the question of building theories that aim to capture, in a holistic manner, complex and developmental phenomena, without viewing them in a hierarchical order; instead of hierarchies, such theories would view developing phenomena as interactions of components that safeguard a degree of their freedom and encourage thinking through centres of variation;
- the question of the diversity of modes of thinking and knowing;
- and finally, the role of the unconscious in social and individual thinking.

We thus hope that our dialogue touching on these interrelated points in our books will be generative and will invite other colleagues to join.

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Ivana Marková (2013). *The making of a dialogical theory. Social representations and communication*. Cambridge University Press.

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In her last book, *The making of a dialogical theory. Social representations and communication* (2023), Ivana Marková is pursuing her systematic reflexion on dialogical theories in our contemporary world. Her reflexion was developed in her two previous volumes at Cambridge University Press, *Dialogicality and social representations: The dynamics of mind,* which examined social representations from a dialogical perspective (Marková, 2003), and *The dialogical mind: Common sense and ethics,* (Marková, 2016), in which she showed that dialogism offered an ontology, an epistemology and an ethics for the social sciences. In the current volume, Ivana Marková anchors further dialogical theories in the history of social sciences, and highlights their power to apprehend the complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity of the contemporary world.

Ivana Marková presents her book as a case study, that of Serge Moscovici's theory of social representations and communication; understanding better the making and reception of the theory, she argues, can contribute to a more general reflection on the making of social theories (see *Afterword*). That case study is realised through a systematic dialogical method, made possible thanks to her long acquaintance with the development of social theories within their cultural and historical environments, and especially with the work of Serge Moscovici and its reception.

The book is constructed in two main parts. The first part is devoted to the development of Moscovici's theory of social representation, its reception, and the discussions to which it led in the social sciences. The second part adopts a dialogical stance and reexamines aspects of the theory of social representations that deserve further attention, before showing how, as dialogical social theory, it may contribute to a better reading of our current society. In what follows, I present these two parts and their main arguments, discuss some points raised in the second, before highlighting the main contributions of the volume.

Re-appraising Moscovici's theory of social representation

In the opening of part I, Ivana Marková first retraces the post-war climate in which Moscovici, a young refugee in Paris, was developing his thesis project, which became *La psychanalyse, son image, son public* (later here: *La psychanalyse*), under the supervision of Daniel Lagache, both to satisfy his existential and scientific curiosity, and to guarantee acceptance and recognition in the French academic community (Chapters 1 and 2). In this section, Ivana Marková poses two cornerstones for the construction of her book.

First, she highlights the core interrogations underlying Moscovici's lifelong work: "First, who is the Other, that is, how does the individual create a sense of other people? And second, who is the individual and what is society?" (Marková, 2023, p. 3). These questions are both fundamental to understand Moscovici's epistemology and the evolution of the themes he addressed (common sense and knowledge, minority influence, relationship to nature, etc.), and to develop a social theory.

The second cornerstone of Marková's demonstration is the evolution taking place between the first French edition of *La Psychanalyse,* in 1961 (Moscovici, 1961), and its second edition in 1976 (Moscovici, 1976), the one that was translated to English and other languages, and most often quoted. As most readers now, *La psychanalyse* examines how the invention of psychoanalysis was understood in post-war France; through media analysis, interviews, a survey and ethnographic work, Moscovici shows that different people, related to different groups, understood differently this new and complex theory. With the concept of social representations, Moscovici thus designated the complex social and psychological dynamics by which social knowledge and common sense were created, intergroup dynamics emerged, and communication took place. He was thus initiating, as Faucheux, reviewing the work, suggested, "an anthropological study of our own society" (Marková, 2023, pp. 72–73). However, the way this theory was presented and discussed is to be understood in the light of two important changes between the two editions.

The first edition

Marková shows that the first version, written as Moscovici was at "the age of intellectual innocence" (Marková, 2023, p. 45), was influenced by Jean Piaget, whose courses Moscovici had followed in Paris, anthropology of his time – Margaret Mead, Malinowski and especially Ernst Cassirer's theory of symbolism –, psychoanalysis – as his supervisor was a psychoanalyst, and, more surprisingly, that he borrowed the term "social representation" from a French clerical philosopher, Reverend Father Robert Lenoble (Lenoble, 1943; Marková, 2023, p. 37). The epistemology of the first edition was complex, deeply dialectic, and admitting the dynamic evolution of forms of knowledge (Chapter 3). Indeed, Moscovici's intellectual training in Hegel brought him to develop a taken-for-granted dialectic outlook, which Marková reads as dialogical as he refused historical determinism (Marková, 2023, pp. 19–20). This is also why, in the first edition, Moscovici mentioned Durkheim mainly to criticise his "static Kantian perspective of representations" (Marková, 2023, p. 50).

Marková then highlights the contributions of the first edition: an attention to the distinction between myth, language and social representations; and a still implicit "Ego-Alter-Object" triad. She further presents the key-concepts in this first edition. First, she details the two key processes by which social representation are generated: objectification - including the selection of information, the constitution of a figurative schema, and its naturalisation, with its effects on social reality -, and anchoring. Importantly, she emphasizes that Moscovici presented the pair objectification and anchoring in that order, and that he considered them as taking place simultaneously; these were partly individual psychological process by which person selected meaningful information to turn them into a figurative schema, depending on their biographies, and in dialogue with the social world. Marková then explains the concept of cognitive polyphasia, which "refers to the co-existence of distinct kinds of social thinking in the same communicative situation arising when an individual both thinks and does not think something, believes and does not believes, feels and does not feel, and so on" (Marková, 2023, p. 67). Third, she reminds that Moscovici, for whom social representations only existed within communication, distinguished between two genres: as a "primary genre", communication participates to the creation of social representations; a "secondary genre" pertains to mass communication; in the case of the press treatment of psychoanalysis, secondary genres included diffusion, propagation and propaganda (Chapter 3). Marková finally shows that the reviews of the first edition of *La psychanalyse* where positive, acknowledging its anthropological scope; interestingly, none of the reviewers mentioned Durkheim. In her dialogical approach, thus, Marková retraces the intellectual genealogy of this first volume, the resources at his disposal, Moscovici's need to find and audience, the specific of his complex contribution and also, the responses this edition received.

The second edition

The same dialogical stance is adopted to approach the second edition of *La psychanalyse* in 1976 (Chapter 4). Fifteen years after the first edition, Moscovici was acquiring

academic recognition and public and international visibility – he was starting the establish social psychology internationally, together with colleagues from the US; his supervisors were dead; the intellectual climate had changed; and perhaps, as creative author, his ideas had evolved. In any case, the second edition of *La psychanalyse* was revised. One key transformation is that now Moscovici claimed that the origin of his concept of social representations had to be found in Durkheim's collective representations, both in the prologue (Moscovici, 1976, p. 25) and in his Chapter 1 titled, "Social representation: the lost concept"; social representations were now a Durkheimian concept. Marková emphasises this transformation, which she notes, was never discussed by Moscovici's commentators, not even by Denise Jodelet who otherwise compared the two versions of *La psychanalyse*. This re-invented affiliation to Durkheim, suggests Marková, generated many of the misunderstandings, discussions and debates around the theory of social representations. Fundamentally, the second edition attached the theory of social representations to Durkheim, whilst Moscovici claimed that his aim was to modernize Durkheim. However, he did not explain that none of the concepts he used in social representations either made no sense in Durkheim's approach or were directly opposed to Durkheim's thought, for example cognitive polysemy, anchoring, objectification, or common sense.

The second key transformation of the second edition are, on the one hand, a change of emphasis in the theoretical anchorage of the study – authors that played an important role in the first version (Cassirer, Piaget, etc.) were now backgrounded, and on the other, a series of conceptual simplifications. Objectification is now seen as designating "the transformation of an unfamiliar scientific object into something familiar" (Marková, 2023, p. 88); the processes by which individuals make sense of the social is backgrounded. Anchoring itself is redefined as what "transforms science into a knowledge that is of use to anyone" (Moscovici, 2008, p. 104), which turns it to a quasi-synonym of objectification. In addition, since the early 1980s, Moscovici presented these two concepts in the reverse order: anchoring now came first, and objectification second.

Ivana Marková suggest that these changes eventually led to "loss the originality" of Moscovici two key concepts, and turned them into "notions that have been known both to psychologists and to lay people for a long time" (Marková, 2023, p. 90). This simplification brought the pair objectification-anchorage into to "'must' of the theory" (Marková, 2023, p. 93). As a consequence, language and communication may have seemed more important in the second edition.

For Ivana Marková, the trajectory of the theory, and the debates it triggered, are deeply marked by these two transformations. First, reviewers of the second edition recognised the Durkheimian affiliation of Moscovici's work – although, Marková' emphasises, "none of the core concepts of the social representations of Psychoanalysis are derived from Durkheim" (Marková, 2023, p. 87). In addition, neither there nor later, Moscovici never fully defined some key concepts of his theory, which thus remained a "Great smoky dragon" (chapter 5). These two facts became sources of confusion in the interpretation of the theory, and for the debates it stirred.

Generativity of social representations

Nevertheless, the theory was revolutionary and generative; various lines of work developed from there, partly to explore points raised and insufficiently explored by Moscovici himself. Marková thus retraces six lines of studies: the works on the structure of social representations, and notably their core/periphery (Abric, 1983), and on the organising principles of social representations (Doise, 1986); the studies adopting a "sociocultural/anthropological" approach to the study of social representations (Jodelet, 1989; Kalampalikis, 2007); the sociogenetic approach (Duveen, 1997); the work on semantic barriers (Gillespie, 2020).

On the other hand, as the readership of the second edition of *La psychanalyse* became more international, many established scholars tried to open a dialogue or possible bridges with Moscovici – among which Michael Billig, Rom Harré, Gustav Jahoda, and the British discursive tradition. Marková reads the disputes that follow as pseudo-dialogue, the authors involved apprehending the theory of the other in their own terms (Chapter 6). These have various causes, among which Moscovici's lack of definition of many terms such as attitude, knowledge, etc., as well as confusions simply due to translation in different languages and academic traditions. For instance, many questioned the relationships between social representation are attitudes; in Moscovici's first edition term, attitude, that is, emotional-valuational positions, are part of representing – so for him, one was part of the other. Yet for authors thinking that Moscovici shared a cognitive, monological stance, the two terms seemed equivalent, while for cognitive approaches, attitudes where internal, cognitive traits that could be measured with a scale – which is totally contrary to what is meant by social representations, always taking place in communicative practices… In addition, two conceptions of social representations emerged from Moscovici's work: the narrow conception focuses on empirical studies of social representations of various phenomena, while in a broad conception, studying social representation is a way to study social thinking, thus becoming "an anthropology of modern culture" (Marková, 2023, p. 133).

Finally, and beyond confusions and the risk for the term social representation to lose its theoretical substance, bridges were made, and Ivana Marková sees wider potential to the theory.

Towards the future of social theory

In the second part of the volume, Ivana Marková proposes to focus in "specific unfinished and underdeveloped issues (…) to suggest selected possibilities for their rethinking and further development in the dialogical perspective" (Marková, 2023, p. 149). In this part, Marková builds on ideas present in Moscovici's work on social representations, before putting them back in historical and philosophical perspective, and expanding them into a larger conception of social representations, which, from a dialogical perspective, can become an anthropology of our contemporary society. I treat these two aspects in turn.

Re-developing theoretical concepts

Marková emphasises the notion of common sense (Chapter 7), going back to Vico, into Lenoble, Bergson and Moscovici's work. Within his broad conception of social representation, Moscovici could see common sense as a form of thinking in continuum with scientific thinking (in opposition to Durkheim's view of a radical rupture). He also distinguished between two forms of common sense, first-hand common sense which comes from experience, naming, tradition, etc. and second-hand common sense, which comes from the transformation of scientific knowledge into daily thinking. In the narrow sense of social representations, Marková argues, "we are concerned with *the change from unconscious and non-conscious thoughts into conscious beliefs and knowledge*, and vice versa" (Marková, 2023, p. 159, emphasis original); and she identifies two kinds of relations between social representations and common sense, which, using Moscovici's terms, she call the unconscious, and themata. I first mention the latter, before discussing the unconscious. I then expand on the future directions to theoretical development identified by Marková.

The notion of themata designates dialectical oppositions which constitute the common-sense core of social representations; evolving with time and dependent on the sociocultural environment, they are likely to generate debate and social change. The idea of such opposition was present in the 1961 edition of *la Psychanalyse*, and Moscovici came back to it in the 90s, although he did not use it often – but for instance in a study on social representations of ethnic minorities (Moscovici, 2011). Marková however emphasises the fruitfulness of the notion, as for instance when it regards the Self-Other tension, and how this notion was generative for many studies on self-other relationship, including her own studies on HIV/AIDS (Marková, 2012).

Moscovici (1993) always admitted that unconscious dynamics took place. Marková recalls that these appear at two levels of description; first, when describing the figurative schema at work on the social representation of psychoanalysis, beliefs about the tension between unconscious and conscious were at heart. Second, Moscovici saw the unconscious as an important theme to be theorised in the social sciences, even though many authors wanted to exclude it from it. Marková choses to focus on how unconscious dynamics play an important role in irresistible beliefs. "Resistible beliefs are those that humans may hold about daily events or objects (…). Such beliefs are based on experience, or statistical evidence, or expectations, and so on. With more information, these can be discarded or replaced by other beliefs" (Marková, 2023, p. 121). Irresistible beliefs are, for Moscovici, "entrenched in the mind. Ideologies, religious beliefs, morals, common-sense beliefs and otherwise defy arguments, logic and experience because they are engrained in individual and collective thought" (Marková, 2023, p. 162); common sense is partly on this side. This is why, for instance, "It is the will of effective leaders that controls the will of the masses and becomes their common sense" (Marková, 2023, p. 163) – and here the author mentions the actions of past and current leaders, from Stalin to Trump.

This point calls for a commentary. As mentioned earlier, Moscovici's supervisor was a psychoanalyst; also, in the 60s–70s, he was acquainted to the anthropologists, psychoanalysts, and artists from his time. He is thus mentioned by British psychoanalyst

Masud Khan as being part of group of friends' meeting including "Victor Smirnoff, Jean Pouillon, Pontalis, Moscovici, (..) even Henri C.-B [Cartier-Breton]" (9 October 1969) (Khan, 2022, p. 103). Moscovici knew the history of these disciplines, and was following their progresses; and from later texts, it seems that Moscovici gave a much broader importance to the unconscious than what solely concerns irresistible beliefs. He thus wrote "In my opinion, the discovery of the unconscious is the most significant discovery in the history of psychology" (Moscovici, 1993, p. 48). He saw it at work in social dynamics, as well as in the way people try to make sense of experimental situations; he also thought it was necessary to account for many results in experimental social psychology, although most authors tried to avoid the topic. Coming back to studies on group, masses or altered states of consciousness, he stated that the unconscious concerned collective phenomena, these being always to some extent unconscious. Consequently, given his project to understand the relationship between the person and the group, he considered that "a proper social psychology acknowledges the there is a life of unconscious ideas, manifested in culture and social movements" (Moscovici, 1993, p. 93). Thus, "in order to be profound, a theory social psychology must look like a compromise between luxuriant unconscious uncovered by mass psychology and today's minimal unconscious, covered by cognitive psychology" (Moscovici, 1993, p. 93). This line has not been examined as such; psychologists since have carefully distinguished "nonconscious" phenomena – such as the mechanisms that we don't need to access to when we think or remember, largely admitted by cognitive psychology and neurosciences (de Gelder & Tamietto, 2011), from "unconscious" dynamics, which they carefully leave to psychoanalysis. On the side of psychoanalysis, however, there is a growing awareness that people's psyche is not only defined by individual and interpersonal dynamics, but also by issues of belonging, cultural groups, collective memory, corresponding to massive social events affecting people united by a community of fate – wars, displacements of population, or natural catastrophes (André, 2023; Diatkine, 2023; Nathan, 2000). Although some psychoanalysts are aware of the progress of social sciences and the need to take in account diverse causalities (Green, 1995; Nathan, 1991; Verdon, 2016), social sciences would still gain by including and integrating these careful observations and theorisations – which, in social and cultural psychology, only a handful of authors do (Billig, 1999; Neuman, 2009; Neuman et al., 2023; Salvatore, 2016).

Finally, the question of the forms of socially shared knowledge addresses the issue of what sorts of knowledge individuals and groups use when facing new or unfamiliar circumstances. Marková mentions forms of knowledge developed in training or personal experience, expert knowledge, personal or collective routines, knowledge developed through argumentation, expertise, etc. "Lists of forms of socially shared knowledge can be endlessly extended and serve as a reminder that socially shared knowledge serves different purposes and has different aims; it is characterised by tensions, contradictions, vagueness, and ambiguities, as well as by regularities and recurrent themes" (Marková, 2023, p. 172). Cognitive polyphasia thus offers a mean to approach the coexistence of these modes of knowledge. This again opens interesting routes to study the way people challenge these forms of knowledge, their inequal distribution, or their possible blending. The recent epidemy of COVID-19 revealed these various dynamics, reminds the author.

Towards a new social theory

Marková then steps back to address more fundamental aspects of the theory of social representations understood in the broader sense, as a theory of social knowledge. First, she highlights its semiotic nature (Chapter 8). Here, she argues that to ground his theory of social representation as a study of people's symbolic activity, Moscovici needed to adopt a theory of sign; and thus, his work deeply drew on Peirce's semiotic. He found in this author's work a holistic perspective that suited him, and developed his triadic model of Ego-Alter-Object on the basis of Peirce's core triad of representant, interpretant and object. Marková explores the way by which meaning-making processes as infinite process is brought in Moscovici's work; following step-by-step the connection between his work and Peirce, and subsequent studies in semiotic cultural psychology (Valsiner, 2001), Marková draws a distinction between meaning-making, an open-ended process that can be catalysed, contested, or interrupted, and knowledge, which are meanings that become socially shared: "Meanings become embodied in socially shared knowledge (social representations) only if they are accepted as symbols by other groups or societies" (Marková, 2023, p. 194). Here also, Marková gives examples of recent inspiring studies in social and political realities.

Second, Marková comes back to the Ego-Alter-Object (or Self-Other-Object) triad to highlight its heuristic power. Beyond Moscovici, she suggests that this schematic model should be deployed so as to capture the complex relational nature of dialogical dynamics taking place: "Humans are ethically engaged, they have aesthetic feelings, and they take, or reject, responsibility for each other" (Marková, 2023, p. 196). These aesthetic and ethical dynamics are situated in specific environments and can be more or less symmetrical. On a theoretical side, Marková further explores these aspects going back to Bakhtin, Tarkovsky and Dewey. On the empirical side, she shows the heuristic interest of such ethical and esthetical expansion of the triad in a series of studies blood donation, poverty in India, or in situations of political dissidence. In particular, she carefully rereads Flora Cornish's study of the Grenfell Tower Disaster (Cornish, 2021) that shows the ethical and esthetical dialogical dynamics by which inhabitants used silent walks and means of artistic expression to respond to, and address the authorities. Hence, Marková demonstrates the "rich potentialities of the triadic model in relation to dialogical intellectual interactions, ethic, aesthetics, responsibility and engagement on the one hand and to populism and distortion of the model on the other" (Marková, 2023, p. 212). Here, Marková is bringing forward a very original contribution to the triadic model: this expansion which takes in account ethics, aesthetics and responsibility, corresponds to her own very original and important contribution to Moscovici's model and more generally social psychology, as defined through the years (Marková, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2016), including in this volume. It is deeply generative, and has, and keeps inspiring many colleagues.

Third, Marková goes one more step further by addressing two meta-theoretical questions: the issues of unicity of social phenomenon, and of dynamics and complexity. If both are at the heart of Moscovici's work, they are also defining the social theory that Marková envisages for the future. The first issue is actually a response to an

epistemological problem, the question of reproducibility – a recurring problem in the social sciences. Marková argues that the issue "is not applicable in the study of humans as symbolic agents" (Marková, 2023, p. 214); she also proposes that, against a bias of science oriented toward "rational" behaviour, "each system of thinking most be evaluated individually on its own merit" (Marková, 2023, p. 215). On this double ground, she argues in favour of dialogical single case studies. At heart in Moscovici's work, they actually concern the interactions between self-other-object, within specific environments. The second issue goes back to Moscovici's search for a model that would account for the complex and dynamic nature of social representations, initially found in cybernetics. This leads Marková to a fascinating discussion on the nature of time and temporality, as discussed in Einstein and Picasso and Bergson - sciences, the arts and philosophy – as well as common sense; in a nutshell, she claims that time is reinterpreted in complex ways by humans, which are not reducible to a linear progression. She also shows how time has been tackled in social representations – from the Toblerone model (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008) to the socio, micro and ontogenesis distinction (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990); yet this needs further developments. In what regards complexity, Moscovici and other social scientists were looking for models not reducible to the analysis of its components, which lead to an explosion of studies on that matter in the 1970s. Moscovici (1974) "coined the phrase "biunique societies" as a new episteme" (Marková, 2023, p. 230), while Edgar Morin was developing his complexity model on the same epistemological basis. Eventually, in dialogue, Moscovici and Morin started to define a new metatheoretical frame to address complex dynamics (Morin & Moscovici, 1974). Mainly, it enables to go beyond Hegelian/Marxist dialectics, which progresses cyclically back and forth toward a more adequate form, and eventually implies a hierarchy. In contrast, Moscovici and Morin "abandon 'hierarchy' as an organising principle of the system" (Marková, 2023, p. 232). Morin thus prioritises system, interaction and organisation; Moscovici, a "hierarchy" which "presupposes a decentralised organisation which safeguards a degree of freedom and establishes a reflexive relationships between parts" (Marková, 2023, p. 233). Although Marková indicates some studies proposing such holistic approaches, this is mainly a call for studies that would fully account for the complexity of the social. Such studies would need to be "incorporating theoretical concepts into research designs during the process of data collection, analysis, and interpretation brings the theory of social representations and communication in the centre of attention in comprehending unique complex and dynamic real-life phenomena" (Marková, 2023, p. 235).

On this point, it can be noted that some attempts have been made to develop such complex and holistic approaches, some mentioned by Marková (Psaltis, 2015; Stenner, 2015), some less so (for instance (Cole, 2016; Engeström, 1999; Hedegaard et al., 2008). In developmental psychology, where the issue of time and temporality is always crucial, people have been looking for meta-models, mainly within open dynamic system – as Piaget did himself (Valsiner et al., 2009; van Geert, 2019; Witherington, 2007). Two challenges stem from these approaches. One challenge is still, I believe, to integrate such dynamic views with phenomena of different levels of determination, inner-psychological, interpersonal and social, accounting for personal and collective meaning-making, plus as Moscovici suggested, conscious and unconscious dynamics. The second challenge is that

most of these models suppose that, when some state of a system is disbalanced, its reorganisation or re-equilibration will imply a more complex state of thing – and so these models very often carry an implicit hierarchy to theories to which they are applied. This is why it is still very difficult to identify diverse modes of thinking of people and groups without implicit evaluation. To avoid hierarchical models, without falling into models which refuse any form of order, one needs very carefully to examine the hidden normativity and propose conceptual alternatives. Such route is possible and is hinted at by Moscovici and Markova's reading – it requires tolerating ambivalences and ambiguities, which is characterise the symbolic and aesthetic nature of human conduct.

The final chapter (Chapter 11) allows Marková to address the making of a social theory itself; the case of Moscovici's theory of social representations, in which he could respond to his initial questions, is used as case study to reflect on what makes a social theory, or more exactly "an exceptional dialogical theory" (Marková, 2023, p. 237), its acceptance, and its generativity. Here, she highlights a series of dialogue by which such theories develop: the dialogue between creative individuals and their sociopolitical environment; how these dialogues also correspond to a certain *Zeitgeist*; how they involve dialogue with audiences, and how they imply the author's' inner dialogue; she here illustrated this reflexion with the cases of Shostakovich, Vico, Herder, or Kepler. Then she traces how these dialogues are then further maintained in publications or, in the case of Moscovici, textbooks. Ivana Marková finally asks whether Moscovici could respond to his initial questions, and this seems to be the case, and what remains of the theory of social representations. Her own careful assessment is that the main contribution of Moscovici's theory is his triadic model, which represents "an epistemological revolution" (Marková, 2023, p. 260), although she also notes that the theory would have been stronger if it had been diffused in its 1961 version avoiding subsequent useless debates. It is thus this epistemological revolution that has for the author "the potential of becoming an anthropology of modern culture" (Marková, 2023, p. 260).

The making of a dialogical theory: A critical synthesis of the past, a program for the future

In *The making of a social theory,* Ivana Marková deploys her own dialogical perspective to re-read the case of Moscovici's theory of social representation (*Afterword*). Her deep and life-long knowledge of the theory and of its author enables her to pursue a dialogue developed over the years (Moscovici & Marková, 1998, 2006), questioning the evolution of the concepts corresponding to Moscovici's inner dialogue. Her deep knowledge of the history of philosophy and history of sciences, her complex reading of the scientific, artistic, political debates and tensions characterising the years of the making of the theory of social representations – the post-war artistic and intellectual ebullition, the consequences of the theory of relativity, the cold-war ambiance – enables her to create a rich, polyphonic frame to her very careful and critical engagement with this work. For Marková is critical: notably, her systematic reading shows epistemological inconsistencies and their longstanding consequences for the theory of social representations. Yet she is also, with the distance that is hers, able to assess the strength and programmatic power of the theory:

not only was it heuristically inspiring, but, she argues, with its core Ego-Alter-Object triad, enriched by a careful attention to the aesthetic, ethical and responsibility, represents an actual and so-far unnoticed paradigm shift for the social sciences, and assessed as such, it opens a new horizon for research.

Hence, this dialogical case study of the making of a theory can be read at two levels. At a first level, to the reader wanting to better understand the theory of social representation, this volume offers a full, precise, and documented presentation of the theory, its concepts, dynamics and possible application – better than any current handbooks.

At a second level, the case study sets the program for a dialogical social science, a science able to apprehend complex social phenomena as case studies, in their multiple temporalities, and in their complexity. Here, Marková joins the call made by others for a more integrative science (Brinkmann, 2010; Morin, 2005; Valsiner, 2021; Wagoner et al., 2015; Zittoun, 2023). Through these two levels, three theoretical problems calling for a specific attention have been identified: the question of the place of the unconscious in social theories; the question of time; and the question of assessing and theorising dynamics complexity, beyond hierarchical models. These theoretical questions are some of the currently most important and difficult ones, still insufficiently addressed in our domains, and I would second Marková in her call. These questions indeed take a particular importance in the light of the issues of current times. Marková identifies empirical issues that should be addressed by social scientists – the digitalisation of our lives and the new modes of diffusion of information, the rise of totalitarianisms, the destruction of our living environment, etc. Thus, it seems, more than ever, a dialogical social science is needed to address the modes of thinking of collectives, exposed to information available at an unseen speed, and of individuals, in all courses of lives, at times invaded by unconscious fears; more than even, new forms of sociality and dialogue, with their ethical and aesthetical qualities, need to be identified, analysed, and supported.

Altogether, the program awaiting us is vast. In *The making of a dialogical theory*, Ivana Marková just demonstrated, what such a new dialogical social science, deployed with *maestria*, can do.

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The Pleasure of Thinking is an original, intellectually stimulating, and timely book that overflows with ideas and images, making reading it most exciting and enjoyable. As Tania Zittoun explains, her book was inspired by her own enjoyment of thinking, sharing ideas, debating, and discovering new things in which thinking can be exhilarating. She presents thinking as an activity in which people engage all the time, whether walking in the streets, sitting on a train, or watching a play. One could say, following the philosopher Martin Heidegger, that Zittoun considers thinking as a way of living. Thinking defines the human species, it makes them what they are, what they enjoy and aim for. Such a perspective on thinking sharply contrasts with the more common portrayal of thinking as either a formalised deductive or inductive process with a very narrow remit, or as a frustrating and depressive activity that absorbs peoples' minds.

Zittoun emphasises that although thinking as a way of living involves both pleasurable and frustrating experiences, pleasurable thinking has been underrated in human and social sciences. In exploring the arts, philosophy, and biographical materials, she encounters five different modalities of pleasure of thinking. She names them as curiosity, functional pleasure, (i.e., pleasure of being engaged in activities related to thinking), discovery, dialogical pleasure of thinking together with others, and reflective pleasure of realizing that the activity of thinking is joyful or brings satisfaction. In addition to these five modalities Zittoun notes two additional dimensions that can modulate pleasures of thinking: first, embodiment, that is, the fact that pleasure involves a physical and physiological experience; and second, each modality of thinking can be experienced with

different degrees of playfulness, that is, as fun, counterfactual explorations, and even craziness. Her arguments present a rich pattern of thinking activities, and in this book, she aims to develop an integrative model of pleasurable thinking to be applied in diverse situations and trajectories of pleasure.

Readers will be intellectually stirred by plentiful references to resources of thinking as a living activity, and by concepts justifying her approach. Zittoun takes inspiration from the cultural thinking of Freud, Vygotsky, and Arendt, and from philosophers whose work appreciated the stimulation of the dynamic nature of thinking, intuition, and intelligence, such as Spinoza, Dewey, and Kahneman, among others.

The book is extremely timely as it appears now, when mechanistic techniques arising from fast advances in computing and in technological facilities lead to fierce debates that necessarily impact on thinking as a way of life. Will thinking become a secondary activity subsumed under the ready-made fast solutions of artificial intelligence? Will humans become satisfied with substituting thinking by superficial observations and by plagiarising information available on the media? The ease of finding information on the internet and using it without care, whether in students' essays, or reports of the media present danger of producing intellectually empty mental products.

The Pleasure of Thinking consists of three Parts that follow the complex logic of diverse and heterogeneous directions of thinking. Part I consists of two chapters focusing on ontological, epistemological, and conceptual issues pertaining to the pleasure of thinking as depicted in some exemplary arts, and in the emergence of the pleasure of thinking in child development. Part two is crucial for Zittoun's argument providing a theoretical framework which builds on psychoanalysis and on sociocultural psychology. The most important here is Chapter five, where she presents an original model accounting for the five modalities of the pleasure of thinking. In Part III, consisting of Chapters 6, 7, and 8 Zittoun justifies the validity of her propositions of pleasures of thinking and their ethical implications in a variety of daily situations, in the course of life, and in the thinking of the elderly.

In this review, I shall first draw attention to the features of thinking that, in my view, particularly highlight the novelty of Zittoun's theoretical framework and method that facilitate her ideas on pleasures of thinking. I suggest that these features concern the distinction between thinking and non-thinking, viewing thinking through centres of variation rather than as a hierarchy of cognitive stages, and conceiving thinking as a social or dialogical enterprise. I shall then show how, in the rest of the book, Zittoun uses these features to justify her arguments about pleasures of thinking in professional thinking and in daily life.

What is thinking?

Thinking and non-thinking

The vast range of definitions of thinking in social scientific literature encompass capacities of reasoning on the one hand, and unspecified and broadly conceived mental activities on the ot pragmatists' conceptions of thinking range from encompassing capacities of reasoning to unspecified and broadly conceived mental activities. Thus, according to James (1890), thinking refers indiscriminately to any form of consciousness in

its loosest sense and signifies everything that is 'in our heads' or that 'goes through our minds' (quoted by Zittoun, 2023, p. 24). Dewey (1910) refers to four kinds of thinking, ranging from 'any idle fancy, trivial recollection, or flitting impression' (quoted by Zittoun, 2023, p. 24) to thinking that relates to reflective thought and beliefs. Charles Sanders Peirce (1931-1958) views thinking as the mediation of signs, or the search for meaning. These authors pay a great deal of attention to describing and analyzing these very broadly based conceptions of thinking, which involve both thinking as a process and thinking as recollection and a relatively stable or indiscriminate state of mind. Thus, despite the provocative and intellectually stimulating work of the pragmatists, their definitions of thinking do not suggest what thinking is not. This raises the question such as if thinking refers indiscriminately to all forms of consciousness, do we need the word 'thinking' at all?

An answer to this question is provided by the philosopher Martin Heidegger (1968) who, in his book on *What is called thinking?* Clearly distinguishes thinking from non-thinking, or thinking as a dynamic process, from thoughts as fixed states of mind. For Heidegger, thinking is a dynamic force of human nature, allowing curiosity, inventiveness, and creativity. As a dynamic force, it has the capacity of generating static states of the mind, that is, thoughts, opinions, ideas about some situations, or re-presentations. In other words, whilst thinking is dynamic, non-thinking thoughts are fixed states of the mind.

In pursuing the idea of thinking as a way of living and an activity that defines human beings, Heidegger emphasized, again and again, the problem of thoughtlessness. Although all people have the capacity to think, they are often thoughtless. It is thinking that defines humanity and therefore, the more thoughtless we are the less human we are. Being thoughtless means not considering the implications of one's actions, and causing consciously or unconsciously, damage to the self and to others. We may consider that Hannah Arendt's (1964) insistence that it was thoughtlessness that underlay Nazi crimes exemplified Heidegger's insistence that thinking is inherent in humans and that its absence transforms humans into non-humans.

The distinction between thinking and non-thinking is crucial for action, and as we shall see, for the modalities of pleasures of thinking. Thinking is synonymous with questioning, intuition, or guessing, and with humans' efforts to discover their own nature (Heidegger, 1968). Gray (1968, p. xxiv) likens it with 'making a first path on skies through new-fallen snow or clearing a way for oneself through dense forest growth.' Its excitement follows from the adventure of the unknown in searching for the next step in the path. Such a path of thinking is specific for every individual, and it does not require any certain destination. Although Heidegger and Gray do not use the notion of pleasure when characterising thinking, raising questions, and searching for the unknown provide humans with satisfaction and fulfils their desire for novelty.

I suggest that Zittoun's position on thinking as an activity of continuous questioning, search for meaning, imagination, curiosity and discovery parallels Heidegger's and Arendt's perspective. It separates thinking as a dynamic process of searching for meaning from non-thinking as an expression of opinion, or as a repetition of a fixed state of mind.

States and processes of non-thinking can be also pleasurable, and they play an important role in a social context as phatic communication. Phatic communication

establishes social connection, for example, it starts discourse, expresses sympathy with the other's problems, or involves participants' chats over dinner, or repeats already spoken attitudes – simply it conveys a friendly attitude towards the other, usually without any meaningful information. Such occasions of repetitive chatting, expressing sympathy with the co-participant and otherwise, often mix non-thinking and thinking.

Thinking in hierarchies and thinking through centres of variation

Casual inspection of literature suggests that the development of thinking in psychology may proceed in two ways. The most common is the concept of hierarchical development of thinking, which was adopted by pragmatists, as well as by Piaget. According to Piaget (e.g., 1970/72), thinking develops in hierarchically organized stages from less adequate to more adequate forms, reaching a mature state of abstract thinking in adulthood. Hierarchical development is determined by cognitive structures of the individual.

The other perspective emphasizes a non-hierarchical approach to thinking. For example, Merleau-Ponty (1964) conceived life-experience as a dynamic and open system. He fundamentally disapproved of the Piagetian conception of the child's intellectual development from illogicality towards logicality, which accounted for development in terms of a gradual approach to mature thinking of the adult. Merleau-Ponty emphasised the child's representation of the body as a 'lived experience', and as a relation between activities such as speaking, thinking, listening, knowing, and imagining, among others. He did not view the child's representations as inadequate or irrational, which gradually, through the passage of cognitive stages, finally reach mature and logical adult thinking. Instead, he thought that the child's representation at a given time is adequately adapted to his/her lived experience.

Hierarchies as a developmental approach are also abandoned by the philosopher and sociologist Edgar Morin (1992; 1996; 1997) by his Dialogical principle, in which he prioritises system, organization and interaction of components. Links between order and disorder, autonomy, and dependence may be both complementary and antagonistic at the same time. They may involve a constant transfer from elementary to global relations, from certainty to uncertainty, inseparability to separation, implosion to explosion. Through these complementary and antagonistic interdependencies, systems spontaneously self-organise and self-regulate. The social psychologist Serge Moscovici (1974/2012), too, rejected the concept of hierarchical stages both as a form of explanation and as a form of development because they implied a pre-determined hierarchical order, for example, Piagetian stages. In discarding 'hierarchy', Moscovici stated that the alternative to 'hierarchy' is not anarchy, promiscuity, or randomness, but 'heterarchy', which means that tasks between individuals and groups are distributed to coordinate their actions in cooperation. Although the whole takes precedence over the parts in such relations of companionship, they are not in a hierarchical relation to one another. Heterarchy presupposes a decentralised organisation which safeguards a degree of freedom and establishes a reflexive relationship between parts.

Zittoun observes that the broadly based hierarchical conceptions of thinking in the pragmatism of the early 20th century, were later in the 20th century replaced by more

distinctive processes and categories of thinking. Among these, she follows the ideas of Peter Hacker (2013). Before we come to Zittoun's conceptual innovations and her model of pleasurable thinking, let us remind ourselves of Hacker's propositions. First, Hacker rejected simple categories of thinking based on binary or bipolar oppositions that strictly separate opposite categories, for example, being 'hot' versus being 'cold'. Categories conceived as strictly separate were already established in ancient Greek philosophy as the search for invariant states in nature, science, and in the human mind. Throughout the 20th century, binary or bipolar oppositions defined structuralisms in anthropology, linguistics, sociology, literature, and cultural studies. They referred to the mutual exclusion of contrasting features in categorical thinking. Instead, Hacker suggested that thinking is organized as 'centres of variation'. 'Centres of variation' involve interdependent relations between oppositions that mutually transform one another. For example, 'hot' and 'cold' categories exist in their sociocultural contexts and these contexts co-determine meanings of categories and their transition. The idea of interdependent forces of oppositions was part of the Hegelian dialectics in the early 19th century. It was embedded in the principle of complementarity of the physicist Niels Bohr, as well as in the concept of themata (Holton, 1974, 1975) and dialogical thinking (for a discussion of diverse conceptions based on oppositions in thinking, Marková, 2003, 2016; 2023). Variations of centres form an alternative epistemology to that based on hierarchical categories.

Zittoun clearly states that she does not adopt the hierarchical perspective on thinking. Instead, she endorses the perspective of centres of variation. Moreover, she argues that thinking always involves imagination, although in different modalities of thinking imagination plays different roles. She explains:

In thinking as *reasoning*, imagination is controlled by rationality. Reasoning is informed by the cognitive and neuroscientific approaches in the study of the brain, and imagination plays a very small role in these enterprises. In reality, Zittoun notes that for specialists in the arts, science, and designs, both reasoning and imagination are fundamental in their creations.

In thinking as *sense-making*, the search for a 'correct' or 'true' outcome is not essential. Instead, experiences from the senses, from language and symbols allow for expansion of imagination. Memory, anticipation of future events, and exploring other avenues – all such capacities facilitate imagination's searches for meaningful answers to unanswerable questions of life.

In thinking as *daydreaming*, imagination is totally free. Daydreaming is a process of thinking that is detached from current activity and imagination is given full chance to display its powers. Zittoun comments that daydreaming is at the centre of psychoanalysis, which she discusses later in the book.

Thinking as dialogue

Tania Zittoun recalls Hannah Arendt's (1978) dialogical perspective of thinking which, although it takes place in and through the sole individual's mental processes, it is not a solitary activity. By engaging in an inner speech, the individual carries out an infinite inner

dialogue of the self with oneself as 'two-in-one'. Arendt qualifies this dialogue as a breath of life, as '*duality* of myself with myself that makes thinking a true activity, in which I am both the one who asks and the one who answers. Thinking can become dialectical and critical because it goes through this questioning and answering process' (quoted by Zittoun, 2023, p. 31).

The inner dialogical voices of 'two-in-one' are in a constant tension, and they always remain autonomous and unfinished. Their tension is orientated towards new events and new interpretations. Thinking appears in Arendt (1978) as a movement, a dialogue with friends and within oneself, a breath, and a pleasure.

In developing these ideas, Zittoun retraces the dynamics of thinking, the curiosity, the search for meaning, realization of new insights and their effect. Through thinking we evaluate, make judgements, and determine what is relevant for a particular situation. As thinking is dialogical, it is open to others, and it is charged with tension. This means that because communication is always directed at someone, it is never a neutral piece of information controlled by cognitive rationality (see above). In other words, cognitive rationality is based on a different epistemology than dialogical rationality. The latter is socially and culturally constructed, and it involves an inner dialogue of the individual in Arendt's sense, or alternatively, an inner dialogue constructed between the individual and historical/cultural conditions, or between the individual and various others (parents, peers, institutions).

Zittoun's model of pleasures of thinking

Chapters 2, 3 and 4 depict pleasures of thinking in child development, psychoanalysis and in sociocultural psychology. In each of these domains Zittoun presents the five modalities of the pleasure of thinking together with two additional transversal features (embodiment, degree of playfulness). These different forms of pleasure can coexist because many layers of experience may be intermeshed, some being more elaborate than others, but all producing affective experience.

Developmental psychology shows the emergence of pleasurable thinking in infants and children, who explore the world in their attempt to discover things and master objects around them. They enjoy surprise and this can gradually grow to interests, as more permanent expressions of pleasure at pursuing problems or activities. All this has an impact on the child's development of personality and interpersonal interactions.

In turning to psychoanalysis, Zittoun observes that it is a rare discipline that acknowledges thinking as pleasure. Psychoanalysis encompasses a broad range of activities, unconscious experience, fantasies, and daydreaming, which enriches people's understanding of themselves, sense-making, and their relations to pleasure, playfulness, and affection. It proposes a model of an embodied mind at unconscious, preconscious and conscious levels.

In contrast to psychoanalysis, sociocultural psychology focuses on the conscious dynamics of sense-making, and it accounts for a variety of modalities of thinking in a socially and culturally constructed environment. In building on Vygotskian heritage, contemporary theoreticians build a semiotic cultural psychology: Jaan Valsiner has

developed a new and creative semiotic cultural psychology, notably drawing on Peirce and the open dynamic system; Sergio Salvatore's semio-dynamic approach also draws on psychoanalysis; and Yair Neuman's approach pursues the dialogue with biology and the sciences in computational cultural psychology. Zittoun notes however, that the main concerns of sociocultural psychology are sense-making rather than pleasures of thinking.

These three chapters prepare the ground for Chapter 5 which presents Zittoun's model as the nodal point of the volume. Epistemologically, her model goes far beyond trajectories of thinking accounted for in developmental psychology, psychoanalysis, and sociocultural psychology. She turns to a very careful analysis of the models of gradients and shows limits of their narrow understanding in the previous chapters: Gradients in psychoanalysis proceed from unconscious, to preconscious, and to conscious levels. Sociocultural gradients proceed at conscious levels. What is needed is the third dimension, which would capture the unfolding of a trajectory of thinking in time, that is, its dynamic temporal aspect.

Zittoun's proposal of an integrative model of the mind is embodied and culturally guided; it includes unconscious and conscious dynamics, and the progressive complexification of the dimensions of sense-making:

The deepest pleasure of modality of thinking in Zittoun's model is *curiosity.* This natural exploratory capacity to explore the world focalizes on specific objects or events. Curiosity can transform into interests, thematic engagements, and thematic fields. It is present in infants, in children and adults, and can take different multidimensional shapes.

The second pleasure refers to the involvement in tasks in the pursuit of ideas, for example, solving mathematical problems, or building a bookshelf. This *functional* pleasure connects thinking with pursuing activity in the temporal experiences of learning, daydreaming, trying, failing, and starting again.

The third form of pleasure refers to *discovery*, as it is concerned with the satisfaction of one's effort to achieve something. It is a functional pleasure that has an affective and aesthetic value.

The fourth pleasure is *dialogical.* It refers to intersubjective experiences of working together with other thinking partners, sharing the pleasure of humour, surprises and thinking jointly with them. 'The dialogical pleasure includes the dynamics of the dialogical movement, the affective quality of the exchange, and the energising pleasure of complicity, challenge, competition, and friendship, that are associated and intermeshed to thinking itself' (Zittoun, 2023, p. 162).

Finally, *meta-pleasure* arises from the pleasure of realizing one's own thoughts. It can emerge spontaneously, or it can result from reflection on one's own thinking activities.

As already noted, to these five kinds of pleasure Zittoun adds two dimensions. First, thinking is embodied, which means that the individual is engaged in thinking with all his/her body and mind, whether in drawing, or constructing something. Second, thinking is accompanied by some degrees of playfulness, which could be meditative, focused, creative, dreamlike, and otherwise. In summary, Zittoun (2023, p. 163) insists on the importance of the tri-dimensional space, that is, the space that captures not only non-conscious and conscious experiences, but their dynamic temporal aspect: 'every trajectory of thinking, whatever triggers it, can be described in this tri-dimensional space, each are likely to combine, to different extent, some, or all of the modalities of pleasure of thinking; and each

of these modalities can itself vary along that trajectory, and so their combination'. These pleasures may lead to further thoughts and pleasures and become involved in long biographical trajectories of thinking and engagements, and all pleasures can occur in domains of experience that may be unconscious, preconscious, or conscious and deliberate.

Theoretical insights and empirical evidence supporting Zittoun's model

Short- and long-term pleasures of thinking

Part III of the volume includes chapters 6, 7, 8. Here Zittoun provides theoretical insights and empirical evidence supporting her model. In Chapter 6 she focuses on pleasures of thinking based on biographical, autobiographical, and longitudinal documents in diverse sociocultural domains, in which people express themselves with intensity, attention, and rigour. For example, 'professional thinkers' (Arendt's term to refer to philosophers or social scientists) have their specific styles, which contrast with those of lay people in daily activities. While functional pleasures of 'professional thinkers' are usually related to creativity and discoveries, daily thinking is more fulfilled by practical engagements, for example, gardening, painting, and various kinds of hobbies. Whilst many of Zittoun's examples in Chapter 6 are concerned with relatively short-term pleasures or provide a static view of these pleasures, she aims at long-term extensions in which trajectories of thinking dynamically unfold in time. Therefore, in Chapter 7 she adopts a longitudinal perspective to show trajectories of thinking in the evolution of specific engagements and explores people's pleasures of thinking in these. Curiosities and pleasures of thinking can be sources of engagements that become life-time commitments. As examples of these, Zittoun evokes the trajectory of a student, who, very early in life became interested in the environment and in nature and followed these interests throughout his life. Then she turns to two 'professional thinkers' giving as examples, the psychologists Kurt Lewin and Henri Tajfel who were excellent observers of humans as inventors of ideas and artful objects, as well as evil existences destroying others and their creations. Lewin and Tajfel maintained a high degree of commitment to their own thinking.

Pleasures of thinking in the elderly

Zittoun finally turns to examining pleasures of thinking in older adults. While there is a great deal of evidence about the declining cognitive capacities of the elderly, for example, of memory, reasoning, or interests, she focuses on the transformation of thinking and its pleasures. She observes two forms of thinking in the elderly. One form is the pleasure of contemplative thinking which is often accompanied by observation of surroundings, whether of people or nature, and of enjoyment of having time and peace to get involved in contemplation.

The other form of pleasure of thinking in the elderly is the vital engagement with active life. Consider an example of the philosopher Edgar Morin, at the age of 101: 'Whenever I'm possessed by the force of life, the spectre of death recedes' (Elola, 2023). Elola (2023)

comments: 'Edgar Morin is a man with a mission. An unfinished, unpostponable, unavoidable mission: transmitting his ideas and sharing knowledge. Intellectual production keeps the French philosopher lucid and vibrant at 101 years of age. It feeds him and preserves him: he sees himself as being "possessed" every time he confronts a book or an article on his computer'.

Zittoun observes that older people pay more attention to events that are directly relevant to them in engaging their interests in life-long pursuits. This year, at the age of 102, Morin (2023) actively involves himself in writing about the Gaza-Israel war, the history of the State of Israel, and he expresses worries about the future of humankind. Yet, he finds satisfaction with his personal involvement in these dramatic matters.

Finally, in addition to pleasures of thinking in contemplation on the one hand, and vivid interest on the other, the elderly may become aware of ethical issues surrounding old age. Discussing thinking activities in old age, in his interview with Jesuino (2013), Serge Moscovici was talking about the dilemmas and ethics of getting old. He believed that the young and the elderly are in continuous disputes and even wars. Younger generations assume that the elderly have benefited from a period of riches and of full employment whereas the youth will know a period characterized by poverty and unemployment. Moscovici (in Jesuino, 2013, p. 11.16) suggested that 'in exotic societies, the elderly are put aside on a coconut tree while they are waiting to die'. In our societies, the elderly are cared for by charities. Moscovici suggested that there are two discourses about old age: 'there is the discourse of the scientific triumph and of the lengthening of life expectancy; the second deals with old people as a burden and this can lead to old people being put on a coconut tree, to eugenics' (Moscovici in Jesuino, 2013, p. 11.19). The new ethics pretends to be objective, but it does not accept that the elderly can come with their own decisions: 'The man who, a few years ago, was a father, who belonged to a family, a professional of religious community, who was responsible for the well-being of others, falls in disfavor or is thrown into a category imposed by others: 'the old'. This is so even if he continues to live and work like the others. No government or society has had the courage to engage into a conversation with the elderly about issues related to thanatological ethics' (Moscovici in Jesuino, 2013, p. 11.16).

The ethics of thinking with pleasure

Having convincingly argued that pleasures of thinking are fundamental for living, in the final part of the book Zittoun raises vital questions about the ethics of thinking with pleasure. If thinking is pleasurable, then the absence of pleasures of thinking is highly disturbing. Here Zittoun reminds the readers that it is vital to distinguish between the object of thought from the process of thinking. The process of thinking, we have seen is concerned with pleasurable activities such as curiosity, discovery, functional pleasures, sociality, and meta-thinking. However, it is the object of thought that may trap us in impossible problems; it may dominate the process and make thinking unpleasurable. Unpleasurable thinking may also arise when the object of thinking is routinised and unstimulating. This may lead to anxiety, cause unpleasant tension, and even become threatening. Lack of pleasure of thinking may also arise from political and economic

oppression and make thinking scary or traumatic. It can arise from boredom and a lack of stimulation, making thinking scary or traumatic, or could be associated with mental problems or political and economic oppression. Zittoun refers in this context to the importance of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis which people consult when they are unable to cope with unpleasant thoughts, fears and when they have a restricted capacity to help themselves. Therefore, therapies can be considered as places where the pleasure of thinking can be systematically cultivated.

Zittoun now poses the question as to whether, looking for pleasure, we might be encouraging easy gratification over other features of thinking. She emphasises that whilst she does not encourage pleasure per se, the pleasure of thinking is central to thinking as a creative individual and social process, and this raises fundamental ethical issues. Above all, to discourage that pleasure is damaging and denying humanity of the Self or Others. Moreover, pleasure of thinking prevents people from evildoing, and enables them to reflect upon the world, and to engage dialogically with the Self and Others.

These ethical issues, Zittoun argues, imply the importance of supporting the development of the pleasure of thinking in children in primary schools as well as in students' higher education establishments in and through pedagogical programs reaching far beyond formal boundaries of schooling. Self-cultivation provides infinite occasions for enhancement of thinking with pleasure.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Zittoun's innovative book on the pleasure of thinking integrates the wealth of intellectual and practical resources for exploration of thinking as a way of living. By drawing attention to the phenomena of thinking that have been neglected, she

- opens the possibility for deepening expertise and interest in cultural features of thinking
- leads individuals to realize their own emotions and pleasure of thinking and learning
- encourages individuals to follow their own intellectual and practical interests
- encourages individuals to develop lifelong strategies, and progressively discover the pleasure of cultivating questions, possible answers, and temporary discoveries. This is particularly important today when quick and superficial answers are easily found on the internet and in social media and when advances in technology discourage in-depth delving into problems, whether practical or academic. Therefore, it is particularly important to encourage pleasures of thinking, of deepening interests, discovery, and all other ways in which the pleasure of thinking is manifested and supported. Zittoun's integrative model, comprehensively incorporating unconscious dynamics, the progressive complexification, preconscious and conscious layers of pleasure provide a rich resource for thinking and its pleasures.

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