Université de Neuchâtel

SHAPING THE AMERICAN MIND TO GO TO WAR

A Cognitive-Pragmatic analysis of war rhetoric in America post-Vietnam

Doctoral dissertation

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p/o Le doyen
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Summary

This thesis explores American War Rhetoric post-Vietnam, stemming from a large corpus-based analysis of presidential speeches from Ronald Reagan in 1980 to Barack Obama in 2011. The issues of identity and threat construction are considered through the lens of several mechanisms, mainly those of presupposition and metaphor, to show that recurring, underlying constraining effects serve to promote the interpretation of the discourse in a consistent and unified direction, even when what is argued is the withdrawal of troops. The objective is two fold: firstly, the combination of cognitive linguistic and cognitive pragmatic frameworks (mainly those of Conceptual Blending Theory and Relevance Theory) helps to provide linguistic analyses which can both tackle the online interpretation of discourse, along with its effects in the long-term. These amount to the formation and constant consolidation of an overarching frame, which provides a very accessible context within which the interpretation of new conflicts can easily find relevance, based upon familiar reasoning. The second objective is to get to a fuller explanatory account of the mechanisms which underlie the efficiency of persuasive discourse, with a special focus on its lasting efficiency, including when conflicting facts come to light.

Key words: American War Rhetoric; cognitive pragmatics; cognitive linguistics; discourse analysis; conceptual blending; relevance; metaphor; presupposition; persuasive communication

Résumé

Cette thèse explore la rhétorique guerrière des États-Unis suivant la guerre du Vietnam, à partir de l'analyse d'un corpus formé de discours présidentiels allant de Ronald Reagan en 1980 jusqu'à Barack Obama en 2011. Les thématiques de la modulation de l'identité et de la menace de l'ennemi sont étudiées par le biais de plusieurs mécanismes, notamment ceux de la présupposition et de la métaphore, pour montrer que des effets de contrainte récurrents et sous-jacents contribuent à ce que l'interprétation du discours prenne une direction consistante et unifiée, même lorsque ce qui est défendu est de retirer les troupes américaines. L'objectif est double: premièrement, en combinant les apports théoriques de la cognitive linguistique et pragmatique (principalement ceux de l'intégration conceptuelle et de la théorie de la pertinence), il est possible d'arriver à des analyses linguistiques qui traitent à la fois du discours au moment de l'interprétation, et de ses effets sur le long terme. Ces derniers culminent en la formation et consolidation d'un cadre ("frame") prédominant,

qui fournit un contexte très accessible au sein duquel l'interprétation de nouveaux conflits peut facilement trouver pertinence, en se basant sur un raisonnement familier. Le second objectif est d'approfondir la notion de communication persuasive, particulièrement les mécanismes qui soutiennent son efficacité, notamment dans le temps, et face à l'apparition de faits contradictoires.

Mots-clés: Rhétorique guerrière; États-Unis; pragmatique cognitive; linguistique cognitive; analyse de discours; intégration conceptuelle; pertinence; métaphore; présupposition; communication persuasive

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Why American War Rhetoric?

(1) “How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing.” (Chamberlain, 1938)

(2) “In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defense of the indefensible. Things like the continuance of British rule in India, the Russian purges and deportations, the dropping of the atom bombs on Japan, can indeed be defended, but only by arguments which are too brutal for most people to face, and which do not square with the professed aims of the political parties. Thus political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenseless villages are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called pacification. Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with no more than they can carry: this is called transfer of population or rectification of frontiers. People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot in the back of the neck or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber camps: this is called elimination of unreliable elements. Such phraseology is needed if one wants to name things without calling up mental pictures of them.” (Orwell, 1946)

(3) “Known by reporters as the ‘Five O’Clock Follies,’ official briefings in Saigon became more likely to misinform than to inform. Officials sanitized language, using terms such as ‘soft ordnance’ for napalm, ‘surgical precision’ to describe bombing, and ‘collateral damage’ for killed and wounded civilians.” (Brewer, 2009: 196)

The unravelling of historical tragedies such as World War 2 has alerted to the role of language to bridge the gap between the terrible reality of war, and its justification or negotiation with the public. Such concerns are highlighted by the contrast between the words of British Prime Minister Chamberlain before World War 2 (1), and Orwell’s analysis following its conclusion (2). In (2), Orwell warns us about the destructive power of political language, about what really lies behind euphemisms or other vague uses of language. The reality which Orwell witnessed is now acknowledged as one of the worst chapters in the West’s modern history. With the fall of totalitarian regimes and the rise of alliances to preserve peace and democracy in the world, one might think that this grim chapter is over, that lessons have been learned so that we might never go back to a reality that is so horrific that it cannot be openly discussed. The events portrayed in (3) could very well have been added to the list shared by Orwell in (2) to alert the public to the corruption of political language. And yet, Brewer is here documenting the difficulties faced by American reporters of the Vietnam War, their frustration with “what was becoming known as the ‘credibility gap’” (2009: 196). And so it seems that Orwell’s warning was still relevant twenty years later; that language could be “sanitized” to continue “defending the indefensible.” Of course, it would be too simplistic to end the comparison there, and to conclude that nothing had changed. Many Americans were appalled at their country’s attempt to disguise destruction in Vietnam, when it was supposed to be the

champion of democracy. The reporters' frustration was soon to be shared by the American public, and voices of discontent opposing the war grew louder, and contributed to put pressure on the American administration to make proposals to end the war. It was then evident that winning a war without the public's approval was not a realistic possibility. As disillusion grew, hiding the reality of war became a harder task, and perhaps defending the indefensible would become as impossible as it sounds.

But the story does not end there. The first time I read Brewer's words, I was sitting in an American history class, focused on 20th Century American wars. From my perspective as a student, it seemed that every chapter ended with the same feelings of disillusion, with the same determination from members of the public that such manipulation (resulting in getting dragged into lengthy or unnecessary wars) would no longer occur. Brewer quotes Senator Fullbright, who summarizes the general atmosphere in the aftermath of the Vietnam War: "The biggest lesson I learned from Vietnam is not to trust government statements." (2009: 229) Yet, every chapter also seemed to begin in the same way. What struck me were the similarities in the propaganda, as it was often referred to, which was used to promote every new war. War after war, the message did not seem to change. This is how the question which motivates this thesis was raised. The disillusion resulting from the gap between the language used by the government and the reality of the issues described did not seem to be powerful enough to trigger a sort of linguistic/political revolution. How then is the reality of war negotiated between the American government and the public, between speaker and hearers? Does disillusion simply fade away with time, which gets massively compressed throughout a term's history class? Or can language really be sanitized, so that each time, the government is given a 'clean slate' to work with? In other words, can the American mind be 'shaped to go to war'?

These are the general, initial questions which prompted this thesis. The aim of this first introductory chapter is to narrow and determine its scope, goals, and precise objects of study (linguistic and scientific), in order to approach these questions. To that end, 1.1 aims at identifying the scope of the thesis, what type of analysis it will be. 1.2 will then have a more philosophical tone, and will serve as the basis upon which research goals and questions will later be set out in 1.3. We mentioned the 'sanitization' of language in order to achieve clear goals, to get the audience to accept what would otherwise be unacceptable; we talked about 'shaping the American mind to go to war.' Given the nature of this line of questioning, it seems important to start this thesis with a brief exploration of the role of language, its links with cognition, so as to be able to clearly determine what the object of

study will be, and how it will differ from other analyses of political language. Finally, 1.3 will outline the questions which will guide the linguistic analyses of the data, which will constitute the main contribution of the thesis. Indeed it will adopt a practical approach, in the sense that its starting point is not the testing (or the elaboration) of a linguistic theory, but rather discourse itself, specifically American War Rhetoric. Hart and Cap define Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) as "a transdisciplinary, text-analytical approach to critical social research," (2014: 1) which is best characterized "by the 'critical' in its designation" (2014: 2). It is the critical aspect of this thesis which first motivated the analysis of discourse at a micro-level, so as to discuss (at the macro-level) the relationship between the linguistic and the cognitive, between language and thought. According to Hart and Cap, there are two main (and complementary) ways to approach CDS:

> looking from a theoretical/methodological point of view toward the range of data that a given model is equipped to handle or looking from the point of view of particular data-types toward the range of theories and methodologies that one would need to properly account for them. (2014: 2-3)

This work falls within the realm of the second approach, that is a 'bottom-up' approach, starting from a particular set of data. I will now expand on the methodology and the reasoning which motivated the selection of the data, and the subsequent organization of the analyses which it will lead to.

Methodology and organization

This work is based on a wide selection of Presidential addresses on American wars in the post-Vietnam era, specifically from Ronald Reagan's presidency to the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011. When it comes to issues which most people have no direct experience of, such as foreign policies, the President's speeches constitute a significant source of information and play a decisive role in the way the Nation will debate the issues. This explains the choice to limit the corpus to Presidential addresses. The motivation behind this particular time period is as follows. Reagan's presidency marked a significant time in American history. Given the American public's reluctance to engage in military actions following the Vietnam War, and the various scandals which massively affected the people's trust in the Presidency (which will be discussed in further details in Chapters 6 (6.2) and 10), the legitimization of Reagan's "peace through strength" policy was crucial in re-establishing the portrayal of American wars as a necessary resort to support "freedom fighters." Chapters 10 and 11 will examine Reagan's re-interpretation of the Vietnam War in more detail, while the rest of the thesis will attempt to establish the grounds on which the tradition of American involvement in foreign conflicts is founded.

The word ‘tradition’ is indeed quite important. The terrible attacks of 9/11 are often described as a pivotal moment in American history. The success of George W. Bush’s rhetoric had a huge impact on the face of American foreign politics. To quote Murphy, “the world [...] has grown significantly less peaceful since George W. Bush took office” (2003: 607). There is no debating the huge impact of the launch of the War on Terror, and the subsequent changes to America’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, I will not look at 9/11 as a new chapter, which is why the corpus is extended to 2011. I will argue that the tradition which is set by American War Rhetoric results from the conceptualization of America’s place in the world, which was, in ways, cemented rather than updated by the response to the events of 9/11. The establishment of America’s identity was a long and steady process. While certain events can set precedents which can have significant impacts on that identity, it does not change overnight. In fact, I will also show in Chapter 11 that arguing for the end of a war needs to rely on similar conceptualizations so as not to stray from that identity. The death of Osama bin Laden was an important moment in the War on Terror. While the latter was started as an answer to the attacks of 9/11, and the fall of Al Qaida’s leader was a definite goal of the war, his death certainly did not mark its end. The overarching goal of each and every war is to defend freedom against oppression, to preserve peace from evil forces. However, that is in itself a never ending journey. That is precisely what I wanted to illustrate by ending the corpus with Osama bin Laden’s death. My goal here is not to depict the specificities of different eras, but rather to understand the background against which American wars are argued, and the construction and cementing of America’s identity in the world. The ambition is therefore to come to a comprehensive understanding of American War Rhetoric, based on the linguistic analysis of large corpus-based data. Before getting to those practical analyses, Chapter 1 will proceed to clearly set out the angle from which the data will be approached, along with research questions and objectives, which will lead to the appropriate selection and application of theoretical frameworks in Chapter 2. Chapters 3-9 will then aim at depicting the pillars of the legitimization of war, the patterns which were found to run through the different eras represented by the data. Chapters 3-6 will specifically look at the conceptualization of America (US) vis à vis the Other, as the foundation on which military action can be defended. Chapters 7-9 will then explore the conceptualization of America (US) *now,* that is vis à vis its past and future. When looking at the processes of language interpretation, the starting point will thus be the conceptualizer, the hearers, those to whom the discourse is addressed. Chapters 3-9 will therefore deal with the parts of discourse which appear to be constant; the foundations upon which American War Rhetoric is built. On the other hand, Chapters 10-11 will move on to tackle specific times of crisis within the data, and the negotiation of conflicting facts in discourse, before coming

to a conclusion in Chapter 12, in an attempt to highlight how such empirical analyses can serve to support the suitability of certain theoretical frameworks in their claim to describe how interpretation works, and to point to the necessity of combining frameworks for the study of persuasive communication.

1.2. Defining objects of study

1.2.1. Manipulation and the construction of reality

We have established that American War Rhetoric (post Vietnam) will constitute the *linguistic* object of study, and we now move onto the definition of the *scientific* object of study. Political communication is a vast field, and the data selected for this thesis also constitutes a rather large corpus. The aim of the following sections is therefore to narrow down the focus of research, by making clear what type of phenomenon will be tackled, how, and why. Given that the mere mention of Vietnam seems to bring to the front the notion of manipulation, it is with this concept which we will start to set out the scientific object of study which the corpus-based analyses of the data will aim to reflect. If an empirical analysis of American War Rhetoric is to serve one's broader understanding of language, one must start by wondering: what role does language play in influencing thought and reasoning? This question is of particular importance before analyzing the chosen data, which covers a large timeframe which has seen a growing access to information, in a way that was not possible at the time of the Vietnam War. This discussion on the role of language will also allow us to determine which linguistic tradition this thesis aims to contribute to, exploring what other types of studies have already been conducted, how this one will thus differ from previous research, and what it aims to achieve.

1.2.1.1. A cognitive approach

Discussing 'the power of language' might lead to the misconception of language possessing 'mystical' qualities, which, when understood properly, can be manipulated so as to get people to believe X or Y. Such a conception of language would have significant ramifications for the study of political language, including American War Rhetoric. Although this might seem like a rather far-fetched interpretation, this is precisely what has led to the strong refutal of the Linguistic Determinism Hypothesis, which Pinker (1994: 57) described as a "conventional absurdity," equating it with "the idea that thought is the same thing as language." To avoid this danger (that of overstating/overgen-

eralizing ‘the power of language’), I advocate firstly a cognitive approach to manipulation (1.2.1.1), as well as a nuanced approach (1.2.1.2.).

This power of language to construct reality is at the heart of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which is sometimes relabeled CDS (for reasons behind the motivation of this relabeling, see Hart, 2011a; van Dijk, 2009, 2015: 62). The premise upon which CDA studies lies is that “CDA sees discourse - language use in speech and writing - as a form of social practice.” (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258) By definition, the study of discourse cannot be disassociated from its practice, from the way that language is used in context. The founders of CDA made significant advances in that regard, by highlighting the capacity of language not only to describe, but also to construct and maintain aspects of reality, which is at the heart of the questioning motivating this thesis. This construction of reality, however, does not only relate to the social dimension of language use, but also to its cognitive function. At this point, one might then wonder: how determining is language use? As Chilton (2011: 179) points out, “the titles of their books have an Orwellian cast - Language and Control (Fowler et al., 1979) and Language as Ideology (Kress & Hodge, 1979).” Later, Fairclough’s Language and Power (1989) offers a title that is perhaps more encompassing, in the sense that one central aim of CDA is to raise awareness of the perpetuation of power relationships through discursive practices, that is of the power that exists behind discourse as well as in discourse itself (Fairclough 1989). The idea that language structures can be manipulated, and that these manipulations could be ideologically motivated (Chilton, 2011: 179) is what allows language to have these powerful controlling effects as society develops. However, I agree with Hart (2014: 38) that “no linguistic structure is in and of itself ideological - at least not in the pejorative sense.” The ‘power of language’ should indeed not be equated with abuses of power, which can arise as a result of particular uses of language in certain contexts (Hart, 2014; van Dijk, 2008). In their review of the newest approaches within the field of CDS, Hart and Cap (2014: 6) point out that

> [w]hat all these recent approaches have in common is that they do not treat the ideological, persuasive or manipulative potential of discourse as a property of language itself but of the cognitive processes which language is able to mobilize.

What is made clear here is the importance of cognition. In this view, language might be described as a tool to serve various purposes, among which is communication. What Hart and Cap point at is that language is not inherently persuasive (or indeed manipulative, in the negative understanding of the term). Rather, it has the *capacity* to mobilize cognitive processes in order to achieve certain goals, with the effect of prompting representations which the addressee might not otherwise have formed. It is in that sense, through the interface of representation, that language manipulation can impact reality, and in fact can contribute to constructing reality. It seems that in particular, the cognitive

turn within CDA (Hart & Lukes, 2007, also see Chapter 2, section 2) has helped to make that distinction between determining and influencing clearer. The mobilization of cognitive processes is what allows humans to use language in such a way so as to make sense of reality, and expand on it. The first consequence which this theoretical discussion leads to is the narrowing of the research focus to the hearer, to the interpretation process, as opposed to language production or linguistic structures. Indeed, the interest lies within the link between the representations which arise as a result of the interpretation process, and their ability to influence thought and reasoning. What we begin to see here is thus the need for a more nuanced approach when dealing with issues of language manipulation.

1.2.1.2. A nuanced approach

Going back to the question, 'does language determine thought?' we will see that a redirection of the way the question is phrased might be better suited to a study which focuses on the hearer, and is necessary to avoid equating any study of language manipulation with a Machiavellian exercise. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Whorf et al., 1956), which often gets interpreted as the statement that the language which we speak determines the way we physically apprehend reality, has been vehemently disputed, most notably by Pinker (1994). Rather than entirely discarding the hypothesis, a more nuanced approach might be more appropriate, and indeed very fruitful, as it could shed light onto ways in which language usage might (unconsciously) affect other cognitive mechanisms. This is precisely what Thierry et al. (2009) advocate, and it has led them to design fascinating experiments, pointing to the effect of language on one's perceptions of reality. Similarly, Athanasopoulos & Casaponsa (2020: 3) argue that what is needed is a shift in one's questioning, from

> the traditional yes/no binary way in which researchers have tried to answer the Whorfian question (either language affects cognition, or it does not), to a series of wh- questions: when and why do language-specific lexico-grammatical elements provide a basis for individuals to make a perceptual decision? And how does such influence play out in real time during the process of perceptual integration?

From a neuroscientific point of view, Athanasopoulos & Casaponsa (2020: 30) thus conclude that "the real question is not whether language can alter the anatomical and biological structures of perception, but rather where in that continuum top-down information like language kicks in." This nuanced approach has led these researchers to demonstrate, for instance, the existence of a link between one's native language, and "unconscious, preattentive color discrimination" (Thierry et al., 2009: 4568). From a psycholinguistic point of view, I argue that this approach can also serve to formulate more relevant, insightful questions for the study of political discourse: if one was able to

raise awareness of the ways in which language can affect one's reasoning, through one's perceptions of what is normal, objective, or right, one might then be better equipped to alert the public to abuses of power which might result from manipulating language in certain contexts.

Chen (2013) reports a very interesting correlation between futureless languages, and saving behaviors: at stake is the impact of the way in which one's language construes the future, on a nation's (or person's) ability to save money, but also to make savings in other areas (smoking for example is seen as a negative saving). Briefly put, one finding was that in countries with futureless languages, that is where people talk about the future in the same way as they discuss present concerns, governments were far better at making decisions which would allow to save money, than in countries with a distinct future tense. What is at stake here is not an inherent property of future tense structures; rather, it is the effects which entrenched ways of speaking might have on one's representations and perceptions of reality: what we might pay more attention to, or how one reasons about the future. This perfectly highlights what is of interest here: the unconscious ways in which language might impact one's representations, and ultimately one's reasoning and actions.

Coming back to language manipulation, by letting go of the either/or dichotomy which for a while shaped the Whorfian debate, we might instead view the relationship between cognition, language, and our environment as dynamic, as a movement that goes back-and-forth. The environment which we find ourselves in will undoubtedly constrain our language (and thought). Equally, our language will then also come to constrain our reasoning and thoughts, and as a result our apprehension of reality, of what gets perceived as 'normal' or objective. It is not quite enough, however, to leave it at that, as these influences keep going back and forth, which supports the argument that language and thought cannot be equated, or even nearly equated. Language is not simply a mirror to cognition, although the two are intricately linked. Fauconnier's image of a "spectacular but far from transparent window into this backstage cognition of our minds" (2006: 657) seems to be a better alternative. Perhaps one might conceive of language as a physical reality or product. We use it, produce it on a daily basis, and it is partly thanks to language that we can organize the reality which surrounds us. But behind this physical reality, this product which we constantly use and which *seems* to reflect reality, is a vast history. As such, language is far from a neutral product, and that is what makes it such an effective tool for persuasion, as one might not be aware that what might be taken for granted as a conventional use of language has in fact the potential to influence one's reasoning. Does

American War Rhetoric contribute to the cementing, or formation of a cognitive environment, which might then constrain (rather than determine) the hearer's reasoning about war?

We are now coming to a refinement of the (scientific) object of study: persuasion rather than manipulation. In the next section, we will see what that will entail for the study of American War Rhetoric.

1.2.2. From Manipulation to Persuasion

1.2.2.1. Persuasion and the issue of accessibility

"The speaker may therefore not be 'guilty' of any attempt at manipulation and the information may be perfectly accessible to the reader." (Hart, 2014: 40)

The word "manipulation" was on everyone's lips following the shocking release of the Pentagon Papers in 1971, first brought to the public's attention by *The New York Times*. The impact of its revelations is best summarized by *The New York Times*' own analysis, twenty-five years later:

> TWENTY-FIVE years ago this month, The New York Times began publishing the Pentagon Papers, a documentary history tracing the ultimately doomed involvement of the United States in a grinding war in the jungles and rice paddies of Southeast Asia. They demonstrated, among other things, that the Johnson Administration had systematically lied, not only to the public but also to Congress, about a subject of transcendent national interest and significance. (Apple Jr., 1996)

Twenty-five years later, the lies of the Johnson Administration remained the first lesson from the U.S.'s involvement in Vietnam. People knew they had been lied to. And yet, that knowledge did not prevent the story from repeating itself. In fact, Apple Jr. goes on in his analysis:

> Governments, meantime, have continued to conceal and, on occasion, to prevaricate. The Iran-contra affair, almost certainly illegal, was conceived and carried out by the Reagan Administration in total secrecy, and no one involved blew the whistle -- any more than anyone had done so during the months and years as the nation stumbled ever deeper into the Vietnam quagmire. (Apple Jr., 1996)

Apple Jr. is not alone in his condemnation of the government's deceptions, not as an isolated incident, but as what might be called a continual feature of the handling of international conflicts. Chomsky (1989, 2004; also see Moyers & Flowers, 1989), among others, is a well-known public figure whose analyses of the government's discourse clearly highlight its clashes with the reality which it claims to depict. Indeed in this day and age, the whistle keeps blowing. What makes Vietnam stand out might well be the publication of clear, indisputable evidence of deception for all to see: it was then possible to state that the government had, not "almost certainly," but *definitely* deceived the public. This raises a key issue, which allows for the elaboration of more precise research questions. The notion of accessibility is made apparent: although the release of the Pentagon Papers

relates to the unveiling of deception, the latter will not be the primary object of study here. While effective deception relies upon covertness (see Parret, 1978 for a theoretical discussion of manipulation, and for a cognitive pragmatic analysis of effective deception, de Saussure, 2005 and Maillat & Oswald, 2009), what is at stake in the data is the efficiency of discourse *despite* the accessibility of views and facts which directly question the American government's transparency and intentions in foreign affairs. Indeed, the first main observation after an initial examination of the data is that what is happening here is not that people are being fooled by the government; rather it is about how they are persuaded that their country's involvement in war continues to be required, as testified by the government's ability to press on with is foreign policy agenda. The interest of this thesis thus lies within the lasting persuasive *efficiency* of discourse, which constitutes an important distinction for a more narrowed focus.

Implications for the study of persuasive communication

Once persuasion has been identified as the main object of study, one might wonder: what is persuasion? O'Keefe (2004: 32) has identified previous trends of research on that topic as overly focused on the notion of attitude change, which he advocates one should go beyond:

> In its most basic form, persuasion involves changing persons' mental states, usually as precursors to behavioral change. Of the various mental states that might be implicated in persuasion, attitude (understood as a person's general evaluation of an object) has been the center of research attention. Correspondingly, persuasion has often been conceived of as fundamentally involving attitude change.

According to Taillard (2000: 157), this "attitude change," as called by social psychologists, is the "process that takes place as we come to believe an utterance." This is not to say that the reinforcement of existing beliefs is never mentioned in accounts of how persuasion works, but it is indeed that "attitude change" which tends to be the main focus. What I am proposing here, on the other hand, is that persuasion is most effective precisely when it allows to reinforce some deeply existing beliefs, which can interact with potential new beliefs. This reinforcement should thus be at the heart of studies of persuasive communication. As a result, persuasive discourse, in the context of political language, should not solely be analyzed in order to uncover where misrepresentations might occur, even in cases where the speaker might have been accused of misleading his/her audience; rather, the focus here will be on its capacity to reinforce certain representations and their impact on thought and reasoning about certain issues. We have already pointed to the distinction between deception and/or manipulation, and persuasion. It is worth pointing out, however, that the two are very much intertwined, which has some implications for the study of persuasive discourse, especially in the

context of politics, a domain where various scandals regularly surface. It is not within the scope of this thesis, which is rather concerned with the workings of American War Rhetoric, to further examine the relationship between the concepts of manipulation, persuasion and deception, although it will be interesting to see if the findings from such an empirical study might lead to future fruitful discussions and perhaps rethinking on the matter. For the purpose of determining this thesis' object of study, it suffices to say that the reason for manipulation's "bad name" (Chilton, 2011, also see van Dijk, 2006: 3), might well be that one is naturally led to observe cases where manipulation has caused problems, triggered misrepresentations which ended up impacting others' actions in a way that served the speaker, perhaps at the expense of others. Through solely focusing on observable cases where an attitude change occurred, one might come to the conclusion that by having a great command of language and of its manipulative potential, one might be able to direct others to do what one wants. The idea would be to study how such (mis)representations come to be acquired. But of course, as Austin (1962) rightly observed, the effects of language usage are not always those which are intended. One such effect is that of reinforcing existing representations or background assumptions, and particularly one's perceptions of what constitutes as 'normal.' It is precisely this type of phenomenon which is of interest here (rather than the uncovering of discrepancies between the language used and the reality of war on the frontline). It is at the level of these background assumptions that the practical analyses of the data will be aimed.

We have defined the main scientific object of study as that of persuasive communication. To be more precise, the aim is to get to a better understanding of the relationship between the representations put forward in discourse (which might or might not be misleading), and reasoning, particularly so as to combat accessible conflicting views. This focus is in line with Sweetser's remark that "our cultural model of representation is essential to our understanding of misrepresentation" (1987: 60). According to de Saussure (2005), it is the way in which these (mis)representations are processed which distinguishes deception, and I argue, persuasion, from other uses of language: "The speaker aims at giving manifestness to a certain number of assumptions to the hearer and have him consent to them, *provided that they would be rejected under normal conditions*." (2005: 118, my emphasis) One might then conclude that in the case of persuasion, such representations might not be necessarily rejected, but that the reasoning which they promote might not have been made possible under normal conditions.

Implications for the study of American War Rhetoric

Misrepresentations of reality are often the focus of studies which are critical of political language. As Marin Arrese (2011: 258) notes, political language is "particularly sensitive to distortion subject to the interests and power relations of participants." The identification of such distortions as resulting from persuasive or deceptive strategies, however, is more difficult. The belief that Iraq was directly to blame for the 9/11 attacks constitutes such a misrepresentation of reality, despite its ill foundations being made directly accessible to the public. After all, Al Qaida took full responsibility for the planning and conducting of the attacks, and no evidence ever linked them to Iraq. That belief was a direct result of the President's handling of the matter through his discourse (see Chomsky, 2004: 18 for discussion of polls; the construction of the links between Al Qaida and Iraq's involvement will be detailed in Chapter 6, 6.2.3). Nonetheless, one could argue that George W. Bush genuinely believed that Saddam Hussein had a role to play in the success of the attacks, and that given the threat that he posed to the United States, public support to go after him was of vital importance. Even in the case of secret operations, one could still argue that they were conducted with the best interests of the nation at heart, supported by expert knowledge, and that the sharing of such information with the American public would have impacted their own security. What this points out is that in the context of national security, intentions behind the need for covertness might still be perceived as rightly founded. I argue that the main question regards one's understanding of truth. The problem is not merely related to the false information that might have been conveyed; rather, it has to do with whether these communications remained true to the American understanding of democracy, which presupposes a certain role for the people, and more specifically that the sharing of information between the government and the people safeguards against abuses of power, making it a pillar of democracy. It is the violation of *that* (presupposed) truth that is primarily condemned by the American people who might feel betrayed when covert operations are made public knowledge. The world of value and of cultural evaluations, which Galasinski (2000) associates with persuasion rather than deception, is thus also at the heart of the issue here. The point of this study of American War Rhetoric is therefore not to identify the speaker's intentions, or to condemn any President for their use of language, but rather to better understand the impact of the message on the addressee, whether deception is involved or not. While covertness might be essential to the success of deceptive communication, the same is not true of persuasion. The unveiling of deceptive strategies or intentions is not always enough to distract from the heart of the persuasive message.

This distinction will also allow me to comment on another significant aspect of persuasion, as opposed to most cases of deception: its impact in the long-term. In the context of American War Rhetoric, striking cases of manipulative communication which had negative effects (i.e. distortions of reality, and possible loss of trust in the speaker) include the discourse post 9/11, which received great attention. These studies (see for example Silberstein, 2002; Lazar & Lazar, 2004; Gershkoff & Kushner, 2005; Ivie, 2005) are very useful in order to better understand the link between persuasive language and the formation of beliefs. While these events will also be discussed here, it should now be apparent that such instances of manipulating language, where it is indeed possible to point to a gap between the representation of events and the reality of the conflicts, will not be my starting point. I adopt Lazar and Lazar's view that "the American presidential statements and actions arising from 11 September and thereafter should be viewed as part of a larger discourse on the 'New World Order'" (2004: 223). Ivie (2005: 28) also describes the narrative of the "story of democracy," which the War on Terror continued to write, as a "continuation of the Cold War culture of containment into the present." That larger discourse or narrative is constantly being manipulated so as to effectively change reality by promoting a course of action rather than another, generally in the shape of military action. It is this larger discourse which is responsible for placing America on what Bacevich (2010) called a "path to permanent war." The objective here is therefore to better understand influences which might be beyond the addressee's consciousness, and in some cases the speaker's too. In particular, one might wonder where one's representations of what is 'normal' or 'right' come from, and how these might constrain one's reasoning in the long-term. These (mis)representations are not hidden from the public (that is they are not inaccessible), but their influence might be unnoticed, consolidating the object of study to that of persuasive rather than deceptive language.

1.2.2.2. Persuasion and the issue of pervasiveness

Fascination for rhetoric, often known as the art of persuasion, goes a long way back. When we think about the art of rhetoric in Ancient Greece, one might imagine a particularly skillful speaker, whose mastery of the art allows him to be persuasive in a given situation. What I am interested in here, however, is not so much the persuasive power of one specific speech, but rather the pervasiveness of cognitive mechanisms and their impact on the effectiveness of persuasive discourse. As Bates remarks when discussing the power of Reagan's rhetoric (2011: 52),

> to be sure, Reagan did not awaken one day and pronounce that he, alone, would change how Americans perceived the veteran. What he did do was greet each day as a new opportunity to repeat what he had said so many times before.

The question is not so much "how can the President win this argument?" but rather "how does American War Rhetoric construct a context which has naturalized the resort to military action as the only way to solve international conflicts?" The previous section (1.2.1.) focused on constructing reality, a focus which derives from a Foucauldian conceptualization of discourse. In this understanding, discursive power does not merely constrain; rather, it produces reality (Foucault, 1972). It is when the representations conveyed in discourse become unchallenged, or common sense (unproblematic), that it might become difficult for discourse users/receivers to see things differently. The issue is not so much the capacity of political language to construct reality (in a way that serves the needs of the interested party) and perpetuate ideologies, but rather it is what tends to be referred to as the "normalization" or "naturalization" of these ideologies, of these (mis)representations. Fairclough (2003: 130) summarizes the problem as follows:

> What is at issue here is classification, preconstructed classificatory schemes or systems of classification, 'naturalized preconstructions . . . that are ignored as such and which can function as unconscious instruments of construction' (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), preconstructed and taken for granted 'divisions' through which people continuously generate 'visions' of the world.

Krzyżanowski (2020) talks about normalization as a process of transformation, whereby the change which arises from "new patterns of representing social actors, processes and issues" is also designed to gain legitimacy. Language and power thus seem to somewhat sustain each other, leading to the definition of politics as a linguistic activity (Reyes-Rodriguez, 2008; Geis, 1987), as a linguistic practice which allows for the naturalization of ideologies. When studying the mechanisms of persuasion, it is therefore necessary to focus not merely on the presentation of new or controversial ideas, but also on the context in which the reasoning is grounded. The question is not just 'what does the speaker want his/her addressees to believe?' but also 'how do the representations promoted in discourse relate to normalized ways of thinking?' What is perceived as objective or normal will thus be at the heart of the practical analyses that are to follow. Given the goals set out for this thesis, the focus will not be on the process of transformation itself, but rather on the interaction between these "unconscious instruments of construction," and the new arguments laid out to promote military action. The necessity to go to war can thus appear both as a new concern, arising out of unique present circumstances, and as an old pattern, deeply entrenched in social cognition.

Many researchers within the field of CDA/S aim to raise awareness of the ways in which certain social or power relationships are merely cultural constructs. For instance, issues relating to racism and immigration have been the focus of great (and extremely valuable) attention (see for example Hart, 2010, 2011b, 2013a; Van Der Valk, 2003; Charteris Black, 2006). The idea is to expose the

fact that “racial classification is very much a cultural construct rather than a scientific one” (Goatly, 2007: 67), in the hope to deconstruct the representations upon which racist attitudes are founded. This opposition between culture and science is very interesting, insofar as it points to a generally accepted conceptualization of science as a trustworthy way of establishing classifications, upon which reality can be safely built. While racial classification has never been successfully scientifically defended, its deconstruction appears incredibly difficult, despite the importance of the work that is conducted to denounce racial prejudice. Goatly (2007) tackles the importance of metaphors in the construction of reality (to be discussed in more detail in 2.4.2), and in the case of racial classification discusses the prevalence of the following: GOOD IS CLEAN/ WHITE and EVIL IS DARK/ BLACK. These conceptual metaphors seem to have an impact not merely on the construction of racial classifications, but also on their *maintenance over time*: “Caucasians tend to accept the label white and Afro-Caribbeans to reject the label black, because of the themes GOOD IS CLEAN/ WHITE and EVIL IS DARK/ BLACK” (Goatly, 2007: 68). This raises the important question regarding the role of metaphors in the long-term efficiency of persuasive mechanisms.

Another very interesting question raised by Goatly is regarding the link between the way in which our society talks about sexual relationships and the reality behind the number of women reporting rape. He also notes that while that number increased in the time period observed, the number of convictions did not follow the same pattern (Goatly, 2007: 71). One might then wonder whether the discursive construction of SEX AS VIOLENCE could be responsible for these numbers. Goatly mentions studies which have shown that a vast majority of males who committed rape “denied that it was rape” (2007: 72). The naturalization of these constructions could therefore account for such discrepancies between perceptions of reality. That is precisely what a recent TV show has tried to portray. *The Morning Show* (Aniston et al., 2019) depicts a fiction within which multiple scandals bring to light the reality of sexual harassment within the TV industry. When one of the main characters also becomes the centre of such a scandal, he loses his job and with it his reputation, and devotes his energy to denouncing the unfairness of the situation. His perception of unfairness is a result of his denying that rape was ever committed, and that consent was always there. The naturalization of the practice which he perpetuated allowed him to effectively deny that there was anything scandalous about his behavior. Eventually, one of his victims commits suicide, and the reality of how terrible the situation really was is made apparent. What this shows is that the process of naturalization does not generally get verbalized or brought to light until problems occur. By then of course, it also tends to be too late. The construction of reality through discursive practices merits

attention, not merely when such problems occur, but because of the way in which it can unconsciously constrain reasoning, as certain patterns get reinforced over time. In that sense, persuasive mechanisms can be said to be more dangerous than occurrences of deception. While successful deception relies on covertness and can thus be exposed, effective persuasion rather relies on manipulating the context (which includes the cognitive context), on the hearers' readiness to accept the representations which are promoted. This is precisely the type of phenomenon which needs further analysis in order to answer the questions raised in this introduction. While the Pentagon Papers unveiled acts of deception in the handling of the Vietnam War, the discourse around America's involvement in international conflicts is part of a larger narrative containing deeply entrenched representations which are difficult to deconstruct. The way in which this thesis differs from other CDA analyses which might focus on visible issues leading to power imbalances, is its heightened focus on a pervasive phenomenon, that of persuasion which does not seem to cause immediate problems. It is only when we look at the bigger picture, thanks the the analysis of a vast, comprehensive set of data, that we can see a consistent, pro-war agenda emerge, and we might then wonder why and how that is.

The analysis of American War Rhetoric within a wide time frame thus offers interesting angles in the study of language persuasion, and its relationship with thought, and with unconscious influences on reasoning. Racial or gender discrimination, issues surrounding immigration or sexual violence are sadly a feature of our (more or less) immediate environment. Persuasive communication to promote support for war has different implications, because the harm that is done is not easily seen. It is certainly not inaccessible, but it relates to a reality which is remote, not only physically but also culturally. War Rhetoric has immense potential for constructing and changing reality, which tends to rely on prophecizing the future (Dunmire, 2011; Bell, 2008). The construction of a threat relies on the conceptualization of an unwanted future, requiring immediate action. Bell warns of "false prophecies," noting that "it is difficult - if not impossible - to know whether the prophecies would have turned out to be true or false if no such action had taken place" (2008: 28). Therefore, the harm that gets done is justified on account of an urging threat, as a form of necessary evil (although it certainly does not get called that). While one can discredit racial classifications on account of the fact that they hold no scientific grounding, disproving a false prophecy is a different matter. The discursive construction of a threat will be the focus of Chapter 7; it is worth noting at this point that the construction of a threat does not merely rely upon the successful argumentation that immediate action is needed. Rather, effective persuasion relies upon the perpetuation of certain representations

which have a strong cultural hold, which is why I argue that the representations which will be the focus of Chapters 3-6 act as a pre-condition to the relevance of the argumentation outlined in Chapters 7-9, which tackles the construction of threats and the pushing for immediate action.

1.2.2.3. Persuasion and the issue of inconsistencies

We have discussed the process of naturalization/normalization, which can have significant influences on social cognition and reasoning in general. Naturalization relates to what becomes known as common sense. When we think about what might constitute a successful persuasive move, we might first think that logical arguments would be particularly suited to convince someone to adopt a point of view. If a point is logical, it might indeed be difficult (or even impossible) to refute. It might then appear as a perfect candidate to play a significant role in updating or consolidating someone's beliefs. However, common sense does not necessarily follow the rules of logic, and indeed, logic does not necessarily change minds. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) made some great advances into the field of psychology, by showing that people can easily discard logic when making decisions, driven instead by reasoning which is prone to cognitive biases (also see Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982).

Rational cost-benefit analyses might play a crucial part of the government's decision to promote military action as the right course of action. Reyes-Rodriguez (2008) proposes a Rational Decision Filter, "which is considered by politicians *before* making the decision of going to war. This cost–benefit analysis is a necessary state that governments consider every time enemies are identified or new enemies arise" (Reyes-Rodriguez, 2008: 40, my emphasis). It is important to note that such analyses (or filters) occur *prior* to the promotion of the reached decision in discourse. The discourse might present itself as an informative basis upon which the public is free to make up their own decisions, when it has in fact already undergone a significant pre-assessment process. American War Rhetoric does not simply consist of a repetition of that process, because rational cost-benefit analyses do not particularly appeal to the way we think, or at least to common sense. Indeed, the fact that the decision to go to war might have been agreed on based on a "rational" filter is not enough to persuade the public of its righteousness or of its necessity. American War Rhetoric thus does not appear as an overview of pros and cons, but rather as a *constrained* interpretation of the issues at stake, so that war might be seen as the *only* right choice.

The resort to war in order to secure peace might seem completely counter-intuitive. Yet it is exactly what is defended in discourse. As Lazar and Lazar (2007: 58) point out, "in the context, 'forces of peace/freedom' refer unmistakably to military forces or forces of war." More than just creating some distance from the reality of war, one might question the logic of such reasoning and wonder whether a continued position of peace (in the strictest sense of the word) would not be more beneficial in the long term. However, that view is not, and indeed cannot, be accessed in the President's discourse, as it could lead to the conceptualization of America's resort to war as a potential cause of international conflicts. Constraint will therefore be the central focus of this work, and the common point between all the strategies or mechanisms which allow for effective persuasion. It is important to note, however, that constraint does not mean that conflicting views or facts cannot be accessed outside of the interpretation of American War Rhetoric, for the latter to be successful. Billig (1988) points out that common sense contains contrary themes. "The very existence of these opposing images, words, evaluations, maxims, and so on is crucial, in that they permit the possibility not just of social dilemmas but of social thinking itself." (Billig, 1988: 17) Billig concludes that the "dilemmatic aspects of thought" (1988: 24) need to be recognized, and it does seem to be an essential starting point when studying the mechanisms of persuasion. Indeed, the discursive realization of constraining effects might be efficient precisely because of the discourse's appeal to common sense, and its dilemmatic character. The goals of the linguistic analyses thus need to be refined, so that the study of the mechanisms of persuasion can lead to an understanding of how the interpretation process allows for the incorporation of (apparent) 'inconsistencies,' and their negotiation in discourse for the maintenance of beliefs or the perceived suitability of ideologies. The key here is therefore not covertness, but rather coherence, which we will expand on in Chapter 12. In the words of Billig (2003: xi), "the apparent irrationality of war is not the product of irrational psychological drives, but it is the outcome of the seemingly rational human propensity to make sense of the social world."

1.3. How to study Persuasive War Rhetoric

This section outlines the research questions which result from the discussion in 1.2, while also expanding the latter to explain the benefits of analyzing persuasion, in the context of American War Rhetoric, as a sound, scientifically-based study.

1.3.1. Asking the right questions

• From ‘what is persuasion’ to ‘what does it do?’

Analysing persuasive discourse from the perspective of the hearer, rather than speaker (as advocated in 1.2), amounts to moving from asking ‘what is persuasion,’ favoring instead the question: ‘what does it do?’ This perspective aligns with that favored by Oswald and Maillat (2011) (also see Oswald 2014), whose work on deceptive communication does not start with the question ‘what is deception?’ but rather ‘how and why does it work?’ While an analysis of what distinguishes manipulative practices also has its benefits, “reflecting on the intentional nature of deception will however not allow us to inquire about how deception works” (Oswald, 2014: 4). In a similar way, there are two main reasons why the question ‘how and why does persuasive communication work’ might be better suited to the purpose of discourse analysis:

(a) Part of the interpretation process involves the retrieving of the speaker’s intention. This is a major contribution of Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory (1995) and of research within the framework of Cognitive Pragmatics. What matters here, is that whether the hearer is right or wrong in identifying the correct intention, that is what will influence the whole interpretation process; and more importantly, *that* can be predicted;

(b) Secondly, by focusing on what persuasive communication *does*, one is able to discuss cases where misrepresentations occur, without necessarily being meant by the speaker himself/herself.

Beyond the speaker’s intentions, it is also very difficult to comment on the *conscious* motivation for a speaker’s use of language. In the words of Chilton,

> Did Hitler, for example, say consciously to himself, ‘I will call Jews parasites because that conceptual chunk will attach itself to a natural pre-existing mental schema in the minds of my listeners’? This is not of course the same as saying that such a communicator does not know, from empirical experience of the effectiveness of such communications, that he is likely to promote the representation in question, and his purpose may indeed be to change recipients’ beliefs, ideas, attitudes, etc. (2011: 187)

By looking at what Hitler’s language did, however, one is able to conclude that the parasites’ “conceptual chunk [attached] to a natural pre-existing mental schema in the minds of his listeners,” and thus confirm the power of language to impact cognition. It is indeed this direction which the analysis of the data will take, in order to get to a comprehensive understanding of American War Rhetoric.

• ... and ‘what makes it efficient?’

By focusing on the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of persuasive communication, what one is concerned with is its effectiveness. The following question will therefore guide the practical analyses in this thesis: ‘what makes persuasive communication *effective*?’ This focus on effectiveness can also help to evade problems of over-interpretation of isolated strategies or utterances. The representations promoted by a single phrase or within a single speech are greatly influenced by the cognitive context in which it was uttered and interpreted. In order to answer the ‘how’ question, one must start by understanding the general rules which guide language interpretation. The study of persuasive communication is indeed very much a matter of pragmatics. In this type of approach, the analyst looks at what *hearers* do when they interpret persuasive discourse. We will now see that Cognitive Pragmatics, and in particular the framework of Relevance Theory, is very well equipped to describe what happens during the interpretation process, that is how the hearer gets from hearing to understanding, and in fact also “from comprehension to believing” (de Saussure, 2005: 15).

1.3.2. Answering how: discursive creation of a reading grid

1.3.2.1. Constraining the context of interpretation

Relevance Theory is established within the framework of Cognitive Pragmatics as a theory of communication and cognition. It presents significant advantages which might be summarized as two-fold: first, it is a theory that encompasses all types of communication; and secondly, it also provides a practical framework for the interpretation process, explaining how and why hearers might come to retrieve a particular interpretation over another.

> The advent of cognitive pragmatics, specifically of the relevance-theoretic approach, has brought a rather different orientation: ‘pragmatics’ is a capacity of the mind, a kind of information-processing system, a system for interpreting a particular phenomenon in the world, namely human ostensive communicative behaviour. It is a proper object of study in itself, no longer to be seen as simply an adjunct to natural language semantics, though it clearly continues to have an essential interaction with semantics. (Carston, 2002: 4)

It is not within the scope of this thesis to discuss the history behind the advent of Cognitive Pragmatics, or its differences and complementarity with semantics, but rather to explain its suitability to meet the goals which I have set out for the study of American War Rhetoric. The way in which Carston summarizes what makes Cognitive Pragmatics stand out seems to answer issues regarding the inaccessibility of the speaker’s intentions. The mechanisms of interpretation offer an object of study which is grounded in cognition. While one is not able to go into a speaker’s head to directly read his/her intentions, a lot of progress has been made in the field of cognitive science, providing great insights into how information is processed. Indeed, “what a hearer is going to interpret is

clearly predictable on the simple basis of the concerned utterance and a limited set of contextual assumptions" (de Saussure, 2011: 34). These predictions are not based on the analyst's intuitions, rather they arise out of an understanding of language as a cognitive mechanism, following rules of optimal efficiency, which also opens up the door for heuristic processing. De Saussure (2011: 34) goes on: "But there is more: speakers themselves predict what their interlocutor is going to interpret, otherwise they can't hope passing on a message unless by chance." This capacity to read other people's minds, to predict what a speaker's communicative intention might be, or to predict what one's addressee might interpret, is referred to as Theory of Mind. The study of the interpretation process as set out by Cognitive Pragmatics thus seems perfectly suited to the analysis of persuasive communication, from how information gets processed online, to why it is effective from a cognitive point of view.

Yet, as Carston also points out, the study of interpretation might be said to be all too vague; its reliance on context-dependent factors might then constitute just as big an obstacle and dismiss it as a scientific object of study. Among critics, Carston cites Noam Chomsky, who she recalls "[sees] the wish for a theory of the interpreter as tantamount to a 'demand for a theory of everything', the pursuit of which will lead to a theory of nothing" (Carston, 2002: 1). According to van Dijk (2002: 211), contexts need to be understood as "personal mental constructs," rather than as being "out there." The study of the interpretation process might then be criticized as a proper scientific object of study, when so much of it depends upon what might be seen as the hearer's subjectivity. While it is true that every individual brings to the interpretation process a different set of expectations and assumptions, it is important to note that the construction of the context is dynamic, and is not solely dependent upon the interpreter. In fact, that is precisely where the effectiveness of persuasive discourse seems to lie: within the manipulation of the context in which an utterance gets interpreted, so that the set of contextual assumptions upon which the hearer derives meaning is constrained. This might be understood as the dual aspect of contexts: as personal mental constructs, they differ for every individual; at the same time, the context in which an utterance gets interpreted can be constrained. These two aspects do not need to be incompatible.

Firstly, let us expand upon the second aspect, the manipulation of context. Oswald, Maillat and de Saussure (2016) talk about its manufacturing (also see Maillat & Oswald, 2009, 2011), which allows to constrain the interpretation process. The model developed by Maillat and Oswald to study deception and manipulative communication in general (also see de Saussure, 2005; Oswald, 2010,

2011; Maillat, 2013; Oswald, Maillat and de Saussure, 2016) is grounded within the findings of Relevance Theory, and provides a very useful framework which defines manipulation by explaining how (and why) it works:

> Manipulation is therefore an attempt at controlling the context selection process of an utterance U by making a set of assumptions C so salient so as to make them inescapable from a cognitive point of view. In accordance with the relevance- theoretic framework, it is predicted that the context-selection constraint can essentially take two forms. The manipulator can try to make some contextual assumptions more accessible, which constitutes an effort-oriented strategy; or she can try to make these contextual assumptions stronger, which would be an effect-oriented strategy. Crucially, the inescapability of C is intended to block access to a context C' in which U would be incompatible with other contextual assumptions. (Maillat and Oswald, 2011: 74)

While there is a lot more to be said about how Maillat and Oswald got to that conclusion, and about how this definition fits in with the findings from Relevance Theory, it is enough at the present moment to highlight that constraint is at the heart of the effectiveness of manipulative communication, and that constraining the interpretation of an utterance refers to the constraint of the context in which it occurs. I argue that the same mechanisms can apply to the study of persuasive communication, and that through constraining the context, what the President's discourse on American wars does is to create a reading grid for the American people, guiding the interpretation of the issues in one single direction, and by doing so, making sure that other interpretations are inaccessible. The 'reading grid' is not a theoretical concept, but rather serves as an image to understand what makes persuasive discourse efficient, in the context of political communications on unfamiliar issues: it does not determine thought, and it does not rely upon the inaccessibility of conflicting information; however, it provides the hearer with the relevant information to focus on, and once accepted, can be difficult to get away from. We will see how this works in discourse in Chapters 3-11. This certainly does not mean that every single person who listens to the President's speeches will end up with the same interpretation, but rather that constraint can allow for an overall unity on the way certain issues are reasoned with, so that war does not just get perceived as acceptable in a specific context, but as the *only* right way to remain true to America's identity. The image of the reading grid can be helpful, because it highlights our natural ability to reduce the overwhelming nature of reality to an acceptable whole. Although the context of interpretation might vary between groups of people and between individuals, Relevance Theory is also a theory of cognition, and it highlights the very important point that (successful) human communication is geared towards efficiency, which can be achieved through the search for optimal relevance. Therefore it does not seem right to arrive at the conclusion that interpretative mechanisms cannot be accurately studied or predicted, from the observation that they are context-dependent. Indeed, the context of interpretation should not be understood as an open-ended collection of possibilities: its constraint serves concerns of efficiency.

When the reading grid gets accepted, this can also lead to an illusion that it is the only way to interpret the issues at stake. But it is important to remember that it does not have to be accepted, or that it could only be partially accepted. Nevertheless, in the case of American War Rhetoric, the effectiveness of the persuasive message can be observed through the overall acceptance of the President's policy, or perhaps more simply through a lack of opposition so strong that it could not be ignored.

1.3.2.2. Broadening the context of analysis

So far, the central aspect of context has been highlighted. Communication is indeed a matter of meaning negotiation. This understanding differs from the view that language interpretation is purely a matter of decoding. Sperber and Wilson make explicit the difference between "the code model" and "the inferential model":

> According to the code model, a communicator encodes her intended message into a signal, which is decoded by the audience using an identical copy of the code. According to the inferential model, a communicator provides evidence of her intention to convey a certain meaning, which is inferred by the audience on the basis of the evidence provided. An utterance is, of course, a linguistically coded piece of evidence, so that verbal comprehension involves an element of decoding. However, the linguistic meaning recovered by decoding is just one of the inputs to a non-demonstrative inference process which yields an interpretation of the speaker's meaning. (Wilson & Sperber, 2004: 607)

Through sending *ostensive* stimuli, and through inferring the speaker's meaning based on the evidence provided by that stimulus, communication can thus be described as a negotiation rather than as a unidirectional process. The negotiation of meaning is made clear by the distinction between what is said and what is meant; or between what a sentence says and what the speaker means. This distinction was first brought to light by Paul Grice (1975) through his introduction of *implicatures,* which refer to what a speaker implies with an utterance, but which might not be made apparent by its semantic decoding. Since then, a lot of work has been done on the inferential aspect of utterance interpretation. Relevance Theory has replaced the distinction between 'what is said' and 'what is meant' with that between explicatures/implicatures, arguing for an even more inferential account of interpretation mechanisms. I will mention here the debate between Récanati and Carston, summarized by the latter by the title of her article: "How many pragmatic systems are there?" (Carston, 2007) Both researchers' account of interpretative mechanisms is grounded in contextualism. However, they disagree as to the degree to which interpretation is inferential. According to Récanati, there are two types of pragmatic processes. Broadly, explicatures ("what is explicitly communicated" (Wilson, 2017: 90)) are characterized by primary pragmatic processes, while implicatures rely on secondary pragmatic processes (Récanati, 2003). What this implies is that not all aspects of in-

terpretation need to be inferential. On the other hand, according to the Relevance Theoretical account,

> [t]he processes involved [in utterance comprehension] are claimed to be *entirely* a matter of (non-demonstrative) inference, with linguistic meaning providing crucial guiding evidence, and some of the inferences [...] are backwards inferences geared to providing a sound basis for expected implications. (Carston, 2007: 21, my emphasis)

When studying persuasive communication, the main advantage of an inferential account is to account for potential misrepresentations and/or misinterpretations, without necessarily implicating the speaker or commenting on the speaker's intentions. One of the examples provided by Récanati and Carston to defend the validity of their respective model is the following utterance, which we will briefly examine before evaluating how this might impact the study of political discourse:

(4) Neil has broken his leg.

(4) is uttered by a student. The addressee knows two people named Neil: her son (NEIL1), and a colleague in the linguistics department (NEIL2). The student who uttered (4), however, has no knowledge of her addressee's son's name. Récanati and Carston use this example in order to account for the way in which the addressee gets to the interpretation that Neil refers to the colleague (NEIL2) rather than the son (NEIL1), despite the fact that the concept NEIL1 would be more highly activated in the addressee. I will not go into the details of the debate here, but will comment on the illustration which it provides of the importance of context not just in deriving the right meaning, but in influencing the interpretation process. Let us say that the addressee is a worried mother, who is regularly anxious about her son's well-being. Regardless of whether she would get to the correct interpretation that the "Neil" in (4) refers to NEIL2, and that (4) should in no way indicate that her son is unwell, and regardless of how automatic that process is, the mere conceptualization of the possibility of NEIL1 with a broken leg might be enough to trigger worry. In that case, the strong intuition (which might be near enough certainty) that the speaker could not possibly be referring to her son (NEIL1) might not be enough to ease the speaker's very real worry. I then argue that what would be most likely in this situation (and what can be often left out of theoretical analyses of made-up examples) would be for the addressee to seek clarification. This might take the shape of a question such as "just to be clear, you don't mean my son Neil?" or simply of adding NEIL2's last name in a question. In the (albeit unlikely) event that as soon as the student uttered (4), she received an important phone call and had to leave before the addressee could seek clarification, one might

imagine that, should the worry be strong enough, a text to her son might be necessary, or perhaps a conversation might be initiated with another colleague, asking if they have heard anything about NEIL2 breaking his leg.

Why does this matter? Because it illustrates the importance of clarification, and the dynamic aspect of meaning construction, while also highlighting the crucial role of the cognitive context. In the case of American War Rhetoric, this might seem problematic, as there cannot be a direct response from the public, and certainly not from every member of the audience. Nonetheless, polls are constantly being run in order to analyze the public's response to certain uses of language, from specific phrases to broader discursive framing, and politicians' discourse will reflect that. For example, in his analysis of the Gulf War rhetoric, Lakoff (1991: 27) notes that:

> The American people could not accept the Self-Defense scenario, since it amounted to trading lives for oil. The day after a national poll that asked Americans what they would be willing to go to war for, the administration settled on the Rescue scenario, which was readily embraced by the public, the media, and Congress as providing moral justification for going to war.

Meaning is thus very much a matter of negotiation, and the resulting reading grid is not rigid. Let us now go back to the Neil example, which can serve to inform our analysis and the formulation of research questions on three main fronts:

- A broader view of the communicative event in which utterances occur

In the Neil example, it is reasonable to assume that utterance (4) would likely trigger some degree of worrying. What happens next is thus very dependent upon the addressee's state of mind and personality. While Carston's goal is to get to a better understanding of the interpretative process, its restriction to one single utterance is not natural, and would cause issues for discourse analysis. In the case of American War Rhetoric, the interpretation of an utterance or speech should be made within that of a larger corpus, so as to discuss the interaction of resulting representations with other widely communicated ones. In answer to the question, 'what does the interpreter of political discourse do?' expanding one's knowledge about an issue might come to mind. In the context of a Presidential address regarding a significant decision for the country, another function of interpreting discourse might be to seek confirmation that the President is doing his job properly (or on the other hand to confirm personal beliefs that he is not). In American politics, the role of the President is a very special one. He is not just at the head of the government. First and foremost, he is the representative of 'We, the People.' Murphy (2003: 627) notes that "to oppose him is to oppose the [synecdochical] voice [of the people] and, not coincidentally, the will of the people." For his decisions to

be approved, they need to be grounded in the American identity. When interpreting a speech on America's military involvements, the goal is not merely to establish the veracity of the facts related, but rather, and perhaps more importantly, whether the handling of the issue is representative of the American identity. This is extremely important, because it underlies the choice to focus on the reinforcement of certain representations, rather than on the uncovering of misleading interpretations. Rather than talking about the persuasive effectiveness of a single speech or utterance, the aim will therefore be to look at patterns within the wider corpus, to comment on the effectiveness of the reinforcement of constraining effects in the broader context of constructing the American identity. This is in keeping with what was said in 1.2, about the need for an added focus on the reinforcement of entrenched representations, which translates here into an added question regarding the long-term impact of persuasive discourses.

• Importance of constraint at the heart of effective persuasion

It is therefore crucial that the events which are discussed make sense to the interpreters, as part of an American story which they can relate to. What needs to be avoided is precisely a scenario similar to the one which we described following the utterance of (4), whereby the mother's worry is so strong that she feels the need to seek clarification. In the case of American War Rhetoric, the seeking of clarification might not be as straightforward as a single question, as it might be more difficult to assess the trustworthiness of the information conveyed. The creation of a reading grid as described above does not mean that no alternative information is made available to the American public. However, the persuasive potential of the discourse revolves around the mechanisms of constraint, so that the hearer might feel like the interpretation of the issues in question can easily be incorporated within an existing set of beliefs, so that it makes sense to them, and so that the interpretation process might stop. Particular attention will be paid to this aspect of the interpretation process (its end), so as to understand not only what representations might be favored in discourse, but also how they might come to be accepted.

• Clarification of what is meant by the interpreter/hearer

The Neil example portrays an exchange between two individuals. The utterances within that communicative event would thus be highly influenced by what the interlocutors know (or do not know) about each other. Presidential addresses constitute a very different type of communicative event, which is influenced by and contributes to the construction of social representations. According to van Dijk (2002: 210),

social representations such as group beliefs, attitudes and ideologies are by definition general and fairly abstract: they need to be used by group members in different situations. They are, for instance, about what WE think about THEM, in general, and not what you and I now think about some specific person.

This is an important distinction. In the context of political discourse, the discursive representation of the 'hearer/interpreter' does not refer to single individuals, but rather to a social construct, defined by belonging to a group whose identity keeps getting constructed through the realization of discursive practices. For the rest of this thesis, I will therefore use the notation WE/US and THEY/THEM to refer to the concepts rather than to the individuals which make up those groups. While one cannot ascertain how every individual might interpret a single utterance or speech, the mechanisms of constraint can point the interpretation process in a unified direction, and can thus be effective as they allow for interpretations to be coherent with the construction of US.

1.3.3. Answering why: cognitive efficiency

The *how* question might be answered by defining effective persuasion as the manipulation of context, while also getting the analyst to focus on the broader communicative event which utterances are part of, and on what the interpreter does, on the tasks which they are performing as they interpret language. This latter aspect also serves to answer the *why* question. To give a quick illustration of this, Maillat and Oswald provide a cognitive pragmatic account of the Moses Illusion:

This is an experiment where subjects are asked the following question: 'How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the Ark?' The results indicate that as much as over 2/3 of the subjects tested answer 'two', at the same time failing to notice the anomaly (i.e. that the episode of the biblical flood is about Noah, not Moses). What this shows is that some crucial, and highly relevant, information may go perfectly unnoticed and lead to a blatant judgmental error (semantically speaking there is a referential mismatch, since it makes no sense to speak of Moses in connection with the ark). Such a biased processing of information is often referred to as shallow processing. (Maillat & Oswald, 2011: 67)

This "shallow processing" is possible because the hearers are focused on the cognitive task of answering the question which they are asked, and are thus more likely to overlook the anomaly in the question. Maillat and Oswald (2009) are then able to apply this type of analysis to the interpretation of political communication. For example, we will come back later to de Saussure's analysis of the interpretation of a referendum, and to the importance of contextual constraint in guiding the interpretation process. This cognitive pragmatic framework is extremely interesting when accounting for the use of fallacies in political discourse. The aim is not simply to identify fallacies in discourse, that is the ways in which hearers might get to a certain conclusion based on flawed inferences, but also to account for why these fallacies are effective in the first place. In other words, why does it work?

What I would like to highlight here is the fact that shallow processing, which allows for the realization of cognitive illusions (see Pohl, 2004 for definitions and discussions on their theoretical status), is not just an unfortunate possibility, favored by the manipulation of context; it is first and foremost a cognitive advantage, and that is why persuasion is not only possible, but why it can be so effective, even when conflicting facts are brought to light (a phenomenon which will be discussed in Chapters 10 and 11). As mentioned previously, these cognitive errors have led to many prolific studies, highlighting the common reliance upon heuristics in areas such as decision making (see for example Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman, 2012). These heuristics are sometimes referred to as cognitive shortcuts, a very useful designation in that it highlights their advantage alongside potential issues. Shortcuts are designed to help the person who is on a journey, to offer an advantage to facilitate the fulfilling of a goal. Cognitive shortcuts, although they can lead to some cognitive errors, are no different in that aspect: they allow humans to make sense of the reality which surrounds them, without overwhelming them. That in fact is a crucial aspect of cognitive operations in general. If we think about perception, when we look around us, our mind is not led to focus on every single aspect of our environment; rather, we tend to focus on what is relevant to us. Our brain also allows us to categorize the sounds which we hear when we first acquire language, so that after a certain time, we are unable to distinguish between certain similar sounds, compressing the richness of the acoustic reality into a manageable size in order to serve the goals of communication. The ability to make fast decisions is also incredibly beneficial. One cannot imagine debating every single possible outcome every time a decision needs to be made, especially when it is a decision which relates to one's survival, that is to say in a situation where an *immediate* or urgent reaction is required. As Oswald, Maillat and de Saussure point out,

> this should not be regarded as a defect in the system [...]: heuristics are the results of an evolutionary drive in optimizing cognitive efficiency as they offer the best balance between speedy derivation of new knowledge and costly inferential thorough evaluation processes. (2016: 524)

In order to answer the question 'why does it work,' analyses must therefore be grounded not only in the general communicative function of language, but also in cognition. This is what makes Relevance Theory such a suitable framework for the purposes of discourse analysis. Indeed, its premise revolves around two main principles: the cognitive principle of relevance, which specifies that "human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance" (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 260), and the communicative principle of relevance, which states that "every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance." (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 260)

Cognitive illusions are a fascinating topic, and they might be particularly useful when analyzing the manipulative/persuasive efficiency of a specific communicative act. However, when it comes to the enduring aspect of beliefs, or of ways of thinking, they are only part of the answer. Hence the need for the following chapter, which will focus on the selection of other theoretical frameworks, beyond that of Relevance Theory. One challenge of this thesis will thus be to incorporate those frameworks into a coherent whole. As a matter of fact, I will finish here by adding that beyond relevance, a presupposition of coherence lies behind the efficiency of cognitive mechanisms to provide the hearer with a feeling (or in certain cases, an illusion) that the whole makes sense, that is to say that the representations promoted in discourse make sense against the cultural and cognitive background in which they are set. Humans tend to assume that things make sense; that language makes sense; that communication makes sense; perhaps even that the world makes sense. It is only because of that presumption of coherence that humans are able to create categories to organize reality, because they assume that there is some form of pre-existing order. This does not mean that they need to believe that everything makes sense, or that things make sense on their own, independently of conceptualization. Indeed, the drive for coherence does not mean that there can be no inconsistencies within a belief system; rather, it strives to make sense of those inconsistencies. This presumption of coherence seems to go beyond the immediate communicative situation; although Relevance Theory is grounded in cognition, I find that the incorporation of other frameworks is necessary in order to tackle the complexity of persuasive communication, especially when it comes to these elements which lie outside of the immediate communicative situation. The formulation of the following research questions reflects the centrality of the issues identified in 1.2 and 1.3, tackling both the 'how' and 'why' of the efficiency of the discourse of American War Rhetoric in terms of persuasion. They are declined on two fronts: (a) those that deal with the discourse itself, and (b) those which relate to the broader realm of persuasion:

(a) - How is war construed in the Presidents' discourse?

- Are there any recurring patterns, or is each war construed in a way which reflects its unique circumstances?
- How does the discursive negotiation of war make the latter acceptable to the American public, allowing for the government to press on with its agenda?
- How does the representation of war in discourse get reconciled with the government's professed peaceful intentions, which came under scrutiny in the aftermath of the Vietnam fiasco?
- Are there any linguistic mechanisms which favor this reconciliation, and which have a particular impact on the hearer's reasoning about war?

- Does the President's discourse show signs of change when new facts come to light which might discredit previous assertions of peace or of the enemy's alleged threat?

(b) - What mechanisms (if any) allow for continued persuasion despite the accessibility of contrary views?

- What does effective persuasion entail? Does it just mean discarding elements which do not fit the official discourse?

(c) - Finally, tying those two aspects together, can an empirical analysis of American War Rhetoric inform discussions on the mechanisms behind efficient persuasion?

Chapter 2: Selecting Theoretical Frameworks

The questions outlined in Chapter 1 relate to various concerns: some of them are directly related to the domain of communication, while others tackle that of reasoning, thoughts and beliefs. In an effort to maintain coherence, the selection of theoretical frameworks to answer those questions will revolve around one concern: that they are centered around cognition. It thus seems fitting to start this chapter with Cognitive Linguistics. At first glance, Cognitive Linguistics might not seem to be best suited to analyze utterances as they occur online. However, in order to answer the 'why' question, alongside 'how,' the analysis of online utterances cannot be divorced from the understanding of the ways in which language and cognition mutually impact each other.

2.1. Cognitive Linguistics

"Cognitive linguistics surveys the conceptual system through linguistic phenomena" (Abdikalyk et al., 2016: 3170), and as such, it seems greatly suited to the study of persuasive communication, as a bridge between the realm of communication and that of cognition. George Lakoff best defines Cognitive Linguistics, not by stating what it is or should be, but rather what it does, or should do, that is to adhere to a "cognitive commitment" (1990: 40): "The cognitive commitment is a commitment not to isolate linguistics from the study of the mind, but to take seriously the widest range of other data about the mind." (Lakoff, 1990: 46) In an effort to keep this commitment, any linguistic theory should reflect advances in cognitive sciences, and be updated should new information come to light. In that sense, the upholding of the cognitive commitment seems to align with neuroscientist Antonio Damasio's remark that "when the amassing of data does not resolve a complex issue, it may be necessary to find new ways to conceptualize the problem" (in Plutchik, 2001: 344). New ways to conceptualize linguistic and cognitive mechanisms have indeed recently emerged. This chapter deals with three main 'revolutions,' in the sense that they have led to new ways to conceptualize the following: categorization (2.1.1), emotions (2.1.2), and metaphor (2.1.3). Some of these revolutions started in separate fields, but they are intricately linked. One clear example of this being the capacity of metaphors to stir strong emotions, and which is often linked to metaphors' persuasive potential (Charteris-Black, 2011). The issues which are discussed here are fundamental to the laying out of a theoretical framework for the analysis of the data selected.

2.1.1. Revolutionizing the conceptualization of categorization

Metaphors are found everywhere in language, and are recognized as a powerful tool in political discourse (Billig et al., 1988; Chilton, 1996, 2003; Lakoff, 2002; Charteris-Black, 2011; Musolff, 2016). This work does not deviate from that finding and will indeed have a significant focus on metaphor. However, as Glucksberg and Keysar (1990: 17) note, "the central problem [to understanding metaphor] is to understand categorization," and that is where we shall start. One of the concerns of Cognitive Linguistics is indeed to better understand the ways in which we construct, organize and store knowledge, a valuable input which merits attention when studying persuasive communication, particularly its long-term impact.

The argumentation over many political issues often involves the construction of who (or what) is referred to as 'the Other,' and the target group's deviation from that 'Other.' In broad terms, 'the Other' is that who is excluded from OUR group. More than that, in the context of American War Rhetoric, 'the Other' *cannot* be part of OUR group, because THEY do not belong to the same category as US. Categorization is thus essential to the discursive legitimation of political issues, and it is essential to the development of social life. THEIR violation of social norms, resulting in THEIR 'Otherness,' might involve the categorization of THEIR ways as not being 'normal,' thus implying that OURS are. But what does 'normal' mean? I argue that what one considers to be 'normal,' or perhaps 'objective' is related to one's experience of the world through the interface of cognition.

Categorization is essential to what makes us human. According to Lakoff, "most of it is automatic and unconscious, and if we become aware of it at all, it is only in problematic cases." (1987: 6) It is precisely the problematic way in which categorization itself was understood that Lakoff responded to with *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things* (1987), following from Eleanor Rosch's groundbreaking observations (1973). In the case of American War Rhetoric, I argue that one main aspect of the President's job is to make his proposals fall within normal, unproblematic categorization, that is in a way that fits in with the public's understanding of the American identity (or rather of its core). However, this does not mean that inconsistencies cannot occur, and that should they do so, the legitimization process would fall apart. Lakoff's contributions to the conceptualization of categorization help to explain what that means, and how it is possible. Rosch's Prototype Theory was thus born in response to the classical theory of categorization. When we categorize, we do so on the basis of what members of a category have in common. This led to a rather strict conceptualization of CAT-

EGORIES AS CONTAINERS, whereby categories are understood as being out there, and members fall into one or another. “Things were assumed to be in the same category if and only if they had certain properties in common. And the properties they had in common were taken as defining the category.” (Lakoff, 1987: 6) Lakoff also notes that this understanding was not seen as problematic, and indeed was taken for granted as a form of background assumption. Prototype Theory identified two key issues with that way of conceptualizing categories. The first one has to do with what came to be known as *prototype effects*: if all the members within a category share the same properties, then it should follow that no members should stand out as better representatives of that category. Secondly, if these properties are indeed inherent, then “categories should be independent of the peculiarities of any beings doing the categorizing” (Lakoff, 1987: 7). This revolution around the theme of categorization was central to redefining concepts such as understanding, reasoning, truth, beliefs, knowledge, objectivity, etc., and led to Lakoff’s theory of *idealized cognitive models* (ICMs):

> The main thesis [...] is that we organize our knowledge by means of structures called idealized cognitive models, or ICMs, and that category structures and prototype effects are by-products of that organization. (1987: 68)

The theory of ICMs is crucial in order to account for what might be labeled as inconsistencies within a belief system. Categorization is partly a matter of imagination, and therefore categories should be understood in a way that is more flexible than rigid containers where no variation is to be observed. The first example which Lakoff borrows from Fillmore (1982) is that of the category of *bachelor*, which contains prototypical examples, such as that of a young, single man. However, this ICM is the result of a mental construction, and in this case “does not fit the world very precisely,” as it “says nothing about the existence of priests,” for instance. This category was formed in a specific context, with specific expectations regarding relationships and marriage.

The ICM model can also be very useful to the study of deception and particularly to account for people’s representation of what might be called deceptive. Just like any categories, deception will have prototypical members, and is not easily defined. As a result, we can be led to debate on the degree to which certain utterances might be said to be deceptive, with certain utterances being classified as more deceptive than others. For example, Sweetser (1987) uses the ICM model in her study on the meaning of a *lie.* She notes that ICMs have a structure, and that when several ICMs are taken together, the result might first appear as an anomaly. This is what Coleman and Kay (1981) observed in their own experimental study of lying, noting that “when informants [in the Coleman

and Kay study] were asked to define a *lie*, they consistently said it was a false statement, even though actual falsity turned out consistently to be the least important element by far in the cluster of conditions" identified (Lakoff, 1987: 72). The internal logic of ICMs which rule everyday social and linguistic interactions, and which we tend to take for granted, can account for these seeming anomalies.

So how are ICMs structured? One way to provide internal logic is through image schemas, defined by Johnson (1987: xiv) as "a recurring, dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives coherence and structure to our experience." These image schemas can constrain our understanding of the world, based on our experience of the latter, and therefore the construction of meaning. The basic premise is thus that our physical experience of the world acts as a first type of constraint on reasoning, and on our imposition of order. Categories might still be perceived as containers, but these are not just out there. It is the structure within these containers, including their boundaries, which needs to be reassessed. One example of an image schema is that of CENTER PERIPHERY, which structures what Lakoff calls "Radial Categories." This is how Lakoff defines the CENTER PERIPHERY schema:

> We experience our bodies as having centers (the trunk and internal organs) and peripheries (fingers, toes, hair). Similarly, trees and other plants have a central trunk and peripheral branches and leaves. The centers are viewed as more important than the peripheries in two ways: Injuries to the central parts are more serious (i.e., not mendable and often life threatening) than injuries to the peripheral parts. Similarly, the center defines the identity of the individual in a way that the peripheral parts do not. A tree that loses its leaves is the same tree. A person whose hair is cut off or who loses a finger is the same person. Thus, the periphery is viewed as depending on the center, but not conversely: bad circulation may affect the health of your hair, but losing your hair doesn't affect your circulatory system. (1987: 274)

Radial categories can trigger prototype effects, generating members seen to be at the center and exhibiting properties perceived as more important, thus allowing for variation within the category.

This revolution informs the purposes of this thesis on two main accounts:

- First, it impacts our understanding of how beliefs might be organized, which has significant implications in assessing the efficiency of persuasive communication:

What is believing, and what influences whether one is ready to accept, reject or update one's beliefs? According to Sweetser (1987: 47): "belief is normally taken as having adequate justification, and hence as equivalent to knowledge, which would entail truth." Without this revolution around categorization, one might construe knowledge and belief as operating on slightly different levels. One might intuitively take beliefs to relate to the individual, while knowledge might be taken to be more universal. However, this would entail a conceptualization of truth as being absolute. Rather, beliefs might be justified as long as no contradictory evidence gets provided. This is extremely im-

portant for the study of persuasion, as it seems to confirm that its efficiency lies within the mechanisms of constraint. If efficient reasoning is not grounded in some external truth, but rather is embodied, then that is what efficient persuasion must be built upon too. Despite a widespread regard for arguments which are grounded in logic, that is not what beliefs tend to be based upon. The influence of one's own bodily experience of the world needs to be acknowledged so as to understand how persuasive communication might appear to provide an illusion of objectivity, merely because it appeals to the ways in which a culture or group is known to understand the world. This is what our work on the use of metaphors within persuasive discourse will aim to reflect.

• Thinking about America's identity in terms of CENTER PERIPHERY:

Secondly, the conceptualization of national identity as a radial category has significant implications for the study of political discourse, and in particular of American War Rhetoric, which is deeply concerned with the protection and survival of the country. In that understanding, what matters is the core: without it, the category no longer holds. The negotiation of that core, of what truly makes one American is therefore a powerful tool in legitimization discourse. This is what our work on the use of presuppositions within persuasive discourse will aim to reflect. If the discourse works on the premise that the core is undebatable; and if the President can successfully align his policies with these core values, which are perceived as stable elements which do not need defined; then I argue that this is precisely where the basis of effective persuasion lies (in the context of American War Rhetoric).

Implications for the study of American War Rhetoric

As a general conclusion, everything needs to be related to what gets constructed as 'the core' of America's identity, so that the emergence of controversial facts can be incorporated while preserving the country's defended essence; secondly, the reasoning which is centered on that core should be entrenched in the ways in which America understands the world and constructs meaning.

I would like to finish with a hypothesis on what might constitute an ICM OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT'S ROLE, and which might account for the efficiency of Presidential addresses in promoting or preserving certain beliefs, despite widespread issues of mistrust towards political figures:

(a) The President's actions must reflect the American identity;

(b) If the President is seen to harm the core of America's identity, his authority can be questioned.

Lakoff defines the ICM OF ORDINARY COMMUNICATION as follows (1987: 72):

(a) If people say something, they're intending to help if and only if they believe it.

(b) People intend to deceive if and only if they don't intend to help.

At first glance, the ICM OF ORDINARY COMMUNICATION might be seen as irrelevant when it comes to the interpretation of Presidential addresses, which falls within the category of political discourse. Politicians' intentions to help can often be perceived as a disguise to further personal interests in order to maintain or gain more power. I argue, however, that the President of the United States should not necessarily be seen as a prototypical politician. While American politicians might be seen to defend their own state's authority, or perhaps to defend a stronger influence from the Federal government, the President should first and foremost be a spokesperson for 'We, the People.' The people's beliefs towards their President's suitability for the job, in all aspects, have a significant influence, as demonstrated for example by the Lewinsky scandal which led to Clinton's downfall. The conclusion that the President is only intending to deceive if and only if he is not intending to help might then represent, to some extent, the way in which people apprehend the President's addresses. If we combine the two ICMs listed above, then the President's desire to further his own interests does not have to be incompatible with his role, as long as his actions are in keeping with the American identity. This could explain why it might be difficult to conceive of the President's intention to deliberately harm the principles defended by his country, which is different from furthering the interests of the majority of Americans.

The purpose here is not to offer a full-fledged theory of belief systems. The point is rather to highlight the fact that our beliefs are not organized in ways which follow strict rules of logic. When we talk about coherence within a belief system, the implication is not that inconsistencies (in the logical understanding of the term) cannot occur. The ICM model, which arose out of the revolution of the conceptualization of categorization, provides a framework which accounts for the incorporation and maintenance of inconsistencies within a coherent whole, which was identified in Chapter 1 as a key concern. As a result, one can hold the belief that the President of the United States does not have all individuals' best interests at heart, while also believing that his intents are to uphold the American identity and to help the country to the best of his ability. What really matters when studying persuasion in the context of Presidential addresses is the negotiation of that core, the (re)construction of what it means to act on behalf of 'We, the People.' The advancements in Cognitive Linguistics do not just serve to get to a better understanding of categorization; by providing insights

into how we store and organize meaning/knowledge, the framework of Cognitive Linguistics seems to have a vital place in the study of persuasive communication, which is concerned with the way language is used and interpreted, but also with how comprehension relates to an existing belief system.

2.1.2. Revolutionizing the conceptualization of metaphors

We have seen that the rethinking of human categorization has led to a new understanding of what it means to reason. According to Johnson (1987: 57), reasoning is something that we "do," and it is grounded in our experience of the world. Both Lakoff (1987: 8) and Johnson (1987: 209) stress the importance of imagination to expand our conceptual systems. This is where metaphor comes in. With *Metaphors we live by,* Lakoff and Johnson (1980) made groundbreaking advances in the re-conceptualization of metaphors, the main idea being that metaphors are not just nice ways of speaking, they are necessary (Ortony, 1975). The first time that I encountered the term 'metaphor' was most likely in a French literature class in middle school. Prototypical examples would be brought to the students' attention in the form of poetic metaphors. This is where the conception of metaphors as being nice, elaborate uses of language tends to come from, that is as expressions whose meaning might not always be straightforward, but which provide the text with an aesthetic quality. This understanding of metaphor is thus completely at odds with Lakoff and Johnson's title: metaphors are not unusual, they are not restricted to literature; metaphors "we live by" are everywhere. This is the view which drove the 'metaphor revolution,' and is now widely accepted, although it might not have yet reached the middle/high school classrooms. If the purpose of metaphor is not (at least not necessarily) to get hearers or readers to pause and think, or to embellish language, then what does metaphor do? According to Johnson (1987: 22), metaphor should not be "treated as a proposition, but as meaning construction," which fits in with the role of language defended in Chapter 1. Chilton and Lakoff (1989: 5) conceive of metaphor as our "primary means of conceptualizing the world." As such, metaphor is understood to be, not on the surface of language usage in literary circles, but rather "at the nexus of mind and language," as a "ubiquitous part of both ordinary language and everyday cognition" (Tendahl & Gibbs, 2008: 1823). Extensive work in Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) (see for example Kovecses, 2002/ 2010) has thus shown that mappings between source and target domains are part not only of everyday language, but shape the way we think.
The implications of this work have been immense. What is particularly interesting for the study of persuasive communication, is that metaphor does not only expand reasoning, it also constrains it.

Chilton and Lakoff (1989: 5) note for example that there is hardly anything "more frustrating to an American than a sense of 'not getting anywhere with your life' - an idea that would be meaningless in much of the world." The reinforcement of particular ways to conceptualize the world through the use of metaphors will thus be seen to be an important aspect of effective persuasion. We will see in Chapters 7-11 that reasoning about military involvement can be heavily constrained by construing the latter as a way, in fact the only way, to get somewhere. Metaphorical systems can thus account for cultural differences in the way that different societies might reason about the same issues. But more than that, deeply entrenched metaphors can make it difficult to think outside the box, so to speak, which is provided by conceptual metaphors. The central aspect of metaphor for the development of language, thought and experience (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Johnson, 1987; Gibbs, 1994, 2014; Kovecses, 2002/2010; Tendahl and Gibbs, 2008) is precisely what makes it such an important object in the study of persuasive discourse. It is therefore no surprise that the metaphors used in political discourse have attracted a lot of attention. The study of metaphors in manipulative (not necessarily in its negative understanding) communication has led to a better understanding of the purposes of metaphor for the construction of meaning and of reality. Charteris-Black (2013: 201) outlines the benefits and purposes of metaphor as follows:

> gaining attention and establishing trust; heuristic (simplifying issues so that they become intelligible on framing issues); predicative (implying positive or negative evaluations of actors and issues in a way that makes an argument); empathetic (arousing feelings that are favorable to the speaker); aesthetic (creating textual coherence and alluding to respected orators and/or history); ideological (representing political actors and issues in a way that reflects, or constitutes, a world view); mythic (framing participant roles so that they contribute to, or create, a political myth).

While the ideological and mythic functions might appear as those which would be of particular interest to the study of political discourse, these various functions of metaphor usage are not to be understood separately. I agree with Kovecses (2005, 2010), who proposes that coherence is a major function of metaphor (also see Semino, 2008). In fact, it might be the most important one, as it is what brings together all of the benefits listed above. Its contribution to coherence (with the rest of the discourse, but also with entrenched representations, and most importantly with the way that our cognitive system constructs meaning), might also help metaphors to go unnoticed, and favor ease of processing. This latter aspect seems to be confirmed by advances in neuroscience:

> A significant feature of this account, then, is that the totality of a source domain does not need to be processed before target domain inferences are determined. This immediate creation of an integrated circuit, in which both source and target domain are processed at once, is consistent with behavioural evidence that people can as easily understand metaphorical expressions as non-metaphorical ones, and with neuroscience evidence on the spread of activation in neural circuits. (Tendahl & Gibbs, 2008: 1830)

Although cognitive linguists (wether they abide by the framework of Cognitive Linguistics or Pragmatics) do not all agree on exactly how inferences are drawn when interpreting metaphors (see for example Relevance Theory's unified account of interpretation, Wilson and Sperber, 2004; Gluckberg's Class Inclusion Model, Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990; Glucksberg et al., 1997; Glucksberg; 2001; or Conceptual Integration Theory, Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), the fact that metaphorical expressions do not require an especially complex interpretative path is now generally accepted. This is a direct result of this new conceptualization of metaphor, and stands in stark contrast with the previously held conception that metaphors must require a longer processing time than literal uses of language. In particular, the focus on poetic metaphors as prototypical examples might lead to the conclusion that the interpretation of metaphors needs to involve the hearer's conscious, critical abilities. One of this thesis' aims, however, is to show that adopting a more global view of metaphor does not entail letting go of its special status (2.4.2).

Johnson (1987: 82) specifies that "metaphorical interpretations [...] are not ordinarily part of our self-reflective awareness, though they are part of our awareness." This is what makes metaphor such a powerful tool when it comes to driving the efficiency of persuasive discourse, because most of the time, we do not see its constraining power (although it is accessible through critical thinking); unless of course the interpretation of a metaphor leads to a paradox which is inconsistent with one's set of beliefs, one which cannot easily be integrated. As a result, the study of metaphor within the field of CDA/S has tended to highlight the potential dangers of metaphor usage within political discourse, for instance. These dangers refer to the ways in which metaphor can constrain representations of reality, based on the observation that metaphor can hide vast aspects of reality (Chilton and Lakoff, 1989: 15), without necessarily attracting the hearer's attention and deployment of critical thinking. However, we will see that the incorporation of RT can guard against the risk of over-interpretation in that regard. In order to get to 'how' this works, one of the main points of this thesis for the analysis of "novel" metaphors[1] is to discuss their interpretation in the context of their interaction with entrenched metaphors which make up part of the cognitive context. This distinction between entrenched (sometimes referred to as conventional) and novel metaphors has led to the career of metaphor theory (Gentner & Wolff, 1997; Bowdle & Gentner, 2005), which postulates that as metaphors get conventionalized, a processing shift occurs from comparison to categorization. It is not within the scope of this thesis to go into the details of how Bowdle arrived at this conclusion.

[1] "a metaphor not used to structure part of our normal conceptual system but as a new way of thinking about something." (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003: 53)

While I do not disagree with the theory itself, which highlights the capacity of metaphors to construct meaning and reality through the process of categorization, I argue that the term "career" might be slightly misleading, and propose that we should move towards a more 'global' conceptualization of metaphor. But before explaining what I mean by that in 2.1.4., it is necessary to take a quick look at the third revolution, regarding the conceptualization of emotions.

2.1.3. Revolutionizing the conceptualization of emotions

Charteris-Black (2004: 41) argues that "metaphor has a very important persuasive role in evoking strong emotional responses that may prioritise one interpretation of a text over another," and that "[it] is this persuasive role that constitutes the ideological and rhetorical basis of metaphors." This raises the question of whether emotion needs to be triggered for a metaphor to have persuasive potential in the construction of ideology. First and foremost, the role of emotions in persuasive communication must be acknowledged, starting with the revolution of the categorization of emotions. This revolution happened within the field of neurosciences, but has deep implications for discursive studies. In *Descartes' Error,* Antonio Damasio (1994) questioned the widespread conceptualization of emotions, and particularly their role in decision-making. Descartes' error, he argued, was to separate mind and body, that is rationality and emotion. Damasio thus formulated the "somatic marker hypothesis," which shows that emotions guide decision-making, and are in fact a very efficient way to do so. Two pathways are distinguished: the body-loop, which refers to the ways in which emotional responses can be triggered by changes in our body; and the "as-if body loop," referring to the impact of cognitive representations of emotions, which can trigger similar effects without the need for a sensory stimulus. The latter can thus provide significant insights into the property of discursive practices to affect other people's behavior, and potentially their beliefs. As-if loops are identified as a key mechanism, helping humans to anticipate rather than wait to be confronted with a particular situation in order to react appropriately. In the context of persuasive discourse, the cognitive representation of certain emotions, which can easily be triggered by the interpretation of metaphors, for instance, thus appears to be a powerful tool in the construction of meaning.

Information that can be trusted

Just like the metaphor revolution might not be very well-known outside of academic circles, the conceptualization of emotions as leading us astray, perhaps preventing us from making rational de-

cisions, is still present within society, and as such, it should be taken into account when discussing the ways in which people might be persuaded. This is part of what looking at what the hearer does implies, rather than simply focusing on how a particular mechanism works, for instance, and amounts to distinguishing between what the analyst knows of how the mind works, and what the non-analyst assumes (see O'Halloran, 2003 on the importance of that distinction, and its implications for CDA), impacting his/her reasoning. Indeed, it is not unusual to hear of people talking about their emotions playing tricks on them, implying that they cannot be trusted.

Of course, what the emotion revolution shows is precisely the opposite. In fact, and that is of particular interest to the study of persuasive communication, it appears that emotions might be seen as trustworthy guides, which is highlighted by theories such as the affect-as-evidence hypothesis (Clore & Gasper, 2000). Clore and Schnall (2008) attempt to show that emotions are indeed very reliable:

> The 'affect-as-evidence' hypothesis holds that self-generated experiences of affect might serve as evidence of evaluative beliefs, just as sensory experiences routinely serve as evidence for descriptive beliefs about the world. (2008: 3)

Emotion should therefore not be seen as an isolated feeling in one's body, rather it is "arguably nothing but the co-occurrence of evaluation in thought, feeling, physiology, expression, and so on." (Clore & Schnall, 2008: 1) This general feeling of coherence is what leads to the proposition of the "affect-as-evidence hypothesis," which points to our tendency to trust one's emotions more than we might think. Stirring emotions in discourse can thus be a very useful strategy, not because the hearer might be misled by unhelpful emotions, but because the information provided by affect tends to be perceived as reliable. This is particularly significant in the context of American War Rhetoric, where the issues which are discussed are not often easy to comprehend due to their geographical and cultural distance. Findings arising from the emotions revolution thus inform the study of persuasive communication, helping to answer both the 'why' (due to their central role in cognition) question, as well as the 'how' question, which will rather be reflected by the practical analyses of the data.

Implications for the study of American War Rhetoric

The main takeaway for the study of persuasive communication is that rather than impairing one's ability to make the right decisions, emotions actually assist reasoning; more than that, they tend to

be perceived as reliable, that is when one experiences them, which is different from an explicit display of emotions on the speaker's part. A distinction needs to be made between the widespread misrepresentation of emotions, through their perception as a separate entity, and the actual impact of emotions on one's reasoning, which is central to cognition and can go unnoticed. Indeed, the idea that emotions can lead us astray remains prevalent. As a result, the perception of an emotive President might not always be fitting. This is particularly true of American War Rhetoric. In that context, the use of strong emotive language might not be particularly well-suited, because it might clash, in the public's mind, with the representation of a President who should not act upon his impulses, but rather will deeply ponder on the implications of sending young men and women to war. This leads us back to the crucial part played by metaphor in the efficiency of persuasive discourse. While direct expressions of the speaker's emotions might cast doubt upon the latter's ability to make rational decisions, metaphors have the power to trigger strong emotions in the hearer (Charteris-Black, 2004, 2011), reinforcing the centrality of metaphor analysis for the study of persuasive communication.

2.1.4. Towards a more global view of metaphor?

The emotions revolution does not stop at the reconceptualization of emotions as a central part of cognition. Emotions are very complex, and their functions are the focus of ongoing research. As we have seen, emotions and metaphor are intricately linked. Advances in the field of emotions can also inform our understanding of metaphors, and of their efficiency in persuasive discourse. To that effect, Plutchik's remarks (2001: 347) are particularly relevant, as they clearly highlight this need for a reconceptualization of emotions as seen in 2.1.3:

> Emotions are not simply linear events, but rather are feedback processes. The function of emotion is to restore the individual to a state of equilibrium when unexpected or unusual events create disequilibrium. Even if cognitions are generally at the beginning of the chain of events, they can be influenced by events appearing later in the chain —states of arousal, say, or ego defenses— through a feedback process.

How does this inform our conceptualization of metaphor? Although restoring equilibrium is not the main function of metaphors, the conceptualization of metaphors as "linear" might be just as misleading. The "life" or "career" of a metaphor tends to reinforce such a linear understanding. In brief, every metaphor starts out as novel. Over time and through repetition, metaphors can become conventionalized. This in itself constitutes an important field of study, as it can help to understand the different ways in which metaphor usage within communicative settings interacts with cognition. However, the story does not need to end there. As Billig and McMillan (2005) note, the property of

metaphors to 'dull' reality is often highlighted, in order to warn against potentially dangerous uses, such as those mentioned by Orwell. One such effect is that "we become used to the idea of politics as war," for instance, as "metaphorical meaning is dulled" through conventionalization (Billig & McMillan, 2005: 478). Equally, the warning should not end there, and indeed Billig goes on: "But there is another important consequence: the metaphorical idiom can also dull literal meaning to the point of ideological concealment." (Billig & Macmillan, 2005: 478) As the War On Terror was launched,

> few gave special credence to Bush's words. It was not generally realized that the President was literally declaring a planned, even 'long-sought', war. At least two countries would be invaded militarily. The actual policy of war was being declared furtively by means of the familiar metaphor of 'declaring war.' (Billig and Macmillan, 2005: 478)

This is a very important point, and one which should be taken into account for any theory of metaphor. It might then be more beneficial to think about what metaphors 'do' as involving a movement that can go back and forth, rather than promoting a linear conceptualization of metaphor. This is what I mean when I refer to a global view of metaphor. In practical analyses (Chapters 3-11), I will discuss the impact of metaphors as they interact with the rest of the discourse, as well as with other metaphors within the data or within our culture (some metaphors might get combined, or novel metaphors might be supported by more entrenched conceptualizations). The impact of metaphors does not merely refer to their usage in single utterances, but also to their impact as part of a coherent whole, which is of great interest for the analysis of a wide set of data.

By characterizing the advances made in Cognitive Linguistics (and other Cognitive Sciences) as "revolutions," it follows that its findings have significantly impacted the practice of other related disciplines, such as that of Critical Discourse Analysis. We now move onto the implications of the advent of Cognitive Linguistics for discourse analysts, and how it has led to some fruitful combinations with other disciplines or fields. Finally, we will turn our attention to the chosen combination of frameworks for this thesis, as what seems to be missing for the purpose of this thesis is a focus on the online interpretation process, which we will come back to in 2.3.

2.2. Cognitive approaches to CDA

2.2.1. A short introduction

As we have already seen, CDA/S, "which is less a linguistic discipline than a social movement," (Chilton, 2011: 188) might best be defined by its purpose. Through renaming the movement CDS, van Dijk (2015: 62) notes that "this more general term suggests that such a critical approach not only involves critical analysis, but also critical theory, as well as critical applications." I would add that by grounding CDS analyses in Lakoff's understanding of the "cognitive commitment," (see section 1) the critical purpose of CDS and the richness of linguistic theories might best be combined. Recently, an added focus has thus emerged within CDS. In fact, rather than an added focus, cognition is seen as a necessary component, given its intrinsic links with language. Hart (see for example Hart & Lukes, 2007; Hart, 2010; Hart, 2013b) has made significant contributions to make the case for the incorporation of Cognitive Linguistics as an essential part of CDS, giving a new direction to the field, without losing sight of the critical essence of its purpose. The premise is the following: speakers have to their avail a rich array of linguistic structures in order to describe a particular situation. These structures are not devoid of meaning - rather, they construct and constrain meaning. This is what is referred to as "construal." Hart here joins Langacker in his explanation "to capture the essence of construal": "in viewing a scene, what we actually see depends on how closely we examine it, what we choose to look at, which elements we pay most attention to, and where we view it from" (Langacker, 2008: 55), upon which Hart expands:

> Linguistic structures in texts therefore reflect the text producer's own - ideologically constrained - conceptualisation of events, or at least the conceptualisation that they wish to promote in order to realise macro-level discourse goals like legitimization. (2011a: 271)

The identification of linguistic strategies at the micro-level serves discourse goals at the macro-level, making CDS a well-rounded framework (combining analysis, theory and applications), within which the analysis of persuasive communication might be conducted. The perspective which one has when viewing a scene is inevitable, and it can be seen as analogous to that which the speaker brings to his/her production of utterances. When it comes to political issues which the public has no direct knowledge of, the interpretation process is thus already heavily constrained, having gone through what one might call a pre-assessment. While this is indeed inevitable, it can become particularly problematic when the discourse carries an illusion of objectivity.

The cognitive turn in CDA/S has also led to further fruitful combinations, drawing for instance from Evolutionary Psychology, which also fits with the goals set out for this thesis.

2.2.2. From cognition to adapted cognition: inputs from Evolutionary Psychology

2.2.2.1. Consolidating an explanatory stance

One of the advantages of CDA/S is that it presents itself as an interdisciplinary approach. The aim should be to draw from the most suitable frameworks to make sense of a set of data. In A *Hybrid Theory of Metaphor*, Tendahl (2009) regrettably notes the possible reluctance for analysts to look beyond the framework which they have chosen to adopt. Given the complexity which is intrinsic to the phenomenon of persuasion, Tendahl's concern is particularly relevant here, and one of the main aims of this thesis is to show how various frameworks (mainly RT and CBT, see 2.3 and 2.4) can be successfully integrated to account for the efficiency of American War Rhetoric. The cognitive turn in CDA/S was precisely aimed at moving from a descriptive approach, to go toward and/or consolidate an explanatory stance (Chilton, 2005a: 24). Faithful to its interdisciplinary approach, CDA/S analysts have also looked to Evolutionary Psychology to consolidate that explanatory stance. CDA is particularly interested in the effects of manipulative discourse on consolidating power relationships. Discriminatory practices are thus often under CDA/S's radar. In his analysis of media discourse on immigration, Hart (2013a) integrates findings from Evolutionary Psychology to account for the effectiveness of certain biases, rather than simply noting (in a descriptive manner) where such biases occur or are used in discourse. One example which Hart gives is that of the conformity bias, which can translate in accepting the validity of a proposition, simply because other people seem to have accepted it. As Hart points out, this type of reasoning does not appear to have solid foundations, and one can wonder why it is that we so often resort to it. The answer might just be evolution:

> Whilst it may be epistemologically fallacious to entertain a proposition simply because it is believed by others, to do so may have been a sensible strategy for our ancestors which has given rise to a modern conformity bias. (Hart, 2013a: 207)

Exploitation of biases is a prominent focus in the study of persuasive or deceptive communication. The cheater-detection module has been identified as a mechanism which should help us detect cheaters and exclude them from social interactions (Cosmides, 1989). Although Sperber et al. (1995) disagree with Cosmides' method for proving the existence of such a mechanism, they do not deny its potential and advantageous existence, and even allude to the possibility that there might be more than one such mechanism (Sperber and Girotto, 2002: 33). We will see that such modules can also be exploited so that 'the Other' can be identified as 'the cheater,' facilitating the acceptance of discriminatory practices against THEM (Chapters 3-6).

What this type of research highlights is that behind a lot of modern practices lies an *evolution.* What might have been a sound, beneficial way of reasoning for our ancestors could be detrimental today, for example when it is exploited by people in power. Nevertheless, that does not mean that these practices can easily be discarded, and their understanding is complementary to that of the efficiency of persuasive discourse. This is particularly interesting when it comes to the study of practices such as that of war. Although the practice of war in Western culture has vastly evolved, the acceptance of war as a "natural way to solve conflict" (Laland & Brown, 2011: 207) might still be somewhat present in the modern mind. Once again, we are faced with an appearing inconsistency, that of a culture which "detest[s] war," (Reagan, 14.11.1985) but which is led to accept a "permanent path to war" (Bacevich, 2010) in order to resolve the problems of each era. Inputs from Evolutionary Psychology can thus effectively consolidate an explanatory stance (Chilton, 2005a: 24), highlighting that such inconsistencies are a product of evolution. It does not suffice to say that evolution has made us biologically predisposed to accept war as "a natural way to solve conflict":

> However, these predispositions do play an important role, as they are exploited, for instance, in the propaganda of mobilizing and abusive leaders, in ways that lead to an image of the enemy as different or evil and which sanctify aggression against adversaries. An individual's view of war may be influenced by everyday background factors such as books and films that can create the impression that war is a natural way to solve conflict and that promotes the prestige and status of the individuals involved. (Laland & Brown, 2001: 207)

This is a very interesting point. The conception of war in current America relies heavily upon second-hand information, and only tends to get visually portrayed in films or video games. War is perceived as a last resort, and the people who are willing to make that sacrifice are viewed as heroes. In our modern society, it is not so much about explicitly making war "a natural way to solve conflict," as this might lead to the conceptualization of modern leaders as ruthless. Rather, it is about making the enemy a complete outsider, perhaps one that has not evolved in the same way as WE did. Going further, when THEY get construed as 'cheaters' in the evolutionary sense of the term, that is as detrimental to the survival of modern society, war becomes a necessity. This is how it can be construed as a last resort. As biological predispositions allow for the acceptance of war as a (necessary) way to solve issues, even if it has evolved to be seen as a last resort in modern societies, the aim of the discourse is not to vilify war itself, but to construct war as different for US and for THEM. The result is that going to war can come to be seen as "common sense," "imbued into the psyche of the American" people (Reyes, 2010: 207), as it becomes acceptable for US (and for US only) to use war to restore world order. The focus here has moved from cognition to "adapted cognition," leading to a refined definition of some manipulative practices: "In other words, discriminatory attitudes

arise when argumentation harnesses adapted cognition for manipulative purposes." (Hart, 2013a: 203)

This new focus within CDA/S has allowed to expand linguistic analyses, so as to account for ways in which certain biases might be exploited so as to lower epistemic vigilance, leading to the acceptance of propositions despite the fact that they might not be logically sound. When it comes to the legitimization of American War Rhetoric, its efficiency does not seem to rely essentially on the exploitation of heuristic biases like the confirmation bias, which tend to be more prevalent in situations such as political debates, for instance. Evolutionary Psychology still offers some valuable insights, such as its contributions to the function of emotions, and the role that they might play in making persuasive discourse effective.

2.2.2.2. Emotions in the context of persuasion

Distinguishing between emotions

The usefulness of emotions when it comes to our ability to make fast decisions can be accounted for by using the framework of Evolutionary Psychology, which states that "emotions exist to facilitate functional behavior in the face of a prototypical, fitness-relevant opportunity or threat" (Plutchik, 2001: 192). One of the main contributions of this line of research for the study of persuasive discourse is that emotions which carry a positive affect (such as happiness) make people more likely to process information on the basis of heuristics, while negative affect (i.e, sadness) tends to have the opposite effect. Griskevicius, Shiota and Neufeld (2010: 190) summarize what they refer to as the "traditional approach" to affect and cognition: "[i]n general, positive affect has been found to facilitate peripheral, heuristic, or simple processing; people in this state are less likely to scrutinize incoming information carefully, and more likely to base their judgments on simplifying heuristics." The triggering of certain emotions in discourse can thus have powerful implications for the efficiency of persuasive communication. The discourse on American wars has at its core the survival of the nation, or at the very least of its identity. Strong emotions are often solicited: disgust of the enemy's practices; anger at the unfairness of situations; fear of losing one's freedom; guilt or shame at a (often hypothetical) lack of bravery for not doing what is required to stop oppression; or on the contrary, pride at the sacrificial instincts of the American people who make up the American identity; pride in America's history. The first observation is that these emotions are overwhelmingly nega-

tive (with the exception of pride), which might first indicate that persuasion could be more difficult. However, it would be wrong to jump to that conclusion when evaluating the efficiency of American War Rhetoric, for two reasons:

- First, it might be more fitting to say that persuasion *that is based on heuristic judgements* might be rendered more difficult. Rather than focusing on shortcuts in the interpretative process, which might lead to misrepresentations, the way in which constrained representations appear to be made relevant in a given context will be explained in the practical analyses;
- Secondly, more recent research has increasingly pointed to the necessity of studying the function which *specific* emotions serve, rather than grouping them under the general etiquettes of 'positive' and 'negative' emotions (see for example Plutchik, 2001; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Clore and Huntsinger, 2007; and Griskevicius, Shiota & Neufeld, 2010 for study of the specific effects of positive emotions). It is this aspect which we will mainly draw from (Chapters 7-9).

Attention is thus being drawn to the function of each emotion, to the reasons (in evolutionary terms) for specific emotions to have emerged. Different negative emotions seem to trigger different effects. For example, anger was shown to facilitate risk taking, which can be explained by its function: "If the function of anger is to reclaim threatened resources and status, then risk seeking, self-confidence, and disinhibition are appropriate." (Plutchik, 2001: 192) On the other hand, fear seems to have the opposite effect, leading people to be more risk averse (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). These findings have significant implications for the choice of emotions to stir in discourse in order to further persuasion.

Distinguishing between individual and group selection

The emergence of specific emotions is understood to serve evolutionary functions. However, these functions can serve individual and/or group selection (Deem & Ramsey, 2016). This distinction is particularly interesting when explaining the function of emotions such as guilt. For the purposes of this study, and of persuasive communication in general, it is also noteworthy, insofar as it can help to account for the usefulness of emotions in discourse to integrate inconsistencies, without disrupting an entire belief system. This is how Deem and Ramsey (2016: 1) explain it:

> There are two forms of evolutionary selection on which we might draw when explaining guilt, individual selection and group selection. Individual selection occurs when individuals in a population vary from one another with respect to some trait, and some of this variation is fitness-affecting and heritable. The traits in this case are individual-level traits, and the selection occurs within groups or populations of individuals, leading to increased frequency of some traits and a decrease of others within the populations. Much of evolution occurs in this way. But there is also a form of evolution that operates at a group level. The idea here is that *groups* of individuals exhibit traits and can fare better or worse than other groups because of these traits.

Although groups and their individual members can sometimes exhibit the same property (e.g., a group of wildebeest might be fast when all or most of its members are fast), groups frequently exhibit traits no individual organism can bear, such as sex ratio (the proportion of males and females). Things get interesting when a trait is *selected against* at the individual level, but *selected for* at the group level. Such a trait benefits the group and helps it prosper, even though it is not in the evolutionary interest of individuals to bear it.

One of the main challenges of American War Rhetoric is indeed to place at the forefront the interests of the nation, which might not reflect those of individuals. The negotiation of these sometimes conflicting interests will be mainly explored in Chapters 3-6. Problems can occur when reasoning about the nation and reasoning about individuals are blurred, or even seen as one and the same, thanks to the entrenchment of metaphors such as STATES ARE PEOPLE. The central aspect of metaphor is reflected by the selection of the next theoretical framework, which can also serve to maintain a cognitive focus within CDA/S studies: Conceptual Blending Theory (CBT).

2.3. Conceptual Integration/Blending Theory

We have seen in 2.1. that research within the field of Cognitive Linguistics (CL), particularly Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) has been essential in refining our understanding of metaphor, and more generally of the links between language and thought, which led to a push for a cognitive focus within CDA/S (2.2). The goals of CMT, however, do not predominantly relate to the online interpretation of metaphors or other linguistic strategies, as the aim rather seems to be to uncover general patterns of language. Another added advantage of CBT is its aim to "unify the analysis of metaphor with the analysis of a variety of other linguistic and conceptual phenomena" (Grady, Oakley & Coulson, 1999: 101), which helps to make sense of an emergent coherent message for the purposes of persuasion. Nevertheless, I agree with Grady, Oakley and Coulson (1999) that the two frameworks are complementary, and argue that inputs from both are necessary when studying persuasive communication, so as to effectively account for the move from understanding to believing. The centrality of CBT thus does not entail disregarding CMT altogether. Firstly, combining RT with CL should prove to be fruitful in order to yield the analysis of online utterances within a wider corpus a more explanatory power, to account for why certain mechanisms might be effective (in terms of persuasion), but also to make the case that metaphor should hold a 'special' status in the study of persuasive communication. In that sense, Lakoff's invariance hypothesis (1990) has been extremely influential. Tendahl and Gibbs (2008: 1825) sum up its impact as follows: "Among the most important insights from Conceptual Metaphor Theory is the observation that metaphors do not just map single elements from a source to a target, but relational structures and inferences." This is a crucial

factor in the effectiveness of constraining mechanisms, particularly the constraint on reasoning. It will therefore be one of the aims of this thesis to demonstrate the significance of these "relational structures," which I argue a combination of Relevance Theory (RT) and Conceptual Blending Theory (CBT) can best achieve, while also drawing from CMT's findings.

2.3.1. Definition and insights from Mental Spaces

Conceptual Integration or Blending Theory (CBT) offers innumerable insights into the ways in which the study of language can inform us on "the way we think," which is the title that Fauconnier and Turner (2002) chose to outline their theory. The subtitle which is also provided is a good starting point to account for the insightful nature of CBT: "Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities." One of the most baffling things about the mind is that it is indeed incredibly complex, yet on the surface, there is no hint of complexity. Language is a great example of this. We use language with such ease and automaticity that it is easy to overlook the great complexities which lie behind language use, interpretation, or meaning construction. This "hidden complexity" is what makes language use so efficient. So what exactly is "blending?"

> Conceptual integration - 'blending' - is a general cognitive operation used to construct meaning. It is dynamic, supple, and active in the moment of thinking. It interacts with other general cognitive operations. It yields products that frequently become entrenched in conceptual structure and grammar. It often performs new blending on its entrenched products. It is easy to detect in spectacular cases but it is for the most part a routine, workaday process, and is not especially costly. (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998: 1)

The first thing to note about the definition of "blending" is that it is a "*general* cognitive operation" (my emphasis). This is an important aspect of CBT. While the interpretation of metaphors is a direct application of the framework, the processes described thanks to integration networks are not limited to the study of metaphor, and instead extend to a lot of other "routine" ways to construct meaning. Looking at a photograph can involve the construction of an integration network. This is an interesting example, because it does not involve a (typical) communication setting, and in that sense highlights the way in which CBT deals with the interpretation process, as part of the broader construction of meaning within the conceptual system. As Fauconnier and Turner point out (2002: 97), "we point to a picture of a face and say 'That's Jane Doe,' not 'That's the face of Jane Doe.'" What is at stake here is the formation of a conceptual integration network whereby the most salient aspect to identify a person, the face, is linked to the person in the picture by a relation of Part-Whole. The photograph then gives rise to a conceptual blend, where that relation is compressed into one of

Uniqueness[2], so that we are able to look at the photograph and entertain, so to speak, the illusion that we are looking at the person it represents. This is just one of the many examples which we can find within our daily life, our routine, where conceptual networks are operating to construct meaning.

Another important aspect of the definition of blending is that it is "active in the moment of thinking." Indeed, CBT can be seen as part of a wider framework to account for the online interpretation of language, which is that of Mental Spaces, that is to say "partial assemblies constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action" (Fauconnier, 2012: 351). We have seen that unlike CBT, CMT was rather concerned with entrenched patterns of language use (Grady, Oakley & Coulson, 1999); in that respect, the framework of Mental Spaces and that of RT are very much compatible, as they both highlight the dynamic process of online interpretation for the construction of meaning. These mental spaces have a structure, provided by frames or cognitive models (similarly to the way ICMs are structured, see 2.1.1). The Mental Spaces framework is very useful to the study of persuasive communication, specifically of its interpretation, in that it highlights the direct relation between the processing of a linguistic utterance and its conceptualization. This then constitutes a good basis for the evaluation of whether a particular conceptualization might have the potential to be accepted, or not. In the context of American War Rhetoric, mental spaces allow the public to visualize the presence of US (Americans) within a single space, also containing the issues which are discussed and occurring in remote countries. The construction of relations between the different actors can then appear as a more natural one, perhaps not questioning whether WE should have a role to play in the first place (focus of Chapters 3-6), and allowing for inaction to be construed as inappropriate (focus of Chapters 7-9). In other words, mental spaces make it easy to *see* how discourse can build the relevance of an issue to the public. This last remark should highlight the general direction which the practical analyses of the corpus will take, which will mainly (although not exclusively) draw from the findings of both CBT and RT as complementary frameworks, in order to fulfill the goals outlined in Chapter 1: study the effects of the interpretation of American War Rhetoric, looking at both (and distinguishing between) what happens during the communication episode, and the representations which have the potential to impact thought and reasoning.

[2] The formation and interpretation of conceptual networks (including the mechanism of *compression*) will be detailed as part of the practical analyses in Chapters 3-11

2.3.2. Advantages and limitations of conceptual blends

We have seen that the formation of a blend is a routine operation which allows us to construct meaning on a daily basis, and also to infer new meaning from it. The formation of blends is deeply grounded in cognition:

> We do not establish mental spaces, connections between them, and blended spaces for no reason. We do this because it gives us global insight, human-scale understanding, and new meaning. It makes us both efficient and creative. (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 92)

Purposeful efficiency and creativity are thus the two main characteristics of conceptual blending, making the inclusion of RT perfectly suitable. Indeed, one of the premises behind RT is that "utterance interpretation in general is goal directed" (Wilson and Carston, 2006: 421). Optimal relevance is then defined as the balance between the costs which are incurred by the interpretation process, and the effects that it generates. In other words, efficiency is at the heart of relevance theoretical accounts of the interpretation process. When it comes to the interpretation of metaphors, for instance, the potential extra processing cost which certain metaphors might incur is said to be balanced by the extra effects which their interpretation might lead to, making the use of metaphor in a given context the most efficient choice, that is the most relevant way to convey the speaker's meaning. We will come back to the debate on how metaphors are interpreted in 2.4.2. For now, let us turn our attention to the efficiency provided by the formation of a blend.

"One of the powers of the blend is that it carries in itself the germ of the entire network." (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 332) This is what is referred to as the "Unpacking Principle," which allows us to access the entire network when prompted by the blend. This can have important implications in the long-term, because the mere activation of a blend can give access to the way it was previously established, for instance. What it also highlights is the importance of relational structures, which constitutes one of CBT's main strengths. However,

> As Douglas Hofstadter points out, the Unpacking Principle is not purely one of structure within the network but, more broadly, one of communication, since the unpacking possibilities offered by the blended space will depend on what is already active in the context of communication. (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 333)

Here again, compatibility with RT is clearly apparent. But it also points to a potential limitation of CBT, highlighting the need for the integration of RT. Conceptual networks are rich and complex. Elements get selected from different input spaces, and are linked to others by Vital Relations. As the above quote exemplifies, context plays a crucial role in determining what parts of the integration network are being accessed. However, it might be difficult to understand not only which elements get selected and which do not, but also what relations are made salient. In the context of persuasive

communication, this seems like an important question to answer, especially to avoid over-interpretation, and this is precisely where inputs from RT might be needed. We might thus get to an analysis which combines the strengths of both frameworks, explaining why the salience of certain relations might successfully constrain the interpretation process, making other ways to understand a situation irrelevant. 2.4 will now expand on this complementarity in order to demonstrate how it might explain, among other mechanisms, the persuasive power (and special place) of metaphors.

2.4. Applying Theoretical Frameworks

In this section, I attempt to show how the selection of a multi-disciplinary theoretical framework can best be applied in order to study persuasive communication, and specifically to answer the questions raised in Chapter 1. In an effort to be critical, multi-disciplinary approaches can be particularly appropriate. Indeed, the existence of a single theory which can account for the complexity of American War Rhetoric, or for the multiple aspects involved in the efficiency of persuasive mechanisms seems implausible. However, multi-disciplinary approaches can also appear to be too eclectic, which could result in lacking a general direction. This can be avoided by grounding one's analyses in cognition (see 2.2.).

So far, we have established that Cognitive Pragmatics can provide a strong starting point for the analysis of what makes deception effective, and which can also be extended to persuasive communication (Chapter 1). Within this framework, deception or persuasion work by constraining the context, that is by constraining the set of contextual assumptions available to the hearer, blocking access (to a certain extent) to critical information which would make persuasion unsuccessful. In that light, the analysis of various strategies within the corpus, mainly presuppositions and metaphors, will strive to show how these can constrain context, and as a result the hearers' inferences so as to guide the interpretation process in the same direction.

2.4.1. Presuppositions

2.4.1.1. Presuppositions and relevance

Presuppositions have attracted a lot of attention and research: their triggers, reference, but also exploitation for persuasive/deceptive purposes. What is of particular interest here is the negotiation of meaning between speaker and hearers through the use of presuppositions. In this thesis, I take the

stance that presuppositions are first and foremost properties of the utterance act, *not* of sentences or indeed of speakers alone (Simons, 2005), following Simons' proposal that presuppositions are best understood as establishing relevance: "perhaps the things which we call 'presuppositions' are a kind of relevance implicature: propositions which a hearer must assume in order to find the utterance *relevant.*" (Simons, 2005: 331, my emphasis) Caffi (1997: 437) interestingly refers to the phenomenon of pragmatic presupposition as a "*ménage à trois* between a speaker, the framework of his/her utterance, and an addressee," and in so doing effectively expresses its dynamic aspect. That is why I have not explored the definition of presuppositions according to truth-conditional accounts (Strawson, 1950), nor the notion of presupposition triggers as advanced by Levinson (1983), which do not fit the purposes of this research. Besides, there is no list of 'triggers' which can lead to effective persuasion; rather, context is key. Therefore such accounts (although central to theoretical accounts of presupposition) are not suited to the purposes set out for this thesis.

On the other hand, Simons' definition is centered on what the *hearer* does when interpreting presuppositions (by optimizing relevance), which seems to fit our previous conclusions on how to study persuasive communication (Chapter 1). Indeed, the definition of presuppositions as a property of the utterance act, and whose retrieving is a matter of optimal relevance might translate as asking the question: what does the hearer do when retrieving presuppositions? Geurts (1999: 9) reminds us that "presupposing is something *people* do" (my emphasis), and that "to presuppose something is to take it for granted." However, I argue that focusing on the hearer when discussing presuppositions does not mean that one must abandon the aspect of the speaker's commitment, which was mainly defended by Stalnaker (2002). There are many ways to define presuppositions (for an overview see Mazid, 2007), one of them being that presuppositions are about what the speaker does. Stalnaker argued that presuppositions should be viewed as a relation between a proposition and the speaker (1973). In this understanding, it is the speaker who takes something for granted, and by doing so he/she affects the common ground (Stalnaker, 2002), that is the set of assumptions shared by both hearer and speaker for communication to be successful. While it might seem that the two approaches are incompatible, one essentially talking about what the hearer does while the other focuses on the speaker's behavior, I argue that Geurts' notion of "promise" can be seen as a reconciliation of the two, and fits with the description of presuppositions relating to the utterance *act*:

> To presuppose something is like making a promise. If I promise my daughter to buy her an ice cream, it is completely irrelevant what my actual beliefs and intentions are: I made a promise regardless whether I intended to keep it or not. Likewise, a speaker who presupposes something incurs a commitment (to use Hamblin's expression) regardless whether he really believes what he presupposes. To be sure, presuppositions are normally believed to be true, but belief is not a prerequisite for presupposition. (Geurts, 1999: 10)

Geurts thus seems to acknowledge the speaker's commitment, but adds that "belief is not a prerequisite for presupposition." This distinction is significant, especially for the purpose of studying persuasive or deceptive discourse. In the context of political discourse, the speaker might resort to presuppositions of democracy's safeguarding against abuses of power (this will be explored in Chapter 3), regardless of whether he actually believes that the current state of democracy reflects its ideals. Besides, what matters is not whether the speaker had any intention to mislead through the use of presupposition, but rather the resulting impact on the interpretation process. I argue that this view is perfectly compatible with a relevance-theoretical account of presuppositions. The persuasive potential of presuppositions might be said to stem from expectations of relevance: it is because the hearer expects that the speaker's commitment can be taken for granted that presuppositions might not trigger critical evaluation. We will now explore in further detail the links between presuppositions and persuasive communication.

2.4.1.2. Presuppositions and persuasion

In their paper on mutual knowledge, Sperber and Wilson dispute the existence of such a concept, which seems to promote an "absolute" view of comprehension, rather than a "reasonable" one (1982: 71). Firstly, mutual knowledge was defined as an essential feature of the context and thus of speaker meaning (Clark & Marshall, 1981: 58; also see Schiffer, 1972), mutual knowledge being "knowledge that is not only shared, but known to be shared, and known to be known to be shared, and so on." (Sperber & Wilson, 1982: 61-62) This eventually led to the "mutual knowledge paradox," the "dichotomy between checking an infinite number of conditions and a finite amount of time available" (Tendahl, 2009: 14). It is not within the scope of this thesis to come back to the arguments supporting or rejecting the existence of mutual knowledge. The debate, however, is an interesting one, insofar as it illustrates RT's intuitive and realistic account of communication, as an event that is not perfect, but that is very efficient. Moving away from the notion of mutual knowledge does not merely contribute to refining one's understanding of communication; it paves the way for the inclusion of presupposition at the heart of persuasion. More precisely, the presupposition of a common ground between speaker and hearer seems unavoidable if we wish to preserve the efficiency of communication. Stalnaker's common ground theory of presupposition (2002), although far from being undisputed (see Abbott, 2008; Von Fintel, 2008 for an acknowledgment of Abbott's concerns, but without dismissing Stalnaker's theory), thus seems to be better suited to the analysis of presupposition in the context of persuasive discourse. Von Fintel (2008: 137) summarizes it as follows:

The common ground of a conversation at any given time is the set of propositions that the participants in that conversation at that time mutually assume to be taken for granted and not subject to (further) discussion.

As Sperber and Wilson (1995: 15-16) rightly point out, it is the speaker and hearer's "assumptions, of course, rather than the actual state of the world, that affect the interpretation of an utterance."

Without going further into theoretical discussions of 'the common ground,' the aim here is to show how we can use this concept, within the framework of RT, and combined with inputs from Mental Spaces and CBT, to go beyond the realm of conversation analysis and extend the discussion to that of persuasive discourse. Indeed if an assumption is "taken for granted and not subject to (further) discussion" (Von Fintel, 2008: 137), one can see the potential for exploitation for the purpose of persuasion. When studying addresses to an entire nation, presuppositions of a common ground do not just serve matters of efficiency, they can also be used to trigger feelings of belonging. Indeed, part of the idea behind the notion of belonging to a common identity is that a common ground is shared. In certain contexts, that common ground might present itself as a set of conditions which all members need to adhere to to be part of the group. When it comes to national identity, the negotiation of the common ground can be tricky in parts - although there is an expectation of adhering to certain common principles, there is no contract that needs to be signed when you are born into a nation, for instance. Although Americans are often reminded of the great ideals which their nation stands for, such as democracy or freedom, presuppositions of a common ground when it comes to the understanding of what these notions mean are prevalent in American War Rhetoric (see Chapter 3 for a linguistic analysis). We have seen that RT was well-suited to the analysis of presupposition interpretation. While that is true, I argue that the incorporation of CBT is also needed here, and that it is very compatible thanks to its dynamic understanding of context. When complex concepts such as identity are involved, a framework which deals with the way in which these concepts are used to construct meaning beyond the communication setting is indeed valuable. One might then be able to move beyond 'what is presupposed,' to understand why it is an efficient persuasive mechanism.

When it comes to the study of persuasive and especially of deceptive communication, the interest in presuppositions has led to a focus on what is referred to as *false accommodation* (Greco 2003). False accommodation occurs when the adjustment of the context through the use of presuppositions leads to the incorporation of a proposition which happens to be false. The point is thus that presuppositions can be particularly useful in deceptive (and persuasive) communication, because they can lead to the incorporation of false propositions, without directly committing the speaker's responsi-

bility. Indeed it is rather through negotiating the common ground that the hearer comes to accommodate a misleading proposition or representation. This type of strategy can be very effective in political debates, which rely upon spontaneous, quick responses, but it can also have broader and more dangerous consequences, and we can see here its effects beyond the realm of conversation:

> Frege considered in his analysis the danger potentially involved in sentences containing false presuppositions that have not been previously accepted by the interlocutors. He examined an expression whose manipulative effects became evident later, during the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century: 'Der Will des Volkes' (the will of the people). The expression "the will of the people" takes the existence of a unique will of the people for granted, whereas its Bedeutung does not actually exist in reality, or, at least, as Frege suggests, cannot be univocally identified. (Greco, 2003: 218)

In this tragic example, the relevance of the measures suggested by totalitarian leaders was achieved through the negotiation of a common ground, whereby the false accommodation of a unified will of the people was necessary for the legitimization of actions which were construed as being faithful to that will. In other words, the premise upon which measures were justified is false, in that it led to the misrepresentation of the existence of a unified common will. The focus on false accommodations can however be slightly misleading, as it induces the analyst to look for instances whereby the hearer is led to update the common ground by integrating a false proposition. In some cases, it might be that certain aspects of the common ground might be made more salient than others, for instance, without necessarily involving any falsity (see how this happens in Chapter 3, section 2). That is why I prefer to talk about the negotiation of the common ground and of meaning between speaker and hearer. Another way to align the hearer's interpretations with that of the speaker's is metaphor.

2.4.2. Metaphors

With this section I would like to add to the discussion regarding the complementarity between RT and Cognitive Linguistics, with a special focus on CBT. The need for cooperation between the two frameworks is not new, and has been mainly advanced by Tendahl and Gibbs (2008), which led Tendahl (2009) to formulate his "hybrid theory of metaphor." The latter is a full-fledged, cognitive theory of metaphor, resulting from a very detailed analysis which first covers the specificities of each framework, before moving onto the ways in which they can (and should) work together. Given their respective backgrounds as linguist and psychologist, Tendahl and Gibbs (2008) make a very compelling case for the integration of these two different frameworks (beyond the scope of metaphor), in order to get to a stronger account of the complexities of mind and language, and the ways in which they interact with each other (2008: 1824). Since then, more voices have been added

to the discussion, with the focus generally remaining the interpretation of metaphor (see for example Wilson, 2011). However, it seems that these new contributions have tended to focus on how the researcher's own defended theory could supplement analyses made within 'the other field.' This is the real advantage of Tendahl and Gibbs' account, which promotes an understanding of "complementarity" on a more general, dynamic level, highlighting ways in which both frameworks can and should support each other. In particular, this thesis explores ways in which CBT might be seen as an ideal platform to incorporate valuable contributions from RT, and from other theories within Cognitive Linguistics such as CMT, in its treatment of online metaphor interpretation. But the other way round is also equally valuable: although metaphor is not the only mechanism which can benefit from this complementary approach, I argue that it should have a special place in the study of persuasive communication, which I argue CBT is particularly well equipped to account for, thus adding to RT's insights when studying persuasive communication. The main benefit here is to go beyond the theoretical discussion of the two frameworks' compatibility (which is a necessary first step), and to see how they can both be used for a vast corpus-based analysis.

2.4.2.1. Why Metaphor?

One of RT's most insightful contributions to metaphor research has been to show that it should not be treated any differently from the ways in which we interpret utterances in general, echoing findings from Experimental Psychology or Psycholinguistics (see for example Glucksberg, 2003). RT proposes a model of language interpretation which is all inferential. In this view, metaphor is seen as a form of "loose" talk:

> According to the relevance-theoretic approach, the metaphorical use of language is a kind of loose use and involves no special interpretive mechanisms or processes; it is understood in accordance with the standard procedure of evaluating interpretive hypotheses in their order of accessibility. (Carston, 2002: 349)

In more recent relevance-theoretic accounts, this understanding of metaphor was developed into the notion of *ad hoc concepts* (Carston, 2010), whose purpose is defined by the needs of the communicative event. Ad hoc concepts can be the result of concept broadening or narrowing, and contribute to the formulation of a unified account of metaphor (Wilson and Carston, 2007), in which metaphor should be understood to be on a spectrum along with other mechanisms such as approximation or hyperbole, for example. When dealing with metaphors, the interpretation process thus follows the same principles, which are guided by expectations of relevance. Let us take a quick look at the following utterance, borrowed from Carston (2002: 332):

(1) The steak is raw.

This unified account has the great advantage of showing that the interpretation of metaphorical expressions follows the same process as utterances such as (1). In this case, (1) is uttered by a customer in a restaurant. The hearer is led to derive contextual implications "in their order of accessibility," in order to retrieve the speaker's meaning that the steak does not taste nice, and more importantly should be cooked further, leading to the further inference that the customer is not satisfied. (1) leads to the formation of an ad hoc concept, RAW*, via concept broadening: the steak is indeed not completely raw, as it has undergone at least a minimum amount of cooking, which the speaker is aware of. The point is not that the chef did not bother to cook the steak at all, but rather that its cooking was inadequate (going further than not to the customer's taste). RAW is thus broadened, so as to include instances which are close to, but not entirely raw. Concept narrowing is to be understood as having a symmetrical effect. Ad hoc concepts can then also be used to account for the emergent structure which results from the interpretation of metaphors (Wilson and Carston, 2006), which previous relevance-theoretic accounts had occasionally been criticized to lack.

While I agree with this inferential account, I also argue that it is not incompatible with the view that metaphors should have a special place in communication, especially in persuasive communication. We have mentioned CL's insights into the role of metaphor, which is not just a pretty way of talking, but rather it is essential to the overall construction of meaning, to the apprehension of the world around us and of our own experiences (Gibbs, 1994). It is perhaps in this respect that RT's and CBT's accounts of metaphor might differ the most. In the words of Sperber and Wilson (2012: 97), "we acknowledge its importance but dispute its distinctiveness." This is where the stance adopted in this thesis departs from RT, and it will be one of the aims of the linguistic analyses to argue against this view, especially when the object of study is persuasive communication. We will now move onto the ways in which these two theories can successfully be combined to study metaphor within American War Rhetoric, despite diverging stances on metaphor's status in cognition.

2.4.2.2. Integrating RT and CBT for metaphor analysis

2.4.2.2.1.Where they depart

We have already hinted at a few differences between RT and CBT, especially when it comes to their understanding of metaphor. Rather than having different goals, RT and CBT seem to have slightly different scopes. This, however, can be an asset to tackle a very complex phenomenon: that of persuasion. Before moving onto ways in which they can be practically incorporated in the study of metaphors within American War Rhetoric, I will start by listing and discussing some areas in which

they depart, so as to then show that these divergences do not proscribe from a complementary approach.

• Architecture of the mind

Relevance is not just a theory of communication: it is a theory of cognition. Beyond what happens during the interpretative process, RT makes important claims about the structure of the cognitive system. In particular, Sperber (1994) supports a massively modular conception of the mind, which he argues is in line with advances in Evolutionary Psychology which show that our mind adapts and evolves by responding to specific problems; the 'tweaks' that answer these problems are thus highly-specific. Highly-specialized, autonomous modules are responsible for distinct, specific capacities. In that view, language and reason are also seen as belonging to autonomous modules, a claim that is rejected by Cognitive Linguistics (Tendahl, 2009: 255). In fact, according to Croft and Cruse (2004: 1), this constitutes one of three major hypotheses guiding Cognitive Linguistics' approach to language. It is not within the scope of this thesis to explore in detail arguments for or against the modularity of the mind (see Sperber & Mercier, 2018 for an overview and answer to arguments against their modularist approach to reason; Sperber, 2005 for why modularist approaches are not inflexible, and compatible with the relevance theoretical understanding of context). However, as Tendahl (2009: 256) notes, given that RT and CL depart significantly in their understanding of how the mind is structured, it appears necessary to make clear where one stands in that regard. The stance adopted in this thesis aligns with Cognitive Linguistics and its much more central view of cognition, an approach which I argue allows to make room for metaphors' special place, particularly in the study of persuasive communication. More importantly, the rejection of mass-modularity claims does not entail that of RT's insightful inferential model to study the online interpretation of utterances.

According to CL, embodiment plays a much more important role in cognition. This is made especially apparent by Lakoff's Neural Theory of Metaphor (2008), at the heart of which lies the notion of simulation:

> Simulation semantics is based on a simple observation of Feldman's: if you cannot imagine someone picking up a glass, you can't understand the meaning of "Someone picked up a glass." Feldman argues that, for meanings of physical concepts, meaning is mental simulation — that is, the activation of the neurons needed to imagine perceiving or performing an action. Thus, all mental simulation is embodied, since it uses the same neural substrate used for action, perception, emotion, etc. (Lakoff, 2008: 19)

The idea that "meaning is mental simulation" is very much in line with the way CBT explains the interpretation process. This is not incompatible with an inferential model of interpretation, such as that advocated by RT. However, it also places imagination at the heart of comprehension. It is in that sense that CL's vision of cognition is more central. Indeed, Gallese and Lakoff choose to speak of "multimodality," rather than modularity:

> Accordingly, language is inherently multimodal in this sense, that is, it uses many modalities linked together— sight, hearing, touch, motor actions, and so on. Language exploits the pre-existing multimodal character of the sensory-motor system. If this is true, it follows that there is no single "module" for language—and that human language makes use of mechanisms also present in nonhuman primates. (2005: 2)

The key here is embodiment. If our mind is embodied (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), then so is our capacity to reason. Embodiment might thus be understood as the first major constraint on reasoning, and is also key to the understanding of how and why persuasive discourse can be efficient in the first place. CBT offers a theory which reflects these findings from CL, which is made apparent in Turner & Fauconnier's definition of conceptual blending, as a "basic mental operation" which underlies language, and more importantly which is "indispensable to human understanding" in *all* its aspects (1999: 30). In sum,

> Conceptual blending [...] plays a role in grammar, semantics, discourse, meaning, visual representation, mathematics, jokes, cartoons, and poetry. It is indispensable to the poetics of literature because it is fundamental to the poetics of mind. (Turner & Fauconnier, 1999: 30)

It is precisely because conceptual blending is everywhere that it can become such an effective tool to persuasive communication. It is this aspect of the answer to 'why' persuasion can be effective in the first place, which seems to lack from RT.

- Distinction between semantics and pragmatics

The central aspect of imagination is also at the heart of CBT. According to Fauconnier, the "centrality in meaning construction" (2006: 661) is essential, echoing Lakoff's conception of the mind, and of language's place in it. One way to get to this centrality is to "do away with distinct semantic and pragmatic components." Fauconnier explains:

> The point is that the most elegant and general account of meaning construction in cases like this does not require, and in fact does not allow, an intermediate 'literal' or 'logical' or 'core' meaning to intervene between the syntactic form and the intended meaning. (2006: 661)

What is perhaps most confusing is the fact that the same terms can sometimes be used to refer to different concepts. Indeed, it seems that Fauconnier's "syntactic form" resembles RT's "logical form," which serves as an input for the hearer to retrieve the speaker's meaning (Wilson & Sperber, 2004), rather than being conceived as an intermediary step. It is important to note that RT does not promote a sequential type of processing, which might translate as the prior treatment of the logical

form, followed by the retrieval of explicatures and implicatures. The two accounts might then be more similar in that regard than first appears. Nevertheless, by advocating to entirely "do away" with such distinctions, Fauconnier seems to go further than RT, and it is also the approach that this thesis has taken, in an effort to reflect the centrality of meaning construction.

2.4.2.2.2.Where they join

Despite these rather fundamental differences related to the architecture of the mind, CBT and RT join in many respects, allowing for the integration of both frameworks. These similarities have already been mentioned in various parts. The aim of this subsection is therefore to offer a succinct summary of these elements which allow to form a common ground between the two frameworks:

- Efficiency

Whether a modular or multimodal approach of the mind is promoted, what is agreed is that the processes involved in understanding and in the construction of meaning are very efficient. For relevance theorists, this translates into the maximization of relevance, which is "the key to human cognition" (Wilson & Sperber, 1994: 91). Efficiency is also at the heart of CBT, as Fauconnier and Turner argue that the main advantage of conceptual blending is that it reduces the scale of understanding to a manageable size (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 322). Blending is not just a beautiful or impressive display of the mind's creativity, it serves a specific purpose. The maximization of relevance could very well supplement and support the claim for the efficiency of blends, in order to show that blending is an extremely efficient mechanism, not only because of what it allows us to do (expand reasoning/construct meaning on the basis of a reduced scale), but also through the way in which blends are formed. This is an aspect which will get developed in the parts dealing with linguistic analyses of the data.

- The place of context

Both approaches have a similar understanding of context, which stems from their common focus on the online interpretation of utterances, unlike other cognitive theories such as CMT (Grady, Oakley & Coulson, 1999). Fauconnier views the language form as a "prompt to go directly to the context" (2006: 661), from which one could say inferences are drawn to retrieve the speaker's meaning. What makes up that context, however, might not be so easily agreed upon. The construction of meaning through metaphor interpretation is generally understood to involve "both the use of previously acquired concepts and schemas, and the creation of new ones" (Rubio Fernandez, 2007: 345).

Entrenched metaphors can thus form a significant part of the context. I argue that this is compatible with RT's account of the interpretation process as following a path of least effort, as the presence of entrenched metaphors within the cognitive context can lead to fewer costs, and explain why a particular inference might be retrieved over another. When we talk about metaphor's special place, this should then refer both to the role of metaphors as they arise in discourse (mainly novel metaphors), and to that of entrenched metaphors within the context. The interaction between the two will be at the heart of the corpus' analyses, and can be crucial to move from understanding to believing.

2.4.2.3. From understanding to believing

So how do we get from understanding to believing? Both RT and CBT are concerned with this question, and I argue that answering it requires the integration of both frameworks.

Sloman and Fernbach (2017) argue that collaboration is the main way in which we build up knowledge. In that sense, what we know and believe is not based upon the careful consideration of reasons supporting our beliefs; that is, believing in something does not entail storing all the reasons why that belief is legitimate, or why it is true (at least in our eyes). In sum, we know a lot less than we think we do. Communication thus plays a crucial role in the construction of knowledge, and of meaning. If we rely upon others to build up our knowledge, this raises the issue of trust. In answer to this, Sperber et al. (2010) argue that communication can remain advantageous, thanks to the development of mechanisms for "epistemic vigilance."

> So, understanding is not believing, but nor is it adopting a sceptical position. Comprehension involves adopting a tentative and labile stance of trust; this will lead to acceptance only if epistemic vigilance, which is triggered by the same communicative acts that trigger comprehension, does not come up with reasons to doubt. (2010: 368)

The issue of epistemic vigilance makes the study of political discourse particularly interesting. Indeed, the idea that politicians regularly lie (or manipulate the truth) to reach their goals is quite prevalent in society, giving the public plenty of "reasons to doubt." Politicians have at their disposal multiple tools to highlight the nature of the evidence upon which they make their claims, so as to pass the filters of epistemic vigilance mechanisms. These are often referred to as "evidentials" or "evidential markers." Xu (2015: 89) points out that a definition of evidentiality should include both the "source of information" and "modes of knowing." While the former is generally at the heart of definitions of evidentiality, Xu notes that modes of knowing also need to be incorporated. This is indeed a valid point, and one which seems particularly relevant to the study of political discourse, and of persuasive communication. This nuance insightfully points to the importance of the way in

which we acquire information, which can lead to the incorporation of metaphors' special place, all the while abiding by RT's inferential model of communication.

(a) Metaphor's special place: going by CL's view of metaphor, we have concluded that metaphor plays a crucial role in the construction of meaning. In the case of political discourse, I argue that metaphors are especially important to the effectiveness of persuasion. If we go back to the importance of context for the interpretation process, entrenched metaphors can also be part of that context. These metaphors have a significant influence in guiding the interpretation of an utterance, because they constitute representations *that we can trust*. It is the mode of knowing, rather than the source of an utterance, which drives efficiency here;

(b) The maximization of relevance is not restricted to the process of understanding. Indeed it can also be applied to that of believing, which is where the cooperation of CL, which in this thesis is mainly focused on CBT, and of RT is most fruitful.

Rather than restricting the definition of evidentials to that of linguistic markers, de Saussure (2011: 37) insightfully remarks that "evidentiality [...] enters a calculus of relevance too." What this means is that the calculation of positive effects can also be extended to those which entertaining a new belief, or updating old beliefs, might represent. "That is, in sum: relevance to believe." (de Saussure 2011: 37) From there, I argue that the way in which a representation conveyed in discourse interacts with entrenched representations or ways of reasoning can directly impact the relevance to believe. This is reflected in the corpus' analyses in the following manner: in Chapters 3-6, we will see that the conceptualization of an enemy that needs fought directly relates to the established conceptualization of US as a group united in purpose and in time; in Chapters 7-9, we will see that the successful construction of an urgent threat needs to interact with deeply entrenched conceptualizations of time.

A complementary approach is beneficial in order to come to a well-rounded understanding of the efficiency of metaphor within persuasive communication. Expectations of relevance guide the interpretation process and should always be taken into account. In the context of American War Rhetoric, Presidential addresses are inherently relevant, presuming that the issues discussed have the potential to directly affect Americans' national security. When interpreting this type of discourse, what the hearer does is not simply to decide whether the President's suggested course of action is right or wrong; on a broader level, the suggested course of action can only be accepted if it appears to fit with the American identity. The hearer is thus also deciding whether the President is doing a good job at keeping true to the American identity. When deciding whether the inferences which emerge in a conceptual blend are relevant, one must assess whether they fit with the general

conceptualization of the American identity. In that regard, the tightening of relations which occurs as a result of blending is particularly compelling to explain how the decision to take up military action can be seen to stem directly from the core of America's identity. When the decision to go to war gets fused with support for the American identity, its rejection can then be very costly, contributing to the cementing of binary oppositions in and beyond the corpus.

2.4.3. Concluding remarks

In these first two chapters, I have established the foundations upon which the analyses of the data selected to study American War Rhetoric are grounded. Although this thesis takes a multi-disciplinary approach, all the frameworks which are used are grounded in cognition, in an effort to contribute to the wider discussion on the links between language and thought. More particularly, a complementary approach drawing from CBT and RT is promoted, in order to adopt an explanatory stance towards the mechanisms of persuasion in the context of political discourse (see figure 1 below). Both approaches can be used to show how context can be manipulated in order to guide the interpretation process in a coherent direction. The richness of that context (which can include emotions, for example) also prompts for the incorporation of other theoretical fields such as that of Evolutionary Psychology. Finally, inputs from theories such as CMT have also been highlighted; these are particularly useful at the supra-individual level, to account for the ways in which certain inferences might appeal to social cognition, to the metaphorical systems which structure a society.



Fig.1: Multi-disciplinary approach to persuasive discourse

The first question which was asked was regarding the apparent lasting efficiency of the discourse, despite emerging facts casting doubt as to the government's truthfulness and transparency. Consequently, one of the main goals here is to find out whether there are any underlying patterns which run throughout the different eras covered by the data. The empirical part of this thesis has been organized in a way which should reflect the thesis' main findings, in an answer to the previous questions. To that end, Chapters 3-9 are concerned with the representations prompted by the interpretation of discourse, from the point of view of the conceptualizer. One of the main goals of the discourse is indeed to build relevance of the issues for Americans, so that prompt action can be agreed on. This can be achieved through the construction and cementing of two main representations, which will be referred to as the two main pillars of American War Rhetoric: US vs. THEM (Chapters 3-6), and a need for immediate action (Chapters 7-9). We have also identified presupposition and metaphor as two central objects of analysis, and Chapters 3-9 have been organized in a parallel fashion, so that each mechanism will be analyzed with respect to one of the two pillars of American War Rhetoric. Despite the different issues which every President had to deal with, American War Rhetoric can be seen as a continuation, and this continuation should be reflected throughout Chapters 3-9. That is not to say, however, that the discourse does not change or evolve. Chapters 10 and 11 will thus aim to show how the frames upon which American War Rhetoric is built are negotiated when the facts change.

- US vs. THEM: Chapters 3-6

"Normally, people are considered good or bad depending on what they do. In the politics of fear the enemy is not bad for what it *does* but for what it is - an Islamic fundamentalist or a Western crusader." (Stocchetti 2007: 234)

In Chapters 3-6, the focus will be on the representation of the issues, and how they relate to US, to OUR identity. Who is involved, and how are WE involved? The main, overall strategy is the construction of a binary opposition between two groups: US vs. THEM. This is a well-documented strategy, especially within CDA/S studies, and it serves an important purpose, as it contributes to the acceptance of action against THEM. The point here is not just be to study this strategy as a way to legitimize action against THEM. Rather, I aim to show how the consolidation of such binary oppositions (as an underlying mechanism) contributes to the constraint on reasoning. This constitutes the first pillar, as I argue that the asymmetrical construction of US and THEM serves as a pre-condition to the relevance of the argument that immediate action is required. In other words, it is a necessary, underlying strategy to the efficiency of "the politics of fear" which Stocchetti refers to.

• Need for immediate action: Chapters 7-9

The relevance of the need for immediate action relies upon the understanding that it is indeed up to US to do something. The other overarching strategy is to construct the relevance of the issues as a matter of urgency. It is not about acting, it is about acting *now*. The hearer is thus led to conceptualize the issues from a specific point of view: OUR present is conceptualized vis à vis OUR past and OUR future, so that *now* can be constructed as the time to act. These chapters are therefore more heavily concerned with the role of emotions in constraining decision-making and in turn, action. Constraint is here understood as a form of 'pre-assessment' (see Slovik, 1999 on the pre-discursive construction of risk assessment), whereby the hearer is led to construct the events in such a way so that only two options are made available to make sense of the issues presented by the President. The aim is for the hearer to arrive at the *certainty* that acting now is OUR only option.

Chapters 3-9 deal with the construction of certainties, or of their cementing in discourse. But what happens when conflicting facts emerge, with the potential to disrupt these certainties? This is what will be tackled in Chapters 10-11. The negotiation of inconsistencies is necessary so as to understand how the strategies discussed in these empirical analyses can constrain reasoning about war *in general*.

Chapter 3: Presuppositions in American War Rhetoric

The first strategy to legitimize America's resort to war, to resolve conflicts which might directly or indirectly affect the United States, is to construct the conflicts in question as matters of identity. More specifically, the construction of a binary opposition between US and THEM will be seen to be essential to maintain the relevance of identity as a pillar upon which the legitimization of each and every new conflict can be built. One of the claims made in this thesis is that regardless of the circumstances, each conflict appears to fit the same frame[3], which might be summed up as the fight against evil. This chapter, the first chapter dealing with linguistic analyses of the data, tackles the role of presuppositions in establishing the *relevance* of that frame. In other words, why should the identification of evil in remote countries lead to the justification of OUR involvement? The aim of this chapter is to show how presuppositions can be used in discourse to 'set the scene,' to establish the parameters of the negotiation for action between the President and his people.

Why presuppositions?

Presuppositions can be a powerful tool to construct conflicts as matters of identity. The establishment of a binary opposition between US and THEM is not specific to American War Rhetoric. Indeed, it is a rather common strategy, when action needs to be legitimized against a group which appears as 'Other' (van Dijk, 1993; also see Wirth-Koliba, 2016). 'The Other' is then overwhelmingly portrayed negatively, while a positive image of the self comes out of this type of discourse. This positive representation is not always asserted, but rather taken for granted, presupposed as the common ground from which the interpretation of the issues is to be based. While a significant part of American War Rhetoric is dedicated to describing the evil acts committed by the enemy, it will become apparent that the discourse is mainly about US. However, the justification of America's interventions can not rely upon the constant affirmation of OUR greatness, at the risk of appearing superior or egotistical. In fact, we will see that this type of inference gets blocked in discourse. This chapter thus focuses on the use of presuppositions in order to manipulate the context in which the justification of OUR action is set, so that the interpretation of the conflicts (regardless of the circumstances) can take a single direction. While the outlining of a current enemy's new acts of cruelty might constitute new information, used to justify OUR intervention, what gets established at the

[3] Frames are dealt with (and defined) in more detail in Chapter 10. The term "frames" is to be understood here in the way Lakoff (2014: xv) defines frames, that is as "mental structures that shape the way we see the world."

level of presuppositions is a stable context, one which can effectively constrain the interpretation of every new conflict. I argue here that the framework of Discursive Presuppositions is best suited to that endeavor.

Discursive Presuppositions and (continued) persuasion in a corpus across eras

We have seen in Chapter 2 that presuppositions are not just the properties of certain linguistic markers: the question is not about "what words or sentences presuppose, but what *people* presuppose when they are speaking" (Beaver, Geurts & Denlinger, 2014: 13). In this thesis, the focus of the empirical analyses is indeed on what people *do* when a presupposition occurs in discourse, and more specifically on the effects of such commitments on the *hearers*, and subsequently on their interpretation of the conflicts. To that end, de Saussure's input on Discursive Presuppositions (2012) is particularly helpful. Discursive Presuppositions are not restricted to the study of linguistic markers for their trigger. Rather, they can go beyond the immediate text itself, as they are "pre-conditions not to meaning but to relevance" (2012: 38). Relevance is concerned with what the *hearer* does when interpreting an utterance, as it balances the cognitive costs and gains resulting from the interpretation process. As "pre-conditions to the relevance" of an utterance, Discursive Presuppositions (DPs) therefore allow us to turn our analysis to the *hearer* when dealing with the phenomenon of presuppositions. They are not restricted to the semantic coherence of a sentence, as they also encompass the assumptions that a hearer needs to presuppose - which does not entail belief - for an utterance to be relevant. For instance, de Saussure (2012: 52) shows how to use the framework of DPs to analyze people's responses to a referendum regarding the proposition to ban the construction of minarets in Switzerland. De Saussure shows that "for the question to be relevant," some presupposition accommodation is involved, such as that of the threat posed by minarets in the first place. This is particularly important for the study of a corpus which spreads across eras, as presuppositions might draw on assumptions or values traditionally maintained over time, which might be misleading as various factors (time, evolution of cultural norms, societal changes, etc.) might affect the relevance of principles which originated in different circumstances. I therefore argue that when it comes to established discourses, such as American War Rhetoric, the exploitation of the "common ground" can be of a great persuasive value, as what was true twenty years ago might look completely different today. In the case of American War Rhetoric, the main object of the speeches is to share information with the public about situations in the world which the hearers do not tend to be familiar with, and how these might affect the American nation and its actions abroad. In other words, it

frequently deals with new information, which is by essence relevant. Details about the enemy's latest actions, tipping the balance in favor of military involvement which until then could have been avoided, represent new information. What does not change, however, is OUR identity, OUR role, which is where the use of DPs can contribute to maintaining the relevance over time of the same opposition between US and new enemies. In order for details about the Other's cruelty to be relevant to the American hearer in the first place, one needs to assume a particular role for US in the fight against evil. This study does not aim to give a theoretical account of what presuppositions are, but rather of ways in which they can be exploited for persuasive purposes. In particular, I aim to show how the presupposition of unity, firstly through the use of the first-person pronoun "we," and secondly around the ideals upon which the American identity is built, allows to establish the parameters of the discussion regarding America's action. Finally, the concept of DPs can also be used in order to account for the interpretation of what might be labeled as 'false choices,' and their function in constraining the interpretation of the discourse, by aligning the hearer's background for interpretation with the speaker's, creating an asymmetry within the group US. The overall goal here will be to answer, at the end of this chapter, the following question: where does the persuasive power of presuppositions, within American War Rhetoric, come from?

3.1. Presupposing belonging

3.1.1. United in OUR purpose

(1) "Since the birth of our nation, "We, the People" has been the source of our strength. What government can do alone is limited, but the potential of the American people knows no limit." (George Bush, 29.01.1991)

When addressing the public, the use of the collective first-person pronoun "we" is by far the dominant choice. Indeed, first-person plural pronouns appear more than three times as frequently as the singular version (2718 vs. 893 occurrences). In the context of American politics, the President's choice to speak using the pronoun "we" carries with it strong references to the Constitution of the United States, whose authority lies in "We, the People of the United States," (U.S. Const. pmbl.) at the origin of the break from tyranny and the move towards independence. By speaking in the name of "We, the people," the President thus extends the power which lies in decision-making to the rest of the nation, enforcing this most significant term of the contract between the American government and its citizens. The use of presuppositions can thus serve to remind Americans of the other part of the contract, that of the American people, to remain true to certain American values. Even though the speeches in the corpus are Presidential addresses to the Nation, with no direct response possible

from the audience, the use of the pronoun "we" directly involves the American public, and presupposes belonging, as well as compliance from the President with the conditions laid out by the American Constitution. I argue that manipulation at the level of presuppositions, specifically through the presupposition of unity, can serve to set the parameters of the 'debate,' by establishing the relevance of America's core values (of what appears as the "common ground").

In order to do so, I will start with the analysis of several examples selected to be representative, in the sense that a similar usage of "we" appears to run throughout the data, among the various speakers. The use of "we" might be prevalent throughout the corpus, but it does not necessarily always refer to the same group of people. In certain cases, the same pronoun might be used several times in one sentence, without referring to the same group in all instances. The speaker, however, does not need to specify who he is talking about every time he uses "we," whether it might be the President and his administration, the President and the American people, the President, his administration and the American people, or even the President and the American soldiers. Rigotti discusses the cognitive benefits of presupposition accommodation (2015: 49): if hearers constantly had to interrupt the interpretation process to verify whether such information should indeed be presupposed, or whether it should be made explicit, no new information could ever be communicated, thereby also failing an essential clause of the American democratic system. This type of processing is often referred to as "shallow processing"[4] (as discussed in Chapter 1, 1.3.3), allowing the hearers to focus on information which is relevant to them. While this is extremely useful, not only in saving hearers cognitive efforts, but also in helping them to access the cognitive benefits from interpreting an utterance, it can also be misleading. Indeed, there might be instances where the pronoun's anaphoric reference is not straightforward, and might even be falsely accommodated. More than that, the presupposition of unity through the use of "we" can also be particularly manipulative, in that it can lead to exclusion from the group US, and to establish the parameters within which opposition to OUR action is to be expressed. Let us see how this happens in (2):

(2) "**Our** enemies send other people's children on missions of suicide and murder. They embrace tyranny and death as a cause and a creed. **We** stand for a different choice, made long ago on the day of **our** founding. **We** affirm it again today. **We** choose freedom and the dignity of every life. Steadfast in **our** purpose, **we** now press on [...]" (G.W. Bush, 29.01.2002, my emphases)

[4] According to de Saussure (2012: 47), "'Shallow processing' is a type of processing usually described at the level of conceptual change of lexical meaning under the pressure of maintaining the logical consistency of the proposition. Shallow processing happens when the contents of a conceptual expression in an utterance get loosened to minimal information in order to fit with a plausible informative intention, so that the presumption of relevance is maintained."

(2) certainly does not assert that the support of certain values through supporting the war is a condition of Americanism, or that not supporting the war means that one is not truly American. However, those inferences can be drawn from utterances such as (2). The reasoning might be retrieved as follows:

- A choice is to be made between freedom and tyranny;
- Being American means choosing freedom;
- Choosing freedom means defending it where it is threatened (through war);
- As the choice presents itself, "we" affirm it again: we choose freedom;
- Therefore, "we now press on" with war.

In order for "[our pressing] on" to follow from "our" affirmation that freedom is preferable to tyranny, and in order for the conclusion that war is necessary to be relevant, the hearer needs to accommodate a Discursive Presupposition (de Saussure, 2012), relating to a particular understanding of morality: namely that following up on one's principles, *at all times*, is what defines the validity of such principles, at least when it comes to a nation's identity. Through (2), President Bush is reaffirming this common ground, the core values which make up America's identity. The use of "we" in (2) thus presupposes a collective identity. The scope of reference is enlarged from the soldiers' mission to the whole of America, including past Americans. Those who "stand for a different choice" are not merely the soldiers on the frontline, or the President making the call for war, but also every single living American, and all Americans since the nation's foundation. In choosing freedom, the reference of "we" similarly extends to all Americans (past, present, and arguably future). Those who "press on," however, can strictly speaking only refer to those in government who made the decision to move forward with war, and/or to the soldiers on the frontline. It should be noted that one of the aims of this thesis is also to highlight the special role of metaphors (see Chapter 4), through which one could account for the extension of that last "we" to encompass all Americans. For the time being, the relevance of (2) relies upon the DP of a unity of purpose, and of the understanding that that purpose justifies OUR action: what is presupposed to be shared by all for (2) to be *relevant*, is the understanding that "choosing freedom" is a key feature of the American identity, and that it is through OUR military involvement that this identity gets to be embodied. This is how the presupposition of unity, through the use of the pronoun "we" (in this context) allows for the construal of America's identity as being made up of what I have called "core values":



Fig. 2: Presupposition of a collective identity around core values

These core values do not need to be explained, as we will see in the next section; but they are presupposed to be shared by all. If war appears to be the realization of these values, then the rejection of war might be equated with the rejection of the affirmation in (2), leading to inferences that if one does not support the war, one is not truly American. Through the presupposition of a collective identity around core values, what is hidden is thus that one can oppose a war while supporting the American ideals at the heart of the American identity. What this type of DP does is therefore to build the relevance of the current conflict for America, as fighting THEM becomes a matter of identity. The context in which (2) is uttered is extremely influential in the retrieval of such inferences, which can be described with RT. RT can indeed provide a sort of 'selection engine,' a tool allowing us to select the relevant contextual assumptions in order to get to the final interpretation of an utterance. In this case, and in other similar utterances from the data, the context is that of the President of the United States addressing the American people, whose will he represents through his actions. It is only in that context that utterances such as (2) can become re-affirmations of the common ground, as the President is the only unifying figure for all Americans, at least in principle. As unity and identity are made salient through this context, one can easily get to the conclusion that those who oppose the war are not 'truly' Americans. The mere presence of the President is a reminder of America's own freedom, and of how hard some people fought to obtain it. The mention of the Founding Fathers in (2) increases the salience of the value of following up on one's principles, and of respecting those who fought for US by remaining true to those principles, which, within the framework of RT, can be seen to make more easily available the contextual assumption that supporting the current war makes one 'truly' American. Beyond increasing the salience of such contextual assumptions, the use of DPs can also effectively constrain the interpretation of the discourse, as other inferences about OUR motives for war can be made less accessible. The following two aspects can thus remain hidden through the use of presuppositions in the corpus (in this case through presuppositions of a common purpose):

• Hiding the political dimension of war

The following example uses the pronoun "we" in a similar way, and we will not come back to the various groups which it might refer to:

(3) "Today **our Armed Forces** joined **our** NATO Allies in air strikes against Serbian forces responsible for the brutality in Kosovo. **We** have acted with resolve for several reasons. **We** act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive. **We** act to prevent a wider war [...] And **we** act to stand united with our allies for peace. By acting now, **we** are upholding **our** values, protecting **our** interests, and advancing the cause of peace. Tonight I want to speak to you about the tragedy in Kosovo and why it matters to **America** that **we** work with **our** allies to end it." (Clinton, 24.03.1999, my emphases)

As we have just seen, the use of the first-person plural pronoun presupposes a sharing of values and of purpose, which allows the "resolve" of action to lie not only with the President's decision to send military forces, but also with the soldiers themselves in the remarkable undertaking of their duty. The assumption which is needed in order for this unity of resolve to make sense in the first place, is that the soldiers are not just acting out of obedience, but out of shared principles. This presupposition of unity with the soldiers makes it a lot harder to blame the President for the war, who ultimately is the one who makes the call for action. As a result, through presupposing unity and purpose, utterances such as (2) and (3) can, to some extent, block interpretations which would portray the President as a power-thirsty leader trying to assert his authority in the world. Indeed, the interpretation of OUR resort to war is constrained, as what is highlighted is the moral rather than the political dimension of war, that is to say what links war to OUR identity. This is essential for the entire interpretation of the discourse, as resolve can be construed as a positive trait, following through on one's principles with actions, as opposed to a reckless decision which will cost the lives of many.

• Suppressing individualism within the group US

This is a rather natural consequence of the presupposition of unity. However, disagreement is not suppressed altogether; rather, it is the frames within which opposition is to occur which are being defined. In other words, disagreement with the government's general policies is possible, but it does not appear as relevant here. Through widening the pronoun's anaphoric reference, the interpretation of the group US is constrained, so that individual opposition within the group is not accessed. The President can thus appear as a spokesperson, acting on behalf of a united group. Indeed, by enlarging the reference of "us" to the whole of America, the decision to take action cannot be seen to serve individual motives; rather, it is construed as being grounded in shared values, in a common purpose. This alignment of the speaker's values with the hearers' is essential to the construction of a binary opposition between US and THEM, where THEY embody oppression and tyranny. By accepting the premise that the enforcement of the use of force is not just the President's decision, but

rather is first agreed by the entire American population (by remaining true to the American identity), the enemy can then be seen as the only one capable of imposing their own wishes on their population.

(4) "Democracy brings the undeniable value of thoughtful dissent, and **we've** heard some dissenting voices here at home — some, a handful, reckless; most responsible. But the fact that all voices have the right to speak out is one of the reasons **we've** been united in purpose and principle for 200 years." (G. Bush, 29.01.1991, my emphases)

In (4), the first "we" refers to the American government, listening to the people and the voices among them who might disagree with the proposed course of action. The second one signals the speaker not only as a member of the government, but also of the American nation, united with all Americans, past and present. The potential for disagreement within the nation is fully acknowledged. However, wherever dissent occurs, it is "thoughtful"; and most importantly, it is listened to, taken into account. There is one thing that never changes, and that is always agreed on: all Americans are linked by their most precious ideal, that of democracy, united around what makes America America. "We" might disagree on minor issues, but not on what really matters. OUR core values, from which stems OUR purpose, thus appear to be those that are non-negotiable, again leading to the inference that the rejection of the President's plan entails, to some extent, a rejection of the American identity. These core values are not just a valued part of the American identity, they are what separates US from THEM, what protects US from the descent into tyranny. The presuppositions of unity and purpose which we have discussed so far thus allow the President to re-affirm the sacredness of America's core values. We can talk about manipulation at the level of presuppositions, because what is being manipulated is the context in which the conflicts are to be interpreted: as a moral fight against evil. It is that non-negotiable core which sets out the parameters of the discussion, and what lays the grounds of an irreconcilable divide between US and THEM. This re-affirmation is more than the positive portrayal of OUR values, as it consolidates a particular form of reasoning: as what is presupposed is that OUR purpose justifies OUR action as morally-driven, a further function of the DPs found in the data is to attribute roles in the conflict, by establishing who is right and who is wrong. One of the implications of this usage of presuppositions is the trigger of feelings of guilt, making it all the more difficult to reject the war without feeling like one might be letting down one's country.

3.1.2. United in OUR response

3.1.2.1. A shared burden

The preservation of America's core values is more than a condition of being American: it is a responsibility. The aforementioned presupposition of unity gets declined on three levels: (a) the presupposition of a shared responsibility; (b) the presupposition of shared knowledge; and (c) the presupposition of shared emotions, all amounting to the inference that only one response is available. Throughout the corpus, America's role is regularly nominalized as a "responsibility," or "our responsibility" in (5):

(5) "And **we all** realize that **our responsibility** to be the catalyst for peace in the region does not end with the successful conclusion of this war." (G.Bush, 29.01.1991, my emphases)

(a) A shared responsibility

The nominalization of America's involvement as "our responsibility" triggers the semantic presupposition that America does indeed have leadership duties that extend beyond its borders. America's involvement in world conflicts is therefore not questioned, it is established as shared knowledge between the speaker and hearers, independent of time and circumstances: whether military intervention is necessary or not, it is up to America to start the process of peace where it does not exist; it is up to America to see that it is preserved, to defend human liberty against violence and aggression. Through the use of the pronoun "we," this responsibility, which relates to foreign affairs, does not only fall on the government, or on those whose job it is to oversee American foreign policy; rather, it is one that "we all realize" is part of what it means to be American. The issue placed before the American people, what might be classified as new information, is that this responsibility is being challenged. What is not questioned is whether the events concern US in the first place, or whether it is OUR place to intervene. The use of presuppositions can therefore act as a form of pre-assessment of the issues discussed (comparable to Slovik (1999)'s discussion on risk assessments which happen prior to the President's addresses to the Nation). By portraying the grounds for the interpretation of OUR role as already known, and unchanged since the founding of America, the new information conveyed about the current situation is to be interpreted in this regard: will America be true to its identity? *How* will it choose to react? The presupposition of unity around this responsibility sets the President's role as one of sharing with the American people the information that he has acquired, the new challenges that have arisen. But the frame for interpretation, the 'reading grid' is already in place. The burden of making the tough decisions is thus extended to the whole nation, as "we" all share in this responsibility.

I also argue that feelings of guilt might get triggered, because part of the reasoning is missing. It is not just the existence of a special responsibility for America which is taken for granted, but the links between morality and the continued fulfillment of this responsibility, which is where the significance of DPs (de Saussure 2012) can be seen. For the mention of America's special role to be relevant in the first place, what also needs to be presupposed is a shared concern for the maintenance of this identity, the belief that it should remain unchanged, out of respect for one's origins. Without assuming respect for the sacredness of this special identity, the possibility that it might be threatened if one chose to ignore the issues at stake would not be relevant to the hearer. In that sense, DPs encompass more than the semantic consistency of a sentence, as they can also include the hearer's cultural background, and relational structures between concepts. I argue that this is how guilt can be triggered at the level of presuppositions, in this case by presupposing belonging based on an identity which is deeply entrenched in history. As a result, the implication is that by not opposing THEM *now,* by failing to fulfill OUR responsibility, OUR identity will be forever damaged. The positive view of the self which is promoted throughout the data relies on this *constant* opposition with THEM. The concept of responsibility is one that most people have experience of; the way that society portrays responsibility can be assumed to be part of the common ground here. Most adults can indeed relate to having some responsibilities. For example, parents can regularly be left to feel guilty when they leave some of their responsibilities to other people, feeling that they should be the ones doing it all if they are to do it right. The assumption behind this feeling of guilt is that fulfilling one's responsibilities perfectly, all of the time, is part of the definition of the term. What is not questioned is whether the occasional sharing of responsibilities takes away from one's status. In the case of American War Rhetoric, does disagreeing with the government's course of action mean that "we" can no longer be part of the group, that America will have lost its special responsibility altogether? What we begin to see here is the reinforcing of a type of reasoning which is based on absolute interpretations.

(b) Shared knowledge

(6) "Most Americans **know instinctively** why we are in the Gulf. **They know** we had to stop Saddam now, not later. **They know** that this brutal dictator will do anything, will use any weapon, will commit any outrage, no matter how many innocents suffer. **They know** we must make sure that control of the world's oil resources does not fall into his hands, only to finance further aggression. **They know** that we need to build a new, enduring peace, based not on arms races and confrontation but on shared principles and the rule of law." (G.Bush, 29.01.1991, my emphases)
(7) "**We know** why **we**'re there: We are Americans, part of something larger than ourselves. For two centuries, we've done the hard work of freedom. And tonight, we lead the world in facing down a threat to decency and humanity." (G.Bush, 29.01.1991, my emphases)
(8) "**We know** that, ultimately, their fight is our fight." (Reagan, 16.02.1985, my emphasis)

Verbs related to the domain of knowledge are frequently used to include the hearer in the reasoning process, as in (6), (7) and (8). In (6), the President does go on to specify the reasons why America is in the Gulf, even though these reasons are not announced as new information. "We know" presupposes that all Americans do indeed share this belief, established as a fact. "We," members of the government and of the public, are construed as all having the same information available, from which the conclusion that war is necessary arose. What the President achieves here goes beyond the sharing of information. Using the framework of Mental Spaces, the conclusion that "we" need to be "there," that it is indeed "our fight," is related to what might be called a Knowledge Space. As a result, one possible inference is that disagreement with the war can only stem from a lack of knowledge. For the hearers to question that it is indeed "our fight" would incur a significant cognitive cost. Since that knowledge is construed as being "instinctive," stemming from a shared identity, rejecting the war would then entail an exclusion from the group and in that sense be very costly (psychologically and cognitively). Indeed, rejecting the conclusion reached that action must be taken would require rejecting the premise which is said to be known by all, that the conflicts in question are part of "our fight." Ultimately, it requires a rejection of the group which the hearers are assumed to belong to. Rigotti calls this the "psychological" consideration of presupposition accommodation (2015: 49):

> This kind of manipulation, which takes place at the level of presuppositions, on the one hand is difficult to unmask, on the other hand it is particularly violent: the one who becomes aware of the deception is threatened with exclusion from the community of the participants in the communication exchange who were assumed to agree on that presupposition. (Rigotti, 2015: 50)

Rigotti was referring here to Aristotle's example of manipulation based on *ad nauseam* arguments, where the hearer is ashamed of not knowing what the author claims everybody knows, and is thus led to agree. In utterances such as (6), (7), or (8), if shame is not part of the interpretation process, a similar type of community exclusion could be at stake. Questioning what is presupposed to be common knowledge, and what is more, what is intrinsic to the American identity, would involve parting from this very identity, and could come at a very high cognitive cost. The presupposition of shared knowledge allows to construe the people who might disagree with the government in a negative light, implying that they are choosing to ignore the facts, ignore what "we" all know. The fight to defend freedom becomes one of morality, which extends to that of every American individual, as the hearers are left to question their personal integrity, whether they are ready to stand up for their principles.

(c) Shared emotions

We have seen that US vs. THEM is an opposition of morality, involving all of "us." The presupposition of unity extends to that of the emotions felt regarding the issues at stake, which can act as a significant constraint on the interpretation process.

(9) "**We Americans** should be proud of what **we**'re trying to do in Central America, and proud of what, together with **our** friends, **we** can do in Central America to support democracy, human rights, and economic growth while preserving peace so close to home." (Reagan, 9 May 1984, my emphases)

The presupposition of belonging to the group "Americans" here also presupposes a unity around feelings and reactions; in this case, all Americans should be proud. Once again, the presupposition of unity takes for granted that there is only one way to interpret the situation, contributing to the formation of a reading grid for the hearer. Indeed, for pride to be relevant in the first place, America's action needs to be seen as wholly honorable; otherwise there could be no unanimous pride. What is also interesting is that it is not only the responsibility to act on one's principles which is shared, but also the credit. I argue here that this is possible through a transfer of consequences between elements from the mental spaces representing America's involvement abroad, and Americans at home. The following example is an expansion of (7). Although it does not explicitly state that all Americans should be proud, it has the capacity to trigger similar feelings:

(10) "I come to this House of the people to speak to **you and all Americans**, certain that **we** stand at a defining hour. Halfway around the world, **we** are engaged in a great struggle in the skies and on the seas and sands. **We** know why **we're** there: **We** are Americans, part of something larger than **ourselves**. For two centuries, **we've** done the hard work of freedom. And tonight, **we** lead the world in facing down a threat to decency and humanity." (G.Bush, 29.01.1991, my emphases)

The first part of this utterance establishes the Base Space or Reality Space (here, now), where the President is addressing the Congress, and all Americans. "Halfway around the world," and "for two centuries" are two space builders, building up a new geographical space, which forms representations of America's presence outside of America, and of the present time. Through optimization (Fauconnier, 2012), structure gets transferred from the parent space to new spaces, as long as the transfer does not cause explicit contradictions. The different representations of "we" in the three different spaces are here conceptualized as one single representation of "Americans," which makes space optimization even easier, as there is no explicit contradiction. Strictly speaking though, they refer to different groups of people: the soldiers, the entire American population, and previous generations of Americans. Indeed, although the soldiers are the ones who are active "in the skies, on the seas, and sands," their engagement extends to the entire American population. As a result, what happens "halfway around the world" directly reflects on individual Americans at home, and likewise, the morality of all of America is reflected by its support (or non support) of the wars it choos-

es to be involved in. Through space optimization, the consequences of the soldiers "there" are also attributed to all of "us". Through the use of the pronoun "we," and thanks to the optimization between spaces, what is profiled is what unites all groups, the motivations behind the war. Praise for the work of soldiers, of all generations, is transferred to all Americans, leading to a positive representation of the self. The reality of what war actually represents for the soldiers on the frontline, or the different stakes faced by previous generations, is not accessed. The presupposition that being American implies that "we" all share the principles which move(d) America into action makes each new issue everyone's fight. However, this unity of purpose, and the profiling of pride which stems from this common purpose, hide the fact that "doing the work of freedom" does not entail the same thing for the soldiers, for Americans today, or for Americans two hundred years ago. As a result, it is the moral aspect of war which is highlighted when representations of America's military engagement occur in discourse; the moral aspect being the one which links all three groups together.

In terms of relevance, the interpretation of the conflicts as matters of identity appears to be the least costly, which the visualization of mental spaces that link "us" directly whether at home, in the House of Congress or on the battlefield, can support. As long as there is no explicit contradiction between the spaces (made possible thanks to the presupposition of unity), the fact that "we" at home might feel guilty should "our" government or "soldiers" fail us is made easily accessible. Besides, it allows for a form of continuation, so that each new conflict can be interpreted following a well-known reasoning pattern. Indeed, we have seen that the use of DPs could involve the integration of reasoning patterns as part of the common ground. Beyond the assumption that WE are a moral group, it is the understanding of what being true to one's identity means, of what it entails to be moral, which is negotiated within the "common ground." By assuming that what being true to OUR identity entails is to *always* act on OUR shared principles, what is promoted is a clear-cut, binary interpretation of the events, with clear right and wrong sides. This is particularly beneficial when the issues at stake involve cultural differences, of which the hearer might have little understanding. Finally, through presupposing a unity of purpose, we have seen that the rejection of the conclusion that war is necessary involves that of America's professed identity. This can be particularly costly from a psychological point of view too. Indeed, what is presupposed to be shared is not merely a common history, but rather the burden of knowledge and responsibility, as well as emotions such as pride, but also guilt, and, as we will see in Chapters 7-9, fear. It is not merely the pride of doing something worthy which is transferred to the individuals making up the group US, but also the

hardship which comes with making the tough decisions. These shared emotions get heightened as the public gets construed as witnesses or even actors of the conflicts.

3.1.2.2. A shared standpoint

The presupposition of a shared interpretation of morality constrains the perspective which Americans are led to adopt when interpreting the conflicts. As the morality of the conflicts is profiled, the construction of "us" as witnesses can be particularly effective:

(11) "A year ago, **we all** watched with horror as Somali children and their families lay dying by the tens of thousands, dying the slow, agonizing death of starvation, a starvation brought on not only by drought, but also by the anarchy that then prevailed in that country. This past weekend **we all** reacted with anger and horror as an armed Somali gang desecrated the bodies of our American soldiers and displayed a captured American pilot, all of them soldiers who were taking part in an international effort to end the starvation of the Somali people themselves." (Clinton, 07.10.1993, my emphases)

(12) "**Our** consciences said, enough." (Clinton, 07.10.1993, my emphasis)

The horrors of the conflict are here construed as common knowledge. As "we" are all united in purpose, "we" all become witnesses of the acts of cruelty which occur around the world. With (11), a single Mental Space for the conceptualization of the conflicts places the American public in direct proximity with the most agonizing realities. Thanks to the presupposition of unity, and of belonging to a democracy where all information can be shared with the public, Americans are not only reminded of the horrors committed by the enemy; they are also reminded of their role as witnesses, of the responsibility that comes with being made aware of such injustice. In (12), "our consciences" are linked by a Part-Whole relation to the whole body, thus profiling the morality of the decision made to take action. What is presupposed is that "our" shared values, our shared standpoint can only lead to a single interpretation of the conflicts, in turn leading to a unanimous decision.

All the examples which have been analyzed so far point to the construal of what should be a unanimous decision, which might be surprising, given the President's awareness that all Americans will not agree with the war. I argue that the effectiveness of the strategy stems from the presupposition of a shared standpoint, guiding the interpretation of the conflicts. With this final example, the aim is to show how the framework of RT can highlight the constraining power of DPs, such as those which have been analyzed in this section.

(13) "**We Americans** are slow to anger. **We always** seek peaceful avenues before resorting to the use of force, and **we** did." (Reagan, 14.04.1986, my emphases)

The first "we" is explicitly referring to the entire nation, rather than simply the government which the speaker is part of. This group is defined by their moral character, echoing the words of the Bible, which describes God as being "slow to anger." In reality, the actual seeking of peaceful avenues, and eventually the decision to deploy military forces, referred to in the last part of the utterance by "we did," can only involve the American government. Nevertheless, the previous reference to "We Americans" allows a transfer of reasoning and consequences between the different spaces (past and present), as the analysis of America's political actions is to be based on assumptions about personality, rather than on the actual circumstances. If being American means that one does not act irrationally, driven by anger, then America's current actions are not irrational, or precipitated. The context in which the interpretation of America's action is based is constrained, so that the political circumstances are left in the background, while America's character is highlighted. "We" are American before anything else, making each and every conflict a new realization of US vs. THEM, where OUR character is put to the test. This is where all the examples which have been analyzed so far can come together, in a manner of speaking, to reinforce the effects of constraint occurring at the level of presuppositions, through the manipulation of context. I will not reiterate the ways in which (13) presupposes unity of purpose, responsibility, etc., but rather use RT to highlight what might be the main purpose of presuppositions within the corpus: to determine who is in the right, and who is in the wrong. Once WE are understood to be on the right side of the conflict, it becomes a lot easier to disregard potential issues regarding America's involvement.

In order to do so, let us imagine how the phrase "being slow to anger" might come to get interpreted in an entirely different context. The speaker is here communicating about a fight between two of his friends, Sam and Ruby. Ruby is said to have hit and hurt Sam quite badly. The speaker then comments on the fact that Ruby is "slow to anger." In that context, where Ruby has expressed her anger by hitting Sam, being "slow to anger" does not lead to the interpretation that Ruby does not give in to her anger, which is blocked by the contextual assumption that she did in fact hit Sam. What then would be the purpose of such an utterance? Unlike God, the context is here made of imperfect people who cannot control their emotions in all situations. The cultural assumption that hitting is not acceptable, and in some situations should indeed be punished, leads the addressee to naturally ponder over who might be responsible for the fight. By saying that Ruby is "slow to anger," the addressee can thus infer that Sam must have said or done something unacceptable, which would be the only way to interpret Ruby's strong expression of anger. Such an interpretation would fit in with the speaker's knowledge of Ruby's character, which would not need challenged following this violent

altercation, and can thus be said to be optimally relevant. Once the addressee has attributed blame to Sam for causing the conflict, expectations of relevance have been met, and there is no need to look any further, i.e. for clues of Ruby's part in causing the fight in the first place.

Let us now go back to the interpretation of (13). In the context of international relationships, war needs to be legitimized as a last resort. WE cannot legitimately get involved in a military conflict, unless it appears to be the only possible way out of that conflict. In that context, the attribution of who is to blame for initiating the conflict is highly relevant: if THEY are to blame, the slot for who is responsible has been filled, and there is no need to access assumptions which might make OUR actions or motives questionable. We might thus retrieve the inference that OUR resort to war is legitimate, while THEIRS is an expression of violence, in that way:

- If a nation is slow to anger, they will always favor diplomacy over war;
- America is slow to anger;
- If WE take action against THEM, it is through no fault of OURS;
- The conflict is THEIR responsibility, while OUR role is to save the situation.

The final inference meets expectations of relevance, as it makes sense of the current conflict, while reconciling OUR resort to war with OUR moral character, *and* with OUR identity. Blame has been attributed, and as a result interpretations of OUR resort to war as driven by a thirst for power or a wish to impose America's authority can be successfully blocked.

3.1.3. Concluding remarks

We have seen in this section that American War Rhetoric regularly presupposes a unity of purpose between the government, the soldiers, and the American people. The use of DPs in American War Rhetoric might be said to be effective in terms of persuasion, because it can successfully manipulate the context in which the conflicts are to be interpreted. What is taken for granted is a form of agreement that (a) OUR resort to war is acceptable as long as it abides by America's core values, and (b) that these core values are common to "us" all, whether "we" are on the frontline, in the White House, or at home. Since "our" core values are what tie "us" all together, what is made salient is the moral aspect of the war. By profiling (OUR) morality, the hearer is also oriented to attribute responsibility for the conflicts to THEM, despite OUR decision to take an active involvement (as opposed to US being directly attacked, for example). What is thus made inaccessible is the potential for US to be wrong, or at least to be blamed. It is in that sense that the interpretation of US as being in the wrong is said to be more costly: once reasoning patterns have been made available

(WE are "slow to anger" therefore WE cannot be responsible), particularly as they get reinforced over time, other interpretations which might implicate America are harder to retrieve to make sense of the situation. One aim of this chapter is to point to the constraining effect of presuppositions within the corpus. Specifically, the interpretation of the conflicts is constrained so that each conflict can be understood as a new realization of the divide between US and THEM. The profiling of OUR morality through the presupposition of unity goes further than the mere enhancement of OUR image, and contributes to the consolidation of that divide. Through the use of the pronoun "we" when discussing significant political decisions, the basis of the relationship between speaker and hearers is established as one of openness: the premise is that what I (as President) know, you (members of the American public) will know too. It is on this assumption that the ideal of democracy is based, and that the opposition with a regime of oppression and a rule of tyranny can be made *relevant*. Presuppositions are not only cognitively useful, helping the hearer to sort out the information that is relevant; they are also psychologically essential, consolidating belonging to a nation which values and gives power to its people. The accommodation that "we" all share the same understanding of the concepts which make up OUR identity (if one considers oneself to be moral) is necessary in order to access what is considered to be new information, the evolution of the situation, or even the reassurance provided by the President over its eventual resolution. However, as Rocci (2005) and Greco (2003) point out, accommodation does not entail acceptance or belief. Still, the psychological aspect of the discursive presupposition that all Americans share the same definition of morality, one which entails a strict respect of the principles which are intrinsic to the American identity, and dating back to its founding, makes it particularly difficult to challenge. We will now move onto the representation of these principles and values which appear to be shared by "us" all, and in which the divide between US and THEM is grounded.

3.2. Presupposing the virtue of Democracy

The exploitation of presuppositions in manipulative discourse is often linked to what might be referred to as the process of false accommodation, where information which is in fact new, or even wrong, is falsely accommodated as shared knowledge (Greco 2003, Rigotti 2005). However, this does not make presuppositions a perfectly reliable tool for deceptive speakers. In this section, I argue that the constraining effects of the presuppositions found in the data stem from their role in consolidating a type of reasoning which is grounded in binary oppositions, in a way that is not always easily spotted, especially as these effects get consolidated over time. Indeed the common

ground is constantly being negotiated, although it might not seem like that is the case, which is where presuppositions might become problematic. Within American War Rhetoric, military action is often claimed to be undertaken in the name of democracy, and that might in itself be compelling enough to secure support for war; more importantly, the premise upon which the conclusion is made does not need to be challenged. Chomsky (in Moyers & Flowers, 1989: 47) notes that "more democracy is a value in itself," and that "democracy as a value doesn't have to be defended any more than freedom has to be defended." Beyond the fact that "we" can all agree to support democracy, the understanding of democracy itself is also considered to be shared by all Americans. It constitutes old information, and indeed lengthy discussions over it would make impossible the communication of new information about the development of conflicts in the world. What is presupposed in discourse is therefore not only that America is a democracy, but also a certain type of *reasoning* based on a particular understanding of democracy. This implies a rather broad and complex understanding of presupposition, going well beyond the semantic 'truth' of an utterance, in accordance with Caffi (1993, quoted in Mazid, 2007: 357): "presuppositions are not only about knowledge, but also about 'expectations, desires, interests, claims, attitudes towards the world.'" It is in that sense that presuppositions can be seen as efficient persuasive mechanisms, as they can constrain the interpretation of democracy to its idealistic aspect (3.2.1), which contributes to the entrenchment of reasoning grounded in binary oppositions, and to establishing the relevance of the frame of the fight against evil. A further objective is again to show how the incorporation of Mental Spaces, along with CBT and RT, can successfully account for their prominent role in American War Rhetoric.

3.2.1. Impoverished concepts ?

The legitimization of wars today is very different from what it was hundreds of years ago. The enemy might not physically or directly threaten US. As this chapter has made clear, however, it is OUR identity that is challenged, and this challenge comes from the choice to (or not to) address THEIR evil. In order for THEIR evil and its impact on remote victims to be relevant to US, it is essential that the principles which WE live by go beyond what directly concerns the American nation, and extend to matters of humanity. To that end, this section pays particular attention to the way presuppositions can be used to constrain or broaden the interpretation of certain concepts, and their role in the establishment of separate categories, whose understanding relies on this relationship of opposition. I will start with the representation of "democracy" in the corpus, wondering whether the use of presuppositions is leading to the impoverishment of the concept.

*From DEMOCRACY to DEMOCRACY**

We have seen that the framework of RT can serve as an 'engine of selection' of the information. When democracy is mentioned in the corpus, only its positive aspects are selected, leading to its interpretation as an ideal. As the conceptualization of democracy gets constrained to the ideals which it strives to serve, a positive image of the self gets constructed. Ideals are, by definition, not anchored in reality, but instead represent something to aspire to. What is hidden is therefore the reality of the practice of OUR principles, which can sometimes be far from the ideals behind them. The analysis of the occurrence of the term "democracy" in the data revealed that its most frequent collocate is the coordinating conjunction "and." Democracy is indeed most often associated with other concepts, most often those of freedom or peace, but also progress or economic prosperity.

(14) "The people of Central America **want** democracy **and** freedom." (Reagan, 09.05.1984, my emphases)
(15) "[...] Appreciation for our country's efforts to **promote** peace, democracy, **and** development." (Reagan, 24.03.1984, my emphases)
(16) "Freedom **and** democracy are the best guarantors of peace." (Reagan, 14.11.1985, my emphasis)
(17) "The only countries where dictators have managed to hold back the wave of democracy **and** progress that has swept over our entire region and that our own Government has so actively **promoted** and supported for years." (Clinton, 15.09.1994, my emphases)

The same concepts keep reoccurring in collocation with "democracy" throughout the data. The conceptualization of DEMOCRACY is thus affected by the creation of a higher paradigm, one where democracy, freedom, peace, and prosperity are all to be understood on the same level, belonging to one higher-order category. Two parts of the context are to be noted, which contribute to constraining the interpretation of DEMOCRACY, by only selecting its positive aspects. Firstly, the verbs which are to be found in the *immediate* context: democracy is something that we "promote," or that others "want" (14,15,17). What is presupposed here is not just that democracy is something positive and desirable, but that it is desirable for *everyone*, for the whole of humanity, on the same grounds as peace, economic prosperity or freedom. Secondly, the wider context: America's cultural background (taking into account America's history, with democracy signaling the end of colonial rule), as well as the type of speech in which utterances (14) to (17) are uttered. The speeches in this corpus come at times of crisis, or of change, as wars are about to erupt, or a new President has been elected. Maintaining unity in times of crisis is essential, and is another element which influences the selection of democracy's idealistic aspects. The interpretation of democracy *solely* as an ideal is very compatible with the presupposition of unity discussed in the previous section, with the interpretation of "we" as a group that is rallied around shared ideals.

Barsalou (1987: 102) defined *ad hoc* concepts as occasion-specific categories, that is to say "goal-derived categories that are not well-established in memory but instead created to achieve a novel goal." Someone might be described as a "dragon," as a way to comment on the way that they are talking and reacting to other people. Certain traits of "dragons" would then be highlighted (their fierce and aggressive nature), leading to the interpretation of an *ad hoc* concept, serving the needs of the speaker to describe that person in that particular context. In the context of American War Rhetoric, I argue that the way the word "democracy" is used leads to the formation of an ad hoc concept, or "occasion-specific sense" (Wilson and Carston, 2007: 1), that is an interpretation which relies on a form of narrowing of the concept DEMOCRACY, so that it may be construed *solely* as an ideal, while the specificities attached to the practice of democracy are left in the background. Utterances such as (14) to (17) thus lead to a specific conceptualization of DEMOCRACY, which will be referred to as DEMOCRACY*, to serve the purposes of a context where unity is profiled, not only among Americans but among freedom-loving nations, among humanity.

The mention of democracy might activate different representations, different types of information, depending on the context in which it occurs. It will most definitely have a different meaning depending on which country one is from, and the regime that one lives under. Some contexts might activate a representation focusing on the practicalities of a democracy, the different systems put in place in order to ensure that the people have some control; some contexts might narrow that focus down to the practice of democracy in one specific area, perhaps to highlight certain flaws, or to compare two democratic systems. In the aftermath of President Trump's election, many texts which related the results of the election pointed to the fact that fewer people had actually voted for Trump than did for Clinton, making Clinton the winner of the popular vote. In this context, it might be easier to pinpoint certain inconsistencies within the system. If the context makes salient the voice of the people as the essence of democracy, one might get to the inference that its current practice needs to change in order to match its ideal. Such an interpretation would be optimally relevant, as it would make sense of the latest election results, but also suggest change without letting go of the ideal of democracy, by separating the ideal from the practice. On the other hand, in a context where unity is profiled (see previous section), the selection of democracy's idealistic aspects is a lot more readily available, serving the maximization of relevance. What is presupposed in the corpus is therefore the shared belief in the *ideal* of democracy, rather than on every way it might be implemented by American politicians. Although *ad hoc* concepts are occasion-specific, the reinforcement of the conceptualization of DEMOCRACY* throughout the corpus and over time is significant, in that it can result in constraining effects, due to its potential to consolidate reasoning grounded in binary oppositions.

From mentions of "democracy" to the ever-widening gulf between US and THEM

The presupposition of a shared understanding of DEMOCRACY* has repercussions on the entire interpretation of the discourse. Thanks to the creation of a higher paradigm, the presupposition of shared ideals places whoever supports peace, progress or prosperity on the side of democracy, along with whoever opposes violence and oppression on OUR side. By focusing on the ideal rather than on the practice, binary oppositions can easily emerge, as every actor can then be construed as being either for or against democracy. In reality, there could be many forms of democracy, where the people might have more or less power. If the discourse becomes about the support, or non-support of America's ideals, being "for" democracy implies being against oppression. OUR action can therefore be seen as entirely positive, as WE get construed on the right side of the conflict, while THEIRS is entirely negative. It is this type of reasoning, leading to the exclusion of any of OUR traits from the conceptualization of THEM, and vice-versa, which leads me to the conclusion that the representation of DEMOCRACY* promoted in the corpus has led to the impoverishment of the concept. Indeed, the narrowing of DEMOCRACY to DEMOCRACY* serves to hide an important aspect of America's interventions abroad. What does not get accessed through the conceptualization of democracy as an ideal, is the damage which WE might do through OUR resort to war. In reality, the establishment of democracy does not immediately give rise to the ideals that it stands for. The transition can be difficult, and is not without consequences. If one abides by the rule that democracy can only be desirable, opposing OUR intervention to promote democracy in the face of oppression becomes very difficult. What it hides is the context in which OUR intervention occurs, the vast cultural and historical differences which can make the establishment of an entirely new system problematic, and in some cases cause more problems than it resolves. These effects, which might lead to the conceptualization of US as imposing OUR rule on the world, can remain hidden thanks to presuppositions of a shared understanding of DEMOCRACY*, as the retrieval of assumptions of OUR ideal-driven nation causing destruction is made less easily available.

What is also hidden through this 'sorting' function is the fact that all those who call themselves democracies are not necessarily anywhere close to these ideals, thus further impoverishing the concept. This is an example of broadening, where countries who aspire towards a democracy such as that in the United States might be included in OUR category (for occasion-specific purposes). One could argue that since reality can never truly reflect ideals, should not aspiring towards those ideals always be preferable? I argue that the presupposition of a shared understanding of DEMOCRACY*

can indeed make opposing its promotion very difficult, because WE cannot be seen as motivated by the wrong intentions - those are reserved to THEM. As the 'villain slot' gets filled and expectations of relevance are met, questioning OUR promotion of democracy is not easy, because it is not relevant. While unity is crucial in times of crisis, and the questioning of one's political regime would also not be appropriately timed, the use of presuppositions when it comes to the interpretation of the need for OUR involvement might lead to an oversimplified version of the events, making democracy not only a reason to fight, but also a safeguarding of good intents.

3.2.2. Democracy, the solution to the world's problems

3.2.2.1. A safeguarding of good intents and trustworthiness

Genuine vs. False Democracy

(18) "Rather than make this document public, they followed the advice of Fidel Castro, who told them to put on **a facade of democracy**." (Reagan, 16.03.1986, my emphasis)

The interpretation of "a facade of democracy" involves a conceptual metaphor, and will be dealt with in more detail in the following chapter. The message which Reagan is trying to convey in (18) is that the enemy is not to be trusted. We will see now how one gets to this conclusion. As the aim of this chapter is not to discuss the significant role played by metaphors (object of Chapter 4), the focus here is on the process of accommodation of DPs for the interpretation of the metaphor in (18). What is taken for granted for this metaphor to be relevant in the first place, is that belief in democracy is a *guarantee* of good intents and trustworthiness. This is not only presupposed to be shared by the speaker and hearers, but also by the enemy; in fact, the assumption is that it is a universal truth. The premise to the efficiency of the metaphor, and which is not made explicit, is that a democratic government is, in all instances, a truthful government. Therefore, by extension, there should be no doubt as to OUR transparency. Besides, for Castro's deceptive ruse to be relevant, one also needs to assume that America did want to believe and trust them. While the speaker repeatedly highlights and documents the enemy's lying nature, OUR willingness to cooperate and to be transparent is presupposed to be common knowledge, directly arising from OUR being indeed a democracy, a *genuine* democracy. An opposition between genuine and false democracies can thus arise as follows. In Figure 3, "democracy" refers to the name which leaders (of either side) use to describe their nations, rather than to the understanding of DEMOCRACY* promoted in the data :



Fig. 3: Genuine vs. False Democracy

What is profiled in (18) is the direct link between democratic governments (based on a model similar to that of the United States) and the establishment of transparent, trustworthy regimes, which will have peaceful dealings with other countries. The resulting consolidation of the binary opposition between US and THEM can lead to the (sometimes false) accommodation of the assumption that being a democracy (false democracies are reserved to THEM) is a safeguarding of good intentions. If peace arises out of democracy, when the opposite of democracy is equated with the reign of oppression, then one can easily arrive at the inference that being a democracy does not only oppose oppression, but safeguards against it; similarly, democracies do not just oppose untrustworthiness, they safeguard against it. The salience of the binary style of reasoning which is constantly promoted in the data impacts the interpretation of the conceptual blends which unfold in discourse. Here, when interpreting "the facade of democracy," the inference that the enemy is never to be trusted, and moreover, that WE are, is easily made available. In the end, the mere mention of democracy becomes enough to sort between the actors of the conflict, between who is to be trusted and who is not.

Sorting out whose cause is worth supporting

When construed in opposition with the enemy's cruelty, the backing of democracy can be used to legitimize the victims' cause. Through the presupposition that democracy acts as a safeguarding of good intents, the word "democracy" can act as a sorting tool, helping the hearer to quickly and effectively decipher the conflicts: who the victims are, why WE are on their side, why WE can be assured that their cause is worth supporting, etc.

(19) "The true heroes of the Nicaraguan struggle, non-Communist, democracy-loving revolutionaries saw their revolution betrayed and took up arms against the betrayer. These men and women are today the democratic resistance fighters some call the Contras. We should call them freedom fighters." (Reagan, 16.02.1985)

The revolution of the Contras appears to be legitimate on account of their love for democracy, which is driving their action, and in contrast with the government they went to war against. The premise is that the support of democracy makes the Contras worthy of America's trust; that democracy is more than something that one wishes to improve one's quality of life: it is the answer to the world's problems, the answer to evil. In this context, it is the answer to Communism (indeed the context of the Cold War makes the aforementioned distinction between honest and dishonest regimes all the more salient). If that is true, then fighting for democracy can easily be justified to defeat evil, and become a form of crusade. This was especially prominent in the Cold War era, where democracy was consistently construed in direct opposition with Communism. Fighting THEM thus becomes a morally worthy cause, rather than being construed as a desire to dominate the world with one's ideology, for example. What is hidden in (19), what is made inaccessible through the salience of these clear oppositions promoting the conceptualization of DEMOCRACY* (see 3.2.1), is the violence of the revolution, which is constrained to the enemy, to the Communists at heart, "the betrayer." Indeed the revolution of the Contras does not appear here as a violent or illegal movement. In reality, their crimes involved the use of terrorism, as well as human rights violations. By profiling the Contras' aspirations and dreams, the interpretation of DEMOCRACY* is consolidated as an ideal to attain and to love, leading to outcomes which are entirely positive, in line with the conceptualization of a higher-order category as described in 3.2.1. Through the label of "freedom fighters," Reagan continues to profile the ideals behind the fight, which are presented as evidence for the worthiness of their cause, at the expense of what fighting for freedom might look like for them.

The following example highlights that Reagan was not the only President who used democracy as a sorting tool to defend the cause supported by America:

(20) "Afghanistan has gone from a nation where the Taliban harbored Al Qaida and stoned women in the streets to a young democracy that is fighting terror and encouraging girls to go to school." (G.W.Bush, 15.01.2009)

In (20), it is presupposed that Afghanistan did not use to be a democracy. The presupposition that democracy is the solution to the spreading of evil in the world is what can lead to the inference that the absence of democracy is precisely the reason why violence was so widespread in the first place. The establishment of democracy does not just represent progress for the people of Afghanistan, it is in everyone's interest, as it is construed as the key to the fight against terror. Just as terror can be exported anywhere in the world, the spread of democracy is conceptualized as its counterpart, a

neutralizing agent which needs to be nurtured in order to be fully functional. The presupposition that democracy is the solution to the world's problems is essential to the relevance of utterances like (20), which place the two concepts of democracy and terror in direct opposition. It is this presupposition which acts as a pre-condition to the relevance of OUR involvement, of OUR opposing THEM, in order to tackle an issue which does not only concern the victims of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, but everyone else in the world. OUR involvement can thus become acceptable on two fronts:

- Similarly to (19), through conveying presuppositions which assume an interpretation of democracy as solely positive, all the while hiding the reality of what its practice might look like in different countries, the hearer might infer that being a democracy also safeguards against the resort to terror. In certain cases, that is sadly far from the truth.
- It is also important to note that the solution is not America, but democracy (defended by America). This allows to keep in the background potential criticisms of America's desire to impose their own culture on the rest of the world.

As democracy is construed in opposition with tyranny and the spreading of lies in order to gain power, the hearer is being reassured that such deception cannot happen in America, thanks to the establishment of a working democracy. Reassurance of OUR trustworthiness might be more efficient at the level of presuppositions, grounded in the belief in an *ideal* whose suitability is constantly reinforced by the details of extreme oppression. By contrast, if the speaker was to assert that Americans can trust in the fight that is being promoted, because a democratic government would not deceive its people, one might question the speaker's need to assert his honesty, which in turn might bring to the foreground the potential for untrustworthy individuals to compromise the working of the ideal of democracy. Another consequence is that through impoverishing concepts such as DEMOCRACY, it is also the enemy's perception of US, perhaps as terrorists in other's countries, which is made inaccessible, thus further cementing the divide between US and THEM.

3.2.2.2. Concluding remarks

The use of presuppositions has been shown to be very useful in order to guide the hearer when trying to decide who can be trusted, and who cannot; who falls within the group US, and within THEIRS. To finish this subsection, I will expand on this cognitive advantage, namely that to make the choice between supporting or not supporting the war easier. This last example summarizes the

analyses of presuppositions relating to the understanding of democracy so far, to conclude on their efficiency in persuasive communication.

(21) "His lawlessness will threaten the peace and democracy of the emerging new world order we now see: this long-dreamed of vision we've all worked toward for so long." (G. Bush, 09.01.1991)

In (21), several contextual assumptions allow the hearer to favor the selection of democracy's idealistic aspects, rather than its exercise in reality: the mention of a "new world order" which is the result of a "long-dreamed of vision," the alignment of democracy with idealistic concepts such as peace, and against lawlessness. Someone's "lawlessness" points to a complete disregard of human laws. It gets conceptualized as the absence of something. On the other hand, "peace" is construed as the ultimate destination, and in that sense is understood as an ideal state, one which is not just obtained, but for which one needs to work hard. An asymmetry thus appears, as one man's lawlessness is enough to disrupt the results of OUR hard work, which makes sense since what WE are working toward are ideals. For this utterance to make sense, for lawlessness to threaten on an equal level the peace and the democracy of this "new world order," a higher paradigm is formed, where peace and democracy are understood as essential elements to an ideal world, which does not contain lawlessness, or, one might continue to infer, any disregard of rules or humanity. The implication is that what THEY are, WE are not, because both groups belong to separate categories. The presupposition that democracy warrants against lawlessness is necessary for such conclusions to be accepted as arguments in favor of OUR intervention. The interpretation of the issues as an opposition between two separate categories leaves no room for any middle ground, leading to the laying out of simple choices for the hearers to make between two options. We will now take a closer look at the strategies used to explicitly lay out these choices.

3.3. Presuppositions and False Choices

The public's involvement in the choices made regarding America's military presence is essential for the exercise of American democracy. By looking at the presuppositions which occur in discourse from the point of view of the hearer, some of these choices appear to only lead to one acceptable answer, making them 'false choices.' "False dilemma is a specific form of reasoning: despite the fact that it is based on a deductively valid argument form, it is rightly depicted as fallacy." (Tomic, 2013: 347) This type of reasoning seems particularly suited to the elaboration and consolidation of binary oppositions. In his article, Tomic argues for a systematic approach to this type of reasoning,

differentiating between four different types of false dilemma, and outlining clear criteria to distinguish between them. While this research can effectively promote critical thinking, and is particularly useful to uncover uses of the false dilemma fallacy, or on the other hand to avoid overusing it in one's analyses, it is not within the scope of this section to get to a better understanding of the false dilemma fallacy. Rather the aim is to explore the role played by presuppositions, in this corpus, to guide the hearers in order to align their interpretations with the speaker's. It is in that sense that we speak of false choices. A few strategies have been outlined, depending on the way the choice is presented to the hearers:

- Explicit choices: conclusion of the reasoning process

(22) "Every nation, in every region, now **has a decision to make**: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists." (G.W.Bush, 20.09.2001, my emphasis)
(23) "But we, we in the United States **must decide** whether we will give them enough time to have a reasonable chance to succeed." (Clinton, 07.10.1993, my emphasis)

In (22), G.W. Bush is giving the rest of the world a choice between two options. The options are straightforward: supporting America, or supporting terrorism. While the President is asking other nations to make that choice, the (discursive) presupposition is that Americans have already made theirs. The first option is to side "with us," which presupposes unity among the American people and the American government. Indeed, for the use of the pronoun "us" to be relevant in the first place, what needs to be accepted is that all Americans are on the same side, and thus that there are only two sides. Therefore refusing to support "us" is not a real option, in the sense that it implies supporting terrorism. The alignment of the hearers' choice with the speaker's relies on the presupposition that all Americans, along with all those who are on the side of humanity, reject terrorism; that terrorism is anti-American; that it is an issue that is not up for debate. More importantly, in order for this choice to be accepted as legitimate, America cannot be seen to endorse any form of terrorism in the way that it fights its enemies. The acceptance of that choice implies that of its premises, that is the interpretation process leading up to the formulation of the options: that the present conflict is *not* just about the defense of America, but about the rejection of terrorism on a human level. Indeed, for a single decision to be made by "every nation, in every region," for this decision to be relevant in the first place, one needs to assume that there exists a problem which is of international concern; that the issue at stake does not only concern the United States of America, although it was the direct target, but instead is a matter of humanity. This is significant in the sense that the interpretation process has already been made, which is why the options given can only lead to one acceptable choice. The proposed 'choice' would be better equated with a form of conclusion

about how to interpret the current events. The absolute righteousness of "our" cause on a *human level* is profiled, portraying anyone who might disagree in a negative light. Furthermore, whether the hearer actually shares G.W.Bush's understanding of these issues, the interpretation of the two-option choice involves conceptualizing the rejection of his course of action as making a step towards terrorism and breaking from the American identity, from the unity of the group at a time of national crisis. It is not that the hearer cannot reject the President's interpretation, but rather that such a rejection would come at a high cognitive and psychological cost, due to the presupposition of unity against THEM.

Similarly in (23), Clinton makes explicit the fact that there is a choice to be made, as he frames it as an obligation: "we, we in the United States **must** decide [...]" Again, only two options are presented: giving the Somalis enough time to succeed, or not. The latter option implies that the interruption of America's military action would lead to inevitable failure, and the return of tragedy for the Somalis. So what part do presuppositions play in the interpretation process? For the American people to decide on the future of the Somalis, one needs to assume that it is indeed a matter of choice, and that this choice belongs to America. The decision which Clinton presents to his people is the result of a reasoning process, and leaves out the premise that the resolution of the conflict directly depends on America's action. Indeed, this is necessary for the choice in (23) to be relevant in the first place. The implication is not simply that the Somalis will not succeed without continued American support, but that it is a mere matter of choice. The reasoning which led to the formulation of America's choice is as follows:

- We, in America *can* help the Somalis;
- If we choose to help them, they will have a decent chance of success;
- If we choose not to help them, they will fail.

What is profiled is the consequence of OUR action on the Somalis' immediate fate; what is hidden is what OUR involvement might entail for US. The real, implied question therefore is: "do you wish for the Somalis to succeed, or not?" The feelings of guilt which might be triggered if one was to answer in the negative are due to the presupposition of the hearers' morality, of a shared belief in humanity and care for others, making the interpretation of the conflict a mere question of morality: a question which is relevant to *all* of US.

In both (22) and (23), the President chooses to give the people an explicit choice, when the reasoning has actually already taken place, and the way the options are laid out implies only one acceptable answer. So what might be the purpose of giving a choice in the first place? By explicitly offering Americans a choice, WE are further separated from THEM. Not because WE are in a democra-

cy, within which all Americans have the ability to choose their own path; but rather because what is presupposed is the hearer's responsibility to act morally. The persuasive power of these false choices lies with what the speaker assumes about the hearers' state of mind. Presuppositions about the hearers' wish to do what is right, about their care for humanity, impact the interpretation of what is at stake, making the opposition between US and THEM an essentially moral one. Accepting the validity of the decision put forward by Clinton therefore involves accepting these presuppositions. The effects of guilt, triggered here at the level of presupposition interpretation, profile the moral aspect of the war, at the expense of the reality of the war for OUR soldiers, for example.

• Rhetorical questions

Rhetorical questions are commonly understood as questions for which the speaker does not expect a direct answer. Indeed, the function is not to ask anything of the addressee, but rather to "[put forward] standpoints" or to "[put forward] arguments" (Henkemans, 2009: 15). I argue here that the efficiency of the rhetorical questions in the corpus lies with the presuppositions about the hearers' state of mind and beliefs, again with the aim to reinforce the moral divide between US and THEM.

(24) "But we deplore even passive acceptance of such actions, and I can assure you great progress is being made. Can anyone really believe that the situation would improve if our influence for moderation were removed?" (Reagan, 13.08.1985)

By "such actions," Reagan is here referring to the misuse of public trust in any way, shape or form. The facts asserted by the President are as follows: America condemns any misuse of public trust; the situation in El Salvador is improving. The President then wonders about the reasons behind the progress that is being witnessed, implying that without America's intervention, it simply could not be possible. One part of his reasoning, however, is taken for granted, as he presupposes that America's influence is one of moderation (and not of imposition, as some critics might suggest):

- There is terrible unrest in El Salvador, resulting in violent conflicts and attempts at a revolution;
- America intervenes as a *moderator* between the groups, in order to restore peace (and with the aim to establish freedom);
- The situation in El Salvador is improving - progress has been witnessed;

—> America's intervention is working and needs to be sustained.

The focus is on evidence that the situation is indeed improving, in order to reassure the American people that the contribution of their nation, of the soldiers who are risking their life, is having a positive impact. What is taken for granted, however, is that America's presence is solely positive, and welcome. As a moderator, America's involvement also appears rather neutral; while America supports one group in the conflict, it is to be completely disassociated with any misconduct on the part

of El Salvadorian officials who, while they might be making progress, are still guilty of some of the practices that had been in place for a century.

By tackling the issue of America's continued presence through the use of a rhetorical question, Reagan is directly involving the hearer in the reasoning process, thereby focusing on the moral aspect of the situation, rather than on its costs, for example. What is presupposed through asking this question, is a deep belief in America's power of influence, and in the values which it promotes. By indirectly answering the question, these beliefs are reinforced. Anyone who claims that America's intervention is not necessary is thus construed as being naive, and possibly even selfish for wishing to deliberately remove the support without which disaster is inevitable. The relation of Cause-Effect between America's action and the newly witnessed progress is made salient, thus making it difficult to interpret the situation in any other way once expectations of relevance have been met. The question thus leads the hearer to conceptualize America as an effective and positive influence, as a moral actor in the conflict, thereby hiding potential criticisms over its responsibility to be there in the first place. By focusing on the end result, Reagan is guiding the hearers in their task to decide whether America's continued presence is right or wrong. The context has been carefully manufactured, so that the slot for who is wrong is already filled: if a moderator has to intervene, the fault falls onto those who could not manage the conflict in the first place. The moral aspect of the war is again profiled, and it is established as the relevant factor upon which the task of deciding whether to take action or not needs to be fulfilled.

- Explicit response to an implied question

(25) "A world in which brutality and lawlessness are allowed to go unchecked isn't the kind of world we're going to want to live in." (G.Bush, 16.01.1991)

Bush is here quoting a soldier, who, like the rest of the troops, "knows why they are there," and is sharing these reasons here. The answer comes following a question regarding his personal motivations to fight. Through the use of negation, the implied question to the hearers is the following: do *you* want to live in that kind of world, "a world in which brutality and lawlessness are allowed to go unchecked?" If one presupposes that all Americans stand against brutality and lawlessness, then there is only one possible answer: no. As a result, the inclusive pronoun "we" refers to the soldiers on the front, and by extension to those who support the fight against brutality and lawlessness, and excludes those who do not support the war. Even when directly dealing with the experience of a soldier, the interpretation of the conflict remains constrained to a moral opposition between two groups: on one side, those who stand against brutality, either physically on the frontline, or through

their moral support of the war; and on the other side, those who are guilty of brutality, and those who are guilty of letting them get away with it by not supporting the fight. By supporting the soldier behind this statement, one therefore also needs to accept the premise that this is indeed a question of morality, reinforcing the divide between US and THEM by aligning those who do not support the war with THEM. By quoting a soldier and presupposing unity between the government and the soldiers through use of the inclusive pronoun "we," this interpretation of the conflict as a moral war is not just that promoted by the government, it is that of the soldiers too. Support of the soldier (by accepting their motives to fight) can thus be falsely equated with support of the war.

I have chosen to conclude this chapter with the analysis of false choices, because they highlight a significant function of the presuppositions in this corpus, as well as the suitability of the framework of DPs for the study of persuasive discourse, which guides the analyst to focus on what needs to be assumed for an utterance to be relevant. In the context of Presidential speeches to the American nation on Foreign Policy, the laying out of choices to the public serves an important function. Indeed, what is presupposed for these choices to be relevant in the first place is a shared moral responsibility, and a shared understanding of morality. When negative consequences are portrayed, whether they concern the disastrous fate of innocent victims, a loss of influence for America, or a decline in Americans' quality of life, what is presupposed is that these consequences are "our" choice. Through presupposing a unity of purpose, the President is thus able to remind all Americans of their moral responsibility as members of a powerful democracy. We have seen in this chapter that the hearers are directly invited to take part in the reasoning process, through the use of the inclusive pronoun "we," and through the explicit laying out of 'choices.' We have also seen that what is consistently profiled so that a single decision can be made is the moral aspect of the war, that which WE can all agree on, whether "we" refers to members of the public, of the government, of the army, or even to past generations of Americans. By profiling morality as the relevant factor upon which war is to be debated, the interpretation of the conflict is constrained, and a strict opposition between US and THEM can be established. This is what allows each and every new conflict to be interpreted as a continuation of the same fight between good and evil.

I argue that the framework of Discursive Presuppositions is particularly well suited to the analysis of a corpus that stretches across several eras, and to the study of persuasion over time. For the opposition between US and THEM to be relevant in the first place, for OUR fight against evil to be

legitimate, what is presupposed is that WE need to be free from the type of badness which THEY exemplify. This is what leads to the type of reasoning which I have referred to as grounded in binary opposition, whereby what applies to US does not apply to THEM, and vice versa. This type of reasoning is highly constraining, as once the fault has been assigned to THEM, it does not get shared. Presuppositions can thus act as sorting agents, allowing the hearers to be directly shown what elements are relevant in order to make sense of the conflicts. Although they can be effectively exploited in order to serve the needs of persuasive communication, simply presupposing unity is not enough. Indeed, we have seen that the presupposition of unity is centered around the concept of identity. For these presuppositions not to be questioned, the interpretation of the conflicts needs to be unproblematic, to fit in with OUR identity. What we need to understand is therefore: how is OUR identity construed? When discussing the identity of a nation, I argue that politicians have no choice but to resort to the use of metaphors, which are indeed a staple characteristic of political discourse in general. Part of this thesis' aim is to highlight the special role played by metaphors for persuasion to be effective in the context of American War Rhetoric, and it is therefore this topic which I will now turn to in Chapters 4 and 5: the metaphors which construe THEIR and OUR identity.

Chapter 4: Metaphors about the actors of the conflicts

Lakoff (1991: 32) concluded his analysis of the Gulf War rhetoric with a thought provoking statement: "metaphors can kill." As we have seen in Chapter 2, the role of metaphors to constrain people's responses to various issues has now been acknowledged and has become the focus of important research. Part of this thesis' aim is to show how RT can complement CL's take on metaphor analyses, so as to get to a better understanding of how constraint happens online.
The previous chapter ended with a question: how is identity construed in the corpus? A detailed analysis of the metaphors used in the corpus can serve to answer the latter, along with the following: why are metaphors so efficient for the purposes of persuasion? Indeed, what might make metaphors more effective than assertions that "our fight" is just, that WE are right and that THEY are wrong? Chapter 4 focuses on the metaphors used to construct the main actors of the conflict, while Chapter 5 will deal with the metaphors used to construct the conflict itself, with the aim to show how both contribute to the elaboration of an irreparable divide between US and THEM.

One of the main strategies in maintaining a coherent approach over time in the construction of the actors of the conflicts is the use of conceptual metaphors (and metonymies). One of the many areas of influence that metaphors can have is the way "we relate to other people," (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 4) which is precisely what is of interest here. The construction of America's place in the world as leader of the mission to defend peace and freedom (and without whose leadership that cause could not succeed, thus justifying OUR involvement) relies upon the construction of its relationships with other nations, some of which are geographically as well as culturally remote. The construction of these relationships is essential for the hearer to accept the need for America's military intervention abroad, through two main aspects: the acceptance that it is indeed up to America to take decisive action; and the acceptance that military action is the only way to deal with the enemy. It is the conceptual nature of metaphors which allows them to have an impact on such important decisions. This chapter, along with Chapter 5, thus explores **the role of metaphors in the corpus in shaping the hearers' thinking about how WE relate to THEM**. They are guided by the following questions:

- What are the metaphors used to refer to the groups US and THEM?
- Are there any identifiable patterns in the use of these metaphors across the different eras covered by the data?

- How do the metaphors of the corpus contribute to the creation of concepts of US and THEM, i.e. of the American identity and of the enemy, or the 'Other'?

An organization by theme was chosen to answer those questions, highlighting the identified patterns to construe the two groups, "America" and "the enemy," over time. Two aspects of metaphor analysis are at stake: the analysis of metaphors as they occur online, but also within the context of the whole corpus and across different eras. Therefore, each metaphor will be studied not only in regards with its portrayal of the groups "America" and "the enemy" in the immediate context they arise in, but also with its contribution to the construction of the concepts of US and THEM, and finally with its impact on the hearers' thinking about the conflicts as well as America's overall position regarding foreign issues.

Cognitive linguists like Fauconnier and Lakoff have contributed to the understanding of how we construct meaning and knowledge, thanks to what they have called Idealized Cognitive Models (or ICMs). According to Sweetser and Lakoff (in Fauconnier, 1994: x), "conceptual structure is indicated by Idealized Cognitive Models," highlighting Fauconnier's contribution to the distinction between referential and conceptual structure. "The ICMs themselves are not entities in the mental spaces; rather, they provide relational structure linking the roles, which are entities in the spaces." (Sweetser and Lakoff in Fauconnier, 1994: x) This is precisely what the following two chapters are concerned with. I argue that American War Rhetoric contributes to the elaboration (and negotiation) of ICMs for US and THEM. It is these "relational structures" which are stable, and which allow the interpretation of new conflicts to appear as part of a broader, timeless fight between US and THEM, as a continuation of a well-established mission. Through the capacity of metaphors to highlight but also to hide, referred to as metaphor systematicity (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Kövecses, 2002), the interpretation of new conflicts can always be geared towards matters of identity, following well-known relational structures.

4.1. STATE AS PERSON

The first main actor is actually that of the nation itself, and the metaphors used to construe THE STATE are greatly influential in our understanding not only of "our" nation, but also on what makes THEM 'Other,' which is why it is important to start with a review of THE STATE AS PERSON metaphor. The STATE AS PERSON metaphor is not restricted to American War Rhetoric and in-

deed structures much of the discourse on international relations. In fact, Wendt (2004: 289) notes that "in a field in which almost everything is contested, this seems to be one thing on which almost all of us agree." Wendt goes on:

> Indeed, it is not just in social science that state persons are pervasive, but everyday life as well. Ordinary citizens, the media, and policymakers all systematically personify the state. It need not be so. The idea of corporate 'personality' is of medieval origin, its application to states was not routine in the West until the eighteenth century, and it is still not routine in some places today. But in the modern world this is how most of us, most of the time, think about the state in world politics.

The discourse around American foreign policy is no exception; indeed the metaphor has had significant implications for our reasoning about war, by laying the foundation for the construction of matters of national security. The metaphor has become so pervasive that it is unlikely to attract the hearer's attention. We have seen that CMT tends to be used to tackle conventional metaphors such as the STATE AS PERSON metaphor, and it has indeed been very useful in marking a contrast between OUR understanding of THE STATE and THEIRS. As Lakoff (1991) points out, the BROTHERHOOD metaphor is a lot more prominent in the Arab world, which has significant implications for THEIR understanding of national borders, for instance. However, I argue that CBT is better suited to the analysis of the following data, in order to account for the interaction between entrenched metaphors or mappings, and their recruitment online to suit the needs of discourse. We saw in Chapter 2 that the two frameworks should be seen as complementary rather than competing, and that one of CBT's advantage was to "unify the analysis of metaphor with the analysis of a variety of other linguistic and conceptual phenomena" (Grady, Oakley & Coulson, 1999: 101). In a similar vein, we will see with the following examples how the resort to CBT can unify the analysis of metaphor usage across varied levels of perceived metaphoricity, as we explore the implications of the ways in which the STATE AS PERSON metaphor is used for the construction of three main concepts or strategies: US vs. THEM, National Security, and the broader legitimization process.

• Implications for US vs. THEM

If our state is understood as a person, then other states can be neighbors, friends, or foes. Some can be victims that need rescued, thus making the involvement of other states such as the U.S. a necessity. Personal traits can also be applied to this person, such as strength or loyalty. Anyone who is weak, or not loyal to the friends of our state, thus becomes against US. It is in that way that this metaphor can be used as a way to create or strengthen the opposition between US and THEM. As America's presence abroad comes to embody its strength, fighting THEM can become a matter of identity. THEY then represent all the states that are against the values that WE stand for (a strategy

that was particularly useful in the War on Terror, which made legitimate the use of force in states that were not directly linked to the 9/11 attacks); or THEY can even extend (in specific contexts) to all those within America who do not agree with America's fight.

The ability of the metaphor to create these oppositions stems from what it hides. These clear-cut oppositions are best understood as an effect of blending, which hides the complexity behind the concept of STATE. When a group formed of many different people, belonging to different political parties, holding various beliefs, is construed as *one* single person, the interpretation of the issue becomes constrained so that all opposition within the group is hidden. What we have seen in Chapter 3 with the presupposition of unity is supported by the prevalence of the STATE AS PERSON metaphor, whose role is then also to help avoid the questioning of "our" presupposed unity of purpose. According to Lakoff (1991: 31), "the State-as-Person metaphor highlights the ways in which states act as units, and hides the internal structure of the state." What a framework like CBT might add to such an analysis is that this is an effect of blending, which is "a compression tool *par* excellence" (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 114). It is these compressions which lead us to form "intelligible meanings" (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 113) which might then affect one's reasoning, and that is what we are interested in here. This is the first way in which we can justify the resort to conceptual blending, even in cases where a metaphor has become conventional: the main idea behind conceptual blending is that it relates to the way we think, and that it is everywhere - it is not restricted to metaphor analysis. As such, it strives to highlight the constraints on our reasoning, which are directly linked to blending. Whether a metaphor is novel or conventional, what CBT analyses can show is where the constraints on reasoning come from in a particular context. The result of compressions in this particular blend is that inner differences are blurred, as inside homogeneity is promoted by the compression of Analogy (between states and people) into Identity in the blend. When it comes to the legitimization of war, military action can thus be construed as serving the nation's interests; in reality, as Lakoff points out, national interests do not necessarily reflect those of individuals. Even in the context of war, where one could argue that America's security (or as we will see later, its well-being) is a matter which affects all of its members equally, the construction of one single national interest is misleading:

> When President Bush argues that going to war would 'serve our vital national interests', he is using a metaphor that hides exactly whose interests would be served and whose would not. For example, poor people, especially blacks, are represented in the military in disproportionately large numbers, and in a war the lower classes and those ethnic groups will suffer proportionally more casualties and have their lives disrupted more. Thus war is less in the interest of ethnic minorities and the lower classes than the white upper classes. (Lakoff 1991: 31)

The STATE AS PERSON metaphor thus plays a crucial role in cementing clear-cut oppositions between US and those who oppose US, by placing at the forefront of the interpretation process values which appear to be shared by all of the members of the group. Indeed, while what is put in the forefront is the American government's concern with the safety of its people, what is hidden is the disproportionate impact of the reality of OUR resort to war. As THEY get construed as a group who is not at all concerned with the ways in which THEIR actions might hurt the people who THEY are supposed to lead, what the STATE AS PERSON hides contributes to cementing an opposition between US and THEM which is black and white, with no room for a middle grey area where WE might not be equally concerned with the well-being of all of our citizens.

The entailments of this metaphor are numerous. One of them is to construe the relationships between states as relationships between people. Let us consider a case whereby the United States chooses to take military action in order to help a nation in need, unable to defend itself against its oppressors. The victim would then be construed as a 'weak nation,' highlighting its helplessness. However, the chain of events that leads to the characterization of a state as weak is compressed into the resulting relation of Property, here of being 'weak.' The notion of compression helps to understand not only *what* is constrained, but where that constraint comes from and how it might impact reasoning. While a person might be said to be weak due to their character or nature, a state can be weakened as the result of a complicated history. Years, decades of conflicts with other states (perhaps initiated by that 'weak' state) might have shrunk frontiers or reduced their military force, for example. This does not appear in the blend, where action against a weak person is simply seen as unfair and cruel. While metaphors can help us make sense of a complex situation, they can also hide its complexity. What the STATE AS PERSON metaphor allows is to construe one's action in war as arising out of personal traits (or in the case of the enemy, defects). As a result, the assignment of blame can not only be made easier (THEY are wrong to attack a weak nation; WE are right in defending the defenseless), but it is also made relevant within the frame which the metaphor gives rise to. In a conflict between two people, and where significant damage has occurred, it might make sense to attribute responsibility for the conflict, so as to establish how the damage might be repaired; however, the nature of international relationships is extremely complicated, as it involves cultural, economical and historical differences, and attributing responsibility might, in certain cases, cause more damage than it might try to solve. Blending also allows the integration of further input spaces (rather than two domains) (Grady, Oakley & Coulson, 1999), such as that from which one's knowledge about conflict resolution might be derived, which might lead to the emergence and salience of responsibility in the blend. The construal of STATES AS PEOPLE thus allows for clear

oppositions to link the different actors of the conflict, thanks to the application of human traits such as weakness, strength or (im)morality.

• Implications for the construction of National Security

One main entailment of the STATE AS PERSON metaphor is the extension of the scope of what is referred to as 'national security,' beyond the physical protection of the border or of American citizens. By combining the STATE AS PERSON metaphor with others such as ECONOMY IS WELL-BEING, one can get to the conclusion that trading concerns fall under the label of national security and are thus a necessity, not only to the government or to business companies, but to all the people in the country.

Throughout the corpus, various elements (economy, minerals, oil, endangered friends, etc.) can threaten America's security or freedom, and they are often used as a justification for military intervention abroad. These elements never, or rarely, directly threaten the security of Americans at home; rather, national security is construed as being threatened by describing what is at stake as "vital," as illustrated by the following examples from the data:

(1) "The simple questions are: Will we support freedom in this hemisphere or not? Will we defend **our vital interests** in this hemisphere or not?" (Reagan, 09.05.1984, my emphasis)
(2) "If we come to our senses too late, when **our vital interests** are even more directly threatened, and after a lack of American support causes **our friends** to lose the ability to defend themselves, then the risks to our security and our way of life will be infinitely greater." (Reagan, 09.05.1984, my emphases)
(3) "I mention this because the polls say many Americans are confused about what we're supporting in Central America and about why that region, **so close to home and to our strategic trading arteries**, is important to us." (Reagan, 13.08.1983, my emphasis)
(4) "Let me be clear: The sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is **of vital interest** to the United States. This decision, which I shared with the congressional leadership, grows out of the **longstanding friendship and security relationship** between the United States and Saudi Arabia. U.S. forces will work together with those of Saudi Arabia and other nations to preserve the **integrity** of Saudi Arabia and to deter further Iraqi aggression." (G. Bush, 08.08.1990, my emphases)
(5) "This is an opportunity for Congress to give our men and women in uniform the tools they need to protect us, and Congress should approve these **vital funds** immediately." (G.W. Bush, 07.06.2008, my emphasis)
(6) "One wonders why the Carter Administration fails to see any threatening pattern in the Soviet presence, by way of Cuban proxies, in so much of Africa, which is the source of minerals absolutely essential to the industrialized democracies of Japan, Western Europe, and the U.S. We are **self-sufficient** in only 5 of the 27 minerals important to us industrially and strategically, and so the security of **our resource life line** is essential." (Reagan, 18.08.1980, my emphases)

Before going into a linguistic analysis of utterances (1) to (6), one might wonder why blending is necessary here, as "vital" has become synonymous with "extremely important" in everyday language. I argue that CBT, and particularly the notion of compression is needed here, in order to account for the way in which such utterances can guide the interpretation process, by building up the

relevance of the issues: the hearers are guided as the relevant criteria for the interpretation of these unfamiliar and complex issues are being set out for them. What is also at stake is the notion of perceived metaphoricity. According to Thibodeau & Boroditsky (2011), the impact of metaphors on reasoning is not conscious, which leads to the question: once a metaphor is no longer perceived as such, because it has become conventional, why would its impact on reasoning be diminished? What Thibodeau & Boroditsky (2011) also found was that this impact on reasoning is more, or perhaps only influential when the metaphors are found at the beginning of a text or argument. In their experiment,

late metaphorical framing had no effect on people's crime-related information foraging. These findings suggest that metaphors can gain power by coercing further incoming information to fit with the relational structure suggested by the metaphor. (Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011: 8)

This is perfectly compatible with our account of instantiations of entrenched metaphors as setting the scene, so to speak, and whose impact is not to be studied on their own, but rather on the further interaction with other metaphors in the rest of a speech. What is important to note here, is that references to America's "vital" interests are not isolated; indeed they are mixed in with more novel instantiations of the metaphor which regularly surface in our data, such as that in (3), and I argue that this interaction is better portrayed by CBT analyses. Let us now take a closer look at (1) to (6), where the use of "vital" is to be understood within a political context which is heavily influenced by the STATE AS PERSON metaphor. In this context, America's "vital interests" can thus be in jeopardy when conflicts erupt abroad (1,2,3,4); they can be affected by a lack of funds (5); or by the control of oil resources (6). This highlights yet another benefit of CBT analyses, which provide greater flexibility, so that the same mapping might be used in different contexts to serve slightly different purposes. The combination of ECONOMY IS WELL-BEING and STATE AS PERSON occasionally accounts for the expansion of the scope of national security, so that defending economic interests can be described as "vital," and becomes a matter of survival. This is most obvious in (3), where trading is construed as fulfilling an essential function of the body, similar to that of arteries. (4) serves here as our 'key example' to highlight the benefits of our chosen combination (CBT and RT) for metaphor analysis. I have repeated (4) here for convenience:

(4) "Let me be clear: The sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is **of vital interest** to the United States. This decision, which I shared with the congressional leadership, grows out of the **longstanding friendship and security relationship** between the United States and Saudi Arabia. U.S. forces will work together with those of Saudi Arabia and other nations to preserve the **integrity** of Saudi Arabia and to deter further Iraqi aggression." (G. Bush, 08.08.1990, my emphases)

(4) thus starts with the construal of the current foreign policy concerns ("the sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia") as a "vital interest" of America. Why might the interpretation of "vital interest" be subject to blending? Firstly, because it allows for the integration of several input spaces, and unlike CMT, CBT stipulates that the direction of mappings does not need to be unidirectional (Grady, Oakley & Coulson, 1999). Grady, Oakley & Coulson (1999) also note that for a conceptual blend to be metaphorical, there needs to be a "fusion" of two counterparts from separate input spaces. Here, the entrenched STATE AS PERSON metaphor serves as an input to the further blend within which America's "vital interests" are set out. In this blend, "America," whose interests can then be labeled as "vital," appears as a fusion between the political state, and the person discussed in discourse. But that is not enough to account for the impact on reasoning which "vital interests" might lead to. In this context, the notion of political interests is selected from the input space of nations, while "vital" gets selected from the human space. In that space, "vital" refers to the elements of the human body without which one cannot function; should one's vital organs stop working, one then dies immediately. What this highlights is the direct impact of an organ on survival. The structure which appears within the blend in (4), however, is not solely derived from that human space. Indeed, the notion of interests tends to highlight a more indirect type of causality, whereby consequences are rather understood as a chain of repercussions. Unless a state gets annexed by another country, or destroyed, it does not suffer immediate death. It is this incompatibility which calls for blending here. In this unique blend, which derives structure from both input spaces, emerges the realization that what might appear as distant and unimportant to the American public can actually be essential for the country's survival. The chain of consequences is thus compressed to human scale, so that the end result, which happens at the end of the chain, can visibly and directly affect OUR survival in the blend. It is through blending that one can arrive at the conclusion that what is vital for a state's survival does not merely involve emergencies, direct or immediate threats on vital organs. It is this impact on reasoning which is made available through the resort to CBT, even in cases where a metaphor has become so entrenched that it is no longer perceived as such. In this case, it serves to quickly sort out foreign policy issues, setting the scene so that further instantiations of the STATE AS PERSON metaphor (which here focus on the notion of friendship) can immediately appear relevant. Besides, in the case of American War Rhetoric, the definition of America's "vital interests" is not isolated, but arises within a context where THE STATE AS PERSON metaphor is pervasive, in the shape of conventional or novel uses. In fact, I argue that in a context where the construction of AMERICA as a person is so salient for the interpretation of the issues at stake, even the weakest instantiations of the metaphor can effectively influence the interpretation process, as

they contribute to the maximization of relevance: the benefits are those which we have just outlined (compression to human scale which allows further reasoning), and the costs are reduced given the entrenchment of the metaphor and its prevalence when dealing with international relationships. As we saw previously, starting an argument by defining a nation's vital interests allows the hearer to quickly and effectively select the relevant criteria (or personal trait) upon which the current conflict is to be interpreted.

Context is key here. Indeed it is only in this unique context that the outlining of "vital interests" can have these effects, and it does not imply that in any context, labeling something as 'vital' will activate the conceptualization of THE STATE or other concept as A PERSON. In (4), the context makes salient the notion of friendship. This makes available the assumption that supporting one's friends is right, while letting them down, or worse, betraying them, is not. This will guide the formation of a conceptual blend, by acting as a form of constraint when selecting which elements from the various input spaces should go into the blend. The question here is: how does America's friendship with Saudi Arabia affect its national security? When it comes to preserving "the integrity of Saudi Arabia," different elements might be selected to get to different interpretations. In the input space for STATES, one might select the effects which wars have on the physical state of nations; in the input space for PEOPLE, one might select the effects which abuse might have on a person's mental well-being. Given the constraint on reasoning provided by the use of vital as outlined in the above analysis, I argue that the latter might be more relevant to make sense of OUR involvement, even if the preservation of Saudi Arabia's physical security is clearly at stake. Given that the context makes salient the notion of friendship, the standard for relationships between countries is that of mutual respect. In (4), the enemy has violated that standard, and has attacked "our friend." THEY have thus acted in a way which appears unacceptable. Since "our friend" has been wronged, coming to her defense can appear righteous, even if it means entering a military conflict. In the blend, where states are construed as people, one can get to a basic understanding of international conflicts: some states are bad (those who violate the integrity of others), and some are good (those willing to fight to preserve each other's integrity). The criterion applied to distinguish between good and bad states is that of how one treats others, especially friends. In that sense, the issue is not just about what THEY have done, but also about OUR response: how will WE respond to the way OUR friend was treated? This is how morality can become the relevant criterion when interpreting the conflict. As a result, Bush's assertion with "let me be clear" can be interpreted as evidence of his moral standards, as assertion of his own integrity, as it becomes clear that not acting on his promise to support his

friends is out of the question. The interpretation process does not stop there, as supporting Saudi Arabia is not just construed as the right thing to do, it is also of "vital interest." The interpretation of the latter can be seen to influence the formation of further blends. Indeed, while the fact that someone else's vital organ has stopped working will most likely not have any consequences for ourselves, the preservation of a friend's integrity as a state is here seen to have direct consequences on OUR essence and survival. This is an effect of blending, as explained above. This is indeed where the effects of conceptual blending are most noteworthy, as it gives rise to an entirely new structure, unique to deal with the issues at stake. There is one last aspect which influences the reasoning in (4), also brought from the 'states/international relationships' space. Friendship, in the context of international conflicts, can turn out to have much more significant consequences than in the input space for personal relationships. Indeed, while betraying a friend might lead to the loss of that friend, perhaps to the loss of one's credibility among others, in the blend, it can lead to endangering the security of the whole nation, physically and in terms of identity. The relevant standard is that of morality. In the blend, what might appear as prominent is thus the impact of the conflicts for OUR own integrity, which gets reinforced by Bush's later statement: "America does not seek conflict, nor do we seek to chart the destiny of others. But America will stand by her friends."

The STATE AS PERSON metaphor highlights the significance of the mechanism of compression, which is of great benefit to the hearer, as it places the elements of a blend within a scale that is more easily handled, more suitable for the purpose of reasoning. Trading issues, the import or export of minerals to remote countries, are all compressed to the workings of a single body and its organs. The world and the complexities of the relationships between its countries are here compressed to a group of people, some of whom are good, and some bad. While it can be difficult to reason about the issues of the Middle East due to cultural differences, reasoning about a conflict between people is well within the grasp of the American public. Compression helps to bring matters of foreign policy closer to US, and thus also to expand the understanding as well as the scope of national security. While issues in Central America might not seem directly relevant to the American people, the STATE AS PERSON metaphor makes it clear that anything which is "so close to our strategic trading arteries," (3) matters to US and to OUR survival. By naming what is "vital," it is not just the urgency of the matter which is made explicit; rather, the relevant criteria for the interpretation of the conflicts are being set out.

• Implications for the entire legitimization process

(7) Or maybe it was that unforgettable moment when after 444 days of captivity, our hostages came home from Iran to **breathe American freedom again.** (Reagan, 05.11.1984, my emphasis)
—> FREEDOM IS OXYGEN

While the construction of national security often revolves around what endangers the health of the nation, in (7), Reagan reminds the American people of what it is that makes America so special. The interpretation of (7) summarizes the implications which we have outlined both for the construction of a clear opposition between US and THEM, and for that of national security. Here, the physical survival of America is linked to its body's most essential function: breathing. As freedom gets construed as oxygen, it follows that it is not merely something which Americans enjoy; rather, it is a necessity. This entailment of the STATE AS PERSON metaphor is crucial to the entire discourse around America's foreign policy: whether America is directly, physically threatened or not, what is at stake is indeed its survival: the survival of its identity. Fighting for freedom, here and everywhere, is more than a noble act; it is essential to the survival of OUR nation and justifies OUR action in countries where America's security is not directly threatened.

In (7), conceptual blending allows the hearer to visualize the unseen: just like the air that we breathe, the freedom which we enjoy can easily be taken for granted. The context makes available the conceptualization of life in captivity - of one's freedom being taken away. As a result, one element from the input space for oxygen which makes its way into the blend might be the fact that although oxygen is vital, our capacity to breathe is not something which we often think about (and in that sense the same metaphor is used for slightly different purposes, compared to what we saw in (4), which is something that CBT is slightly better equipped to deal with). Similarly, once freedom is obtained, one can wonder why it is necessary to keep fighting for it (beyond the selflessness associated with fighting for the freedom of others). The conceptualization of freedom as America's oxygen is what allows for feelings of gratitude to emerge in the blend. The visualization of freedom as oxygen also allows for further inferences, such as the fact that this oxygen is not to be found in our enemies' land (here, Iran). The oppression of the enemy can thus emerge as even more cruel in the blend, as the suppression of something which is vital to survive is obviously not acceptable: it is murder. The metaphor in (7) places freedom, and morality, at the heart of the divide between US and THEM, a divide which is made physically visible. Once again, the interpretation of the discourse is not just oriented towards THEIR evil, but also towards OUR commitment to fight the latter.

The compressions which occur as a result of blending have the following effects:

- The scale of the conflict gets reduced, so that the hearer can visualize what the conflict is about. Compression is thus very useful for the elaboration of a story, in which America is a main actor, so as to answer the question: what are WE fighting for? The discourse is not so much about providing detailed information about the conflicts in question, but about making the latter relevant to US. When space is compressed so that the scene of international relations is reduced to that of a group of people, OUR role can appear significant, even if the issues at stake are actually taking place on the other side of the world. The compression of space allows for the redefinition of proximity, and it can be adapted to suit the needs of the discourse, something which CBT shows particularly well;
- The mechanisms of compression also hide the great complexity which lies behind international conflicts. This allows for the consolidation of an US vs. THEM dichotomy, one which governs the entire interpretation process. The compression of relations of identity allows to get to a better understanding of why WE do what WE do, and why THEY act in the way THEY do, which maximizes the relevance of the President's addresses; THEIR action can be construed as arising out of a personal defect, while OURS is to be understood as a reinforcement of OUR moral commitment;

The pervasiveness of the STATE AS PERSON metaphor thus sets the scene for the interpretation of the conflicts, and it also influences the interpretation of more novel metaphors about US and THEM, highlighting an interaction between entrenched and more novel blends.

4.2. The Other, the enemy, THEM

While the use of the STATE AS PERSON metaphor can construct OUR action as necessary out of respect for humanity, the conceptualization of the 'Other' comes in direct opposition with that of a group that is united in its commitment to high standards of morality. Above all, it seems that this 'Other' is mainly construed as non-human. This conceptualization of the 'Other' as non-human is not specific to one enemy or time. The following metaphors thus allow for an abstraction of the enemy, a representation of the concept of evil, which needs to be fought at all times. Indeed, the legitimization of a just war involves an enemy who cannot be reasoned with. In that sense, construing the enemy as non-human can act as a condition for the relevance of the resort to war.

4.2.1. Animals

In this section, I argue that metaphors which construe the enemy as animals can be used in two different ways, leading to the conceptualization of an 'irreconcilable THEM,' or, on the other hand, of a 'reconcilable THEM,' the former warranting military action.

4.2.1.1. Irreconcilable THEM

The 'Other' is often construed as an animal, a "brute," especially in the treatment of their victims, in other words, in the way that they relate to people. In a context where states are construed as people, acting as a "brute" (see utterance 9 with further analysis) towards others is not merely to be understood as a cruel act: it becomes a violation of the contract which represents the code of conduct between nations, so as to prevent international conflicts.

(8) Above all, we must realize that no arsenal, or no weapon in the arsenals of the world, is so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women. It is a weapon our adversaries in today's world do not have. It is a weapon that we as Americans do have. Let that be understood by those who practice terrorism and **prey upon their neighbors**. (Reagan, 20 January 1981, my emphasis)
—>THE ENEMY IS A PREDATOR

It is to be noted here that the enemy's "prey" is not a vulnerable animal, but a "neighbor." By combining the STATE AS PERSON and ENEMY/TERRORIST AS ANIMAL metaphors, this blend shows a unique conflict between a vicious animal and a group of humans. The predators' input space might include their superior strength compared to their preys', or their tendency to act out of instincts and lack of mercy, thus triggering fear. In the blend, however, it is not weaker animals that are the target of these predators, but free men and women, often selected at random. The fear is still there, but the aspect of (physical) dominance that might be associated with predators is not selected, because it clashes with the "will and moral courage of free men and women," which is construed as the greatest weapon in the world. Indeed, in the context set out by the previous section (4.1.), the selection of physical dominance would not be relevant.



Fig. 4: Conceptual blending for: THE ENEMY AS PREDATOR

Relevance Theory and selected projection into the blend

Relevance Theory can explain why certain elements that are often associated with predators might not make their way into the input spaces or into the final blend. A quick analysis of the cost and benefits associated with the interpretation of this metaphor will demonstrate this point. Terrorism tends to be understood relatively simply as the use of terror. It is thus understood, as Reagan points out in (8), as a "practice," one which does not fit at all with Western democratic systems, and with the feeling of safety which these democracies have enjoyed since the end of World War II. This safety, however, is not a fixture of the world, and is not enjoyed by all. The reasons behind terrorism are incredibly complex, as they relate to a fundamentally different understanding of the world, of what freedom is, of the value of life itself, etc. When it comes to issues such as that of terrorism, metaphors such as (8) are thus particularly relevant. What is assessed here goes beyond the realm of comprehension, also relating to "relevance to believe" (de Saussure, 2011: 37):

- The **cognitive costs** are thus very much reduced on two fronts: firstly, the conceptualization of the 'Other' as animal is prevalent in our wider culture (see for instance Otto Santa (1999) on anti-immigration discourse in the US; Hitler's construction of Jews as parasites), and in that sense does not cause problems. Beyond matters of local comprehension, the hearer does not need to contemplate THEIR reasons, THEIR understanding of the world; instead, the construction of the above blend allows to reason about the issue at stake by highlighting one as-

pect: animal behavior and its inadequacy in the human world. What the metaphor hides can thus appear as irrelevant for the cognitive task which involves reasoning about specific foreign policy issues;

- While the assertion of physical dominance might be selected as a positive trait in a context where the selection of the fittest is made salient, it is not the case here, where all states are construed as people, belonging to one species whose main distinction (from the animal kingdom) is the ability to reason, and to work together for the greater good. The assertion of physical dominance would not be relevant in such a context, as it would clash with the desire to maintain peaceful relationships between people, where the standard for personal relationships is established as one of respect. The presence of the STATE AS PERSON metaphor within the wider context thus makes the retrieval of the unsuitability of animal behavior the most relevant one, mainly by making salient the notion of respect;
- Finally, in this particular context, construing the enemy as an animal presents one main **benefit**: although the fear associated with strong animals or predators is still present in the blend, it is also overcome by a sense of security thanks to the knowledge that man is stronger than *any* animal, and so cannot lose. Besides allowing the American people to make sense of complex foreign policy issues, the public is also provided with the reassurance that free men and women *will* prevail, as long as they are not afraid to stand up for what makes them special. The context in which the ENEMY AS PREDATOR/ANIMAL metaphor appears is one where will and moral courage are construed not just as a weapon, but as the greatest weapon. In this context, it would be costly to construe the predators as dominant in the blend, because they, as Reagan points out, do not possess America's will or moral courage, which in the blend ranks higher than physical strength. The predators' dominance thus does not make its way into the blend, allowing the fear which would be associated with merciless predators to be lessened.

In this case, a cost/benefit analysis of the interpretation process highlights that the aspect of dominance that is often associated with the concept of PREDATORS would not be relevant here, as it would clash with the context in which it appears, while also creating a sense of fear that could not be resolved. The balance between a reduced cognitive effort, and the retrieval of further contextual assumptions leading to the resolution of the problem outlined makes metaphors such as the one in (8) optimally relevant. The conceptualization of terrorists as animals can both provide an explanation regarding their unfathomable behavior, and lead to inferences which might serve to reassure the public that terrorists *cannot* win.

Effect of constraint in the blend

A comparison between physical and moral strength occurs in the blend, as one might construe (at the elaboration stage, that is the running of the blend) a battle between an animal or predator, and a (free) human being. The free world will of course win this battle, thanks to a weapon that *only they* possess. While morality, courage and will might be available, at least to some extent, to all the humans that appear in input space 2, they are only associated to *free* men and women in the blend. Equally, the cruelty of predators is directly related to their animal condition. In the blend, such cruelty can only be associated to these different types of predators, to the terrorists. What this means is that no cruel acts can be conducted by Americans or by the rest of the free world. THEIR evil is directly linked to THEIR condition, to THEIR nature. The blend thus provides the hearer with an understanding of the situation which is grounded in the actors' identity, in their essence. This is what leads to dehumanizing effects, which facilitate the public's acceptance of the need to go to war against THEM - if THEY are not human, extreme measures involving killing can be made acceptable in the blend, paving the way for their acceptance on the frontline and then at home. Indeed, there is no reconciliation possible between the two groups, because they belong to two fundamentally distinct categories; besides will or moral courage, predators certainly cannot act out of ideological motives either, or be reasoned with. The metaphor thus helps to create a complete disassociation between the two groups - an irreconcilable one.

The metaphor does not only highlight the courage of America or the cruelty of terrorists; it also hides any scenarios whereby Americans could resort to cruelty, or ones whereby the enemy could act courageously trying to follow their own ideologies. THEY are the animals, THEY are the reason why there is a conflict in the first place. Such an opposition is a pre-condition for a war to be just, and therefore for the relevance of any argument putting forward a need for military action. The next example (9) makes that opposition more explicit.

(9) We have been more than patient. We've tried sanctions. We've tried **the carrot of oil** for food and **the stick of coalition military strikes**. But Saddam Hussein has defied all these efforts and continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. (G.W. Bush, 12.09.2002, my emphases)

The construction of the enemy as an animal in (9) offers an interesting example of how this type of metaphor about THEM can consolidate an opposition between US and THEM, so that it becomes fundamentally irreconcilable. We saw previously that the STATE AS PERSON metaphor could make oil issues matters of national security. When oil is part of OUR motives for war, it is linked to

OUR survival, and that of OUR friends/allies too; in fact, when it becomes necessary for US to fight for oil, it is precisely because THEY are unreasonable. Indeed, Saddam Hussein is here construed as an animal, whom one can only get to act by tempting him with what he wants; what he wants is not world peace, in fact he is incapable of such aspirations. Through conceptual blending, the animal which appears in the blend is nothing like those which are part of the input space for ANIMALS. What is highlighted is Saddam Hussein's animal instincts and motives (the constraint on the selection process occurs in a similar manner as previously explained with the analysis of (8)). The combination of animalistic behavior and power in the human world leads to terrible consequences: the development of weapons of mass destruction, mixed in with unpredictability. It is this unpredictability which is the issue; *he* is the issue. As a result, a clash appears within the blend, as characters like Saddam Hussein cannot coexist with the rest of the human species, explaining why sanctions have been unfruitful. By contrast, America is depicted as "patient," a trait which is not associated with animals and which testifies to OUR use of reason. The metaphor thus provides several contextual assumptions: by giving rise to what might feel as an immediate, obvious reason why diplomacy (i.e., the efforts of civilized men) has not worked (for how can one reason with animals?), continued attempts to negotiate with the enemy also appear laughable here. The use of a different metaphor, construing the enemy as a child, for example, would not lead to the construction of an 'irreconcilable THEM' in this context, as a child's lack of patience could improve, and attempts to reason with a child could be considered. The impossibility to reason with the enemy, due to THEIR essentially different nature, is what is highlighted through the use of metaphor in (8) and (9). Whatever the circumstances, what comes out of the interpretation process is that what is true for US is not for THEM, and therefore a different type of reasoning is necessary - hence the acceptability of war.

Primitivism as the relevant trait

(10) "The greatest fallacy of the Lenin-Marxist philosophy is that it is the "wave of the future." Everything about it is **primitive**: compulsion in place of free initiative; coercion in place of law; militarism in place of trade; and empire-building in place of self-determination; and luxury for a chosen few at the expense of the many." (Reagan, 18.08.1980, my emphasis)

In some cases such as the War on Terror post 9/11, conceptualizing the enemy as deprived of any morality was an absolute necessity. What this subsection aims to show is indeed that the use of metaphors about the Other contributes to a different type of reasoning that is to be applied to the

two groups (US, and THEM). Nothing in the discourse surrounding the tragedy could have allowed for even a hint of justification of the terrorists' actions. Furthermore, construing these actions as resulting from the pursuit of ideals could have questioned the role of the U.S. in world conflicts. Depriving the enemy of humanity was thus a condition for the relevance of the suggested course of action, which was war. The conflict described in the above example was of a different nature, in that it was often portrayed as a fight between two ideologies or philosophies: Democracy/Freedom/Liberalism on one side and Marxism-Leninism/Communism on the other. However, animal metaphors can still be used to the same effect, that is the establishment of two separate entities that cannot overlap in any way. The aspect that is most often highlighted in the ANIMAL input space is that of primitivism, of a type that is not suited to OUR society, to a world system dominated by the STATE AS PERSON metaphor. It is in that context, which makes salient the conceptualization of THE ENEMY AS AN ANIMAL, that even weaker instantiations such as the labeling of THEIR doctrine as "primitive" can be enough to bring up the entire conceptual network, which also maximizes relevance: indeed it is within the whole conceptual network that the interpretation of "primitive" as an animal trait can derive the most contextual assumptions, as everything that THEIR ideology achieves (which Reagan goes on to list) can then be related to animal instincts and can thus explain why it does not work, and why it certainly should not be exported anywhere. The animal that appears in the above blend differs from the cruel animals used to describe the enemy in the previous examples. It is one that has not evolved yet. By construing two 'philosophies' as being at different stages of the evolution process, time is compressed in the blend. Reagan acknowledges the existence of an ideology, but one only in form rather than matter; one that is construed as an animal that has not evolved and is probably not fit for survival in a world that yearns for freedom. America's ideology emerges as the one at the end of the evolution process, the perfect model for our current world. The effect of compression produces a similar result as the one described by the previous animal metaphors, that is the creation of two separate categories that do not interact, thus cementing the opposition between US and the Other (and in keeping with the effects of presupposition usage noted in Chapter 3). Free initiative, law, trade, self-determination and care for an entire population only exist at OUR stage of evolution, and so do not arise in the mental space representing THEM. Similarly, compulsion, coercion, militarism for the purposes of empire-building, and caring mainly for the rich are far back on the evolution ladder and are to be understood as properties of the enemy only, stemming from THEIR inferior nature.

4.2.1.2. Reconcilable THEM

(11) "I know many well-intentioned people would rather not accept these facts. But we who have the responsibility for governing cannot afford to be **ostriches with our heads in the sand**." (Reagan, 30 March 1985, my emphasis)

Most of the time, the 'Other' refers to an individual or group in ideological and/or military conflict with the United States. In this case, the 'Other' refers to a group that belongs to the United States, but a very specific part of it: those within the country who do not agree with the administration's plans for military intervention. Here, the use of the animal metaphor sets aside one category of people using morality and a willingness to act as defining traits of the group US. "We" refers here to one specific category of American.

While the choice of animal used to construe the group THEM is slightly different, the results are similar: vilifying (rather than dehumanizing) a group and nullifying their reasoning capacity, thus making a compromise between the two groups (as they currently stand) impossible. WE are right and THEY are wrong. THEY are here construed as ostriches, which takes away the cruelty aspect associated with the image of the brute. However, while the ostriches in the input space cannot help their behavior and what they cannot see, the blend portrays creatures which intentionally choose not to see what they know is out there. The elaboration stage of conceptual blending, where the hearer runs the blend, allows for inferences that these people are perhaps cowards, or perhaps ignorant, as they *choose* not to see or act upon what is right in front of them. Therefore, like in the previous examples, it is THEIR essence, specifically THEIR morality which is highlighted as the dividing aspect. The ostriches in the blend are not completely deprived of morality, but their choice not to make good use of it and act on it is to blame. They do have the capacity to be reasoned with, but there is only one way to reach reconciliation: choosing morality, getting their heads out of the sand and facing the facts, in which case they would then join the group US.

Construing the enemy as a merciless animal places US and THEM in different categories. Rather than just representing US as superior to THEM, there is no overcoming the differences between the two groups. As a result, the same reasoning cannot be applied to both. It is only in the case of THE OTHER IS AN OSTRICH that the blend allows for the possibility of reconciliation. Indeed, getting their heads out of the sand would be enough to make "them" united with US again. Nevertheless, the present situation is still construed as one where the "ostriches" are in a different place from "the rest of us," and there is no question of "us" meeting "them" in the middle: "they" need to come to

"us," to get back to reality. In the other examples, the intrinsic cruelty of the animals makes THEM fundamentally different, with no possibility of ever being part of OUR group. It is this disanalogy which often prompts blending, and the incompatibility of THEIR ways in OUR world gets resolved in the blend as one comes to the conclusion that THEY need to be fought. That being said, the enemy cannot be construed as any animal for military action to become acceptable - it is the selection of animal behavior, which in the blend gets construed as cruelty, which makes THEM unfit for OUR human world. The perception of THEIR unsuitable nature is not restricted to the choice of animals as the source domain, and we will see that construing the enemy as non-human is indeed a recurring characteristic of the conceptualization of the enemy.

4.2.2. Diseases

One of the aims of this chapter is to show that various source domains are used in order to obtain the same constraining effects. Consequently, in order to avoid repetition, the following analyses will be slightly less detailed.

(12) "Our interest is to ensure that it [the Government of Nicaragua] does not **infect** its neighbors through the export of subversion and violence." (Reagan, 28.04.1983, my emphasis)
(13) "I have only 3 years left to serve my country; 3 years to carry out the responsibilities you entrusted to me; 3 years to work for peace. Could there be any greater tragedy than for us to sit back and permit **this cancer to spread**, leaving my successor to face far more agonizing decisions in the years ahead?" (Reagan, 16.03.1986, my emphasis)
(14) Will we give the Nicaraguan democratic resistance the means to recapture their betrayed revolution, or will we turn our backs and ignore the **malignancy** in Managua **until it spreads and becomes a mortal threat** to the entire New World? (Reagan, 16.03.1986, my emphases)
—> THE ENEMY IS A DISEASE

Diseases are a common source domain in the conceptualization of the enemy, not only as non-human, but also as a threat to the whole of humanity. The conceptualization of JEWS as PARASITES immediately comes to mind, enabling Hitler to justify their inhuman treatment and the need to separate US from THEM in one of humanity's greatest tragedies. The threatening aspect of such metaphors will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 9, through the construction of fear. The focus here is rather on the way in which WE are seen to relate (or not to relate) to THEM.
In order to establish what elements might be used to create the input spaces, and then the blend, we need to think about the characteristics and associations of diseases. Firstly, it is noteworthy that the enemy is not seen as any type of disease, it is an infection (12), or a tumor, a malignant tumor (13, 14). What is made manifest is thus the ability for the hearer to visualize the potential for something

bad which happens over there to come here, but also the anomaly which THEY represent, a feature which the body needs to get rid of (unlike 'good bacteria,' for instance). Let us expand by looking precisely at what is happening in (12): there can be cases when contracting a disease might be thought of as somewhat beneficial (which is different from saying that the disease itself is beneficial). Parents of a young child contracting chicken pox might see it as a chance to get immunization against a disease which could have serious complications at a later stage in life. Some parents might even seek exposure of the disease for their young child. It is rather obvious, however, that this is not how Reagan conceptualizes the Government of Nicaragua in (12). As the context makes available the dangers associated with the disease, i.e. "subversion and violence," the selection of a virus' property to reinforce the immune system cannot be selected, as it would not be relevant. Instead, Reagan is warning his people and the world against the dangers of an infectious disease, one to stay away from, given the difficulty to eradicate infectious diseases once they find a way in (see Chapter 9). The role of the President is thus reinforced as the defender of the nation, as THEY are not viewed as any type of danger, but as one which has the capacity to destroy humanity. The conceptualization of the enemy as a disease might go even further than the ANIMAL metaphors in terms of its dehumanizing effect, as THEY appear as an anomaly of the human world. It might then be easier to use when the enemy is not a country or a leader, but rather is closely attached to an ideology, as is the case with the Cold War. The two groups US and THEM are here construed as completely opposite in nature, and are encouraged to stay away from each other to avoid contamination (12). Symptoms of violence are to be associated solely to THEM, as exhibition of the disease that THEY represent. While sick people can be saved, there is no saving a disease; in this sense, no negotiation with the enemy can be conceived.

4.2.3. Conceptual Metonymies

4.2.3.1. Why metonymies?

Metonymies are often viewed as "a kind of domain highlighting, while metaphor is characterized as a form of domain mapping" (Tendahl & Gibbs 2008: 1854). However, CBT allows to treat metonymies as part of conceptual networks, rather than as a separate strategy, which is why I have included them here. I argue that CBT's treatment of metonymies as a relation (Part-Whole) which can not only link counterparts between spaces, but also as an emergent relation within blends, better accounts for their potential constraint on reasoning. Panther and Thornburg (2003, quoted in Tendahl & Gibbs, 2008: 1855) argue that metonymies offer "natural inference schemas," which can

thus result in constraining the interpretation of issues. According to Belaj (2005: 129-130), "the basic idea of this constraint is that some indirect metonymic relations from the input spaces become direct metonymic relations in the blend, that is, that metonymic links become tighter, and thus clearer." I argue that this makes metonymies a great object of study to highlight the complementarity of CBT and RT. One way to use RT here is to treat metonymies as sorting instruments (Wilson, 2014). In the context of American War Rhetoric, what they highlight is not merely a part of conceptual domains, but rather the part which is *relevant* for the interpretation of the issues at stake. In that sense, the use of metonymies can be seen to assist reasoning, contributing to a form of pre-assessment of the conflicts. Finally, the tightening of metonymic relations through blending might then explain how this pre-assessment can have an illusion of reality.

4.2.3.2. Metonymies in American War Rhetoric

The data shows that the way in which the enemy's actions are related systematically profiles the violent means which THEY use, which stand for the whole event. This can be summed up by the resort to a MEANS FOR EVENT metonymy, which works in the same way as the more general PART-WHOLE relation (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 97). What is significant is the consistency with which this metonymy is used, the stark contrast with the way America's actions are related (which will become apparent in Chapters 5 and 6), and its interactions with the wider context. Let us take a closer look at a few utterances from the data, selected to be representative of the way in which THEIR actions are construed:

(15)"They [guerillas in El Salvador] want to **shoot** their way to power." (Reagan, 9 May 1984, my emphasis)
(16) "Facing negligible resistance from its much smaller neighbor, Iraq's tanks **stormed** in blitzkrieg fashion through Kuwait in a few short hours." (G.Bush, 08.08.1990, my emphasis)
(17) "The dictators refused to leave and instead increased the brutality they are using to **cling** to power." (Clinton, 15.09.1994, my emphasis)
(18) "We're working hard to provide economic and political support for development so that ballots will replace **bullets** in that troubled region" (Reagan, 13 August 1983, my emphasis).

(19) "The community of nations has resolutely gathered to condemn and repel lawless aggression. Saddam Hussein's unprovoked invasion -- his ruthless, systematic **rape of a peaceful neighbor** -- **violated** everything the community of nations holds dear. (G.Bush, 29.01.1991, my emphases)
(20) "On Saddam Hussein's orders, opponents have been decapitated, wives and mothers of political opponents have been systematically raped as a method of intimidation, and political prisoners have been forced to watch their own children being tortured." (G.W.Bush, 07.10.2002)
(21) "By **tying us down** in this hemisphere, by **penetrating** our vital sea lanes and **crippling** our ability to meet our commitments worldwide, the Soviets will find it much easier to intimidate other nations and to expand their empire." (Reagan, 30.03.1985, my emphases)
(22) "[…] a fringe movement that **perverts** the peaceful teachings of Islam." (G.W.Bush, 20.09.2001, my emphasis)

(23) “In Afghanistan, we see Al Qaida's vision for the world. Afghanistan's people have been **brutalized**. Many are starving, and many have fled. Women are not allowed to attend school. You can be jailed for owning a television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate. A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough.” (G.W.Bush, 21.09.2001, my emphasis)

Usage of MEANS FOR EVENT throughout the corpus

Starting with (15) to (17), the whole event is here described through the means which the enemy uses to achieve their goals, which has the effect of profiling THEIR violence. One of the most notable metonymies used in American War Rhetoric, that of the “ballot and the bullet” (18), was adapted from a human rights speech by Malcolm X. Two metonymic relations are at work here, within a conceptual blend: BALLOTS FOR DEMOCRACY, and BULLETS FOR THE ENEMY. By profiling the MEANS, what appears within the blend is the superiority of OUR ways when compared to THEIRS. Indeed it is quite clear that THEY are the problem here, as bullets cannot serve the cause of peace. More importantly, through the tightening of metonymic relations, the violence of THEIR means is restricted to THEM, hiding the reality that America also fights with bullets, and that it might indeed be accused of inflicting terror too, in certain circumstances. This is how metonymies might be understood as sorting instruments, which in this case translates as the allocation of blame to THEM, and solely to THEM. What I want to show with the rest of these examples is that the MEANS FOR EVENT metonymy is not an isolated strategy. Rather, it arises within a context which, as we have seen, tends to dehumanize the enemy. In that sense, the prevalence of the MEANS FOR EVENT metonymy to describe THEIR actions can influence the interpretation of conceptual blends, as in (18), where one might conclude in the blend not merely that the enemy is violent, but rather that that is all THEY are, and that WE cannot be, at least not on the same level.

MEANS FOR EVENT in the context of the Gulf War

Let us now extend the discussion by looking at utterances (19) to (21), which are part of a wider strategy whereby the entire conflict was construed as “the rape of Kuwait” (exemplified in (19)). The RAPIST metaphor achieves the construction of an irreconcilable divide between US and THEM very powerfully, as THEY appear as a group whose disregard of human rights places THEM outside of a world guided by the rules of humanity, where states are construed as people. (20) then goes on to show that literal rape was also one of Saddam Hussein’s preferred methods of intimida-

tion, giving some frightening reality to the metaphor, and perhaps acting as evidence for the metaphor's own suitability. The "rape of Kuwait" seemed to resonate quite broadly with the public, and became prevalent among the media, as well as among the rest of the community of nations (Jeffords, 1991: 203). The rapist metaphor is built on the STATE AS PERSON metaphor, where sea lanes become vital organs, for example. The organizing frame *Raping* is used to construe the relationship between the enemy and the rest of the world, one point or benefit being to offer the hearer global insight into the intricate matters of foreign policy, and the enforcement of justice on the world scale. To that end, the sexual component, which appears in the Rapist input space, is not always relevant, and so does not necessarily get selected in the composition of the blend. Instead, the focus is on the cruelty of such behavior, and on the unfairness of the situation, since the act of raping implies an unwilling victim. Conceptual blending pays particular attention to how a metaphor is used in context, rather than listing all of its potential entailments. What it focuses on is the relations upon which inferences are drawn. In examples such as (19), Kuwait appears as a "peaceful neighbor." When STATES ARE PERSONS, and where the ENEMY IS A RAPIST, the crime portrayed is of the most intimate nature. In the blend, the outer-space relation which links the Iraqi regime to a rapist gets compressed, so that the acts of terror which are described appear as matters of identity. In this understanding, the only way to save the innocent victim is to condemn the aggressor. This is what allows for the allocation of blame, which gets automatically placed on the side of the enemy, while nations like the United States appear completely passive in the trigger and/or escalation of the conflict.

By contrast, (21) and (22) might be said to be more conventional, as the "perversion" of principles might not always activate the RAPIST metaphor. Nevertheless, they contribute to the same overall conceptualization of the enemy, highlighting THEIR disregard for decency by profiling the violent MEANS which stand for the whole EVENT. While the hearer might not consciously construct the enemy as a rapist following utterances such as (21) and (22), I argue that this use of metonymies contributes to cementing the conceptualization of the enemy as an unredeemable character, by making violence the only lens through which one could interpret THEIR actions. Although these metonymic relations might have become conventional, their salience within American War Rhetoric contributes to the constraint on reasoning which occurs as a result of cementing THEIR violent nature as the origin of all conflicts. On their own, utterances like (21) and (22) are not enough to trigger the conceptualization of the enemy as a rapist; however, in this unique context, the MEANS

FOR EVENT metonymy taps into a broader conceptualization of the enemy as 'Other,' defined as such on account of THEIR violence and disrespect for humanity.

When such acts are performed in the name of Islam (22), the victim is the religion itself, which is wrongfully used to assert the terrorists' dominance. While the "rape of Kuwait" rhetoric was particularly poignant, its effectiveness might partly rely upon a familiar conceptualization of the enemy as inhuman. Indeed, what all these blends highlight is the inhuman character of the enemy, and what this entails for the conduction of international relationships. While both persons or groups are presented as human from a strictly biological sense, the enemy consistently, "systematically" (19,20) takes advantage of others and uses force to dominate. The enemy appears as essentially different from US, in a way that makes THEM irreconcilable with the rest of humanity.

MEANS FOR EVENT in the wider context of the dehumanization of the enemy

(23) "In Afghanistan, we see Al Qaida's vision for the world. Afghanistan's people have been **brutalized**. Many are starving, and many have fled. Women are not allowed to attend school. You can be jailed for owning a television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate. A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough." (G.W.Bush, 21.09.2001, my emphasis)

We have seen that the construal of the enemy as animals constitutes an important strategy in the entire corpus. Following from the previous analyses, I argue that even instantiations such as the one in (23) can evoke the conceptualization of THEM as ANIMALS, as what gets fused is the structure which rules the animal kingdom, and that which rules human relationships, giving rise to inadequacies that urgently need rectified. The metaphorical usage of "brutes" has been conventionalized and is not specific to American War Rhetoric; it serves to highlight a departure from what is considered acceptable human behavior. This is shown thanks to the MEANS FOR EVENT metonymy which links THEIR behavior to THEIR so called "vision," giving the American public an insight into the reality of what is going on. In this particular instance, I argue that the MEANS FOR EVENT metonymy arises within a broader conceptual blend, which draws elements from the ANIMAL input space and from the HUMAN input space, giving rise to a concept of human brutes which is unique to American War Rhetoric and perfectly serves its discursive needs. The animal, the brute in the blend does not refer to the same type of animal as that found in the input spaces. Indeed, the ways in which animals treat one another is perfectly adequate within the animal kingdom, or within the ANIMAL input space. It is the selection of animal behavior, combined with that of a world in-

habited by humans, which gives rise to a unique blend. In that blend, the enemy's cruel behavior towards their people thus emerges as completely out of place and leads to the conclusion that THEY deny basic human rights. These human rights are then listed and contribute to reinforcing the inadequacy of the situation portrayed in the blend. The complete inadequacy of Al Qaida's vision comes in stark contrast with the American way of life. What the metaphor achieves is therefore to account for why the situation described in Afghanistan is unacceptable, and why external intervention is necessary. We have seen in Chapter 2 that conceptual blending allows to highlight the relations within a conceptual integration network, which can account for the explanatory power of metaphors. Here, the hearer is given an insight into the enemy's nature. The relation of analogy between the input spaces, linking the enemy's treatment of the Afghan and animal behavior, gets compressed into identity in the blend, so as to make sense of the image provided in the blend. One can then easily arrive at the conclusion that the inadequacy of the situation needs to be resolved by extraordinary means, because THEY are not like US. The horrors which are taking place in Afghanistan are explained by THEIR different nature. As fellow humans, the people of Afghanistan deserve to be rescued. Beyond commenting on THEIR nature, utterances such as (23) also lead to important inferences about US, and about OUR role in such conflicts.

We have seen that the metaphors used to describe THEM have a dehumanizing effect, whether THEY are construed as ANIMALS, or DISEASES. The unique violence of the enemy is thus consistently emphasized in the blends which we have analyzed so far: the violence of the animal is not to be compared to OUR resort to war, as what gets emphasized is THEIR unfit nature for OUR world. Similar constraining effects appear when the enemy is construed as a disease which must be eradicated if WE want to preserve humanity. I now argue that these constraining effects are coherent with a much more widespread conceptualization of the enemy's actions which profiles MEANS over ENDS, which is particularly fitting with the conception of the enemy as AN ANIMAL. While much attention has been given to the mappings involved in metaphor interpretation, Handl and Schmid (2010: 10) suggest that the "conventionality and salience of metonymic mappings" has been much neglected. I argue here that the salience of metonymic mappings to describe the enemy in our data is very influential in the interpretation of metaphors within American War Rhetoric, so that even the weakest instantiations of a metaphor can activate the entire network which they tap into in an effort to maximize relevance. The activation of an entire metaphorical network yields further contextual assumptions, such as the confirmation that OUR decision to take action against THEM is justified on account of THEIR nature.

4.3. Metaphors about the victims

CBT has allowed to shed some light onto the role of compression in constraining the interpretation of metaphors. This section expands on that mechanism, and on the ways in which CBT can also be used to understand the constraining effects of metaphors over time. Compression is a key mechanism in conceptual integration, serving to reach its "overarching goal: Achieve Human Scale." (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 322) "Compression helps human scale, human scale helps getting a story, getting a story helps global insight, going from Many to One helps the blend achieve human scale." (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 336)

In this section, I argue that the use of metaphors to conceptualize the victims of the conflicts is yet another strategy to achieve human scale, and that by doing so, it also contributes to achieving relevance of the issues for the American public. The use of metaphors allows to construct abstract concepts such as FREEDOM or DEMOCRACY as the main victims of the conflict, which has two main effects: that of expanding the scope of the conflict, making it humanity's concern; but also that of reducing the scale of the conflict, by facilitating the attribution of the conflict's main roles. In this case, the compression of time and space which results from the construal of abstract concepts (PEACE, DEMOCRACY, etc,) as people, and more specifically as victims, thus helps to achieve human scale; human scale helps getting a story, here a story involving a victim, a villain and a hero. Finally, the conceptualization of a victim that needs defending paves the way for OUR need to get involved.

In some cases where the United States cannot be seen as directly suffering from the conflict, making their involvement relevant for the American public can become an even trickier task: WE are not directly and literally opposed to THEM, in the sense that THEY do not pose a direct threat to US. The construal of FREEDOM and other abstract concepts as victims is a recurring strategy, establishing US as a natural savior, and sustaining the opposition between US and THEM on a moral, if not physical level (at least not to begin with). The compression of time, which results from the use of this type of metaphor throughout the different eras of the corpus, helps to reinforce the role of the United States, OUR role, as the "defender of freedom" in the world, making it a constant, defining trait (see 4.4). When FREEDOM IS A PERSON who needs saving at different points throughout the corpus, the time frame of the history of the United States is compressed, so that each new conflict appears simply as a continuation of the battle for freedom and against evil. This allows the story to write and re-write itself, which in turn helps the hearer to gain global insight into the

workings of foreign policy. There are two steps to this strategy, starting with the construction of a victim:

• Construction of a victim

The first step is the establishment of FREEDOM as a victim, so that each and every new conflict can be interpreted as following the same pattern, as involving the same actors.

(24) What the administration is asking for **on behalf of freedom** in Central America is so small, so minimal, considering what is at stake. The total amount requested for aid to all of Central America in 1984 is about $600 million. That's less than one-tenth of what Americans will spend this year on coin-operated video games. (Reagan, 27.04.1983, my emphasis)
—> FREEDOM IS A PERSON

On its own, the use of phrases such as "on behalf of freedom" would most likely not be enough to trigger the conceptualization of FREEDOM AS A PERSON. However, in a context where the international scene is reduced, where STATES ARE PEOPLE, where THEY appear as the world's bullies, I argue that it is relevant to also construe THEIR victims, those who WE are fighting for, as people. The selection of a human trait is indeed a lot more accessible in the wider context of American War Rhetoric, especially when one takes into account America's history: the nation is indeed often referred to as a chosen nation, who was born precisely to defend freedom (this will be elaborated in 4.4); this is often known as the rhetoric of American exceptionalism, which according to Pease (2009) has always dominated American history, and is thus part of the American culture. In this context, the costs of retrieving the conceptualization of FREEDOM AS A PERSON, and not as any person, but rather as a VICTIM, are also much reduced, considering the prominence of America's unique role and relationship with Freedom. In (24), the reasoning is indeed based on the conceptualization of freedom as a person, and the American administration is then perceived as its representative or spokesperson. Not going along with the administration's plans becomes a rejection of freedom. By refusing to allocate more funds, (something which the hearer and the rest of the country are partially in control of through their support or lack of), Freedom is made a victim of the conflict. The consequences of rejecting the proposed funds are made fully apparent in the blend: the direct effects are not to be felt by the administration, but rather by Freedom. The creation of guilt is reinforced by the analogy with the amount spent by Americans on video games. The metaphor highlights the importance given to virtual objects, made to appear meaningless next to the concerns of a helpless, suffering victim. In another context which would make available the need for people to work so that they can sustain the economy, their ability to spend money "on coin-operated video

games" might be selected as positive. The analogy in (24) constrains the interpretation process by profiling the priorities of the American people when they think about money. As a result, the hearer is led to feel guilty should they choose not to give the funds necessary to the survival of freedom, when they have money to spare on video games. The construction of Freedom as a victim here highlights its helplessness, as it cannot advocate for itself, but needs a spokesperson to fight on its behalf. It is this helplessness which allows for the emergence of guilt during the interpretation process, as (some) Americans appear to hold the fate of Freedom in disregard.

• Construction of a victim through time

(25) They have attacked America because we are **freedom's home and defender**. And the **commitment of our fathers** is now the calling of our time. (G.W. Bush, 14.09.2001, my emphases)
—> FREEDOM IS A PERSON
—> AMERICA IS A HOUSE/HOME
—> OUR NATION IS A FAMILY

The conceptualization of FREEDOM AS A PERSON is indeed to be combined with the consistent conceptualization of AMERICA AS A FAMILY, which permeates American history and the understanding of America's identity. There are two victims here: freedom, and America. The metaphor thus places America within the same mental space as freedom, as its home and defender; the 'Other' (referred to as "the enemies of freedom" by Reagan), is other because of its animosity against freedom. Protecting someone who lives in one's home is often seen as natural, and it therefore makes perfect sense for America to embark on a battle against their wrongdoer. The combination of the metaphors FREEDOM IS A PERSON (WHO LIVES IN AMERICA), and OUR NATION IS A FAMILY, results here in a blend where time is compressed, so that Freedom is protected by all the generations of Americans. As a result, in the blend, the person of Freedom does not seem to really age or ever die, and is in constant need of America's protection. To stop doing so would therefore also be a lack of respect towards "our fathers."

We have seen that the STATE AS PERSON metaphor lay the grounds for the conceptualization of America as a person, a righteous person within the community of nations. Indeed, America is here not only construed as a home but also as a person ("a defender") with several positive traits: caring, protective, and committed to the defense of freedom. The FREEDOM IS A PERSON metaphor allows for the construction of a special role, that of defender, for which America is the value. In the blend, it is through its commitment to the protection of the weak that America appears as a particular type of person: a hero, a "defender," forever devoted to the protection of those in need. And it is

through this same commitment that America establishes itself as THEIR counterpart in the defense of Freedom; it is what separates US from THEM.

Rather than viewing freedom as an abstract concept, it is seen as a physical person who comes between the two groups. It is Freedom who THEY have come to attack, in its own home; it is Freedom who THEY hate; it is Freedom who WE stand to defend. Support of FREEDOM is therefore construed as solely belonging to the mental space that holds the representation of US, not THEM. The compression of time (as America's mission gets fused with the commitment of the Founding Fathers) is also significant, making the attacks of 9/11 an attack not only on Freedom, but also on all Americans, now and across time. Conceptual blending thus allows for the conceptualization of FREEDOM as a victim through time, a constant in the battle against evil. In turn, this then contributes to the creation of an ICM for THEM/the enemy, allowing for phrases like "the enemies of freedom" to become widespread:

(26) "As for **the enemies of freedom**, those who are potential adversaries, they will be reminded that peace is the highest aspiration of the American people." (Reagan, 20.01.1981, my emphasis)
—>FREEDOM IS A PERSON

The conceptualization of Freedom as a person is also relevant in (26), as the selection of a human trait is made accessible by the mention of "enemies" and "adversaries." In a battle, and indeed here in a war, groups of people are opposed, which is interesting considering that it is by dehumanizing the enemy that physically attacking THEM can become acceptable (4.2). Both strategies thus work together to profile THEIR inhumanity while placing US on the side of humanity. Besides, conceptualizing abstract concepts as people, and more specifically as victims, places these ideals (here, freedom) on OUR side *only*, and by doing so allows the legitimization of action on the part of America, regardless of where the conflict takes place. Through the compression of space, geographical boundaries have no role in the construction of the two sides of the conflict, and therefore remoteness is no argument against American military action. The compression of time is also at work here, and is what allows for the creation of an idealized concept of the enemy, defined as anyone who opposes, or does not stand to defend Freedom, thus hiding the complexities of the circumstances of each conflict and the past events that might have led to it. The compression of time which is at stake here means that the only relevant aspect that is selected to interpret past and present conflicts is whether or not WE stood up for freedom or not. Failure to do so would therefore entirely compromise OUR proclaimed identity, which we will now explore further in 4.4. The framework of CBT, where conceptual blends are involved, and that of Mental Spaces, highlight the impact of language on reasoning: it is by reducing the scale of the conflict to a single Mental Space that timeless

roles can easily (at little cost) be filled: as WE are the ones who are concerned with matters of humanity, OUR intervention cannot convey any violence, which is restricted to THEM. This is highly efficient, as it can immediately convey a lot of information on the conflict: who started it, and why. Where freedom gets conceptualized as a victim, the start and existence of the conflict itself is seen as prompted by the enemy's hatred of such ideals. In the blends, Vital Relations of Cause-Effect become relations of Identity throughout time: THEY (an ICM for THE ENEMY) thus appear as a single enemy, while OUR actions or reactions are accounted for by OUR unchanged feelings towards freedom, peace, or democracy, by OUR moral standing on main issues such as the treatment of fellow human beings.

4.4. Metaphors about US

We have seen that the metaphors used to portray the various actors of the conflicts all worked to make these conflicts matters of identity. We are now finally moving to the metaphors which are used to construct the group US, which are actually a lot less prevalent than the ones about THEM. In fact, OUR identity also relies upon the conceptualization of a fourth actor in the conflicts: History. In this case, the sense of moral obligation which the metaphor triggers does not lie within the individual, but seems to emerge from a higher order, which fits in with the wider narrative of American exceptionalism.

4.4.1. History: OUR judge

The personification of HISTORY is yet another strategy to build the relevance of America's involvement in various remote issues, by way of reminding the hearers of their responsibility as Americans. Rather than coming directly in between US and THEM, the person of HISTORY seems to be constantly above US, reminding US of who WE are and of OUR duties, which we will see is very coherent with the metaphors about US. While THEY are the epitome of evil, WE are at the other end of the scale, and that comes with responsibilities.

(27) Well, for my part, I want it clearly understood today that if we fail to meet this obligation, then **history will hold us fully accountable to the consequences**, for we will send an unmistakable signal that the greatest power in the world is unwilling and incapable of stopping Communist aggression in our own backyard. (Reagan, 30 March 1985, my emphases)
(28) But our **responsibility to history** is already clear: To answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. (G.W. Bush, 14.09.2001, my emphasis)
—> HISTORY IS A PERSON

HISTORY is here construed as a person, but not as an equal. HISTORY seems to have the quality of a judge, someone that WE have to "answer" to for every one of OUR actions. This judge is always present: in the past, present, and future. While the concept of HISTORY generally tends to be used to refer to the past, to the course of events that has led to the present day, here it encompasses the future as well, through the repercussions of present decisions and events. The conceptualization of HISTORY as a person compresses time in the blend, so that the events of the past, present (and future) are all part of one person's identity. The events of yesterday, going back to OUR fathers' fight for independence, set the path for our present conduct, which will directly affect OUR world image and power tomorrow. Human scale is thus achieved in the blend, and helps the hearer to understand that the issues that are being discussed are part of something bigger than the individual, bigger than their country. Besides responding to direct attacks, the duty of Americans to stand up for peace and "rid the world of evil" is construed as a responsibility towards a third party, one that cannot be escaped. Failing to meet such responsibilities would drastically change OUR image and identity not only now, but also for 'future America'.

(29) And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends, in **history's unmarked grave of discarded lies**. (G.W. Bush, 20.09.2001, my emphasis)

Through embracing a JUDGE identity, the person of History can appear as somewhat of a threatening figure, making sure that all of OUR actions are representative of the identity that WE proclaim. That is also true for the enemy, whose mistakes will not be forgotten. The image of the grave acts as a physical anchor for the compression of time, making the past visibly present, a judge throughout time. Through the judge of History, a direct link is thus made visible between the events of the past, which shall always be honored, the actions of today, and the consequences of tomorrow, that is to say how one will be remembered. Accountability can thus emerge in the blend, so that lies and cowardice can never go unnoticed.

By representing History as a figure of moral authority, the group US is also reaffirmed as the righteous one, those who are ready to fight against the ones who History has judged to be immoral. The question of what to do becomes somewhat irrelevant, as there is only one right answer: if one is true to one's identity, then one must act; in turn, thanks to the compressions of time, OUR actions can only be interpreted as part of a continuity, which makes the retrieval of the assumption that every new conflict is another realization of OUR mission very easily accessible.

4.4.2. OUR NATION IS A FAMILY

Conceptual blending highlights the importance of context when interpreting a metaphor. Before the elaboration of the blend is the stage of completion, where the hearer brings "background knowledge and structure into a blend unconsciously" (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 48). What this shows is that the hearers bring a lot of their own personal knowledge to the interpretation process. References to history may bring up various values or ideas: the fight for freedom and independence, America's role in past World Wars, or perhaps losses such as these embodied by the failure of the Vietnam War. Other metaphors are used throughout the corpus to construe the hearer's understanding of history, such as the AMERICAN NATION AS FAMILY metaphor. Through the construction of the NATION as a FAMILY, all Americans can be seen to belong to the same community, guiding the interpretation process so that the conceptualization of the past can remain unanimously glorified. The prevalence of the NATION AS FAMILY (made evident by the construal of America's founders as the "Founding Fathers") can act as an effective contextual constraint, as it makes salient the notions of respect for one's elders, responsibility, and heightens the sacredness of doing right by one's family, stemming from a debt of gratitude. Mentions of the Founding Fathers take the hearers back to the ideals that their country stands for; when they are part of the direct context surrounding the occurrence of metaphors personifying history, they may thus influence the interpretation of the latter, facilitating the retrieval of HISTORY IS A PERSON.

(30) "He is right. We have strayed off course many times and we have been careless with the machinery of freedom **bequeathed to us by the Founding Fathers.**" (Reagan, 18.08.1980, my emphasis)

(31) "And the **commitment** of **our fathers** is now **the calling of our time**." (G.W. Bush, 14.09.2001, my emphases)
—> OUR NATION IS A FAMILY

The Founding Fathers are a part of American history and belong to the past, but their heritage lives on with Americans. Time is again compressed in the blend, so that America's mission "now," "the calling of *our* time" (my emphasis), is equated with the commitment of the Founding Fathers hundreds of years earlier. The whole of American history is compressed to two generations, thus achieving the scale of a human's lifetime. The chain of actions that led to the present day's conflicts is hidden, while our moral responsibility is highlighted. This time compression creates a sense of continuity: our fathers were committed and we must be, too. The circumstances of the war of independence and how they compare with the circumstances of current conflicts do not appear in the blend; instead, military actions are seen as resulting from a deep sense of commitment. By construing the nation as a family, the notion of respect emerges in the blend, as the hearer is led to think of

military involvement as a way to pay respect to family members. Like with the STATE AS PERSON metaphor, human traits or qualities are used to reason about the issue, made more relevant in a context where family is made salient: if one takes freedom for granted, one is careless, disrespectful, irresponsible, or even selfish. As OUR response is construed as stemming from respect, vital relations of Cause-Effect in the input space for the current conflict are once again compressed, so that in the blend, OUR response becomes a matter of personality, of identity (which is what allows for feelings of guilt to potentially emerge at the elaboration stage, as the hearer might visualize the image of disappointed Fathers). Acting carelessly with an object that was bequeathed to US by OUR ancestors is indeed a lack of respect. OUR opposition to those who wish to destroy freedom and peace in the world can thus be interpreted as the only way today to honor OUR Fathers.
These metaphors thus come to reinforce the irreparable divide between US and THEM. While individuals might not see how the current America can be conceptualized as evil's counterpart, the metaphors HISTORY IS A PERSON and NATION IS A FAMILY allow to think of America as a continuum, starting with a special focus on the values and ideals that the country was founded on. Should WE choose not to oppose THEM, the consequences would not merely be felt by the direct victims of the conflict, as History would be judging US and recording OUR mistakes for the world to see. This is what allows for the broader construction of US vs. THEM to act as a pre-condition to the relevance of the argument that America needs to take immediate action, as the retrieval of the conclusion that it is not up to US to take action in the first place is made very costly within this metaphorical system; it is irrelevant.

We have seen in this section that human scale gets achieved through a series of compressions, as every conflict can be seen to follow this schema:



Fig. 5: Schematization of the conflict

The goal of achieving human scale is perfectly compatible with RT's focus on the maximization of cognitive cost and benefits. Through the construal of a timeless victim, THEY can always be as-

signed the role of attacker, and WE can always fill in the role of defender. The interpretation that WE are acting on moral grounds, and that WE are obligated to take action becomes the most relevant one, because once THEY have filled in the role of ATTACKER and blame for the conflict has been assigned, the interpretation process renders irrelevant elements which might question OUR motives or OUR conduct in the conflict, as has already been mentioned in the previous sections of this chapter. Furthermore, the compression of time which is at stake here is particularly significant, as the relevant trait for the final interpretation of OUR part, that is the way in which it will be noted down in history, is selected as that of morality, specifically how one treats a defenseless victim. The main benefit is therefore that OUR responsibility to *always* be involved can be made sense of, as each and every conflict is perceived as a matter of identity. While CBT and RT are often used to study the interpretation of utterances online, the analyses in this section point towards their effectiveness in studying constraining effects over time as well: through compressions can emerge the notion of continuity, which mainly comes through as stemming from a stable identity; this in turn makes a lot more easily available for further conflicts the assumption that OUR action is justified on moral grounds, while also making unavailable assumptions that THEY might be justified in THEIR resort to violence.

4.4.3. Moral fighters

I will end this section and chapter with an overview of the metaphors which directly tackle OUR identity, rather than indirectly through the conceptualization of OUR family, for instance. Plain statements of the belief in OUR special identity might simply be interpreted as the speaker's own ideals or beliefs, and so might get challenged more easily by the hearer. Instead, the use of conceptual metaphors about the enemy, freedom or history, allows the hearer to construe the role of the United States in the conflicts as brought on by elements which are outside of OUR control. This is the focus of this subsection: the effectiveness of conceptual metaphors (about US) in making sense of OUR identity within the wider, *natural* organization of the world.

Metaphors which directly portray US or OUR role are used slightly differently from the metaphors about THEM or the victims of the conflicts; they are not as prevalent in addresses about America's military involvements, while they are abundant in speeches such as the "State of the Union" (only the paragraphs tackling foreign policy have been selected for this corpus), or as a response to direct attacks, such as in the aftermath of 9/11. Both of these instances have in common the examination

of the American identity; these are times of reflection, and in such cases, metaphors can be used to highlight certain aspects of OUR character to reaffirm rather than to challenge America's special identity. This can be achieved by profiling OUR core values/ideals, firstly by 'looking up,' secondly by 'looking in,' and finally by 'looking beyond' one's immediate reality.

4.4.3.1. Looking up: the power of vertical constructions

(32) As for the enemies of freedom, those who are potential adversaries, they will be reminded that **peace is the highest aspiration of the American people**. We will negotiate for it, sacrifice for it; we will not surrender for it, now or ever [...] Above all, we must realize that no arsenal or no **weapon** in the arsenals of the world is so formidable as **the will and moral courage of free men and women**. It is a **weapon** our adversaries in today's world do not have. It is a **weapon** that we as Americans do have. (Reagan, 20 January 1981, my emphases)
—> THE AMERICAN WILL / COURAGE IS A WEAPON
—> PEACE IS UP

(33) And only by trusting you, giving you opportunities to **climb high and reach for the stars**, can we preserve the golden dream of America as **the champion of peace and freedom among the nations of the world.** (Reagan, 05.11.1984, my emphases)
—> SUCCESS/DREAMS ARE UP
—> AMERICA AS THE CHAMPION OF PEACE AND FREEDOM

Metaphors about US often lead to the conceptualization of US on a vertical axis, at the top of that axis. The effect of such metaphors is not so much to boost OUR ego or to paint a positive image of US, as it is to construct US as opposed to THEM, thereby reinforcing the construction of OUR role in the conflicts as essential. What we can notice in (32) and (33), is that the metaphors which are used to portray US do not occur on their own; they are combined with primary metaphors (for a more detailed analysis on their role in constraining the interpretation process, see Chapter 9, section 1). This chapter focuses on their role in making sense of OUR identity within the wider organization of the world.

Primary metaphors are part of Grady's "new approach to conceptual metaphor" (1997: 19), stemming from the observation that the latter are not necessarily motivated by analogy between two domains, but rather by correlations in *experience*. These correlations are experienced on a daily basis, and as such constitute an important constraint on one's reasoning about the world. In American War Rhetoric, their usage helps to make sense of the separation between US and THEM on a vertical axis. In a wider context, they structure our understanding of the world by making connections between abstract concepts such as GOOD, EVIL, MORAL, etc., and concrete, physical experiences such as UP or DOWN. Because they are grounded in our physical experience of the world, primary metaphors, such as MORE IS UP and LESS IS DOWN, are pervasive in our language and can often

be overlooked. However, they are used abundantly as a basis for conceptual metaphors, to structure and expand our understanding of reality. For example, "[b]ecause it is better to walk upright than to fall down, we find the widespread metaphor that Morality is Uprightness" (Lakoff, 1995: 184).
In the above examples, we find not only that morality is construed as uprightness, but so are peace (32), dreams or success (33). Indeed, the metaphors that describe the group US often appear in immediate association with the primary metaphor MORAL IS UP, or other variations such as PEACE(FUL) IS UP, or even THE AMERICAN DREAM IS UP. America's actions (at least those promoted by the government) are thus structured vertically, always reaching higher, and never looking down. The use of primary metaphors in this context has two main entailments:

(a) The pursuit of OUR cause is not construed as random; it is not construed as arising out of a whim (which might lead to equating OUR motives with the egotistical desire to be superior); rather, it is construed in correlation with the hearer's physical experience of reality, where all that is good is UP, and all that is bad is DOWN;
(b) The use of vertical constructions reinforces the visualization of two groups that are entirely separate. Therefore if WE are on the positive and right side, THEY are entirely in the wrong, justifying the resort to extreme measures.

What appears at the top of this vertical scale are ideals such as PEACE or FREEDOM, stars and the golden dream of America, and the group US. It is these ideals that define OUR cause, not the other way round. If these metaphors are so closely linked to the construal of the American identity, they might form part of the hearer's background knowledge, and in turn influence the elaboration of blends for novel metaphors such as THE AMERICAN WILL IS A WEAPON (32), favoring interpretations such as: 'America's actions/means are justified, in fact they are to be admired, because they exemplify the determination to serve a righteous cause and to always put that cause first, to always look up.'

We will see now how the presence of these primary metaphors within the context in which metaphors about US occur can constrain the interpretation of the latter. Both (32) and (33) point to the notion of American exceptionalism. In (32), it appears to be due to the possession of a special weapon, one which WE only possess: the strength of OUR will and moral courage. While the atrocities committed by the Other are outlined in great detail throughout the corpus, the metaphors about US paint a different reality: Americans do not fight with guns, but with their ideals (32). They do not use physical, but moral strength. In other words, their involvement in the conflicts is spoken of

in metaphorical terms. The enemy, on the other hand, does not possess that weapon, and so is essentially inferior.



Fig. 6: Conceptual Blend for: AMERICA AS THE CHAMPION OF PEACE AND FREEDOM

The above figure shows the elements which might get selected to form a conceptual blend following the interpretation of (33). The 'America' in the blend is not on the same level as the other free nations of the world: it is their champion. In the defense of peace and freedom, America is number one. By construing international relationships as a sports competition, the nations of the world are ranked: their relationships are not understood in terms of geographical proximity, but in terms of where they appear on the ranking. The implication of having a champion is that someone also comes last: the enemy. The opposition US vs. THEM is here conceptualized vertically, as one between two extremes on a ranking, namely winner and loser. The blend thus focuses on the end, on the results of the competition. What is interesting is that in an entirely different context, the portrayal of America as a competitor might lead to the conceptualization of US as egotistical, concerned with the advancement of OUR own image, rather than with the needs of others. This aspect, which might be associated with a constant wish to be at the top, does not get selected here because it is not relevant. It is blocked by the presence within the context of terms such as "golden dream," as pursuing one's dreams is generally accepted as something positive, but also by that of the primary metaphors which we have mentioned so far. If MORAL/PEACE, and more generally GOOD are

construed as being UP (along with dreams, stars, etc.), then OUR striving to stay at the top, to be a champion cannot appear to be ill-founded. This allows for the reasons why America fights to be selected as the relevant basis upon which its actions are to be understood. What matters is therefore why WE fight, while the way that America might have got to the top is left out, for example. In the final blends, the interpretation of OUR involvement might be visualized as follows:
Moral aspirations > OUR ACTION. This allows for the abstraction of OUR actions to the ideals which they are meant to serve, making it right *and* making US superior (and in stark contrast with the study of the MEANS FOR EVENT metonymy which consistently construes THEIR actions in a way that highlights THEIR cruelty). If the defense of peace is construed as being subject to gradation, then it follows that some countries are better than others. While many countries might support the defense of peace, it would seem that the United States is its number one sponsor, and in that sense the country that is the most opposed to THEM.

Rather than simply stating that OUR intents and actions are moral, by grounding morality in our physical experiences, the blends can easily make sense to all individuals. A sense of objectivity might get triggered, a sense that the favored interpretation of the issues (with US at the top and THEM at the bottom) fits with a broader understanding of the world, one which is grounded in the hearer's experience of reality.

4.4.3.2. Looking in: unshakable strength

The construal of the group US typically does not look at what is actually going on, but rather at the ideals that the current reality strives to serve. This is indeed compatible with the compression of time explored in the previous subsection, which requires the selection of a relevant set of criteria upon which OUR contribution can be noted as positive or negative in the history of the world. We have just seen that by 'looking up,' the elements which might lead to the conceptualization of US as egotistical can be effectively blocked; we will now see how the interpretation process can be constrained by 'looking in.' Indeed, another strategy found in the corpus is to look underneath the surface of America's actions, at what they are made of.

(34) […] but they cannot touch the **foundation** of America. (G.W.Bush, 11.09.2001, my emphasis)
—> AMERICA IS A BUILDING
(35) They did not touch its **source**. (G.W.Bush, 20.09.2001, my emphasis)
—> AMERICA IS A STREAM/WATER AREA
(36) These acts shattered steel, but they cannot **dent the steel of American resolve**. (G.W.Bush, 11.09.2001, my emphasis)
—> AMERICAN RESOLVE IS STEEL

Buildings are often used as source domains, whether they target America, the enemy, or other abstract concepts. When America is compared to a building, it is its foundations that are highlighted. We have seen that the groups US and THEM get construed as essentially different. If states were buildings, it is the uniqueness of OUR foundations which makes US essentially different, and even potentially immune to THEIR attack. The building that appears in the blend (34) is a different type of building from the ones in the input space, as it is one that cannot fully break.



Fig. 7: Conceptual Blend for: AMERICA IS A BUILDING

In this blend, if the structure of the building is destroyed, the spirit remains and allows the country to rebuild itself and remain a great country. This is what makes the building in the blend unbreakable. This metaphor is particularly powerful as it contrasts with material buildings like the World Trade Center. In this case, the power of the terrorist attacks themselves can be explained through conceptual blending, as "when we think of an input as a representation, we build a conceptual integration network" (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 97). The attack on a single building to symbolically strike a whole country works by compressing space, making the building of the World Trade Center a physical anchor representing the whole of America and its proclaimed power. The vital relation of Representation gets compressed in the blend into Identity, so that the heart of America itself appears under attack. The American President's response in (34) and (36) acknowledges the impact of the attack, the pain that was caused; however, through the conceptualization of America as a building, President G.W. Bush is able to highlight the unique nature of his country, thanks to its foundation,

what makes it stand apart from all others; and what the 'Other' has failed to understand. The vertical structure is maintained here, but with slightly different entailments: as long as the foundations are strong, as long as America is true to its identity, whatever is built on top of these foundations will be strong, will be good. It is in that sense that the terrorists' attacks have failed.

The hope triggered by the possible image in the blend of an America regenerating itself is a powerful statement, which does not undermine the horror that was caused, but which does undermine to some extent the scope of terrorism. The battle between US and THEM thus portrays US as a much stronger party, regardless of the type of weapons which might be in THEIR possession. This constitutes an essential cognitive benefit from the use of metaphors: the trigger of strong emotions, here of hope, to counteract fear. Instead of simply stating the strength of the American spirit, the latter appears unbreakable, untouchable in the blend in (36) (THE AMERICAN SPIRIT IS STEEL). While the framework of RT can effectively explain which elements from the building input space (figure 7) are to be selected to form the blend (the structure/foundation of buildings rather than the fact that they tend to have windows, for instance), the retrieval of the latter inference, which arises out of the blend's emergent structure, highlights the benefits of an analysis which also incorporates inputs from CBT. The context (following the destruction of the World Trade Center) makes available the selection of elements which pertain to what breaks and what does not. As a material, steel is known to be extremely strong. Yet "these acts shattered steel." (36) It is the fusion of the two, of the physical material represented by steel, and of personal traits (here the American resolve) which gives rise to the conceptualization of OUR resolve as unbreakable. There is a clear distinction between the steel found in the input space of materials (that which was shattered), and that which is used to define the American spirit in the blend. In the first input space, there is no such thing as an unbreakable material: that is only possible in the blend, as the properties of the strongest material get applied to the abstract concept of a nation's spirit. The metonymic relationship which links America's will to the whole (the entire nation) gets tightened in the blend, and so the interpretation of America's actions by looking exclusively at what they represent (i.e., commitment/courage, etc.) is further encouraged.

A similar analysis might be used for the metaphor in (35), AMERICA IS A STREAM/WATER AREA, where it is the source that is highlighted. This is how American actions should be interpreted, no matter when they occur in the corpus. In this context, whether Americans are reminded of the value of dreams (33), or of the exceptional nature of the American resolve, what might also get ac-

tivated in the context is the folklore idea that the 'good guys' always win, making the selection of hope to interpret utterances such as (34) to (36) all the more relevant, and fitting with a wider organization of the world (one that is grounded in morality). The last subsection dealing with the metaphors about the actors of the conflict slightly expands on this supernatural element which often emerges when interpreting metaphors about US.

4.4.3.3. 'Looking beyond': The light of the world

Whether it is looking up, or looking in, America's dreams and core values are consistently depicted as entirely positive. Light and darkness are also used throughout the corpus to achieve similar goals, again grounding the conceptualization of US in experiences of reality. In this subsection I explore two of metaphor's main functions in the context of American War Rhetoric: answering the question 'why us?,' and reinforcing the irreparable divide between US and THEM.

- Answering the question: 'why us?'

(37) America was targeted for attack because we're the **brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity** in the world. And no one will keep that **light** from shining. (G.W.Bush, 11.09.2001, my emphases)
—> AMERICA IS (A) LIGHT

Not only is America conceptualized as a light, but it is the *brightest* light in the world. Other countries that follow America's example might also be on the side of light, but light is also subject to gradation. What makes America the brightest is its resolve and courage, leading the world in the fight for peace and freedom. On the other hand, since the enemy's goal is to extinguish this light, no parts of THEIR group can be seen as carrying light. While the brightness of a source of light might be perceived similarly by most people (provided that they share the same environment), the definition of the exercise of freedom is not so straightforward. The construction of America as light therefore contributes to hiding THEIR point of view, THEIR understanding of what freedom is. US and THEM are once again construed as perfect opposites, extremes on the spectrum of light to darkness. Indeed that is precisely the reason why WE have been attacked. The metaphor comes as an answer to the question: 'Why us?' If THEIR goal is to extinguish light, then it makes sense that THEY would attack the brightest one, the leader of all other lights. In the blend, WE are once again only portrayed through the glimpse of OUR ideals, as Cause-Effect relations get compressed into Identity: WE are attacked because of who WE are, as WE and THE LIGHT are one in the blend. Any other interpretation, such as those that might blame America for its part in angering the Other, can thus be kept in the background.

• Reinforcing an irreparable divide: US vs. THEM

The activation of primary metaphors which are so pervasive within our culture, such as GOOD IS LIGHT and BAD IS DARK, is an important part of the cognitive context which influences the interpretation of metaphors such as AMERICA AS THE BEACON OF FREEDOM. As we have just seen, by grounding the interpretation of the conflict in the hearer's experience of reality, primary metaphors can reduce cognitive costs. In terms of cognitive benefits, the use of the metaphor in (37) not only provides the hearer with an explanation as to why what happened happened, but it also makes sense of the current events within the larger context of America's story, creating direct links with its identity. When optimal relevance has been reached, the interpretation process can stop; in other words, there is no need to look for THEIR version of the story. In that sense, the use of metaphor here serves another important function, besides answering a question. It helps to constrain the interpretation of the discourse: in the blend, there can be no darkness or evil associated with US, none that is relevant to the interpretation of the issues at stake; similarly, there can be no light or any sort of positive justification associated with THEM. Constraint here translates as the construction of an irreparable divide. WE and THEY cannot coexist (paving the way for the acceptance of military action as the only solution), because the existence of each group serves a different, an opposite purpose.

US vs. THEM: the expression of a mission, of a belief in OUR exceptionalism

Finally, the use of metaphors about US can construe this irreparable divide as the expression of OUR mission, OUR purpose on earth, making the interpretation of OUR action as solely defensive the most relevant one.

(38) "Across the Earth, America is **feeding the hungry**. More than 60 percent of international food aid comes as **a gift** from the people of the United States. As our Nation moves troops and builds alliances to make our world safer, we must also remember **our calling as a blessed country** is to make the world better." (G.W. Bush, 28 January 2003, my emphases)

—>AMERICA IS JESUS' REPRESENTATIVE ON EARTH

In (38), the phrase "feeding the hungry" is an explicit reference to the Bible, specifically to the figure of Jesus, which is easily retrieved thanks to the context in which (38) is uttered: one where religion is an integral part of politics (as testified by the country's official motto, "in God we trust"), and where the speaker's identity as a born again Christian was a salient part of his Presidential campaign. G.W. Bush's professed faith might well have motivated the choice for this particular metaphor. Indeed, while America's sense of responsibility is apparent throughout the whole corpus,

it does not always have a religious tone. Even for those who might not recognize (38) as explicitly referencing the Bible, America remains construed in a spiritual manner, having a special mission, responding to a "calling" which is outside of its control. The people of the United States do not only have a duty of care towards one another, but towards the people across the Earth: "[…] our calling as a blessed country is to make the world better." This is how each of the United States' actions should be interpreted. In the blend, THE UNITED STATES is a PERSON, but not any person, it is construed as Jesus' representative on earth (or at the very least as a missionary). Oppressed countries are seen as the weakest members of our society. Unlike other countries which also help out fellow human beings in need, the United States' existence and presence is due to a special mission as Jesus' representative on Earth. The elaboration stage of the blend might allow for the conceptualization of "moving troops" as another special "gift," allowed by God (or by the belief in a unique status). In other words, America's strength comes from God, or from a higher order. In this blend, WE are not only on the side of peace, on the side of light, or on the right side, WE are on God's side. Jesus was essentially good, which attracted some people's hatred and eventually got him killed. Likewise, the representation of the group US in the blend cannot contain any badness. All military actions conducted on America's part appear to be supported by God, as part of OUR mission. Whatever the means, whatever happens on the field, what is highlighted by the metaphor, and what "we must also remember," is OUR mission, this "calling to make the world better" (38). The metaphor thus focuses on the origins, the reasons why, and the end result: making the world better.

Construing America as Jesus' representative on Earth is different from using humanitarian arguments. The latter tend to focus on the weak (in the Christian understanding of the term), the poor, or the unfairly treated members of our society and of the world. The main conclusion is therefore that these people need help, and that someone needs to provide this help. To which the following questions can often arise: 'Why *us*?', 'Why should *we* suffer?', as well as concerns related to the sacrifices that financial and/or military involvement would require, and the negative impact they would have on one's own people. We have already seen how the use of metaphors can help to answer these questions, by constraining the interpretation of the issues, focusing on the source/ideals or the end result, or the timeless nature of OUR mission, thus hiding the reality of the conflicts. But that is not all. The reasoning behind humanitarian arguments tends to revolve around two main actors: the victim, and the one who provides help. However, we have seen that the metaphors in this corpus tend to construct the issues at stake so that there are at least three actors: the victims, US, and THEM. OUR status, whether it is as a beacon of light, or as Jesus' representative, is construed in stark con-

trast with the evil which THEY create. As THEIR opposite, if WE do not resolve the conflicts, who will?

4.5. Conclusion on metaphors' efficiency in persuasive discourse

The constraint on reasoning is not just the result of the online interpretation of metaphors, but rather stems from the continued **establishment of two categories which are completely separate and opposed, so that no overlapping, no middle ground is possible.** What THEY are, WE cannot be, and vice versa. Interestingly, none of the past American or European wars that resulted in the expansion of their countries or empires seem to be portrayed as rapes in our culture, for instance. The use of non-human or inhuman source domains is indeed restricted to the enemy. Equally, the metaphors of the corpus never portray US as conquerors, or as individuals acting on egotistical grounds, because righteousness is always on OUR side. This does not mean that access to contrary information is physically blocked, and it is on that issue that this subsection aims to bring answers.

Creation and cementing of an irreparable divide between US and THEM

Besides the metaphor in (38), America is indeed often construed as doing a missionary's work, fulfilling the mission that WE were "called" to do. That mission is more complex than US helping the poor or vulnerable, it is a mission to fight THEM. Through the use of metaphors, OUR involvement is directly linked to who WE are, which in this case is not of OUR choosing (and therefore cannot be seen as egotistical). What makes the use of metaphors particularly effective is that they allow to make sense of that identity as part of a natural world order, particularly as we saw that Primary Metaphors were an important part of the context of interpretation. If the President was to merely state that it is America's role to help out those in need, critical evaluation of the reasons behind that claim might be more salient. However, the use of metaphors helps to make sense of the issues at stake by grounding them in one's broader understanding and experience of the world, the understanding that both good and evil are properties of the world, and that if good is to prevail, it must commit to the fight against evil. This fits in very well with Lakoff's Strict Father Morality (SFM) model, which describes the metaphorical system structuring the discourse of the Conservative political party in the U.S.A. (Lakoff, 1995). SFM is centered around the family, particularly the father figure. Within SFM, evil is part of our world; it is an internal force that can make you fall, and it is the father's responsibility to protect his family from it (Lakoff, 1995). This is where inputs from

CMT are particularly useful, as we can see that the metaphors analyzed in this chapter about US and THEM do not only make sense within the discourse of American War Rhetoric, but also within the broader American political system. This supports the idea that metaphors' main function might be that of coherence (Kovecses, 2005, 2010). It is not the whole of SFM which is profiled in American War Rhetoric, but rather part of its structure, which I refer to as the frame of Fighting against Evil. Frames are to be defined and expanded on in Chapter 10. For now, it suffices to say that my usage of frames falls within Lakoff's definition as "mental structures that shape the way we see the world" (Lakoff, 2014: xv). I thus argue that the metaphors in this chapter are made immediately relevant within that frame. The fact that all the metaphors studied tap into a broader metaphorical system means that expectations of relevance can easily be met. Indeed, the frame Fighting against Evil's own relevance can be established thanks to the discursive creation of an ICM for the enemy: evil is indeed there, and the reinforcement of the frame Fighting against Evil can then also make much easier the retrieval of the inference that it is up to US to fight it, to fight THEM, or WE might fall too.

The consequence that every conflict can become a new realization of US vs. THEM is compatible with findings from the RT framework. Two types of interpretations might be competing: (a) one which fits with an existing belief system, that everything exists for a reason; that WE exist for a reason (to fight evil); or (b), one which does not fit with that system, and which instead profiles politicians' thirst for more power as the explanation for America's recurring involvement in foreign affairs. The confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998; Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Oswald & Grosjean, 2004) has shown that we are more likely, in fact that we seek information which fits in with our existing beliefs. As a result, I argue that interpretation (a) will often be the most relevant one, because it maximizes expectations of relevance, relevance *to believe* (de Saussure, 2011). It accounts for OUR part in the conflicts, and it is also less costly, because it fits with an existing, folklore understanding of the world which makes available ready made roles: that of the hero and that of the villain. However, ease of processing is only part of the answer, when the question is that of persuasive efficiency. The other part relates to the constraint on reasoning, which is best made apparent through the use of CBT and its emphasis on relational patterns.

Central role of compression

The analyses in this chapter have also highlighted the central role of compression for the constraint on reasoning. Metaphors about the enemy are never just about the enemy. They are not just about making THEM look bad, they also say a lot about US and who WE *are.* The use of conceptual metaphors about US also helps the hearer to think of the conflicts from a specific angle, once again by seeing US for what WE are, the mission that WE are on, or the ideals that WE serve. The compression that takes place as a result of blend formation allows for Cause-Effect relations to become ones of Identity: WE *are* LIGHT, WE *are* Jesus' representatives (or spiritual missionaries following a calling). Compressions of Cause-Effect are what can lead to a feeling of "global understanding" (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 77), which is what makes the use of metaphors particularly efficient in terms of persuasion. Indeed, what the analysis of the metaphors about THEM has shown, and this will be made even more explicit in Chapter 6, is that the mere existence of a conflict is seen to stem from THEIR own nature and identity. In fact, in the blends, the need for war testifies to THEIR evil (again reinforcing the relevance of the wider frame of Fighting against Evil).

This concluding subsection aims at showing that empirical analyses of metaphor interpretation can lead to fruitful theoretical discussions on the place of metaphor in the study of persuasion. The feeling of global understanding which Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 127) describe does not stem from a collection of precise facts, but rather from relations which allow remote issues to appear relevant to US. The following example provided by Fauconnier and Turner (2002) helps to make this point clearer, and to extend the discussion to the role of metaphors in the efficiency of American War Rhetoric:

"Do you remember how when you were little you were so intent upon hiding your treasures that you hid them so well even you could not find them again? Do you remember that you hid your new penny when you were four and we never found it? That's just what you have done with Angela. You've been talking for two hours about all your troubles, but what they boil down to is that you have hidden away your love for her so deeply that you can't see it. Once again, you've hidden your penny, even from yourself." (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 127)

As Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 128) point out, the effects of this single scope network "go far beyond the analogy" which might have motivated the conceptual blend in the first place. What the hearer is left with is rather a "comprehensive pattern of causality" (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 128), so the current issue can be seen to stem from a character trait. This makes the use of the penny metaphor extremely relevant, as the benefits go beyond the comprehension of the issue discussed in

discourse. In fact, the hearer is left with a deep understanding of the person, and might go on to apply the same pattern of causality to other events, which might also imply that change cannot or is unlikely to happen, as relations of Identity and Cause-Effect are tightened in the blend. This is who she is. The conclusions here can also be applied to those following the analyses of the metaphors about US and THEM. Indeed, it is not a better understanding of the facts specific to each issue which the hearers are left with, but rather a deep understanding of who the actors are, and as a result why there is a conflict in the first place. Over time, the fact that the same relational patterns are used to describe every new conflict also makes the interpretation of new, complex issues a lot easier. It is this compression of relations which gives the hearer a global insight into intricate foreign policy issues, and which is to account for the important role played by metaphors in the corpus, and in persuasive discourse in general. One of the goals of this thesis is to provide a better explanatory power when analyzing persuasive discourse online. In order to do so, it is now necessary to go slightly further in the questioning around why metaphors might be so efficient in this corpus.

Special role of metaphors in persuasion?

We have said that the metaphors used in the data are optimally relevant, as they incur few cognitive costs, and lead to numerous benefits. Among these benefits is the efficient attribution of roles, which provides the hearer with an immediate sense of understanding, of global insight into intricate matters: who is guilty/in the wrong, who is in the right, as well as who the victims are. What is promoted in discourse is therefore a rather simple classification into 'good' and 'bad.' These cognitive benefits are not just the result of interpreting a single metaphor. Rather, they are constantly promoted in American War Rhetoric, which we will continue to explore in the next chapters. I argue that the notion of cognitive benefits should here be complemented by that of positive emotional effects, which lie at the heart of metaphors' effectiveness in persuasive discourse. In order to make that point, we need to go back to the role of emotions in discourse.

On the role played by emotive words, Macagno and Walton (2010: 1) explain that these stimulate a classification of the kind good/bad on the grounds of values commonly shared by the community to which the interlocutors belong. The speaker, by using emotive words in certain ways, can make it seem like there is no need to accept, or even to consider, a contrary viewpoint, because doing so would stem from unacceptable values. In the context of American War Rhetoric, the use of emotive words might be counter-productive, as it might lead to the portrayal of an emotive, perhaps

impulsive president. Nevertheless, what the use of metaphors about the actors has shown is that by making every conflict a matter of identity, a similar classification of the kind good/bad comes out of the interpretation process. The power of metaphors is often related to their capacity to trigger strong emotions in the hearer (Charteris-Black, 2011; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). However, I argue that although it might be the case in certain contexts, it is not supported by the linguistic analyses of the metaphors about US and THEM. Emotions such as disgust at the horrors which THEY commit might well be present, and influence the interpretation process on some level; or perhaps pride at OUR national identity and the sacrifices which WE are ready to make. But what is at stake here is a much less intense form of emotion, but which is not less influential. I thus argue that the cognitive benefits of metaphor usage mentioned above need to be supplemented by the notion of "positive emotional effects" (Wharton & Strey, 2019: 263; de Saussure & Wharton, 2019: 12).

These positive emotional effects are defined by "the interpretative reaction triggered by the direct manifestation of an emotion, rather than its description" (de Saussure & Wharton, 2019: 12, translated from French), "bridges between feelings and sensations and cognition," and which "prompt a range of particular inferential processes" (Wharton and Strey, 2019: 263). I hypothesize here that these positive emotional effects might be related, in some contexts, to the generation of coherence which we have mentioned in this conclusion, one of the main benefits of the use of metaphors in this corpus. Once a speech is over, what the hearer is left with (particularly over time) might not be strong emotions linked to the description of horrors happening abroad, but perhaps a general feeling that the interpretation of the issues at stake fits within a broader metaphorical and cognitive system; the manifestation of an emotion that everything seems to fit, and which triggers familiar inferences about what needs done. I argue that this type of effect is better described by the notion of positive emotional effects.

Emotions play a crucial role in providing us with the feedback that something is coherent, or that it is not, and in turn in accepting or rejecting beliefs:

"Belief revision is a matter of explanatory coherence: you accept or reject beliefs on the basis of how well they fit with your full set of observations and explanations (Harman, 1986; Thagard, 2000). The process of assessing explanatory coherence operates unconsciously and in parallel, so we have no conscious access to it. **All that comes to consciousness is a feeling that a belief seems to fit, which is part of a positive emotion that things make sense.** On the other hand, if a belief does not fit, we get a negative feeling about it or about the overall state of our belief system. **Coherence and acceptance feel good, whereas incoherence and doubt are irritating**." (Thagard, 2008: 168, my emphases)

This constant search for coherence can also lead us astray, so to speak, as Thagard (2008: 180) also notes:

> "When we feel good about how well our beliefs fit together, there is no way for us to tell whether in fact the coherence is really a matter of the goodness of fit of hypotheses with the evidence, or instead a matter of goodness of fit of hypotheses with our personal goals."

What I suggest is that when a metaphor seems to "fit" (with one's individual beliefs, or with a wider cultural belief system), it triggers *positive emotional effects*. Rather than focusing on the trigger of strong emotions which might be described in discourse, as "coherence and acceptance feel good," (Thagard, 2008: 168) then metaphors' contribution to coherence might also trigger positive emotions, and these are very important for effective persuasion to occur. In the context of political discourse, this might translate as coherence with culturally entrenched metaphorical systems which are used to organize the social and political life of a nation. The point here is that emotions do not need to be strong. A general feeling that things seem to fit within one's broader understanding of the world can generate positive emotional effects. What we have seen in this chapter is that the interpretation of the metaphors about the actors of the conflict involves the presence within the context of primary metaphors, which allow to relate the understanding of what is happening abroad to one's experience of the world; we have seen that the interpretation of every conflict is constrained by the profiling of relations of Identity, which relate issues of foreign policy to who WE are as a nation, but also to one's own feelings about morality, how to treat others and particularly victims. This is what allows for the feeling of global insight described by Fauconnier and Turner (2002), this feeling that everything fits. As THEIR actions keep getting construed as violent in essence, further positive emotional effects can be generated, as the hearer is left with the feeling that the interpretation of this conflict fits into familiar conceptualizations of US and THEM. Every new conflict can thus attest to its own relevance, so to speak, as yet another proof that the battle against evil is not won, and is necessary. Going further, I suggest that once these positive emotional effects are triggered, the interpretation process might stop because expectations of relevance have been met. This is precisely what allows the hearer to disregard facts about America which might not portray the latter as an irreproachable nation in its conduct in war; or facts about the enemy's attempts to cooperate, for instance. These can be disregarded, because they are irrelevant.

Chapter 5: Metaphors about the conflict

The previous chapter analyzed the conceptual metaphors found across the corpus to depict the various actors of the conflict: who are WE? Who are THEY? One of its aims, and indeed one of the main aims of Chapters 3-6, was to point to an irreparable opposition between the two entities. In turn, Chapter 5 examines how this opposition, how war itself is constructed in discourse, so as to expand on the impact on reasoning which this type of binary construction might have, paving the way for the acceptance of *immediate* action (Chapters 7-9). The aim here is to show how constraining effects work in discourse, and to reinforce the suitability of a combined approach between CBT and RT for extensive empirical analyses.

As social psychology informs us, man has a natural need to belong. In order to "solve adaptive problems associated with sociality," some "exclusionary mechanisms" have evolved, designed to exclude others who might break the rules of social exchanges. Such mechanisms "generate the phenomena that have fallen under the rubric of stigmatization" (Kurzban & Leary, 2001: 188). Therefore, the opposition between US and THEM (the latter representing those that break the rules), is, to some extent, a rather familiar one. In that regard, what is it that sets aside American War Rhetoric from any other form of discourse where stigmatization occurs?
"Stigmatization is based on the shared values and preferences of members of a particular group." (Kurzban & Leary, 2001: 193) In the case of American War Rhetoric, these shared values incorporate a high respect for human life, justice, and a fundamental drive towards peace. Indeed, the group US is conceptualized as the leading defender of freedom as a way to achieve peace in the world. In view of this construal, it is rather striking that certain aspects of war might go against these moral values and ideals. If one holds the sanctity of life in the highest regard, one might imagine that war could be construed as barbaric, making its acceptance very challenging. This chapter aims to show that the metaphors used about the conflict itself contribute to the hearer's acceptance of military action, without it clashing with the ideals that the group US stands for.

Conceptual blending and "blurring"

"[A] complication emerges because of the human capacity for metaphor (Lakoff, 1980; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). In a certain sense, metaphor blurs distinctions that one might otherwise see in a modular, domain-specific system (e.g., Mithen 1996) and clouds our analysis to some extent." (Kurzban & Leary, 2001: 202)

Conceptual metaphors are very helpful when trying to understand abstract, intricate or remote issues, thanks to the use of source domains which are more easily accessible, and through reducing the scale to human understanding (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 324). The hearer's analysis, however, can become "clouded" when one thing is not just like another, but as it gets fused with the other, so that certain characteristics are left in the background - these remain accessible, but might be harder to see; in other words, when a conceptual blend occurs. There are two parts to the process of blurring which are of interest to this study:

- Some elements are blurred together, making up the blend;
- Some elements, proper to the separate input spaces, become 'too blurry to see.'

Justifying a "moral war"

"War is dangerous and costly, and even where it is not mutually injurious or lethal to the participants, it is difficult to see why any sane organism, selected to survive and genetically propagate, should seek so actively to create conditions of such remarkable personal cost and danger." (Tooby & Cosmides, 1988: 1)

The justification of a moral war is a product of the evolution process. "Our modern skulls house a Stone Age mind" (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997). Tooby and Cosmides go on to explain:

"Although humans now nearly universally live in state systems, our minds were formed during tens or hundreds of thousands of generations in small, horizontally organized hunter-gatherer bands. The special psychological mechanisms to deal with coalition aggression that evolved then are with us now, and influence modern human behavior in a wide variety of contests." (1988: 10)

This points to the power of conceptual metaphors in the context of American War Rhetoric. Within a Stone Age mind, resorting to war can be instinctive in order to protect our species from evil forces threatening the evolution of the "moral man." On the other hand, war needs to be moral in order to satisfy "our modern skulls." This perfect example of a conceptual blend shows us that while the reality of war and the advocacy of a peaceful way of life might clash on some levels when analyzed separately, our mind allows for the creation of a space where they can perfectly cohabit: the blend. As one of the aims set out in Chapter 1 was to analyze the mechanisms which allow for apparent inconsistencies to be made sense of, this chapter examines how the metaphors used to construct the conflict can achieve this type of coherence in discourse.

The following three questions should help to account for the effectiveness of conceptual metaphors in this corpus in constraining the interpretation of the conflict to its moral dimension:

1) How do conceptual metaphors "blur boundaries," and what is left in the background of the interpretation process?
2) How is the conflict, the opposition between two groups, construed as one of necessity,
3) while not clashing with OUR ideals of peace?

5.1. A metaphorical battle

The capacity of metaphors to highlight and hide is often referred to when discussing their efficiency in persuasive communication. In the context of American War Rhetoric, hiding the reality of war seems like a powerful strategy in order to convince the public that war, which they might object to on account of the disastrous consequences that it will have on people's lives, is necessary. Although the above interpretation might end up being accepted (it is ok/necessary for THEM to be "destroyed"), the use of terms such as "destroy" might still cause issues for the hearers, and is certainly not favored in the data. It is in that sense, to "defend the indefensible" to borrow Orwell's words (1946), that metaphors become not only useful but necessary in order to discuss OUR involvement.

Within the group US, the reality of military combat only *directly* concerns the soldier. However, the conflict is construed in such a way that it involves citizens at home and soldiers alike. Utterance (4) serves as a key example in order to show how the analysis of such utterances can benefit both from CBT and from RT, and upon which the analysis of (1) to (3) can also be based. I have included the latter in order to exemplify the fact that metaphors such as the one in (4) are to be found throughout the data. The metaphor's constraining effects might thus get reinforced over time.

(1) "We must **take a stand** against terrorism in the world [...]" (Reagan, 18.08.1980, my emphasis)
(2) "We must **stand up** for our security and for the permanent rights and the hopes of mankind. By heritage and by choice, the United States of America will **make that stand**." (G.W. Bush, 12.09.2002, my emphases)
(3) "As one Libyan said, 'We just want to be able to live like human beings.' We just want to be able to live like human beings — it is the most basic of aspirations that is driving this change. And throughout this time of transition, the United States will continue to **stand up for freedom, stand up for justice, and stand up for the dignity of all people.**" (Obama, 23.02.2011, my emphasis)

(4) "Should the day come when we Americans **remain silent** in the face of armed aggression, then the cause of America, the cause of freedom, will have been lost and the great heart of this country will have been broken." (Reagan, 14.11.1985, my emphasis)

For the American soldier, taking part in a foreign war is about getting "the job done." (Clinton, 07.10.1993; Reagan, 09.05.1984). But what does war represent for the rest of the American people? The conceptual metaphors that are used to portray the action taken by America construe military action as a form of statement - vocal, or physical: (AMERICAN) MILITARY ACTION IS SPEAK-

ING UP (4)/ (AMERICAN) MILITARY ACTION IS STANDING UP (1, 2, 3). It is important to note that military action here is only to be understood in the context of American intervention, not military action by the enemy. The previous metaphors offer examples of what Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 126) call "single-scope networks," in that they have "two input spaces with different organizing frames, one of which is projected to organize the blend." The typology which is used to organize the blend in (4) is that of SPEAKING UP. In (4), the hearer is led to infer that failure to speak up, to use one's voice, would not only be inefficient (as armed aggression could not be stopped), but it would also signify a lack of effort on one's part. In the blend, however, the resources needed in order to speak up are not voices - in fact, merely speaking against the atrocities of the enemy would go against what the President is advocating. In the unique blend that is created, "speaking up" requires the use of *all* the resources that are necessary in order to bring an end to the atrocities committed by the enemy, together: this involves military resources, but also the support of the American administration (through allowing military action where necessary, allocating an appropriate budget, etc,) *and* of the people back home. In the blend, cutting short America's involvement, when all else has failed and all that can be done is to fight the enemy with the full might of the American military, would have the same effect as that of remaining completely silent. What is activated from the input space of "speaking up" is thus the effort that it takes to do so, *vs.* the easiness of remaining silent; the active voicing of one's principles vs. the passive nature of keeping them to oneself. The question that I ask here, is how does the hearer get to that interpretation, and how does it get accepted as the most relevant one to interpret the entire conflict?

We have seen that one of conceptual blending's main purposes is to achieve human scale. In (4), and in other utterances where the whole of America is seen to "take a stand" through its military presence, the metaphor THE NATION IS A PERSON contributes to achieving human scale, here by extending the reference of "we," the soldiers on the front, to "we, Americans," to "America," that is every single American, present, past (and future). As a result, the scale of the conflict gets reduced to one between a group of people. It is through achieving human scale that relevance can be achieved: current Americans can directly visualize the significance of the action of American soldiers now, why it is that WE need to be involved in this particular conflict; why it is that this very conflict has perhaps become a matter of OUR national security. In that sense, we can already see the compatibility of CBT and RT, as achieving human scale can both be beneficial to the hearer (in expanding their understanding of the current issues and how they relate to US), and reduce costs, as it

is easier to reason about one person's involvement than to take into account all the people that would be affected by the conflict, not only here and now, but in the world and over time.

We have also seen that RT provides a framework which can act as an engine of selection, so as to understand why certain elements are selected from the input spaces to the blend, while others are not. Here, the actual use of one's voice does not need to make its way into the blend, as it would not be relevant in this context. Rather, it is the topology, the relation of Cause-Effect (between speaking up and communication) that is selected. What follows "remaining silent" in the above utterance favors the activation of the element of effort rather than that of speaking. Indeed, while the use of one's voice might be useful in a political debate, it would have no effect "in the face of armed aggression." While the topology of SPEAKING UP is used to structure the blend, the input space of military combat brings to the blend the elements of courage vs. cowardice. As mentioned above, the blend which is created, however, is unique: in this blend, the courage is not that of the soldiers of the war input space; it is that of the whole American Nation.

What also does not get selected to make sense of the conflict is the reality of combat. Let us see how this might be accounted for here:

- Firstly, through profiling "the cause of Freedom."

The cause defended by the present soldiers is referred to as "the cause of America," which is then equated with "the cause of Freedom." Once again, in order to achieve human scale, the blend compresses relations of Cause-Effect, here into Uniqueness. The value for 'cause' (in the Cause-Effect relation, rather than in the "cause of America") is filled by America's intervention; the 'effect' is then the freedom that should result from the removal of those who use armed aggression to get what they want. In the blend, America and Freedom are linked by a relation of Uniqueness - in order to understand the stakes of this conflict, they are one and the same. In this context, where it is the cause of Freedom that is profiled, one that is suffering, along with the end result, what is relevant is to select the elements which will serve to save it; the selection of the image of American soldiers dying, or perhaps of American soldiers inflicting suffering on others, would not be relevant, as what is profiled in the blend is the ideal of Freedom, and that of America as a nation encompassing not only the soldiers on the front, but all Americans since the nation's founding. The effectiveness of these conceptual metaphors in hiding the reality of military action might indeed be favored by the fact that this reality only directly affects a portion of the people who are addressed, and is physically not accessible to the rest of the American people. The interpretation of such metaphors would be

vastly different if the audience was a group of soldiers, in the context of detailing their duties before being sent to the frontline. In such a context, the implications of construing military action as SPEAKING UP or TAKING A STAND would most likely not be accepted by the hearers, as the reality of combat would be too salient, and would be brought up to highlight the flaws of the metaphor's constraining effect.

- Secondly, through the emergence of responsibility.

"Adding new vital relations to a space can help it achieve human scale. Compression can create a vital relation for the blend that is not in the inputs." (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 324) This is an important aspect of compression, and one which appears to be prevalent in the interpretation of the metaphors about the conflicts. What also gets extended in (4) is the soldier's responsibility in resolving the conflict. Given that the conflicts are interpreted as global issues of humanity, WE (including the people at home) are thus linked to the victims by a new relation of responsibility. Out of this relation of responsibility can stem strong emotions, which can vary depending on the context (from disgust, to guilt or even pride). Through the reduction of the scale of the conflict, it is indeed all of America who is made to feel the burden of its country's responsibility. We can now get to the conclusion that it is not merely up to the soldier to obey their Commander-in-Chief's orders; it is up to "us" all to take that stand, to not remain silent, to not ignore the issues at stake or even undermine their significance.

- Finally, the capacity for blends to trigger strong emotions is also of significance.

"The blend brings to bear inferences that are available from the framing input; and it evokes emotions, seemingly anchored in the trustworthy framing input, that feel to us as if they are all-clarifying [...] [S]trong emotions emergent in the blend can induce the feeling of global insight, because the highly compressed blend remains actively connected to the entire network." (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 129)

We have seen that the added relation of responsibility is to account for emerging emotions in the blend. Strong emotions are more prominent in the interpretation of the metaphors of the conflicts, but they should also be supplemented by the notion of positive emotional effects, as argued in Chapter 4, in order to account for this feeling of "global insight." I argue that the notion of relevance should be added here (and it is indeed very compatible with the notion of positive emotional effects), as that feeling of global insight can translate here into relevance (to all of "us") of the issues discussed, which might at first glance seem so remote that they certainly should not involve placing "our" men in harm's way. Emotions warrant a response; negative emotions, for instance, might provide an indication that something is not quite right. Once strong emotions get triggered,

they need to be integrated. Should the hearer feel disgust, for instance, at the enemy's treatment of their victims, or guilt at the thought of not helping defenseless victims when one has the ability to do so, the decision not to do anything about it might result in a feeling of hypocrisy, given the direct relation between the present conflict and OUR identity. Therefore, what these emotions do is to guide the interpretation of the conflict, to form conclusions on a more global level: it is right to act, and it is wrong not to. The trigger of emotions through metaphors is thus particularly powerful (whether they are strong or not), because it grounds the understanding of the conflicts onto a more fundamental level, one that makes sense to all hearers. Once global insight has been achieved, it would therefore be quite costly to access further input which would clash with this resulting interpretation, such as the reality of the sacrifice involved by taking part in war, questioning whether it is worth it, or whether it is indeed up to US to get involved. Furthermore, in (4), the speaker adds that by remaining silent, America's heart would be breaking. These strong emotions are thus already made sense of on the reduced scale of the interpretation process: the 'spot' for the reasons behind this extreme sadness is already filled by OUR inaction. Therefore what would be more relevant? To interpret the 'harm done' as that to OUR nation's identity? Or as that inflicted on all those who might lose their lives in this one conflict? I argue that the former is the most relevant interpretation, because it allows to make sense of the loss of life as a necessary sacrifice, in order to avoid further losses through OUR nation crumbling entirely. This does not mean that the harm done to OUR soldiers is not heartbreaking or regrettable; but it is not the most relevant factor for the interpretation of the issues at stake, which is constrained to a global, higher level, and which have the capacity to cause the entire nation's heart to break. By incorporating RT, one can thus arrive at an analysis which goes beyond explaining how a blend gets formed and interpreted, so as to account for its efficiency. In this context, once the hearer gets that "all-clarifying" feeling, once positive emotional effects have been triggered, the interpretation process can stop, and the harsh reality of combat which does not match that of speaking up or taking a stand can remain in the background.

In the long term, as the violence of military action is not accessed when the conflict is construed from the side of America, the opposition between US and THEM is strengthened: the metaphors of the conflict appeal to the hearer's human side, extending the soldiers' fight to that of all who care about "the rights and the hopes of mankind." The result of the repeated use of metaphors which reinforce the divide between US and THEM is to constrain the interpretation of the issues, so that nothing about OUR actions can overlap with THEIR use of war.

5.2. Scenarios involving US

Andreas Musolff (2016: 30) defines metaphor scenarios as

> "a set of assumptions made by competent members of a discourse community about the prototypical elements of a concept, that is, participants, 'dramatic' story lines and default outcomes, as well as ethical evaluations of these elements, which are connected to the social attitudes and emotional stances that are prevalent in the respective discourse community."

Metaphor scenarios thus seem to have a sort of narrative built into them, which favors certain inferences over others, and which is grounded in the discourse community they arise in. They are very compatible with CBT's framework of metaphor interpretation, which can include several input spaces, including elements "connected to social attitudes," for instance. When discussing foreign policy, I argue that the use of metaphor scenarios is particularly useful and relevant, thanks to their capacity to activate narratives which are familiar to the discourse community. The metaphors that are analyzed in this section are not necessarily recurrent in several parts of the corpus, unlike those which appeared in Chapter 4. However, their efficiency seems to be based on the narratives or story lines that they assume. I use here the term "metaphorical scenarios" when culturally salient frames are used to structure conceptual blends, containing prototypical story lines and roles. In Fauconnier and Turner's Conceptual Blending Theory, "role is a ubiquitous Vital Relation."

> "Roles have values [...] Within mental spaces, and across mental spaces, an element can be linked, as a role, to another element that counts as its value. Elements are roles or values not in some absolute sense but only relative to other elements." (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 98)

While the narratives present within metaphor scenarios might be helpful in drawing specific inferences in argumentative discourse (Musolff, 2016: 31), it is the roles within them that are of interest here. CBT can thus make sense of this notion of roles within the context of metaphorical scenarios, and account for the effectiveness of the metaphors about the conflict in continuing to make foreign issues relevant to US.

When a conceptual blend is formed, elements and relations from the different input spaces are "compressed" into the blend. Through the process of decompression, the blend also provides access back to the elements of the input spaces, some of which might not appear directly in the discourse, to the entire network; this is referred to as the Unpacking Principle (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 332). In the case of scenarios, some elements might be connected between the various spaces by the vital relation of Role-Value. Some of these "roles" might not be explicitly mentioned in discourse, but the activation of the scenario in the blend is enough to provide access to these roles through de-

compression. In other words, they are available to be filled. In the case of foreign policy, especially when dealing with dangerous conflicts in remote parts of the world, the very existence of a role for the United States might be questioned. Construing these conflicts as scenarios with roles to be filled is therefore of particular interest. I argue here that the search for optimal relevance helps the hearer to "fill the gaps," so that the presence of evil, THEIR presence, calls for a natural opposition from US.

5.2.1. WE are: active spectators

This subsection explores the different metaphors in the corpus which feature the role of spectator, and the construction of that of 'active spectator,' which is reserved to US:

- CONFLICT IS A DRAMA PLAY

In the following examples, (5) and (6) serve as key examples, whose analysis will make more explicit the combination of CBT and RT for the interpretation of online utterances. The rest of the examples in this subsection will then expand on the significance of the metaphors' constraining effects for the consolidation of a binary opposition between US and THEM, by highlighting what is made salient and what is hidden through these metaphorical scenarios.

(5) "Central America is a region of great importance to the United States […] It's at our doorstep, and it's become **the stage** for a bold attempt by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua, to install communism by force throughout the hemisphere." (Reagan, 9 May 1984, my emphasis)
(6) "The **role** that Cuba **has long performed** for the Soviet Union **is now also being played by** the Sandinistas." (Reagan 9 May 1984, my emphases)

Ronald Reagan here construes the conflict in Central America as a drama play, directed by the Soviet Union. While it might be difficult to understand why affairs that are taking place in Central America could be significant to the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, the blend reduces the scale by construing the conflict as a drama play: relations of space are compressed, so that Central America is the stage, and the play is about installing Communism. The different roles that appear within the input space of a drama play are those of the director, the actors, as well as the spectators. In the blend, Cuba and the Sandinistas are the former and current actors. Thanks to the mechanism of decompression, the role of spectators which appears in the input space of the drama play is also available, although not explicitly mentioned in discourse. However, I argue that it does get selected as it meets expectations of relevance. By nature of the context in which (5) and (6) are uttered (addresses to the Nation on National Security), the hearer is trying to answer

the question: how does this affect US? The United States, which is available in the input space of foreign policy/national security, seems to fit that role. In this context, the search for maximum relevance allows for this gap to be filled with little cost to the hearer. Additionally, the fact that there seems to be no clash between the two organizing frames indicates that little cognitive cost should be required to interpret the blend.

This blend offers a unique version of the spectator: unlike the spectator of the drama play input space, there seems to be a choice to become an active spectator, or even an actor, and alter the course of the play. If not, the American people remain spectators of the forceful installation of Communism, but by choice: the spreading of Communism and the consequences that might follow can thus be blamed on this choice to remain passive while witnessing the Soviet Union act with force, triggering guilt (or even fear) in the hearer. In (6), WE might then appear as foolish for failing to act and to comprehend what is really going on. The construction of the conflict as a drama play orchestrated by the enemy also portrays the latter as being fake, using other countries and their civilians as props in order to gain more power. The metaphor thus also serves to discredit THEM, as THEIR behavior in the conflict is staged, untrustworthy. The focus is not on what is actually taking place during the play, but rather on the way that WE and THEY conduct themselves in the conflict: while THEY cheat by resorting to devious means in order to install Communism, WE have a choice between being passive or active to save the way the conflict ends. The conflict is not just about the spread of Communism, but also about OUR role in fighting cheats and brutality in the world. Whatever part WE decide to play in the war, OUR genuine intentions for peace set US apart from THEM. Whatever part WE choose to play, THEY remain evil.

(7) “I have **no illusion** that tonight’s action will **bring down the curtain** on Qadhafi’s reign of terror.” (Reagan 14.04.1986, my emphases)

The metaphorical scenario of THE CONFLICT AS A DRAMA PLAY thus brings out specific roles. While spectators and actors are not normally opposed, when integrated with the conflict/war frame, they become so ideologically opposed that choosing to stay out of the confrontation would taint OUR own identity. In this example, the nature of the play is contrasted with Reagan’s grounding in reality, with a President whose decisive action leaves him with “no illusion” as to what will and should happen. This is a very interesting blend, as it creates a certain uneasiness. Qadhafi’s reign of terror might be construed as a gruesome play, but it is all too real, and it needs to stop. What gets highlighted is not so much Qadhafi’s disregard for humanity as OUR responsibility to make it stop. The metaphorical scenario thus brings in a role for US: as spectators of Qadhafi’s reign of terror,

WE are in the full knowledge of the horrors that he causes, of what is going on being the curtain. Just as WE know that what WE are all watching is wrong, WE also know that OUR decisive action will bring a swift end to the play. It is precisely OUR choice to bring an end to his act that makes the United States of America the antithesis of evil in the world. However, what the metaphor also continues to hide is the fact that military action does not resolve issues quite as simply as one might end a play, and might leave behind seeds of distrust, anger, and perhaps more conflict.

- A TRAGEDY

The conflict is also often referred to as a tragedy. The term "tragedy" has become so common in everyday language that its use as a source domain to form conceptual blends might be questioned. However, the narrative that is made available through the use of "tragedy" in the following utterances creates the perfect conditions for the formation of metaphorical scenarios. In a context where a clear opposition between two main actors, US and THEM, is constantly reinforced, the retrieval of the tragedy's narrative is made easier:

(8) "Tonight I want to speak to you about **the tragedy in Kosovo**..." (Clinton 24.03.99, my emphasis)
(9) "Ending **this tragedy** is a moral imperative." (Clinton 24.03.99, my emphasis)

(10) "Could there be any greater **tragedy** than for us to **sit back** and permit this cancer to spread, leaving my successor to face far more agonizing decisions in the year ahead?" (Reagan, 16.03.1986, my emphases)

(11) "Instead of **drifting along toward tragedy** [...]" (G.W. Bush, 17.03.2003, my emphasis)

THE CONFLICT IS A TRAGEDY. Thanks to the mechanism of decompression, the hearer can have access to the inner-space relations that are available within the input space "tragedy." In the blend, the focus is on the unfairness of the situations, calling to our moral side to take action.
In the input space "tragedy," one finds a victim, whose fate is deemed to be desperate and generally unfair. The outer-space relation of Cause-Effect between the events that led to the unfortunate end, and the fate itself, is compressed into one of Property in the input space of TRAGEDY, so that the end/fate of a tragedy systematically appears as desperate (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 100). These compressions are transferred to the blend, so that the people affected by the conflict appear as victims, whose fate one can only despair at.
The conflict/war frame brings new roles into the blend: that of the attacker, who, causing the victim's despair, appears as a bully; and possibly that of a defender or savior. The blend creates a unique metaphorical scenario where the roles of bully and savior are free to be filled, so that expectations of relevance can be met. Unlike in the tragedy of the input space, a new role, that of the sav-

ior, can change the outcome which no longer needs to be inevitably desperate. If the spectators choose to remain so, and "sit back," they become at least partly responsible for the suffering of the victims. Once again, WE can choose to confront THEM, thus leaving evil solely on THEIR side; or WE can remain passive and let tragic events take their course, becoming at least in some way accessories to the unfolding of evil. It is thus OUR choice, which is profiled as a moral choice, which cements the strict opposition between US and THEM.

- World Scale Courtroom

The conflict is also occasionally conceptualized as a courtroom. The conceptual blends that follow are also interpreted as metaphorical scenarios, by virtue of the roles and storyline that they make available during the interpretation process.

By reducing the scale to a human scale, conceptual blending allows the hearer to gain insight into very complicated issues, involving actors across the world and/or across time. In the world of politics, metaphors such as STATE AS PERSON effectively contribute to achieving human scale (Chapter 4, 4.1). In the following examples, the conflicts which fall under the scope of international affairs are construed as the ones dealt with in a courtroom. The American hearers are encouraged to apply the same rules as the ones they are familiar with within the American justice system. However, the same crime might not get the same sentence in different countries, or even in different states of America, which highlights the limitations of such metaphors. The overall interpretation of the conflict is constrained, not merely by constraining the response to the events to that of criminal acts, but also by taking for granted that it is OUR role to decide on that punishment in the first place, and then to enforce it.

(12) "If we let him **get away with this**, who knows what's going to be next?" (G.Bush, quoting a soldier, 16.01.1991, my emphasis)
(13) "A world in which brutality and lawlessness **are allowed to go unchecked** [...]" (G.Bush 16.01.1991, my emphasis)
(14) "Terry understands the moral obligation that has compelled our extraordinary multi-national coalition to make this stand in the Gulf. To look this international terrorist straight in the eye and say: no concessions. To proclaim for now and for the future: no compromises. **To bear witness by our presence** to the fact that aggression will not be rewarded." (G.Bush 09.01.1991, my emphasis)

(15) "By breaking every pledge, by his deceptions, and by his cruelties, Saddam Hussein **has made the case against himself**." (G.W.Bush 12.09.2002, my emphasis)

In these metaphorical scenarios, the conflict is taking place in the courtroom, at the time of judgement. It is not the semanticity of the words used which triggers the formation of conceptual blends,

but rather the structure, the roles which they imply: a criminal/witnesses/and potentially, a judge. The criminal act has been committed, and the question is not whether or not the accused is indeed guilty, but whether or not they will be punished; whether or not WE will punish them. Indeed, the role of the judge, which is made available through the use of the courtroom scenario, is here filled by America. In (14), G.Bush's comment follows his quoting excerpts from a soldier's letter. The soldier in question, Terry, testifies to the righteousness of the decision to take firm action. The voice of an American soldier to "bear witness" is rather powerful, easing the acceptance of the resort to military action. The courtroom scenario makes salient the fact that the issue at stake, and particularly OUR role in the affair, is about more than the mere resolution of a conflict: it is about setting a precedent: that "aggression will not be rewarded." The American soldiers are construed as ready to bear witness to that important truth; it is then up to the judge to decide whether WE are ready to make this stand. That is the bigger issue.

While the blends focus on the judge's choice to enforce a punishment, what is left in the background is whether or not America should be acting as judge in the first place. Musolff (2016: 31) explains that scenarios, especially as they are deeply culturally entrenched, are "more than a random selection of conceptual elements" from general domains, "but rather a particular set of presuppositions that are chosen for specific argumentative purposes." In this case, it is presupposed that morality standards call for a judge to step in; that that judge should be America. The response is thus constrained to whether or not the country will act as a *fair* judge, not who the judge should be. This decision will set a precedent to the future of the world: OUR military presence is not only construed as a response to the current conflict, punishing the evil acts that have just been committed; it reinforces OUR role as judges, as holding the authority to make these important decisions, and on occasions despite disapproval from world organizations (see Chapters 10-11).

These blends allow the hearer to take a glimpse into the future. The relation of Cause-Effect which, in the input space of (AMERICAN) JUSTICE, links past court cases to America's current and future landscape, is transferred to the blend. Although past rulings are not explicitly stated in (12-15), the relation of Cause-Effect in which they are involved is made available through the organizational frame activated by the (AMERICAN) JUSTICE input space. It is this relation of Cause-Effect which directly involves America in such remote conflicts, making the opposition between US and THEM relevant to the future of the world. The unfolding of the conflict relies on the constraint of the opposition between US and THEM as one of moral authority, where the choice to *not* oppose them and let them "get away" with their wrongdoings is construed on the side of immorality (on

OUR part). The scale of the interpretation process is thus also established, on the level of humanity. When global concerns are made salient, the retrieval of facts about the victims' questionable past actions (see Lakoff 1991), for instance, which might on a more local level be used by the enemy to justify his actions, is made a lot less accessible, it is irrelevant.



Fig. 8: Conceptual blend for: AMERICA AS JUDGE

5.2.2. WE are: timeless fighters

The results of the above analyses can now be used to attempt to account for the effectiveness of these metaphors/metaphorical scenarios in the construal *over time* of the conflict as a constant fight of good vs. evil, so that the opposition between US and THEM can always be made relevant. There are three steps to this process:

1) Bringing the injustice before our eyes

As an effect of conceptual blending, the scale of the conflict is reduced, so that the injustices taking place on the other side of the world can be brought directly to the hearer. The above metaphorical scenarios all have in common the creation of a role of witness for US, as spectators in a play, or as members of a jury in court. Bringing the injustice before the eyes of the hearers allows the conflicts to become relevant to them, not just as American citizens, but as moral human beings. The relevant criterion for the interpretation of the conflicts is set as the selection of humanity's scene, rather than

perhaps focusing on the consequences of America's action for the immediate future of Iraq, in the case of the Gulf War.

2) Roles fitting in dominant models

Whatever the situation, whatever the scenario chosen, the role given to US is always the same and goes back to this basic need to punish evil, wherever or however it appears. The effectiveness of such metaphors, however, lies within the fact that OUR role as savior is not questioned.

In Western discourse, the STRICT FATHER MORALITY model (SFM, as opposed to that of the NURTURANT PARENT) is dominant in the conceptualization of world politics and the role of nations like the United States. One of its key characteristics is that "for the strict father, strictness is a form of nurturance and love -- tough love" (Lakoff, 1995: 192). By contrast, the "primal experience behind [the NURTURANT PARENT model] is one of being cared for and cared about" (Lakoff, 1995: 197), one which sees protection as caring.

The two models make up the landscape of American politics, and the activation of one does not entail the complete suppression of the other. "Cognitively, the NURTURANT PARENT alternative is and has always been available; however, in terms of political influence, the STRICT FATHER model has been dominant until relatively recently." (Musolff, 2016: 30) I argue that the metaphorical scenarios used to conceptualize the conflict in the corpus are grounded in that dominant model, that is the SFM model, which advocates the need for a role of 'punisher,' executed by a strong father figure, and which stems from the (presupposed) existence of evil. We saw in Chapter 4 that the metaphors about US and THEM consistently reinforced the SFM model throughout the corpus; given the salience of SFM, the retrieval of OUR role (as judge/savior, etc.) within metaphorical scenarios can become a lot more easily available, and remains consistent over time. In a context which would profile the NURTURANT PARENT model, which rather advocates protection and care (as opposed to punishment or harsh action), bringing up facts about Kuwait's less than innocent actions towards Iraq, for example, would be more problematic, and the retrieval of OUR role as judge would thus be made more costly, as different solutions might appear more suitable. Within SFM, on the other hand, every conflict can come as a confirmation of the frame's own relevance, maintaining OUR role as savior over time.

3) Time compression

The metaphorical scenarios analyzed above all focus on one specific part: the resolution/ending of the play; the moment of judgement. As the chain of events that leads to the conflict is compressed,

OUR part is constrained to one of resolution, to the part that is recorded in the history of the United States as the defender of freedom. What remains hidden is the present reality of war for the American soldier, as OUR actions are interpreted according to their impact for the future of America and of mankind. Compressions play an important role in supporting interpretations which focus on the end point, on the resolution of the conflict.

(4) "Should the day come when we Americans remain silent in the face of armed aggression, then **the cause of America**, the cause of freedom, will have been lost and **the great heart of this country will have been broken**." (Reagan, 14.11.1985, my emphases)

If we go back to Reagan's utterance in (4), repeated here for convenience, we can see that time is compressed so that the cause of America is constrained to a person's lifetime, for example. The reality of war in the present, the lives affected by present conflicts, can appear a lot smaller as time is compressed in the blend, which helps the hearers to accept the implications of their mission. Present conflicts are therefore conceptualized as chapters in a story which unfolds over time, where the main actors remain the same: roles remain unchanged, only circumstances differ. **The compression of time appears as a central mechanism in promoting an understanding of each conflict as a new realization of the more general battle between US and THEM**, and will be further explored in 5.3. The fixation of these roles into constants throughout time reinforces the construction of a binary opposition between the two groups. The conceptualization of the conflict thus appears as a binary opposition which lasts in time, just like right vs. wrong, light vs. dark, good vs. evil, etc.

(16) "**A year** after **the joyous dawn** of freedom's light in Eastern Europe, a dark evil has descended in another part of the world. But we have the chance — and we have the obligation — to stop ruthless aggression." (G.Bush 09.01.1991, my emphases)

Once again, the compression of time favors an interpretation of the conflict that is grounded in the roles of both actors, particularly in OUR role to fight evil wherever, whenever and however it might appear. This is a very interesting conceptual blend where the present situation is directly linked to this overarching conflict between good and evil. By fighting THEM now, WE are contributing to the everlasting battle between good and evil. "A year" indeed refers to the timeline which the hearer is in, to the current conflict; "the joyous dawn," however, establishes a different timeline, that of the timeless conflict between good and evil. As both timelines are blended, OUR role (here construed as an obligation) is not confined to the role "we" are currently playing in defeating a specific enemy, but rather it is extended to OUR role in the fight against evil in the world, and through time. As G.W.Bush summarized it, "[we]'ve been called to a unique role in human events." (29.01.2002)

Sections 5.1 and 5.2 have served three main goals: (a) to account for the ways in which the metaphors about the conflict contribute to reinforcing the divide between US and THEM; (b) to account for the effectiveness of these metaphors in hiding the reality of war, thanks to the combination of CBT and RT; and (c) to evaluate the impact over time of the cementing of this binary opposition on the online interpretation of metaphors. In order to do so, we have often seen that RT can feed into CBT and enrich the latter, particularly to make clear what elements of input spaces might get selected and which might not. 5.3 explores the ways in which the reverse is true. Chapter 2 briefly summed up RT's approach to metaphor processing, viewing metaphor as an example of loose talk. One aim of this thesis is to show that this is not incompatible with the statement that metaphors have a special role to play in persuasion. I thus agree with Tendahl and Gibbs' take on the significance of metaphors:

> "We support the idea that mappings play a significant role in accessing contextual assumptions and we also agree with the idea that metaphor interpretation works according to expectations of relevance. However, we would go a step further and claim that mappings do not just modify accessibility of assumptions and thereby the processing effort of interpreting metaphors, we believe that mappings are responsible for the connection between, for example, physical and psychological senses of concept attributes like 'powerful'." (Tendahl & Gibbs, 2008: 1839)

The aim here is to take the discussion from the theoretical to the empirical domain. To that end, 5.3 focuses on the constant reinforcement of mappings between the physical and the moral domains, with the hope of continuing the discussion on metaphors' 'special' place in the efficiency of discourses such as American War Rhetoric.

5.3. From the 'physical' to the 'moral'

This section explores the metaphors within the data which blur the lines between the physical and moral domains, giving rise to inferences not only about the present conflict, but also about OUR role on a broader level, OUR place in the world. I argue that it is through these mappings, or rather through conceptual blending, that the interpretation of the conflict can be constrained to one of *objective* morality. First, strategies which allow to convey a sense of objectivity to the hearer will be reviewed in 5.3.1 and 5.3.2; 5.3.3 will then conclude this chapter with a corpus-based analysis of the JOURNEY metaphor, to analyze the potential impact over time of the constant reinforcement of mappings between the physical and moral domains.

5.3.1. IDEOLOGY AS PHYSICAL LOCATION

The angle from which one looks at a scene will inevitably alter the way one interprets it: what appears in the foreground, in the background, what is hidden, what seems more prominent, but also what the observer him/herself might be concerned with at that moment., are all factors that will impact the observation/perception process. Likewise, the speaker's cultural, political and personal positions will influence his discourse on the conflicts that his nation is involved in. The aim here is to show that the use of conceptual metaphors can provide the hearers with a feeling of objectivity, so as to efficiently align their interpretation with that of the speaker, and in so doing hiding the speaker's inevitable bias. This feeling of objectivity is based on the claim in Cognitive Linguistics that

> "language is grounded in non-linguistic experience, including visuo-spatial experience of the kind captured in a grammar or visual design. From this perspective, then, meaning draws on experiences we have with our bodies, including visuo-spatial experience, and meaning construction relies on cognitive processes whose primary domains are those involved in such experiences, including vision, spatial cognition and motor control." (Hart, 2014: 107)

What this entire section (5.3) is concerned with is the construal of the conflicts - I argue here that by grounding this construal in the hearer's physical experience of reality, a feeling of objectivity might be obtained, making conceptual metaphors a particularly powerful mechanism in aligning the speaker's and hearer's representation of the issues.

When dealing with morality, conceptual metaphors are an obviously useful resource, as they help to make sense of the abstract with concrete, familiar notions. When trying to comprehend what constitutes morality, the boundaries might be slightly fuzzy: depending on the angle from which one is looking, classifying an event as moral or immoral might be difficult, or may at least give way to some grey areas. Grounding the conceptualization of the conflict in 'the physical' dimension of reality can in this sense help to establish clear boundaries. The first step is to separate oneself from immorality:

- Separating ourselves from immorality

Moral viewpoints and ideologies are regularly understood in terms of physical positions:

> (17) "My fellow Americans, you know **where I stand**. The Soviets and the Sandinistas must not be permitted to crush freedom in Central America..." (Reagan, 16.03.1986, my emphasis)

In (17), the construal of IDEOLOGY as a PHYSICAL LOCATION is particularly significant. In the context of war, the country's ideological position translates as the physical presence of the American soldiers, acting as a physical barrier to stop those who wish to "crush freedom in Central Amer-

ica." The lines between the metaphorical and what one might refer to as literal, are thus blurred. This allows for the interpretation of utterances such as (18) to serve a double function.

(18) "Terry understands the moral obligation that has compelled our extraordinary multi-national coalition to **make this stand** in the Gulf." (G.Bush, 09.01.1991, my emphasis)

One entailment of the choice of PHYSICAL LOCATION/MOVEMENT as source domain is that American soldiers appear as a physical barrier to the cruelty of the enemy. The conflict thus visually appears two-sided: the enemy and all that they represent (evil, violence, immorality) lie on one side; America and the rest of the civilized world are on the other, with the American soldier (supported by a coalition) acting as a physical barrier between the two. While the framework of RT is perfectly equipped to account for the interpretation of utterances like (17) or (18), I argue that that of CBT needs to be incorporated to fully account for the effectiveness of these metaphors. In the context of a physical conflict, "making a stand" without getting physically involved might appear frivolous, thus reinforcing the perceived suitability of the metaphor itself as an objective way to interpret the situation. What we are concerned with here is not merely the interpretation of metaphors as they occur online, but rather their impact in the long term, as the need for America to "make a stand" is reiterated throughout (and outside) the corpus. The analysis of utterances such as (17) and (18) with the tools of CBT can help to determine what it is that makes them relevant for the whole discourse, as well as when they get interpreted online. As Stover (2010) notes, what is perhaps missing from relevance-theoretical accounts of metaphor interpretation is the visual simulation which it seems to intuitively provide. I argue that this is especially true for cases such as (17) or (18), and that conceptual blending in particular is best equipped to deal with that aspect. In the context of war, it is the blending of elements from the Ideological Input Space and from the Physical Input Space which makes the metaphor so powerful. It is the compression of Part-Whole relation (between the American soldier and his country) into that of Uniqueness, which would allow the President to say that America itself is making that stand. We have seen that metaphor can blur lines between different domains. In this case, it is the blending of the two which leads to interpretations of OUR uniqueness, of OUR superior moral standing: the willingness to make the biggest physical sacrifice, to fight for one's ideals. We have already tackled the property of metaphors to hide the reality of war (5.1.2). Indeed, bringing to the American people's minds the direct representation of their soldiers' loss of life, of the sadness which this would cause their families, or of a country devastated by war would be rather costly, when the aim is to gather support for war. Rather, what is selected to be transferred to the blend is the immense property of their soldiers' sacrifice, extended to the whole

country. The compression into Uniqueness means that "we" are all making that stand, whether "we" are giving orders from the White House, supporting the war at home, or fighting on the frontline. But what makes the metaphor so powerful is that the hearers still have access to the rest of the network. The reality of war is fully accessible, and while upsetting details might not get selected, its physical element is.

WAR is thus conceptualized for US as the physical representation of morality, the embodiment of OUR moral principles, where violence and despair end. As the two domains become repeatedly blended, one might then infer that being there, being *physically* there constitutes a condition to OUR morality. Blending is responsible for that emerging inference; it does not just make it more easily available. This is what makes the interpretation of the conflicts *always* directly relevant to all Americans. It is not the direct visualization of "making a stand" (at the elaboration stage) which makes CBT particularly well equipped to deal with such metaphors; indeed, in the case of metaphors which are used over and over again, that visual component might be less significant. Rather it is the reinforcement of relations of Uniqueness, linking OUR physical presence and OUR morality, as America continues to make a stand, both metaphorically and literally. This is what then makes salient assumptions that America's presence abroad is first and foremost a moral necessity. In terms of relevance, the hearer's task is directed to determining whether it is right or wrong to support the war. When the latter is linked so closely to OUR morality, not *now* but as a matter of identity, it can then be very costly to reject it. Regardless of one's potential reservations regarding war, the cementing of the suitability of metaphors profiling OUR physical presence to realize one's moral principles, to oppose THEM, makes it a lot harder to argue against military action.

• Delimiting abstract concepts

(19) "We are **on the side of** peaceful, democratic change in Central America." (Reagan, 13.08.1983, my emphasis)
(20) "**On the one side** freedom, on the other, despair." (G.Bush, 22.11.1989, my emphasis)
(21) "And so let us remember and support Terry Hatfield, all our fine service men and women, as they **stand ready on the frontier of freedom**, willing to do their duty and do it well." (G.Bush 09.01.1991, my emphasis)

The construal of the morality of the conflict as being physically divided between two "sides" reinforces a binary opposition between US and THEM, where peace, democracy and freedom are opposed to violence and despair, and where the two groups and what they stand for cannot coexist. In (21), the conflict is construed as a country or geographical area where freedom is a physical frontier. While the reality in which the hearers live is made of multiple physical spaces (most commonly

delimited as countries or continents), the blend compresses them into two single physical spaces, separated by "the frontier of freedom." FREEDOM is conceptualized as a physical barrier which separates US from THEM. In this understanding, whoever opposes freedom is the enemy, regardless of one's geographical position. There is no middle ground: one cannot support freedom without supporting the conflict. The compression of space places all Americans and all the supporters of freedom in the world into one unified group. The question, 'should Americans be part of the conflict?,' therefore becomes irrelevant; instead, it becomes a question of morality, dividing the whole of humanity into two groups. By construing the divide between US and THEM as a physical frontier, a sense of objectivity can come out of the blend. Some other motives for taking part or staying out of the conflict might appear in the input space of the United States of America. When the whole of humanity is separated into two spaces, and the criterion for being placed on one side or the other is the support (or non support) of freedom, such individual differences do not appear, because they are not construed as relevant to the final decision of whose side one is on - although they remain cognitively available to the hearer. By grounding the conflict between US and THEM into a physical divide with a physical frontier, the issues at stake appear to be objectively delimited, rather than as a 'Westernized' version of events.

By grounding the conceptualization of the conflicts in one's physical understanding of reality, the lines around the concept of morality are not blurred; rather they are cemented, because the definite properties of the physical domain are used to construe morality, which allows for an over-simplification of the issues. By profiling morality, and by construing the latter as a clear-cut concept (which is certainly not always true), the interpretation of the conflicts can thus carry a feeling of objectivity. Where PHYSICAL LOCATION is used to construe IDEOLOGY, it then makes sense that OUR part in the conflict regularly gets construed as a JOURNEY, which constitutes another strategy to blur the lines between the physical and moral domains.

5.3.2. (OUR) CONFLICT IS A JOURNEY

Indeed, one recurring source domain for the conceptualization of the conflict is that of JOURNEY. More specifically, it is rather OUR part in the conflicts which is construed as a journey.
The JOURNEY metaphor differs from those which have been analyzed so far in this chapter, because it was found to be recurrent and prevalent throughout the corpus. I will start by outlining the methods of analysis, before moving onto the analyses themselves and the discussion.

Methods of analysis

After reading all the collected speeches making up our data and conducting a manual analysis, it appeared that the JOURNEY metaphor ran through the entire corpus. A more thorough analysis was then conducted to confirm (or refute) this. The aim was first to find out whether it was actually salient in the *entire* corpus, and so whether it constitutes a prominent feature of the rhetoric of war, or whether it was only used at certain, specific times; the second aim was to understand how the metaphor is used throughout the corpus. While it is probably impossible to generate an accurate, undisputed list of all the uses of the metaphor, the following method was helpful in identifying an extensive, representative list of concordance lines that use the metaphor in the corpus.

1. First, a manual analysis of *one* speech (selected at random) by each president was conducted to highlight each term that was used to convey the metaphor.
2. A list of key terms was then created following this manual analysis:

move moving moves moved; forward; reach reaches reached reaching; come comes coming came; pursue pursues pursuit pursuing pursued; advance advances advanced advancing; progress; toward towards; step steps stepped stepping; seek seeking sought seeks; return returns returned returning; embark embarked embarks embarking; follow follows following followed; turn turned turning turns; drawn draws draw drawing; advantage; gathers gathered gather gathering; spread spreading spreads; course; lead leads led leading; focus refocus focuses refocuses focusing refocusing; direct redirect directs redirects directing redirecting directed redirected ; chart charts charting charted; guide guides guiding guidance guided; beyond; far; close; back; near; ahead; point; way; path; passage; pathway; journey; trek; steadfast; stand stands standing stood; ongoing; transition; penetration penetrate penetrates penetrating penetrated; drift drifting drifted drifts; along.

(I chose to list all the possible forms of each verb rather than use a *, in order to avoid too many unrelated entries - such as “become” when searching “com*”)

3. Antconc was used to search these key terms in the whole corpus.
4. Finally, a manual analysis of the concordance lines generated was conducted to determine which entries were actually used metaphorically.

By looking at the file view, it appeared that the metaphor was used relatively as frequently by all presidents, confirming that it is indeed used throughout the whole corpus rather than just at periodical times. Reagan and G.W. Bush seem to resort to it slightly more, but we will see in further detail in Chapter 11 that this difference can be accounted for by the fact that they are the only presidents who also construe the enemy’s actions and goals as a journey. On the other hand, the U.S.’s part in the conflict is systematically construed as a journey.

The domain of JOURNEY contains many elements, only some of which get activated in discourse, selected to fulfill a specific purpose. In the data, two distinctive uses of the metaphor have been noticed:

- focus on the end point, the destination, when the purpose is to determine who is on the right side of the conflict, and who is in the wrong.
- focus on the manner/direction, when the main purpose is to criticize the nation's current (inactive) stance (this will also be tackled in the chapters dealing with the construction of urgency).

5.3.2.1. Focus on: destination

(22) "It has made great progress **toward** democracy." (Reagan, 09.05.1984, my emphasis)
(23) "[…] a **move** against communism and **toward** freedom that is sweeping the world" (Reagan, 16.02.1985, my emphases)
(24) "**reach** a peaceful resolution" (my emphasis)
(25) "America does not **seek** conflict." (G.Bush, 16.01.1991, my emphasis)
(26) "and put the people on the **path to** peace" (Clinton, 12.10.1988, my emphasis) (the "path to peace" is mentioned on many occasions)
(27) "By acting now, we **are taking a strong step toward** a goal that has always been […]" (Clinton, 27.03.1999, my emphasis)
(28) "**leading** the world **toward** a new age when freedom belongs to all." (G.W. Bush, 15.01.2009, my emphasis)
(29) "the hope of a world **moving toward** justice, **escaping** old patterns of conflict" (G.W. Bush, 12.09.2002, my emphases)
(30) "We will secure the peace and **lead** the world **to** a better day." (G.W. Bush, 07.10.2002, my emphases)
(31) "liberty and justice light the **path to** peace." (G.W.Bush, 15.01.2009, my emphasis)

What is profiled in (22) to (31) (selected as representative examples from the data) is the purpose, the *end point*. The enemy can then be construed as more than a simple obstacle that one might just have to walk around; rather, THEY are *essentially* opposed to this end point. This 'Other,' these "enemies of freedom," is what prompts the journey in the first place, and keeps it going: without THEM there would be no journey, no need to save peace or to defend freedom. In these blends, going to war as a means to get to peace makes sense, as the conceptual blend resolves the clash between the input spaces (between the ideal of peace and the resort to war).



Fig. 9: Conceptual Blend for: (OUR) WAR AS A JOURNEY

For the group US, WAR IS A JOURNEY; since the focus is on the destination, America's involvement in wars is seen to stem from a desire to reach its (selfless) goal, which is the defense of freedom and preservation of peace in the world. Despite its resort to war, the ideal of peace as a central component of America's identity can be maintained, which can be demonstrated by an analysis combining inputs from RT and CBT. If we look more closely at (26) or (31), which both direct the hearer's attention to "the path to peace," how might such utterances be interpreted? Let us start with a relevance-theoretical type of analysis. The element PHYSICAL SURFACE ON WHICH ONE CAN WALK does not get selected here, so that the concept can be broadened to PATH*. This is possible through profiling the journey's DESTINATION: as the path in (26) or (31) leads to "peace," the concept of DESTINATION (which is integral to that of JOURNEY) is also broadened, so as to encompass anything that is desirable, rather than just physical locations. One can then easily get to the inference that the journey is worth taking (in (31), this is also reinforced by the fact that that path is lit, indicating that it is the right one to choose). This is indeed compatible with the wider use of the JOURNEY source domain to construe other concepts such as that of relationships, where if a relationship is not "going anywhere," the implication might be that it is not worth pursuing. The notion of ad hoc concepts can show us here that (26) and (31) can easily be understood, and do not

require much cognitive effort. Added inputs from CBT can take the analysis further, so as to understand not only how one gets to the interpretation that it is ok for US to resort to war to get to peace, but also why it can be accepted, and even how it might contribute to updating one's understanding of PEACE.

Firstly, I argue that the previous analysis points to a clear compatibility with the framework of CBT, as one might say that what appears in the final blend (see figure 9) is actually an ad hoc concept of PEACE*, which, within the above integration network, does not have to clash with the reality of America getting involved in a war. Besides, the combination of ad hoc concepts and conceptual integration could allow the former to have some implications, not only on the analysis of online utterances, but on a discourse's impact over time as well. Let us start with a theoretical discussion of how the two frameworks might be combined before seeing how it might be applied here. The differences between the accounts of ad hoc concepts and mental spaces might be said to derive from differing goals or approaches of the communicative act. Nevertheless, they present some similarities, paving the way for analyses integrating both frameworks. As Tendahl (2009: 198) points out, "blending theory's notion of mental spaces is somewhere in between the notion of ad hoc concepts and conceptual domains." Unlike conceptual domains, ad hoc concepts and mental spaces are both dynamic constructs, serving the purpose of local understanding. It is at this point that the notion of relevance is particularly useful, in order to account for the constraints on their construction/interpretation. But what distinguishes ad hoc concepts from mental spaces is that the latter emphasizes relational structures, which are of significant importance to account for the potential constraint on reasoning, especially in the case of metaphors. In that regard, Tendahl's notion of conceptual regions, which he defines as "a blueprint for an *ad hoc concept*" (2009: 199), seems to make apparent the positive aspects of both theories. However, it has not been adopted in this thesis, because although the idea that utterances might *point* at conceptual regions is very appealing, and in line with Fauconnier's notion of "language prompts" (2006: 658), the assumption that there are conceptual regions containing empty slots which need filled is speculative. Rather, the interpretation process as developed in this thesis seems to align with Fauconnier's argument that "language forms do not 'carry' information," but that they "*latch on* to rich pre-existent networks in the subjects' brains and trigger massive sequential and parallel activations" (2006: 658, my emphasis), which exemplifies better the addressee's search for coherence. The combination of ad hoc concepts and of CBT's account of metaphor interpretation thus has the potential to make the needs of the discourse meet broader concerns of coherence, from a cognitive point of view, which seems perfectly suited to the

analysis of persuasive mechanisms. Let us now get back to the interpretation of (26) and (31), in light of the above discussion.

It might first seem that the use of a metaphor to discuss war should highlight the idealistic aspects of peace, which would then favor the interpretation of peace in its strictest understanding, that is implying a complete absence of violent means. However, the construction of peace as a destination, as we have seen, implies that the latter has not been reached yet. In fact, is is THEIR mere presence which stops US from reaching OUR destination. In this understanding, THEIR removal is not just acceptable, it is necessary in order to reach that ideal. We can thus get to the ad hoc concept PEACE*, which promotes America's action to reach an ideal. However, PEACE* is not simply juxtaposed beside America's ideals and involvement; rather, it is through conceptual integration that the physical element of the input space of JOURNEYS (which in the blend translates as America taking an active stance vs. remaining idle) can modify the understanding of PEACE, so that PEACE* might rather be understood as the willingness to sacrifice what is necessary for the greater good of humanity, so that the world's ideals might be realized. In this understanding, one can get to the conclusion promoted by this type of discourse, whereby ideals are not separated from reality; instead, they drive all of one's actions, and it is only in that sense that they can one day be reached and become reality. The integration of an input space grounded in one's physical experience of reality (that of taking a journey) is what allows for this reconciliation of ideals and reality, for the conceptualization of PEACE* which perfectly meets the needs of this discourse. As the hearer is guided to distinguish who is doing war right (those on the path to peace), and who is not (those who disrupt the state of peace), two goals are reached here: expectations of relevance are met, and the broader opposition between US and THEM is cemented.

Although RT is generally used to analyze the online interpretation of metaphors, we can begin to see how its framework might also be applied to the interpretation of discourses within which metaphors might be recurring, as is the case here. Indeed, if the creation of ad hoc concepts can occur within a blend, following the principles of CBT, it might then serve as an input space for further blending, and in that sense impact the interpretation of other metaphors in discourse. Furthermore, it is to be noted that the prevalence of the source domain of JOURNEYS to construct concepts such as LIFE, LOVE, etc., (Lakoff 1986) is likely to reduce the cognitive costs associated with its uses in different contexts, such as that of foreign policy, thus facilitating its acceptance when applied to OUR involvement in military conflicts. However, I argue that this still does not fully account for the

efficiency of the metaphor in this particular context. This is where a final contribution from CBT is required.

If we take a closer look at the above utterances, we can notice that the mechanism of compression occurs in ways that are similar, and indeed in ways which we have already discussed in this chapter. In the blends, it is not just space that is compressed, but also time, as the journey is taking "us" to "a better day," or to "a new age." Following the effects of blending, 'America now' is thus linked to its future, to the future of peace (that which is desired, where there is no evil), not by a relation of time, but by a relation of Cause-Effect. Over time, this can translate as a relation of Responsibility, thanks to the salience of the metaphor STATE AS PERSON. It is not just contextual assumptions which are constrained, but rather reasoning. I argue that this is what then allows for arguments which promote a more dynamic approach to resonate so widely with the public, as OUR identity gets construed over time as a dynamic concept, which we will see in Chapter 9 plays a significant role in the construction of urgency. Through conceptual blending, this "new age," this better tomorrow will not just come, in the same way as tomorrow morning does; rather, what is made salient is OUR responsibility in making it happen.

By reducing the conflicts to human scale, OUR (timeless) responsibility is made salient as the dynamic element which allows the world to reach peace. The way this scale is organized is of importance, because the relations between each element might determine on what level the consequences which failing to meet OUR responsibilities are to be felt. The context in which all the speeches from the corpus are made makes salient the notion of responsibility. Indeed, the polls following those speeches often ask the question: do you think the President is handling the issues well?, highlighting his responsibility towards the world but also towards being true to his nation's identity. However, it is important to determine on what level that responsibility is understood: is it the President's responsibility towards his citizens that is profiled? Or America's responsibility towards the rest of the world? Or even towards America's Founding Fathers? These are all factors which will affect the relevance of the issues and the way they get interpreted. CBT can enrich RT accounts here, by highlighting the way in which the scale is reduced, and to what/who OUR responsibility is directly linked. Through the construal of OUR part in the conflict as a JOURNEY, it tends to be towards America's and the world's future. As long as that "new age" has not been reached, OUR resort to war can therefore be construed as a responsible action.

5.3.2.2. Focus on: Manner and Direction

We have seen that the focus on the journey's direction can help the hearers determine who in the conflict is right, and who is wrong. Once that is acknowledged, focusing on the manner with which WE are walking, or on the journey's direction, serves to criticize the current lack of action, as it appears to be unfit for the purpose of reaching that destination. For example, if the U.S.'s involvement becomes the focus of a bi-partisan divide, the same metaphor can be used to construe the opposition as being 'led astray.' As a result, the speaker's own views can be portrayed as more appropriate, because they appear in keeping with America's life long journey, true to its identity and purpose. This use of the JOURNEY metaphor is particularly relevant at times when a new election is looming, as the President's ability to lead the country in the right direction is made salient, as is the case in (32):

(32) "Is it only Jimmy Carter's lack of coherent policy that is the source of our difficulty? Is it his **vacillation** and indecision? Or is there another, more frightening possibility—the possibility that this administration is being very consistent, that it is still **guided** by that same old doctrine that we have nothing to fear from the Soviets—if we just don't provoke them. Well, World War II **came** about without provocation." (Reagan, 18 August 1980, my emphases)

The President is indeed portrayed as the leader of this journey that everybody in the country is taking *together*. What is reinforced here is the President's responsibility in actively leading this journey in the right direction, in order to reach its destination. Without clear guidance, terrible events such as WWII might "come" to surprise US. Whatever happens, regardless of who the enemy is, what they want, did or are doing, the constant is that America IS on a journey: a journey to defend peace, while the enemy is construed as whoever stands in the way of that goal - which could be the American who wishes for stay idle, or who is unsteady in the face of adversity, as in (32). It is interesting to note that by emphasizing the manner with which WE are embarking on OUR journey, the speaker is able to criticize some of the people within his own nation, moving them closer to THEM: those who are not strong enough to lead, or who are passive when faced with the threat of evil, somehow join in THEIR evil (which is very compatible with the SFM model's understanding of morality). Indeed we saw in Chapter 4 that the way the enemy's actions are construed also profile the manner, which in their case stands for the whole event. The use of a metaphor, such as OUR FIGHT IS A JOURNEY, is therefore not prescriptive, in the sense that it is the context in which it is used which directs the elaboration of the blend. By making certain aspects more salient, and perhaps by making those stand for the WHOLE, one can thus direct the interpretation process in an entirely different direction, and be more or less harsh in one's criticism, for instance.

The following table shows the way in which the manner and direction adopted in OUR journey are consistently highlighted by the metaphor in the data:

MANNER	DIRECTION
Reagan "But innovation is not enough. We have to **follow through**. **Blueprints** alone don't deter aggression." "Pressing forward" vs. "sleepwalking": "America has been **sleepwalking** far too long." […] "folly for the United States not to **press forward** with SDI" "ripe for us to take **bold new steps** to open the way" Need to walk upright, with confidence: see '**crutch** example' G. Bush "the **faster** the **pace**, the **smoother** our **path** must be." v.s passive: "WWII **came about**" G.W. Bush "instead of **drifting along toward** tragedy" "**Steadfast** in our purpose, we now **press on**" "We cannot **stand by** and do nothing." "Yet as a country, we will never tolerate our security being threatened nor **stand idly** by when our people have been killed."	Reagan "It's not in the American tradition to **turn away**." "In **advancing** freedom, we Americans carry a special burden." "Or will we **turn our backs** and ignore the malignancy..." "We cannot **turn our backs** on this crisis at our doorstep." G. Bush "we must **step forward** and accept our responsibility" G.W. Bush "and **in the long run**, **advancing** this belief is the only practical **way** to protect our citizens." "The U.S. are leading the journey. "If America does not **lead** the cause of freedom, that cause will not be **led**." Obama "we shall always **march ahead**. We cannot **turn back**. America, we **cannot turn back**." "that American promise – that **pushes us forward** even when the **path** is uncertain." "We **face** the challenge of **refocusing** on Afghanistan and Pakistan."

Table 1: Occurrences of JOURNEY metaphor profiling manner or direction

When focusing on the manner or direction of the journey, what needs to be presupposed in the first place is that WE already are on a journey, and that this journey is worth taking - otherwise turning back would be a perfectly acceptable option, with no implication of cowardice, weakness or failure. During the completion stage, where the hearer draws in elements of the context, cultural values which are deeply entrenched in American society are required to make sense of the blend. Being active, being a hard worker, are qualities which are valued in the Western world. It is this belief which allows the implication that refusing to take part in the conflicts would be seen as a sign of weakness, of cowardice for the entire nation. The character of the American people is brought to the foreground, and is determined by the way America walks, or the direction America chooses in this journey to face the dictators of the world. Standing idly is opposed to being active; taking the lead is opposed to taking the lazy option at the back; pressing on with courage is opposed to turning back and acting with cowardice in the face of adversity. The manner and direction aspects of the journey thus bring in morality at the centre of the issue, creating a new asymmetry between those who support their nation in difficult times, and those who take the easy way out. In that sense, Americans who do not support their government in times of international crises can appear unpatriotic, as they are construed as obstacles in their own nation's journey to defend peace and freedom. In the blend, this category of people can become an enemy to their nation's long-term purpose, just like being idle might not serve the country's economics. This is where the trigger of guilt comes from, as the interpretation of the metaphor makes the issue about one's inner morality rather than about remote politics. One can also see here how the blends make direct links between the interpretation of the issues at stake, America's broader identity, and individuals' life values as well. In that sense, I argue

that the use of metaphors such as the JOURNEY metaphor, particularly given its consistency, can trigger positive emotional effects, giving the hearers the satisfaction that the interpretation of the conflict makes sense within their broader understanding of America's purpose, and of what society values in general. This can then make the critical evaluation of a metaphor, and particularly of what it hides, a lot more difficult.

A nation on crutches

The validity of novel metaphors motivated by the JOURNEY metaphor can also be facilitated by the latter's usage across time:

(33) "But while SDI offers hope for the future, we have to consider today's world. For too long, we and our allies have permitted nuclear weapons to be a **crutch**, a **way** of not having to **face up to** real defense needs. We must free ourselves from that **crutch**. […] I will never ask for what isn't needed; I will never fight for what isn't necessary. But I need your help. We've **come so far** together these last 5 years; let's not **falter** now. Let's maintain that crucial level of national strength, unity, and purpose that has **brought** the Soviet Union **to** the negotiating table and has given us this historic opportunity to achieve real reductions in nuclear weapons and a real chance at lasting peace. That would be the finest legacy we could **leave behind** for our children and for their children." (Reagan, 26 February 1986, my emphases)



Fig. 10: Conceptual Blend for: "a nation on crutches"

While the organizing frame of WALKING seems to be the one chosen to structure the blend here, walking with a crutch does not mean that one will not reach one's destination. In the blend, however, walking with this crutch seems to lead to a state of vulnerability. The Cause-Effect relationship is

thus different. The negative connotation associated with the crutch in this instance does not come from the walking input, but from a cultural one: in the Western culture, relying on someone else is seen as being needy or dependent, and not as good or valuable as being able to do something oneself. This might indicate that this is a double-scope, rather than a single-scope network. Single-scope networks are particularly useful when the point of the metaphor is to enlighten the hearer on an issue or concept by focusing on one aspect of a familiar domain, thus leaving the hearer with a feeling of reliability (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 129). This blend, on the other hand, offers a challenge, a paradox: spending more money on the military, especially following the devastating outcomes of the Vietnam War, is construed as the way forward, as a way to achieve peace rather than to get further away from it. One could argue that trusting our adversaries would be an essentially more peaceful strategy, in the strict sense of the term. More importantly, the U.S. should continue to be seen as the defender of peace, rather than a hungry conqueror (and so a potential instigator of jealousies and conflict/war). The use of the JOURNEY metaphor is familiar, and keeps the interpretation of the issue in line with the image of the U.S. as the leader of a journey towards peace. This in turn facilitates the retrieval of assumptions which focus on one's status, as it is an important quality for a leader to inspire respect and a commanding attitude.

In this context, what helps the hearer to select from the input spaces the elements that allow the U.S. to still appear as the defender of peace in the blend? What favors the acceptance of the interpretation that the crutch prevents us from walking properly, rather than enabling us to get to our destination when injured, for example? In order to answer these questions about the interpretation process of metaphors, RT can here bring some valuable inputs to CBT. CBT acknowledges the importance of context when selecting which elements go into the input spaces and into the blend. Nevertheless, the elaboration process, where the hearer plays the scenario in the blend, entails an endless number of possibilities. Relevance can act as a criterion to understand why certain elements are selected and some are not, and so why one might favor an interpretation over another. Furthermore, RT can explain why these interpretations might also be accepted (and not questioned), by the hearer, thus escaping critical evaluation. There are two factors that determine whether something is relevant or not: Cost and Benefits.

- Cognitive cost

Context plays a crucial part in the interpretation process. In this case, nuclear power is also previously compared to a "jail," which makes the interpretation of the crutch as a helping device inco-

herent with the rest of the speech. Besides, the interpretation of the crutch as an inhibiting device is also coherent with the hearer's experiences and system of values: pressing forward is culturally preferable to going backwards or slowly. It is better to be independent, to be seen as walking on one's own, with confidence; to be moving on, to accomplish what one has started: one would want to get rid of a crutch, rather than to keep it forever because it is easier. All these entailments of the metaphor are coherent with the general portrayal of the American culture, where independence is key. The activation of the JOURNEY metaphor also makes available the assumption that the way one walks is of great importance, as seen earlier with the salience of one's manner and direction when taking a journey. As WE are construed in the corpus as the leaders of the world's journey to peace, WE cannot be seen to falter, as any sign of weakness on the leader's part would compromise the whole enterprise. All these elements make the retrieval of the crutch as an inhibiting device more easily accessible, and so less costly, which might not be the case in another culture which does not emphasize independence and self-reliance as much.

- Cognitive benefits

The crutch metaphor provides a better understanding of a difficult political decision, by making it relevant to US. In this instance, support for SDI does not stem from sharing complicated numbers and their significance, but from a desire to do what is right for the identity of the country. "We've come so far [...] let's not falter now." By conceptualizing SDI as part of the journey America has been on, it appears as an extension of what is familiar, rather than a complicated new project. By tying it to the identity and purpose of the United States, it becomes relevant to US as a Nation, making available new assumptions about the country's plan for the future. As the hearers are provided with the satisfaction that the interpretation of this issue fits in with America's purpose, and with their own personal values about life, positive emotional effects might also be triggered, allowing the interpretation process to stop, and in turn the acceptance not only of what the metaphor puts forward (and the conclusions which it can lead to), but also of what it hides.

> "Only when the entailments of a metaphor fit our cultural and personal experience closely enough and when it seems reasonable to ignore what it hides, can we speak of it as being appropriate, and even perhaps true." (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 483)

A cost and benefits analysis can also help to determine whether it might be "reasonable to ignore" what a metaphor hides. So what exactly is hidden here? Again, an asymmetry within the group US is highlighted in the blend: while some are strong and independent, others are weak and lazy. This

comes from cultural assumptions rather than from the walking space, construing leadership as an essential, rather than selfish or threatening, quality. What the JOURNEY space hides is the possible interpretation of America's actions as a form of intimidation; instead, intimidation is restricted to the enemy. In order to accept the implications of the crutch metaphor, the hearer also needs to overlook the fact that being independent in life and being independent as a country have very different implications. I argue here that rejecting such metaphors can also come at too high a psychological cost to the hearer, as it would imply rejecting an entire belief system: that America does not act for the greater good of the world, or for the immediate security of its citizens, but for egotistical purposes, out of a desire for supremacy. It would clash with the basic topology described previously (5.3.2.1), which construes OUR main responsibility towards America's *and* the world's future.

5.3.2.3. A special journey: a mission

While the target domain of MISSION is not as prevalent as the more general domain of JOURNEY, it is used in a very similar way and appeals particularly to the belief in the special role which the United States was given. Just as with the JOURNEY metaphor, the conceptualization of the conflict as a mission focuses on the end of war rather than on the means, constraining the interpretation of America's involvement in war to a solely moral aspect. Indeed, the righteous elements are even more salient here.

Conflict as the realization of OUR burden

(34) "In advancing freedom, we Americans **carry a special burden —** a belief in the dignity of man **in the sight of the God** who gave birth to this country. This is central to our being. A century and a half ago, Thomas Jefferson told the world, 'The mass of mankind has not been born **with saddles on their backs**...' 'Freedom is America's core. We must never deny or **forsake** it." (Reagan, 14.11.1985, my emphases)

(35) "We give thanks for the men who carried out this operation, for they exemplify the professionalism, patriotism, and unparalleled courage of those who serve our country. And they are part of a generation that **has borne the heaviest share of the burden** since that September day." (Obama, 02.05.2011, my emphasis)

The physical properties of weight are used here to make sense of OUR duty in the world. It is something that WE did not choose, that cannot be escaped. The conflicts thus appear as the realization of a burden that must be carried at all times. This burden is not only that of the American soldier; rather, it is shared by all Americans, and is what makes America special. The personal motives of the current President remain hidden behind this "burden," dismissing the potential assumption that America's involvement in war might serve a President's thirst for power. This burden does not lessen with time, and is somewhat independent from the events going on in the world, making OUR

part in the journey out of anyone's control. While WE are made vulnerable by this burden, it is one that WE all share, and is what makes US human. Indeed, as the burden is equated with the belief in the dignity of man, anyone who lets go of their share also lets go of this belief, a belief which the enemy openly denigrates. This contributes to cementing an absolute type of reasoning, whereby letting go of a part involves letting go of the whole. By grounding the conceptualization of OUR mission in one's physical experience of mass/weight, the opposition between US and THEM appears as one of objective morality. What does not appear, however, is that this is a result of viewing the conflicts from OUR point of view, and hiding THEIRS.

By being construed as a mission, it is the *long-term effects* of OUR involvement which are being profiled. A stark contrast appears with the metaphorical system which the enemy uses to construe THEIR reality. In his analysis of the Gulf War rhetoric, Lakoff explains that the Arab world gets construed as a single brotherhood, which has significant implications for the enemy's perception of their own actions.

"The metaphors used to conceptualize the Gulf crisis hide the most powerful political ideas in the Arab world: Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. The first seeks to form a racially-based all-Arab nation, the second, a theocratic all-Islamic state. Though bitterly opposed to one another, they share a great deal. Both are conceptualized in family terms, an Arab brotherhood and an Islamic brotherhood. Both see brotherhoods as more legitimate than existing states. Both are at odds with the State-as-Person metaphor, which sees currently existing states as distinct entities with a right to exist in perpetuity. Also hidden by our metaphors is perhaps the most important daily concern throughout the Arab world: Arab dignity. Both political movements are seen as ways to achieve dignity through unity. To many Arabs, the national boundaries drawn by colonial powers are illegitimate, violating the conception of Arabs as a single "brotherhood" and impoverishing millions." (Lakoff, 1991: 30-31)

Unlike US, the enemy's emphasis on dignity might well assign relevance to the short-term costs which THEIR present actions (ignoring OUR reasonable demands), or lack of, might induce (even if they might be perceived as violent by other nations); not for THEIR status as part of a timeless identity, but for THEIR leaders' present status. It is beyond the scope of this chapter, and of this thesis to analyze the enemy's portrayal of the events. However, this contrast highlights the benefits of CBT (added to those of RT), as it can make stand out the relations upon which the relevance of OUR need to take action can be established.



Fig. 11: Visualization of America's responsibility to the future

When weighing the pros and cons of OUR action, it is that relation of responsibility which is made salient, thanks to the use of metaphors such as that of a mission, and which guides the search for relevance as the hearer is wondering whether WE should be involved in the conflicts or not. It is upon that relation of responsibility that the relevance of the whole discourse is established.

5.4. Concluding remarks

What the metaphors about the conflict achieve is to guide the hearers in selecting the level upon which the conflicts are to be interpreted; the level at which expectations of relevance are to be met: that of humanity, of the preservation of mankind. This is why, to conclude this chapter, insights from Evolutionary Psychology can be used to support the linguistic analyses conducted in this chapter, so as to account for the efficiency of the metaphors about the conflicts in consolidating the divide between US and THEM. Haidt, Rozin, McCauley and Imada

> "suggest that contamination sensitivity, which helps us avoid pollution and maintain purity in the material world, should be thought of as a schema that we have extended into the social world, where we use it to avoid 'evil' and increase contact with 'goodness'." (1997: 116)

It would seem that blurring the lines between the physical and moral domains might also appeal to evolutionary concerns - such as maintaining healthy social relationships by staying away from what is evil, and increasing contact with goodness. The trigger of disgust, which was an important component of the "rape of Kuwait" rhetoric, might then be particularly efficient in judging morality. I argue that this is an important aspect of metaphors' efficiency in American War Rhetoric, as a particularly efficient mechanism to help the hearers sort out the actors of the conflicts, between the good ones and the bad ones.

> (36) "This is not war in the traditional sense. It is an attack by tanks and artillery on a largely defenseless people whose leaders already have agreed to peace." (Clinton 24.03.99)

The way THEY do war, or use war, places the enemy outside of civilization, refusing to follow the evolution of social relationships or the compass of morality. Through THEIR use of war, THEY have broken all social contracts, and therefore need to be excluded, while the "newborn democracies," as Reagan once called them, the babies of the evolved world, need to be protected. To conclude this chapter, we might say that utterances such as (36) do not merely point out THEIR badness, they also imply OUR own morality. Through the salience of US vs. THEM, THEIR immorality is enough to signal the validity of OUR fight, and vice versa. Besides, the salience of US vs. THEM also guides the hearer's task towards deciding who is wrong and who is right - so that once

one slot gets filled, the other can easily be inferred, and the relevance of the present issues is easily established.

Objective morality?

"The twelfth element is moral antirelativism - the preference to spread and enforce the belief that morality is objective and has an intrinsic reality (...) It is almost definitional of morality that people intuitively represent morality to be intrinsically good, and support its being seen as real and objective. We argue that this is an evolved circuit." (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010: 221)

If morality is indeed perceived as objective and real, then grounding the opposition between US and THEM in morality makes it appear objective too, that is to say unaffected by OUR own perceptions of reality. As morality is intrinsically good, the damage that WE might cause in the process remains hidden, in favor of an overall moral end: the two operate on two different levels, and it is that of global morality which is made salient in our data. If one is fighting on the side of morality, then OUR part in the war cannot be seen as violent or evil in any way. This feeling of objectivity might also bypass concerns about the truthfulness of the speaker's intentions, as presidents might occasionally be accused of taking advantage of their own power rather than selflessly serving their nation. The acceptance of the metaphors as reliable is thus favored by constraining war to its moral dimension.

Evolutionary Psychology can also enlighten us on a potential cognitive benefit that such interpretations might incur. After arguing that "Americans want to distinguish themselves from animals," Haidt, Rozin, MacCauley and Imada ask the question: "But why?"

"Ernest Becker (1973) has offered one possible motive. Becker's thesis is that the fear of death and insignificance is the greatest fear haunting humans. Human culture and heroism are, in large measure, attempts to deny or repress the fear that, ultimately, human life is pointless and brief." (1997: 115)

The construction of each conflict as a part in the larger history of the fight between good and evil would therefore contribute to defeating this fear of life being pointless, giving US a role which goes beyond the hearer's lifetime. The interpretation of war on OUR part is constrained to one which focuses on the identity and survival of the group, leaving the individual in the background. At the level of the interpretation process, the identity/purpose of the United States and the survival of 'the moral man' are fused to make up a blend, which can be brought up by the mention of "our cause." OUR cause, the world's cause, defines who WE are, as time is compressed in the blend and the end of the conflict is highlighted (saving humanity). Compressions from the input spaces into the blend

also blur the reality of the circumstances of each conflict, which remains accessible in the separate input spaces. Each conflict thus becomes one recurrent expression of OUR identity, of the burden that WE carry, that belief in the dignity of man, and its defense throughout time in an effort to preserve the meaningfulness of life and the role that WE have in it. The next chapter continues to explore the ways in which the discourse of American War Rhetoric contributes to the conceptualization of OUR involvement in war and THEIRS as fundamentally opposed.

Chapter 6: Space builders of opposition

6.1. Negation

This entire chapter is dedicated to the construction of opposition in the corpus, for which we will see that negation constitutes the most obvious trigger (or space builder). The focus is on the constraint on *reasoning*, as a result of the constant resort to what I have referred to as 'space builders of opposition.' The scope of this type of study is not to determine which processes are at play when interpreting instances of negation operators, but rather to evaluate the potential of such utterances to contribute to the overall aim of persuasion. So far, we have evaluated the use of presuppositions and of conceptual metaphors, and their role in legitimizing U.S. action grounded in an irreparable divide between US and THEM. One aim of this chapter (the last in the construction and consolidation of US vs. THEM) is to highlight that there is not one single strategy which can account for the efficiency of persuasion, which is rather a matter of coherence.

In this section, I adopt Carston's view of the negation operator as unambiguous (2002: 311), and argue that it can make an effective tool in the consolidation of clear-cut categories, which can serve to over-simplify the issues at stake. The focus of this section is therefore to look at negation across the corpus: how is it used, and how does it constrain reasoning, so that US vs. THEM can successfully and systematically legitimize the United States' involvement in military conflicts? In other words, what makes it an efficient persuasive mechanism? To answer these questions, I mainly rely here upon the framework of Mental Spaces (of which Conceptual Integration is part), which I argue is particularly suitable, given (a) its grounding in man's reasoning processes, and (b) this chapter's focus on the concept of opposition. Indeed, while the framework of Mental Spaces allows us to look at the interpretation of negation online, it is also based on an account of how negation works (in relation with reasoning). Essentially, it allows to answer the question: what does negation do? From there, one can effectively answer the question: what does negation do *here,* in this utterance, and how does this serve the broader purpose of persuasion?

Negation can be described as a specific type of analogy, which works by "virtual contrast" or "comparison" (Oakley, 2005: 2). This virtual contrast occurs as negation sets up two alternative spaces (Sweetser, 2006; Oakley, 2005; Dancygier, 2008), only one of which is directly and linguistically coded in discourse. Sweetser (2006: 315, 320) explains that negation modifies more than just

the content of an utterance. Indeed, the operation of virtual contrast allows for numerous pragmatic effects, which get explored in detail in this chapter, such as: construction of the opposition as naive or lacking common sense; trigger of feelings of guilt or shame; reinforcement of the hearer's trust in the speaker; and consolidation of the belief that WE are doing the right thing. In this corpus, the use of negation contributes to the elaboration of a reading grid for the hearer. Two columns emerge in opposition with each other, used to decipher OUR and THEIR choices and actions.
The uses of negation throughout the corpus have been divided into three separate categories, depending on their cognitive effects.

6.1.1. Mutual exclusion

6.1.1.1. Oversimplification of events

Negation sets up "two alternative spaces, rather than just one: the negative space described in the sentence and its positive alternative" (Dancygier, 2012: 69). The construction of an alternative positive space is part of the interpretation process of negation; however, it can sometimes be constrained by the speaker, by the setting up of two clear alternative spaces, through the use of structures which follow the pattern: "this, not that." We will start with an example from George Bush's rhetoric:

(1) "A world where **the rule of law, not the law of the jungle**, governs the conduct of nations." (G.Bush 16.01.1991, my emphasis)

At first glance, it might seem that the analysis of (1) should be rather straightforward: two spaces are constructed in opposition, one featuring "the rule of law," along with US, and another with "the law of the jungle," and THEM. However, what makes (1) effective for the purposes of persuasion is the retrieval of the inference that not only is "the rule of law" opposed and superior to "the law of the jungle," but it is only through applying "the rule of law" *everywhere* that "the law of the jungle" will be rendered obsolete. With constructions which follow the pattern "this, not that," the speaker is making explicit what the alternative to "that" is. Let us start by imagining a different type of construction, where President Bush instead chose to assert that
(2) "we will not be governed by the law of the jungle."
In (2), the negation triggers a comparison between two spaces, one featuring "the law of the jungle," and another implicit alternative space, unlike in (1). The "law of the jungle" might be compared with "the law of men." This would indeed be perfectly compatible with the construal of the enemy as animals (Chapter 4, 4.2) that cannot be reasoned with. The "jungle" would serve here as

an input space, leading to a conceptual blend within which behaving like animals causes disorder, which WE reject. It is this rejection of THEIR ways which is made apparent in (2), through a contrast between OUR choice to follow rules, leading to a peaceful, ordered world, and THEIR animalistic behavior. This choice is indeed reinforced through the assertion that "we *will not* be governed by the law of the jungle." A sense of superiority of the world of men over that of animals thus appears in the final blend. One might then conclude that with an utterance such as (2), the speaker is pointing at the enemy's nature as the cause for the chaos which THEY find THEMSELVES in, thus justifying the intervention of a rational third party. So how does (1) differ from (2)?

In (1), the two spaces which are set up by Bush's utterance do not bring up the role of man in the same way. In the mental space for "the rule of law," law itself is placed in the foreground; the rules to be followed are constructed as inherent to the concept of law, rather than man made. In that sense, it is a rule that should be followed by all, not just "us," and it allows Bush to construct the issue as a univocal matter to be extended to the whole of humanity. As opposed to "the rule of law," "the law of the jungle" is seen to result from the impulses of a madman, a disregard for humanity leading him to impose the chaos and cruelty of the jungle on his own people. As the two spaces are linked by a relation of Disanalogy, they are constructed as mutually exclusive: therefore, WE appear on the side of law, which cannot exist on THEIR side. Likewise, chaos is reserved to THEM. US vs. THEM is therefore not seen as an opposition between two competing value systems. As law is placed in the foreground of the opposition between US and THEM, the subjectivity associated with the choice for a particular set of rules is hidden. Instead, WE appear to be dictated by law itself. In the blend which is triggered by the conceptualization of NATIONS AS PEOPLE, the disanalogy between the two alternative spaces is resolved, as peace and order become a *property* of the civilized world (that which is governed by the rule of law).

So far, we have dealt with the construction of "the rule of law" in mutual opposition with "the law of the jungle." Indeed, Bush could also have stopped at "a world where the rule of law governs the conduct of nations." The use of the negation allows the President to go further than to portray "the rule of law" in a positive light; by contrasting it with "the law of the jungle," the former appears as the only answer to violence. The negation in (1) triggers the formation of a counterfactual space, as the alternative space to a world which is not governed by the law of the jungle. Through the use of the negation, the hearer is led to conceptualize a world where the law of the jungle does indeed govern the conduct of nations, and which appears quite obviously undesirable. The conceptualiza-

tion of a world where “the law of the jungle” reigns might lead to the representation of a world where only the strongest members may survive, while other weaker members might be taken advantage of in order to establish one’s strength. In such a world, one might view the United States as a prey, only intervening in conflicts to assert its dominance, or to further its own interests. However, this type of behavior does not belong in the alternative space, which is constrained here to one governed by the rule of law. The alternative space thus comes as a solution, as the only solution to govern human civilization. While one might easily agree that a world governed by the rule of law is preferable to one governed by the law of the jungle, what is presupposed is the premise upon which the disanalogy is based in order to be relevant in this context: that a ‘one-size-fits-all system’ might be applied to solve the conflicts of the world. As the hearer is led to focus on one specific element which makes US different from THEM, that which is profiled as relevant for the interpretation of the conflict, what is hidden is that due to cultural diversity, the application of a system which successfully established a peaceful society might not be suitable in another country, at least not in its present circumstances or without some serious considerations. The success of (1) thus lies in its constraint on reasoning, consolidating the belief that only OUR system can overrule barbaric behavior and conflicts, and in so doing effectively blocking the inference that the United States’ involvement stems from an egotistical drive to impose its authority.

Finally, the structure of (1) deserves special attention, as it seems intuitive that it contributes to the efficiency of this type of utterance to accept the President’s interpretation of the issues. The structure might be summed up as follows: “A of B, not B of C” - such is the order which the world should follow, not the other way round. The inference that THEY have got it all wrong with their “law of the jungle” is thus mirrored by the phrase structure itself. I argue that this reinforces the conclusion that the solution to THEIR problem, and indeed to the world’s problems, is of a very simple nature, when the reality is far more complicated.

(3) “Because in a democracy, people are the masters of government, not the servants.” (Reagan, 13.08.1983)

(4) “The freedom fighters are putting pressure on the Sandinistas to change their ways and live, not as Communist puppets, but as peaceful democrats.” (Reagan, 16.02.1985)

A similar analysis might be conducted for (3) or (4), which constrain the interpretation of the situation to an oversimplified, two-option world. In (3), this translates as one where people are the masters of government; and one where they are its servants. In the colonial frame which is brought up here, and which is salient in this context given the history of the United States, masters and servants are opposed in every possible way: there is no middle ground, or indeed no middle stance, as the

only acceptable view is to reject the masters' abuse and to favor the servants' independence. However, as we have seen for the interpretation of (1), this hides an important element: that the ideologies of the world do not fall within such a clear-cut division. Democracies themselves take many different shapes, where the leader could be more or less directly elected. One could easily conceive of a system where the people are not the masters of government, where the latter might be elected by an inclusive group of politicians, and whose responsibility was to serve their people to the best of their knowledge. This type of construction thus seems to be highly effective, because (a), it oversimplifies the matters discussed, and (b), it allows the speaker to strengthen OUR own image while discrediting THEIRS. As a result, Reagan is here able to block interpretations which would construe the United States as an imperialist nation seeking to expand its control over the world, which indeed seems to be at odds with the image of a nation born out of the fight against colonial oppression. Besides, the reiteration of opposition to a time when WE were not OUR own masters is likely to trigger approval from the general population. What is implied in (3) is that democracies such as OURS do not just support their own people's independence; through the activation of the colonial frame, what is reinforced is that this entails standing against oppression and power-driven leaders. Similarly in (4), the disanalogy between the two spaces, (this time one featuring "Communist puppets" and another "peaceful democrats") is resolved through "change." When the context in which the conflict is to be interpreted is constrained to an opposition between two extremes, the rejection of what is undesirable/unacceptable entails that change is indeed necessary, and it can only be provided by the alternative space.

The constraint on reasoning which is induced by this use of negation rests upon the construction of mutual exclusion, so that what appears in one space cannot be in the other, and vice versa: "peaceful democrats" do not appear to be controlling, to impose their will and rule as puppet masters would (4). Disanalogy can thus serve to highlight *properties* of each space, justice, peace and freedom being *properties* of the space associated with US. What the discourse highlights is the wish to see that property extended to the rest of humanity, which renders the conceptualization of US as imperialists incoherent. What is constantly reinforced is an oversimplification of the issues at stake, as a humanly unacceptable situation is presented in the negated space, and the existence of one perfect alternative is provided and appears as a rather natural solution. The reasoning induced by the utterances analyzed in this subsection supports the consolidation of the belief that WE are doing the right thing, for the right reasons.

6.1.1.2. Defying expectations

(5) "When we speak of peace, we should **not** mean just **the absence of war**. True peace rests on the pillars of individual freedom, human rights, national self-determination, and respect for the rule of law...When we meet in Geneva, our agenda will seek **not just to avoid war, but to strengthen peace**, prevent confrontation, and remove the sources of tension." (Reagan, 14.11.1985, my emphases)

A double negation is used here to talk about peace as "**not** [...] just the **absence** of war." Let us start by taking a look at the interpretation of "absence of war."

Oakley (2005) uses conceptual blending to analyze the use of negation in the following utterance, the opening sentence of a news story:

"Mark McGwire loves the cover of the St. Louis Cardinal's media guide. The reason? There's **no** picture of him on it." (In Oakley, 2005: 8)

According to Oakley, a virtual contrast happens thanks to the blend of two spaces. In the first one, the positive alternative space, the writer exploits the reader's background knowledge that athletes enjoy fame and publicity, conceptualizing a magazine cover with a picture of Mark McGwire. He calls this space the "expected media guide." The "actual media guide" is made of a cover with pictures of McGwire's team players. The interpretation of the negation through virtual contrast of these two spaces gives rise to a third "blended space in which a blank space appears in the center of a media guide, signifying his absence" (2005: 8). The negation here creates a "hyperliteral scenario," whereby the absence of McGwire's picture is conceptualized as something that was taken out, which allows the writer to defy expectations and comment on the athlete's modesty, and on what matters most, his talent as a sportsman. Similarly, the sentence "there's no milk in the fridge" can be interpreted thanks to the conceptualization of an empty space in the fridge, where the milk is normally expected to be, "rather than bread, cheese, or lettuce" (Sweetser, 2006: 314). The presence of what is negated thus needs to be conceptualized in order to comment on its absence.

Let us now get back to the interpretation of (5). The negation calls for the conceptualization of the unwanted presence of war in one space, where fighting between US and THEM occurs. In another space appears the perhaps naive expectation of "no war," where WE do not get involved in military matters. In the blended space, the virtual contrast between the two spaces leads to the conceptualization of the "absence of war," where WE do not get involved, but the tensions, feelings of instability are still to be felt. Thanks to the use of a double negation, Reagan is able to defy what he thinks is a misconception, that peace and war are opposed, and are mutually exclusive. The alternative space of "the absence of war" does not contain a peaceful representation of the world, where everyone lives happily and without tension. Instead, war can be construed as a sometimes necessary means in order to remove tensions and to obtain what he calls "true peace." What is rejected

through the use of negation is the representation of peace as a choice to stay out of military affairs. Rather than making the opposition's view inaccessible, the use of negation to defy expectations allows Reagan to construe these 'false' representations of peace as unrealistic, unreal and even naive. Instead, war for US is always to be seen as a means to strengthen peace. In other words, WE are always on the side of peace, true peace, even when involved in war. Negation is therefore used here as a strategy to address certain misconceptions (based on the speaker's understanding of the world), in order to reinforce the policy of the United States as effective and fair, and to unify the nation behind its ideals. Negation offers more than simple clarification. In this particular instance, the contrast which occurs in what Oakley calls the hyperliteral blended space allows for reasoning about the purpose of war for US. The existence of a negative space, the conceptualization of the "absence of war" which leads to a false impression of peace, triggers the construction of a corresponding positive one, the only one where "true peace" can exist. As a result, every individual who wishes for true peace is aligned with Reagan's administration through sharing the same ideals, and should therefore feel assured that it is these common ideals that will drive the decisions that need to be made.

What this example also highlights is the fact that conceptual integration is not restricted to the interpretation of metaphors. As all of the examples which have been analyzed so far promote the visualization of an ideal world (at least on some level), devoid of oppression or injustice, conceptual blending appears as a suitable tool to reason about the unreal. In the case of (5), the interpretation of the negation itself can be explained through conceptual blending.

6.1.2. Addressing the nation's doubts

This subsection turns to a different usage of negation, that to directly confront the nation's doubts or concerns, in this context regarding their country's military involvement. This strategy can be seen as two-fold, allowing the speaker both to acknowledge (rather than negate) the opposition, and to discard the latter as unfounded, naive, or even lacking common sense. This is something which Ronald Reagan was particularly skillful at. Indeed, it is no small task to confront *and* dismiss legitimate concerns, precisely by making them appear non-legitimate. As the President acts as the spokesperson for *all* Americans, openly calling part of the population naive would most likely severely impact the President's image, credibility and authority. What the following analyses show is that the use of negation can be a very effective strategy in that regard, as the naive representation of opposing views is rather achieved through pragmatic effects. However, it is certainly not a fool

proof strategy which can be deployed at any time to push one's agenda forward. The aim of this section is to demonstrate the effectiveness of negation as a persuasive mechanism, and of the framework of Mental Spaces/Conceptual Integration to evaluate the efficiency of such phenomena. In that sense, this subsection aims at providing another illustration of the ways in which negation can be used in persuasive discourse, without aiming to be representative of the whole corpus.

6.1.2.1. Negation at the speech act level

Sweetser discusses the rhetorical use of negation, for example when what is negated is "the speaker's in-process speech-act intentions" (2006: 316):

"Cicero was famous for his semi-performative use of the implicit negative *praetereo* ('I pass over') - in contexts on the order of 'I pass over [i.e., don't mention] the fact that you murdered your brother and are sleeping with your mother;' so the term *prateritio* has come to refer to such mention via 'non-mentioning.'" (Sweetser, 2006: 316)

When it comes to issues of trust, the President's assertions of his own good character and intentions will probably have a very limited impact on the hearer. Negation at the speech-act level can have much more impact, by reminding the people of their trust in the institution of democracy which the President lives and works to represent, that is by re-asserting these important qualities through "non-asserting" them. This is a strategy which Reagan in particular made frequent use of.

(6) "But that isn't what I want to talk to you about." (Reagan, 09.05.1984)

If I was to start a sentence with "I do not mean to criticize you, but...," my interlocutor would most likely expect a negative comment to follow, and the action of criticizing would indeed be completed. According to Sweetser, the "frame of criticism" is evoked by such utterances, leaving the hearer to "fit the subsequent characterization" as such (2006: 316-317). In the context of a President making a public address on his government's foreign policy, (6) evokes the frame of discussion. What is negated is not the speaker's intentions, but rather the enemy's openness. A contrast will indeed subsequently occur with the way the enemy (the Soviets and the Sandinistas) communicates with their people and with the world, through lies. What Reagan refers to in (6), what he states he is not here to talk about, is a report on his recent trip to China. In order to fully grasp the context of the above utterance, I have included its preceding paragraph:

"I'm pleased that our trip to China was a success. I had long and thoughtful meetings with the Chinese leadership. Though our two countries are very different, we are building a strong relationship in a genuine spirit of cooperation, and that's good for the cause of peace. This was our second trip to Asia in the last 6 months. It demonstrates our awareness of America's responsibility for leadership in the Pacific Basin, an area of tremendous economic vitality. I believe our relationship with our Asian allies and friends have never been better."

The United States' strong relationships with a "very different" country, its willingness to cooperate, resulting in positive friendships and the building of peace: these are, in fact, key factors for the interpretation of the rest of Reagan's discourse. The negation in (6) builds up two alternate spaces, one dealing with pressing concerns which the President needs to tackle urgently, and one dealing with more regular items on the President's agenda, still within the context of foreign policy. Although the latter "is not what [Reagan] wants to talk to [the American people] about," he did take care to share the results of his last trip to China with the public. Through this act of sharing, the President appears as honest and open, communicating with the people what is construed as directly relevant *and* what is not directly relevant to America's involvement in Central America. What Reagan *does* here (in the sense meant by Austin's *How to do things with words,* 1962), is evoking the frame of dialogue between the President and the American public. His role as intermediary between the people and the government representing them is thus consolidated. We will now get a brief picture of Reagan's speech, before coming back to the contrast which is evoked through his use of negation in (6).

• The President: a trustworthy spokesperson

The following sentences continue to reinforce the image of an open President, as well as the importance of his role:

"I asked for this time to tell you of some basic decisions which are yours to make. I believe it's my constitutional responsibility to place these matters before you. They have to do with your national security, and that security is the single most important function of the Federal Government."

The President is here construed as a spokesperson rather than as the country's decision maker. Instead, making decisions seems to be the responsibility of the people: "some basic decisions which are **yours to make**." All Reagan does is to "place" the issues which he has been made aware of before the American people, taking the reality of remote matters directly to them.

• The enemy: systematic liars

The construction of Reagan as a truthful, open President, committed to his role and to his people, comes in stark contrast with the image which he goes on to paint of the enemy in the rest of his speech. Much later on, Reagan adds: "It's the fate of this region, Central America, that I want to talk to you about." The reason why their situation is so desperate, and why, in Reagan's eyes, the people in Nicaragua need rescued, is the way they are treated by those in power, the "Cuban-backed Sandinistas." Reagan outlines all the promises of democracy that were made, and which were not kept.

But it is not only THEIR own people who THEY lie to; indeed lying is part of THEIR strategy, and THEY also lie to the world:

"[Castro] **told them to tell the world** they were fighting for political democracy, not communism. But most important, he instructed them to form a broad alliance with the **genuinely** democratic opposition to the Somoza regime. Castro explained that this would **deceive** Western public opinion, confuse potential critics..." (My emphases)

Such promises of democracy made the subsequent slaughter and persecution of parts of the population even more tragic.

• Interpreting THEIR military build-up

In that context, the interpretation of THEIR military build up only seems to make sense as yet another act of deception. How else could we explain such an unnecessarily growing force? Interestingly, part of the criticism which Reagan faced had to do with the amount of money spent to support international conflicts such as those taking place in Central America, and to increase the national defense budget. What makes US different from THEM though, is the genuine intentions of peace that lie behind OUR use of military forces. Reagan shares with the American public the reasons which THEY give to justify the expansion of their military forces:

"**They claim** the buildup is the result of the anti-Sandinista forces. **That's a lie** [...] **They claim** the buildup is because they're threatened by their neighbors. Well, **that, too, is a lie** [...] The Sandinistas **claim** the buildup us in response to American aggression. And **that is the most cynical lie of all**." (my emphases)

This is precisely how WE differ from THEM: THEY lie to their people, and to the world. THEY take advantage of others, of the weakest, to gain power. THEY cannot be trusted, and in fact Reagan goes on to construe THEIR weapon as THEIR resort to subversion. WE, on the other hand, share everything that is going on with OUR people, as demonstrated by utterances such as (6); WE only share the truth; WE are capable of trusting others and of building positive relationships, even when the 'Other' is as culturally different as the Chinese. In fact, America's attitude when first dealing with this particular enemy was no different, even though it later proved to be misguided:

"So much for our **sincere but unrealistic hopes** that if only we try harder to be friends, Nicaragua would flourish in the glow of our friendship and install liberty and freedom for their people. **The truth is**, they haven't." (My emphases)

Let us now go back to what Reagan first chose to discuss in this speech, although it was not what he asserted he wanted to talk about: the United States' willingness to build relationships based on trust, to make friends even with those who WE might not relate to as easily, in an effort to reach peace; that is *exactly* what this speech seems to be about. The use of negation at speech-act level allows

Reagan to reinforce his role as an intermediary, leaving the final decisions in the hands of his people. This is the context in which OUR and THEIR planning for a military build-up are to be interpreted. A complete opposition appears between US and THEM, as WE are worthy of OUR people's and of the world's trust, while THEY have proved to be devoid of all trust, making negotiations for peace impossible. According to Sweetser, "speech-act negation on the speaker's part can have *praeteritio* effects." (2006: 329) In this particular example, one effect of negation is that Reagan is able to mention "via non-mentioning" the significance of his role as President of a truly democratic country. Acceptance on the hearer's part of the speaker's truthfulness is reinforced by the further contrast with THEM, usurping the name of democracy in order to take power and impose a regime of terror. The rhetorical effect of the use of negation is here the positive reinforcement of the American Presidency, and of the success of the American democracy, which gets construed as the only remedy to the issues of Central America, to the propagation of lies and to the people's helplessness. The speaker's authority is reinforced as he is placed on the side of genuine democracy in the opposition between US and THEM, while doubts regarding truthfulness of intents are reserved to THEM. As he is uttering the words "but that isn't what I want to talk to you about," he is in fact exerting his power as President, fulfilling his responsibility to share what he knows with the public, and therefore effectively addressing potential doubts regarding his position and motives in promoting an increased budget for military spending and support to Central America. These rhetorical effects are possible thanks to the contrast which is allowed through the use of negation; that contrast happens at the speech-act level, between one President who fulfills his responsibilities through the act of his communication, and a leader whose promises are actually devoid of meaning. When Castro makes a promise, that speech act is worth nothing. Although this is a strategy which mainly Reagan resorts to in the corpus, we can observe similar effects as those described in 6.1.1: an oversimplification of the events. Indeed the latter are reduced to one (simplified) decision, that between who one can trust, and who cannot be trusted. And between US and THEM, what makes more sense? In that constrained context, what is the most relevant interpretation? Indeed it would be pretty naive to believe THEM, and especially to believe THEM over US. As THEY fill the slot for the untrustworthy actors in a two-sided conflict, expectations of relevance are met, and the hearers are thus less likely to direct their attention onto reasons why OUR conduct might not be seen as entirely free of blame.

6.1.2.2. Rephrasing

The second strategy which we look at in this subsection is that of rephrasing, through the use of negation. It follows from the use of negation at the level of speech acts, in the sense that similar pragmatic effects are achieved. The speaker is able to acknowledge the public's concerns, which then get dismissed. We have seen in the above example that the belief that WE should trust THEM, which would have the great benefit of avoiding war, gets perceived as naive, and in fact would be equated with falling into the enemy's trap. However, when rephrasing opposing views, the criticism of those who do not support the war is felt more directly, and might in some cases lead to the trigger of feelings of guilt or even shame. This is a strategy which was also mainly used by Reagan, although not exclusively. This is to be expected, given the context in which he found himself, where the public's doubts and concerns were made salient by fears of 'another Vietnam.' The first example is therefore extracted from Reagan's rhetoric, before moving on to evaluate its efficiency when compared with a different example from the corpus.

In the following speech, Reagan chose to directly confront some polls' results, which seemed to highlight that part of the population was confused regarding what America was doing in Central America. Previous polls taken the month before had shown that many Americans feared that El Salvador would become the new Vietnam (Gruson, 1983). Although Reagan does not explicitly mention Vietnam, he directly addresses the American people's fear of not having "learned any lessons from history" (Reagan, 13.08.1983), which he dismisses as untrue. In order to do so, he shares a hypothetical letter of complaints to his government:

(7) "Well, my staff recently put together a composite letter that combines the most widespread **misconceptions** [...] Sound familiar? I'm sure you've heard it all before. But let's look at what is **really** happening." (Reagan, 13.08.1983, my emphases)

That letter was introduced as a combination of "the most widespread misconceptions." "Misconceptions" implies a negation, i.e. "representations which are *not* correct." Therefore, the interpretation of this letter is subject to the building of two alternative spaces, one of them featuring the 'correct' interpretation of the issues at stake, while the other features "widespread misconceptions." This allows Reagan not only to address opinions which could form an opposition to his plan, but also to construe these opposing views as grounded in falsehood, and finally to form a stark contrast with the tough reality of his job. After addressing each "misconception," he goes on to conclude:

(8) "Unfortunately, there have been such **distortions** about U.S. policy in Central America that the great majority of Americans don't know which side we're on. No wonder a great many sincere people write angrily that we should support regional dialogue, emphasize economic assistance, or take any number of other ac-

tions, all of which we're already doing and have been doing for more than two years. Well, it's time to get away from fairy tales and get back to reality." (Reagan, 13.08.1983, my emphasis)

Like in (7), by referring to the concerns expressed as "distortions," two alternative mental spaces are built up. The mental space in which Reagan then goes on to specify Americans' real objections (through the alternative choice to "support regional dialogue, emphasize economic assistance," etc.) is linked to one of non-truth ("distortions"). The hearer is then led to make an implicit choice, between choosing to believe the information as it comes first-hand from the President, or the way it is being distorted, through the sharing of misconceptions. Any opposition or even anger towards the government is thus construed as a result of misinformation. The President and his administration, on the other hand, appear on the side of truth, and their decisions or suggestions as resulting from first-hand knowledge. The two alternative spaces thus do not appear to be compatible in any way, which is reinforced by the activation of the fairy tale vs. reality frame. In the context of his Presidential duty, and where the need to address reality is promoted, it is the naive rather than the idealistic perception of fairy tales which is made more accessible, and is thus selected here. Reagan's plan is therefore seen as the only reasonable choice, grounded in reality, leaving no grey area or third space where opposition could be well-founded. The use of the negation achieves more than negating the contents of the letter. Indeed the focus here is not so much on the ways in which opposing views are rephrased, but rather on the way in which they get presented: the contrast with an alternative space, construed as the only possible alternative due to its grounding in reality, allows Reagan to dismiss the public's concerns, and the opposition to US taking proper action as being naive, and completely unfounded.

Let us now turn to another use of this strategy, this time by Clinton, who is here appealing not to common sense, but rather to the public's morality. I argue that this is a much bolder use of negation. In the above example, although the public's doubts are construed as unfounded, the President accounts for the way in which they might have come into existence, in an understanding manner. In the following utterance, however, it is the morality of those who contemplate an opposition to the war which is questioned:

(9) "I know many people believe that **we shouldn't help** the Haitian people recover their democracy and find their hard-won freedoms, that the Haitians should accept the violence and repression as their fate." (Clinton, 15.09.1994, my emphasis)

To place (9) in context, it is worth noting that it was followed by a reminder that when faced with a similar situation, those in America who yearned for freedom received the support which they need-

ed to fight for their independence. The opposition is here oversimplified, as reasons behind the reluctance to send American troops are reduced to issues of morality. The pragmatic effects which are due to the use of negation in (9) go further than the previous examples, as condemnation of those who refuse to support the war is to be inferred. Indeed, the construal of (9) in the positive would not lead to such condemnation: "I believe we should help the Haitian people recover their democracy and find their hard-won freedoms." Even if it was asserted that this would be "the only moral thing to do," I argue that the condemnation is much stronger with the use of the negative form. By construing people's objections within a Mental Space of knowledge ("I know..."), the condemnation does not seem to come directly from the President, who is portraying himself as understanding. It is at the level of presupposition that condemnation is to be felt, through the presupposition of shared standards of morality, where leaving people to a fate of violence and repression is acknowledged to be cruel. The negation allows to bring up two alternative spaces, one in which America chooses to help the Haitian people, and one where it does not. As the latter appears morally unacceptable, the use of negation leads to an oversimplification of the issues, which is here reduced to one of morality.

By comparison, I suggest that Reagan's use of the negation might be more effective than Clinton's. In Reagan's case, the public's "misconceptions" get linked by a relation of Cause-Effect to those who spread lies (whether it is the enemy, the media, or less informed, scared members of the public). As a result, there is a sort of understanding which results from the interpretation process. On the other hand, in Clinton's case, the objection to war gets construed as stemming from the hearer's selfishness and might not be so easily accepted. Indeed Americans are not just reminded of their country's moral principles; rather it is their own which are under review here.

The framework of Mental Spaces appears to be particularly useful to understand why the use of negation as a persuasive mechanism might be effective. A main asset of Mental Spaces is indeed made apparent here, that is its visual component. It is not just the visualization of the undesirable, in the case of negation, but rather that of the relations which link US directly with the issues at stake, which is significant here. Mental spaces are not set in our minds; rather they get constructed online, serving the purposes of the communicative event. In the utterances which have been analyzed in this section, part of the public is led to construe their own objections to war in a single space, where these objections are directly linked to the enemy feeding US lies; or perhaps to the distortion of less informed people (and which might fit in with one's conceptions of the media distorting the truth, for

instance); or, in Clinton's case, to one's own moral judgment. The context in which these speeches are interpreted is one where conflicts of the most serious nature are discussed, and as a result, one of the hearers' task is to decipher who is in the right, and who is in the wrong, so as to decide what type of action might be required. It is through its capacity to constrain that context that the use of negation can lead to the oversimplification of events, and of the public debate about America's potential resort to military action. Although mental spaces are constructed online, what this section has attempted to show is that they can also have a clear impact in the long-term. By consistently linking the issues at stake to the broader opposition between US and THEM, it is the hearers' reasoning which gets constrained. What we have seen through the analysis of the use of negation is that it is not so much the truth of the facts which are reported which matters, but rather their relevance to US. It is not so much the details of the enemy's cruelty, but rather their propensity to cheat and to lie which has the capacity to update or reinforce one's beliefs, not only about the current issues, but about OUR role in the world and through time.

6.1.3. Negation within counterfactual spaces

In this final subsection, we will analyze negation as a trigger for counterfactual spaces. Negation can also be used to depict scenarios which are remote from reality and which cannot be realized. The conceptualization of the conditions under which they might be, however, can impact the hearer's reasoning. The virtual contrast between these counterfactual scenarios and an alternative, positive space is also what allows negation to trigger strong feelings, making it an asset to persuasive discourse.

6.1.3.1. A debt of gratitude

Negation can be used to remind American individuals of what they do have, to directly link their present reality and enjoyment of freedom to that of the victims'. We will briefly analyze here the use of negation as an instrument of counterfactual reasoning, which will be the object of further discussion in Chapter 8 (8.2.2), which deals with the construction of fear.

(10) "It's **not** in the American tradition to turn away. And lucky for us that those who loved democracy 200 years ago **didn't turn away** from us." (Reagan, 16.02.1985, my emphases)

Two worlds are built in opposition in (10). The reality of the present, free America is opposed to a counterfactual space, where the hearer is encouraged to conceptualize a world where no help was

provided to those who fought for America's independence, leading to the country remaining under the control of Great Britain. In that space, America is oppressed by a remote nation, and that oppression is directly linked to a lack of support from those who promote, but do not actively defend democracy. The reality of freedom which Americans currently enjoy is conceptualized in an alternative space, construed as the desirable one. Through a virtual contrast between the two spaces emerges a debt of gratitude in a counterfactual blend. Conceptual blending allows for "those who loved democracy 200 years ago" to be placed right beside "us," current Americans, in a single space. This is what allows for OUR debt of gratitude to be timeless, making it relevant again today. Should the speaker have chosen to assert the victims' need for support, the hearers might be led to make a decision based on their own understanding of morality, of what falls within America's duties and what does not, etc. In (10), the use of negation is particularly efficient, because it leads the American public to *share* with the fate of remote victims, through the conceptualization of an America that is still under oppression. The context in which the hearers' response to the conflicts is set is thus constrained, as the virtual contrast between two spaces allows to construe the choice not to support war as uncaring. This is a result of what is referred to as the blend's emergent structure, which is key to a blend's persuasive effectiveness (Polak, 2017). "The two inputs are not simply juxtaposed. Rather, emergent structure specific to the blend is created." (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 133) There is emergent structure here when running the blend, and this is how the inference of being uncaring comes from. What is also apparent is that although no obvious metaphor is present here, conceptual blending plays a crucial part in our reasoning process, and is necessary for the interpretation of (10), and for its persuasive efficiency.

6.1.3.2. Oxymorons

We will finish with a strategy which seems to be used by most speakers of the corpus, and for which the framework of CBT also proves to be needed: the negation of oxymorons. Oxymorons tend to be described as the juxtaposition of two seemingly incompatible elements. The examples selected from the corpus might not strike as obvious oxymorons, but I argue that they qualify as such on the grounds that they create a *paradox* within the mental space which they are interpreted in. We will then see how the use of negation can resolve these paradoxes.

(11) "**Not once** were those young men sent abroad in **the cause of conquest. Not once** did they come home claiming a single square inch of some other country as **a trophy of war**." (Reagan, 14.11.1985, my emphases)

(12) “**No people** on Earth **yearn to be oppressed** or **aspire to servitude** or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police.” (G.W.Bush, 29.01.2002, my emphases)

(13) “These sanctions, now enshrined in international law, have the potential to **deny** Iraq **the fruits of aggression** while sharply limiting its ability to either import or export anything of value, especially oil.” (G.Bush, 08.08.1990, my emphases)

“The cause of conquest”; “a trophy of war”; “yearn to be oppressed”; “aspire to servitude”; “the fruits of aggression”: all these phrases set up spaces in which a paradox appears, one that is morally unacceptable (at least in the Western world). The interpretation of “a trophy of war” entails the conceptual integration of two organizing frames: competition, and war. The soldier thus appears in the blend as someone who uses war for his own personal gain, taking what used to belong to his opponents as a token of victory, of superiority. Such an interpretation would construe war as a game aiming at showcasing the strongest, and the soldier as acting out of egotistical motives. In the blend, the focus is on the soldier, rather than on the organizers of the competition: it is the soldier who brings home the trophy, it is the soldier that people at home cheer on. This focus on the soldier is what creates the paradox. This portrayal is indeed incompatible with the respect which both the American government and people share towards the members of their military, those who serve their nation and are ready to sacrifice their lives in order to protect American citizens, and defend American ideals in the world. The use of the negation sets up two alternative spaces: one featuring the unacceptable portrayal of the soldier who views war as a competitive sport; in the other space, the American soldier appears as a selfless hero, placed in the foreground of America’s involvement in foreign affairs. By rejecting this culturally unacceptable conceptualization of the American soldier, the hearer is led to accept the alternative space as a form of resolution to the affront made to the figure of the soldier. What is negated here is the criticism directed at America’s frequent involvement in foreign conflicts as a sign of its superego. In fact, this criticism is made ridiculous by its ‘literalization,’ through the image of a soldier coming home to bring a new trophy. Again, this inference is the result of the blend’s emergent structure.

“The fruits of aggression” constitutes another interesting, complex conceptual blend. Two organizing frames are competing: one of violence and aggression, and one of nature and the growth of plants. These two frames have little in common. Both feature processes initiated by a source, and leading to results. In the input space of violence, the source of aggression tends to be a person or a group; in the context of military aggression, the result can be acquisition of territory, or gain of power, and is viewed negatively in the civilized world. Indeed violence tends to be seen as a shortcut to get to an end, and one which causes many damages in the process. In the input space of na-

ture, the source of growth can be a seed, which after a long process can lead to the appearance of fruits. Although the process of growth is a natural process, it is slow and needs nurturing. The results, however, tend to be enjoyed by men, and as such it is viewed positively. This is where the two input spaces clash. One might indeed talk about "the fruits of hard work," in a society where hard work is valued positively, as the concept of growing plants gets broadened to anything that is worth the effort. This is where the notion of ad hoc concepts might be used to describe what is happening in the blend, as a unique conceptualization is triggered to serve the needs of discourse, which here are to discredit the notion that a lack of action might be considered a reasonable option. The conceptualization of this ad hoc concept, where FRUITS* might be broadened to anything at all, rather than just to anything which is worth the effort, causes discomfort and leads the hearer to conclude on the unsuitability of this line of reasoning. While the process of broadening might normally be unconscious, the creation of discomfort here brings the inappropriate nature of the process when interpreting the conflict in question to the hearer's consciousness, alerting the public that something must be done. Looking more closely at the structure provided by the virtual contrast triggered by negation can help us to see how this discomfort might then be resolved. "The fruits of aggression" clash with OUR perception of violence and with OUR understanding of justice. What is profiled in the blend is the end result, the reward. However, the conceptualization of rewarding cruel aggression appears unacceptable. OUR opposition to THEM is construed within the alternative space, set up by the negation present in the verb "deny," and comes as a solution to the clashes which appear in the blend. In both spaces, THEY are construed as the initiators of violence. The contrast between two worlds results in the interpretation of a lack of involvement on OUR part as unacceptable, and in the rejection of inaction as ignoring the principles of justice. More than rejecting the thought of Saddam Hussein being rewarded for his cruelty, the use of negation allows to comment on OUR part to play in his condemnation, on OUR morality in addressing the issue and opposing evil.

The efficiency of negating oxymorons lies within their ability to prompt a reaction from the hearer; in these three instances, it could be rejection, possibly guilt, or even outrage. The conceptualization of the oxymorons in the above examples creates some deontic distance, as the representation which it leads to is as remote from the speaker's moral standing as it is possible to be; in fact it is aligned with THEM. The alternative space set up by the use of negation offers a solution, and aims at (re-)aligning the hearer's principles and moral ground with the speaker's, creating a united front against THEM. The setting up of two extremes, of two spaces which are ideologically opposed,

construes US as the only answer to the oppression and servitude that THEY impose on their people, and which appears to be unfit for this world.

In this section, we have explored the role played by negation to constrain context, leading to an oversimplification of the conflicts, so that OUR role in them might stand out. Although rephrasing has been analyzed as a separate strategy in 6.1.2, which dealt with the direct expression of the public's concerns, I argue that every use of negation in this section could be analyzed as a matter of rephrasing, providing the hearer with a quick overview of the issue, of the stakes involved, and how it relates to US. In other words, negation is a powerful tool in the construction of a reading grid for the hearer to navigate the issues dealt with in discourse. We have seen that negation is a special type of analogy, one which might easily be seen to build spaces of opposition. We now move onto the role of analogy itself.

6.2. Analogy

At first glance, it might seem counter-intuitive to discuss analogy as a trigger to build spaces in opposition with each other. However, what Chapters 3-6 have aimed to show so far is that the salience of US vs. THEM in the corpus allows for mentions of THEIR immorality, for instance, to implicitly reinforce OUR own, as OUR opposition to THEM is construed as a matter of identity. In this section, I evaluate the role of analogy to strengthen that divide. The purpose is two-fold: through analyses of the use of analogy in the corpus, I aim to show (a) that the framework of CBT goes beyond metaphor, and that its tools can be used more widely to analyze persuasive mechanisms; and (b) that analogy can be a very effective strategy in persuasive discourse, thanks to its ability to quickly and effectively constrain context.

How does analogy differ from metaphor?

The terms "comparison," or "simile" are often used to describe the use of analogy in discourse, and to differentiate it from metaphor. While the latter refers to utterances such as "My lawyer is a shark," a simile would specify "My lawyer is *like* a shark." According to Glucksberg and Keysar (1990), both utterances seem to follow the same type of processing. Rather, it is the intensity of the effects of metaphoricity which gets affected:

"When metaphors are expressed as comparisons (i.e., as similes), then they are interpreted as implicit category statements, rather than the other way around. The grouping that is created by the metaphor induces the

similarity relation, and so the grouping is prior [...] Hedges and specification of the grounds for similarity of a metaphor reduce perceived metaphoricity. These effects follow from the class-inclusion nature of metaphors. The canonical metaphor explicitly expresses an unqualified class-inclusion relation. Anything that qualifies the class-inclusion character or reduces its scope will reduce metaphoricity." (Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990: 16)

This seems to fit with the intuitive feeling that similes might be perceived as less intense, less powerful, perhaps, than metaphors. We have seen in Chapters 4 and 5 that the metaphors in the corpus help to consolidate an *irreconcilable* divide between US and THEM. If similes specify "the grounds for similarity," then it might follow that this would also, in turn, make more easily available the ways in which the two elements compared are not similar. In that sense, similes might be seen as serving purposes that are occasion-specific, rather than tying the understanding of the conflict to matters of identity. As a result, one might conclude that explicit comparisons might be less effective in the cementing of an irreconcilable divide, especially over time. However, this is precisely what the analyses of this section try to show, that is the ways in which analogy can be used to maintain the relevance of US vs. THEM over time.

At this point, it is important to note that the terms "analogy" and "metaphor" are not interchangeable. While relations of analogy often motivate the use of a metaphor, they do not necessarily give rise to a conceptual blend, with a new, emergent structure. The study of analogy as it is used in the data, separately from that of metaphor, strives to serve a specific purpose: to show that CBT can be used beyond the analysis of metaphors as they occur online. While RT is a theory of understanding grounded in the communicative event, CBT expands its account of understanding to reasoning, to "the way we think" (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). As such, although analogy, unlike metaphor, does not necessarily give rise to the formation of conceptual blends, this does not mean that blends are not part of the analysis. Conceptual blending thus does not merely account for ways in which a metaphor or utterance gets interpreted online, but also for the reasons behind its potential *efficiency* in the context of persuasion. The combination of RT and CBT should therefore be considered beyond the interpretation of metaphors.

6.2.1. Quoting previous Presidents: Positive Self Presentation

CBT is grounded in the broader theory of Mental Spaces. The latter are not set in the hearers' minds; rather, "a mental space is understood as a conceptual domain with *unique* coordinates in terms of both time and space as well as subjective viewpoint, which anchor the validity of the rep-

resented information to that specific domain." (Van Krieken & Sanders 2019: 500) In this section, we explore the role played by analogy to anchor the validity of the represented information so as to fit the mental space for America's role, as it gets constructed in discourse. One of the recurring ways in which analogy is used throughout the data is through quoting previous Presidents. The point here is to anchor the representation of the current conflict in the judgment of trusted members of OUR union. The answer which we try to answer here is: why is that efficient? In their analysis of news narratives, van Krieken & Sanders (2019: 504) refer to the use of quotes as builders of an *intermediate space,* whose function is to "convince the reader about the truthfulness of the narrative reconstruction, for quoting from communicative events legitimizes the narrative reconstruction of the newsworthy events." In the case of American War Rhetoric, the President acts as the most official source when it comes to relating matters of foreign policy. However, issues of trust were made salient following the Vietnam War and the release of the Pentagon Papers, and even more so after the Watergate Scandal, which directly questioned the integrity of the then President. On these two occasions, what was made evident was indeed the fact that several Presidents had not been truthful in their addresses to the public, whether it was regarding the extent of America's involvement in Vietnam, or domestic politics. The issue of the President's integrity in fulfilling his role might then appear as a recent trend, throwing doubt onto those who followed Johnson and Nixon. When it comes to historical figures, such as Kennedy or Washington, issues of truthfulness are somewhat irrelevant: history does not lie (or at least it tends to be accepted as the most accurate record of past events). Quoting past Presidents, whose mark in history has been recorded as the achievement of great, respected men, can thus anchor the validity of the present conflict in America's history, reminding the hearers of past successful outcomes, of the trust that was then placed in their leader. What we will see through the analyses of the following utterances (with (14) serving as a representative example of this type of analysis), is that the efficiency of this strategy needs to go further than the speaker's alignment with a respected figure. For example, should the President decide to quote a businessman's reasons for supporting the war, the irrelevance of his views for the interpretation of foreign policy might directly be made apparent, and lessen the efficiency of the strategy. However, what I argue is that the relevance of the following utterances does not just lie with the person who the speaker is quoting and aligning with, but rather with the reinforced validity of US as a broader concept, of OUR battle as a continuum.

(14) "**As** President Kennedy said **in October of 1962**, 'Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small." (G.W.Bush, 07.10.2002, my emphases)

(15) "**On this, the centennial anniversary of President Harry Truman's birth**, it is fitting to recall his words, spoken to a Joint session of the Congress **in a similar situation**: 'The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter...we may endanger the peace of the world, and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this nation.' The speech was given in 1947. The problem then was 2 years of Soviet-supported indirect aggression against Greece (...) Democratic forces succeeded, and Greece became a parliamentary democracy." (Reagan, 9 May 1984, my emphases)

(16) "For thirty years **since the end of World War II**, our strategy **has been to preserve** peace through strength. It is steadiness and **the vision of men like Dwight Eisenhower** that we have to thank for policies that made America strong and credible." (Reagan, 18 August 1980, my emphases)

In (14), analogy is triggered by the use of the conjunction "as," which leads to the formation of two spaces: one representing the America of 1962, and that of the present. For Kennedy's words to be relevant in the context of (14), one needs to assume that they are indeed suitable to describe the current conflict in which America was involved. The accommodation of this DP is necessary in order to retrieve the following inferences: that the present enemy has deliberately deceived the world, and that their offense is not only condemned by the United States, but by the "world community of nations." From there, one can conclude that if THEIR offense then justified OUR involvement, then it should today too. I now argue that the framework of Mental Spaces, and of CBT, is needed in order to understand why utterances such as (14) (and indeed such as (15), or (16)) are efficient - why it is that the fact that today's world varies greatly from the world in 1962 does not become available (which does not mean that it cannot), so that rejections of OUR involvement might be kept at bay.

As well as the political situation, the Presidents in each space are also linked by a relation of analogy. Fauconnier and Turner explain that "analogy depends upon Role-Value compression" (2002: 98). One example which they use is that of an analogy between "Pope Paul VI" and "Pope John Paul," which applies here too. What we have in (14) is therefore two networks: the first one features *John Kennedy* in one input, *President of the United States* in the other, giving rise to *President Kennedy* in the blend. In a second network, we have *G.W. Bush* in one input, another input with the same Role as previously, *President of the United States*, and *President Bush* in the blend. Role and Value are compressed in both blends, and the two distinct networks share the same Role input (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 98-99), 'President of the United States.' The two blended spaces, *President Kennedy* and *President Bush* are thus linked by the Vital Relation of Analogy. "In other words, when, through blending, two different blended spaces have acquired frame structure in common, they are linked by the Vital Relation of Analogy." (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 99)



Fig. 12: Conceptual Network for Analogy between 1962 and 2002 America

We can already see here that conceptual blending is not restricted to the analysis of novel or conventional metaphors. In (14), although there is no blended space where 1962 America and the present America become fused, the reasoning based on the relation of analogy between these two separate spaces still relies upon conceptual integration of some elements (resulting in "President of the United States"). The acceptance of the analogy is grounded in the speaker's and hearers' shared understanding of a continuity between America's past and America's present. By profiling this continuity, which is presupposed to be intrinsic to the American identity, the different circumstances of each time can be made less easily accessible, irrelevant to the decision which needs to be made about OUR current involvement. In other words, the elements between the two time spaces which might be disanalogous can remain hidden. The hearer's attention is not drawn to spot the differences between the two situations, rather it is directed towards what it is that makes them similar. This is also helped by the fact that Kennedy's words resonate like universal truths, ones that do not change with time: no matter what the exact details are, never will it be acceptable for deliberate deception or offensive threat to become legitimized. The drawing of analogy in (14) thus serves to constrain the context in which the current conflicts are interpreted, in light of America's timeless cause to fight against injustice, to punish deception and violence. George W. Bush's suggested plan for action can appear justified, not simply because it fits with the philosophy of a trusted actor in American history; his reasoning is also supported by its grounding in continuity.

As a result, OUR cause to fight evil gets abstracted as a feature of American history, allowing for the present circumstances to remain in the background. Nevertheless, it is also worth noting that individualism is not entirely discarded - indeed that of Kennedy's is made available. In (15), it is that of Truman's, and it is even more salient in (16), as Dwight Eisenhower's vision is praised, making the individuality of whoever fills the role of President a significant factor in the country's, and

the world's fate. This individuality is profiled for a specific purpose: that to make the rejection of the current President's course of action even more costly. This is where the notion of "intermediate spaces" might be particularly useful, as a space which contains not only America's purpose and identity, but also the trusted judgement of an individual. It would come as no surprise if each of the above utterances, (14) to (16), were followed by this final statement (which would lead to the formation of a blend): "Let us not let him down now." The relevance of this type of statement, where "we" can be seen to let down a President who is long gone, relies upon our understanding of America's cause as a continuity. This is what allows for the inference that rejecting the current President's course of action would be letting Kennedy/Eisenhower/Truman down. The rejection of the analogy does not merely involve the rejection of America's moral battle, but also that of trusted, highly respected characters, whose soundness of interpretation can be applied to the present.

In (14), (15) and (16), the interpretation of the conflict is thus constrained to a new version of the well-known fight for freedom, a new version of US vs. THEM. In both (15) and (16), the hearer is reminded of the success of past missions: "Greece became a parliamentary democracy," and Eisenhower's vision of "peace through strength" "made America strong and credible." When discussing America's current or future involvement in military action, the hearer might question the necessity of war, wondering whether the sacrifice might be worth the cause. By linking the present situation to previous wars, analogical projection of similar results can also be mapped onto a third future space, reinforcing the perceived adequacy of OUR cause. This idea of continuity between the present and the past is crucial for the efficiency of such analogical reasoning. In their analysis of reality and intermediate spaces, van Krieken and Sanders (2019: 500) go on to specify that all spaces are related to the '"ground' of commonly shared knowledge about the world and the discourse context" (also see Rubba, 1996; and Oakley & Coulson, 2008 for references to the "ground" in relation with cognitive models and mental spaces, respectively[5]). I argue that the efficiency of analogy as a persuasive mechanism (within American War Rhetoric) relies upon its ability to effectively constrain the context, by profiling the relevant elements from the "ground" for the interpretation of the current conflict. Analogy with previous Presidents can therefore be effective to give a positive image of the speaker, not only because figures like Kennedy are generally well-thought of and es-

[5] Oakley & Coulson (2008: 30) talk about "grounding," which they note is mostly absent from CBT. Its integration is thus specific to their mental spaces model. "Grounding allows the theory of mental spaces to consider explicitly how situational knowledge contributes to the understanding and management of discourse […] The grounding of networks is such that a given mental space network functions as a discourse scenario, or a rhetorical or discourse move that can be characterized in terms of its illocutionary force and perlocutionary effects."

teemed, but also because the conceptualization of the present is anchored in the country's history, and in a need for continuity which is presupposed to be shared by all.

6.2.2. Negative 'Other' Presentation

While the previous examples highlighted the role of analogy in enhancing the speaker's image and the credibility of his interpretations, we will now turn to the ways in which analogy can be used to paint a negative image of the Other, so as to constrain the context by profiling morality as the relevant factor of interpretation. The 'Other' can either refer to the enemy, or in some cases to the opposition at home, i.e. those who do not support the war.

- Undermining opposition at home

(17) "The total amount requested for aid to all of Central America in 1984 is about $600 million. That's less than one-tenth of what Americans will spend this year on coin-operated video games..." (Reagan, 27.04.1983)

We have seen in Chapter 4 (4.3) that (17) was uttered in the context where FREEDOM was construed as a PERSON, on whose behalf Reagan's request for military funds is to be understood. The focus here is on the use of analogy, which does not give rise to a blended space in the same way as metaphors such as FREEDOM IS A PERSON do. Two ways of spending money in America are compared: the amount of money requested by the President to help with the conflicts in Central America, and that spent by Americans on video games. The analogy achieves two different effects: the first one is to put in perspective the amount that is being requested by the government which, when compared with money spent on video games, i.e. a small portion of Americans' budget, can be conceived of as a lot less significant. The second is to trigger feelings of guilt if one was to oppose the government's request. The first mental space is that of Reagan's administration, and features the money requested ($600 million), along with its purpose, helping the victims of the conflicts taking place in Central America. The second is that of the American population, and the money they allocate to their personal entertainment such as video games. While analogy links the choices made on how one's money is spent, there is a disanalogy between the importance given to the concerns of international crises and to those of personal entertainment. The individuals who are happy to spend money on video games, but not on aid programs to Central America can therefore be construed as selfish or uncaring. This is what makes inferences on grounds of morality relevant. What happens in (17) is the constraint of the context in which the question, 'is it ok to support the

government's request for $600 million in military aid?,' gets answered. Through the Vital Relation of Analogy, Reagan is able to constrain the context by profiling morality as the deciding factor. Reagan might justify the use of analogy as a way to place those $600 million in context, when in fact, what happens is that he is taking it *out* of its context. In reality, the money which individual Americans might save by not buying video games would not go towards international aid funds. Despite the use of numbers, the persuasive power of the analogy does not rely on factual information, but rather on the judgement that it allows, leading to a negative 'Other' presentation. The hearer becomes directly involved, as a mental space for the American public gets linked to that of the government. Through analogy, personal choices are made salient, and linked to an impact on the fate of innocent people in Central America. By constraining the context in which Reagan's budget is to be interpreted, (17) can become a relevant argument to support the war effort. By separating the group of Americans who do not agree with Reagan's plan, and construing them as somewhat immoral or selfish, the analogy hides any legitimate opposition within the group US: WE are those who care enough to help those in need. As a result, binary oppositions such as the one which opposes US and THEM are reinforced, as all those who disagree with US share in the enemy's immorality (to some extent).

• THEM: the epitome of evil and oppression

Analogy can be used as a very efficient tool in the categorization of THEM as the epitome of evil and oppression, whatever era THEY belong to. New, unknown forms of evil can therefore be categorized as 'OUR enemy,' i.e. the representation of oppression and cruelty in their most extreme forms. The focus on intensity is what matters here.

(18) "Al Qaida is **to terror what the Mafia is to crime**." (G.W.Bush, 20.09.2001, my emphasis)

The interpretation of (18) relies upon that of a relation of analogy linking two spaces: one with Al Qaida and the concept of terror; and one with the Mafia and the concept of crime. In the first one also features America in the present, as terror represents its most significant threat. The selection of what goes into those spaces can also be guided by expectations of relevance. Indeed, the selection of ITALIAN for the second space would not be relevant (although it is accessible) to comprehend Bush's use of analogy; indeed, its selection might lead to conclusions that Al Qaida is not America's problem. In order to meet expectations of relevance, that is to understand how the rise of Al Qaida affects US, the hearer is led to infer that what both have in common is extremism, the intensity of the form of evil which each group represents. What is highlighted in each space is the worst repre-

sentation in history of its concept. We can then get to the inference that Al Qaida represents the worst terrorist threat the world has ever known. From there, it is then also possible to reason that such intensity is to be matched by an intensity in OUR response, extending the relation of analogy between the two spaces. This section is concerned with the evaluation of analogy as an efficient persuasive mechanism. I argue that the reason why utterances such as (18) are efficient is that it maintains the relevance of the frame of (OUR) fighting evil. Indeed, it is grounded in the presupposed, shared assumption that evil exists, and continues to appear in different shapes throughout history. As time goes on, as geographical borders evolve, and as scientific progress advances, new forms of evil will appear, making OUR continued involvement all the more relevant: WE must always be vigilant. Rather than focusing on the motives behind Al Qaida's actions, or later on the precise location of Al Qaida's leaders, the relevant factor in the interpretation of the current challenges appears to be that of intensity, justifying OUR own intense response too. The question 'why have THEY attacked US' thus also gets answered, allowing for the opposition between US and THEM to be accepted as the most relevant interpretation of today's conflicts: if THEY are the embodiment of evil, it makes sense that THEY would attack the defender of freedom in the world.

(19) "They are the **heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century**. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions, by abandoning every value except the will to power, they **follow in the path of fascism and nazism and totalitarianism.** And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends, in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies." (G.W.Bush, 20.09.2001, my emphases)

In this last example, the Vital Relation of Analogy which links the current enemy to "all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century" is part of a conceptual blending network. Terrorists are not described as acting "like" the Nazis this time; instead, they are their heirs, or rather they are the heirs of murderous "ideologies." This is perfectly compatible with the construal of the enemy as non/in-human as seen in Chapter 4 (4.2). The reason why this particular example is being tackled here is to discuss the role of analogy to maintain the relevance of the frame of Fighting against Evil. Indeed, the fear which might get triggered when interpreting utterances such as (19) is conditional upon the understanding that evil exists and evolves with time. The battle between US and THEM thus becomes one which inevitably spreads across generations. As terrorists are seen as being genetically related to the murderous ideologies of the 20th Century, namely Nazism and Fascism, they share certain traits, and more specifically, their *worst* traits, those that led them to become murderers. If the focus of the metaphor was the human side of the family input space, one could argue that in a different environment, these "heirs" might not behave like their ancestors, that they might have a chance of redemption. Of course, this would be completely inconsistent with the inhuman portrait

that is drawn, as they "[sacrifice] human life to serve their radical visions." Instead, the metaphor focuses on the sharing of character traits, the basis for the analogy, as evidence of an evil that cannot be changed, an evil that is genetically coded. The part played by the environment is not accessed, while the focus is on genetics as a reliable tool which can not only account for certain behaviors, but also give us reliable insights into what is to come. In the blend, current and previous enemies do not only share character traits; they will also share their fate. When analogy motivates a metaphor as in (19), it gets compressed in the blend, here into Uniqueness: the terrorists are to be understood as perpetuating the same evil that America has been opposing for generations. The relation of analogy does not just alert the hearer to certain similarities between two groups; by highlighting the extremism in their respective views or in the means used, the hearer is allowed to quickly and efficiently categorize new, unknown groups as 'the enemy,' OUR enemy.

Analogy with the past is a recurring strategy in American War Rhetoric. We have seen here that the framework of Mental Spaces and/or CBT can help to shed some light onto its efficiency as a persuasive mechanism, that is onto why it might be accepted as a reliable element when deciding whether WE should go to war against THEM. I have argued that this is the case, because it perpetuates (a) the conceptualization of US on a continuum, and (b) the belief that evil exists and keeps evolving, so that WE must always be vigilant and ready to adopt the most extreme measures to keep it at bay. Analogy allows to constrain the context, by highlighting what is relevant for the hearer to interpret the present conflicts. In the examples discussed in this section, time or circumstances do not really matter, as what is highlighted is the need for evil to be fought, by US. As the worst forms of evil are linked throughout history in the discourse, a categorization of the enemy appears, standing at the other extremity from US on the morality scale. In some cases where analogy gets compressed into identity or uniqueness, the effects of categorization can go further, leading the hearer to make false assumptions about the identity of a group. We will see that this can happen even outside of conceptual metaphors usage.

6.2.3. When analogy becomes real

"President Bush never publicly blamed Saddam Hussein or Iraq for the events of September 11, but by consistently linking Iraq with terrorism and al Qaeda he provided the context from which such a connection could be made." (Gershkoff & Kushner 2005: 525)

Despite the lack of explicit condemnation, some polls confirmed that a significant proportion of Americans thought there was a direct link between the attacks of September the 11th and Iraq, on which the war on terror was focused until Obama's presidency. In fact, according to Chomsky (2004: 18), "by March, almost half believed that Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the 9-11 attacks and that the hijackers included Iraqis." What seems to be at stake here is the constraint of context through repetition of analogies. The question is: what allows analogy to appear as a relevant element in the interpretation of the conflicts, so that, in this context, it gets accepted as the only way to interpret Iraq's behavior? Gershkoff and Kushner (2005: 527) go on to explain:

"The administration juxtaposed allusions to Iraq with the terms terror, bin Laden, and al Qaeda [...] From September 12, 2002, to May 2003, the subjects of terrorism and Iraq were intertwined on a regular basis. Of the 13 speeches given in this period, 12 referenced terror and Iraq in the same paragraph and 10 placed them within the same sentence. In 4 speeches, a discussion of terrorism preceded the first mention of Iraq, giving the impression that Iraq was a logical extension of the terrorism discussion."

We will now explore the various elements which led to the discursive construction of this analogy, from the context it arose in to its realization in discourse:

- Making Iraq "relevant"

The first element of response can be provided through RT's framework. Expectations of relevance can explain why Iraq could be logically construed as an "extension of the terrorism discussion." In the aftermath of 9/11, punishing the culprits of the attacks, and tackling the broader issue of terrorism in order to reassure the American public, was the number one priority on the foreign policy/national security agenda. As a result, the mere mention of Iraq, in the context of Presidential addresses on national security, was enough to draw a link between Iraq and the salient issue of terrorism, and occasionally even 9/11, in order to maximize expectations of relevance.

Reagan's use of analogy in the context of the Cold War was similarly used as a persuasive strategy. On many occasions, Reagan directly compared the Soviets' military expansion with that of the United States, or mentioned their presence in countries that were nowhere near their own borders. The question that was brought to the hearers' mind, and which acted as a great constraint on the interpretation process, was 'if THEY are not acting in this way to attack/intimidate US, how else could such action be interpreted?' This highlights an important aspect of analogy: by constraining the context, the interpretation of current issues only seems to make sense within the well-known frame of US vs. THEM. Let us now see how this happened in the context of the War on Terror.

• Network Metaphor

The relations of analogy which we discuss in this section do not appear within metaphors; indeed one of this section's aims is to show that the framework of CBT, and particularly the notion of compression, can extend beyond metaphors. However, the 'network metaphor' is an important part of the context in which these relations of analogy are to be interpreted; a brief discussion of its entailments is thus necessary.

(20) "Our enemy is **a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them**. Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there." (G.W.Bush, 20.09.2001, my emphasis)

Terrorism is commonly construed as a "network." This metaphor is prevalent in the entire corpus, and entails a different definition of the enemy. In a war, one is used to conceptualizing the enemy as a person, or a group of people, often located in a specific country. But this does not apply to this construal of terrorism. If TERRORISM IS A NETWORK, the terrorists who were directly responsible for the 9/11 attacks can be connected to many different actors, *and* locations. Nations such as Iraq are often blamed for "harboring" terrorists, offering them a "safe haven." A boat's journey, if it is to be successful, needs to start and end in a harbor. If IRAQ IS A HARBOR, a relation of Cause-Effect is created to link the starting place where a terrorist might depart (most likely coinciding with his training place), and the successful completion of an attack. This might even get compressed into a relation of Part-Whole, where the harbor stands for the whole enterprise. The element of safety is thus profiled and stands for the whole event. Iraq can then become more than a mere observer, but rather a facilitator of terror, an integral part of its success. The NETWORK metaphor thus allows for the many relationships between the different elements of terrorism to be made relevant, as crucial elements related to the power of terror to inflict fear. Given the metaphor's salience in the context of the 9/11 attacks and of the following war on terror, it might facilitate confusion in some hearers about the exact relationship of the links between certain actors, such as Saddam Hussein and Al Qaida. The metaphor also taps into our understanding of responsibility. Indeed, responsibility for a crime is not merely established upon determining who committed the final act. Many elements are to be taken into consideration, such as who had the original intention to commit the crime, who planned it, who facilitated it, and who eventually committed it. The latter might even end up being perceived as 'less responsible' than those behind the planning.

• Construction of attacks as a series of steps

In the context of the war on terror, the discourse tends to focus not merely on the cruel means embraced by the enemy, but also on the various steps leading to an attack. The fear associated with ter-

ror stems from its element of surprise; but what the discourse makes available is the planning that goes behind the final execution. The realization of such attacks could be described as incorporating the following steps:

- Intention, often equated with a deep hatred;
- Means: both technical (designing and use of weapons) and practical (securing a "safe haven" to plan operations, conduct training, prepare weapons, etc.);
- Actual conducting of the attack;
- Celebration of the outcome (if successful): claiming of success and responsibility;
- Hiding of culprits (those who were behind its planning, as the ones who conduct the attacks generally use their own life to take others)

(21) "We know that Iraq and the Al Qaeda terrorist network **share a common enemy**: the United States of America. We know that Iraq and Al Qaeda have had high level contacts that go back a decade. Some Al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq. These include one very senior Al Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for chemical and biological attacks. We've learned that Iraq has trained Al Qaeda members in bombmaking and poisons and deadly gases. And we know that after September the 11th, Saddam Hussein's regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America." (G.W.Bush, 07.10.2002, my emphasis)

(22) "In 1993, Iraq attempted to assassinate the Amir of Kuwait and a former American President. Iraq's government openly praised the attacks of September the 11th, and Al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan and are known to be in Iraq." (G.W.Bush, 12.09.2002)

A direct link is created between Al Qaida and Iraq, through their common hatred of the United States. But that is not all. I argue here that the inference that Iraq might have had some involvement in the attacks of 9/11 is allowed thanks to the relations of analogy that are constructed between the input spaces of Iraq and Al Qaida. Indeed, their common hatred of the United States seems to lead to similar intentions to kill Americans, whether it was the U.S. President in 1993, or thousands of innocent civilians going about their daily lives in 2001. As all the different steps necessary to the execution of a terrorist attack are intertwined, going back and forth between Al Qaida's and Iraq's role, assigning responsibility becomes a cognitively difficult task. In both of the above utterances, the construction of two mental spaces, one for Al Qaida and one for Iraq, helps the hearer to make sense of the roles played by each group in the events. Let us take a closer look at the attacks of 9/11: in the input space of Al Qaida, 9/11 appears as the most salient element for the American public, and it thus features as their most significant achievement; in other words, it is what they are now known for in the Western world. Relations of analogy can appear between the two spaces, for example between the execution of 9/11 in one space, and its celebration in the other; or between the planning of terrorist attacks, and the provision of a safe haven to do so, because in both instances, each event stems from a similarly intense hatred of the United States. This does not mean that Iraq

shares the same responsibility, and indeed that is never explicitly stated. To understand how this inference might be made, I argue that the discourse favors the creation of a conceptual integration network (despite the fact that no metaphor is being used), leading to the conceptualization of a single, even more dangerous enemy. In *The Way We Think,* Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 6) introduce integration as follows:

"Finding identities and oppositions is part of a much more complicated process of conceptual integration, which has elaborate structural and dynamic properties and operational constraints, but which typically goes entirely unnoticed since it works fast in the backstage of cognition."

What we are concerned with here, is the definition of the enemy's identity, so that WE can know how to defeat THEM and prevent further attacks on American soil. This is precisely what conceptual integration is concerned with, and is not always restricted to the interpretation of metaphors.

• An axis of evil

Both Al Qaida and Iraq fit the definition of the enemy. Their hatred of the United States has been demonstrated by attacks against the country, or by celebration of such attacks. Some of the cultural models which form part of the background shared between speaker and hearers can influence the formation of implicatures, such as that Saddam's celebration of 9/11 is to be equated with his sharing some responsibility in the events. If one looks at the culture of sports, celebrating a team's achievements is often done by referring to such achievements as one's own. "We won" would indeed be perfectly fitting for a spectator's description of the victory of the team which they support. When it comes to intentions, some religious teachings regard sinful thoughts on a similar level as acting upon such thoughts. In both instances, what is at stake is the construction of identity. In the context of the War on Terror, each step is linked to the process of conducting a terrorist attack by a Part-Whole relation, the Whole representing conducting a terrorist attack on the grounds of hatred towards the United States. The mention of Iraq's pursuit of "the most dangerous weapons," or of harboring terrorists can thus lead to the implication that these demonstrate Iraq's knowledge of the *entire* enterprise, and therefore should share blame for it.

(23) "States like these and their terrorist allies constitute **an axis of evil**, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them **the means to match their hatred**." (G.W. Bush, 29.01.2002, my emphases)

As the enemy is understood as an "axis of evil," citizenship or geography cannot be used to locate them. Instead, OUR enemy is solely defined by a propensity for evil, a single and growing force as they all join together, united by a common hatred. Having similarly hateful intentions of destruc-

tion, Al Qaida and Iraq are not to be seen distinctively. Within this new conception of the enemy, an analogy is formed between the means used to conduct an attack, and the hatred which motivates such attacks. The construction of a hypothetical space, triggered by the modal "could," allows for the conceptualization of a new type of threat, one which does not only compare the two groups, but which integrates the worst of both into a blend. The construction of this blend might occur as part of a hypothetical space, but its conceptualization remains real - this point will be detailed in Chapter 8. I argue here that the discourse encourages the hearers to combine the worst traits of each group, leading to potential misconceptions about the role played by Iraq in the events of 9/11, while Chapters 7-9 will explore the aspect of fear which is triggered by this conceptualization of a new type of enemy.



Fig. 13: Conceptual Network for the conceptualization of a new enemy

What prompts the formation of a conceptual blend, from these relations of analogy, is the need for the enemy's identity to be defined or filled, or rather the need to understand the threat which WE are facing and how to defeat it. The salience in the context of metaphors such as that of the "axis of evil" also favors the conceptualization of an enemy with no clear-cut boundaries, and thus favors the understanding of the enemy through the integration of various elements. Their shared hatred is what motivates the combination of both groups' resources in order to plan attacks on the United States. Iraq's pursuit of the most dangerous weapons is linked to Al Qaida's determination and intentions by a link of analogy, highlighting a similar degree of intensity. The conceptualization of a potential attack which would combine elements from both input spaces gives rise to a conceptual blend with an emergent structure, that of a new enemy. As intensity gets transferred to the blend, this new enemy is therefore capable of causing much more damage and destruction than either

group alone. This is what makes this "axis of evil" so dangerous. The outer-space relation of analogy between the Iraqi regime and the Al Qaida terrorist network responsible for the 9/11 attacks, is compressed into Uniqueness, in a blend whose function is to conceptualize a new form of evil. In this context, it is not so much the exact identity of who did what/when, but rather the intensity of evil which is made relevant to US. The construction of the enemy as a single group/axis, morally and ideologically opposed to US, contributes to the compression of relations of analogy between the motives of separate groups into identity in a blended space for the enemy/evil, in terms of what they represent for US.

Relations of analogy alone are not enough to trigger interpretations that might misrepresent Iraq's role in terrorist attacks against the United States. It is the context which they find themselves in which favors these (mis)interpretations. The discourse around terrorism seems to constrain the conceptualization of the guilty to their intentions (linked by a relation of Part-Whole to the threat which THEY represent), highlighting a complete lack of morality. Analogy can therefore be used as a key strategy in the construction of one single enemy. When we look at the communicative event, within which analogies might be drawn between Iraq's and Al Qaida's purpose/motives, the search for optimal relevance can account for the resulting inference that Iraq was involved in 9/11.

6.3. Semantic and grammatical choices

This section focuses on the semantic and grammatical choices which construe OUR role in the conflicts, that of the enemy, and their contribution to maintaining the coherence of the discourse in the building of a binary opposition between US and THEM. In the case of American War Rhetoric, the linguistic choices made to portray remote conflicts have a significant impact on the hearer's conceptualization of the issues, as most people have no direct perceptual access to the situations dealt with in discourse. So far in this chapter, we have dealt with ways in which various spaces get related as discourse unfolds, which impacts the conceptualization of the elements within the spaces themselves. In section 6.3., we will take a closer look at what makes up the mental spaces which emerge in discourse, as the public is related details about what WE and what THEY are doing in the conflicts. The analyses are not merely concerned with the online interpretation of these semantic choices, but also with the impact on *reasoning* of their repetition over time. The word "choices" is an important one, as it already allows us to see their role as a persuasive mechanism, in the sense that the interpretation of the conflicts is constrained to the ways in which WE look at them.

6.3.1. Active, not guilty

The main strategy which has been explored in Chapters 3-6 is the interpretation of each conflict as a realization of US vs. THEM. We have seen that opposing evil to defend freedom is understood as part of OUR identity, as WE are moral beings who meet OUR obligations, among which fighting THEM. If OUR opposition to THEM is crucial in the establishment of OUR role in the conflicts, it mainly remains a *moral*, *ideological* opposition. When it comes to physical confrontation, dealing with OUR part in the conflict can easily bring up problems to the hearer's attention: is war really necessary? Is OUR intervention really welcome? Certain semantic and grammatical choices can help to constrain the interpretation of OUR part to one that is active, but not guilty, thus contributing to keeping such questions in the background. If one examines the choices used to describe American intervention, a pattern emerges across the corpus to portray US as *secondary actors*, except when responding to direct attacks, such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, or perhaps assassination attempts on the American President.

• Not guilty...

Hart (2016) shows how alternative constructions affect the perception of political protests and mainly the reader/hearer's assignment of blame. In the context of our selected data, it makes sense that no blame should appear on America's side, as it only contains speeches made by the President of the United States, and with the exception of Obama and the war in Iraq, all defending America's action abroad. By constructing US as secondary actors, the blame for starting wars, or for the need for US to oppose THEM in wars, resides entirely with THEM. This is how Clinton announced his country's military intervention in Kosovo:

(24) "Today our Armed Forces **joined** our NATO allies in air strikes against Serbian forces responsible for the brutality in Kosovo." (Clinton, 24.03.1999, my emphasis)

(25) "But when we and our allies **joined** with courageous Bosnians **to stand up** to the aggressors, we helped to end the war." (Clinton, 24.03.1999, my emphases)

OUR participation in air strikes, OUR action to stand up to the aggressors is foremost understood as a joint effort. What is profiled is not the character of the action taken, but the unity demonstrated by Americans with their allies, with NATO, and with the Bosnians. The structure of the conflicts seems to be as follows: first, THEY start a war. While WE are on the side of unity, THEY are at the origin of confrontation and of disaccord. Although international relationships can prove quite complex,

and in some cases conflicts can go back over generations, the starting point of the conflicts in the data tends to be clear:

(26) "This conflict **started August 2nd** when the dictator of Iraq invaded a small and helpless neighbor. Kuwait — a member of the Arab league and a member of the United Nations — was crushed, its people, brutalized. Five months ago, Saddam Hussein **started this cruel war** against Kuwait. Tonight, **the battle has been joined**." (G.Bush, 16.01.1991, my emphases)

By highlighting THEIR role in initiating war, blame for the violence that military confrontation entails lies on THEIR side. This is reinforced by the semantic choices used to depict the conflict from THEIR side, and from OURS. Saddam Hussein started a "war," while WE joined a "battle." The term "battle," when differentiated from that of "war," carries less violence. Indeed, barbarism can often be associated with the practice of war. Battles, on the other hand, tend to be linked to the larger concept of war by a Part-Whole Relation (in our encyclopedic knowledge of war), as battles constitute specific events in a war, but do not represent its entirety. It is important to note, however, that there is a clear opposition in discourse between THEIR part in war, and OUR joining the battle. In (26), the verb "start" activates a simple EVENT schema, thus making salient relations of Cause-Effect. Saddam Hussein is the cause of the war, *and* of OUR involvement, of OUR joining the battle. The two concepts are thus dissociated, each playing a distinct role in the conflict, rather than construed as one. Indeed, while America might take part in a battle, it is to be dissociated with the broader concept of war, with the barbarism associated with it, and with how it started. The juxtaposition of the two terms to relate to THEIR and OUR part thus highlights the relation itself, that WE are merely taking PART in a conflict that is not of OUR doing.

• ... but still active

Let us take a closer look at how America's involvement is described in (26): "the battle has been joined." The use of the passive voice does not indicate a fully passive stance on America's part. Indeed, it serves to profile the "battle" which WE are joining, that is actually OUR part in *ending* the war. Indeed, despite the use of the passive voice, OUR involvement is very much active, which is made apparent through the choice of verb, "joined." WE have not been dragged into this war, WE have made the choice to join the battle, which highlights America's moral strength. The semantic choices used to depict each group's part in the conflicts assign violence and blame to THEM, while resolution lies on OUR side. The active part played by Americans is thus constrained to the *resolution* of the conflict. On the other hand, THEY have no interest in ending the atrocity of the wars which THEY started.

• Focus on OUR part

So far, we have dealt with America's part in the context of the whole event. Let us now zoom onto precisely what it is that America actively does. America's active part in the conflicts tends to be depicted through the use of transitive verbs, which serves to construct US as opposed to THEM in OUR treatment of those who stand in the middle of the conflicts: the victims. The grammatical choices made to construct OUR actions contribute to portraying America as always thinking of others, as acting with the concern of others in mind, in a way that separates US entirely from THEM. Although the conflicts are construed as an opposition between two main actors (US and THEM), OUR actions, OUR interventions do not efface the people who are most affected by the conflicts, the people who saw war imposed on their country and had no choice but to live with the consequences. The use of transitive verbs to construe America's actions is indeed prevalent in the data. America is most often said to "help, "aid," or even "rescue" certain groups of people. These verbs profile those people, who appear at the center of OUR actions.

(27) "So, in addition to economic and humanitarian assistance, we must also provide adequate levels of security assistance **to permit our friends to protect themselves** from Cuban and Soviet subversion." (Reagan, 24.03.1984, my emphasis)

Utterances similar to (27) are to be found throughout the whole corpus, where OUR role appears to be to *enable* others, and where OUR actions therefore need to reflect the needs of OUR "friends." Indeed, it is with "our friends" in mind that America's entire part is to be interpreted:

(28) "We do not seek the destruction of Iraq, its culture, or its people. Rather, **we seek an Iraq that** uses its great resources not to destroy, not to serve the ambitions of a tyrant, but to build a better life for itself and its neighbors." (G.Bush, 29.01.1991, my emphasis)
(29) "**We seek a Persian Gulf where** conflict is no longer the rule, where the strong are neither tempted not able to intimidate the weak." (G.Bush, 29.01.1991, my emphasis)

"We seek an Iraq/a Persian Gulf that..." Such constructions directly place those who are affected by the conflicts, in this case Iraq, and the whole Persian Gulf, *before* our concrete actions. OUR action is therefore construed as one of intention. Concern for the well-being of the people in Iraq, for the preservation of their freedom and culture, is what drives America's intentions, which in turn leads to taking actions.



Fig. 14: Conceptualization of OUR action

The conceptualization of OUR actions as the fulfillment of genuine intentions makes less accessible the critical interpretation of America's involvement as a demonstration of its wish to impose its own culture on the rest of the world. Profiling selfless intentions also acts as a form of safeguarding; no matter how the events unfold, what matters is what was intended, and that is the restoration of justice and the establishment of peace. Blame can therefore remain constrained to THEM. It is not just the understanding of the events which is at stake here, but rather the hearer's reasoning about them, so as to arrive at the conclusion that it is acceptable for America to take an active part in them.

6.3.2. Lessening the violence of OUR actions

'Acceptable' and 'easy to accept,' however, are two different things. This subsection explores ways in which reasoning gets constrained, so that it is not just blame but also violence that is restricted to THEM. Besides profiling the intentions behind America's actions, the grammatical and semantic choices made to describe the conflicts can also help to keep the reality of war in the background, making it easier to accept any involvement on OUR part. Hart (2014: 107) argues that "certain grammatical constructions include, as part of their meaning, a simulated spatial point of view which is imposed on the conceptualization they invoke." In his analysis of the discourse around political protests, Hart distinguishes between three ways to construe the interactions between police and protestors: ACTION, MOTION, and FORCE events. These choices influence the construction of meaning by imposing a specific viewpoint from which the interaction is to be seen, which then impacts the assignment of blame.

> "Construing the event in terms of FORCE reduces the intensity of the process so that the event becomes one of 'balance' (and its modulation) rather than violence [...] Construing an event as a MOTION event [...] still further reduces the intensity of the process involved. Crucially, MOTION events are not transactive." (Hart, 2014: 116)

These findings can also be applied to the events related in American War Rhetoric. What comes out of the analysis is that OUR participation in war does not get conceptualized as violent, but rather as a determination to get the conflict resolved. On the other hand, the events which relate to the enemy's part in war tend to be schematized as ACTIONS, which further emphasizes the cruel impact on their victims. According to Hart, "in ACTION events, there is a transfer of energy between an AGENT and a PATIENT" (2014: 115). As a result, there is a change in state to the PATIENT (2014: 115), so that the consequences of the event can be made apparent. The following table illustrates the contrast between construing THEIR involvement and OURS as ACTION and MOTION events, re-

spectively. This type of construal is recurrent throughout the entire corpus, and is consistent with the construction of two thoroughly opposed categories:

ACTION events for THEM	MOTION events for US
(30) "We've seen innocent people taken from their homes, **forced** to kneel in the dirt, and **sprayed** with bullets; Kosovar men dragged from their families, fathers and sons together, lined up and **shot** in cold blood." (Clinton, 24.03.1999, my emphases) (31) "And let's not forget what happened: innocent people herded into concentration camps, children **gunned down** by snipers on their way to school, soccer fields and parks turned into cemeteries, a quarter of a million people **killed**, not because of anything they have done but because of who they were." (Clinton, 24.03.1999, my emphases) (32) "This conflict started August 2nd when the dictator of Iraq **invaded** a small and helpless neighbor. Kuwait — a member of the Arab league and a member of the United Nations — **was crushed**, its people, **brutalized**. (G.Bush, 16.01.1991, my emphases) (33) "the Miskito Indians, thousands of whom have been **slaughtered** or herded into detention camps, where they have been **starved** and **abused**. Their villages, churches, and crops have been **burned**." (Reagan, 09.05.1984, my emphases)	(34) "Before it is too late to act, this danger will be **removed**." (G.W. Bush, 17.03.2003, my emphasis) (35) "Resolution that authorizes the use of all necessary means, including force, to **remove** the Haitian dictators from power and restore democratic government." (Clinton, 15.09.1994, my emphasis) (36) "In Afghanistan, we **removed** the Taliban Government, which had given bin Laden and Al Qaida safe haven and support." (Obama, 01.05.2011, my emphasis) (37) "Now the 28 countries with forces in the Gulf [...] have no choice but to **drive** Saddam **from Kuwait** by force." (G.Bush, 16.01.1991, my emphases) (38) "I urge the nations of the world to **bring an end to** this danger." (G.W.Bush 17.03.2003, my emphasis) (39) "We've maintained a consistent policy toward the Sandinista regime, hoping they can be **brought back from the brink** peacefully through negotiations." (Reagan, 14.04.1094, my emphasis) (40) "Whether we **bring our enemies to justice** or **bring justice to our enemies**, justice will be done." (G.W.Bush, 20.09.2001, my emphases)

Table 2: Occurrences constructing events as ACTIONS for THEM vs. MOTION for US

• ACTION events for THEM: (30-33)

The use of the passive voice is prevalent here, and profiles the impact of these actions on the victims, highlighting THEIR cruelty and injustice. The violence of these events is heightened further by extending their impact to entire cultures (32, 33), or on the other hand by individualizing those impacted: "fathers and sons" (30), or even "children [...] on their way to school" (31). The violent impact of THEIR actions is thus conveyed to a remote public. By contrast, OUR involvement, OUR intervention in these conflicts tends to be schematized as MOTION, or sometimes FORCE events.

• MOTION events for US: (34-40)

While the use of force is explicitly mentioned, OUR actions to enforce it are conceptualized here as a change of location. What is more, what is actually moved is either the abstract notion of "danger" (34, 38), or a targeted group of people, whether it is a group of "dictators" (35), the "Taliban *government*" (36), the "Sandinista *regime*" (38), or even a single person, "Saddam" (37). "The vector in

the conceptualization thus represents a spatial trajectory rather than a transfer of energy with a LOCATION rather than a PARTICIPANT." (Hart, 2014: 116) Constructing events which involve US as MOTION events thus leaves out any impact on other people, such as civilians. As the danger is simply "removed," moving from the place where the conflict is to an unspecified location, everything else appears to remain the same, unaffected by the event. In the last three examples (38-40), the schematization as a MOTION event leads to a conceptual metaphor, where resolution of the conflict is understood as the end of a journey. The Sandinistas appear to have lost their way and need to be "brought back from the brink"; "justice" is the ultimate destination. "Whether we bring our enemies to justice or bring justice to our enemies," the issue will be resolved via the initiation of a form of MOTION, leaving everything around US exactly as it was.

• OUR use of force

While the above utterances (34-40) tend to focus on the end result, FORCE schemas can be used to tackle OUR direct confrontation with THEM. However, there is still no transfer of energy from AGENT to PATIENT. "Rather, it is the location and freedom to move of one participant, the AGONIST, that is at issue determined by its relation, including relative strength, with a second entity, the ANTAGONIST (Hart, 2014: 115) (also see Talmy, 1988, 2000 on force dynamics[6]):

(41) "If the Soviet Union can aid and abet subversion in our hemisphere, then the United States has a legal right and a moral duty to help **resist it**." (Reagan, 09.05.1984, my emphasis)

(42) "Tonight, 28 nations (...) have forces in the Gulf area **standing** shoulder to shoulder **against** Saddam Hussein." (G. Bush, 16.01.1991, my emphases)

(43) "But when we and our allies joined with courageous Bosnians to **stand up to** the aggressors, we helped to end the war." (Clinton, 24.03.1999, my emphasis)

WE are the ANTAGONIST, and "the use of force" is understood as opposing the enemy by resisting THEM, restricting THEIR ability to move freely, to inflict harm on others. By "standing shoulder to shoulder against Saddam Hussein," WE are creating a front, by which Saddam Hussein cannot pass. As WE "stand up to the aggressors," OUR mere presence is enough to push THEM back. The balancing of forces is what eventually brings an end to the conflict. Indeed, without OUR presence as a counter force, the enemy would keep on their destructive path. OUR intervention is thus construed as a restoration of the right order, rather than as the unfolding of violent interactions. These grammatical constructions can therefore contribute to constraining the hearer's conceptual-

[6] One interesting aspect of Force Dynamics, the "previously neglected semantic category" describing "how entities interact with respect to force," (Talmy, 1988: 49) is that it encompasses both the physical and psychological domains, among others, both of which are at play in this corpus.

ization of OUR military presence, OUR participation in war to a welcome, necessary intervention. The interpretation of America's involvement as an imposition is thus made less accessible, as the destructive effects of violence and tyranny are constrained to THEM, and THEIR part in the conflict.

An asymmetry is here created between OUR behavior and THEIR contribution to war, as THEY disturb the peace of the world and affect everyone around THEM, while WE remove or bring back what is needed for order to be restored. In 6.3.3., we will focus on the semantics of the verbs chosen to depict OUR action and THEIRS, so that OUR impact can be conceptualized as entirely positive, and THEIRS entirely negative, reinforcing the divide between US and THEM.

6.3.3. Building VS. destruction

We saw in the previous subsection that the construal of THEIR actions profiled its impact on others. For the victims of the conflict, this impact tends to translate into having something taken away from them: their life, their freedom, their dignity, their homes, their crops, their country, etc. OUR involvement, on the other hand, is largely construed through the use of verbs relating to the concept of building, as illustrated by the following examples:

(44) "We have before us the opportunity to **forge** for ourselves and for future generations a new world order." (G.Bush, 16.01.1991, my emphasis)
(45)"In the work of **building peace**." (Clinton, 24.03.1999, my emphasis)
(46) "Only the passage of time will tell us whether we **constructed a durable bridge to a safer world.** This, then, is why I go to Geneva, **to build a foundation for lasting peace.**" (Reagan, 14.11.1985, my emphases)
(47) "We must be smart about what we **build**." (Reagan, 26.02.1986, my emphasis)

The focus on building sets US apart from THEM, as OUR participation in war appears as a contribution. The semantic domain of building makes accessible the elaborate process which is involved, the thinking and the hard work that lies behind the final product. "Forging," for instance, implies a certain craftsmanship, as well as the creation of something that is desirable, and thus highlights the care and the skill that lie behind OUR actions. The surrounding context also tends to favor the retrieval of this particular aspect of building, through mentioning the properties which the builders hope to get from their final product ("durable"), the various steps required to ensure that this is the case ("foundation"), or the qualities required from the architect, so that what gets built can serve the world ("smart"). Unlike dictators who impose their wish on their people, WE carefully think about what the world needs, not only in the present, but also for generations to come. By profiling the

process of construction, from the laying out of foundations, to the durable effect which is pursued, the personal traits associated with imposition and dominance are made less salient.

There is one final aspect of the construction of OUR involvement which helps to keep inferences about America's desire for supremacy to be kept at bay. The reality of war, of OUR tough action against THEM is not entirely absent in the corpus. WE do not just build bridges of peace; WE need to be forceful in OUR removal of the evil which THEY represent. References to OUR capacity for destruction are therefore also present. However, it is important to look at what it is that America destroys, which the following utterances exemplify:

(48) "We will **tear down the apparatus of terror** and we will help you to **build** a new Iraq that is prosperous and free." (G.W. Bush, 17.03.2003, my emphases)
(49) "Isn't it better to use our talents and technology to **build** systems that **destroy missiles**, not people?" (Reagan, 26.02.1986, my emphases)
(50) "We are determined to **knock out** Saddam Hussein's **nuclear bomb potential**. We will also **destroy** his **chemical weapon facilities**." (G.Bush, 16.01.1991, my emphases)
(51) "Our mission is clear: (...) and, if necessary, to seriously **damage** the Serbian **military's capacity to harm** the people of Kosovo." (Clinton, 24.03.1999, my emphases)

OUR impact on Iraq, or on the countries which America intervenes in, is entirely detached from OUR resort to destruction, which is limited to machines, missiles, or the enemy's capacity to destroy. Destruction on OUR part is thus constrained to inanimate objects, again highlighting OUR great care for human life. An asymmetry appears between the devastating, negative effects triggered by THEIR part in the conflict, and the positive contribution that OUR involvement represents. The extreme measures on OUR part serve to remind the hearers of THEIR abuse of military weapons. The forceful imposition of one's will or supremacy is thus reserved to THEM, to those who would use missiles to destroy those who get in their way. Besides, the conceptualization of an imposing, dominant America would be entirely at odds with an America which builds upon existing resources, or upon what is left of the country after the war, to restore or make better; not one that takes what is not OURS.

6.4. Concluding remarks

Whatever strategy is used, as spaces of opposition unfold in discourse, the context of interpretation gets broadened, so that inconsistencies which might appear at more local levels become irrelevant in that constrained context. Wherever confrontation is tackled, the discourse does not favor the conceptualization of a symmetrical opposition of equal forces. Violence, oppression and intimidation lie on the enemy's side, and they are confronted by a different type of strength, but one which

weighs a lot more: moral strength. This does not just make US essentially different from THEM, it also highlights the confidence in the righteousness of OUR cause. The resulting asymmetry between the two sides, between these two unequal types of strength, is what makes it possible for US to remain righteous in war. But there is also a symmetry to this asymmetry. What I mean by that is that that reasoning (OUR strength weighing more than THEIRS) goes both ways: even if America's behavior was to be questioned, THEIR evil weighs a lot more than OUR potential mistakes. It is on a different level, because it is a matter of identity; that is, it is related to THEIR nature. This constant reinforcement of US vs. THEM thus strengthens the frame Fighting against Evil, where the latter's existence is acknowledged as a feature of the world, an oddity of nature, one that cannot be reconciled with the rest of society. In a culture where the concept of war, outside of its context, is understood as wrong or barbaric, it is natural for the American hearer to assign blame, to wonder whose fault it is. If each and every conflict is construed as a new instantiation of US vs. THEM, then what seems to be more relevant: that THEY are in the wrong, or that WE are? It is on the basis of that reasoning that spaces in discourse ground the interpretation of the confrontation between the two groups. It is in that sense that reasoning is constrained, as interpretations which might portray US as ego-centered or as supremacists are also kept in the background, as *irrelevant* to the interpretation of the issues at stake.

Although mental spaces unfold in discourse and relate to the interpretation of utterances online, what we have seen in Chapters 3-6 is that the overall construction of the different actors of the conflict, and of the conflicts themselves, fits with wider, sometimes entrenched reasoning patterns; that is, it appeals to a worldview where 'bad guys' are to be treated differently from the rest of society. By constantly constructing US and THEM as belonging to separate categories, the conclusion that a different type of reasoning applies to each category is promoted. What is true for US is not for THEM, and vice versa. This is a crucial pillar of American War Rhetoric, and it needs to be constantly reinforced, so that when immediate action needs to be argued (focus of Chapters 7-9), the hearers' minds have been shaped, so to speak, to accept that war for US does not mean the same as war for THEM, and can therefore be more easily accepted. What is also made apparent is that OUR opposition to THEM is essential to the construction and consolidation of OUR identity. According to Ferdinand de Saussure (1966: 115), binary oppositions are essential in everyday language and thought, as the "means by which the units of language have value or meaning; each unit is defined against what it is not." In the case of American War Rhetoric, the discourse is not so much about relating specific details about the conflicts; rather it is about the elaboration of relations between

spaces, which helps the hearer to form a mental picture of what is going on, and how it relates to US. Through the framework of Mental Spaces/CBT, these relations are clearly highlighted, and lead to the conclusion that it is not just right to fight THEM; it is part of OUR identity. The efficiency of the mechanisms studied in Chapters 3-6 might indeed be tightly linked to the constraint on reasoning which happens as a result of the constant resort to binary oppositions, making every conflict a matter of identity. The systematic reinforcement of this type of reasoning, here centered around the opposition between US and THEM thus acts as a pre-condition to the relevance of the argument that one needs to take *immediate* action, so as to avoid questioning along the lines of 'why should "we" get involved?,' which would be detrimental to the conveying of urgency. It is this second aspect of the discourse which Chapters 7-9 will now turn to.

Chapter 7: The cognitive mechanisms behind the discursive construction of a threat

> "In a single instant, we realized that this will be a decisive decade in the history of liberty, that we've been called to a unique role in human events. Rarely has the world faced a choice more clear or consequential." (G.W.Bush, 29.01.2002)

(1) "Many Americans have raised legitimate questions about the nature of the threat, about the urgency of action. Why be concerned now? About the link between Iraq developing weapons of terror and the wider war on terror." (G.W. Bush 7 October 2002)

(2) "The time to stop the war is right now." (Clinton, 13.02.1999)

The construction of a threat, one that will be effective to move people to action, is not a straightforward process. The link between what has been identified as a *potential* threat, such as "Iraq developing weapons of terror," and the *actual* risks to national security justifying the deployment of American means or troops, needs to be integrated so that hearers can get to the conclusion that immediate action is indeed required from US. As President G.W. Bush notes in (1), that is not always easily achieved. In Chapters 3-6, I explored the construction of a deeply entrenched dichotomy between US and THEM, one which makes US the right candidates to oppose THEM. This strategy revolved around directing the hearer's focus on 'who is to blame,' on THEIR wrongness, thus effectively hiding concerns about OUR own motives and intentions. However, that does not necessarily answer the question which many Americans might be asking when military action is looming: "why be concerned *now*?" (1, my emphasis). The second main strategy then consists on focusing on the problems of the present. In Chapters 7-9, I will endeavor to account for the construction of this link (between potential threats and actual, present risks), for what favors the conclusion that "the time to stop the war *is* right now" (2, my emphasis). I argue that this link is of a cognitive nature. In order to support this emphasis on cognition, a further aim in this chapter is to continue to demonstrate the benefits of combining the frameworks of RT and CBT when doing empirical work.

Cognition as the Missing Link

In *The Politics of Fear,* Ruth Wodak uses the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) in order to analyze the rise of right-wing populism, which makes extensive use of fear in their argumentation. One argumentative strategy is the use of *topoi,* "warrants which guarantee the transition from argument to conclusion" (2015: 51). "*Topoi* are therefore, neutrally speaking, a useful shortcut appealing to existing knowledge" (2015: 52). It is worth adding that Wodak notes that *topoi* are not necessarily

fallacious, but rather they *can* be, in certain contexts, through "what they ignore or sidestep" (2015: 52). What I want to focus on in this and the following chapters, however, is the nature of this "transition," of this "shortcut" to the conclusion that a threat needs urgently acted upon. When it comes to the deployment of American soldiers, especially when national security is not directly threatened, one can assume that for such conclusions to be reached and agreed upon, the "transition" must be solid, and should not be questioned for acceptance to take place. The context in which these arguments are made is therefore crucial, and indeed plays a very important part in the DHA. According to Wodak,

> Meaning is constructed by form and content, to be understood and explained via many layers of contextual knowledge - historical, socio-political, intertextual and interdiscursive, as well as situative. (2015: xi)

I argue that it is in fact the cognitive context which might be missing to account for the effectiveness of threats in this corpus.[7] By analyzing the construction of threats *and* the cognitive context in which they are set, one can get to an understanding of how urgency is conveyed, so as to lessen the perceived risks of immediate action, when opposed to those of inaction. The way I have chosen to organize the next few chapters is meant to highlight the interplay between the linguistic construction of a threat, the cognitive context, and the conclusions reached: I will first tackle the conceptualization of the threat itself (Chapter 7), leading to the identification of inaction as the highest risk (Chapter 8), before finally moving onto the construction of action as its only resolution (Chapter 9).

7.1. The Cognitive Mechanisms of Fear

The construction of a threat, in the context of American War Rhetoric, relies mainly upon the mechanisms of fear (Reyes, 2011). Emotions, far from making humans *un*reasonable, assist the reasoning process by helping us to form quick decisions (see Lerner et al., 2015 for an overview of research on emotions and decision making). While emotions are indeed extremely useful to our cognition, their use in political discourse, for instance, can serve to "manipulate public opinion" (Reyes, 2010: 206). Indeed, Reyes notes the "power" of emotions in order to "shape the audience's beliefs and ideals:"

> The manipulation of emotions was deployed in the United States after September 11, 2001, as the terrorist attacks provoked very strong emotions on the part of the American populace. President George W. Bush and his team developed a strategy to rationalize and instrumentalize these strong emotions in order to make citizens incorporate the logic of the "war on terrorism" and to support the attacks first on Afghanistan and later on Iraq. (2010: 207)

[7] Chapter 12 explores issues with topoi for the purposes of this type of analysis, and why a cognitive approach might be better suited.

How then does discourse "rationalize" emotions, to the end of "incorporating" the logic endorsed by the government? While the manipulation of emotions can help to bypass the critical scrutiny of an argument, therefore getting the hearer to the conclusion that action is required faster, the right conditions need to be in place for fear to trigger prompt and decisive action. Before moving onto the linguistic strategies which have been identified to serve such goals, this section starts by discussing the cognitive mechanisms of fear, in order to better understand how its manipulation in discourse can constrain the hearers' reasoning about the issues and about their country's actions, as well as the elaboration of a context which is made suitable for the identified threats to 'take hold.'

7.1.1. Why fear?

Although the manipulation of strong emotions discussed by Reyes refers specifically to the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the appeal to fear seems to be prevalent in the entire corpus, as testified by the variety of examples in the subsequent sections. Some researchers have investigated specific emotions and their impact on attitudes. While anger and fear both have a negative affect, they trigger different attitudes. In particular, the work of Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000) focuses on attitudes toward outgroups. Clore and Schnall (2005) summarize some of their results as follows:

> They proposed that emotions such as fear are characterized by different action tendencies than emotions such as anger. They proposed that groups that are feared should be avoided, whereas groups responded to with anger may elicit an aggressive stance. (2005: 457)

When military action is deemed necessary, the government is faced with the task to win general approval from the population. If anger "may elicit" a more "aggressive stance," one might assume that the manipulation of anger in discourse might serve to promote the conclusion that quick and firm action should be taken against evil-doers. Anger is also a very natural reaction to unfair treatment (Seip, van Dijk & Rotteveel, 2014), which might also seem suitable to be exploited in speeches which relay information about the suffering and dying of innocent people, whose unjust fate is regularly highlighted in discourse. However, Cap (2009) notes that even in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Americans were reluctant to take action grounded in such an aggressive stance:

> In fact, the social picture of the late 2001 America shows multiple attitudes of reluctance to engage in a retaliatory combat operation, even if the 9/11 perpetrators were to constitute the primary target. (Cap, 2009: 1)

Fear, on the other hand, is known to trigger a 'Fight or Flight' response. However, in certain situations, the Flight option might translate as a form of paralysis, almost freezing people into inaction. In order to avoid such effects, I argue that the discourse aims to constrain the hearers' reasoning, so

that fighting becomes the only possible option. In the aftermath of 9/11, Lerner et al. (2003) examined the effects of anger and fear on the perceived risk of terrorism: while fear increased risk perception, anger had the opposite effect. The implementation of immediate precautionary measures, associated with the perception of a higher risk, translates into the pressure to take immediate action. The trigger of fear can thus have a significant impact on the conceptualization of the nature of the threat, and of its urgency, focusing the hearers' attention onto the need to make a decision *now*. In order to consolidate 'fighting' as the only reasonable option (and reject 'flying'), a careful balance needs to be established, where fear *and* reassurance are both being manipulated. We now turn to the cognitive mechanisms of fear as the latter gets constructed in discourse, through the concept of Proximization.

7.1.2. Proximization: a two-way movement

What is Proximization?

> The concept of proximization has originally (cf. Chilton 2004) been developed to account for situations in which the speaker (political actor) seeks legitimization of his actions by alerting the addressee to the proximity or imminence of phenomena which can be a "threat" to the addressee (and the speaker, too) and thus require immediate action. (Cap, 2009/2006: 4)

> What makes legitimization in political discourse effective is indeed proximization strategies, which refer to the basic instinct of self-preservation: a threat 'there' is discursively reconstructed into a threat 'here' (spatial axis of proximization), a threat 'then' (past or future) into a threat 'now' (temporal axis of proximization), and a 'potential' threat into a 'real' threat (modal axis of proximization). (Kowalski, 2018: 127)

The acceptance of immediate action relies on effective legitimization in discourse. The concept of Proximization as developed by Cap (2009/2006, 2013) is particularly appropriate to account for the discursive construction and effectiveness of threats. The strategies identified by Cap highlight a movement from THEM to US, which is at the heart of the legitimization process: WE need to act now, before they reach US. In the context of American War Rhetoric, I argue that the construction of a threat to US relies on a movement which goes both ways: from THEM to US, but also from US to THEM. I have shown that OUR identity is founded on OUR opposition to evil. A lack of action on OUR part would therefore constitute a movement which cannot be reversed, and which would bring US closer to THEM through OUR passive acceptance of THEIR evil. As a result, if WE choose not to act, not only will THEY be allowed to get closer to US on the spatial axis, but WE will also get closer to THEM on a deontic axis. What Proximization and other such models (such as

Discourse Space Theory, Chilton, 2005b; Chilton, 2013) highlight is the importance of spatial cognition, which is what I will draw on in order to account for the effectiveness of the threats constructed in our data. Adding to this model, I argue that space relations might be the result of compressions of other types of relations within conceptual integration networks.

Essentially, through proximization strategies, the speaker places "the discourse addressee in the center of events narrated to him/her" (Cap, 2009/2006: 4). The first notable effect of this movement is that it builds the relevance of the issues presented by the President to the American people. This chapter draws on the impact which linguistic mechanisms serving to construct an approaching threat have on the hearer's cognitive environment: on constraining the emotions associated with the events, and the reasoning process, leading to the conclusion that immediate action is required. In order for that conclusion to be accepted, I argue that the proximization of the threats in our data follows two steps:

— First, I have identified strategies which place the hearer **at the heart of the issues,** to trigger emotions such as fear (occasionally alongside feelings of empathy too). I argue that the construction of a threat involves a two-way movement, whereby action does not only stem from the perception of a danger coming towards US, but also from the perception of the hearer's role in the events as he/she is taken to face the challenges of his/her country; whether it's taking the hearer to the future, to the past, to THEM, or construing THEM as coming to US.

— Secondly, I argue that the need for immediate action relies on the **construction of a threat which is not necessarily imminent** (happening now on the temporal axis), **but rather inevitable**, and whose course is entirely determined by action in the present, however far on the temporal axis the realization of the danger might actually take place.

The next sections of this chapter tackle the linguistic mechanisms which achieve this type of proximization, as defined by the previous two steps, to the end of constructing a threat 'that takes hold.' The interplay between the cognitive context and the linguistic strategies identified will hopefully help to answer the question: what is a threat that takes hold?

7.2. Construction of a ‘real’ threat

> Language is based on the use of representations as stand-ins for entities, actual or just imagined. Use of such representations replaces the use of environmental cues in communication [...] In this way, language makes it possible for us to share visions. (Gardenfors & Osvath, 2010: 111)

Cap (2009/2006: 15) expands: “Sharing visions is grounded in the exclusively human ability to metarepresent things, that is to create mental representations of things which are detached from immediate stimuli.” The construction of a threat relies on the *perception* of the danger as being real, whether it does in fact constitute a tangible one or not. The President’s communications on the threats to America’s national security allow to “share visions” of a world where these dangers do unfold, and do affect the American people, thus prompting fear. The aim is then to determine what needs to be done so that this “vision” never becomes real, and to provide some reassurance that in the end, all will be well. Emotions are thus an important part of these visions, of what makes them real for the hearer, in the sense that they can move the country to action. Fear is indeed central to the construction of a real threat, one that is perceived as having the potential to affect the addressee. The danger represented by the events must therefore be significant enough that it could shake US, or even destroy US, while also being of a nature which WE can control. I argue that this can be achieved thanks to the grounding of the message in a particular conceptualization of time, allowing for the conclusion that unless action is taken now, it will be too late.

7.2.1. The dynamics of time in threat construction

The construction of a threat is closely tied with the representation of the future, and of the timeline that leads to that future. However, Cap points out that proximization has several dimensions. A threat can indeed be constructed through temporal proximization, as well as spatial or axiological proximization, leading to his STA model (Spatial, Temporal and Axiological) of legitimization (2009: 8-9). Although I fully agree that the inclusion of these three aspects can account for the communication of urgency, I focus slightly more on the significance of the temporal aspect, which is at the heart of the persuasive nature of the threats presented in our data.

> (3) “Communist subversion is not an irreversible tide [...] The tide of the future can be a freedom tide.” (Reagan 09.05.1984)

(4) “If we do not follow the dictates of our inner moral compass and stand up for human life, then his lawlessness will threaten the peace and democracy of the emerging new world we now see: this long dreamed-of vision we’ve all worked toward for so long.” (G.Bush 09.01.1991)

(5) “It is natural to wonder if America’s future is one of fear. Some speak of an age of terror. I know there are struggles ahead and dangers to face. But this country will define our times, not be defined by them. As long as the United States of America is determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror; this will be an age of liberty, here and across the world.” (G.W. Bush, 20.09.2001)

(6) “Instead of giving in to fear and cynicism, let’s renew that timeless American spirit of resolve and confidence and optimism [...] let’s summon the unity that this moment demands.” (Obama, 02.01.2010)

In all of these speeches, the President identifies a danger, a threat whose handling will determine the future of the world, OUR future, and OUR identity. What justifies the immediate need for action as an appropriate response to these dangers (as the *only* appropriate response), is that OUR actions *now* get constructed as the determining factor for the shape of that future. All the strategies which are discussed in this chapter aim at representing a threat whose handling is identified as a pivotal moment. What is essential is that OUR future is conceptualized as directly dependent on OUR action in the present for military action to be legitimized.

In Reagan’s vision, the future could either take the shape of a freedom tide, or of one of subversion (3); G. Bush envisioned the hope of entering “a new world” of freedom (4); G.W. Bush painted the prospects of an “age of terror” vs. one of liberty (5); and finally, Obama refused to see the new year defined by fear, choosing “resolve, confidence and optimism” to shape America’s future instead (6). In all cases, the nature of the tide that would sweep the world and affect OUR entire future is construed as dependent on what WE decide to do *now*. In fact, Reagan clearly points out that the threat that he is addressing is not imminent: “this does not mean, as some would have us believe, that we’re in imminent danger of nuclear war. We’re not.” (Reagan, 09.05.1984) However, the point is that the future gets decided now, and that once the point of action is past, it will be too late. Unless WE take the right course of action at the right time, then WE lose control over OUR future: WE will live in a world of fear, that is a world dictated by THEM.

The point of the speeches in this corpus is to construe military action as the only appropriate response to the challenges that America and the world are facing. One way to accept this conclusion is to make military action *intuitively* suitable to gain some form of control over the future. This section thus endeavors to show that the conclusion that immediate action is needed can be *intuitively* reached, because the discourse is grounded in our conception of time. Piata (2021: 94) suggests that deeply entrenched mappings, namely “spatial-temporal mappings, when present, facilitate the contextual assumptions required for metaphor understanding.” Besides metaphor understanding, I will add that, in the context of our data, what is also facilitated is the metaphors’ persuasive power, their

suitability to interpret the issues at stake. I also join Piata (2021) in arguing for a combination of RT and CBT in order to tackle this interaction between entrenched and novel uses of metaphor, which is at the heart of the emergence of fear when interpreting the metaphors about the conflicts.

7.2.1.1. Compressing Time to grasp the significance of the present

The need to act now is based on visions of the future. How far that future might be from the present is not especially relevant. In each of the above utterances (3-6), fear stems from the fact that that future seems to threaten everything which OUR identity is based on. However, if that future is not imminent, why can such fears be effective to trigger action in the present? We can answer this question by taking a closer look at our conception of time.

> We have a conception of time as simply a long ordered succession of events separated by "time distances," such that what happened long ago is less and less accessible. That conception of time, which is not unlike the scientific conception of time, has no obvious place for compressions. Yet we have seen again and again that compression of time is conceptually valuable and one of the human imagination's favorite tools. We suggest that there is a fundamental neural basis for these time compressions: The human brain does not for the most part organize events according to the sequence in which they happened or were recorded. Human memory is not a tape that we must rewind to get back to the desired spot [...] Just as physical space is suffused by culture and memory with blend-prompting powers, our brains, in a very different sense but with equal powers, give us imaginative compressions if things that we know are far apart in time or space. (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 316-317)

Compressions allow us to access events which "we know are far apart in time or space" (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 238). The conceptualization of history as a timeline is a perfect example of our use of conceptual blends, where relations of time are compressed into space. As one marks down the significant events of history on a timeline, the compressions within that blend allow for new relations to appear between certain points, as one starts to make sense of these events within the broader concept of OUR history. American War Rhetoric grounds its discourse in this conceptualization, by highlighting the present time as the last point before reaching a potentially disastrous future. Whether America is "approaching" a new decade, the anniversary of a historical event, or the end of a century, each occasion is marked in a way that makes it the right time to take action. Rather than being seen as open, the future of the world is entirely dependent on OUR present actions. While the "age of terror," or the "future of fear" might still be a while away, the point of action is fast approaching.

(7) "Tonight we're launching an effort which holds the promise of changing the course of human history. There will be risks, and results take time. But I believe we can do it. As we **cross this threshold**, I ask for your prayers and your support." (Reagan, 23.03.1983, "Star Wars Speech," my emphasis)

(8) "So, if **the millennia offers us a lesson**, perhaps it's this: True security does not come from empire and domination. True security can only be found in the growing trust of free peoples. It's been said that peace is not the work of a single day, nor will it be the consequence of a single act; and yet every constructive act

contributes to its growth; every omission impedes it. Peace will come, in the end, as a child grows to maturity — slowly, until we realize one day in wonder the child is almost grown."
[...] and now we are **at the threshold of the 1990's.** And as we **begin the new decade**, I am reaching out to President Gorbachev, asking him to work with me to bring down the last barriers to a new world of freedom." (G. Bush, 22.11.1989, my emphases)

(9) "I come to this House of the people to speak to you and all Americans, certain that **we stand at a defining hour**." (G. Bush, 29.01.1991, my emphasis)

(10) "As we **approach the next century**, we must never forget one of the most indelible lessons of **this one we're about to leave**, that America has a direct stake in keeping the peace in Europe before isolated acts of violence turn into large-scale wars. Today determined diplomacy backed by force is creating the path to peace." (Clinton, 12.10.1998, my emphases)

All of the above utterances aim to get a picture of the way time is conceptualized throughout the corpus. Most offer conceptual blends where Vital Relations of Time get compressed into Space. Significant moments in time get construed as physical entities, so that America's present actions can be understood as part of a bigger whole, rather than in isolation. The compressions which are a result of conceptual blending allow the hearers to reason about the significance of the present time. In (7-10), the passing of time is construed as a JOURNEY. The present time can thus appear as a physical location where we can "stand" (9), or as a physical "threshold" (7,8). In both cases, it is from the present time which the direction of the future gets decided. While "America now" and "future America" are linked by a Vital Relation of Time, it gets compressed into Space within the blend. This construal in terms of space allows for a visualization of the issues, which then also leads to their conceptualization as a physical JOURNEY. While there is nothing which we can do to influence the passing of time, our actions can get us from one spatial point to another. A construal in terms of space thus makes more easily accessible relations of Cause-Effect: two points A and B might be linked by a relation of Space; but a person's *movement* between the two gets construed by a relation of Cause-Effect, as the choice to initiate action is what determines the final effect, that is the reaching of the destination. As a result, the construal in terms of space in (7-10) is what allows for the emergence of a relation of Cause-Effect in the blend, leading to the conceptualization of America's future as being directly linked to the decisions which WE make now.

This leads us back to the fruitful combination of RT and CBT when analyzing persuasive communications. The goal here is to better understand what it is which makes arguments of the type 'we must learn from history' (and therefore something must be done now) so efficient for the purposes of persuasion. This is indeed what utterances such as (8) or (10) are based on, as they highlight the significance of the present moment in the history of time. "As we approach the new century," now is the time to show that America has learned from past mistakes. CDA recognizes this type of rea-

soning as a frequently used shortcut to get to the conclusion that action must be taken, identified as the "topos of history," which is summarized by Wodak (2015: 40) as follows:

> Since history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation (allegedly) comparable with the historical example referred to.

The aim of this section is to understand what it is which makes this type of shortcut so easily accepted as persuasive. I argue that the efficiency of such arguments relies upon to the conceptualization of time which the discourse promotes. As time is compressed into a physical line, time 'distances' can be marked down to organize the events of life and history: years, decades, centuries, millennia. One can therefore "approach" a new century, as well as "leave" one. As progress and evolution are construed as a unidirectional journey, once one passes these specific points, there is no going back. As a result, if WE were to choose not to take immediate action, then as the new century begins, it will be tainted by the evidence that these lessons have not been learned, and all the previous efforts leading to this moment will have been lost. As the argument that one must learn from the past is grounded in our conception of time, it might appear as an intuitive response to the challenges which History has set for US - and in that sense allowing for topoi such as the topos of history to go unquestioned. Furthermore, the compression of time into space can indeed help the audience to understand how their country's actions in the present can impact the distant future by reducing the scale of world events. The compression of time allows for traumatic events such as previous World Wars to be construed not as distant events of the past, but instead as vivid reminders that tragedies can unravel very fast, and that nothing should ever be taken for granted. Time compressions can thus be very helpful in reasoning about the future, and are an important part of the cognitive context. The abstraction of time as a separate entity is a recurring strategy, allowing for current events to be evaluated against an *objective* constant.

Looking a bit more closely at (8), which serves as our key example here, the conceptualization of PEACE AS A CHILD makes use of time compressions in order to reason about the significance of one's present actions. To be more precise, it is rather the building of peace which is construed as human growth. Within this conceptual blend, the child represents the state of peace *in the present,* that is the current state of peace. The point which G. Bush is trying to make is that every action which America takes, or chooses not to take, is not insignificant; it does not simply affect America's present, which might be spared by the choice not to intervene in international conflicts. Rather, it is the future of peace which is at stake. America's role here is that of the nurturing parent. What is highlighted is therefore the relation of Cause-Effect between every single parenting choice and a

child's growth as a person. Peace is thus a work in progress, and while one might not see the results of one's current actions for a very long time, every choice matters, as it becomes a part of the child's environment. The abstraction of the passing of time through the visualization of a human's growth is what allows for the relation of Cause-Effect to be made apparent in the blend. The use of the metaphor helps to constrain the context in which "the threshold of the 1990s" is to be interpreted, that is as a significant point in OUR history. As relations of Cause-Effect are made accessible, the interpretation of America's entering a new decade gets constrained, so that the most relevant interpretation is that *now,* more than ever, is the time to get things right. If WE were to mess up now, the consequence which is made available (through the compression of time) is that the whole of this new decade could be tainted by OUR present mistakes; and perhaps even the whole of OUR identity. In all of the above utterances, if we look at the communicative event, we can get to the conclusion that the most relevant interpretation is to see the present circumstances as highly influential for OUR future or for OUR whole identity, as urgent matters. Having argued that the efficiency of these utterances lies within the grounding of the reasoning in our conception of time, this example highlights the inputs of CBT, as the role of compressions to get to the final conclusion that WE need to act (and why WE do) is made apparent.

The abstraction of time can also be used in order to measure not only one's own actions, but the progress of each actor in the conflicts. Various physical anchors can be chosen in order to conceptualize the passing of time, leading to compressions which reduce the scale of the conflict in order to visualize the impact of OUR actions (or lack of) in the present.

7.2.1.2. Compressing Time to constrain reasoning

The urgency of the situation can be emphasized by the visualization of THEIR progress, of THEIR use of time. Compressions of time into space can also allow for the abstraction and the visual separation of OUR time vs. THEIR time. This is a strategy that is often used in order to portray OUR inaction in direct contrast with THEIR active pursuit of evil, or even with the victims' active fighting of that evil despite lacking the means to be successful. What this achieves is making the proximization of THEIR threat a direct result of OUR lack of action in the present. In (11), Reagan reduces the scale of the conflict by construing its timeline as that of a human life. The weapons used on both sides are conceptualized as people, and become a physical anchor for the passing of time. Reagan is then able to make a direct comparison between THEIR achievements and OURS (or rather, OUR lack of).

(11) “But what has the Soviet Union done in these intervening years? Well, since 1969 the Soviet Union has built five new classes of ICBM’s, and upgraded these eight times. As a result, their missiles are much more powerful and accurate than they were several years ago, and they continue to develop more, while ours are increasingly obsolete.
[...] We haven’t built a new long-range bomber since our B-52’s were deployed about a quarter of a century ago, and we’ve already **retired** several hundred of those because of **old age**.
[...] a freeze [...] would reward the Soviets for their massive military buildup while preventing us from modernizing **our aging and increasingly vulnerable forces**.” (Reagan, 23.03.1983, my emphases)

Reagan here creates a conceptual blend, in which reasoning about a person’s vitality, leading to possible inferences about efficiency, is used to discuss military equipment. As such, military equipment cannot live forever, and after some time, it is inevitably due to retire. The use of “retire” on its own would not be enough to trigger a conceptual blend; similarly, taken out of context, it is only the presence of “modernizing” which allows for “our aging and increasingly vulnerable forces” to be understood as America’s military arsenal, rather than soldiers. However, the presence of language that is normally used to refer to a person’s life (“retire” or “old age”) favors the interpretation of America’s military arsenal as a frail, aging person. Besides, what is made salient here is the reasoning which the human input space brings to the blend, through the relation of change: indeed a relation of change links the B-52’s built a quarter of a century ago and that which has been “retired.” The blend thus makes available the assumption that expert military equipment, although it might be categorized as a machine, can also degrade over time and lose efficiency; it is only highly performing when it is relatively new. Just like one would not place an old, retired veteran on the frontline, the same can be said of “old” military equipment. While calling a human person “obsolete” would not be politically correct, this unique blend allows to deal with the issue of time passing in a much more direct manner, since the point is precisely to be shocking in order to place the hearer in front of a scary reality, prompting for urgent action. In another context, references to retirement might activate very different elements, such as the notions of wisdom and experience. We have already seen that RT can serve as an engine of selection when interpreting conceptual blends. In this case, it is rather the value of youth which gets selected. As the second input space is that of weapons, the selection of experience would prove to be irrelevant, as it would defeat the purpose of a weapon, which is to remain as intact as possible in order to best serve its functions.

In addition, two separate timelines, in the form of two separate people, are used to construct the evolution of the situation and its possible consequences: one for the Soviet Union, and one for America. While THEY have spent time building actively, WE have relied on the same equipment, resulting in a massive delay on OUR part. As one cannot go back in time, if WE maintain the same pace, there will be a point where THEY will be too far ahead, and it will be physically impossible for US to catch up. Once again, it is the reasoning based on the relations highlighted by the blend

which is made salient here. Even though the consequences of OUR present inaction might only be felt in the distant future, the point of action is fast approaching. Reagan is then able to construe the opposing view, which presents the seeking of military superiority as unnecessary, as an "old doctrine" which does not keep up with the evolution of time. As time moves on, so do THEY, and so must WE. The context is here constrained through the compression of time, which allows for the direct comparison of THEIR weapons and OURS. Indeed, the abstraction of the passing of time allows to make more accessible the value of results, of making good usage of time. In that constrained context, the most relevant interpretation is therefore that OUR military capacity is not adequate and needs updated, as the interpretation of OUR growing military arsenal as proof of OUR desire for supremacy is made less easily available. Interestingly, the exact opposite is true for THEM.

G. Bush also emphasizes the dangers of inaction against the passing of time:

(12) "Each day that passes, Saddam's forces also fortify and dig deeper into Kuwait. We risk paying a higher price in the most precious currency of all — human life — if we give Saddam more time to prepare for war. And each day that passes is another day of fear, suffering, and terror for the people of Kuwait, many who risked their lives to shelter and hide Americans from Iraqi soldiers." (G. Bush 01.1991)

(13) "While the world waited, Saddam Hussein systematically raped, pillaged, and plundered a tiny nation [...] While the world waited, Saddam sought to add to the chemical weapons arsenal he now possesses, an infinitely more dangerous weapon of mass destruction — a nuclear weapon. And while the world waited, while the world talked peace and withdrawal, Saddam Hussein dug in and moved massive forces into Kuwait. While the world waited, while Saddam stalled, more damage was being done to the fragile economies of the Third World, emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, to the entire world, including to our own economy." (G. Bush 16.01.1991)

In the above utterances, Saddam Hussein's actions are construed against the passing of time. It is interesting to note that when the discourse aims at highlighting the severity of the threat, it is the Moving Time metaphor (Piata, 2018: 3) which is profiled, that is to say the construal of time "as moving in relation to the experiencer," as in (12). By grounding the threat in this deeply entrenched metaphor, the above utterances can easily convey the notion of inevitability, of a disaster waiting to fully unfold. The salience of the inevitable character of THEIR threat is what allows the hearer to retrieve the inference that inaction, in this context, would be akin to suicide, ensuring destruction on a much wider scale. Let us look more closely at how these links get constructed in discourse. In (12) and (13), the urgency of the situation is mostly conveyed by looking very closely at the unfolding of the present. Our conception of time, its compression into a linear shape, is brought into focus so as to create a link between OUR inaction, THEIR pursuit of evil acts, and the suffering of innocent victims. While WE "wait," time goes on, and so does the Kuwaitis' suffering. Just like time, there is no taking back of these cruel acts. The time that WE are "giving" the enemy by not taking

immediate action cannot be taken back. The only thing that WE can do is to apply the full power of the brakes, to put a stop to this terrible situation, as soon as possible. The visualization of the passing of time construes OUR inaction as directly impacting the suffering of the victims, even though they do not share the same physical reality. Time, on the other hand, is shared by all - the key is to make the best use of it. The reduction of the scale of the conflict is here achieved by focusing on its temporal aspect: time is here compressed, so as to place all actors (Saddam, the victims, as well as America and the rest of the world) in the same space. As everyone appears to be affected by the passing of time, the unfairness of the situation gets highlighted in the mental space for the current conflict, and it can also be linked to OUR decision, favoring the conclusion that immediacy is the central concern, and that debating whether it is right to act or not directly contributes to the victims' suffering, as well as to the enemy's success. As not acting gets construed as "giving" time to the enemy, the possibility of not acting as a positive step towards peace is thus not accessed. As G. Bush concludes in (14), the point is to prevent the enemy from making Time an ally:

(14) "Time will not be Saddam's salvation." (29.01.1991)

The abstraction of Time as a separate entity construes Time as a separate agent, one which all actors can choose to use differently, to their advantage, rather than as an overarching element which no one has any control over. As a result, the discourse can effectively constrain reasoning, so that timely action can be viewed as the only sensible course. This is made possible, because the compression of time allows for relations of Cause-Effect to be made directly accessible: indeed as time gets compressed, the results of OUR not investing in military equipment (11), or of OUR waiting (12, 13) are made directly apparent to the hearer, linked by a relation of Cause-Effect in the blends (the effect being the advancement of the enemy's cause). The accessibility of relations of Cause-Effect is what makes relevant the comparison between what WE are doing now and THEIR own usage of time, in order to convey urgency.

7.2.1.3. Compressing Time to constrain OUR response

Finally, another entailment of the construal of time in terms of space is the conceptualization of time as being CONTAINED. This is often the case when the focus is on the time of action, the time of response. The most obvious anchor for such a blend would be an object: the hourglass. The hourglass itself leads to a conceptual blend, whereby time is abstracted as sand, allocating a specific quantity to respond to an event/complete an action, etc. As a result, when time has 'run out,' there is no physical possibility to obtain any back.

When that blend is used to reason about OUR response to the conflicts, once WE reach the physical end of the container, unless action has been taken, the consequences (however far in the future) will inevitably unravel. The same applies to the giving out of ultimatums to the enemy, warning that WE will take action as soon as the end of the container has been reached, unless THEY have chosen to comply. This is exemplified by the following utterances:

(15) "This is the moment of truth. There is no time to lose." (Reagan, 24.03.1984)
(16) "Will we stop the spread of communism in this hemisphere or not? Will we act while there is still time?" (Reagan, 09.05.1984)
(17) "The message of the United States to the Haitian dictators is clear: your time is up." (Clinton, 15.09.1994)
(18) "Still, time is running out. It's running out because each day that passes brings real costs." (G. Bush 01.1991)
(19) "In recent months, however, my advisers, including in particular the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have underscored the necessity to break out of a future that relies solely on offensive retaliation for our security." (Reagan, 23.03.1983)

Ultimatums to the enemy are a recurrent feature of American War Rhetoric, asserting America's power and involvement in the conflicts. In (16), Reagan's question might even sound like a disguised ultimatum to the American people, or rather to America itself, the implication being that should "we" not act in time, Communism will spread in "our" hemisphere and might even reach "us." The focus of utterances (15) to (18) is indeed on the inevitable character of what will happen once the point of action has been reached. The construal of time being contained leads to the implication that there is a specific point which, once past, will trigger unwanted consequences for OUR future which WE will no longer be able to control. OUR response is therefore constrained to the present, within the parameters established by the chosen container.

Most importantly, the conceptualization of time running out triggers the fear that (unless prompt action is taken), the future will no longer be within OUR control. This conceptualization of US losing control is real, in the present, and is what allows the situation to be construed as urgent, whether the danger itself is imminent or not. The perception of the present as the key to securing OUR future is what keeps US safe, and therefore ignoring it can also make US vulnerable, allowing for the construction of disastrous threats: "Time and distance from the events of September the 11th will not make us safer unless we act on its lessons." (G.W.Bush, 29.01.2002) Immediate action thus appears as a form of reassurance, as an answer rather than trigger of fear, so that WE can have a future that is defined by US, not THEM, while not acting gets construed as a risk which gets bigger every day.

The construal of time plays a significant role in the construction of the threat, in the perception of its urgency. By relying upon the familiar conceptualization of time as being contained, these

speeches make sense of OUR need to respond, by creating an environment of fear, which allows to place the hearer at the heart of the issues (with the exception of 17 which offers a direct ultimatum to the enemy). (19) offers a good illustration of this particular point, as a more novel entailment of the TIME AS A CONTAINER metaphor is used. In (19), America's future appears to be contained in a specific type of container: a prison. As OUR future (following from a present where no action is taken) is construed as a jail, every single American becomes a prisoner. Unless the right course of action is taken at the right time, we can all become prisoners of time. This blend thus places the hearer at the heart of the issues, as it leads to the representation of the whole of America being affected by the outcome of present decisions. More generally, the construal of time being contained acts as a reminder that change is coming, and that it will affect all Americans.

What is highlighted is the present's role in the unraveling of the future. When time is "running out" (18), the relation of Cause-Effect which appears in the blend reinforces the links between OUR inaction and a disastrous future: by choosing not to act now, or by impeding the decision to act quickly (cause), WE are *ensuring* that the point where disaster occurs will be reached (effect). The construction of an urgent threat therefore relies upon its perception as inevitable, rather than imminent, as the present time holds the answers to a safe future. Another effect of the salience of Cause-Effect relations is that it allows for the emergence of OUR responsibility to do something while "there is still time." Since this reasoning is grounded in our conception of time, the conclusion that immediate action is required can be reached more instinctively.

The study of threat construction highlights particularly well the benefits of CBT. Although it is a framework which focuses on the online interpretation process, it arises out of the framework of Mental Spaces, which aims at better understanding the processes structuring communication as well as human reasoning. To use Fauconnier's words, this approach looks at "what is going on behind the scenes when we speak and more generally when we think," (2018: 1) and it is therefore extremely useful when evaluating the efficiency of persuasive strategies. In this case, it allowed to show that the above utterances might be efficient in making the interpretation of the present events directly relevant to US, because the reasoning that is made salient taps into a wider, familiar conception and understanding of time which is constantly reinforced in the data, and can thus appear as a natural response to the issues at stake. These findings are compatible with RT's framework of interpretation and understanding; indeed we could say that context constraints which are linked to time compressions (as seen in 7.2.1.1, 7.2.1.2, and 7.2.1.3) are **cost efficient** on two different levels:

- They simplify the hearer's task by making action in the present directly relevant to America's safety. This makes the utterances studied in this section particularly relevant for the **communication** of urgency, especially when the consequences of OUR action in the present might not actually be felt in the immediate future;
- This way of constraining context also taps into the hearer's conception and experience of time, which also reduces the costs of interpretation, by appealing to familiar **reasoning** patterns.

The rest of this chapter continues to explore ways in which grounding the message in the hearer's cognitive context might contribute to its efficiency as a means of persuasion.

7.2.2. Presuppositions of a present, growing danger

The rules of war legitimization require that military action should be a last resort. The construction of urgency thus often stems from a shift in the conditions of the conflict (with the exception of the direct attacks on 9/11): following lengthy diplomatic attempts, a breaking point gets reached, prompting for a decision on OUR part which will shape OUR entire future. The conceptualization of that breaking point is essential to the construction of urgency, as the hearer might indeed wonder why one could not negotiate a bit longer. The semantics of the phrase "last resort" presuppose that the time for negotiation has reached an end, that WE have tried everything other than war, and that no other solution is available. What is hidden is the fact that the negotiations might have only taken OUR understanding of the situation into account, perhaps failing to meet THEM half way.
I have here outlined the necessary conditions and reasoning behind the "last resort" philosophy:
- (A) The enemy has / is gathering the means to conduct attacks;
- (B) The enemy intends to use those means to attack US (or another nation with no other means to defend itself but OUR intervention)
- (C) We must stop THEM before (more) harm is done.

At first glance, and given the sacrifices that war entails, one might assume that the crucial step leading to the eventual move to wage war would be the second part of the argumentation process: that the enemy has not only the means but also the *intention* to harm US. The conceptualization of THEIR gathering weapons, for instance, is completely opposed to Reagan's 'Defense Program,' proposing to expand on military equipment (means) in order to dissuade others from conducting attacks against the United States. This section focuses on the cognitive mechanisms which guide the

hearers to get from (A) to (C), in cases where the enemy's intentions to take action against US are not directly stated, so that the threat discussed can be accepted as real.

It is almost as if the phrase "possessed WMD," by being used repeatedly in the context of the Iraqi terrorist connections, has come to mean "possessed WMD capable of impacting the US." (Cap, 2006: 45)

I argue here that the use of presuppositions can induce the hearer to 'bridge the gap' between the enemy's capabilities and the consequences for OUR future, leading to inferences such as the one made explicit by Cap above. Although the latter referred to the threat of WMD, this analysis covers the use of presuppositions and their role in the construction of threats throughout the whole corpus. We have already discussed the links between what de Saussure (2012, 2013) calls Discursive Presuppositions (DPs) and the relevance of an utterance (Chapter 3). It is this link which is at the heart of the accommodation of the potential danger identified, into a present concern to America's safety. Müller distinguishes DPs from other types of presuppositions, and from implicated premises, because the former "contribute to the *acceptance* of an utterance, because their primary function is to serve as relevance establishers" (2021: 51, my emphasis). This is what makes the analysis of DPs so interesting for the study of persuasion and of what makes it efficient. Beyond the level of utterance comprehension, the use of DPs can thus contribute to making a threat 'real' in the minds of the hearers, by establishing the relevance of the issues communicated to the public: it acts as the very first constraint on reasoning about the conflicts. By placing relevance at the heart of the interpretation process, one is then able to tackle the vast array of domains which presuppositions involve (Caffi 1993, as mentioned in Chapter 3, section 2): the public's expectations from their President, the desire to belong, attitudes regarding America's place in the world, etc.

One of the President's main duties is to protect his country and the people he represents. This duty entails the communication of threats which could endanger the safety of Americans, and of the actions pursued to tackle such threats. Addresses to the public on National Security aim to fulfill that purpose, in an effort to share with the public, "We, the people," knowledge of their country's dealings with the rest of the world, and of what could affect the safety of Americans.

(20) "He said, 'I want it clearly understood that this government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of our nation.' We can do no less today." (Reagan 14.04.1984, quoting Kennedy).
(21) "One cannot sit in this office reviewing intelligence on the military threat we face, making decisions from arms control to Libya to the Philippines, without having that concern for America's security weigh constantly on our mind." (Reagan, 26.02.1986)

Reagan here reminds the people of his duty, one which all Presidents of the United States have shared and will always share. The relation of analogy (explored in detail in Chapter 6, Section 2) between himself and Kennedy makes salient his role as President, and serves to remind the American people that regardless of whether he might be right or wrong in his interpretations, his primary concern is to preserve "the security of our nation." It is in the context of such addresses on National Security that the introduction of new threats is to be interpreted. Similarly in (21), the President also makes use of an ostensive act to communicate his concerns and fears, letting the hearers into the intimacy of his office through the sharing of his burden. The hearer is placed at the heart of the issue, which here is that of decision-making when reviewing the potential dangers which America is facing, and whether they need acted upon or not. In that context, the "military threat we face" can only be presupposed to carry the potential for realization, otherwise the discursive act of sharing these concerns with the public would not be relevant in the first place. Another possible interpretation could be that the President decides to share every bit of information which he receives with the American public in an effort to increase transparency; however, that would make the presentation of urgent matters extremely difficult to convey. DPs which arise here out of the type of communication used thus act as the very first constraint on reasoning, similarly to the effects noted by de Saussure (2012), as the recipients of a referendum on minarets are led to accommodate that the latter constitute a threat for the referendum itself to be relevant in the first place. According to the rules of relevance optimization, it would then be quite costly to interpret utterances relating to the communication of a growing danger as *not* intended to target US, or as not likely to materialize. The dangers tackled in discourse are thus presupposed to be concerns of National Security, and as such to have the highest potential to materialize (unless preventive measures are decided on). Their gravity, although not necessarily shared by all, is taken for granted by the speaker.

The fact that it is indeed not shared by all is precisely where the issue lies here, and is adding to the President's worry. Indeed, the actual danger which the speakers of the corpus seem to be concerned with is that these threats might not be taken seriously, perceived as not worthy of OUR attention and by extension, of OUR intervention. The choice not to take immediate action becomes the real danger that one should be particularly wary of, more so than the actual threat WE are facing, and which is taken for granted. The message is that the fact that the threat is serious and tangible is not up for debate. The question is: (now that the threat is (t)here), what will WE do about it? The use of presuppositions can allow the hearer to focus on this question, on OUR response, taking for granted that the danger in question does indeed require OUR attention and immediate intervention.

However it came into existence, the threat is presupposed as already being there, a known premise on which the question 'what do we do now?,' is based. The use of presuppositions thus focuses on the *present*: as George W. Bush mentions, it is impossible to know whether the enemy will strike or not, and that is precisely the problem. The main issue which the discourse brings to the hearers' attention is *not* necessarily about a threat to come, it is about the present, and more specifically, OUR present. Will "we" take action now, or will "we" wait and see, making the present one of fear, one which relies on the good will of the enemy? This allows immediacy to be conveyed, as the events get construed as matters of the present.

7.2.2.1. A threat that is already there

I now move onto the use of semantic (rather than discursive) presuppositions, in order to reinforce the message that the threat is not to come; it is already (t)here.

<<Naming an existing danger>>

(22) "By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose **a grave and growing danger**." (G.W.Bush, 29.01.2002, my emphasis)
(23) "But isn't it worth every investment to free the world from **the threat of nuclear war**? **We know** it is." (Reagan 23.03.1983, my emphases)
(24) "**We agree that** the Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons. Since we all agree on **this goal**, the issue is: How can we best achieve it?" (G.W. Bush 07.10.2002, my emphases)

These utterances presuppose that the danger which the President urges his country to tackle quickly and forcefully is already present, rather than foreseen. The above set of examples identifies the use of nominalization as a presupposition trigger. What is presupposed is the existence of a serious threat: "the threat of nuclear war" is one which the world must invest and work actively to be free of, presupposing that it is already suffering from its grip. If the world needs to be freed, then it must already be "imprisoned," which translates as living in fear of the day when nuclear war eventually becomes a reality. Whether that is imminent or far in the future, the hearer is led to conceive of the present as merely providing an illusion of safety. Naming can thus be a powerful strategy in the construction of threats. In the case of the war in Iraq, the sole fact of naming the enemy's purpose as the building of "Weapons of Mass *Destruction*" presupposes that these are intended to destroy (us), not to protect (them).

The nominalization of threats also regularly involves the use of the imperfective (unfinished) aspect, as in (23), presupposing its existence as already established and agreed on by all discourse members. The imperfective aspect allows the interpretation process to focus on the importance of

the present. The notion of PROGRESSION towards a GOAL is foregrounded, highlighting that while that goal has yet to be achieved, it is a work in progress, making the present a time defined by fear, as well as the opportunity to prevent the intended action from materializing.

7.2.2.2. A threat which "we all know" is there

The discourse also tends to emphasize the fact that the public already shares the knowledge that the threat being discussed is real, and serious. The President and the majority of the public appear to form one side of the argument; on the other are those who discredit the threat, and who pose a real risk to their country. Consequently, any potential remaining doubts as to whether action is required or not cannot be attributed to the existence or significance of the threat itself, but rather to the fears which acting upon that threat entails, possibly linked to an active denial of what people already know. One frequently used strategy to focus on the common ground between speaker and hearers is to direct the public to respond to statements which the speaker can safely assume will trigger (at least almost) unanimous approval. In (23), Reagan does not assert that the world needs to be freed from the threat of nuclear war. However, the question "isn't it worth every investment to free the world of the threat of nuclear war?" only has one acceptable answer. "We know it is" then comes to reinforce the fact that the President's concerns are aligned with his people's. Expectations of relevance guide the hearer to accommodate the threat of nuclear war as a present and serious concern. Likewise, G.W. Bush can claim that all Americans and his administration agree on the same goal, by first making a statement which he can safely assume his hearers will reject as strongly as he does. Hearers are then led to accommodate the fact that the threat of a chemical or atomic attack on America is indeed real, and that it is Saddam Hussein's intention to make sure that it does become a reality. The focus on the cognitive task which the hearer is asked to perform, i.e. answering a question or at least pondering over its implications, helps to bypass the questioning of these accommodations, and favors the acceptance of the presuppositions. This is what Oswald, Maillat and de Saussure (2016) refer to as pragmatic effects of context constraints. They thus explain the Friday 13th illusion in the following way (where people who are asked if they are frightened about the fact that New Year's Eve will be on Friday 13th, answer the question without noticing the fallacy):

> Starting from the idea that interlocutors are confident that the speaker is cooperative or relevant, the addressee will tend to find an interpretation which maintains this presumption and sometimes he will fail to take obvious pieces of information into account in order to satisfy this expectation of relevance or cooperation (for example that 31st December cannot possibly be on 13th). (Oswald, Maillat & de Saussure, 2016: 527)

Following from this analysis, two elements are to be noted when accounting for the persuasive efficiency of (24), and more generally of the accommodation of all the presuppositions discussed in 7.2. Firstly, cooperation. In order to cooperatively answer the question "how best can we achieve this goal?," it is necessary to acknowledge that we do share the same goal, and by extension the interpretation of the events as a significant threat to the United States. But what of the perception of the speaker's cooperation, when the speaker is a politician, and when so much distrust exists towards politicians' truthful intentions? I argue that in the context of American War Rhetoric, the ICM OF THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE, as hypothesized in Chapter 2 (2.1.1), can provide further answers, particularly when combined with the ICM OF ORDINARY COMMUNICATION. The use of ICMs can indeed explain why it is possible to entertain mistrust towards politicians' intentions, without necessarily questioning that the President of the United States has his country's best interests at heart, particularly when dealing with national security issues, and in a constrained context which profiles matters of identity. This brings us to the second element, that of constraint. The process of accommodation is made possible here thanks to the constraint on context which we have seen in Chapters 3-6, that is a context where everything that THEY are stands directly against US.

Finally, the framework of Mental Spaces can also add something to this analysis. Let us take a closer look at (24). Through this utterance alone, the hearer is led to construct a mental space giving him/her all that there is to know about the situation. Indeed the purpose here is to make an informed decision, i.e. to decide on a plan of action in order to achieve a goal. In order to interpret (24), the hearer is thus led to conceptualize the possibility of Saddam Hussein directly threatening the United States. This might first seem like a very unlikely scenario, given Iraq's geographical position, and the level of security within the United States. However, in this mental space, that possibility is made real through the deployment of "horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons," invisible weapons which would have the capacity to affect a large part of the population in one attack. This mental space is very specific, which allows the focus to be on the final realization of the attack, leaving out all the other factors which contribute to the decision to launch an attack of this sort. Let us now move onto the way the mental space is structured, thanks to the frame of *authorization* (activated by "must not be permitted"). The different actors of the conflict are thus linked by a relation of authority, which is made available through the familiar frame of *authorization.* Indeed if someone is given permission to do something, his/her actions partly depend on the person giving the authorization. The specificity of the mental space does not extend to the representation of the enemy, who is here described as "the Iraqi dictator." This allows for an extra conceptual domain to

build up the mental space in (24), that of dictators, that is people who do not respect anyone else's authority but their own, making the frame of *authorization* seem particularly unsuitable.
What is made accessible here is the United States' responsibility in keeping its citizens safe. In this context, the most relevant interpretation of "our goal" is thus to do whatever is necessary to keep Americans safe. The context in which the question is asked is therefore constrained, as inaction gets construed as inaction in the face of a serious, dangerous threat; in fact it appears as OUR choice to not do everything in OUR power to avoid such a "horrible" attack. Another advantage of this analysis is that even when the hearer does not accommodate the existence of a serious threat, he/she is reminded of the government's responsibility towards its citizens. The relation of Cause-Effect which links 'the goal to keep America safe' and 'America's resort to military force' can thus remain relevant, regardless of whether one agrees with the government's interpretation or not.

7.2.2.3. The power of comparatives

<<Restoring what has been lost>>

(25) "This is why I'm speaking with you tonight — to urge you to tell your Senators and Congressmen that **you know** we must **continue to restore** our military strength." (Reagan 23.03.1983, my emphases)
(26) "But tonight the security program that you and I launched **to restore** America's strength is in jeopardy, threatened by those who would quit before the job is done." (Reagan 26.02.1986, my emphasis)
(27) "And I will **restore** our moral standing, so that America is **once again** that last, best hope for all who are called to the cause of freedom, who long for lives of peace, and who yearn for a better future." (Obama, 28.08.2008, my emphases)

The use of the verb "restore" is often used in the data, and presupposes that something has already been lost. This then impacts the interpretation of the danger which is dealt with (whether it concerns America's military strength or its status in the world), as the public is led to ponder on the implications of the President's course of action *in light of a loss.* Although direct questions were only asked in (23) and (24), these speeches all imply the question: do you support the President's plan, or not?

The use of verbs such as "restore" can be particularly efficient, in that they can make apparent an illusion of safety, which a present free from attack, or a remote threat, might give. In (25), (26), and (27), the President discusses what needs to be "restored," namely America's strength, and its moral standing. If the country is working to restore something, it not only presupposes that it is not there presently, or at least not in its full capacity, but also that it used to be there. What is also implied is therefore a comparison with a previous state of affairs. In other words, WE are not as safe now as WE used to be, whether it is due to a decline in military strength or in moral standards. Once again, the danger is presupposed to be here already, part of America's present, and the government's

course of action is aimed at fixing these existing problems. In the following utterances, the comparison is made explicit:

(28) "Time and distance from the events of September the 11th will not make us safer unless we act on its lessons." (G.W.Bush, 29.01.2002)
(29) "It's better to deal with this guy now than 5 years from now." (G. Bush 16.01.1991)

The use of comparatives also induces presuppositions, mainly that America's safety status has changed, leading to the inference that action is inevitable if one wishes it to change again. While the latter is not always asserted in discourse, it acts as a pre-condition to the relevance of conclusions such as that reached by G. Bush in (29):

- Saddam Hussein poses a grave danger to the free world;
- Every day, that danger is getting bigger;
- The problem will not be resolved until WE take action to stop him;
- WE *will* need to confront him.

Bush's statement in (29) is of the type that prompts (unanimous) acceptance. It is true that dealing with a dangerous tyrant is easier at a weaker, rather than stronger stage. However, for this to prompt the conclusion that WE do need to take immediate action against Saddam Hussein, the DP that the problem will not be resolved until WE take action needs to be accommodated. In this case, the use of a comparative thus entails both semantic and discursive presuppositions. The latter are what makes (29) relevant in the context of a speech dealing with America's national security. What is presupposed is that the process of the identified danger materializing and taking effect against US is inevitable if the situation remains as it is in the present, that is without OUR military intervention. The conclusion is the same: that OUR present safety is a mere illusion. Indeed, safety is here construed as dependent on OUR defeat of Saddam Hussein, which, if achieved later rather than sooner, will incur more costs, more sacrifices. These future and bigger losses are conceptualized as an extension of OUR present. What is hidden here is a potential third option, which would construct the lack of intervention from OUR part as a necessary step towards long-term peace. Instead, danger is solely perceived as coming from THEIR attacking US in the future. OUR part in fueling anger due to OUR dealings with issues that might not be seen as OURS to deal with, is not accessed. Comparatives can offer a glimpse into an even more dangerous future, stemming from inaction in the present. The fear is not only triggered by these visions of the future, but also by the conceptualization of a present which is not as safe as it might seem, of OUR safety as relying on THEIR good

behavior. Immediate action would thus allow Americans to take control not only of their future, but also of their present.

The use of a comparative in (28) leads to similar effects, that is the construction of an illusion of safety, the conceptualization of a present which could at any moment see the realization of OUR most dreaded fears. Indeed, the use of "safer" leads to the conceptualization of a present and future America that is not, despite appearances, entirely safe. For the conclusion that America can regain control over its safety to be relevant, (28) leads to the incorporation of the DP that terrorist attacks *can* be prevented, and the President concludes that the only way to do so is to take firm action.

The real threat does not lie with whether THEY will take action or not (or rather, when); instead, it lies with OUR hesitation to take control by acting now. Going back to the question which started this section, regarding whether the enemy does in fact possess both the means *and* the intention to harm US, the answer might be that the question itself is somewhat irrelevant. The use of presuppositions allows to conceptualize OUR present as already impacted by the threat which the enemy poses, creating a sense of urgency. The danger is relevant now, not necessarily because the enemy is about to take action against US, but because the potential for disaster lies within OUR current inaction, OUR current passive attitude which itself creates the opportunity for tragedy to strike. Presuppositions can be particularly useful in discourses where a threat is constructed - indeed, while the President cannot claim to know what the future holds, presuppositions of a danger that is already present can effectively communicate and trigger feelings of fear, contributing to the perception of urgency. While there could be cases of false accommodation of the enemy's intentions to inflict harm, I argue that the efficiency of presuppositions in threat construction lies within the focus on the present time as a way to counteract fear, to lead to the assurance that tragedy can be prevented. Indeed, what all the utterances in this section have in common is to directly link the enemy's eventual action with OUR present choices. The key lies in what WE do *now*. We have seen that the framework of Mental Spaces can be useful in that regard, in the sense that it helps to shed light on the relations of Cause-Effect which guide the interpretation process. The cause is OUR action, the effect, the protection of OUR country. What I argue in Chapters 7-9, as we continue to analyze how threats are constructed in the corpus, is that the salience of relations of Cause-Effect plays a crucial role in the efficiency of persuasion in this corpus. We have seen that the discourse deals with a danger which America is facing now, and it is in that context that OUR action must be interpreted. In that context, the 'slot' for the effect of OUR action is already filled, constantly reinforced as the protection of OUR country or of world peace. I argue that this effectively meets expectations of rel-

evance, and that this is what allows to make inaccessible the interpretation of OUR action as contributing to these conflicts. What is left is therefore an entirely positive view of OUR acting now, which we will see in Chapter 9 is reinforced by metaphors which consistently portray action as something positive. By directing the hearers' attention onto the ways to defeat the threat of fear, the part played by their own country in the development or perpetuating of certain conflicts can thus remain hidden. The proximization of the threat occurs here by placing the hearer at the heart of the President's concerns, sharing his responsibility to fix present, pressing issues.

7.2.3. The metaphorical mappings that 'zoom on' the danger

Added to the sense of a present which is already unstable, the proximization of the time when the danger might become a reality can also contribute to the building of fear and urgency. The perception of imminence can be heightened through the use of conceptual blending networks, which is the focus of this subsection. Proximization here works by reducing the scale of the conflict, be it from a temporal or spatial point of view, or even axiological by getting US to move closer to THEM.

7.2.3.1. A COUNTRY IS A CONTAINER: the case of the Cold War

CONTAINER metaphors act as a pre-requisite for the establishment of a threat that is getting closer to US (on all axes). COUNTRIES ARE CONTAINERS, and find themselves within the boundaries of larger CONTAINERS such as REGIONS, HEMISPHERES or CONTINENTS, helping the hearer to visualize the reduced scale of the conflicts. This is especially relevant for conflicts taking place on a larger scale, and/or involving nations which are physically and culturally remote from US, both applying to the Cold War:

(30) "[Central America] not only **contains** the Panama Canal, it sits astride some of the most important sea lanes in the world [...] The region also **contains** millions of people who want and deserve to be free." (Reagan, 14.04.1984, my emphases)
(31) "President Kennedy warned against the threat of Communist **penetration in our hemisphere**." (Reagan, 14.04.1984, my emphasis)
(32) "This Communist subversion poses the threat that a hundred million people from Panama **to the open border of our South** could come under the control of pro-Soviet regimes." (Reagan 09.05.1984, my emphasis)
(33) "What we see in El Salvador is an attempt to destabilize the entire region and eventually move chaos and anarchy **toward the American border**." (Reagan 09.05.1984, my emphasis)

If A COUNTRY IS A CONTAINER, any danger entering OUR country can therefore be constructed as a threat (31). Borders are thus made all the more relevant as a protective element, and "open borders" become a potential for disaster (32, 33). The use of CONTAINERS as a source domain is not

restricted to the discourse on foreign policy, and is prevalent in everyday language. The entrenchment of the CONTAINER schema thus further constrains the hearers' reasoning, and contributes to promoting an immediate need for action. Indeed, as soon as an object gets into an empty container, the status of the latter instantly changes, as it is no longer empty. The entering of the object thus automatically affects the state of the container. As violence, chaos, anarchy or terror are also often construed as physical objects, they can easily be "exported" into OUR container, once again instantly affecting its state. The use of such metaphors might have been particularly fitting at times when military conquests were a feature of the Western world, and borders were still left to be defined. However, the success of a doctrine, or the ramification of violent acts, do not follow such simple rules. In the context of the Cold War, Communism might take time to grow and to take hold, and America might not be so easily affected as neighboring countries decide to follow the Soviet Union's ideology, for example. However, threats which are grounded in an instant change of state are coherent with our conception of time and evolution as previously detailed (7.2.1), and might therefore favor the conclusion that the time to act is *now*. If America misses its chance, if it passes the crucial point for its action to have positive effects on the future, then it will be too late, and there will be no turning back. As a result, as Communism is spreading, its doctrine is construed as getting inevitably closer to America's shores and to the subversion of the country's status. The conceptualization of change occurring at one particular point, and which might never be reversed, is at the origin of feelings of fear which the discourse can trigger.

Reagan further exploits the entailments of this metaphor with his "safety margin" argument, which roughly goes as follows: cutting the defense budget would be cutting into America's safety margin; in order to remain safe, one must maintain this safety margin; therefore one should not cut the defense budget. Reagan's rhetoric falls here within the lines of a Practical Argument (PA), which is driven by an overarching goal: the full protection of the United States. It is that goal which leads him to his plan of action. According to Lewiński (2017: 95), "The basic inference licence in PA is then: there are no better reasons for proposing other courses of action." Reagan's argument appears in opposition with suggestions to cut the defense budget; through the use of a Practical Argument, these cuts can appear completely unreasonable, given the goal which is profiled, and which is presupposed to be shared by all, to ensure America's *full* safety, nothing less. In that sense, there can be no better reasons to adopt an active stance, to increase rather than decrease the defense budget. The following examples highlight the metaphor which supports his argument, through the construal of America's security as a WHOLE:

(34) “The budget request that is now before the Congress has been **trimmed to the limits of safety**. Further deep cuts cannot be made without endangering the security of the Nation.” (Reagan 23.03.1983, my emphasis)
(35) You have consistently urged maintenance of a defense capability that provides **a margin of safety for America**. Today, **that margin is disappearing**.” (Reagan, 18.08.1980, my emphases)

In these examples, the safety within the container is established by a set margin. In this blend, once that margin “disappears,” as the enemy advances further into OUR territory, WE are no longer safe. There is therefore a line to cross, a point in time when it all changes, when OUR safety status changes. SECURITY IS A WHOLE, and once it gets cut, it is no longer there. That change is instant, and WE are therefore required to take action before that turning point is reached. In this particular case, the enemy does not need to be firmly established within OUR territory for US to be threatened. Instead, the proximization of the threat happens thanks to the conceptualization of OUR safety as a margin, slowly disappearing before one’s very eyes. The conceptualization of a specific point after which the inevitable process of subversion can no longer be reversed might then trigger feelings of fear, leading to the decision that immediate action is needed.
The use of conceptual metaphors can organize the space in which the conflict is seen to unfold, which is not limited to where countries are situated in relation with one another, thus allowing to construct the danger in a way which makes it seem closer than it might really be. Regarding the methods of analysis, I argue here that the examples in this subsection point to the necessity of frameworks like that of CBT, to get to a better understanding of the constraint on reasoning. The efficiency of Reagan’s argument revolves around two essential parameters. First, RT can show that utterances such as (34) or (35) can easily be understood, leaving very little room for misinterpretation. Indeed the most relevant interpretation seems to be that there are no better reasons to spend money than to preserve the safety of Americans. Why else would the President ask for a budget increase? This is made easily accessible by the knowledge that one of the President’s unique duties is that of Commander-in-Chief: the security of the nation is therefore in his hands, more so than anyone else’s. However, a framework like that of CBT is also necessary in order to properly account for the constraints on *reasoning,* which here come from the conceptualization of safety as a WHOLE.
I will now move on to a specific type of operation, that which is represented by the use of metonymies.

7.2.3.2. Conceptual Metonymies and Proximization

Metonymies can be said to have a sorting function (see Chapter 4, section 4.2.3). Metonymies link two elements within a conceptual network by a relation of PART-WHOLE, and often get tightened

within the blend. The PART which stands for the WHOLE appears as the most relevant element in the given context, which is what leads to metonymies' sorting function. This sorting function is indeed related to relevance: they could then be seen as 'relevance pointers.' As such, the use of metonymies seems to perfectly exemplify the fruitful integration of CBT and RT. In the case of international relationships, the use of metonymies can help the hearer decipher the significance of the events which are being related to them, so as to establish the relevance of the threat these might pose to US. The construction of a threat to the U.S.'s national security relies partly on the conceptualization of the nations involved which are reduced to their *function* in maintaining the peace of the world, and by matter of inclusion, the national security of Americans. This subsection explores the various aspects which allow metonymies' profiling role to construct a real, urgent threat:

• Zoom on: location of danger

The first step is to establish the parameters of the conflict. Through conceptual blending, we have seen that the speaker is able to organize the space of the conflict, and reduce the scale of the events. More precisely, the use of CONTAINERS as an input space to a single scope conceptual network for the conceptualization of the conflicts allows to construe the United States of America as part of a larger hemisphere, which is itself part of the world. Part-Whole relations thus link America to the rest of the scene/actors, in order to establish how the events in question involve US.

(36) [...] "Let us show the world we want no hostile Communist colonies **here in the Americas** - South, Central, or North." (Reagan, 09.05.1984, my emphasis)
(37) "Revolution **here in *our* hemisphere**." (Reagan, 09.05.1984, my emphases)
(38) "Ask yourselves: What in the world are Soviets, East Germans, Bulgarians, North Koreans, Cubans, and terrorists from the PLO and the Red Brigades doing **in *our* hemisphere, camped on *our* own doorstep**?" (Reagan, 16.03.1986, my emphases)
(39) "They have all agreed to join us because they think this problem **in *our* neighborhood** is important to their future interests and their security." (Clinton, 15.09.1994, my emphases)

(40) "Kosovo is a province of Serbia, **in the middle of** southeastern Europe, about 160 miles east of Italy. That's less than the distance between Washington and New York and only about 70 miles north of Greece." (Clinton, 24.03.1999, my emphasis)
(41) "This was genocide **in the heart of Europe**, not in 1945 but in 1995; not in some grainy newsreel from our parents' and grandparents' time but **in *our* own time**, testing ***our*** humanity and ***our*** resolve." (Clinton, 24.03.1999, my emphases)
(42) Right now, **in the middle of Europe, at the doorstep of NATO**, an entire people are being made to abandon their homeland or die, not because of anything they've done but simply because of who they are." (Clinton, 03.04.1999, my emphasis)

(43) "Imagine what would happen if we and our allies instead decided just to look the other way, as these people were massacred **on NATO's doorstep**. That would discredit NATO, the cornerstone on which ***our*** security has rested for 50 years now." (Clinton, 24.03.1999, my emphasis)
(44) [...] "San Salvador is closer to Houston, Texas, than Houston is to Washington, DC. **Central America is America.** It's at ***our* doorstep**." (Reagan 09.05.1984, my emphases)
(45) "Will we permit the Soviet Union to put a second Cuba, a second Libya, **right on the doorstep of the United States?**" (Reagan, 16.03.1986, my emphasis)

(36-45) have been selected from the corpus to highlight Reagan's and Clinton's extensive use of the strategy, to represent the conflict as "close to us." Here, proximization happens again through reducing the scale of the conflict. While the events happening in South America might not seem "close" to the American hearers, the growth of a threat to peace "in our hemisphere" (37, 38) affects all those who are contained in this hemisphere: the relevant WHOLE of which WE are part is thus clearly established. Where OUR NATION IS A HOME, significant problems "in our neighborhood" (39) are also directly relevant to all whose security rests on the safety of this "home." The "home" is therefore perceived as a whole, part of a larger neighborhood, or hemisphere. It is thus the whole of the home which is threatened.

The use of metonymies can serve to highlight geographical location (on a reduced scale) as a primary concern when considering a country's safety. Reagan reminds the public that "Central America *is* America." (44) The United States of America is therefore linked to the continent America by a Part-Whole relation, just as South America is. As a result, all the actors represented in discourse are linked by what they have in common, rather than distinguished by their cultural differences. In (43), the issue extends from the massacre of people in Kosovo, to a matter affecting "*our* security" (my emphasis). The conflict at stake is regularly construed as being "on our doorstep" (38, 42, 43, 44, 45). In the conceptual integration network, the doorstep is linked to the house by a Part-Whole relation, therefore bringing the location of the conflict as directly part of OUR home estate. A very specific part of the house is being focused on: its point of entry. The hearer is thus being led to 'zoom on' the danger, perceiving it as more significant due to its proximity to US. Once on the doorstep, the next move is indeed to enter the house. However, all the external factors which would make a country subject (or not) to invasion remain hidden.

Besides physical proximity, the atrocities of the conflict are also construed as belonging to "our time" (41). Time is also often conceptualized as a CONTAINER. The genocide which Clinton refers to is "*in* our own time" (my emphasis), therefore concerning each and every human it contains. By contrast, newsreels stand for the past, a material anchor for the records of history, which people "in" the present can no longer influence. On the contrary, the danger which the enemy represents is here, now. In the blend (at the elaboration stage), one might imagine that "next step," that is the danger entering OUR home.

• Zoom on: function of danger

Once the scale of the events has been reduced, metonymies can thus help the hearer to sort the elements which are relevant to the interpretation of the conflicts, so that each one can only be seen as

an urgent matter of National Security. We can now expand on the link between metonymies and relevance, as we focus on what it is that allows to jump to the conclusion that the danger will eventually become concrete, as it enters "our home." Metonymic relations allow to make accessible the *function* which each element fulfills. Remote nations are regularly seen as the function which they serve, so as to reason about the significance of conflicts occurring there, and about how these might affect US. As such, when the danger is said to be getting "closer to home" (Reagan, 09.05.1984), it is the function which HOME serves for OUR safety which is highlighted, thus also establishing OUR vulnerability: FUNCTION FOR NATION/LOCATION. In a similar manner, the function of the locations where THEY choose to conduct evil is regularly made salient, in order to establish the relevance of the issues for US:

(46) "Nicaragua is still the **headquarters** for Communist guerilla movements." (Reagan 09.05.1984, my emphasis)
(47) "Cuba even provides **safe passage** for drug traffickers who poison ***our*** children." (Reagan 09.05.1984, my emphases)
(48)[...] Kosovo is a small place, but it sits on a **major fault line** between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, at the meeting place of Islam and both the Western and Orthodox branches of Christinanity. To the south are ***our*** allies Greece and Turkey; to the north, ***our*** New Democratic allies in Central Europe." (Clinton 24.03.1999, my emphases)
(49) "But when brutality occurs so close to ***our*** **shores**, it affects ***our*** national interests." (Clinton, 15.09.1994, my emphases)
(50) But as if all this brutality at home were not enough, the Sandinistas are transforming their nation into **a safe house, a command post for international terror.** The Sandinistas [...] provide **a sanctuary for terror**. Italy has charged Nicaragua with **harboring** their worst terrorists, the Red Brigades. (Reagan, 16.03.1986, my emphases)

We have already seen that RT could complement CBT analyses by acting as an engine of selection to form the input spaces to the blend, where blending occurs. It can also be used within the mental/ input spaces themselves (whether or not there is blending), and also, where a conceptual blend gets formed, to guide its elaboration. Let us start with the formation of input spaces, using (49) as a supporting example. Blending is not directly at stake here, however, let us look at the interpretation of "our shores." There are many aspects of "shores" which are part of the public's encyclopedic knowledge, yet the point is that it is their *function* which gets selected here: "shores" are seen solely as a point of entry into OUR land, as the function which they might serve to benefit the enemy in their attempt to harm US. Why is function selected, over other aspects associated with shores, such as their wildness or beauty, for instance? RT can help to answer such questions. In the context of a speech on national security, the function of shores as a point of access is what is made the most accessible. In another context, where Peter is wondering which route to take, route A which will take him along the shores, or route B which is more direct, various properties of shores would be made

more salient, such as their beauty, wild character (which might require the driver to exert caution), etc. These, however, are properties, rather than functions of shores. When analyzing metonymic relations, RT can thus be particularly useful to understand which aspect (from the PART) gets selected to stand for the WHOLE; in this case, which aspect gets selected as relevant for the interpretation of THEIR action. These relations then get tightened through blending, so that the conflict at stake appears to be directly linked to OUR national security, and it might then become difficult to think of it other than as containing the means to directly harm US.

Consequently for the interpretation of (46 - 50), within the input space for GEOGRAPHY, it is the function which the locations in question serve which is zoomed on. In (48), Kosovo is perceived solely as the role it might play in starting a major earthquake which would inevitably affect all the areas surrounding it. It is not singular due to its cultural differences, but solely due to its geological particularities. Likewise in (50), Nicaragua is seen as a "harbor" for terrorists. The country is thus reduced to the function it serves the enemy, as a strategic location designed to perform an essential function, that is to allow terrorists to safely conduct their operations. In (46), the conflict is construed as a business operation. While the source domain is different, the metonymic relationship which links the location of the conflict and the enemy is the same, and thus leads to similar *reasoning* regarding the significance of the conflict for US. What this shows is that although different metaphors might be used, the framework of Mental Spaces can effectively highlight similar constraining effects. Within the BUSINESS input space, Nicaragua is solely perceived as the FUNCTION which it serves for the Communists in their efforts to "export" terror and violence. It is a strategic space, and should thus be regarded as such by Americans too, should they wish to put a stop to the Communists' operations and the potential exportation of terror into American territory. Similarly, as a "safe house" (50), it is the function of the location within the organizing frame of crime operations which is foregrounded. In (47), the input space is that of a HOUSE as the location for OUR safety. Once again, the location of the enemy's operations, Cuba, is seen solely as the FUNCTION it serves, namely as a "safe passage." The events related to the public can then become directly relevant, affecting "*our* children" (my emphasis) or "allies." The use of metonymies highlighting the function of the locations in question allows the proximization of the conflict, which is seen to directly affect "us:" "our" home, "our" neighborhood, "our" interests, "our" security, "our" children, "our" future.

(39) "Will we permit the Soviet Union to put **a second Cuba, a second Libya**, right on the doorstep of the United States?" (Reagan, 16.03.1986, my emphasis)

Going back to example (39), reiterated here for convenience purposes, the pervasive use of these metonymies culminates in the usage of a country's name, here Cuba and Libya, to refer to the function which they serve to further the Communist cause, as a form of weapon against US. Cuba and Libya are thus conceptualized solely as means to the enemy's ends, rather than as nations with a culture, ideologies, and interests of their own.

• Zoom on: the conclusion that the danger is real

The efficiency of the above utterances for the purpose of persuasion, however, lies within the final interpretation, that the threat will materialize, that the function will be fulfilled unless something is done. In cases which involve conceptual blending, this might involve at the elaboration stage, the visualization of the danger actually entering "our home." Indeed, as the enemy is seen to conceive of other nations and people solely as the function which they might serve THEM, the danger which THEY represent can be construed as getting closer to US, as more and more likely to materialize. The hearer is indeed reminded that the weapons which the enemy is gathering are far from insignificant; that these are not meant to just provide self-protection; rather, they are here to serve a particular function: that to reach US. The enemy's actions in these countries is interpreted as making use of these functions in a war against US, as the furthering of their cause to attack and defeat the American identity. Here again, inputs from RT can be useful in order to understand how these conclusions are reached. Given the favored conceptualization not only of the enemy, but also of the United States (see Chapters 3-6), the most relevant interpretation is indeed that, in the enemy's case, the function (of a safe passage, or of an advantageous geographical location) will be fulfilled or exploited at the earliest opportunity. Besides, in a society that is geared towards efficiency, I argue that the link between an object's function and it actually being used is very easily accessible. This will be illustrated with this following, last example:

(51) "The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings with **Iraqi nuclear scientists**, a group he calls his "nuclear mujahideen," **his nuclear holy warriors**." (G.W. Bush 07.10.2002, my emphases)

In (51), the hearer is given a glimpse into Saddam Hussein's vision, through the use of the enemy's own language. In everyday language, the description of someone relying on their occupation somewhat reduces that person to the function which they serve in society, and is enough to attribute certain qualities without directly mentioning them. By referring to someone as a scientist, a whole list of pragmatic effects can be generated, such as inferences about their rigor, intelligence, tendency to

follow protocols (rather than to abuse them), etc. While WE might see the group of people working on nuclear weapons as scientists, that is as people whose main motive is the advancement of science (often equated with progress), that does not seem to be Saddam Hussein's vision. Instead, he calls them his "nuclear holy warriors." For him, the existence of this group is best understood as serving a unique function: that of fighting what he calls his holy cause, the fight against the Western world and all that it embodies, in the building of his reign of terror. As warriors, these people's 'function' is not to serve science, but to serve their commander, this merciless tyrant set to destroy all that is dear to US. By profiling their function *for him*, and given all that is known about the enemy's character, what is made accessible is the link between function and usage, leading to the visualization of the use of superior nuclear weapons *to attack US*. The threat which the building of Weapons of Mass Destruction represents is thus made all the more real, as a step closer in Saddam Hussein's overt quest to undermine US, as a danger requiring immediate action, before it can materialize and fulfill the enemy's mission, before their function can be realized to its maximum potential. On the other hand, as WE are construed as selfless agents in the cause of peace, OUR developing of such weapons could get interpreted as a deterrent against violence, and certainly never as being actually used (except in retaliation).

In this chapter, we have highlighted the importance of the cognitive context in which the speeches from the corpus get interpreted, and its role in contributing to the overall efficiency of persuasive mechanisms. In particular, we have seen that the construction of threats in the data appeals to our conception of time, to our understanding of Cause-Effect relations (that is where one cause generally leads to one effect - this point gets expanded in Chapter 12), and to that of functions. The salience of these relations constrains reasoning by favoring the conclusion that the enemy's capabilities are aimed to reach US as the most relevant interpretation of the conflicts. The danger is real, and it is solely linked to the enemy's actions/intentions, hiding OUR potential contribution (through what might appear as a systematic resort to military action).

Chapter 8: Reasoning from the '**unreal**'

Chapter 7 dealt with the nature of the threat, and how it impacts US, now. The construction of urgency was seen to rely on the conceptualization of the present moment as a point of no return, focusing on the inevitable nature of a looming danger rather than its temporal imminence. Indeed, we have seen that the corpus tends to construe fear as anchored in the present. A present of fear is what must be avoided, and the hearer is reminded that freedom and safety are never fully acquired; America is often referred to as being "safer," but never "safe." In the words of G.W. Bush, "we must never let our guard down" (15.01.2009). The battle is now. This is the premise upon which lies the goal that America's safety must be preserved or even restored, leading to the conclusion that every means must be gathered to ensure that it is the case. The first step was thus to construct a *present* threat, one which requires OUR immediate attention, one that is real. The second step, which is the focus of Chapter 8, is to conceptualize what inaction would look like, in order to constrain the hearers' response, leaving no real choice. We have already tackled the fact that the context in which inaction gets interpreted is constrained to inaction *in the face of a real threat.* In this chapter, we will focus on strategies which are grounded in a special type of reasoning: reasoning from the 'unreal.'

The decision for America to use force is a delicate one: the risks of inaction must outweigh the risks of military action, not only to the soldiers on the frontline or the civilians and lands involved, but also to the image of America in the world. These costs are real, and cannot be reversed. Unlike some economical questions, where the decision to spend a certain amount of money might be determined by a simple mathematical operation, the resolution of international conflicts does not have a straightforward frame of reference against which one can easily measure the long-term impact of one's actions. The breaching of international laws does not give way to automatic, unanimous responses. However, reasoning about the resort to the ultimate measure of war can effectively be grounded in the conceptualization of the 'unreal,' whose point is precisely to make the weighing of pros and cons a very simple exercise. How then can 'reasoning from the unreal' convince the American public that the decision to take the most costly course of action is the right one, the *only* right one? We start by exploring two main advantages of predicting the future, which constitutes one way to conceptualize what is (at least not yet) real:

• Predicting the future to control its uncertainties

This chapter focuses on the visions of the future which would make America tumble into complete instability, leading to the conceptualization of inaction as the biggest risk: what would happen if Americans chose not to act now? If presently OUR inaction translates as the stationing of a threat on OUR doorstep, what would it look like once it eventually got in? Would it actually get in, would Americans' reality really be altered? These are some of the questions which the discourse aims to answer, in such a way that only one scenario should come out as reasonable. The aim is to constrain reasoning about present decisions, so that inaction can only be understood as a risk that is not worth taking. Hypothesizing about the future can thus be seen as a valuable resource, as a way to control the uncertainties which OUR present holds (as seen in Chapter 7).

Visions of the future are built using various types of constructions. In order to analyze them, I will mainly draw on the framework of Mental Spaces, which provides the best way to conceive of the links between these visions of the future, and the present where action is advocated. Indeed the central aspect of profiling the links upon which reasoning is based has already been highlighted as an essential benefit of Mental Spaces/CBT. In that sense, I do not aim to provide a full account of all the different uses of the constructions encountered, but rather of how they are all coherently used to convey a single message in this corpus. The framework of Mental Spaces allows to effectively portray this coherence - whatever construction is chosen, the effects of constraint remain the same. The framework of RT can then help to ground analyses of online utterances in the communicative event, consolidating the perception of certainty that inaction *now* is not an option.

The notion of an alternative future is regularly mentioned as a motive for immediate action: action now thus allows for the provision of a preferable future world, implying that the situation as it stands would lead to an unacceptable future. As Dancygier & Sweetser note,

> one of the most important reasons for setting up mental spaces is to imagine alternatives [...] These imagined futures, and their imagined unfolding continuations, constitute the basis for an important human activity: *prediction.* If we never engaged in prediction, in the construction of (and commitment to) some future scenarios as more likely than others, we could never make decisions at all. (1996: 84)

Prediction (also see Dancygier, 1993, 1999/2004) is indeed at the heart of the construction of threats, of the relevance of the danger which THEY currently pose to US. It constitutes the crucial link between OUR present, THEIR present, and OUR future. As Dancygier and Sweetser add, "some predictions may be based on certainties" (1996: 84). Of course, if such was the case in our

data, there would be no debate as to what needs to be done. The example which they give is the following: “when morning comes, it’ll be light again.” In that type of utterance, “we do not consider mental spaces wherein there won’t be a morning” (1996: 85). I argue that the efficiency of the discourse to ‘shape the American mind to go to war’ lies in the language’s capacity to constrain the interpretation of the events, so that the hearer does not consider a mental space wherein inaction can lead to the positive establishment of peaceful relationships, of a secure foundation for a new world.

• Predicting the future to contextualize the present threat

The strategies analyzed here will therefore strive to demonstrate how the construction of alternative spaces can constrain the hearers’ conception of America’s future as entirely dependent on the choice to act or not to act in the immediate present. More specifically, I will look at the strategies which allow to make the predictions presented by the President appear as certain as possible. To that end, I will also be adopting the point of view developed by Dancygier & Sweetser, following from Haiman’s (1978) study on conditionals, that “one reason for using a space-builder is precisely to **contextualize** by indicating which already-available information is the background to what is being said” (1996: 94, my emphasis). I would also stress that the notion of relevance needs to be added. The hypothetical structures which appear in our data in the construction of alternative spaces can be seen to contextualize the events in such a way that the information which the speaker deems to be *relevant* to America’s national security has already been selected for the hearer, in an effort to make the risks of inaction more salient. While the visions of the future might be set in hypothetical or counterfactual spaces, the perceptions, along with the fear which they might trigger, are real. This chapter aims to show how the visions presented can take hold, that is to say how they can end up impacting the hearers’ *reality* in the form of accepted decisions to take action. For this to happen, for a threat to take hold, these visions of the future need to be entrenched in a shared cognitive context.

8.1. Viewing the Future through Hypothetical Spaces

The first strategy in the construction of alternative spaces is the building of Hypothetical Spaces. The setting up of hypothetical spaces is essential to establish the conditions upon which predictions about the future can be made. While we all know that when morning comes, it will certainly be light again, hypothetical spaces allow us to make predictions when different outcomes are possible.

The most common way to do so is to resort to a space-builder such as "if." When hypothetical spaces are built in discourse, two main types of strategies have been identified:

- (A) Strategies which focus on the protasis, defined as the set of conditions on which the counterfactual/hypothetical scenarios are dependent. These are aimed at producing positive epistemic effects, so that the conditions are made to appear as close to reality as possible.
- (B) Strategies which focus on the apodosis, where the vision triggered by the hypothetical space unravels. These are aimed at conceptualizing the effects following the realization of the conditions in the protasis as so catastrophic that they cannot be ignored.

Of course, persuasive speeches often resort to a combination of both, as demonstrated by the first example. The rest of the utterances will then be analyzed in such a way so as to highlight one specific type of strategy and its impact on effective persuasion.

(1) "Events can **turn in one of two ways**. **If we fail to act in the face of danger**, the people of Iraq will continue to live in brutal submission. The regime will have new power to bully and dominate and conquer its neighbors, condemning the Middle East to more years of bloodshed and fear. The regime will remain unstable, the region will remain unstable, with little hope of freedom, and isolated from the progress of our times. With every step the Iraqi regime takes toward gaining and deploying the most terrible weapons, our own options to confront that regime will narrow. **And if an emboldened regime were to supply these weapons to terrorist allies, then the attacks of September the 11th would be a prelude to far greater horrors.**
If we meet our responsibilities, if we overcome this danger, we can **arrive at a very different future** [...] And we will show that the promise of the United Nations can be fulfilled in our time." (G.W. Bush, 12.09.2002, my emphases)

Reasoning is here based on the setting up of two hypothetical spaces, leading to two alternative scenarios. Before moving on to the interpretation of these hypothetical spaces, it is worth noting that their construction as a basis for reasoning about America's actions is already constrained by the conceptual blend which they get built in. The two alternatives are indeed set within the construal of THE FUTURE AS A DESTINATION, where the current events are understood as a junction separating into two different routes. Each hypothetical space is then built on one of these two routes. However, unlike most simple journeys, WE cannot turn back. Indeed as the final destination is that of a peaceful future, not just for the Iraqis but also for US, turning back is not an option, which already constrains the interpretation of the decision which Americans are facing. In theory, we could hypothesize that there might be four ways in which the present could develop: (a) positive results of OUR action (the danger is suppressed and peace is secured); (b) negative results of OUR action (where the neutralization of Saddam Hussein does not lead to stability in the region, and lasting peace is not secured); (c) positive results of OUR inaction (where OUR predictions were wrong and the enemy does not take action against US); and finally (d), negative results of OUR inaction

(where the enemy is emboldened and the U.S. faces another attack). These are not all necessarily realistic prospects, but the point is that the discourse reduces the possibilities to (a) vs. (d). Here again, RT can effectively explain why that is possible, and why the most relevant interpretation of (1) might indeed be that inaction would be not only very risky, but completely irresponsible. Firstly, we have already mentioned that the context of a National Address on National Security constrains the interpretation of (1): if the threat considered was not serious, why mention it at all? The assumption that it is a matter of common sense, and therefore that it is a very easy decision to make, is made relevant by reminding the hearers that OUR inaction is to be understood as inaction "in the face of danger." What is made directly accessible is the responsibility of the President to keep Americans safe, which is reinforced by the mention of "responsibilities" and of the "promise" of the United Nations of a peaceful world. This is what leads the hearers to the conclusion that the decision placed before them is a matter of common sense, of ensuring that basic responsibilities are kept, making inaction a simple case of irresponsibility, and so making options (b) or (c) not even worth processing.

The framework of Mental Spaces can then be used to identify strategies which can heighten the perception of the risk described as real, and very likely to materialize, thus reinforcing the conclusion that acting is the only real choice. In order to do so, let us take a closer look at the way the mental spaces in (1) get constructed.



Fig. 15: Building Hypothetical Spaces

The Reality Space (R) contains US as the main actor, on a journey towards the future of the world, standing at a key point, at the junction between two possible routes. "If" acts as a space-builder, creating the first of two hypothetical spaces from which the fate of the world depends. Although it is Iraq and the Middle East which will be immediately affected by actions in the present, the Hypothetical Space 1 (H1) continues to place US as a main actor. In fact, the creation of H1 compresses the space which "we" are in, so that the whole of America is "facing" the danger which the enemy poses. "[Our]" first option incorporates a negation, as it is presented as the "*failure* to act." Another alternative space thus already appears (before being made explicit), one where success is directly related to "[our]" immediate decision to act, making it clear which is the right and the wrong way. Indeed the only variable between those two alternative spaces is whether "we" take action or not. This allows the speaker to then construct his predictions with certainty. The first Future Space (W1) depends directly on H1, and the two seem to be linked by a relation of Cause-Effect (leading to constraints on reasoning). There is no doubt as to what *will* happen should "we" embark on that path: the people of Iraq *will* be bullied; the region *will* be unstable; the Middle East *will* be condemned to this fate. The use of "will" guarantees that the prediction is based on certainty, on the speaker's superior knowledge. As a result, WE are seen as a direct cause of the Iraqis' suffering. The solution thus seems straightforward: if "we" do not want this fate for the Middle East, then "we" need to take the alternative path, which requires America's immediate intervention.

We will see in subsection 8.1.1 what strategies might be used in order to suppress the irreality of the scenario. In this analysis, we focus on the relations of Cause-Effect which are at the heart of the interpretation of (1), and which are to account for the constraint on reasoning, as the hearer is left with the certainty that the prediction in (1) is correct. The President's predictions are here construed as a 'domino effect,' with the first event in H1 starting a motion hitting one prediction after another. After W1, the protasis does not need to be reiterated, and the next Future Spaces stand on their own. The focus is thus on the certainty of what will happen once the motion has been started, and on the numerous effects that one single decision can have. The hearers are reminded here of the immensity of their country's responsibility. As time goes on, the path is said to "narrow," making the eventual fall of the last domino appear ever more certain, reinforcing the idea that there will come a point when it is too late to act. However far in the future, the unraveling of these consequences is seen as inevitable, and it is all linked to H1, to OUR decision in the present not to take action. It is in that context that a final counterfactual blend is to be interpreted, at a point where the reality of America's responsibility has been made very clear.

Let us now take a closer look at that last domino:

"And if **an emboldened regime** were to supply **these weapons** to terrorist allies, then the attacks of September the 11th would be **a prelude to far greater horrors**."

"If" builds up a second Hypothetical Space (H2), which is itself dependent on H1. The use of "were," and later "would" in the apodosis indicates counterfactuality. That regime is not (yet) emboldened, "these weapons" have not been made, and there is no evidence of a conspiracy to attack the United States, presenting an incompatibility with R. We now move onto the strategies which constrain the interpretation process of this Counterfactual Space, so that the risks presented might be perceived as prominent enough to prompt immediate action. Nominalizations in the protasis (hypothetical space) help the hearer to visualize this hypothetical scenario, to view it as a potential reality that can be rejected. "An emboldened regime" appears as a direct result of the motion started by the previous hypothetical scenario, as a direct result of "[our failure] to act." The wider chain of events that would lead to the existence of an emboldened regime (the lack of action of other international powers, the lack of change in America's policy, Saddam's continued refusal to cooperate, etc.), is compressed into the regime's new, stronger identity. The end result is foregrounded, while the hypothetical factors that precede it are left in the background. The hearer is thus led to conceptualize this final potential reality, while its 'unreal' character, that is its embedment in a counterfactual space, is made less salient. The nominalization of "these weapons," these "most terrible weapons," presupposes their existence, once again leading the hearer to conceptualize them not at the stage of production, but rather as being used against their own country. The floating of the presupposition into the Reality Space would be allowed as long as it does not create a contradiction with the receiving space. The verifying of this eventuality, however, is precisely what "we" want to avoid, especially in light of the terrible consequences that it could lead to. "We" do not want to wait for it to become a reality, for inaction to be proved as disastrous as it was predicted. While the enemy's acquiring of such weapons is not asserted as a fact, its realization is perceived as dependent upon OUR action in the present. It is not the existence of "these weapons" which floats into the Parent Space (the Reality Space), but rather the result of the reasoning process: the relation of Cause-Effect between early action, and the result of having stopped THEM from acquiring the weapons necessary to conduct the worst attack the U.S. has ever known.

The costs of inaction…

While counterfactual reasoning might be grounded in the 'unreal,' the fear which is triggered here is real. The modal "would" might grammatically indicate that the realization of such attacks on America is hypothetical, but the hearer is still led to conceptualize what follows, that is "a prelude to far greater horrors." Besides, the conceptualization of such horrors is grounded in the reality of what has already happened. Mentioning the attacks of September the 11th highlights America's vulnerability, reminding the hearers that their country is not immune from terrorist attacks, that it has happened before, and it could happen again. In fact, it could be much worse. The attacks of 9/11 are here constructed as a prelude, rather than as an event which has ended and which will remain in the past. And it is up to the hearer to imagine the rest of the story. The mental space for "far greater horrors" involves the same actors as those of the 9/11 attacks, but this time the perpetrator is equipped with much more dangerous weapons; the victim, however, remains the same. One can imagine that the construction of this mental space is thus likely to bring up very strong emotional effects, given that the attacks of 9/11 were portrayed as one of the most devastating tragedies which America suffered in the public's lifetime. These effects are real, and are part of a shared cognitive environment, alerting the hearer to view the current events as highly relevant to the preservation of America's national security. The mention of past tragedies is also often used in order to make the relation of prediction appear stronger. Kahneman and Tversky's studies highlight the ways in which people tackle decision making and risk assessment. One of their interests was to understand what people do "when they wish to estimate the frequency of a category" (Kahneman, 2012), which led them to the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), which they defined as "the process of judging frequency by 'the ease with which instances come to mind'" (Kahneman, 2012). Exploiting this bias could thus affect one's perception of risks. For example, Kahneman (2012) notes that "a dramatic event temporarily increases the availability of its category." By bringing past events (such as the 9/11 attacks) into the scope of attention, the risk of re-occurrence of a terrorist attack might then get perceived as higher than it really is. Perception is indeed what matters here: by guiding the hearer to perceive the risk of another terrorist attack as higher, the unreal character of the hypothesis is left in the background. Not only is the thought of another, worse surprise attack overwhelming, so that anything that might lead to it should be stopped, but the prediction of its realization if WE do not take action now appears to be stronger. Straight after the trigger of fear comes the solution, the only possibility to "arrive at a different future," in the form of immediate intervention.

…and the benefits of early action

In his study on the discursive strategies which contribute to the overall effect of manipulation, de Saussure (2005: 113) suggests that a central mechanism is the trouble-and-resolution device, which he defines as "causing trouble in the hearer's understanding procedure and offering ready-made resolutions of that trouble." While de Saussure's analysis focuses on the ways in which that device "disturbs the normal processing of intention recovery," a similar type of process seems to be at stake here. In this context, the "trouble" stems from the distortion of the perception of risk, which in turn leads to the perception of the speaker as more competent than the general public. Indeed, it is part of the speaker's responsibility to be aware of dangerous threats to the country, of the details of these threats, of the likelihood of them materializing, etc. By sharing his fear, the speaker lets the public in a troubled environment. His competence as President then gets immediately consolidated as he appears to hold the solution to combat fear, a "ready-made resolution" in the familiar shape of the deployment of American strength. The effects of reassurance that early action will save America from that dreadful future constitute a significant cognitive benefit. As a result, differing interpretations of OUR action as potentially negative (labeled as option b above), or of OUR inaction as positive (option c) can be successfully blocked, as they cannot provide the same certainty of a peaceful future. Overcoming this danger is equated with stopping the realization of greater horrors, of which the relevance to American hearers is so high, that they are not led to look for further information on the circumstances of the present danger, which might convey different interpretations.

In conclusion, this detailed analysis has served to identify the efficiency of utterances such as (1), on account of its constraint on reasoning. The acceptance of the resulting interpretation, that is the efficiency of constraint, can be related to two different aspects:

- It results from what one knows about communication, that is to say that each utterance conveys the presumption of its own optimal relevance. This is what allows the activation of the notion of Presidential responsibility, for instance, favoring the conclusion that something must be done in the present to secure OUR future;
- It also results from the fact that it fits with existing reasoning patterns, with what one knows about causality.

The following subsections (8.1.1 and 8.1.2) will not adopt such detailed analyses, but instead will focus on various strategies which can strengthen the perception of the risk as real, in more depth than what has already been alluded to in the analysis of (1).

8.1.1. Strategies to contextualize the unknown

This subsection focuses on the role of the protasis, that is the establishment of the conditions within a hypothetical space. Rather than viewing it as a set of conditions, whose fulfillment (or lack of) dictates whether or not the contents of the apodosis (Future Space) get realized, I argue that in persuasive discourse, the protasis serves a specific function: it lays the grounds for the contextualization of the events discussed, so that they might be perceived as highly relevant - and real - to Americans. Conflicts are a feature of the world that we live in. They take place all over the globe, in various forms, and over variable periods of time. Some of these events might at first glance have nothing to do with America, which would lead to the conclusion that it is not OUR place to intervene. However, the contextualization of these unfamiliar issues can help the hearer to *see* why the conflicts identified in discourse merit OUR immediate attention. Just like a football is just a round object until a player comes along and gives it its full meaning, contextualization within the Hypothetical Space provides hearers with the right elements to interpret the issues at stake: it acts as the background against which the details of the reading grid which gets constructed in discourse unfold. To that end, the strategies identified here aim at making the hypothetical element fade in the background of the interpretation process.

8.1.1.1. Nominalization

> Nominalization is a process of transformation through which verbs, which construe ideation always meaning in terms of temporally marked processes and actions, are transformed into nouns, which construe ideation always meaning in terms of objects and entities, that is, as reified processes which lack a temporal component. (Dunmire, 2008: 89)

This is what nominalization does at the linguistic level: it is a process of transformation. When studying persuasive discourse, nominalization can be described as a strategy to "suppress the irreality of future processes and events by rendering them as extant entities" (Dunmire, 2008: 90). It can therefore be seen as a constraining mechanism, as it shifts the hearers' attention away from "the original context of production and its status as an unrealized future phenomenon and toward its specific features and consequences" (Dunmire, 2008: 93). The focus of the contextualization process is

therefore not on the production, but rather on the potential for present issues to affect US in the future.

(2) "Concerns about **the prospect of hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing Communist oppression to seek entry into our country** are well-founded." (Reagan 09.05.1984, my emphasis)
(3) "**Alliance with terrorists** could allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints." (G.W. Bush 07.10.2002, my emphasis)
(4) "**Failure to act** would embolden other tyrants, allow terrorists access to new weapons and new resources, and make blackmail a permanent feature of world events [...] And **through its inaction**, the United States would resign itself to a future of fear." (G.W. Bush 07.10.2002, my emphases)
(5) "But there can be no peace if our security depends on **the will and whims** of a ruthless and aggressive dictator. I'm not willing to stake one American life on trusting Saddam Hussein." (G.W. Bush 07.10.2002, my emphasis)

In (2), (3) and (4), the process of nominalization avoids the resort to "if" as a space-builder for the construction of a hypothetical space, thus suppressing even further the irreality of the future scenario described, and allowing the hearers to direct their reasoning on the possible realization of these events, and on what needs to be done to stop it. "Prospects" imply imagined visions of the future, whose realization depends on a set of conditions; they envision possibilities rather than certainties, and the interpretation of (2) can therefore be analyzed as the setting up of a Hypothetical Space. The interpretation process takes the focus away from the production of these conditions, which would have been made available through utterances such as the following: "If they wished to flee Communist oppression, they would most likely seek entry into our country." That type of utterance would facilitate access to the reasons behind seeking refuge, which the nominalization in (2) obfuscates. On the other hand, "the prospect of" directs the interpretation process to the visualization of the end result, of the refugees entering the country. While refugees in themselves are not a direct cause for concern, and countries which face a high demand from refugees are those which are thought to provide better opportunities and to respect one's freedom, the nominalization process shifts the focus onto the threatening notion of volume: hundreds of thousands. As we saw in Chapter 7, the cognitive context within which American War Rhetoric is grounded consists of certain entrenched conceptual metaphors, such as A COUNTRY IS A CONTAINER. Where countries are construed as containers, one can easily see how the visualization of a huge volume of refugees could trigger fear, or at the very least concern. While "well-founded concerns" (2) invoke a hypothetical situation, the hearers are led to presuppose that an influx of refugees would indeed constitute a threat to US, or the sharing of these concerns would not be relevant in the first place (DP). In that context, the focus on volume is all the more significant, pointing to the severity of the threat. By highlighting the gravity of future consequences, rather than the conditions under which these might unravel, the need for prompt action is made more salient through the rejection of the vision

offered. The relation of Cause-Effect between Communist oppression and the massive influx of refugees in America is at the centre of the mental space relating these concerns, and so appears as a reasonable starting point to tackle them. The contextualization taking place in this hypothetical space thus allows the audience to view the direct effects which Communist influence in other countries can eventually have on US, while suppressing the distance of this vision from OUR current reality.

In (3) and (4), the nominalization process also allows to suppress the irreality of the conditions by not using the space-builder "if." Rather, the focus is again on the end result, the "alliance with terrorists." (3) contextualizes Iraq's gathering of weapons by getting the hearer to visualize a collaboration between the regime gathering those weapons, and a group set to inflict destruction regardless of costs, and known to have targeted the United States of America in the past. Thanks to the nominalization, the hearer is not given any modal or temporal information which would give indications regarding the speaker's epistemic stance on that alliance. In the context of unfamiliar issues, the majority of hearers probably do not have in their cognitive environment any information which would indicate that the formation of such an alliance is or is not likely. The speaker is then able to communicate feelings of fear, which would stem from this alliance, through the visualization of its consequences, i.e. an attack on America which could also easily be repeated, as the culprit would not be "leaving any fingerprints." In (4), the focus is also on the visualization of the consequences which a lack of action from America in the present would result in. But the nominalization process also seems to accentuate the blame on America for the rise of fear as a feature of world affairs. The chain of actions which would lead to the empowerment of the enemy's regime, as well as all the actors involved besides the United States, seems to be compressed, so that intentionality can appear in the blend (through the construal of STATES AS PEOPLE, and of TERROR/EVENTS AS BLACKMAIL). It is indeed the present choice not to act which leads America to eventually "resign itself to a future of fear." In the Future Space, America is linked to its fate by an inner-space relation of intentionality, and to its counterpart in the Hypothetical Space by a relation of identity through the Access Principle[8] (Fauconnier 2012). Although the consequences might be felt by a different generation of Americans, and choosing present inaction might feel inconsequential now, the America which is ruled by fear in the Future Space is the same as the one which *chose* not to take action in the Hypothetical (present) Space.

[8] Access Principle: "If two elements a and b are linked by a connector F (b = F(a)), then element b can be identified by naming, describing, or pointing to, its counterpart a." (Fauconnier 2012: 353)

Finally, in (5), G.W. Bush shares his personal standpoint by asserting the following: "I'm not willing to stake one American life on trusting Saddam Hussein." In light of the utterance which directly precedes this statement, it would be quite difficult not to agree with him. This statement thus acts as a reminder of the stakes, of the actual danger which not acting represents, which is equated with trusting Saddam Hussein, a "ruthless and aggressive dictator." The setting up of a Hypothetical Space is actually constructed here within a Counterfactual Blend, taking the hearers to a potential future where a lack of action in the present leads to "our security" being entirely dependent on "the will and whims of a ruthless and aggressive dictator." In reality, "our security" might typically be seen to depend on actions taken to strengthen "our" country; or to be shaken by "our" enemies' actions. Here, the nominalization of "the will and whims" of the enemy profiles Saddam Hussein's unchanging character, highlighted as the relevant information needed to contextualize current events, and America's inaction. While in an ideal world, relationships based on trust might serve the cause of peace better, what is highlighted here is that Saddam's character does not allow for such ideals to be seriously considered.

Despite the explicit use of "if" (unlike (2), (3) and (4)), the irreality of the conditions is still suppressed; indeed it seems that providing the public with certainty is at the heart of the interpretation of (5). The visions of America's future are constrained, as the hearers are led to conceptualize two alternative spaces, one of them being clearly the preferred one: one where "our security" depends on trusting this unpredictable character, and another where "we" are in control of "our security." While there is no certainty as to what the future holds, the function of contextualization allows the hearers to reason about the future. This reasoning is grounded in the certainties of Saddam's unpredictable character. All the information shared about his cruel actions and broken promises constitutes the background against which OUR relationship with him is to be interpreted.

The focus on the end result, on the status of America's national security in the context of a world under the influence of an empowered, unpredictable dictator, hides the potentially counterproductive aspect which American intervention might have in fueling anger and hatred from the enemy. The result is the oversimplification of the debate, as the two options which are presented are in no way equivalent. By contrast, one might imagine a debate taking place in the White House, between proponents of military action and their opponents. In this scenario, the arguments put forward to oppose military intervention would undoubtedly involve a multitude of factors, perhaps highlighting the repercussions of OUR action on various levels. In that sense, the opposition would carry a certain weight, making the decision to choose between the two courses of action a lot more diffi-

cult, and a lot more balanced. Utterances such as (5) thus contribute to the construction of a false dilemma (see Chapter 3, section 3 for a definition), where the option not to intervene is construed as almost suicidal, so that it cannot sensibly be considered.

8.1.1.2. Analogy

(6) "If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium **a little larger than a single softball**, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year." (G.W. Bush, 12.09.2002, my emphasis)

The protasis established by the Hypothetical Space in (6) aims to establish the necessary conditions for the dreaded production of a nuclear weapon by the enemy. However, the construction of the Hypothetical Space is constrained by the use of analogy, so that the enemy might be seen to be very close to their goal; so close in fact that it becomes difficult to conceive of the possibility of them not acquiring the needed quantity of uranium. Although hypothetical, the protasis allows the hearer to conceptualize a scenario whereby the Iraqi regime meets the necessary conditions to achieve their goal to produce a nuclear weapon. The strategies used within the construction of this Hypothetical Space make the perception of the enemy's success more likely than their failure, thus establishing the threat which they pose as highly relevant. In its quest to acquire uranium, the Iraqi regime is seen to have three different paths at its disposal: it could "produce, buy, or steal" it, the last option being well within its capacity given the background on its moral standards. The quantity of uranium required is then linked by a relation of analogy with the size of a softball. While most hearers might be unfamiliar with what constitutes a significant quantity of uranium, softballs are known by all to be small (i.e., to fit in one's hand). The analogy does not only highlight the small size of the quantity required, but also implies that there is a relative easiness about reaching that goal, that very little is left to be done, as the sole parameter taken into account is physical size. The construal in terms of a small concrete object can make the 'grabbing' of uranium seem tangible, almost perceptible, and can thus activate certain unwanted (and false) associations regarding the (non-) complexity of the enemy's task. The various factors which would come into play in order to transport uranium are not represented here: indeed, one can only imagine the high levels of security which this might involve, perhaps requiring a reinforced vehicle - it certainly cannot be as simple as popping it into one's backpack. As the hearer is led to think about the possibility of OUR enemy building a nuclear weapon, what is left out is the difficulty with which the necessary quantity of uranium might be acquired, the difficulty of the process following its gain (i.e., transportation), or even how it might be used. The irreality of the enemy coming in possession of a nuclear weapon is thus left in the back-

ground of the interpretation process, as the hearers are led to focus on how close the Iraqi regime is to reaching that goal. As the mundanity of the object of softball is brought into focus, it becomes difficult to see how they could not end up succeeding, unless immediate action is taken to stop them. The contextualization of the current situation directs the hearers' attention onto its urgency: the only thing which seems to have the power to stop the Hypothetical Space from becoming reality is OUR action, as the enemy's acquiring the means to build a nuclear weapon appears inevitable. Why act now? Because the process needs to be stopped before its inevitable completion. From then on, one can only imagine what THEY could use it for. G.W. Bush continues as follows:

(6 - continued) "and if we allow that to happen, a terrible line would be crossed. Saddam Hussein would be in a position to blackmail anyone who opposes his aggression. He would be in a position to dominate the Middle East. He would be in a position to threaten America. And Saddam Hussein would be in a position to pass nuclear technology to terrorists." (G.W. Bush, 12.09.2002)

Once again, the condition set in the Hypothetical Space does not need to be repeated. As that condition is construed as easily achievable, the conditionality expressed by the modal "would" is almost suppressed. The focus is on the end result, on the inevitable repercussions of that one event. Once Saddam is in "that position," there is no going back. Whether or not Saddam would indeed pass that technology to terrorists, the fear which the realization of that one event can trigger is real, leaving the hearer with the sense that something needs to be done, that that eventuality *must* be prevented.

(7) "And of course, sophisticated delivery systems aren't required for a chemical or biological attack; all that might be required are a small container and one terrorist or Iraqi intelligence operative to deliver it." (G.W. Bush, 07.10.2002)

In (7), there is no space builder to trigger the construction of a hypothetical space. The conditional aspect of the situation is instead indicated by "might." The function of the utterance, however, is the same: the contextualization of the current threat. As the hearer is led to visualize "all that might be required" for these potential weapons to be used at their full potential, the threat is made real. The creation of a Hypothetical Space allows the hearer to visualize the terrorist carrying a container full of destructive weapons, about to conduct a deadly attack. The fear stemming from such an image is real. The focus is not on whether these weapons are likely to be produced, or on whether they might then be used against US. Rather, the point is that action is needed now, before we can find out that they have become a reality; once such weapons get produced, the steps to get them to fulfill OUR greatest fear are construed as minimal, making this terrifying image appear almost realistic.

8.1.1.3. Inside the enemy's mind

When trying to predict the future, one main obstacle is that we cannot know with absolute certainty what is in the enemy's mind. We can only make predictions based on their character, previous actions, and on the analysis of their current actions. Why are they doing what they are doing?

As the following utterance exemplifies, the construction of Hypothetical Spaces is not necessarily linked to dependent spaces by a relation of Cause-Effect:

(8) "But the world has to wonder what the dictator is thinking. **If he thinks that** by targeting innocent civilians in Israel and Saudi Arabia, that he will gain advantage, **he is dead wrong. If he thinks that** he will advance his cause through tragic and despicable environmental terrorism, **he is dead wrong.** And **if he thinks that** by abusing the coalition prisoners of war he will benefit, **he is dead wrong**." (G. Bush, 29.01.1991, my emphases)

The space builder "if" constructs a Hypothetical Space. The speaker is here trying to base his reasoning around hypothesizing about the enemy's intentions. The function of this structure, however, remains that of contextualization. Through the use of Hypothetical Spaces within speeches on America's National Security, we have seen that the speaker is able to communicate feelings of fear regarding the interpretation of current events. As fear gets added to the shared cognitive environment, the hearer's attention is directed towards elements which he/she might otherwise not have seen as relevant. While discussing Saddam's actions, (8) leads the hearer to contextualize these actions by giving them a clear motive, one which in fact might appear as the only possible motive. Indeed, the culture and the history of relationships in the Middle East represents an unfamiliar topic to most hearers, so that once the events discussed have been contextualized, it can become difficult to view them in any other light. Regardless of whether the speaker is right or wrong when hypothesizing about the enemy's intentions, contextualization makes it difficult to see how the enemy could not gather the required material to build a destructive weapon; contextualization makes it difficult to see how such an obvious alliance (made obvious in discourse) as that with Iraq might not be formed, and finally how the enemy could not succeed when all that "might be required are a small container and one terrorist or Iraqi intelligence operative." In other words, contextualization makes it difficult to see why else Saddam Hussein would be acting in this way. Besides, as these utterances are addressed to the American population, the enemy has no way to respond or to offer a different viewpoint on these issues. The contextualization of the events within the protasis can thus somewhat suppress the irreality within which these scenarios get constructed, as no other realistic alternative scenario is made available. This leads to the selection of the inference that THEIR action can only be interpreted as indicating future trouble for US as the most relevant one.

8.1.2. Strategies to heighten risk perception

The second set of strategies focuses on the perception of the significance of the risks presented, and what it means for America's future. In the times that we live in, the emotions around the resort to war tend to be (at least partly) negative. It might occasionally be perceived as a necessary step, but rarely as a good one. The decision to send soldiers in harm's way is never a light-hearted one, and one could assume that it should be based on the certainty (or at least as close to certainty as one can get) that it is necessary. It might therefore seem counter-intuitive that the reasoning around such an important decision is often grounded in the unreal, in the weighing of counterfactual spaces, or in projections of an unknown future. The conclusion that America needs to act now is here reached by viewing the future from the angle of inaction. The strategies identified in 8.1.1 aimed to reduce or suppress the irreality of the scenario presented within a Hypothetical Space. In the apodosis, which focuses on the unraveling of the consequences in a Future or Counterfactual Space, the strategies identified in 8.1.2 tend to portray a situation which cannot be viewed as acceptable, so that anything that can be done to prevent it from becoming reality should be agreed on.

Lakoff's famous example, "don't think of an elephant!" (Lakoff 2014) highlights the importance of the cognitive dimension of language. While the receptors of such an order are asked *not* to perform a task, our minds cannot but conceptualize the elephant in question. While one could easily stop oneself from drawing an elephant, for instance, when the task is that of forming a mental representation, the negation will have no effect. I argue that this is precisely what can make reasoning from Counterfactual Spaces so powerful. While there is no certainty as to what will happen, the hearers cannot but conceptualize what might; those representations, and the emotions that they might trigger, as well as their fitting with the hearers' existing cognitive context, are all real. As the hearers are asked to represent horrors which would jeopardize their present way of life, their freedoms which might have been taken for granted, fear becomes the overarching common element which guides the interpretation process.

8.1.2.1. Visualizing the unthinkable

Let us start with the visualization of what a lack of immediate action would mean for the future of America.

(9) "In the attacks on America a year ago, we saw the destructive intentions of our enemies. This threat hides within many nations, including my own. And our greatest fear is that terrorists will find **a shortcut to their**

mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale." (G.W. Bush 12.09.2002, my emphasis)
(10) "Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun, that could come in the form of **a mushroom cloud**." (G.W. Bush, 07.10.2002, my emphasis)

(11) "If we and our allies were to allow this war to continue with no response, President Milosevic would read our hesitation as **a license to kill**. There would be many more massacres, tens of thousands more refugees, more victims crying out for revenge." (Clinton, 24.03.1999, my emphasis)
(12) "If the United States withdrew immediately, some of the other 30 nations that have contributed to the 28,000-strong U.N. peacekeeping force in Somalia would also bail out. Chaos would return to the ravaged East African nation, he said, and starvation would soon resume. American resolve and its role in the world would rightly be called into question. Our own credibility with friends and allies would be severely damaged. Our leadership in world affairs would be undermined at the very time when people are looking to America to help promote peace and freedom in the post-Cold War world. And all around the world, aggressors, thugs and terrorists **will** conclude that the best way to get us to change our policies is to **kill our people**. It would be **open season on Americans**." (Clinton, 07.10.1993, my emphases)

In (9), the presentation of the Future Space is not dependent upon the realization of a condition. Instead, it is embedded within the space of the speaker's emotions. The construction is as follows: "our greatest fear is that [...]" sets up what I have called an Emotion Space, from which a Future Space is then built. Through the use of the personal pronoun "our," the hearers' emotions are aligned with the speaker's. Regardless of whether the Iraqi regime will or will not end up collaborating with terrorists who are planning an attack on America, or whether it even intends to do so, the fear is real, which allows the use of "when" rather than "if," reinforcing the inevitability of the enemy finding the means to fulfill their ambitions.



Fig. 16: Future Space dependent on Emotion Space

The conceptualization of the future in the apodosis (here in the Future Space) often involves the formation of conceptual blends. In (9), the enemy's plans are construed as a JOURNEY. We saw in Chapter 5 that America's actions are typically conceptualized as a JOURNEY, as a way to focus on its destination. Reagan and G.W. Bush, however, also tend to use the JOURNEY source domain to construe the enemy's plans, as a way to trigger feelings of fear as the enemy's reaching of their destination seems to be a matter of time, and could happen faster than one imagines.



Fig. 17: Conceptual Network for: the enemy's journey

Hearers are led to conceptualize, to visualize the realization of the speaker's fear. The fear which gets triggered by running the blend might in turn make it their own fear too. By construing the alliance between the Iraqi Regime and terrorists as a shortcut, the final destination appears inevitable: it is only a matter of time for the enemy to find the means to reach their goal. Besides, such an alliance appears to make perfect sense: why would the enemy choose a longer, harder route if one more straightforward way was available? The realization of "our greatest fear" is not represented as a distant possibility, but rather as something which could happen at any given point in time, as all the enemy needs is to find that shortcut. The emphasis on the easiness with which a massive attack could be conducted conveys a sense of imminence, while hiding potential obstacles which would impede this collaboration or the final realization of the attack. Instead, the fear expressed in the Emotion Space is linked to America's lack of action in the Present Reality Space. An alternative space is thus implied, which construes immediate military action as the only way to counteract this fear, and to stop the inevitable unraveling of the enemy's evil plans. As the running of the blend involves very vivid images, leading hearers to visualize the worst possible type of attack which their country could be a victim of, a rejection of the envisioned future is unavoidable. The future is here construed as the realization of one's worst fears, and as such represents a risk which cannot be ignored.

The risk which it presents is made to be perceived as even higher due to the presence within the immediate context of references to the attacks of 9/11, already vivid in the audience's minds as the speech comes following their first anniversary. We have seen that, based on research by Tversky and Kahneman (1973), the mention of past events makes their re-occurrence seem more likely in our minds, making the risk presented in the blend appear higher than it might really be, further sup-

pressing its irreality and reinforcing the need for immediate action. What remains constant throughout the various spaces is the intention of the enemy to harm US, reinforced in the context through the construction of US vs. THEM (Chapters 3-6). By not acting, America can appear to add to the likelihood that the conditions for the unraveling of the future envisioned are met, leading to the emergence of recklessness as the only way to interpret OUR inaction.

As in (9), the conceptualization of the future in (10) to (12) always involves a conceptual blend, leading to vivid images through "running the blend" at the elaboration stage (Fauconnier & Turner 1998: 144). Rather than going into detail about the formation of each blend, one can notice an emerging pattern. All of these blends contain the following elements:

- **All Americans** are affected: whether it is by an attack on a massive scale, by a mushroom cloud, or by a license to kill ("it would be open season on Americans"). While in the Present Reality Space, Americans are relatively unaffected by the conflicts (with the exception of the American soldiers who might already be fighting in those conflicts), as the hearers jump to the conceptualization of the Future Space, that is no longer the case;
- Focus on the **easiness** with which the enemy finally achieves their goal. This easiness can translate as the enemy's ability to conduct an attack without leaving any traces, if the final smoking gun comes in the shape of a mushroom cloud, for example; or the enemy's journey is made easier, because WE are making it easier for them, by providing them with a "license to kill" "our people" (11, 12); or as in (9) by giving them the space to find a "shortcut." A lack of immediate action is thus understood as the removal of obstacles on the enemy's journey. Whatever form this might take, this focus on easiness conveys a sense of urgency, not because the scenario portrayed is about to happen, but because in the absence of obstacles, it could happen at any time;
- WE are **defenseless** (having given THEM the means to inflict harm on a scale never before seen). It is too late to act.

The use of Mental Spaces allows us to visualize the part which Americans play in the unraveling of the conflicts, however remote from US they might be at the present time. "We" are present in all spaces, and as the realization of future visions is construed as inevitable, "our" role appears as the only variable. The risk is perceived as high, not because of THEIR known intentions or abilities, but because of OUR lack of action, because WE make it higher. As predictions are made about the unknown, the conditions are ripe for the mind to wander; the hearers of the discourse are thus led to conceptualize the worst possible outcomes, horrors of a new kind, which the use of conceptual blends serves particularly well. Indeed, the scenario presented in the Future Spaces tends to be por-

trayed as so terrifying, affecting "us" all, and with "us" being the defenseless people, that it gets perceived as a risk which cannot be ignored. In the words of G.W. Bush,

"Understanding the threats of our time, knowing the designs and deceptions of the Iraqi regime, we have every reason to assume the worst, and we have an urgent duty to prevent the worst from occurring." (07.10.2002)

The overwhelming aspect of the threat invites hearers to focus on their country's response, constraining the interpretation of military action as the only potential solution, and hiding its own potential for harm.

8.1.2.2. Constructing the future with the modal CAN

When predicting the future, these images prompting fear are often constructed by using the modal CAN/COULD:

(13) "The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists **could** fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country, or any other." (G.W. Bush, 17.03.2003, my emphasis)

In (13), the scenario portrayed by G.W. Bush is hypothetical. First, the existence of nuclear weapons has not been established and is foreseen as a possibility in the future; then, the President makes predictions based on the hypothesis that Iraq might pass these weapons onto terrorist groups. If these conditions were met, "the terrorists **could** [...] kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country" (my emphasis). While the speaker cannot assert with certainty what the enemy *will* do if they did succeed in building such weapons, he knows what they are capable of, or what they would be capable of. The modality expressed by CAN/COULD, however, achieves more than sparing the speaker of accusations of false claims about the future. Indeed, it can act as a strategy in the construction of urgency. While the enemy's capabilities, or predicted capabilities do not necessarily imply that they *will* use them against the United States, the unraveling of the future projected by the modal CAN links it directly to the decision to act, or not to act, in the present. According to Dunmire (2011: 102),

"whereas will projects the future as a matter of course and as not explicitly tied to the present, can projects a future that has the potential to develop out of the present moment unless that development is impeded by intervening factors."

This is particularly significant in order to create a balance between the fear of what is to come, and the reassurance that it can be prevented, if only "we" take action *now*:

(14) “During the past decade and a half, the Soviets have built up a massive arsenal of new strategic nuclear weapons - weapons that **can** strike directly at the United States.” (Reagan 23.03.1983, my emphasis)
(15) “If Saddam corners the world energy market, he **can** then finance further aggression, terror, and blackmail.” (G. Bush, 05.01.1991, my emphasis)
(16) “Before that tragic date, we had only hints of Al Qaida’s plans and designs. Today in Iraq, we see a threat whose outlines are far more clearly defined and whose consequences **could** be far more deadly.” (G.W. Bush 07.10.2002, my emphasis)

In (14), (15), and (16), the use of CAN contributes to contextualizing the present threat, by getting the hearer to visualize how the enemy’s present moves could eventually affect US. That future, however, where the United States is no longer free nor safe but instead is subject to blackmail and terror, is not construed as an entirely unavoidable end. As opposed to “will,” the future predicted by “can” appears to be ‘coming out’ of the present. Its uses in discourse are highly significant, in the sense that what “we” do now gets conceptualized as directly determining what type of future WE will have. It is OUR response to the current events which will decide whether or not Americans will continue to enjoy their current freedom. The present threat is real, and it carries the potential to develop into a dreaded future; the unraveling of that future, however, is not independent from US. The hearer can thus come to the certain conclusion that the risks of inaction, of letting the enemy’s present actions fulfill the potential expressed in utterances such as (14), (15), or (16), are not worth taking.

When modals which express possibility are distinguished, for example in English as a Second Language manuals, CAN is often said to offer only two possible outcomes: events will either turn out in this, or that way. The strength of the predictive link is to be accounted for by the conception of the future which is expressed by CAN; as the present **carries the potential** for the future envisioned, the conceptualization of **a present of fear** is consolidated. What is foregrounded is the link between the present, in which the enemy’s actions might seem irrelevant to US, and OUR future. Therefore if one wishes to stop the future predicted in (14), (15), and (16), it is now that one must act; later is too late.

To conclude this subsection, by sharing his fears, the President portrays the current situation as a risk, which one can either consider worth or not worth taking. Without OUR action, the present time is linked to the future by the notion of inevitability, rather than imminence. The solution to a dreaded future is thus already there; in a way, it is part of the problem. In order to counter inevitability, one must take control of the present. In terms of relevance, the cost which rejecting the interpretation of the events as a serious threat is evident: indeed, through deciding that the threat is not worth responding to, the hearer is automatically portrayed as taking a risk. This is what allows for the no-

tion of recklessness to be inferred, which plays an important role in persuading the hearer that immediate action is the only sensible option (and thus the only one which can be considered by a nation defined by its responsibilities). Furthermore, going along with the President's interpretation does not only provide the benefit of accounting for the enemy's curious behavior; it also comes with a ready-made solution, with a way to counteract feelings of fear. The resulting interpretation is thus that the present threat can only be seen as directly relevant to US.

The analyses in this subsection have also reinforced the benefits of the framework of Mental Spaces when evaluating the efficiency of persuasive mechanisms, in this case to produce fear. This has been highlighted thanks to the various strategies used in the corpus to heighten the perception of the presented risk. These strategies have been separated into two subsections: the first one dealt with the perception of the conditions as easy, and the second with the perception of the consequences as too dreadful to ignore. Both sets of strategies have in common the powerful element of *visualization,* which literally entails that the hearer cannot ignore the threat which is being discussed. I argue that the framework of Mental Spaces allows for visualization to play a more important role in persuasion, which fits with the intuition that visualization is instrumental in the trigger of fear. We have seen that the different instances of "we" are linked between spaces by a relation of identity (or even uniqueness due to blending). This is an important aspect which is directly linked to the efficiency of persuasion in the context of this corpus, in the sense that it can lead to the perception of an imminent threat, even if that is not necessarily the case. Indeed, the visualization of the threat unraveling, linked to OUR present inaction, involves the compression of time, which might lead to the perception of imminence - of a problem that cannot be ignored. The focus of the interpretation process is indeed on solving a present, rather than a distant issue.

8.2. Filling in the gaps with counterfactual blends

In this section, we will use the term counterfactuality as defined by Fauconnier and Turner, who offer a slightly broader understanding of the concept:

> "Counterfactuality is forced incompatibility between spaces, and when one is thinking about reality, counterfactuality is often a vital relation between spaces that involve some of the same people and the same events." (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 230)

As Fauconnier and Turner note, while only one of these spaces is often the "actual space," that is that of reality, that does not have to be the case. "It just happens that we sometimes mark one of the

spaces as 'actual.'" (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 230) Counterfactual thought is not extraordinary. In fact, according to Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 231), "one cannot overstate the importance of counterfactuals in human life." So what do counterfactuals do? Essentially, they involve the setting up of alternative spaces, connected in some way by a relation of disanalogy. Everyday expressions such as "safe beach" involve the setting up of a "counterfactual space of danger" (Fauconnier, Almeida, & Junior, 2020: 211), implying the possibility (and perhaps the reality) of beaches which, by contrast, are not safe. On the other hand, "when morning comes" does not seem to prompt the setting up of an alternative space where morning does not come (Dancygier & Sweetser, 2005: 31). By forcing an incompatibility between spaces, counterfactuality can thus profoundly affect one's perception of what is often the actual state of affairs, of one's current reality.

All the strategies which we have seen so far work together in order to convey a sense of urgency, stemming from inevitability, regarding the current situation. The point is not only to depict a future which is so terrible that it must be avoided, but to construe that future as directly linked to the present, to OUR present. The interpretation process guides the hearers away from the uncertainties around what the future holds, away from their concerns over what military action entails, and towards the certainty that unless their country acts now, they will be held responsible for whatever negative turn of events happens in the future. Counterfactual blending is a particularly useful tool for reasoning about the future. Counterfactual reasoning happens as the result of a blend between two spaces. Most often, by changing one variable, an incompatibility is forced between two spaces, with the aim to arrive at the conclusion that early inaction is the cause of (international) disasters. Although it tends to be grounded in the unreal, it can appear as an almost mathematical method of reasoning, as one element is used as the variable while the rest remains the same. The changes which appear in the blend can thus be attributed to that variable. In the context of American War Rhetoric, the American public is constantly reminded that their safety cannot be real, unless it is extended to world safety, and the portrayal of an 'unsafe America' does not necessarily seem so far fetched. We start by examining how the cognitive context can help to reinforce the perception of this type of reasoning as almost objective, strengthening the illusion of certainty regarding the interpretation of early (present) inaction as dooming US to failure.

8.2.1. When the past informs the future...

The first element of the cognitive context to be taken into account when analyzing Counterfactual Blends, is the US vs. THEM dichotomy. As seen in Chapters 3-6, the construction of the group US throughout the corpus reinforces some form of continuity from the Founding Fathers to the Americans of today, in the form of a high respect for America's special identity and role in the world. When counterfactual blends are built in discourse, the hearer still has access to the entire integration network (following "optimality" principles (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998: 162-163)). The actor 'America' in the final blend is linked by a relation of identity with its counterpart in the input spaces. The construal of continuity, of an identity that remains unchanged through time and space, reinforces the apparent strength of counterfactual reasoning, where the only variable appears to be the one chosen by the speaker, that "forced incompatibility" between the spaces. America's values, beliefs, and character, on the other hand, remain constant (which is to be differentiated from the individual leaders representing this identity). The second significant part of the cognitive context is concerned with the understanding of America's past.

Let us now examine some evidence within the immediate context (and the wider corpus) that knowledge of the past can offer another form of certainty, this time regarding how the present can impact the future. These influences might not get consciously processed by the hearers, as they are entrenched in their cognitive context, but I argue that their activation in the discourse guides the online interpretation of the counterfactual blends, and provides some reassurance as to their validity to the reasoning process.

Chapter 4 (4.4.1) explored some ways in which History is personified throughout the corpus, and gets construed as a person of *authority*. In the following example, it is one particular event in history, WWII, which is personified:

(17) "World War II taught us that America could never be secure if Europe's future was in doubt." (Clinton, 14.02.1999)

More precisely, WWII is here conceptualized as a teacher, that is as a person of authority. "That America could never be secure if Europe's future was in doubt" is therefore established as a fact, a lesson from which one is to conclude that America is not currently truly secure given the turmoil in Europe. What this shows us is that the events of the past are not simply recorded as separate entities, holding no bearing on the future. Rather, the lessons which they bring remain with us long after

the events themselves are over, and we are to learn from them. A conceptual integration network is involved in the interpretation process of (17); although WWII and "us" belong to two separate times in the input spaces, as time and space get compressed in the blend, they are side by side. The compressions in the blend allow American hearers to feel their own vulnerability, even if the current conflicts are taking place remotely, and therefore allow for the conclusion that a Third World War is to be feared if nothing is done. As a constant, History's authority strengthens the credibility of the President's visions of the future, informed from knowledge of the present and lessons from the past.

(18) "But Bosnia taught us a lesson: In this volatile region, violence we fail to oppose leads to even greater violence we will have to oppose later at greater cost." (Clinton, 14.02.1999)
(19) "If there's one lesson we've learned in this century, it's that that kind of poison will spread if not stopped. If there's one pledge that binds the past and future generations, it is that we cannot allow people to be destroyed because of their ethnic or racial or religious groups when we do have the power to do something about it." (Clinton, 03.04.1999)

In (18), Bosnia stands in a metonymic relationship with the events of the past, namely the two World Wars: COUNTRY FOR EVENTS. The compressions in the blend allow for the conclusion which is reached to be valid not only to characterize the events of WWI and WWII, but also for the current situation. In (17), (18), and (19), the focus is on the lessons to be learned, which stem from the figure of authority represented by History. What is hidden is the disanalogy between the circumstances of the past, and of the present; the chain of events that led to the eventual breaking of World Wars, etc., as these are all compressed into one single lesson. But the conceptual blends also allow for intentionality to be added: as "we" are in full knowledge of the facts, the question is, will "we" apply those lessons, or not? Will Americans "allow" history to repeat itself, or will they secure a better future? In the blend, "our" present is linked to the vision of a future of destruction by a relation of Cause-Effect, which is here mapped from the relations of Cause-Effect within the input space recounting events of the past. That added notion of intentionality, which is favored by the contextual influence of our conception of history, of the past's authority to inform the present and the future, is precisely what makes counterfactual blends such a powerful tool when arguing for the need for immediate action. Although we have already touched on the emergence of intentionality on a few occasions, it is important to note here the role which it plays in constraining the cognitive context in which the following counterfactual blends are to be interpreted. More specifically, that constraint might well be effective, because it stems from a type of reasoning which seems to be accepted as trustworthy: applying past lessons to have a clear vision of the future.

8.2.2. ... the direction of the present is clear

(20) Sarajevo, the capital of neighboring Bosnia, is where World War I began. World War II and the Holocaust engulfed this region. In both wars, Europe was slow to recognize the dangers, and the United States waited even longer to enter the conflicts. Just imagine if leaders back then had acted wisely and early enough, how many lives could have been saved, how many Americans would not have had to die. (Clinton 24.03.1999)

This type of reasoning, where hearers are asked to change one aspect of the past in order to reflect on the present, is typically referred to as counterfactual reasoning. Coulson and Pascual (2006: 153) argue that some extremely serious decisions "are often made via the construction of unrealistic blended cognitive models," highlighting the efficiency of counterfactual reasoning in persuasive discourse. In (20), the conceptual network appears as follows:



Fig. 18: Counterfactual Blend: Reimagining past World Wars

The forced incompatibility between the two input spaces leads to the production of a Counterfactual Blend. The conclusion which Clinton arrives at, that many American lives could have been saved, is a result of blending of two past spaces: one where no early action was taken, as we know happened (Reality Space), and one where the leaders of the time decided to intervene earlier in the conflicts. Early intervention is thus identified as the one variable factor, on which the elaboration of the (counterfactual future) blend depends. The absence which is felt within the Counterfactual (Future) Space is a result of blending of these two spaces, much like Fauconnier and Turner's example of the "missing chair":

> In the case of 'the missing chair,' the missing chair is a thing in the blend that, viewed from the outside, is a nonthing. It can be pointed to and takes up physical space. It inherits thing-hood from the counterfactual space in which there is a chair. It inherits its physical characteristics from the 'actual' input, in which there is not a chair in the corresponding position. (2002: 241)

In a similar manner, the notion of absence appears in the blend. The soldiers' lives can thus be said to have been "saved" from a combat which does not take place (in a space where the war ended early). If one is to map this reasoning onto the future, one can then "save" the lives of current Americans from a potential Third World War, by making an immediate, wise decision to intervene. Intentionality also appears in the blend, as the current audience has been made fully aware of the mistakes of the past, and "we" are made responsible for the unfolding of the conflicts. Blame is added to the Counterfactual Blend, where past leaders are found guilty of having broken with the U.S.'s core identity and subsequently blamed for the unnecessary deaths of so many Americans. Counterfactual reasoning does not just serve to inform present decisions - it also re-interprets the past. Indeed, as Fauconnier and Turner note, all the relationships within the conceptual network remain active. The running of the blend can thus also update the hearer's interpretation of the past. As early intervention is identified as the key factor here, past leaders are accused of not making the wise choice, and so appear as having acted recklessly. As Coulson and Pascual note, "blending operations are also jointly constrained by content and context, that is, by the frames and cultural models of a particular community and by the modeling factors of the here and now" (2006: 178). Within the cultural and cognitive context is the notion that one must learn from history, and that one must strive to demonstrate that evolution; that democratic leaders need to act responsibly and that one should be wary of power-hungry individuals who might act recklessly for their own personal gain. All these influences are hugely significant and constrain the interpretation of the Counterfactual Blend by guiding its elaboration, which elements get inherited from the various Input Spaces (following the rules of optimal relevance), as well as the compressions which happen as a result of blending. In this particular case, as WWII followed WWI, despite the world's efforts at preventing a new international conflict, the threat of history repeating itself is particularly relevant. Repeated reminders that WWII was not avoided, but instead assured by a delay in the intervention of exterior powers, make the risk of a Third World War be perceived as higher. In that context, counterfactual reasoning seems particularly appropriate: as one element is identified as being responsible for WWII to have followed WWI, the only way to stop that cycle from being repeated again is therefore to take early action. Indeed, the reasoning within the Counterfactual Blend assumes that the cycle has already started, reinforcing intervention as the only way to break it. What would not make

sense would be to follow the same course of action as OUR previous leaders. As a result, a lack of American intervention cannot be interpreted as leading to positive outcomes. As the history of the world gets compressed to human scale, divided into recognizable cycles, the discourse does not make accessible the evolution of America's perception in the world, following repeated interventions in other countries' conflicts. As relations of analogy between past and present times get compressed into identity through blending, the effects of these repeated interventions, and the evolution of America's image in the world, are kept in the background.

One of the main advantages of counterfactual reasoning is to gain insight into one particular situation or element within a scenario. In the context of American War Rhetoric, it is mainly used to identify 'not acting' as the culprit of past disasters, and in so doing allows it to be seen as a "temptation" which some people "would yield to" (Reagan, 09.05.1984), but which must be avoided. While the insights gained can indeed be valuable, if they are accepted, they can also lead to some misconceptions regarding America's role in specific conflicts. As Cause-Effect relations appear in a Counterfactual Blend, a lack of early action is often identified as the cause of past disastrous wars. These Cause-Effect relations are the result of compressions which occur due to the process of blending, and invite hearers to construe America's actions as single events, having one specific effect. Once the effect of inaction has been identified as the unraveling of disasters, the inference that inaction could in fact lead to peace becomes a lot less accessible. The following utterances focus on America's intervention in Iraq, construing 'non-action' as the root cause of conflict escalation into world chaos, and therefore justifying past military actions to argue for a renewed resort to force:

(21) "Twelve years ago, Iraq invaded Kuwait without provocation, and the regime's forces were poised to continue their march to seize other countries and their resources. **Had Saddam Hussein been appeased instead of stopped, he would have endangered the peace and stability of the world**." (G.W. Bush, 12.09.2002, my emphasis)

(22) "One option was to help the Iraqi government tamp down the sectarian violence and provide them with the breathing space they need to achieve reconciliation, provide them the breathing space they need to take the political and economic measures necessary to make sure our military efforts were effective. The other option was to pull back from the capital before the Iraqis could defend themselves against these radicals and extremists and death squads and killers. That risked turning Iraq into a cauldron of chaos. Our enemy, the enemies of freedom, love chaos. Out of that chaos, they could find new safe havens. **Withdrawal would have emboldened these radicals and extremists. It would have confirmed their belief that our nations were weak. It would help them gain new recruits, new resources. It would cause them to believe they could strike free nations at their choice. Withdrawal would have increased the probability that coalition troops would be forced to return to Iraq one day and confront an enemy that is even more dangerous.**" (G.W. Bush, 01.05.2007, my emphasis)

In (21) and (22), hearers are led to imagine what the world would be like "had Saddam Hussein been appeased instead of stopped." The setting up of this counterfactual space already constrains

the interpretation of the events in question, because it focuses on one particular element: Saddam Hussein's destructive power. It is also constrained by the context which introduces the final blend, and which has been indicated here by the sentences which are not in bold. Indeed, that context is that of a two-option scenario, and two options only, which makes the profiling of a single variable easier. In (21), the "[appeasement]" of Saddam Hussein triggers a conceptual blend within the Counterfactual Space, as the strategy which was coined to deal with dictators in the 1930's is applied to the current dictator of Iraq. The use of a conceptual blend, rather than a simple analogy, highlights that containing terror can *never* be effective, and it can certainly never be righteous. Inaction is thus identified as the culprit. Regardless of whether this conclusion is right or not, what these two utterances have in common is that they isolate Saddam's role in the conflicts, along with America's role, solely in stopping his reign of terror and the destruction that he caused. What does not appear within the Counterfactual Space is the effect of America's continued interventions in foreign issues (besides those of Iraq), the evolution of the perception of its role in the world, and the evolution of power relationships. The rejection of the world which appears within the blend can then lead to the (apparently certain) conclusion that immediate action is the only way to take control of the future.

While America's lack of action gets construed as the choice to live in fear, these strategies which make immediate action the only way to gain control, to put a stop to the evil identified, can also lead to the false reassurance that as the current enemy is stopped, peace will immediately be restored. Promises such as the one made in (23) can then follow, as the speaker shares his vision of the world as a result of America's immediate intervention:

(23) "The long captivity of Iraq will end, and an era of new hope will begin." (G.W. Bush, 07.10.2002)

This is coherent with our conception of time, divided into eras which are themselves conceptualized as CONTAINERS with physical borders. One can thus 'enter a new era,' and entirely leave behind another. As one ends, another begins, possibly entirely independently from the previous one. However, conflict resolution is not that straightforward; while Saddam Hussein's fall is a good thing, the circumstances around it are extremely important. As he gets removed from power, his influence might not be over. The discourse thus presents itself as a coherent whole: while the constraints of the topology of counterfactual blends might seem to be arbitrary (Coulson & Pascual, 2006: 178), the conclusions which get reached within the blends are actually guided and reinforced by the cog-

nitive and linguistic context. In this last example, this allows for the potentially increasing influence of other terrorist groups as a result of Saddam's demise to not be accessed, thus contributing to constraining the interpretation of inaction as an entirely negative and destructive choice. This is where the contributions of RT have been seen to be particularly useful, as they can make sense of what might seem arbitrary in CBT analyses. In the case of counterfactual blends, RT can be used not only to direct what goes into the blend, but also what makes up the Input Spaces, and how they are structured. The presence within the cognitive context of a particular conception of time, of history, and of US does not simply guide the interpretations of the blend: it also influences the formation of input spaces. Indeed, we have seen that beyond predicting the future, counterfactual reasoning also has the ability to reinterpret the past, and expectations of relevance apply there too. In cases like (21), beliefs about the validity of OUR past action in Iraq can thus get reinforced, whereas in previous examples like (20), beliefs about OUR part in past World Wars might get updated, as OUR intervention gets perceived as too late (to prevent a world war). What is made accessible to the Americans of today is the clarity which current leaders benefit from, thanks to the mistakes (or successes) of their predecessors. In that context, and where the cognitive context also makes salient the positive value of evolution through history, linking the decision to take late action in the past with the unraveling of a World War with a relation of Cause-Effect meets expectations of relevance; it is thus used to structure the Past (Reality) Input Space, as well as being mapped onto the blend to make sense of the present. When the mistakes of the past are construed as letting world wars unravel, or on the contrary when past successes appear as preventing the rise of terrorism, the construal of prompt action as potentially having damaging effects, especially in the long-term (given the salience of history), becomes very costly and is thus made inaccessible.

8.3. Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I have demonstrated that the choice not to take immediate action was not only construed as selfish, that is as the choice to preserve America's men and resources at the expense of the victims' suffering, but more importantly as a reckless move; in fact, not acting appears throughout the discourse as the riskiest possible decision, thus triggering fear of an unwanted future, but also of the present defined by a permanent, looming threat. Various linguistic strategies have been analyzed in order to determine how they contribute to the overall construction of a real threat, one that is perceived as carrying the potential to harm US. To that effect, we have seen that realization of the threat does not necessarily need to be imminent, or fast approaching on the temporal axis, but rather

it is construed as being inevitable, directly stemming from the decisions made in the present. The threat is made real through the (near) certainty of its realization, rather than through temporal proximity. While the speaker might have no control over the latter (temporal proximity), we have seen that there exists a number of strategies which can help to modify (a) the perception of the risk as higher, or even (b) the perception of the threat's temporal imminence, and finally (c) the perception of the reasoning as sound, perhaps even objective. There is not one particular strategy which speakers can use in order to construct a real threat, one which the hearers will see as requiring immediate attention. Rather, it is the overall cognitive coherence which each strategy contributes to which makes persuasive discourse effective. I would like to conclude by taking a closer look at the following utterance, in an effort to demonstrate the importance of this interplay between the cognitive context and the linguistic strategies used to urge military intervention, and which has been one important focus of this chapter:

(24) "Before that tragic date, we had only hints of Al Qaida's plans and designs. Today in Iraq, we see a threat whose outlines are far more clearly defined and whose consequences could be far more deadly." (G.W. Bush 07.10.2002)

With this speech, G.W. Bush presents to the American public some information which he believes is of the utmost relevance for his country's national security. The new information regards a better understanding of the Iraqi threat, which seems to confirm the President's previously expressed fears. Although no new overwhelming, incriminating evidence against the Iraqi regime has come to light, the threat is constructed in such a way that it is perceived as real, and the matter as urgent as ever. The threat itself is indeed construed as a physical object, which, thanks to the communicative event during which the President shares relevant information with the public, his discourse makes available for all to "see." What gets integrated here is the reasoning applied to the perception of physical objects, and to that of the enemy's intentions and threat.

Coulson and Pascual (2006: 176) identify four elements which greatly constrain conceptual integration: overall knowledge of "(1) the communicative event; (2) the cognitive task; (3) the issues dealt with; and (4) the discursive goal." We have already discussed how knowledge of the communicative event constrains the interpretation of the presented information, so that it can only be seen as a matter of national security, and optimally relevant. This constraint places fear at the heart of the communicative event. The fact that an important part of the audience is probably not familiar with the workings of the Iraqi regime also makes it less costly (from a cognitive point of view) for the hearer to align with the speaker's cognitive environment regarding the current situation. The second type of constraint seems particularly important to note: in most of the speeches analyzed here, the

hearer is asked (either directly or through the nature of the communicative event) to ponder on the following question: should America resort to (or continue to pursue) military action now, or not? That cognitive task (initiated by the speaker) places in itself a huge constraint on the interpretation of the linguistic mechanisms identified in this chapter: the question is not about whether inaction should be the preferable choice; it is about whether not acting *now* would be safe for the American people. The task is defined by the speaker, making *now* the right time to make a decision, and generating pressure to do so. The strategies identified in discourse can then guide the hearers to reinforce the conceptualization of the present moment as the right time to act. It is with that question in mind that the hearers are asked to consider what makes the situation "today in Iraq" worthy of immediate consideration.

"Today" and "in Iraq" are space builders which lead the hearers to construct a mental space for the issue at stake. Within that mental space, "we" are actors, and "we" are directly confronted with the present threat, and with our predicted future. The space compression within that conceptual blend (as the threat is conceptualized as a physical object) allows for the danger posed by Iraq to be right in front of "our eyes," one which "we" cannot ignore. The hearer is thus placed at the heart of the issues. As the construction of this blend comes directly after references to the tragic events of 9/11, America's vulnerability is profiled, and the risk of further attacks might get perceived as higher than it really is. As a result, the fear which the conceptualization of "far more deadly [consequences]" triggers might be heightened. What we notice in (24), is that everything seems to move in the same direction. As the United States gets a clearer picture of the enemy's plans, does that necessarily mean that those plans are also getting more destructive, and closer to realization? While there does not seem to be a direct link between the two, the construction of threats within this corpus profiles the notion of inevitability, which affects the interpretation process. What appears inevitable here is not just that the enemy will act unless "we" stop them; it is that the dangers to come are getting bigger as time passes. The evolution of THEIR threat is construed so that THEY keep getting stronger: as time goes on, the weapons THEY develop are more dangerous, the alliances THEY form are getting THEM closer to US, the destruction THEY cause gets wider. As a result, not acting gets represented as the real fear, as time is on THEIR side, as long as WE do not stop THEM. On the other hand, OUR evolution does not seem to follow the same pattern: WE do not get stronger as time goes on, WE do not get better equipped to deal with THEM; instead, OUR evolution is recorded thanks to the comparison of single achievements, which add up to the continuation of a single, timeless goal. OUR decision to take action now is of significance because it is construed as what will determine whether WE were able to stop THEM or not. It might be impossible to know what the

future will definitely look like, but should WE choose inaction, its shape will be that of an evolving, growing disaster.

The impact of the cognitive context (which keeps getting reinforced over time) on the online interpretation process has also been identified as playing a key role in the conveying of urgency. This cognitive context includes here a particular (and familiar) conception of time, of history, as well as causality. As urgent matters are being presented to the public, the time of interpretation is not that to critically evaluate the accuracy of the past events being related, for instance. This evasion of critical scrutiny is also reinforced by the promotion of certainty in discourse, which is favored by the profiling of clear relations between similar actors, and which are consistent over time. As the hearer is provided not only with an understanding of what is going on now, but also of the past, of the mistakes of history, one could argue that positive emotional effects might get triggered, allowing the interpretation process to stop as expectations of relevance are met, which also implies that no re-exploration of the intricacies of historical events is necessary. What the hearer is left with might well just be confirmation that inaction in the face of brutality is not an option.

This chapter has essentially focused on the strategies which contribute to the general construction of *in*action as inviting aggression and tragedy, as strengthening the enemy. Chapter 9 will now move onto the other balancing part of the argumentation to move US to action, that is the positive conceptualization of action as the only way to face issues. While the conceptualization of OUR lack of involvement has been seen to lead to the interpretation of inaction as a reckless move, we will now see that the conceptualization of action serves to reinforce the strength vs. weakness frame. The interplay between the reinforcement over time of certain conceptualizations, and the online interpretation of utterances will be further explored, and along with it the notion of positive emotional effects and its relation with persuasion.

Chapter 9: The (Cognitive and Linguistic) Mechanisms that Move US to Action

9.1. 'Priming' with Primary Metaphors

The importance of context

In the words of Werth, discourse is "the combination of a text and its relevant context" (1999: 47). However, this notion of context is, according to Werth, rarely properly or systematically tackled (Gavins, 2001: 66). In his definition of the discourse world, "the situation surrounding the participants" includes

> not only their immediate perceptions but also such abstract notions as beliefs, hopes, dreams, and so on. Werth admits that the discourse context initially appears to incorporate 'no less than all the information available in principle to the human race.' (Gavins, 2001: 66 quoting Werth, 1999: 117)

Defining context proves to be an incredibly challenging task, as it will vary, even if slightly, from hearer to hearer. The dimension of context is what makes the interpretation of any discourse more than a simple matter of decoding. Determining what role context plays in persuasive discourse is therefore a necessity. At first glance, the hearers' hopes and dreams might seem to be completely out of the speaker's control; the key word, however, is "relevant." I would define the context of an utterance or discourse as the combination of all the elements which influence the interpretation process, in accordance with Sperber and Wilson's understanding of context:

> A context is a psychological construct, a subset of the hearer's assumptions about the world. It is these assumptions, of course, rather than the actual state of the world, that affect the interpretation of an utterance. A context in this sense is not limited to information about the immediate physical environment or the immediately preceding utterances: expectations about the future, scientific hypotheses or religious beliefs, anecdotal memories, general cultural assumptions, beliefs about the mental state of the speaker, may all play a, role in interpretation. (Sperber & Wilson, 1995: 15-16)

While that might indeed look very different from one individual to another, discourse can constrain this context, so that the information, the beliefs, and even the reasoning which are made available to the hearers can guide the interpretation process in one particular direction. This is very much in line with the conclusions of Chapter 7, which showed that it was the salience of a particular conception of time, and not say of scientific facts about time, which influenced the interpretation process. As Oswald and Maillat (2011: 72) note, "the inclusion of contextual assumptions for the purpose of comprehension is not an open-ended procedure; it is assumed to stop once a level of optimal relevance has been reached." It is this constraining process and its impact on reasoning which has been the focus of Chapters 7 and 8. More specifically, Chapter 9 will focus on the capacity of persuasive

discourse to *move* US to action; on the constraints on decision making; on the strategies within American War Rhetoric which constrain the interpretation of war, or rather of action in general, as the only way to solve an identified issue. While there are utterances which can be easily identified as having a persuasive end, and which make hearers consciously reflect on certain issues (such as rhetorical questions, or verbal arguments), there is not a point in discourse, a switch when the hearer decides or accepts that immediate action is indeed required. The efficiency of such utterances, or of well-rounded arguments, partly lies with the background work, thanks to the constraining of the context, so that it may be conducive to the conclusions that need to be reached. We have seen in Chapters 3-6 that an important part of the context in which American War Rhetoric embeds its discourse is to construe US as essentially opposed to THEM; Chapters 7 and 8 then highlighted the importance of our conception of time, history, and the salience of certain past events; in this chapter, we will now see that another important step is to construe US as inherently 'geared towards action.'

Before analyzing the metaphors which serve to constrain the hearer's response, we need to focus our attention on the 'supporting' constraining mechanisms which are consistently reinforced in discourse, and whose function might be said to heighten the efficiency of metaphors online to influence the interpretation process. Primary metaphors are one such mechanism. While primary metaphors might not stand out of the discourse (in the way that novel metaphors do), they have a clear role in its persuasive efficiency, in the sense that they contribute to guiding the elaboration of the hearers' reading grid, within which the latest events/ conflicts can be interpreted.

What are Primary Metaphors?

Conceptual metaphors are often analyzed by highlighting the analogical mappings which motivate their usage. When two people discuss their relationship and conclude that it is not going anywhere or that they have reached an impasse, the source domain of JOURNEYS and the target domain of LOVE are identified, so that the impasse where the road ends can be mapped onto the relationship, implying that the latter is (or should be) terminated. Conceptual metaphors are thus understood to further one's reasoning on abstract notions through our understanding of more concrete ones. Grady's work on primary metaphors highlights that metaphorical reasoning is not always attributed to analogical mappings, making them different from, for example, conventionalized conceptual metaphors. For the study of persuasive discourse, I argue that like conventionalized metaphors, primary metaphors can form part of the context, of the background knowledge which the hearer re-

cruits from when interpreting novel conceptual blends, and can in that way constrain the hearer's reasoning about certain issues, and eventually decision-making too. Primary metaphors can constrain the context on a more subconscious level, that is without the hearer realizing the impact on their reasoning. By contrast, should the President construe the new enemy as a descendent of Hitler, for example, or the current conflict as a fire to be extinguished, the hearer will be led to consciously reflect on the implications for their country. According to Grady,

> the one generalization which accounts for all primary metaphors is that they can be plausibly traced to correlations (i.e., consistent co-occurrence) in experience - correlations which sometimes, but not always, reflect either a causal relationship or an instantiation relationship between source and target. (2005a: 1602)

These correlations between various dimensions of experience are not noticed in the moment, as discourse unfolds, but rather they are "available for recruitment" (Grady, 2005a: 1604). When such associations become entrenched, they have the power to impact our reasoning in ways that go unnoticed, allowing us to make quick observations and conclusions. When it comes to the necessity for a general agreement over immediate action, these stored metaphorical associations, when activated in discourse, can constrain the context in order to favor the decision to take action. In the case of American War Rhetoric, a close, manual analysis of the primary metaphors which are prevalent throughout the data highlighted a unified propensity towards action as the *only* real choice, that is as the only one compatible with OUR identity. As action is conceptualized as a necessary factor in order to achieve anything, as opposed to a lack of action which, by contrast, cannot bring about anything positive, a third potential option remains hidden: that no action, no involvement might promote peaceful relations. I will now attempt to outline the uses of primary metaphors in the data and their role in "priming" the interpretation of conceptual blends, so that conclusions that immediate action is required might be reached more easily. If WE are already geared for action, the conceptualization that a lack of involvement could be beneficial would indeed come at a higher cognitive cost and can thus be systematically discarded.

9.1.1. Absolute, dynamic construal of morality

MORE IS UP is a well-documented primary metaphor, based on correlations between increasing quantities and height. This primary metaphor can then serve as an input for more complex metaphorical blends, allowing us to reason about abstract concepts, so that anything that is perceived as better can be construed as being UP. In his acceptance speech, Carter referred to "the high moral character of the American people" (15.07.1976), as a way to separate the American people

from the failings of the leaders involved in the scandals which his nomination as President followed:

(1) "The tragedy of Vietnam and Cambodia, the disgrace of Watergate, and the embarrassment of the CIA revelations could have been avoided if our government had simply reflected the sound judgement and good common sense and **the high moral character of the American people**." (My emphasis)

The quality of being moral, of following up on one's principles, is thus construed as being "up." Even in the event of the government's failure to endorse these principles, the American people's morality remains high on the vertical axis, securing the future of American democracy despite isolated incidents of malfunctions. An entire metaphorical system of morality can be constructed from there: "because it is better to walk upright than to fall down, we find the widespread metaphor that Morality is Uprightness." (Lakoff, 1995: 184) In American War Rhetoric, this translates as "standing up" for one's friends or allies, or "standing" with the victims, thus construing America's military presence abroad as a mark of morality, as the physical realization of Americans' "high moral character." While repeated correlations in our experience might have motivated the primary metaphor MORE IS UP, there does not appear to be any direct correlation between the domains of individual morality and height. The reason it is dealt with here, however, is its strong entrenchment in our metaphorical system, and its grounding in the primary metaphor MORE IS UP, which allows its influence on the hearers' reasoning to go unnoticed.

When discussing the characteristics of primary metaphors, Grady specifies that both domains need to share the same "superschematic structure" (2005a: 1605). In the case of MORE and UP, both are scalar properties, for instance. Interestingly, that is not the case for UPRIGHTNESS, and it is not necessarily the case for MORALITY either. Either one is upright, or one is not, and what American War Rhetoric seems to drive at, is that either one is moral, or one is not. In our everyday life, however, debating someone's morality is rarely an easy task. Moral principles, when thought of outside of context and practicality concerns, might be conceived of as absolute in nature; yet when applying them in our everyday life, we might be driven to choose an option over another because it is more (although perhaps not entirely) in tune with one's principles. This reflects the fact that scalarity can also drive our reasoning about morality issues. However, this is precisely what the discourse on American War Rhetoric aims to avoid. Chapters 3-6 analyzed the significance of binary constructions. When it comes to OUR morality, its construal in terms of uprightness helps to reinforce its interpretation as an absolute state: if America appeared to be bent down, and so not entirely fallen, it would no longer be upright, which would then lead to its representation as weak (which will be made apparent through analyses from the corpus). This is important, because if a conflict is con-

strued as one of morality, and if MORALITY IS UPRIGHTNESS, there cannot be a range of responses that would make US act more or less morally; instead, action is construed as the *only* moral answer. As morality is embodied, grounded in the sensory experience of standing upright, the reasoning around America's involvement in the conflicts is constrained, so that action becomes the only viable option.

I argue here that the vertical orientation in which morality is grounded also gives rise to a dynamic construal of one's moral status. As Lakoff (1995: 184) points out, doing evil is "moving from a position of morality (uprightness) to a position of immorality (being low). Hence, doing evil is falling." This dynamic aspect contributes to hiding the possibility that in some circumstances, inaction might be perceived as a testimony of peace and might be beneficial in the long term. We will now see how that works in the corpus:

(2) "We have held **high** our banner for personal freedom, human progress, and global peace. Now we must go forward to do what is not only practical and beneficial but what is right and just." (Reagan, 26.10.1985, my emphasis)
(3) "We are **upholding** our values" (Clinton 24.03.99, my emphasis)
(4) "If we take these steps, if we take the time to do the job right, I am convinced we will have **lived up to** the responsibilities of American leadership in the world." (Clinton, 07.10.1993, my emphasis)
(5) "The United Nations Security Council has not **lived up to** its responsibilities, so we will **rise to** ours. (G.W. Bush, 17.03.2003, my emphases)
(6) "But when we and our allies joined with courageous Bosnians to **stand up to** the aggressors." (Clinton, 24.03.1999, my emphasis)
(7) "If we **falter**, we may endanger the peace of the world." (Quoting Truman)
"El Salvador [...] struggling ... to **redress** historical injustices." (Reagan, 09.05.1984, my emphases)

Scalarity vs. dynamicity

Matters of morality are here conceptualized as existing 'above us,' at the top of a vertical axis (2 to 5). Rather than construing morality in scalar terms, which would allow OUR actions to be talked about as 'more or less' moral in a given context, what is made salient here is rather the notion of dynamicity which is associated with morality. This does not take away from the understanding of morality as an absolute state. Rather it adds that maintaining OUR moral status, that 'remaining at the top' is a dynamic process. What this entails is that a certain amount of effort is required in order to keep OUR reality on the same level as OUR moral principles; that MORALITY is never simply acquired, and that one can indeed easily fall down. In fact, MORALITY is construed dynamically throughout the entire corpus. (2) and (3) highlight a common collocation between the domain of height and the physical activity of "holding." 'Holding onto something' requires a certain amount of force to be exerted, without which a fall would be inevitable. In (5), the U.S. "rises" to its responsibilities, while in (6), it is said to "stand up to the aggressors," highlighting once more the dynamic

aspect which holding high moral standards entails. In a similar way, (7) construes the ideal of JUSTICE AS UPRIGHTNESS. Justice is not seen as merely existing, it needs to be achieved. It is conceptualized as an absolute state, that is one which cannot exist as long as injustices, even minor, are still arising. “Redressing” such injustices demands the exertion of a force.

As such metaphors are pervasive throughout the entire corpus, I argue that this dynamic construal of America’s moral status as one to attain or maintain, rather than acquired, constrains the interpretation of the discourse to favor a *constant* need for action, a *constant* need to respond to evil (aligned with the construal of America’s identity explored in Chapters 3-6). A lack of decisiveness can therefore appear to be devastatingly damaging, as unsteadiness fails to maintain uprightness. In (7), “faltering” does not simply appear as a small sign of weakness, before getting one’s strength back. Instead, it is the whole “peace of the world” which is instantly compromised. As a result, correlations between action, which in this case translates as America’s involvement in military conflicts, and morality keep getting reinforced, as new forms of evil appear around the world. Other deeply entrenched metaphors, primary metaphors or schemata are used throughout the data to reinforce the conceptualization of action as the only way to achieve America’s purpose, as the only moral choice, thus constraining the context in which the conflicts get interpreted.

9.1.2. ACHIEVING SOMETHING IS GOING SOMEWHERE

As mentioned in Chapter 5, JOURNEY is a common source domain in our data, in political discourse, and in fact in our entire metaphorical system. In the context of war rhetoric, JOURNEY can serve as a source domain for the conflicts themselves, as shown in (8). The JOURNEY metaphor can be deconstructed, so that several primary metaphors are highlighted as inputs to conceptual metaphors such as LIFE IS A JOURNEY, LOVE IS A JOURNEY, or THE CONFLICT IS A JOURNEY. It is not just the JOURNEY metaphor which is prevalent in our data, but also the primary metaphors which motivate it, and the latter can influence the interpretation of the entire discourse, so that the need for action is systematically favored. Before moving on to the deconstruction of the JOURNEY metaphor, it is worth pointing out that the domain of JOURNEYS is particularly relevant to American War Rhetoric.

Relevance of JOURNEYS

(8) "Around the world tonight, new pilgrims are **on a voyage to freedom**, and for many, it's not **a trip to some place faraway** but to a world of their own making." (G.Bush, 22.11.1989, my emphases)

The destination here is freedom, while the passengers or actors are pilgrims, reminiscent of the pilgrims who started the history of the United States of America. In the blend, the military conflicts in which various victims find themselves in are construed as new realizations of the original pilgrims' quest, who travelled to America to escape oppression and live in freedom. In such a blend, the "voyage to freedom" is one that never really ends, as new forms of evil appear around the world, and oppression and violence threaten the freedom of various nations. In America's case, the search for freedom was correlated with a long *physical* journey, where people abandoned their homes and travelled to a new destination. In the American context, the metaphor's own relevance is established as new, remote conflicts are constructed as voyages, freedom as the destination, and America as the leader of the journey which it started upon its founding. Because the correlation between physical journeys and the search for freedom is entrenched in American history, it is reinforced as America gets construed as the "leader of the cause of peace" throughout the entire corpus, through direct activation of the JOURNEY metaphor (THE CONFLICT IS A JOURNEY), but also through the prevalent use of the primary metaphors which serve as its inputs. Indeed, one of the elements which makes the use of the JOURNEY metaphor relevant in this corpus is the profiling of an active, or dynamic, stance.

• ACHIEVING SOMETHING IS GOING SOMEWHERE

In an effort to demonstrate the effectiveness of combined frameworks (RT and CBT) for the online analysis of metaphors, subsections 9.1.1.2 and 9.1.1.3 both follow the same pattern: first, a more extensive list of utterances is used to highlight the prevalence of certain primary metaphors in the data. The impact of these metaphors on the online interpretation of utterances (here of conceptual metaphors) in the corpus will then be more detailed - and this is where the combination of RT and CBT becomes apparent.

(9) "We **started** this mission for the right reasons, and we're going to finish it **in the right way**." (Clinton, 07.10.1993, my emphases)
(10) "The United States has worked to stop the violence and repression and put the people of Kosovo on the **path to peace**." [...] "Today determined diplomacy backed by force is creating **the path to peace**." [...] Now we must and we will do what is necessary to see that **that path to peace is followed**." (Clinton 21.10.1998, my emphases)
(11)"A **move away from** violence." (G. Bush, 29.01.1991, my emphasis)
(12) "Tonight I am pleased to report that we are **on course**." (G. Bush, 29.01.1991, my emphasis)

(13) “And let us **stay the course** until it does.” (Clinton, 03.04.1999, my emphasis)
(14) “For more than five months we, along with the Arab League, the European Community and the United Nations, tried everything diplomatic **avenue**.” (G. Bush, 29.01.1991, my emphasis)

(CAUSES ARE SOURCES); PATHS ARE MEANS; PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS: the same primary metaphors are used to reason about America’s involvement in all the different conflicts, from the remnants of rivalries with the Soviet Union, to the taking down of ruthless dictators, the War on Terror, or even, in the case of Obama, the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq as a way to focus on other geographical areas (see Chapter 11). Repeated correlations in our experience, between the physical activity of walking, or simply of moving, and the actual reaching of a destination are what motivate these primary metaphors. In this case, these embodied correlations translate into the *image schema* SOURCE-PATH-DESTINATION, which makes up the source domain (image schemas will be discussed in more detail in the next subsection). These metaphors construct many more domains other than the scene of politics and the setting of policies, and could possibly be re-labelled under one overarching primary metaphor: ACHIEVING SOMETHING IS GOING SOMEWHERE. If we apply Fauconnier and Turner’s framework for conceptual integration, one might argue that this correlation, when used in the context of American history and of politics, eventually gets compressed into Uniqueness (Grady, 2005a: 1604). Grady raises the question of whether correlations should be added to the list of vital relations outlined by Fauconnier and Turner, which link elements in different spaces, “in order to account for the relationships in experience and conceptual structure which lead to primary metaphors” (2005a: 1603). In a conceptual blend, the compression of this relation into Uniqueness would construct, in this particular case, achieving a purpose and going on a journey as one unique event. In the context of American War Rhetoric and of our data, when that purpose is to reach peace and defend freedom, this compression would contribute to hiding the potential option of no involvement, not simply in order to avoid the risks of war, but as a realistic way to “reach” peace. When PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, not doing anything, that is not moving, cannot get one anywhere, thus blocking access to the reasoning that doing less could be doing more. Let us now see how this might influence the interpretation of (15):

(15) “Yet as a country, we will never tolerate our security being threatened nor **stand idly by** when our people have been killed.” (Obama, 02.05.2011)

(15) is one of many examples highlighting the fact that “standing idly,” as opposed to taking action, *cannot* get us anywhere, and instead leads to the killing of more people, far from the ideal of peace. While not engaging in military action might be favored as the only way to remain, strictly speaking,

peaceful, Obama makes clear in (15) that the current context does not allow for a positive representation of inaction: "when our people have been killed" constrains the context in which OUR inaction might get construed, by making salient the enemy's active part in war, and the terrible consequences which inaction might lead to, in getting more of US killed. The activation in the cognitive context of ACHIEVING SOMETHING IS GOING SOMEWHERE favors the conceptualization of action as the only way to solve the problem which America is confronted with as the only relevant interpretation. The salience of the primary metaphor ACHIEVING SOMETHING IS GOING SOMEWHERE, combined with a context in which America is confronted with a serious problem, contributes to consolidating the conceptualization of any form of action, in this case military action, as the only way to get things done, as essentially positive.

• Forward vs. backward

There are many entailments to this metaphor, which in turn can lead to more complex metaphors such as PROGRESS IS MOVING FORWARD, which is at the heart of persuasive political discourse and more specifically of our data. It is not just about having a destination, but about the need for a momentum, and its direction. The dichotomy FORWARD/BACKWARD is indeed central to the opposition between taking action to resolve an issue, and not acting as a sign of weakness, as exemplified by the following utterances:

(16) "It has made great **progress toward** democracy." (Reagan, 09.05.1984, my emphasis)
(17) "A strong political, diplomatic, and civilian effort on our part can **advance progress** and help lay a foundation for lasting peace and security." (Obama, 27.02.2009, my emphasis)
(18) "the **move against** communism **and toward** freedom that is sweeping the world." (Reagan, 16.02.1985, my emphases)
(19) "The goal of this new strategy is to help the Iraqis secure their capital so they can make **progress toward** reconciliation and build a free nation that respects the rights of its people, upholds the rule of law, and fights extremists and radicals and killers **alongside** the United States in this war on terror." (G.W. Bush, 01.05.2007, my emphases)
(20) "Instead of **drifting along toward** tragedy, we will **set a course toward** safety." (G.W. Bush, 17.03.2002, my emphases)
(21) "The United Nations was born in the hope that survived a world war, the hope of a world **moving toward** justice, escaping old patterns of conflict and fear." (G.W. Bush, 12.02.2002, my emphasis)
(22) "And this great republic, born alone in liberty, is **leading** the world **toward** a new age when freedom belongs to all nations." (G.W. Bush, 15.09.2009, my emphasis)
(23) "'And as we walk, we must make the pledge that we shall always **march ahead**. We cannot **turn back**.' America, we cannot **turn back**. Not with so much work to be done (...) America, we cannot **turn back**. We cannot **walk alone**. At this moment, in this election, we must pledge once more to **march into the future**. (Obama, 28.08.2008, my emphases)
(24) "Commitment to human rights means working at problems, **not walking away from** them." (Reagan, 13.08.1983, my emphasis)
(25) "Do we invite a **return** of mass suffering [...]?" (Clinton, 07.10.1993, my emphasis)
(26) "I'm asking you, my fellow Americans, to pray for God's grace and His guidance for all of us at Geneva, so that **the cause** of true peace among men **will be advanced** and all of humanity thereby served." (Reagan, 14.11.1985, my emphases)
(27) "By acting now, we are upholding our values, protecting our interests, and **advancing the cause** of peace." (Clinton, 24.03.1999, my emphasis)

(28) “diverse nations are **drawn together in common cause** to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind — peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law.” (G.Bush, 29.01.1991, my emphasis)
(29) “Terry understands the moral obligation that has **compelled** our extraordinary multi-national coalition to make this stand in the Gulf.” (G.Bush, 09.01.1991, my emphasis)

Utterances (16) to (22) highlight the importance of direction (which we explored in Chapter 5 in relation with the image of the group US), in conjunction with that of being active in order to *move* toward one’s goals and eventually reach them. We have already seen that abstract concepts such as peace, freedom, or democracy are often construed as DESTINATIONS. Democracy is an especially interesting target domain, as it also often tends to be seen as a mark of civilization, indicative of one’s position on the evolution ladder. When we combine this conceptualization of democracy with that of PROGRESS AS MOVING FORWARD exemplified in utterance (16), for instance, the thought of turning back would have significant consequences and cannot be conceived as conducive in any way. Let us now take a closer look at (24), in order to better understand how the opposition between FORWARD and BACKWARD gets selected from the input space of MOVEMENT/ JOURNEYS to structure the blend, and thus eventually leads to the conclusion that turning back is not an option. The domain of MOVEMENT, or of JOURNEYS contains many aspects. But the way it is used in the corpus contributes to consolidating binary oppositions as an overarching structural element of the interpretation process. Insights from RT can be added to CBT analyses, in this example to show how one particular aspect of MOVEMENT/JOURNEYS gets selected as optimally relevant in the interpretation of the conflicts, and specifically of OUR involvement. Indeed one could use the JOURNEY metaphor in order to promote turning back too: if one can see that one’s approach is not going to have the desired effects, would it not be more beneficial to turn round and select a more productive route, rather than continue wasting one’s resources? That inference, however, is not favored here. Rather it is blocked through the salience of the FORWARD/BACKWARD dichotomy. In (24), the context is constrained to a situation where America is once again confronted with an immediate “problem.” While technically, turning round and adopting a longer route can still constitute movement (and thus an active approach), going round a problem does not eliminate it, making this type of interpretation irrelevant here; it would also be a lot more costly in a context that conveys urgency. Instead, what gets selected as the most relevant aspect of MOVEMENT/JOURNEYS is the FORWARD/BACKWARD momentum, which leads to the interpretation that one can either continue walking *forward,* even when one hits bumps along the way, or turn back, and thus forfeit one’s goal. When that goal is the protection of democracy/peace/freedom, that is not an option.

What the discourse drives at is therefore that the cause of peace *constantly* needs to be "advanced," highlighting that MOVING FORWARD, and keeping constant movement is necessary in order to achieve this noble goal. This metaphor is not exclusive to war rhetoric and is used extensively in political discourse, but also allows us to reason about most aspects of life. That is why I decided to include utterance (23) to the above list, in an effort to illustrate its influence in a broader way. (23) is extracted from a campaign speech, with a significant section on international conflicts and America's part in them. For the rest of this thesis, I have therefore only included that section to my analyses. Although (23) is not part of that section, it serves here to illustrate that the prevalence of a forward momentum can constrain reasoning, so that taking action, as opposed to remaining still, can be seen as the only positive, viable, and sometimes moral choice. On the other hand, should one choose to remain still, to not take action, one will inevitably end up "drifting toward tragedy" (20), a fate which only momentum from OUR part could avoid. The choice not to act, whether it is constructed as an absence of movement, or as a backward motion (25) is not acceptable; a "return to mass suffering," especially when directly caused by OUR choice not to act, would indeed be unthinkable, going against morality as well as reason. Constant action is therefore needed, in order to maintain OUR trajectory, as taking a step back would endanger all that the United States has always worked for. As we have seen with the analysis of (24), another entailment is that there is only one possible path, which is reinforced by the President's frequent reassurance that the country is "on course" (see (12) and (13) previously), and that the aim of the government's suggested actions is to keep things that way. A lack of involvement would thus risk getting the country "off course," which again would endanger all that it has worked for. Being "off course" can thus become a very effective way to dismiss opposing views.

Finally, (29) aims to exemplify a metaphorical pattern which is prevalent in our language and in our reasoning, namely that CAUSATION IS MOTION. It was moral obligation which "compelled" the government's decision to take action and "make this stand in the Gulf." In the context of American War Rhetoric, having a "cause" is necessary in order to legitimize military action (28); it is this "common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind," among which peace and the preservation of human rights, which safeguards against the use of military action if any other means could have been effective. One might wonder what lies behind the widespread use of the term "cause." If CAUSATION is conceptualized as MOTION, this primary metaphor might be what motivates the understanding that a 'cause' is what 'moves US into action,' and its conceptualization as the starting point of OUR JOURNEY, as "leaders of the cause of peace." If one accepts that correlation can act as a vital relation, when CAUSATION AS MOTION is used as an input for a conceptu-

al blend, this relation could get compressed into one of Uniqueness, so that one's understanding of a moral cause, and of its realization, implies the need for physical movement, which in this context translates as active military involvement.
The activation in discourse of primary metaphors which ground progress, and alongside it the advancement of peace, freedom and democracy, into a continual forward motion can therefore impact the hearer's conceptualization of OUR role, construing the choice not to act as one that cannot lead anywhere, and that prevents any positive outcomes.

9.1.3. 'Doing *enough*' to satisfy the rules of balance

In circumstances where an evil dictator is accused of brutally and ruthlessly harming his own people alongside his neighbors, the need for military action to resolve the conflicts is quite straightforward (whether it is up to US to take action is a different issue). However, when arguing for the increase of the United States' military arsenal, when no direct threat can be identified, construing action as the only way forward might be more difficult. Such was Reagan's issue when defending his Strategic Defense Initiative, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War which left the public to question their country's international stance. Although the circumstances are vastly different, the use of primary metaphors, alongside image schemas, serves the same purpose: constraining the hearers' reasoning about an issue in order to make continued action the only option available. It is not necessarily just about 'doing;' it's about doing *enough*.

Image schemas

Reagan's rhetoric is grounded in the most basic type of pattern, image schemas. According to Grady, image schemas should be understood as "mental representations of fundamental units of sensory experience" (2005b: 44). As such, image schemas can constitute embodied source domains for primary metaphors. The BALANCE schema, for instance, allows us to represent the properties of physical weight, what happens when weight increases or decreases, and how that might affect the state of equilibrium. In war rhetoric, we often see PEACE AS AN EQUILIBRIUM, or NATIONAL SECURITY AS AN EQUILIBRIUM, so that we can talk about restoring "the stability of the region" and reason about how to do so. Reagan makes use of this metaphor particularly frequently, regularly construing INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AS AN EQUILIBRIUM, more specifi-

cally those with the Soviet Union, in parallel with PEACE AS AN EQUILIBRIUM. The following list of utterances aims to be representative of Reagan's use of those metaphors:

(30) "What we see in El Salvador is an attempt to **destabilize** the entire region." (Reagan, 09.05.1984, my emphasis)
(31) "If the Soviet Union will join with us in our effort to achieve major arms reduction, we will have succeeded in **stabilizing the nuclear balance."** (Reagan, 23.03.1983, my emphasis)
(32)"As long as we maintain the **strategic balance** and make it more **stable** by reducing the level of weapons **on both sides**, then we can **count on** the basic prudence of the Soviet leaders to avoid that kind of challenge to us." (Reagan, 09.05.1984, my emphases)
(33) "We seek reductions that will result in **a stable balance** between us with no first-strike capability and verified full compliance." (Reagan, 14.11.1985, my emphasis)
(34) "Here **the balance** has been moving against us and will continue to do so if we follow the course set by this administration." (This will be further exploited in the next section) (Reagan, 18.08.1980, my emphasis)
(35) "This program is a **balanced combination** of support for democracy, economic development, diplomacy, and security measures." (Reagan, 09.05.1984, my emphasis)
(36) "'Deterrence' means simply this: making sure any adversary who thinks about attacking the United States, or our allies, or our vital interests, concludes that the risks to him **outweigh** any potential gains." (Reagan, 23.03.1983, my emphasis)

We can see here that besides peace, national security and international relationships, Reagan's suggested program to solve the issues is also construed as a form of equilibrium, meant to restore an imbalance. The BALANCE schema is often used to discuss potential risks and gains, "weighing" each side in order to make a decision. Determining how to measure the weight of what constitutes risks or gains, however, is not an objective matter like an object's mass. Interestingly, this is exactly what Reagan is getting at, all the while hiding his own subjectivity in such matters.

Experience, not numbers

(37) "But first, let me say what the defense debate is *not* about. It is *not* about **spending arithmetic**. I know that in the last few weeks you've been bombarded with numbers and percentages. Some say we need only a 5-percent increase in defense spending. The so-called alternate budget backed by liberals in the House of Representatives would lower the figure to 2 to 3 percent, cutting our defense spending by $163 billion over the next 5 years. The trouble with all these numbers is that they tell us little about the kind of defense program America needs or the benefits and security and freedom that our defense effort buys for us." (Reagan, 23.03.1983, my emphases)

In the defense debate, those promoting a budget cut would use numbers in an effort to demonstrate that too much was being spent on the building of military equipment, and that that money could be put to better use. While numbers might seem like objective figures, and therefore might seem to speak the truth, Reagan's use of the BALANCE schema as a source domain grounds not only the debate in question, but the entire issue of international relationships and the defense of peace in our sensory experience of the world. It is not the numbers which really matter, but rather the weight which is given to these figures. Indeed, through the BALANCE schema, what Reagan is profiling in his rhetoric is what numbers are used for. This allows him to constrain the context in which his for-

eign policy is to be understood, and to effectively attack his opposition in (37). While seeking a "strategic balance" is not about pure arithmetics, it is about the physical laws of nature, which all of us come to experience in our daily life. It is this grounding in the BALANCE schema which allows Reagan to regularly come to the conclusion that "[i]f we do nothing, **if we continue to provide too little help**, our choice will be a Communist Central America [...]" Indeed, the United States might decide to provide help to struggling democracies in the form of economic rather than military assistance, for instance; or it might decide to build a few more pieces of military equipment, or perhaps renovate older ones. However, as long as "the other side" is stronger, as long as THEIR military arsenal is superior, and as long as "struggling democracies" are too weak to fight the spread of Communism, all that WE have done amounts to nothing, as the balance will still be tipping in THEIR favor. The money spent might constitute a small budget increase, but as long as the balance is tipping in THEIR favor, it is worth nothing. To use Reagan's words,

(38) "The people who argue that the root of violence and **instability** is poverty, not communism, are ignoring the obvious [...] All the economic aid in the world **won't be worth a dime** if Communist guerillas are determined and have the freedom to terrorize and to burn, bomb, and destroy everything from bridges and industries to power and transportation systems." (Reagan, 24.03.1984, my emphases)

The numbers used in a budget, the actual money that is spent, are thus not challenged for their veracity, but they are made *irrelevant*, allowing Reagan to warn against their disguise of objectivity. Instead, what matters is how one weighs the United States' contribution, and its weighing against the actions taken by THEM. In this context, doing more in order to do *enough* is essential. Through the literalization of a metaphor (it is not some abstract concept that is described here as being "worth a dime," but indeed actual money), the absurd idea of throwing numbers in the wrong place is made apparent. As a result, the reasoning around the issues at stake is constrained, so that only a continual *active* involvement can be fruitful and resolve the challenges WE face. Indeed, in a context where "the balance is moving against US," the retrieval of positive outcomes of inaction is made a lot more costly.

Example of priming

The activation of these primary metaphors, the grounding of the reasoning process in our sensory experience of weight and balance, can also further influence the interpretation of the conceptual metaphors used in discourse as part of a persuasive effort, through constraining the context in which they occur:

(39) “But a **freeze** now would make us less, not more, secure and would raise, not reduce, the risks of war.” (Reagan, 23.03.1983, my emphasis)

(39) offers a conceptual blend, where the interruption of the building of military equipment is conceived as a natural event, that of freezing. The elaboration of the blend could take several directions, but the constraining of the context plays a crucial role in determining the interpretation process. Freezing a military build up could be seen as a solution to the threats to national security. Indeed, from the input space of the natural process of FREEZING, one might infer that the weapons that could be used to attack one’s country, or even the motives which could spur an attack might be rendered useless, inefficient, irrelevant. The present state, the absence of war involving the United States, if frozen, could be forever preserved. However, the retrieval of the conclusion that peace could be preserved through a freeze would rely upon contextual assumptions highlighting the positive aspects of the situation in which the United States finds itself. That is certainly not the case here. Indeed, what is made available in the context is a distrust between the two main actors of the conflict, alongside the primary metaphor that INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS ARE AN EQUILIBRIUM, and the fact that presently, the balance is tipping in THEIR favor. In that context, if the balance gets frozen, and if an attack does occur, WE would be left unable to defend OUR country. As a result, following rules of the search for optimal relevance, what gets transferred to the blend is rather the single, negative property of freezing *to interrupt movement,* rather than that of preservation. Positive associations with movement are thus reinforced, since correspondingly, continual movement can also prevent freezing. This is also compatible with the discourse’s tendency to construe movement as action (see 9.1.1.1 and 9.1.1.2), further reducing interpretative costs as the hearer is led to the conclusion that America’s continued action is the only way to get out of this situation positively. In the elaboration of the blend, one might imagine a frozen nation, unable to move to protect itself. A nuclear freeze would thus make US incredibly vulnerable, as it would stop the only thing which WE are in control of: OUR movement.

It is in that sense that the activation of certain primary metaphors in the context surrounding the emergence of conceptual metaphors can constrain the interpretation of the issues, so that conclusions that action is indeed necessary are favored, and ideas that a lack of action could bring about positive outcomes remain blocked. As long as the balance is not even, “doing nothing,” or even too little, can not achieve anything.

9.1.4. Concluding remarks

The presence of certain primary metaphors in the context can serve to increase the efficiency of the discourse's persuasive effects, by constraining the hearer's reasoning, which in turn might impact the interpretation of cognitive mechanisms such as conceptual metaphors. The primary metaphors analyzed in this section are those which were found to be recurrent throughout the data. The conceptualization of PEACE AS AN EQUILIBRIUM is indeed also present in the rest of the corpus, although Reagan makes the BALANCE schema more salient to fit his own argumentation and circumstances. In fact, the conceptualization of America's role in international relationships in terms of physical weight is deeply entrenched in American history. We saw in Chapter 5 that America's leadership in the battle for the defense of freedom was commonly referred to and accepted as a "burden." If LEADERSHIP IS A BURDEN, the strength and the position acquired by the United States needs to be matched by its involvement to resolve international conflicts. While it is impossible to determine exactly how influential these primary metaphors are, one can imagine that the more entrenched they are in our metaphorical system, in our culture, the more persuasive effects they might have, in the sense that their constraint on the hearers' reasoning can go unnoticed, due to their grounding in sensory experience as well as in the hearers' cultural background. Besides, the use of RT (as a selection engine) can help us to better account for that constraint on reasoning when determining which aspects of the input spaces make their way to the blend, so that whatever the circumstances, and indeed whatever metaphor is used (in this corpus), the final conclusion remains the same: acting is best. The analyses in 9.1 can also be used to extend the discussion on the role of positive emotional effects: I hypothesize that the presence and constant reinforcement of primary metaphors and image schemas plays an important role in the triggering of positive emotional effects during the online interpretation of metaphors. The fact that primary metaphors and image schemas are grounded in the hearer's experience of the world, and that they have thus already proved useful to make sense of the world around us, might indeed point to a particular metaphor's relevance to interpret the conflicts in question. In the case of utterance (39), the metaphor's own relevance might be reinforced (FREEZING metaphor) because of the context in which it gets interpreted, that is a context that constantly makes use of the BALANCE schema, one that is also grounded in nature's physical laws. This might happen as positive emotional effects get triggered, as the hearer gets provided with a quick and efficient way to understand the stakes of the conflict, and what needs to happen next. As optimal relevance is reached, the interpretation process can stop, and the other aspects of the FREEZING input space which might lead to the interpretation of inaction as a positive

step can remain in the background. Beyond the priming function of primary metaphors, I argue that the notion of positive emotional effects can help the analyst to get to a better explanatory account of what makes the use of metaphors in discourse so persuasive.

It is also worth noting that all the primary metaphors which we have seen in this section are coherent with the conceptual metaphor of MORAL STRENGTH, described by George Lakoff (1995) as one of the main elements of America's morality metaphorical system. I argue that this also supports their effectiveness in guiding the interpretation process, further contributing to their influence going unnoticed, given how deeply entrenched this metaphorical system is. MORALITY IS STRENGTH is given special priority in the STRICT FATHER MORALITY model (as opposed to the NURTURANT PARENT model, where although it can be present, it might be less prominent), which is especially well equipped to reason about war and dealing with evil. In the context of American War Rhetoric, being "firm" is thus equated with following on high moral standards with action (also see Chapter 5, 5.3). Clinton reinforces the importance of such strength, for US and for the people in the world who are in need:

(40) "Right now our **firmness** is the only hope the people of Kosovo have to be able to live in their own country without having to fear for their own lives." (Clinton, 24.03.1999, my emphasis)

The use of "firmness" in (40) could give rise to a conceptual blend, where the relation of Analogy between being strong morally/mentally, and physically (here, on the military front) gets compressed into Uniqueness, so that taking action where evil arises becomes a quality, part of OUR moral essence; so that WE cannot be moral without taking action. Although the use of "firmness" on its own is not enough to trigger a conceptual blend, I argue that in this context, given the salience of metaphors which blend the moral and physical domains, even weaker instantiations such as (40) can prompt blending so as to follow the rules of relevance maximization. This quality which defines OUR "high moral character," OUR resolve to take action to realize moral standards, testifies to what G.W. Bush calls the maintenance of "moral clarity" in his farewell address:

(41) "As we address these challenges and others we cannot foresee tonight, **America must maintain our moral clarity.** I've often spoken to you about good and evil, and this has made some uncomfortable. But good and evil are present in this world, and between the two there can be no compromise. Murdering the innocent to advance an ideology is wrong every time, everywhere. Freeing people from oppression and despair is eternally right." (G.W. Bush, 15.01.2009, my emphasis)

Morality thus provides US with the only correct lens to interpret the conflicts, and constrains OUR response to one and only one possible option, that to take an active involvement. Over time, the constant reinforcement of the need for action through the use of primary metaphors, whether it is to

go forward, restore a balance, or uphold values, creates tight correlations in the discourse around American wars, between America's international actions and the maintenance of its status as leader of the defense of freedom. Could we hypothesize that another primary metaphor might then emerge in this discourse: ACTING IS MORALITY? In a context where action is continually construed as essentially positive, the retrieval of a middle-ground position which might view OUR action as positive *and* potentially destructive becomes increasingly difficult. What this absolute form of reasoning achieves is to leave the hearer with a form of certainty that acting is the right choice, which is what allows discourse to constrain decision-making.

9.2. Moving To Action with Conceptual Metaphors

WE are thus geared for action, geared to see continued action as the solution to growing problems. The discourse around American wars establishes the space where this 'gear' needs to be put to good use, by marking the time to *move* into action. As we saw in Chapter 7, the basic message is that "the time to act is *now*" (my emphasis). In this section, we focus on the role of conceptual metaphors in helping the hearer to reach quick decisions, in this context when faced with the fight or flight response triggered by the emergence of a threat. The use of conceptual metaphors can constrain the hearer's response to the issues placed before them, giving the public the means to join in the debate by directing their attention to the outcomes of the conflicts.

9.2.1. Win or lose: the metaphors which constrain OUR response

While the specificities of each conflict, and the different styles of each president lead to a varied array of metaphors, a general pattern can be observed. Most of the metaphors used to portray the conflicts are single-scope metaphors, where the organizing frame of one of the input spaces is projected onto the blend (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 126). While the choice of the input spaces might differ depending on the circumstances, the overall structure of the organizing frame is similar: the focus is on the end goal, rather than on the means, and there are only two possible outcomes: win, or lose. When these outcomes are mapped onto the conflicts, every decision gets conceptualized as leading to one of only two possibilities, while a third course of action remains hidden. It is not just the representation of the issues which is affected by the mechanisms of constraint, but rather the hearers' reasoning. An immediate problem arises: the resolution of conflicts does not necessarily generate winners and losers, especially when considering that the goal is to obtain peace and free-

dom for the whole of humanity. The presentation of these two outcomes also tends to be framed from the angle of OUR losing, zooming on what happens "if we fail to act" (G.W. Bush, 12.09.2002). The hearer is led to conceptualize a scenario where WE are losing, in order to reflect on what should be done to rectify the situation. It is about regaining the advantage, something which cannot be achieved by taking the flight option.

9.2.1.1. CONFLICT AS ECONOMIC TRANSACTION

All presidents throughout the corpus regularly construe the conflicts which they are dealing with as an economic transaction (see 9.2.1.1.1 for further details). ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS, or BUSINESS, are very common source domains in political discourse. This is not surprising; in fact, in his study of the most commonly used source domains, Kovecses (2010) found that economic transactions were among them, as a staple activity for human societies. Indeed, in most cases, the metaphor is so deeply entrenched that it might go unnoticed. This, however, is no indication of metaphors' loss of influence in guiding responses (Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011). In fact, it might be even harder for the hearer to become aware of what the recurring use of the metaphor hides, and perhaps of its impact on reasoning about new conflicts. In the context of American War Rhetoric, the main point of the metaphor is to constrain the Americans' response, by making further options or conflicting interpretations inaccessible within the blends offered. Where international conflicts arise, especially where competition between different powers is at stake, one might argue that should every country adopt a strictly peaceful attitude, peace would be strengthened in the long term. America could thus lead by example, and use its influence by taking a step back; being selfless could then be interpreted as forgetting one's immediate interests in favor of long-term goals. However, such inferences can be successfully blocked by construing the conflicts as economic transactions.

Given the apparent prevalence of the metaphor throughout the data, a more detailed analysis of its usage was conducted, firstly to check that it was indeed used consistently by all Presidents, and secondly to identify potential patterns in its usage. I used the software Antconc to draw a list of occurrences highlighting the activation of the metaphor THE CONFLICT IS AN ECONOMIC TRANSACTION in the data. It is worth noting that although this list aims to be as representative as possible, it most likely does not account for every single use of the metaphor within the data. In total, I have estimated that 174 terms are used to construct the conflict as an economic transaction. Some of these fell more easily within the category of entrenched metaphors, while others constitut-

ed more novel uses (for example referring to human life as “the most precious currency”). Table 3 constitutes an overview of occurrences from the data, and is followed by an interpretation of these results leading to a broader discussion of the metaphor’s efficiency for the purposes of persuasion in this corpus.

• Organization of occurrences in the corpus

A - Entailments for the conceptualization of the conflict

Products ‘exchanged’: What the conflict is about.	“Exporting”	“[…] intends to export terrorism beyond its borders.”
		“They seek to export terror to every other country.”
		“Let’s do a better job of exporting terrorism.”
	“Earning”	“They bravely struggle to earn for America, for the world, and for future generations a just and lasting peace.”
		“The people of El Salvador are earning their freedom.”
Stakes/interests: What America is fighting for	“at stake”	“America’s well-being and economy are at stake.”
		“At stake is the kind of world we will inhabit.”
		"America has a direct stake in keeping the peace in Europe.”
	“Interests”	“We must act where important interests are at stake and we can make a difference.”
		“This is not only in our strategic interests; it is morally right.”
The worth: Significance of the conflict	“worth”	“There are things worth fighting for.”
		“Do not fight for a regime that is not worth your own life.”
The costs / the price to pay: America’s losses and gains	“costs"	“Each day that passes brings real costs.”
		“Whatever it costs to defend our country, we will pay.”
	“price"	"We have known freedom’s price.”
		“We risk paying a higher price in the most precious currency of all — human life.”
		“You, after all, paid the bill for all we’ve accomplished.”
The guarantees: what America wants	“guaranteeing”	“Only democracy can guarantee that a government will not turn against…”
		“The record of Soviet behavior […] reminds us that the only guarantee of peace and freedom is our military strength and our national will.”
Our debt: How much America owes	“owing”	“We Americans owe them a debt of gratitude.”
		“How much we owe our Vietnam veterans.”
Accountability: Keeping track of rights and wrongs	“accountable”	“It must be held accountable for its failure to meet those responsibilities and face the cost of continued violations of human rights.”

B - Further entailments for OUR decision-making process: what influences OUR decision

Certainties	"counting on"	"Then we can count on the basic prudence of the Soviet…"
		"There was another factor the Communists never counted on, a factor that now promises to give freedom a second chance — the freedom fighters of Nicaragua."
Rules of the exchange	"Returning"	"Our good faith has not been returned."
What can/cannot be afforded	"affording"	"When it comes to keeping America at peace, none of us can afford to be simply a Democrat or a Republican."
		"Can we really afford to do less than what I've proposed?"
Type of transaction	"bargain"	"By banning any U.S. tests of anti satellite systems, Congress not only protected a Soviet monopoly, it unilaterally granted the Soviets a concession they could not win at the bargaining table."
	"Investment"	"Our investment, our training, our planning — all are paying off."

Table 3: Organization of occurrences of ECONOMIC TRANSACTION metaphor

• Interpretation of occurrences

The economic transaction metaphor is built upon the conceptualization of peace, freedom, as well as violence/oppression/terrorism as physical objects which can be imported or exported. Essentially, while evil must be destroyed, the positive ideals of peace and freedom must be *earned.* The economic transaction metaphor thus allows to reinforce the conceptualization of action as the only way to obtain those things in life which are *worth* getting. If what you get is what you pay for, then doing nothing cannot get you anything. Although the metaphor has been conventionalized, the reasoning which it allows (through blending) is maintained and keeps being promoted in discourse. Essentially, you do not obtain peace or freedom by letting things happen of their own accord: within that metaphorical system, it does not make sense to wait for peace to be handed to you. The other side of the coin is that should any harm be inflicted upon an American, there is also a price to pay, and that price is heavy. One entailment of the metaphor is therefore that America's interventions cannot be seen as overreactions, as they are merely viewed as exacting the commonly agreed price for the crime it is responding to. The predominance of the economic transaction metaphor reinforces the idea that there is a form of protocol to be followed, and that OUR response, whether it involves the use of force or not, always falls within that protocol. One of democracy's main advantages can thus be construed as the government's "accountability," which further reinforces the interpretation that OUR actions are legitimate and transparent. Unlike regular business operations, there is also a certain sanctity associated to that protocol which appears in the blends. Indeed, when applying the organizing frame of economic transactions to ideals such as peace, freedom or democracy, the links

between action and morality are also strengthened, so that a sense of moral worth, of deserving these ideals often emerges in the final blends.

The ECONOMIC TRANSACTION metaphor thus provides insights into the basic dynamics of international relationships. It lays out a reasoning pattern which keeps getting consolidated as the metaphor gets activated with most conflicts. The main benefit of the business source domain is its grounding in a seemingly objective reality, one which can be counted, measured. When deciding whether a nation should get involved in war, the "costs of action/inaction" must be weighed; those, however, depend upon countless factors which do not always have numerical values: while the number of physical lives can be counted, establishing how much a life is worth is more difficult. Other factors are also at play, economical but also political, cultural, historical, etc. What this metaphor does is therefore to provide the hearers with the means to measure the immeasurable. If we take a closer look at the following utterance, the reasoning is made quite clear, and follows logical rules, which might be a lot harder if the terms of the debate were solely moral, for instance:

(43) "Each of us will measure within ourselves the value of this great struggle. Any cost in lives — any cost — is beyond our power to measure. But the cost of closing our eyes to aggression is beyond mankind's power to imagine." (G.Bush, 29.01.1991)

The logic here runs as follows: the costs of inaction outweigh the costs of action, leading to the natural conclusion that the latter option must be adopted. In fact, while measuring the costs of action is difficult, it is still possible. On the other hand, the costs of inaction seem to operate on a whole other level, and the mere consideration of "closing our eyes to aggression" would irreparably damage US. The costs of action are not ignored or hidden, but the metaphor does provide the necessary support to reason about them, and so effectively to acknowledge their inevitable nature, and to accept them. These costs are not directly paid by all Americans, but by American soldiers. Once the price of freedom has been paid, however, a debt gets presented to the whole American nation. But that debt does not need to be repaid with the same resource (human life): it is construed throughout the corpus as a "debt of gratitude." All Americans, "each of us," are thus involved in the decision process: their way of giving back, of paying their debt, is to be grateful, to provide the soldiers with the adequate level of support, through supporting the President's plans to finance the necessary equipment, but also through moral support of their actions. So why this sacrifice? Why this "great struggle"?

According to the way the ECONOMIC TRANSACTION is used in the data, every action which WE take benefits others (along ourselves). WE do not just act randomly, but where there is an "in-

terest" for US to do so (which does not have to clash with the perception of US as serving others). On the other hand, THEY do not care for who THEIR actions impact. The metaphor thus also reinforces the US vs. THEM divide which was explored in Chapters 3-6. For the purposes of this chapter, the present analysis focuses on the mechanisms which might account for the effectiveness of the metaphor to promote immediate action. It is interesting that the use of the business domain does *not,* at any point, lead to inferences about OUR being self-centered and solely interested in maximizing profit, even if it comes at the expense of others. I argue that the combination of RT and CBT approaches can successfully account for the blocking of such inferences, and so more broadly for the effectiveness of this type of metaphor, especially over time as it keeps getting reinforced.

- Discussion of metaphor's efficiency

CBT and the emergence of a unique blend

If the conflict was indeed an economic transaction, that is if the business organizing frame was faithfully applied to the conflicts, then one might imagine that the main motive would be to make profit. Of course, the world of business is also subject to certain rules of conduct, and one cannot just do anything to get what one wants. On the other hand, should it become apparent that those rules were meaningless, if condemnation did not necessarily follow rule breaking, for instance, then if the main aim was to make profit, it would make sense to do whatever it takes to maximize that profit. However, the transaction which appears in the conceptual blends is not the same as that in the business input space. Through blending, humanity and decency are also at the heart of the situation (in this way, CBT departs from CMT, as the latter does not allow for multi-directional inputs from various domains). This is what leads to the conclusion which the discourse often arrives at, that WE cannot let THEM *benefit* from THEIR resort to aggression, from their unlawful ways. OUR intervention is thus regularly justified, because it appears as the necessary intervention of a regulator, without which the whole system would crumble, leading to the triumph of oppression and violence. A unique, emerging structure thus appears in the blend, as protecting OUR interests is tied in to the protection of standards of decency and humanity: what this leads to is the emergence of OUR responsibility. OUR own interests can thus be served, even when the conflict itself might not seem to involve US in the first place. Once again, a relation of Cause-Effect emerges in the blends, linking OUR action to the protection of OUR and of the world's interests. As the effect of OUR ac-

tion has been determined, it can then become a lot more costly to conceive of OUR action as damaging: in these unique blends, that interpretation is not relevant.

Cognitive benefits of the metaphor

The search for optimal relevance balances cognitive costs and benefits. The costs associated with the interpretation of metaphors such as the economic transaction are most likely reduced, not only because of how common the source domain is, but also because of its constant reinforcement through repetition in the entire corpus. The cognitive benefits are easily made apparent through a CBT analysis. The transfer of the profit maximization from the business input space, leading to the conceptualization of America as self-centered in the blend is not relevant, in the sense that it would not explain why WE are willing to sacrifice young lives in order to boost OUR economy, or why WE are willing to risk military conflicts which do not directly implicate US. The end (self-advancement, in a context where military conquests are no longer defended) does not seem to justify the means. On the other hand, the cognitive benefits attached to the interpretation of the metaphor which has been advanced in this section are multiple. The metaphor allows to effectively explain: OUR (recurring) involvement in remote nations; the incredible risks which WE are willing to take to achieve OUR goals; it makes sense of OUR gratitude towards OUR soldiers, to whom Americans are reminded that they "owe" their own freedoms (which at first glance might not seem to have anything to do with remote conflicts); it makes sense of the enemy's behavior and self-centered nature, as THEY represent the cheaters, those who are only concerned with their own advancement at the expense of others, those who (always) need to be excluded so that the established system does not collapse. Taken together, the reduced cognitive costs and the increased benefits make the economic transaction metaphor particularly relevant, as a recurring feature of American War Rhetoric. Once it is accepted that the conflicts can be understood as economic transactions, the use of the metaphor can thus effectively constrain the public's response, so that only one option can be promoted as reasonable. Let us now zoom onto specific occurrences found in the data to show how this is achieved.

• Zoom on: OUR loss and the construction of urgency

By broadening the scope of the issues "at stake," the metaphor allows to make sense of the conflicts' significance for America, which is very useful in terms of relevance. The use of ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS as a prominent source domain for the conceptualization of America's involvement constrains the interpretation of the consequences of OUR involvement, by focusing on the

present moment (or present conflict), and thus diverting the hearers' attention away from the impact of its repetitive nature in the long term. The perspective offered by the following blends takes the angle of OUR loss: in the present moment, WE are losing. In that context, the certainty that something must be done can ease the acceptance of what action entails, that is the loss of human life.

<<Constructing THEIR advantage>>
(44) "Clearly, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have grasped **the great stakes involved**, the strategic importance of Nicaragua." (Reagan, 16.03.1986, my emphasis)
(45) "It would be pure folly for the United States not to press forward with SDI, when the Soviets **have already invested** up to 20 years on their own program." (Reagan, 26.02.1986, my emphasis)
(46) If we hadn't begun to modernize, the Soviet negotiators would know we had nothing to **bargain** with except talk [...] Some people may still ask: Would the Soviets ever use their formidable military power? Well, again, can we **afford** to believe they won't?" (Reagan, 22.11.1982, my emphases)
(47) "We've also taken into account the simple reality that **America can no longer afford** to see Iraq in isolation from other priorities." (Obama 27.02.2009, my emphasis)
(48) "We risk **paying a higher price in the most precious currency of all** -- human life --
if we give Saddam more time to prepare for war." (G. Bush, 05.01.1991, my emphasis)

Let us take (48) as our key example for this subsection. The construction of a blend offers a unique vision here: the type of transaction which appears in (48) is not the same as that found in the input space of BUSINESS, that is a regular economic transaction. The discourse fully acknowledges that the currency is the most precious of all: human life. Since the transaction involves the most precious and sacred resource, the blend can naturally focus on the need for guarantees, for certainty. In this blend, OUR present inaction is thus linked by a relation of Cause-Effect to the unnecessary loss of human life, which is made vivid at the elaboration stage of blending. OUR inaction thus directly leads not only to OUR loss, but also to THEIR advantage (giving "Saddam" time to better prepare for war). What this also serves to achieve, is to remind the public of the immense responsibility not of their government, but of their country; by choosing not to support war, the blend makes directly visible the terrible consequences which will be on all of "our" shoulders. The public is also reminded of what it is that they should want from their government: guarantees. In this context, taking up risks is construed as completely irresponsible. This is only possible thanks to the emerging structure of the blend; indeed within the input space of business, being bold and taking up risks might get selected as a desired trait, possibly leading to more profit. The selection of this aspect of business is however blocked by the salience of what it is that is at stake: human life. In this particular example, CBT allows us to get to a better understanding of the metaphor's efficiency to trigger fear (and potentially guilt), as it allows to make visible *direct* links between OUR inaction, the enemy's win and OUR loss. As we have already seen, RT can account for why certain aspects from the input spaces get selected over others, but it also serves to account for why the conclusions of the blend might be

accepted: from the angle of OUR losing, it would be a lot more costly to view immediate action as anything other than positive. In that context (where WE are losing, and where the stakes are extremely high), the selection of 'risk taking' as a positive move becomes a lot less available.

The rest of the utterances make salient various aspects which have been tackled in the above analysis. In (45), being pro-active is construed as a form of investment, focusing solely on the benefits which are here associated with a military buildup, and hiding the damages which it might cause in the long term, and which one might argue cannot be taken back. The organizing frame of BUSINESS leads here to the portrayal of the Soviets as pro-active and sensible, while WE appear to be foolish. What it offers is a solution (in the form of action) which makes sense within the structure which it comes with.

In (44), what is highlighted is OUR failure to realize the significance of the situation. THEIR action demonstrates that THEY have a significant advantage in that regard, showing that they "have grasped the great stakes involved." In that light, the real risk, what could lead to US losing those stakes, would be to ignore the issues, which can then be equated with letting THEM win. The reality of the situation can thus be switched: from the reality of the losses incurred in combat, to the reality of OUR predicament, as WE are losing. The use of the organizing frame of BUSINESS can then lead to the inference that not getting involved is a luxury, a form of foolish idealism which can only be entertained by those who have not grasped the reality that WE are losing.

Indeed, not acting is simply something which we cannot "afford" (46). The question in (46) makes salient America's present circumstances, alongside the government's responsibility to act sensibly; if the answer to that question is no, then how can inaction be justified? Whatever reasons the opposition might have to promote inaction, they are made irrelevant here.

The use of the economic transaction metaphor in the data thus contributes to simplifying the problem. The focus is on OUR present condition, and if WE cannot afford something, WE simply cannot and should not buy it. If what WE want are guarantees, then investing early enough is a necessity. But the benefits of the metaphor go further than simplifying the options which are before US; it also makes sense of the solution itself. This is important, because the resort to war can be difficult to accept. The use of ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS as a source domain does not ease its acceptance merely by hiding the reality of war. Indeed, that reality can be at the heart of the conceptual blends, making the transaction at stake unique, and it is made explicit in discourse (see 48). By reducing the scale of the conflict, the metaphor allows to reinforce the certainty that in the grand

scheme of things, only action now can best preserve human life: a problem is highlighted, and the discourse then strengthens the conceptualization of action as the only way to solve issues. This is one of the main strengths of this metaphor: it allows to trigger fear, which gets counteracted by the certainty, the "guarantee" that action can only be beneficial. Military involvement can thus be legitimized as a way to get these guarantees, so that we might safely "count on the basic prudence" of OUR enemies, for instance.

9.2.1.2. CONFLICT AS GAME or SPORT

Other source domains appear in the data, leading to similar effects of constraint. Whether the conflict is seen as an economic transaction, a game, or a sport, the outcomes are the same: win, or lose. Reagan even uses them together in one single utterance, reinforcing the fact that THEY have the advantage:

(49) If we hadn't begun to modernize, the Soviet negotiators would know we had nothing to bargain with except talk. They would know **we were bluffing without a good hand**, because they know **what cards we hold** just as we know **what's in their hand**. Some people may still ask: Would the Soviets ever use their formidable military power? Well, again, can we afford to believe they won't?" (Reagan, 22.11.1982, my emphases)

In a game of poker, the aim is to win, and every strategy should be used to that effect. Bluffing is one of them, however if the other contestants know what is in one's hand, bluffing will be rendered inefficient. In a conceptual blend where THE CONFLICT IS A POKER GAME, OUR opponent would, in such a situation, have no reason not to play, and would therefore win the game, along with OUR money. The conditions around a poker game and those which surround international relationships, however, are vastly different. What the metaphor hides here, is that even without a military buildup, and even if the Soviets did have the upper hand in that area, it might not mean that they will use it to their advantage; in other words, a state of peace might still be achieved, even if WE were inferior. The hearers' response is therefore constrained, as the outcomes of the issue are construed as those of a game, where winning is the only motivation. The following selected examples are organized within subsets, in an effort to highlight the different uses of the metaphor. Nevertheless, the effects of constraint are similar in all these utterances. Just as in (49), what the metaphor tends to drive to is OUR obligation to win. Here again, CBT can explain why the GAME/SPORT metaphor is particularly powerful: through blending the domain of games with that of war, a *unique* type of game appears in the blend, which leads to the conclusion that in *that* game, losing really is not an option. In fact what is highlighted is the need for America to take these issues very seriously. The organizing frame of games is what gets selected to be transferred to the blend, the fact that only

two outcomes are possible. In the words of G. Bush (22.11.1989), where the "contest" is "between the free and the unfree," the former *must* win.

• When war is not a game: inappropriate nature of inaction

(50) "To assume this regime's good faith is to **bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble**. And this is a risk we must not take." (G.W. Bush, 12.09.2002, my emphasis)

The obligation to win is here inferred thanks to the inappropriate nature of the GAME. We have already seen how RT could be used to account for the selection of aspects within GAMES over others, given the context. When responsibility is made salient, the most relevant aspect is that of recklessness (and not the easiness with which one can get what one wants, for instance), which clashes with the extreme seriousness of the stakes, that is millions of human lives. In fact, when the stakes are this high, conceptualizing the current conflict as a game can lead to the emergence of a feeling of inappropriateness in the blend, as in (50). The complete rejection of the course of inaction can thus be promoted as a way to counteract that uneasiness. Besides, when a lack of action is construed as gambling, there is no certainty as to the outcome. The conceptualization of losing, especially when losing is to be accounted for by OUR reckless choices, is unacceptable. What also gets transferred from the gambling input space is the relation of Cause-Effect which links the gambler's decision to gamble and the final loss; indeed, when it comes to gambling, losses do not tend to be blamed on the players' opponent, but rather on one's own failure to assess the more likely outcome, that is on one's own decision-making skills. These are what the blend places in the foreground - the questionable perception of those who would back inaction in this context.

• When WE must play the game: when inaction is letting THEM win

(51) "Study the map, review history, and you'll see that this presence, with the Soviet Union's **natural advantage** of geography, cannot be ignored. So, even if forces are significantly reduced on both sides, a noble goal indeed, we will remain in Europe as long as our friends want and need us." (G. Bush, 22.11.1989, my emphasis)
(52) "Just as we are sitting down at the bargaining table with the Soviet Union, let's not throw **America's trump card** away." (Reagan, 26.02.1986, my emphasis)

In certain cases, it is not the nature of the game that is called into question, but rather the necessity to adopt a good strategy. Due to the circumstances surrounding the relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union, the source domain of SPORTS or GAMES was used especially frequently by Reagan. While gambling only involves one player, directing the focus more explicitly onto the United States' behavior, the Cold War saw a competition between two main leaders - mak-

ing the nature of the game more appropriate. Although the stakes remain high (and the enemy was certainly not construed as a fair player, reinforcing the need for US to win), this context made it acceptable to play the game, thus placing the focus on OUR strategy. Inaction was construed as the poorest of them all. The famous metaphor of the Arms Race was indeed prominent, and highlighted the necessity for action on OUR part if WE wanted to be ahead of THEM, and the fact that there could only be one winner. Where THE CONFLICT IS A GAME, and one which WE could easily lose, what would be inappropriate would be for US to choose not to play, that is to let THEM win. (51) portrays the situation as a perfectly logical one: THEY have a natural advantage; should WE choose not to take action, THEY would win. As a result, the blend can easily lead to the inference that those who would promote inaction are poor strategists. Although in isolation, the phrase "natural advantage" might not be enough to trigger a conceptual blend, it is in this context, as the construction of the conflict as a game was made so salient through the Arms Race rhetoric. In (52), a relationship of Cause-Effect links OUR decision not to act with a potential final loss, as WE would be (intentionally) throwing OUR "trump card away," a move which cannot be seriously considered. Once again, the focus is on the final outcome, the overall loser, making the losses incurred in the process somewhat irrelevant. If the only way to win is to play, not taking an active stance in the conflict can only appear as a way to ensure losing, rather than as an endorsement of peaceful behavior.

Whether the conflict is construed as an economic transaction, a game or a sports competition, the choice is not exactly between winning or losing; rather, the transactions, games or competitions which appear in the conceptual blends are ones that WE *cannot* lose, under any circumstances. It is in that sense that the potential third option of taking a less pro-active approach as a *positive* step is not accessed as relevant (rather than being physically inaccessible). When doing nothing is directly linked to losing, the conceptualization of inaction as a positive move becomes a lot more costly. In terms of relevance, construing the conflict in these terms allows to make sense of why WE need to play in the first place, by focusing on the unacceptable consequences of losing. The effects of uneasiness, or of fear which can appear in the blends can then be overcome by accepting the solution to take an active involvement. Just like one does not generally pause the process of games, sports competitions, or competitive markets, there is no time to lose, and America's ability to make tough decisions at the right time is profiled as the relevant element upon which the conflicts are to be interpreted. What makes this construal particularly efficient is the ways in which it casts inaction as a foolish option, one that is not worth seriously pondering over. In other words, the use of the

metaphor allows to pre-assess the situation for the hearers by directing them to what is serious and what is not. Where millions of lives are at stake, where immediacy matters, what is not serious is not relevant. Because the blends link the consequences of losing solely with the path of inaction, then the latter can *immediately* be discarded, and along with it its potential advantages in the long term. That is, inaction cannot appear as a serious consideration. It is not that it is completely inaccessible, but it does not appear on the same level as that of serious leaders, and the very serious tasks and concerns which they have to deal with.

The conceptualization of US losing also prompts for a quick, immediate response. If America appeared to have a large advantage and was assured of winning, one could imagine that laying back and saving resources might then appear as a reasonable option. However, the conceptualization of OUR losing constrains the context in which the metaphors are to be interpreted to the present time, where America is seen to face a problem. Acting (through military involvement) is not so much the only option; it is the only serious option. The other metaphors which are found in the rest of the data consolidate the formation of this one conclusion. While luck might be enough to reverse the course of certain games, sports, or even business transactions, that is not the case when it comes to the handling of natural disasters, for example (and the selection of luck does not get accessed thanks to the profiling of Cause-Effect relations in the blends). We now turn to the use of disaster metaphors in the data, in order to reinforce the construal of action as the only viable option. Once the motion towards tragedy is set, there is no way to stop it. The only certain outcome is therefore that WE *will* lose unless immediate action is taken.

9.2.2. Disaster Metaphors: ‘playing against nature’

At first glance, it might seem that playing against nature is a game which essentially cannot be won. What I have called ‘DISASTER metaphors’ place the unstoppable forces of nature at the heart of the issues, playing an important part in the construction of urgency. It is quite easy to see how the conceptualization of a conflict as a major disaster with terrible consequences might trigger fear in the hearers, which in turn might prompt for quick decisions favoring a form of action. However, I argue that the persuasive power of DISASTER metaphors lies in the construction of the event as an unstoppable motion. Urgency (of OUR action) is thus reinforced as being linked to the notion of inevitability, rather than temporal proximity of the danger, which is coherent with the way in which dangers/threats are construed in the corpus (see 7.2.) This time the focus is on the process of the

event, rather than on the end result *alone*, leading to the inference that OUR action is the only way to interrupt the process. Notably, Clinton's entire rhetoric on America's involvement in the Balkans region revolved around the construction of the events as a FIRE, a fire that WE need to extinguish entirely, or it will continue on its devastating streak once WE are gone, making everything that has been accomplished, and every life sacrificed, a waste. Besides Clinton's use of this extended metaphor, DISASTER metaphors are actually present throughout the whole corpus, the point being that unless WE take action *now*, a disaster *will* unfold. While circumstances might differ, DISASTER metaphors are a powerful tool in leading to this conclusion, constraining OUR response by blocking access to other ways to sort the situation.

9.2.2.1. Conflicts where "natural boundaries" do not matter

(53) We must also remember that **this is a conflict with no natural national boundaries** (…) Let a **fire** burn here in this area, and the flames will spread. (Clinton, 24.03.1999)

(53) is an example of Clinton's construal of the conflict as a fire, and sets the parameters of the metaphor, highlighting the special character of the present conflict as one with "no natural boundaries." Countries are often conceptualized as CONTAINERS (see Chapter 7), with established borders, where people might be denied entry. While the invasion of a country is illegal, and subject to condemnation by intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, fires, or any other natural phenomena, do not abide by such rules. Once a fire has started spreading, it will continue to do so, regardless of national borders, unless something is done to extinguish it. In the blend, the growing extent of the fire can lead to the worst proportions that a conflict could take, that is to say a World War. The following utterances show how Clinton uses the metaphor throughout his discourse:

(54) "In a sense, we came to Somalia to rescue innocent people **in a burning house**. We've nearly **put the fire out**, but some **smoldering embers** remain. If we leave them now, **those embers will reignite into flames**, and people will die again. If we stay a short while longer and do the right things, we've got a reasonable chance of **cooling off the embers** and getting **other firefighters** to take our place. (Clinton, 07.10.1993, my emphases)
(55) "Americans have learned the hard way that our **home** is not that far from Europe. Through two World Wars and a long cold war we saw that it was a short step **from a brushfire to an inferno**, especially in the **tinderbox** of the Balkans. The time to **put out a fire is before it spreads and burns down the neighborhood**. (Clinton, 27.03.1999, my emphases)



Fig. 19: Conceptual Network for: the fire in the Balkans

In the blended space, the focus is on the process, as the above utterances make salient the various steps to extinguishing a fire (such as paying attention to remaining embers). As natural phenomena, the elements which lead to a fire are predictable, although they cannot necessarily be prevented. Once these elements are in place, there is no avoiding the unraveling of the fire. The intervention of firefighters becomes necessary in order to deploy the means to put the fire out. When running the blend, one might imagine the terrible consequences of letting a fire spread and eventually turn into a World War, and the devastating losses that this would incur for the American people, the economy, and for the state of peace in the world; for the uncertainty and the fragility of OUR way of life as WE know it. The fear of another World War is on its own a powerful image. Through the process of blending, the terrible consequences of such an event become partly of OUR own doing: indeed, the only way to stop a brushfire from turning into an inferno is to act on it. The structure from the fire input space is brought in, so as to highlight the relations between the various parts of the spreading process, and mainly between OUR action and its extinguishing. OUR response is thus constrained, so that only the pursuing of military action can be seen as a solution, while the withdrawal of troops would contribute to the inevitable worsening of the situation, to eventually affect all other European countries, and possibly even America. The salience of the natural process of disasters, of the fact that they will inevitably reach US if they are not stopped, is what blocks the retrieval of the infer-

ence that other firefighters could just as easily do the job: acting as firemen is the only way for US to secure OUR future. Certainty is indeed the best antidote to fear.

While the process of extinguishing a fire is easily discernible, the same cannot be said of international conflicts. It can indeed be very difficult to determine the point where enough has been accomplished in order to avoid another conflict. Through the use of conceptual blending, the complexity of the conflict is thus reduced to a scale which is accessible to all hearers, however (un)familiar they might be with the situation. What remains hidden is that it is up to the speaker to determine the parameters of this new blend, to decide what exactly would qualify as "smoldering embers." The means to extinguish a fire are rather straightforward; on the other hand, one could argue that after an initial military intervention, other means could be put into place so as to avoid the "reigniting" of the conflict, so that after all, OUR continued presence might not be necessary. While there would be no debating as to how much water one would choose to use in order to stop a devastating fire, the number of human lives to be sacrificed requires careful consideration. The focus on the natural process of disasters is thus what constrains the hearers' response, so that continued military action might be construed as the only life saving solution, by blocking access to other potential options. In the case of the rhetoric surrounding America's involvement in Kosovo, Chomsky notes that a Serbian counterproposal regarding the resolution of the conflict was in fact silenced (Chomsky in Nohrstedt, Kaitatzi-Whitlock, Ottosen & Riegert, 2000: 399).

When it comes to the interpretation of conceptual blends, their elaboration (the running of the blend) is not automatic, in the sense that it might differ from hearer to hearer. The efficiency of the constraining effects depends on a variety of factors; indeed any metaphor could not be used successfully to justify anything. I argue that DISASTER metaphors, and their focus on the natural and inevitable unraveling of the events to a disastrous end, are particularly appropriate in a discourse which favors the interpretation of decisive action as the only way forward. The elaboration of the blend is not just dependent on the constitution of the input spaces. Fauconnier and Turner call "completion" the stage where the hearer brings in background knowledge, before the elaboration stage. I argue that the Primary Metaphors which were analyzed in this chapter's first section (highlighted in bold in the following schema), and which favor a propensity towards action while construing diverging options as passive and unproductive, are part of this background knowledge. As a result, the context for the elaboration of DISASTER metaphors is already constrained, making the conclusion that America's involvement is the only way to end a tragedy a lot less costly. I thus argue that that conclusion can be adopted as the most relevant one in the final blend, as the impact of primary metaphors is to make less accessible the considerations associated with OUR action.



Fig. 20: Priming with primary metaphors

(56) "For 200 years the oceans have protected us from much that has troubled the world, but clearly **our world is shrinking**." (Reagan 09.05.1984, my emphasis)

In (56), the phenomenon of shrinking is not natural in the sense that a well-known combination of elements will inevitably lead to that particular reaction; however, it is natural in the sense that it constitutes a powerful force which cannot be stopped. Once again, it is the process which is profiled, so that Reagan can come to the conclusion that natural borders (the oceans surrounding America) no longer protect US, and that unless something is done *now,* the process of shrinking will continue and will eventually get to US. Unlike international relationships, which involve a certain amount of consideration before action is taken, natural forces do not stop of their own accord. However, through the presence within the context of primary metaphors, such as PROGRESS IS MOVING FORWARD, MORAL IS UP, or even ACTING IS MORALITY, the conclusion that something must be done can be favored, by counteracting the fear that is triggered by the conceptualization of a world that is shrinking, and where WE have become vulnerable. Indeed, what is also made apparent is that WE can stop those forces. In this context, why would we not?

9.2.2.2. Triumphing over nature and 're'gaining control

This subsection explores the function of DISASTER metaphors in further detail. The following utterances constitute a selection of its uses in the data, and have been organized depending on the type of disaster portrayed; the point is therefore to show that whatever disaster is at play, the focus remains on the process, and the constraining effects are the same.

- Large-scale natural disasters: fires, floods, tsunamis, etc.

(57) "Communist subversion is not an **irreversible tide**. We've seen it **rolled back** in Venezuela, and, most recently, in Grenada. [...] The **tide** of the future can be a **freedom tide**." (Reagan, 09.05.1984, my emphases)

(58) “Sarajevo, the capital of neighboring Bosnia, is where World War I began. World War II and the Holocaust **engulfed** this region.” (Clinton, 24.03.1999, my emphasis)
(59) “The Sandinista leadership [...] described themselves as the vanguard of a **revolution that would sweep** Central America, Latin America, and finally, **the world**.” (Reagan, 16.03.1986, my emphases)
(60) “We believe that progress can be made in resolving the **regional conflicts** now **burning** on three continents, including our own hemisphere.” (Reagan, 14.11.1985, my emphases)
(61) “And thus, today there’s no peace in Afghanistan; no peace in Cambodia; no peace in Angola, Ethiopia, or Nicaragua. These **wars** have claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and **threaten to spill over** national frontiers.” (Reagan, 14.11.1985, my emphases)
(62) “Instead of **drifting along** toward tragedy, we will set a course toward safety. Before the day of horror can come, before it is too late to act, this danger will be removed.” (G.W.Bush, 17.03.2003, my emphasis)

- Natural reactions

(63) “A few years ago, then-Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko noted that Central America was, quote, ‘**boiling like a cauldron’** and **ripe for revolution**.” (Reagan, 16.03.1986, my emphases)
(64) “**All the ingredients for a major war** are there: ancient grievances; struggling democracies; and in the center of it all, a dictator in Serbia who has done nothing since the Cold War ended but start new wars and **pour gasoline on the flames of ethnic and religious divisions**.” (Clinton, 24.03.1999, my emphases)

- Natural growth process

(65) “We Americans have offered our most precious resource, our young men and women, to work with you to rebuild what was destroyed by despotism, **to root out our common enemies**, and to seek peace and prosperity for our children and grandchildren, and for yours.” (Obama, 27.02.2009, my emphasis)
(66) “These, then are the indispensable elements of a true peace: the steady expansion of human rights for all the world’s peoples; support for resolving conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that carry **the seeds of a wider war**.” (Reagan, 14.11.1985, my emphasis)

- Technological disasters

(67) “Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like **ticking time bombs**, **set to go off without warning**.” (G.W. Bush, 04.02.2002, my emphasis)
(68) “We act to prevent a wider war, to **defuse a powder keg** at the heart of Europe **that has exploded twice before** in this century with catastrophic results.” (Clinton, 24.03.1999, my emphases)

From natural to technological disasters, the examples are numerous. Whether it is a bomb ticking, ready to explode (67, 68); a nasty plant that keeps growing and multiplying (65); or a recipient which is about to spill over, pouring its contents on the rest of the world (63, 64): in each of these utterances, the conceptual blend highlights the inevitable process of the events, which *will* continue to evolve until they have reached their “catastrophic results” (68). Unless, of course, WE do something about it. This conclusion highlights the unique properties of the blends. Indeed, the point of these metaphors is not so much to scare the hearer with disastrous endings (although fear is definitely an important element), but rather to spur US into action. We saw in Chapter 7 that the feeling of fear, which uncontrollable disasters are likely to trigger, prompts our fight or flight response. Since getting the world to fly from fires or floods, or from a shrinking earth, is certainly not conceivable (as those disasters would eventually catch up with us), fighting in order to interrupt the process becomes the only option. In reality, a tragedy is defined by its disastrous ending, which

nothing could have stopped. The unfair ending has become a property of tragedies. While time bombs can sometimes be deactivated, there is little that man can do to prevent floods. However, in the conceptual blend, the tragedy, the disastrous ending, will only take place if WE do nothing; if WE do not get involved. "Doing nothing," in fact, is construed as "drifting along toward tragedy," (62) as the choice to let OURSELVES be defeated, bringing along with US all the casualties that that implies. An unacceptable choice. "Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative" (Clinton, 24.03.1999) is therefore a reasonable conclusion: if one can foresee such catastrophic consequences, and if one is in capacity to stop them, then morally, one should do so. Since the blend remains connected to the whole network (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 129), the conceptualization of the devastating effects of natural disasters or time bombs always remains accessible. So is the uncontrollable nature of these events, exacerbating feelings of fear. However, the blend offers a unique opportunity to regain control, as long as action is taken, and as long as it is taken *now.* "Ending a tragedy" thus becomes a possibility in the blend.

The conceptualization of loss, of these disastrous consequences, however, is essential. Indeed, if the hearer was simply led to focus on the immeasurable power of the American spirit, one could easily come to the conclusion that other solutions, which would also spare American lives, could be found. Instead, the assurance of a happy ending, of the coming of a "freedom tide" (57) remains linked to the unwanted conceptualization of a world which has been swept by violence and subversion. We mentioned *reductio* arguments in the previous chapter, and the running of two blends in order to find certainty in one's reasoning. In this case, I argue that the efficiency of DISASTER metaphors lies in the running of two blends: one where WE are slaves to the unpredictability of those who wish to export violence and oppression, where WE live in fear and cannot truly be free, where the tragedy is allowed to run its course; and one where WE are victorious over these events, where freedom can be enjoyed by all. When comparing both outcomes, the one difference lies in OUR lack of *immediate* action, constraining OUR response so that fighting *now* is the only way to survive and to preserve freedom. Thanks to the property of the blend to remain connected to the entire network, OUR strength (and eventual victory) is not seen as a given. Instead, it can be seen as both a fragile element, demanding immediate attention, as well as a formidable power. The power of the blend is in constraining the hearers' reasoning about what is to be done in the present, by focusing on the need for action to prevent the unraveling of disasters. Unlike natural phenomena, technological inventions, or even cooking recipes, the circumstances surrounding these conflicts are a lot less predictable. Unlike the way in which the running of two blends in reductio arguments is used to lead to mathematical discoveries, the circumstances here are not invariable factors. The fear that the

current conflicts *could* end in a tragedy, however, prompts the need for a response, and allows for immediate action on OUR part to be construed as a way to re-gain control (see Chapter 7 on fear and loss of control), to be triumphant over events which have not unfolded yet.

What section 2 has attempted to show is that the use of metaphors about the conflicts within the data, although varied, drives the interpretation process in a unified direction, having similar constraining effects. Mainly, whether the conflict is construed as an economic transaction, a game, a sport, or a disaster, one important benefit is to simplify the situation. What these metaphors do is not to provide the hearer with a better understanding of the circumstances themselves, but rather of the stakes, and of the way out; **of the connections or relations between each element**. In that sense, the framework of CBT was very useful in determining the efficiency of these metaphors, as the links between US and the conflicts, and in fact with their resolution, are made clearly apparent, and they are direct. Once OUR place in the conflicts has been established, these metaphors also make clear what needs to be done. Just as one understands the means to win a game or a sports competition, or even the mechanisms to stop a bomb from exploding, what is reinforced here is the need for action to interrupt an ongoing process. Through reducing the scale of the events, the metaphors analyzed in section 2 thus allow the American public to quickly join in on the 'debate,' by providing them with the means to understand why WE have a problem, and the structure within which reasoning about its resolution should be conducted. Finally, the blending of two seemingly incompatible spaces, such as that of a trivial game with a war, can also suppress the illusion of choice in an already simplified context. Blending is what allows for a clash to occur at the interpretation process: a clash between the triviality of gambling and the seriousness of war, or the sacredness of human life; a clash between how seriously we would take the burning of a fire, and the apparent lack of concern for conflicts occurring in remote countries. This clash is what allows for only one option to come out of the interpretation process, as it becomes increasingly difficult to argue either for a complete lack of action, or even for an initial period of waiting, without appearing reckless. CBT analyses can clearly point to this constraint on reasoning, as they explicitly show how feelings of uneasiness come to occur, and even how to resolve them. When it comes to why these solutions might be accepted by the hearer, why they might be persuasive, and in fact why metaphors might have a special role to play in persuasive discourse, I argue that CBT analyses can fall short of a full explanatory account, which can be achieved thanks to a combination with RT. Specifically, the notion of positive emotional effects exemplifies the ways in which contributions from RT might be particularly beneficial for the study of persuasive discourse.

9.2.3. Emotional effects and Relevance

In this chapter, we have noted the cognitive benefits of the metaphors used in the corpus, mainly in getting the hearer to grasp the significance of the issues at stake, by reducing the scale of the events to focus on the links between OUR and THEIR actions/decisions now, and a potentially distant (but disastrous) future; between a conflict taking place *there* and its repercussions on US *here*, and on the entire world. The emergence of these clear and direct links contributes to the "feeling of global insight" which Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 129) claim results from blending, alongside strong emotions. The trigger of emotions, alongside the creation of a coherent narrative, has often been put forward as a main advantage of metaphor usage. According to Charteris-Black (2011: 24), "metaphor provides a linguistic means for mediating between conscious and unconscious mental activities, between cognition and emotion." This mediating aspect is very compatible with CBT's central account of cognition, but also with the notion of positive emotional effects, and the distinction made by de Saussure & Wharton (2019) between shared and communicated emotions. The study of DISASTER metaphors can serve to demonstrate that the emotions triggered during the interpretation process are indeed *shared* rather than communicated, leading to the perception of *urgency* of the matters, and satisfying the hearer's search for relevance.

Compressing to a 'picture of urgency'

In the case of DISASTER metaphors, the compressions which take place in the blend are essential to the conclusion that urgent action is required. What we see when running the blend are the embers reigniting and turning into a huge fire; the time bomb setting off and ravaging its surroundings; the ingredients being stirred together, turning into the final product: a wider war. In other words, the inner-space vital relation of Cause-Effect within the DISASTER input space gets compressed into Uniqueness (or Part-Whole) in the blend, which profiles the inevitability of the process and therefore the urgency of the present situation. It does not matter how long it might take to get there, the point is that it will. The presence of embers, without OUR actions, indicates in itself a disaster to come. In fact, the blend presents a new relation of Cause-Effect, but this time between US, brought in from the input space of foreign affairs, and the unfolding of the disaster, following OUR choice not to get involved. The final compressed blend has the ability to generate both feelings of fear (related to unwanted outcomes) and guilt (related to the emerging relations connecting US to these outcomes). The fear of another World War, or the guilt of being responsible for the development of

disasters, place the hearers on high-alert in the search for an immediate solution to minimize both the risks and feelings of guilt. The resolution of high-stress situations such as the prevention of disasters relies on doing what one knows, what one has been trained to do. It is certainly not the time to experiment with new methods. What WE do know, what has been proved successful in the past, is to fight evil where it occurs. This clarity, this quick insight into a complex matter, stems from effective compressions which result from conceptual blending. But that is not all. What the relations highlighted within the conceptual networks show is that the way to deal with these remote conflicts also links to the way in which WE deal with the world in general, by profiling action in general (rather than solely military action) as the way forward, as the only moral choice, as the only way which makes sense to US. This supports the idea that metaphors provide the means to mediate between cognition and emotion (Charteris-Black, 2011). Going further, I argue that this grounding in general cognition makes the choice of DISASTER metaphors such as Clinton's FIRE metaphor appear particularly suitable to interpret the issues at stake, which favors their acceptance. As the public is given the means to interpret remote, intricate issues in a way which fits in with their conception of time, of action, of morality, of OUR identity, etc., I hypothesize that positive emotional effects also get triggered, satisfying the search for relevance and leading to the acceptance of the President's chosen metaphors. Metaphors are therefore not persuasive in themselves; but their capacity to mediate between cognition and emotion, and to trigger positive emotional effects is what allows for potential contradictory elements (what a metaphor is said to hide) to not be accessed.

Emotional effects

In Chapter 4, a discussion on the role of "positive emotional effects" (Wharton & Strey, 2019: 263; de Saussure & Wharton, 2019: 12) was started, arguing that their added input would benefit the study of persuasive discourse and its efficiency. These positive emotional effects are defined by "the interpretative reaction triggered by the direct manifestation of an emotion, rather than its description" (de Saussure & Wharton, 2019: 12, translated from French). When we look at the DISASTER metaphors within the data, the President never explicitly *communicates* emotions in propositional form, in the way that the following utterances would do: "I am worried that we will end up losing a lot more people, in a way which we will not be able to control;" or "I cannot bear the guilt of leaving people to die when they could be saved." De Saussure and Wharton make the distinction between communicating and sharing emotions: "sharing a mental state, an emotion, involves making this mental state manifest to another, as a fact which is outside the analytical evaluation." (2019: 16)

In the case of DISASTER metaphors, it is the simulation which happens when running the blend, through the mechanisms of compression, which allows the speaker to share with the hearers emotions such as fear or guilt, without directly expressing them in propositional form. Beside the general feeling of coherence described previously, the visualization of watching people die in a fire, or of a World War which would take loved ones away (and which is made possible through compression), might indeed trigger further positive emotional effects. Such effects are better explained as *experiential* responses (de Saussure & Wharton, 2019: 17). The emotional states which might be triggered appear here as a result of the hearers' imagining a scenario, allowing them to better relate to the urgency of the matters. In the first place, emotional effects allow the hearers to align with the speaker's emotional state, or the emotional states which the speaker wishes to make manifest, placing the audience on higher alert, guiding them to interpret the current conflicts as requiring immediate attention. The properties of conceptual blending can then constrain the context so that taking immediate action appears as the only solution to ensure that WE remain both safe and blame-free.

I argue that the contribution of positive emotional effects is essential to the understanding of the persuasive power of cognitive mechanisms such as conceptual metaphors. While it is entirely possible to understand the point of a metaphor, and to derive cognitive benefits without any emotional response, the metaphor might then lose (some of) its persuasive power. If we take Clinton's use of the FIRE metaphor, one possible counter response could be to send other equally qualified firemen to the scene, thereby sparing American lives. While the metaphor would have been appropriately interpreted, its use as a persuasive mechanism favoring immediate action would have been lost. On the other hand, in cases where the simulation taking place while running the blend triggers emotional effects, the hearer is provided with an "all-clarifying feeling" (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 129) about the urgency of the present situation, sharing in (or even experiencing) the President's burden, and alerting to the need to make quick decisions, to act before it is too late. When the links between OUR decisions and the unfolding of disasters are made salient, positive emotional effects can be triggered, in the sense that the speaker is able to share effectively with the public his own responsibility in making these tough decisions.

I argue that when conceptual metaphors are used in persuasive discourse, the search for relevance might be achieved once emotional effects have been triggered; as the interpretation process stops, the potential inconsistencies of the metaphor or further options might then be kept in the background. In the context of American War Rhetoric, the main point of DISASTER metaphors is not to

help the hearers to grasp the intricacies of remote conflicts, but instead to communicate, or rather to *share* their urgency, their immediate relevance to US. The details of the events do not necessarily have to make sense to the public, but their relevance to their country does. I therefore hypothesize that the trigger of emotional effects might satisfy the search for optimal relevance, which allows for further inferences to be made, and for potential inconsistencies to be left in the background. Without such emotional effects, a conceptual metaphor might be understood, but perhaps not persuasive, in the sense that it might not lead to the same cognitive effects, in this instance to the inference that urgency is of the essence. By contrast, the expression of the speaker's emotions in propositional form would make the final decision regarding America's involvement dependent upon the evaluation of the legitimacy of these emotions, therefore failing to communicate the sense of urgency prompting for fast decisions. I will expand on the addition of positive emotional effects and their links to relevance in Chapter 12, particularly for situations which might not warrant emotions as strong as those associated with past traumatic events or future disasters.

9.2.4. Concluding remarks

In the words of Wharton and Strey, "emotional states" are the "states that make inference happen, that make it worthwhile, that make us tick" (2019: 266). When interpreting conceptual metaphors, the yielding of emotional effects is precisely what can make the hearer "tick," what gives him/her that "all-clarifying feeling" (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 129), satisfying the search for the relevance of foreign issues, and thus contributing to the **acceptance of a metaphor's suitability** when reasoning about these issues. In other words, it is these emotional effects which are to account not for the successful interpretation of conceptual metaphors, but for their **efficiency as persuasive mechanisms**.

The aim of Chapters 7-9 has been two-fold: to demonstrate the efficiency of metaphors as a persuasive mechanism, through the analysis of their occurrence online by looking at how they can constrain the hearer's response, but also through the analysis of their impact over time. "We may not be particularly affected by single examples of these metaphors, but if they are repeated enough we come to accept their message." (Wilson 1990 quoted by Ungerer & Schmid, 2013: 151) In the case of American War Rhetoric, it is not about one metaphor being repeated over time by different Presidents, but rather about about the repetition of constraining effects, which the use of various source domains can achieve. Going back to Clinton's fire metaphor, it is not just this single metaphor

which can be said to have persuasive effects. Rather, it is its use within a context where OUR action is constantly reinforced as the only way to regain control, and without which disaster appears inevitable more so than imminent, which contributes to the efficiency of the fire metaphor, and to its appearing suitability (and therefore acceptance by the public) when reasoning about foreign affairs.

So what strategies have been identified, and what are their constraining effects, so that an overall picture of coherence can be built?

- Strategies: we have seen that metaphors can be used in many ways in the context of persuasion. While novel metaphors might attract one's attention, conceptual blends are to be found in many forms, and the efficiency of novel metaphors relies upon their grounding in a shared cognitive context, which is itself made up of other metaphors. We have identified the use of primary metaphors to prime the interpretation process, for example. Counterfactual blends have also been seen to be highly influential in promoting a type of reasoning which appears to be 'foolproof,' grounded in a shared conception of time and history. Indeed, conceptual blends which reinforce a specific conception of time have also been identified to construct urgency, stemming from inevitability rather than imminence (or temporal proximity).
- Constraining effects: we have seen that whatever the metaphor, the constraining effects are the same. One reason for this is precisely the grounding of these metaphors in a shared cognitive context. So what is it that is not accessed? Mainly two things: (a) the idea that inaction now could lead to positive effects, and alongside that, (b) the fact that OUR immediate intervention could have damaging effects. Let us start with (a): the idea that peace could stem from present inaction is construed as foolish, as an irresponsible notion which would be very costly, because it does not make sense given the inevitable character of the events. (a) is thus not inaccessible, but it appears irrelevant to the current context and present predicament in which America seems to find itself. The context is indeed consistently constrained to focus on the issues of the present, where a danger is presupposed to already be there. Let us now move to (b): America's action is consistently linked by a relation of Cause-Effect with one single effect: the resolution of present issues to the end of lasting peace. In that context, the conceptualization of America's repeated interventions, over time, as becoming a cause for the deterioration of international relationships, and thus for the perseverance of certain conflicts, becomes less easily accessible.

What the corpus-based analyses of the data have done so far is to paint a picture of the elements which tie the entire discourse together; the ways in which various strategies work together to rein-

force certain constraining effects. Ungerer and Schmid (2013: 150) argued that "the metaphors favoured by many politicians combine a very simple explanation with strong emotional effects." I would add that the explanation appears very simple, precisely when it fits with the overall coherence of the tradition which it belongs to. If coherence is indeed key, and if efficiency is indeed driven by a grounding in a shared cognitive context, then one might wonder what happens when new facts emerge, which seem to go against the promoted images of US, of THEM, or indeed of the nature of the threat itself? Given that this question was central to the motivation of this entire thesis, a final step before concluding on the linguistic analyses' findings is now required. Chapters 10-11 will therefore tackle the parts within the data which highlight discrepancies.

Chapter 10: When discrepancy threatens established frames

10.1. The frames of American War Rhetoric

George Lakoff shared his knowledge on the nature of the mind in an interview, during which he insisted on the key significance of "frames":

> "After discovering how the mind works through frames and metaphors, many new insights follow. For example, we now know that **if you learn a fact that doesn't fit some conceptual frame that you have, the frame will stay and the fact will be ignored**. That's because **your frames**, which are really the structure of your brain, **are defining what makes sense for you**." (Gates and Nisker, 2005, my emphases)

What are frames?

The notion of frames has been alluded to (mainly as the way input spaces are organized), but has not been dealt with in great detail. Yet it does seem to fit in quite well with the constraining effects which have been analyzed in Chapters 3-9. One reason for this was to avoid overusing the term 'framing,' which has been used in multiple ways and in multiple fields. In the broad context of communication, framing might be used to describe a speaker's strategy to get his/her audience to adhere to certain points of view, through the selection and salience of "certain aspects of a perceived reality" (Entman, 1993: 52). Entman's contributions have been extremely useful in reconciling various and occasionally diverging definitions of framing. However, an important distinction is to be added here, given that one of the goals of this thesis is to understand the efficiency of persuasive mechanisms, from the hearer's point of view. In that sense, I refrain from using frames *solely* as a strategy used by the speaker to promote a particular point of view; rather, I understand frames to play an important role in relevance optimization, as their recruitment can strengthen the perceived appropriateness of the interpretations put forward in discourse. Framing is here understood as the recruitment of relational and more stable cognitive structures (during the interpretation process), in a way which aligns with Lakoff's usage of frames:

> Frames are mental structures that shape the way we see the world. As a result they shape the goals we seek, the plans we make, the way we act, and what counts as a good or bad outcome of our actions. In politics our frames shape our social policies and the institutions we form to carry out policies. To change our frames is to change all of this. Reframing is social change. (Lakoff, 2014: xv)

The way that frames are studied in the following chapters is meant to focus on the effects of their recruitment on the hearer's representations of the conflicts, but also on the reinforcement (or breaking) of these frames as trustworthy structures that mediate one's apprehension of reality. Chapters 3-9 aimed at giving a detailed picture of the "mental structures" which shape the way American War

Rhetoric represents the world, based upon linguistic analyses of a vast number of speeches across different eras. The comprehensive nature of the data analyzed has allowed to see emerge general recurring patterns within the tradition of American War Rhetoric (post Vietnam). We saw in Chapters 3-6 that the conceptualization of who the enemy is and what they represent is always in relation with US and OUR identity; furthermore, whatever metaphor was chosen to construct OUR involvement, the scenarios consistently profile the roles of hero, villain and victim. Consistent with the image of a hero, whether the conflicts are construed as a disaster, a tragedy, or even as an obligation, we have seen that OUR part is always one of response. These relational structures impose a specific angle upon the interpretation process, and betray a particular lens through which the world is represented. It is these relations, as detailed in previous chapters, which motivate the use of frames here. As we have seen that similar constraining effects occur throughout the data, the 'frames of American War Rhetoric' refer to the regrouping of these relations under the *Fighting against Evil* general frame. At the heart of the latter is the presence of evil, which affects the whole of mankind and must be eradicated. The frame is used to structure (a) America's place and role in the world, in relation with evil, which impacts the understanding of what WE can and cannot do, how WE relate to other people, etc.; and (b) the resort to action to solve present issues. (a) and (b) should thus be seen as the two main 'parent' structures under which the frame *Fighting against Evil* is built. Frames offer coherence, *cognitive* coherence, mediating our interactions with the world; new developments in the world can then be more easily interpreted through well-established frames, and decisions can be reached to reflect these frames, to reflect one's understanding of the world. Although the framework of Mental Spaces makes easily available the ways in which frames might get activated in discourse, and their impact on the interpretation process, this constant search for coherence as we interpret new events is also very compatible with the postulates of RT. In this chapter, we will try to establish how the frame *Fighting against Evil*, which combines the representation of OUR place in the world, and the significance of OUR action in the present, can maintain its *relevance* over time, despite the emergence of what might appear as inconsistencies.

Crucially, not only do frames shape the way we see the world, but they also get constantly reinforced in discourse. As new forms of evil keep appearing, OUR need to respond gets reinforced as the only way to reach peace. As a result, the interpretation of new events might not only be heavily influenced by the frames chosen; the emergence of new events is also an opportunity to validate existing frames and to strengthen them, making the mechanisms of constraint all the more effective. The questions which Chapters 10 and 11 are concerned with are the following: what happens when

facts bring to light some inconsistencies, damaging the coherence (or at least the perception of coherence) which frames create? Do the frames in question collapse? Or can they still be maintained? To answer these questions, Chapters 10 and 11 will take a closer look at places within the data where the emergence of new facts threatens existing frames, threatening the suitability of *Fighting against Evil* as a way to interpret OUR military presence.

Frame negotiation and persuasion

According to Lakoff (2014: 17), "if the facts do not fit a frame, the frame stays and the facts bounce off." As a result, when new facts come to light which can appear to be inconsistent with long-standing frames such as the above, it is essential to understand how these frames can be negotiated. This will allow us to understand how "the frame [can stay] and the facts [can bounce] off." Lakoff's observation is in line with research on cognitive biases, mainly what is known as the confirmation bias, which can be defined as "the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand" (Nickerson, 1998: 175). When faced with the emergence of new facts which seem to contradict existing beliefs, one might imagine that a purely logical response would be to update one's beliefs in order to integrate these new facts. However, cognitively speaking, this would not necessarily be appropriate, as the maintenance of a consistent system would be far less costly. The following schema broadly summarizes what might happen:



Fig. 21: What follows the emergence of new facts?

The "bouncing off" of new facts might be a cognitively beneficial move (in certain contexts), but it does not mean that it is automatic. Going back to the confirmation bias, the above definition implies

an active stance on the believer's part. On the other hand, when it is used as part of a discursive strategy, framing is also the responsibility of the speaker. We refer here to the *negotiation* of frames, as a two-way process which involves both the speaker's knowledge and understanding of a (presupposed) shared belief system, and the hearer's seeking of evidence which might confirm existing beliefs. In that sense, the "bouncing off" of new facts will be seen to be dependent upon the successful negotiation of the frames within which they get interpreted. The incorporation of RT could provide valuable insight to CL accounts of frames and their usage online, so as to evaluate whether the resulting interpretations are relevant or not, and whether they are likely to be accepted.
If the purpose of a discourse is to change the hearers' mind on a particular issue, understanding frame negotiation can therefore be crucial to evaluate the mechanisms of (effective) persuasion. As Lakoff (2014) points out, facts alone might not change minds, but their interaction with certain frames might go in that direction.

It follows that the argumentation around America's military interventions should not be studied in isolation (for example as isolated speeches), as arguing for military action can only be done effectively within the frames that shape American politics, and American culture more generally. This is why the analysis of specific speeches in our data follows the establishment of structures which have been seen to be reinforced over time. Let us now move on to the linguistic strategies which serve the negotiation between entrenched frames and emerging new (contradictory) facts in discourse.

10.2. Ronald Reagan and the post-Vietnam era

"When the facts change..."

On June 13, 1971, *The New York Times* made public facts which had to that day been hidden from the American people; facts which had the power to completely disrupt the long-standing frames around which America's identity was built. The conclusions which arose from the *Pentagon Papers*, a study on America's involvement in Indochina, revealed that the reality of America's presence in that area differed in many respects from the way that it was portrayed by the current as well as the past three administrations. "Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study Traces 3 Decades of Growing U.S. Involvement." (Sheehan, 1971) How then does America's growing involvement, as described by these main headlines, sow discordance within the frames which make up America's foreign policy? The first and main revelation was that America's involvement and commitment had begun long before it was publicly debated and acknowledged, which allowed for the "careful preparation of pub-

lic opinion for the years of open warfare that were to follow" (Sheehan 1971). Such a statement clashes with the understanding of the President's role as a spokesperson for "We, the People," presenting issues and decisions to the public ahead of time, so that they can be kept informed of their country's actions. Beyond the integrity of its democracy, it is the foundation of the American identity itself which is at stake:

> The Pentagon study also ranges beyond such historical judgments. It suggests that the predominant American interest was at first containment of Communism and later the defense of the power, influence and prestige of the United States, in both stages irrespective of conditions in Vietnam. (Sheehan, 1971)

The portrayal of America's priorities in its handling of the conflicts clearly clashes with the conceptualization of US as a selfless agent in the world's fight for freedom. It indicates that the ideals stated in discourse do not reflect the reality of what America is, of what it actually stands for. While American War Rhetoric construes an America that is committed to its beliefs and to its identity, and whose commitment translates as the deployment of moral and physical strength to preserve peace wherever it is threatened, the *Pentagon Papers* pointed toward more individualistic motives, and certainly not toward a display of moral strength. A clear question then arises: how can the frames around which American War Rhetoric is built survive the public exposure of facts which completely clash with them? As a result, how can the pursuit of America's actions overseas be maintained and defended in discourse? Let us now take a closer look at Reagan's handling of the issue.

"It is time we recognized that ours was, in truth, a noble cause." (Reagan, 18.08.1980) Nine years after the American people were made aware of the *Pentagon Papers,* this still came as quite a controversial statement. In the aftermath of their shocking revelation of lies perpetuated over four administrations, another political scandal was about to appear and widen the credibility gap between the people and the American government. The Watergate Scandal revealed President Nixon's awareness of the illegal breaking into the Democratic Quarters, and exposed the flaws of America's leaders, that is a readiness to break the rules in order to gain more power. In that context, one might think that it would be extremely difficult for subsequent Presidents to get the people's approval for any type of military involvement overseas, as ulterior, power-seeking motives were made salient by revelations of multiple political scandals, both on the front of domestic and foreign policy. However, it is precisely in that context that Ronald Reagan was able to turn the situation around, taking advantage of a growing mistrust of the government to shift the focus within the frames, thus reinforcing rather than dismantling them. That is why it was important for Reagan to start turning things around, that is to start changing the discourse around Vietnam, *before* he became President, at a

time when he did not yet occupy the office which was the focus of suspicion. The speech which we are looking at in this section was given after Reagan was nominated for the Presidency, at the very beginning of his "campaign [...] to unite people of every background and faith in a great crusade to restore the America of our dreams" (Reagan, 18.08.1980). America's greatness was indeed at the centre of Reagan's rhetoric, which past errors made by previous administrations should not efface.

10.2.1. Shifting the main actors

Reagan did not accept that *America* should be blamed for the war, and he did not accept the conclusion that America should not have got involved in Vietnam. When the revelations made by the *Pentagon Papers* became public, the frames which place US in direct opposition to THEM with a rescue scenario were threatened by the claims of ulterior motives. If WE were not fighting freedom's fight, then what were WE doing in Vietnam? And how can Reagan come to the conclusion that it was, in fact, a "noble cause"?

10.2.1.1. US vs. THEM: when the American government becomes the enemy

"It is time **we** recognized that **ours** was, in truth, a noble cause." As Reagan was not in charge when Vietnam happened, and as he was not yet President of the United States when he made that statement, he was able to align with the hearers through the use of the inclusive pronoun "we." Yet he did not choose to disassociate himself with the war, with what it represented. Vietnam was not Johnson's cause, it was and is "ours." The compression of time allows for all Americans, past, present, and future, to be directly affected by the events in Vietnam, and to accept them as part of a common history. However, Reagan did not own his predecessors' mistakes; instead, he made it clear that it was time to own the war, to endorse it as part of America's history, and not to let it stray from America's purpose and identity. Reagan did not break with the frames of American War Rhetoric: he reinforced them throughout his entire time as President of the United States.

Rather than updating the entire identity of US, of what WE stand for, Reagan shifted the actors of the conflict, so that THEY, the representation of OUR enemy, would also encompass the previous administrations, not merely because they betrayed the American public, but because they impeded the right course of the war. THEY (OUR enemy) are here also those who shamed the war and along with it, those who fought it. The main victims are therefore the soldiers who gave their lives to stand for America's ideals, and who were not given proper support by their government, or subsequently by the American people.

(1) “There is no freedom in the so-called peace in Vietnam [...] in Cambodia there is only the peace of the grave for at least one-third of the population slaughtered by the Communists. For too long, we have lived with the ‘Vietnam Syndrome.’ Much of that syndrome has been created by the North Vietnamese aggressors who now threaten the peaceful people of Thailand. Over and over they told us for nearly 10 years that we were the aggressors bent on imperialistic conquests. They had a plan. It was to win in the field of propaganda here in America what they could not win on the field of battle in Vietnam. As the years dragged on, we were told that peace would come if we would simply stop interfering and go home. It is time we recognized that ours was, in truth, a noble cause.” (Reagan, 18.08.1980)

Reagan’s interpretation of the “Vietnam Syndrome” illustrates the way in which he shifts focus, while maintaining the long-standing frames of American War rhetoric (at the heart of which is OUR place in the world), and reinforcing positive attitudes towards the concept of STRENGTH. The Vietnam Syndrome generally referred to a growing reluctance to send American troops to fight conflicts overseas, following the devastation of the Vietnam War and the scandals in its aftermath. The original metaphor thus focuses on the impact of the trauma which the Vietnam War represents, and on its lasting consequences. The reality of the Vietnam War is something which Americans had to learn to live with. But that is not how Reagan interprets the metaphor. This subsection aims to evaluate what it is that makes his interpretation of the metaphor efficient in persuading the American public that the overarching frame *Fighting against Evil* was well and truly still relevant. According to Reagan, “much of that syndrome has been *created*” (my emphasis), highlighting the distinction between the natural and the artificial from the Medical Input Space. In the conceptual blend, what America is suffering from is not a *natural* result of the war, but rather it appears as something that was planned by the enemy, something that is not real, but which has real and damaging consequences. Reagan’s interpretation of the Vietnam Syndrome metaphor therefore focuses on the links between syndromes, their origins, and most importantly, their potential eradication through a remedy. In the Medical Input Space, a relation of Cause-Effect links a disease with its physical manifestations. In the blend, this relation gets compressed, so that the manifestation of America’s distrust gets equated with the enemy’s evil plan to defeat US. Unlike the usual interpretation of the Vietnam Syndrome, Reagan’s construal allows for the conceptualization of an end to that disease. It is undesirable, it is not right, and America has been living with it for too long. It is now time to move on. For Reagan, the consequence of the Vietnam Syndrome is the wrong conceptualization of peace, and how it should be obtained: “As the years dragged on, we were told that peace would come if we would simply stop interfering and go home.” (1) This was a lie, as “there is no freedom in the so-called peace in Vietnam,” and leads to the distinction between ‘real’ and ‘fake’ peace. The lasting consequence of US believing those lies is the denial of danger where it arises, the hesitation or even refusal to deploy or pursue strength, leaving US and the rest of the world weakened, and vulnerable to attacks. A typical portrayal of the enemy thus appears, breaking the rules of combat by using pro-

paganda where THEY do not have the means to win fairly. But as time goes on, the enemy also encompasses those who continue to believe that peace will be obtained simply by believing that the Other will not take action, thus promoting a laid back attitude from the United States. What gets even more dangerous is the possibility that subsequent administrations might continue to perpetuate that belief:

(2) "Is it only Jimmy Carter's lack of coherent policy that is the source of our difficulty? Is it his vacillation and indecision? Or is there another, more frightening possibility - the possibility that this administration is being very consistent, that it is still guided by that same old doctrine that we have nothing to fear from the Soviets - if we just don't provoke them." (Reagan, 18.08.1980)

Through a reinterpretation of the Vietnam Syndrome, this erroneous conceptualization of what peace is and how it is obtained is directly linked to the propaganda spread by the aggressors at the time of the Vietnam War, and which is still spreading through the policies of the current administration. A relation of Cause-Effect thus appears in the Vietnam Syndrome blend, and that is what needs to be remedied so as to "restore the margin of safety," the aim after which this speech was entitled. Beyond the interpretation of what happened in Vietnam, the conceptualization of STRENGTH as necessary for PEACE to flourish is also reinforced, and with it America's beliefs and ideals in promoting lasting, real peace in the world. By focusing on the origins of the Vietnam Syndrome as being manufactured by an unlawful enemy, and on the role played by the current and previous administrations in perpetuating it, Reagan is able to turn his attention to the immediate need to address it, and move on from it. In this blend, Johnson and his administration, Carter, and other 'weak' politicians become the means to the enemy's evil plan. As a result, Reagan was able to reconcile the devastation of Vietnam with the well-known frame at the heart of which lies THEIR evil. A typical US vs. THEM dichotomy thus established THEM as the masters of deception; THEY are the cheats, *not US*. According to Reagan, it was then high time that the truth was re-established, starting with the real victim of the Vietnam Syndrome: the American soldier.

10.2.1.2. The American soldier as the real victim

After the war's devastating end, and following the revelations of the *Pentagon Papers*, the public felt betrayed, angry. Reagan, however, turned his attention to the figure of the soldier as the real victim of the Vietnam Syndrome:

(3) "A small country newly free from colonial rule sought our help in establishing self-rule and the means of self-defense against a totalitarian neighbor bent on conquest. We dishonor the memory of 50,000 young Americans who died in that cause when we give way to feelings of guilt as if we were doing something shameful, and we have been shabby in our treatment of those who returned. They fought as well and as bravely as any Americans have ever fought in any war. They deserve our gratitude, our respect, and our continuing concern.

There is a lesson for all of us in Vietnam. If we are forced to fight, we must have the means and the determination to prevail or we will not have what it takes to secure the peace. And while we are at it, let us tell those who fought in that war that we will never again ask young men to fight and possibly die in a war our government is afraid to let them win." (Reagan, 18.08.1980)

This also allows for a slight shift of emotions. From feelings of outrage towards a deceptive government, Reagan confronts the American people with their "shabby treatment" of those who served their country, who risked their lives or died defending American ideals. Again, Reagan is pointing out the wrongness of people's reaction after the war in Vietnam. By linking the government's deception with America's behavior in military conflicts, a natural consequence was the lack of acclamation for those returning from a war which was not well-supported. According to Reagan, this consequence, this "shabby treatment" of OUR soldiers was wrong, and so was the reasoning that led to it. By focusing on the figure of the soldier, Reagan is able to begin to restore the image of America's greatness. We will now explore how this shift of emotions occurred in discourse, from disillusion, to guilt, and back to anger:

• From disillusion to guilt...

The soldier is a unique figure in American War Rhetoric. He represents everything that America stands for: the willingness to sacrifice to serve American ideals, to serve world peace; the strength to turn principles into actions, even when those actions constitute the highest risk to oneself; and the strength of the American military, of America's power to restore justice where evil occurs. A corpus-based analysis of the term 'soldier*' confirms that in our data, mentions of the soldier do not serve to depict the reality of the war (except in circumstances where the speaker's point is to depict the enemy's cruelty in their treatment of "our soldiers"). Rather, soldiers are praised, thanked for their sacrifice. Action verbs are rarely collocates (especially in the active voice): the soldiers "deserve," they "are." They remind the American people that the cause which they are fighting for is worthy, sometimes through their own voice which the speaker quotes. This both serves to keep the reality of war at bay, the reality that "our" soldiers also kill, to focus solely on the reality of their sacrifice for "us" all, on the ideals which they make real. The figure of the soldier is thus constantly reinforced as the embodiment of America's selflessness, an indisputable figure of respect. Whether or not one supports the government and their decisions, support of the soldier is generally agreed on. Reagan reminds the American people that their reaction to what happened in Vietnam was not simply against political leaders, but also against the figure of the American soldier. The "dishonoring" of OUR soldiers is yet another manifestation of this Vietnam Syndrome, and one which must be addressed. According to Reagan, this happens "when we give way to feelings of guilt as if we

were doing something shameful." Guilt is here construed as a FORCE, a negative force which in this case, is wrong. Americans must therefore resist that force. "Giving way" to guilt appears as the easy way, resulting from a lack of moral strength. By shifting the focus onto the soldier, feelings of guilt get triggered, but these are not associated with America's part in the war - rather, they are linked with the poor treatment of those who served in the war. The reason why this might be particularly efficient is that Reagan acknowledges the reality of the people's guilt. By construing this guilt as a negative force, a conceptual blend gets formed, within which relations between the various actors and elements of the issue appear to be restored to their rightful place. At the center is guilt, a negative force, here construed as a temptation: what needs to be acknowledged for this to make sense in the first place is that that guilt is wrong, in that it should not be associated with US. The unsuitability or misplacement of guilt in relation to US is reinforced by its construction within a counterfactual space: "as if we were doing something shameful." Two alternative space builders are thus created: the reality space, in which WE have not done anything shameful, and therefore where guilt has no place; and one where WE have done something shameful, justifying OUR feeling guilty. This is what leads to the conceptualization of OUR guilt as inappropriate. As the two spaces get fused, a blend gets created in which WE are innocent *and* feel guilty. A paradox appears in the blend, and the resolution comes as WE let go of that guilt. The ramifications of that misplaced guilt do not just impact the American people. A relation of Cause-Effect also links these feelings of guilt with "our shabby treatment" of the soldiers, who "we dishonor." The honoring frame serves to remind the American people that something big, something highly worthy happened, which most people are not able to do. In other words, it places the figure of the solider above us all. This frame directly taps into the overarching frame of America's fight or mission against evil, which can thus get reinforced. But the difference is here that although the people felt uneasy with applauding their country given the revelations made in the aftermath of the war, they could still easily rally around the figure of the solider. This is how the latter can logically appear as the main victim, as the recipient at the end of an unfortunate course of events. As everything seems to be off in the blend, and Americans are led to conclude that they have been made feel guilty where they should not have, leading to the mistreatment of selfless soldiers, Reagan is then able to redirect another strong emotion associated with the Vietnam War: anger.

• ... and back to anger

Finally, Reagan points out that it is not just the American people who mistreated soldiers, but first and foremost the administration who they were serving and who gave them orders. In order to recti-

fy the wrong that was done, Reagan promises that "we will never again ask young men to fight and possibly die in a war our government is afraid to let them win." The blame is clear: it was the government's handling of the situation which was to account for the outcome of the Vietnam War. The government clearly appears here as an obstacle to the soldiers' fight, and in that way gets disassociated with its ideals, who the soldiers represent. The government's role is here construed as supporting the soldiers on the field, in their fight for American ideals. In the case of Vietnam, they did just the opposite, and in that sense, aided the enemy's cause. Their indecision and weaknesses played against US, and that is what Americans should be angry about.

This construal of the government at the time of the Vietnam War as obstacles to the soldiers' fight took hold, and became the basis of the assurance from subsequent Presidents that they would not let there be "another Vietnam."

(4) "I've told the American people before that this will not be another Vietnam, and I repeat this here tonight. Our troops will have the best possible support in the entire world, and they will not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back." (G. Bush, 16.01.1991)

Focusing on the soldier as the main victim of the Vietnam War has therefore led to this re-interpretation, where participation in war gets construed as following the rules/accepted ethics of a sports competition. We saw in Chapter 9 that this type of conceptualization led to the conclusion that there needs to be a winner and a loser, and promotes the need for immediate action so as not to let the Other win. In this blend, however, the administration at the time of the Vietnam War appears as not committed, and in fact, uncooperative, so that the soldiers were left to fight "with one hand tied behind their back." The enemy is not the only one who gets portrayed as not being or acting fair play. Rather, it is OUR own government that gets construed as the obstacle, as the reason for OUR losing the war. The soldier thus appears as an innocent victim, betrayed by their leaders' lack of care and willingness to put them out there without the right resources. The issue is not the sport itself, but the way that it was being played. We saw in Chapter 4 that the means used often stood in a metonymic relationship with the enemy's actions, highlighting their lack of humanity, lack of regard for other people, and their sole concern for individual gains of power. In (4), the blend also highlights the despicable means used by the American government to fight the war as the reason for OUR loss, aligning them with OUR enemy. This blend therefore maintains the central aspect of the government's betrayal, as well as the strong emotions that it triggered. However, these emotions are no longer associated with America's identity or role in the world, but instead they are directed at particular individuals who chose not to abide by the rules of the 'sport of war.' The "noble cause" (that which is at the heart of the frames of American War Rhetoric) which the soldiers were fighting,

however, remains intact. Whether the enemy refers to the Communists or to the American administration which let them win, the acknowledgement of failings does not need to reflect on OUR identity. Deceitful methods and the pursuit of strength for personal gains remains restricted to THEM, and thus does not apply to US. This shifting process is important, because in a context where the mere mention of Vietnam might trigger anger, the sole profiling of positive emotions (such as pride, for instance) would most likely have rung false to account for what happened, and most likely would not have led to such a successful re-interpretation. Besides, if emotions are understood as feedback processes (Plutchik, 2001), then a new interpretation of Vietnam which did not incorporate the public's emotions probably would not have been as persuasive.

10.2.2. Moving on from Vietnam

A conceptual metonymy is often used to refer to the debacle of the Vietnam War: LOCATION FOR EVENT. When involved in military conflicts, Presidents such as George Bush then promised the American people that it would not be "another Vietnam" (4). What do such promises entail, and how does the omission of "war" help to 'stay within the frames?' I argue here that thanks to the re-interpretation initiated by Reagan, the Vietnam War does not get construed as representative of the American tradition. By profiling the specificities of that one instantiation of war, it is not the American tradition which is attacked, but rather the circumstances of the event: the people in charge, the choices made, the enemy's success at spreading their propaganda, etc. Part of Reagan's strategy was indeed to operate shifts while maintaining the frames around which American War Rhetoric is built. This section focuses on shifts in perspective which allowed Reagan to move on from Vietnam. Specifically, the aim here is to understand why these shifts are effective in terms of persuasion. Indeed, following numerous deceptions, how does Reagan's re-interpretation of Vietnam get accepted so easily, in the sense that it led to his ability to argue for America's active pursuit of strength as President? This is where the complementarity of CBT and RT can prove to be of particular interest, to show that the online interpretation of utterances can lead to the consolidation of some mental structures (or frames).

10.2.2.1. Profiling tradition

Reagan did not simply state that people's interpretation of Vietnam was wrong; that Americans should remain proud of their country's identity and achievements. Such feelings were shared rather than explicitly communicated, through the careful manufacturing of a context which profiles tradi-

tion and therefore makes easily available feelings of pride, in a way that makes them 'ring true.' In that way, the incorporation of positive emotional effects can be extremely fruitful in bringing together insights from RT and CBT.

Reagan's entire speech focuses on the bigger picture, presenting the events in Vietnam and the decade that followed as a bump on the road to something bigger, something that has always been America's destiny. He did that through the use of a familiar metaphor which was already a staple component of American War Rhetoric: the JOURNEY metaphor. One of his criticisms is that "America has been sleepwalking for too long." Here again, it is the *manner* with which America is seen to tackle its JOURNEY that is attacked, rather than the JOURNEY itself. The current situation is conceptualized as an episode which is not representative of the way in which America normally behaves. In order for such behavior not to become the norm, Reagan then urges his public that "we need to snap out of it." Reagan thus shifts the hearers' perspective, getting them to stop zooming onto the tragedy of its circumstances, which in itself would prevent America from moving on. Although sleepwalking is not a type of walking to get to a destination, that is precisely Reagan's point: that America is wandering and needs to get back on track. The activation of the JOURNEY metaphor does not happen through the mere mention of America's sleepwalking. Rather, it is used on numerous occasions throughout the speech, in order to remind Americans of the tradition which they are part of.

(5) "Shouldn't it be obvious to even the staunchest believer in unilateral disarmament as **the sure road to peace**, that peace was never more certain than in the years following WWII when we had a margin of safety in our military power which was so unmistakable that others would not dare to challenge us?"
(6) There is **an alternative path for America** which offers a more realistic hope for peace, **one which takes us on the course of restoring that vital margin of safety** [...] It is **steadiness** and the vision of men like Dwight Eisenhower that we have to thank for policies that made America strong and credible."
(7) "When we ignore our friends, **when we do not lead**, we weaken the unity and strength that binds our alliances. We must now **reverse this dangerous trend** and restore the confidence and cohesion of the alliance system on which our security ultimately rests."
(8) "There is something else. We must remember **our heritage**, who we are and what we are, and **how this nation**, this island of freedom, **came into being**. And we must make it unmistakably plain to all the world that we have no intention of compromising our principles, our beliefs or our freedom. Our reward will be world peace; there is **no other way** to have it."
(9) "Recently academician Andrei Sakharov, one of Russia's great scientists and presently under house arrest, smuggled a statement out of the Soviet Union. It turned up in the New York Times Magazine of June 8, where Sakharov wrote: 'I consider the United States **the historically determined leader of the movement towards a pluralist and free society**, vital to mankind.' He is right. **We have strayed off course many times** and we have been careless with **the machinery of freedom bequeathed to us by the Founding Fathers**, but, somehow, it has managed to survive our frailties. One of those Founding Fathers spoke the truth when he said 'God intended America to be free.'" (Reagan, 18.08.1980, my emphases)

Utterances (5) to (9) have been selected to highlight the extensive use of several of the conceptual metaphors which are so influential in making up the mental structures, what we refer to here as the

frames upon which American War Rhetoric is built. WE are on a JOURNEY, and only an active stance can keep US moving to reach OUR destination (peace); WE ARE A FAMILY, and must pay respect to OUR eldest ancestors, the Founding Fathers, by cherishing what they have bequeathed US: "the machinery of freedom" (9). It is this heritage which makes US the leaders of the journey to world peace, and the activation of metaphors which are at the heart of America's history and identity serves to make salient the concept of tradition, which also makes more salient a form of reasoning which directs the hearer's attention on to one's origins as the defining source of one's goals, or here, destination. At the heart of OUR existence is therefore this machinery of freedom, which gets passed from generation to generation, and which WE can only protect through OUR STRENGTH (through OUR military power and moral standing). As Reagan's speech goes on, OUR STRENGTH proves to be not just "an alternative path" (6), but in fact it is "the only way" (8) to preserve, consolidate, or obtain peace. Within this narrative, the soldier represents a central figure, as the one who turns OUR principles, OUR words into actions, into reality, as "the cause of peace is best served by strength not bluster." When tradition is made salient, the hearer is led to conceptualize America's strength as a broader concept which serves OUR ideals, and which gets realized as soldiers fight for their country's ideals. What is made less accessible is thus the potential negative consequences of using strength, 'collateral damage.' While it seems clear that Reagan is reminding Americans of what binds them all together (past, present and future generations), how do these utterances contribute to the overall effectiveness of persuasion, so that their acceptance can lead to the perpetuating of America's mission through a renewed pursuit of strength (in Reagan's understanding)?

"The assessment of relevance is not the goal of the comprehension process, but only a means to an end, the end being to maximise the relevance of any information being processed." (Sperber & Wilson, 1995: 142) By looking at the interpretation process in that light, one can get to a better understanding of Reagan's strategies' persuasive effectiveness. By grounding his re-interpretation within frames which are deeply entrenched in American culture; by making salient the notion of tradition, the inference that Vietnam was just a poorly executed operation appears immediately relevant. In fact, it can appear as the only plausible interpretation, so that the interpretation process might stop, that is so that there is no need to look for further explanations as to what happened in Vietnam; so that WE can move on from Vietnam.

10.2.2.2. Analogy with the past

The constraint of the context within which America's actions are to be interpreted, which works here by enlarging it and adopting a broader perspective, lends itself to one of Reagan's preferred strategies: analogy with the past. The latter is particularly effective in that constrained context, because it directs the hearer's attention away from the specificities of Vietnam, to focus on the broader tradition which links OUR past with OUR present, and OUR future. His observations of the present are that WE are no longer strong: "We find ourselves in a position of dangerous isolation. Our allies are losing confidence in us, and our adversaries no longer respect us." So when was the last time that WE were perceived as strong? When were WE at OUR strongest? And therefore how can WE get back to that point? According to Reagan, there are two ways to look at the current situation, two "paths" for America: one which advocates a 'backing down' attitude (which would play in THEIR favor), and one which promotes the pursuit of strength to secure peace, both to America's and the world's advantage. The Vietnam Syndrome in its original understanding illustrates the first path, which is to account for America's "declining power." The Americans' disillusion which is often associated with the Vietnam Syndrome does not make sense within Reagan's portrayal of the current situation. Indeed, if one is to look at Vietnam as evidence that America's goal is to seek supremacy (disguised as the defense of freedom), is one to entirely discard the American identity which was forged by the Founding Fathers, or at least the survival of this identity? Cognitively and psychologically speaking, this would be very costly, and would involve rethinking America's purpose, whose sacredness the hearers are here reminded of (9). Is this how far we need to go back when rethinking America's identity? Was the failure of the leaders at the time of the Vietnam War representative of the whole American tradition? Or is it more likely that this episode was a singularity, and that OUR current straying off course and perceived weakness should actually reinforce the previously held belief that only the pursuit of strength can serve the cause of peace not only in America, but in the entire world? Besides, the 'disillusion interpretation' does not offer many positive effects: indeed, where does one go from there? What solutions does the rejection of America's identity provide? What are the entailments for the status of American democracy? One might argue that updating one's knowledge of one's country's actions might be worth the cognitive effort. However, when that updated knowledge does not match one's own beliefs or ideals, or perhaps when it clashes with the pride which one feels for one's country and of which Reagan reminds the public, when there is no room to integrate these individual ideals with the future of the country, is it really satisfactory? On the other hand, Reagan's re-interpretation offers just that: hope, and a plan for the future; a plan to get back on track; a plan which allows Americans to remain proud of their country, and to maintain

America's exceptionalism while acknowledging flaws along the way. A plan which fits in well with the confirmation bias, this seeking of interpretations which match an existing belief system.

We have already mentioned the significance of the links, the relations between elements of a frame which CBT clearly highlights. In this particular example, these relations are all the more significant: the elements (actors, events, means, even emotions) remain the same. But the relations between them all get updated, in a way which maintains, and even restores, the relevance of the familiar frame *Fighting against Evil.* THEY are the source of all that went wrong, at the origin of the main conflict. THEY cheated, this time all the way to victory, and in so doing THEIR evil reached some of US. Let us now focus on how these relations get constructed in Reagan's discourse. Reagan's discourse is grounded in the conceptualization of the past as a form of authority from which one can reason about the present and the future. Let us look at how Reagan incorporates the "lesson" of Vietnam by expanding on the context around utterance (4):

(10) There is a lesson for all of us in Vietnam. If we are forced to fight, we must have the means and the determination to prevail or we will not have what it takes to secure the peace. [...] Shouldn't it be obvious to even the staunchest believer in unilateral disarmament as the sure road to peace that peace was never more certain than in the years following World War II when we had a margin of safety in our military power which was so unmistakable that others would not dare to challenge us? The Korean tragedy was really not an exception to what I am saying, but a clear example of it. North Korea's attack on South Korea followed an injudicious statement from Washington that our sphere of interest in the Pacific and that our defense perimeter did not include Korea. Unfortunately, Korea also became our first 'no win war,' a portent of much that has happened since. But reflect for a moment how in those days the U.S. led free nations in other parts of the world to join together in recovering from the ravages of war. Our will and our capacity to preserve the peace were unchallenged. There was no question about our credibility and our welcome throughout the world. Our erstwhile enemies became close friends and allies, and we protected the peace from Berlin to Cuba." (Reagan, 18.08.1980)

This reminder of America's past serves to remind the hearers that America used to be respected by the rest of the world for its efforts in preserving peace. The criticism that America's pursuit of strength is only indicative of its desire for supremacy then is not consistent with America's history, and surely should not reflect on its accomplishments in "recovering from the ravages of war," or the many sacrifices that were made to join the world in fighting evil. The relations of analogy which are made in (10) allow the hearers to construct America's recent mistakes as evidence that OUR tradition and belief in America's greatness are actually well-founded, that OUR STRENGTH is solely used to serve the cause of peace.



—> OUR STRENGTH is always at the service of others, and of "our" own security (which also serves world peace)

Fig. 22: The lessons of Vietnam

As we saw in Chapter 6, conceptual integration is not restricted to the analysis of conceptual metaphors. In this particular example, the analogy between the two input spaces (America's past and present) serves to identify an issue in the present, so as to consolidate America's ideals and strategy for the future. The analogy gives rise to an integrated mental space, a conceptual blend: indeed, the relation of analogy which links the America in the past space and the America in the present space is compressed into one of identity, as WE are all linked by a common heritage dating back to the Founding Fathers. On the other hand, America's current issues are linked by a relation of disanalogy with America's past. This disanalogy is then reconciled in the blend. If some hearers might be skeptical regarding America's involvement in foreign issues, and particularly regarding its pursuit of strength in response to the Soviet Union's advances, that concern is addressed and then dismantled. The belief that America's pursuit of strength is beneficial for the cause of peace is somewhat being tested, only to be proved right. It is that belief that is identified as the source of the disanalogy between the two input spaces. In the past space, America's involvement in war (and more generally in world affairs) is linked by a relation of Cause-Effect to its authority and credibility being "unchallenged," through its active role in maintaining the peace and in helping other countries to get back on their feet. In the present space, what seems to have changed is this particular belief regarding America's role and strength which is to account for America's first "no win war." In the conceptual blend, where America's special identity is maintained, America's behavior after Vietnam, along with the previous "Korean tragedy," appear as a test to that belief, a test which is

proving to fail. Rather than seeing Vietnam as a sign that America's identity is not what it claims to be, and that America's involvement should decrease, it is precisely this reaction, this lack of faith in US which gets construed in the blend as OUR WEAKNESS, as the source of America's "declining power." The relation of Cause-Effect which appears in the input spaces thus gets transferred to the blend and appears as a consolidation of the belief that OUR STRENGTH is a good thing, that it is necessary, that it is noble. The blend thus manages to integrate the people's anger at previous administrations for getting things wrong, for placing their own interests first rather than serving the cause of peace, along with feelings of pride for OUR special country, and allows for plans to be made to restore OUR greatness. What is offered throughout this blend is a glimpse into a better future, one which has learned from past mistakes. This re-interpretation of Vietnam thus maximizes the balance of cognitive costs and benefits, as it is grounded in deeply entrenched mental structures regarding the relationships between America's present and its past, while allowing to preserve not only America's special identity, but also the hearers' ideals and the pride which they might feel for their country (past, present, and future). These feelings of pride are not merely stated, they get shared thanks to the profiling of continuity (clearly highlighted by the framework of CBT) and to constant reminders of America's past achievements and noble goals. I argue that this is what might lead to the trigger of positive emotional effects, and that these influence the interpretation process so that hearers are not led to interpret the failure of Vietnam as representative of their country's identity. The preservation of the relation of Uniqueness which links all of "us" in the present to "our" Founding Fathers through perpetuating "our mission" is instrumental to the trigger of pride. It is what allows Reagan to claim that by holding onto disillusion following the Vietnam War, it is not only the image of the latter which is attacked, but that of OUR entire history; in that sense, it might also lead to the sharing of guilt, and to the need to update one's assumptions on Vietnam. It is perhaps ironic then, given Reagan's strong focus on the bigger picture, that what this interpretation fails to take into account is the impact of America's *repeated* interventions, and the long-term effects that these could have. If one was to take this impact into account, "not acting then" really cannot be compared to "not acting now." We will expand on the costs which the conceptualization of this type of causality represents in Chapter 12.

Positive emotional effects can also be reinforced as Reagan's interpretation links in with the broader conceptualizations which make up the landscape of American politics and culture in general. I argued in Chapter 2 that this can lead to a general feeling of coherence, and that as coherence feels good (Thagard, 2008), positive emotional effects can get triggered. Following the analysis of Rea-

gan's discourse, one might then also conclude that these directly serve the hearer's search for relevance, as the events discussed can be made sense of in an easily accessible context, one which is used to construct various aspects of reality. In this case, the weakness vs. strength frame which appears taps into the broader mission/responsibility frame at the heart of America's history but also of American culture. Positive feelings towards strength as a sign of independence are indeed prevalent within American culture. This can lead to feelings that Reagan's interpretation rings true, that he got it right. As negative attitudes towards weakness are made available, the interpretation that OUR weakness following Vietnam was due to OUR taking a strong stance in the first place appears completely wrong. Should an entirely different frame be chosen, such as that of bullying, negative interpretations of weakness would not be as easily accessible, and they would also not fit in with the broader American narrative. But in a context which profiles America's history and greatness, only made possible thanks to the people's strength to face the oppressor and rise to independence, the opposite is true. Our final example highlights the tightening of relations when analogies with the past are drawn, consolidating that feeling that everything seems to fit.

(11) "We have an example in recent history of our ability to negotiate properly by keeping our objective clearly in mind until an agreement is reached. Back in the mid '50's, at the very height of the 'Cold War,' Allied and Soviet military forces were still occupying Austria in a situation that was virtually a confrontation. We negotiated the Austrian State Treaty calling for the removal of all the occupying forces, Allied and Soviet. **If we had negotiated in the manner we've seen these last few years, Austria would still be a divided country.**" (Reagan, 18.08.1980, my emphasis)

In (11), Reagan uses counterfactual reasoning to pinpoint the problems of the present, in order to remedy them. The hypothesis that American strength (both moral and physical) might not be necessary is again tested, to be proved wrong again. A blend gets formed as a result of two input spaces fusing together: one in which America behaves as it did in the past (in the mid '50's), and one in which America's current behavior is adopted. The result is an Austria which is still divided, where past conflicts failed to be resolved. The conclusion is thus that the clear perspective which America used to have in handling foreign policy was right, and that today's hesitation leads to the suffering of freedom. The point of counterfactual reasoning is to pinpoint one single element which appears to be key to the resolution of such issues: America's intervention, but through a firm rather than hesitating hand. Once OUR action gets consolidated as the cause leading to the securing of peace, the conceptualization of OUR repeated action as potentially damaging becomes increasingly more costly, and is thus kept in the background.

Conceptual Blending offers a very persuasive reasoning mechanism, as it allows hearers to draw conclusions from what they know and trust. In this case, conceptual blending takes the appearance

of mathematical reasoning, as a single variable is identified in two otherwise similar spaces, leading to the consolidation of a hypothesis in the blend. The compression of analogy, (between the America of today and that of the Founding Fathers, and between America in the '50's and America today), into identity in the blend makes the events of Vietnam appear as an oddity that must be rectified in the future, rather than as the unveiling of America's true nature. Reagan's interpretation can then be said to be optimally relevant, as it appears as the only one which does not destroy the sacred element which is often associated with the American identity, thus lessening the costs of interpretation, and providing with the benefits to confirm past beliefs and to plan for a better future.

10.2.2.3. Concluding remarks

Through the process of shifting perspective within familiar frames, the latter are reinforced rather than dismantled, despite the strong emotions which the Vietnam War stirred within the public. Emotions happen as a reaction to an event, and as such, can be short-lived. What we have seen here, however, is the reinforcement of long-standing attitudes which link the interpretation of the conflicts with one's broader understanding of strength, for example. Positive attitudes towards strength are crucial in maintaining the relevance of the frame *Fighting against Evil.* The public is reminded about what it is that they know and trust about OUR strength, directing the attention away from its recent mishandling. The manufacturing of the context in which these interpretations are set is also influential in building their relevance. Both CBT and RT see the context as a determining factor to guide the interpretation process. The blend which appears above (Fig. 20) highlights the presence within that context of certain emotions and attitudes, and of salient conceptual metaphors. Let us now examine in more detail the context in which Reagan's speech is given. Reagan had just accepted the nomination to run as candidate in the upcoming American Presidential election. America had known its first "no win war," and it could be said that its credibility in the world was lessening. Such a context is ripe for the reinforcement of positive values; it presents the perfect opportunity to give hope to the American people by offering something new, perhaps ironically by getting back to what is familiar and what feels good: pride in America's greatness. In this context, the values which have been identified as central to the blends analyzed are made salient: America's greatness, the sacredness of its mission; America's great foundation and history (of which the election of a new President by the people is a great testimony, one that is perhaps truer to the American identity); liberty resulting from a show of strength from those who were willing to fight and stand up for what they believed in, etc. It is these values which Reagan appeals to in this speech, and which are made

salient in this discourse and throughout his entire campaign. Reagan's strategy can thus be said to be twofold:

- (a): foregrounding of a context in which values associated with the American identity are made salient;
- (b): formulation of a re-interpretation of past issues (Vietnam) which is made to appear perfectly coherent in this context.

As a result of (b), Reagan's re-interpretation of Vietnam is thus easily processed and can appear as the only plausible one. Reagan's strategy can be effectively accounted for by a combination of CBT and RT, for the following reasons:

- CBT can effectively highlight the links/relations which appear in the blend, and which are at the heart of Reagan's 'shifting within the frames' strategy. They are what allows for the construction of continuity, as relations of Identity are profiled between the America of yesterday, that of today's and tomorrow's;
- The trigger of positive emotional effects (which are directly linked to relevance) can then support this all-clarifying feeling which Fauconnier and Turner (2002) claim accounts for the efficiency of blends, as the profiling of continuity and tradition allows to share rather than communicate feelings of pride, and as connections get reinforced between various elements of American culture.

Conceptual Blending and Relevance Theory work very well together when analyzing an utterance's potential at reinforcing or updating beliefs. While the online interpretation of a single utterance, or of an entire speech might not easily affect someone's beliefs, its relationship with the frames around which a community is built is essential when assessing its potential for effective persuasion.

10.3. G.W. Bush and the issue of unfounded argumentation

Section 2 of this chapter explored in more detail the ways in which CBT and RT could be combined in order to assess the efficiency of persuasive mechanisms. With the example of Reagan's handling of the "Vietnam Syndrome," this led to the conclusion that his re-interpretation of Vietnam met conditions of optimal relevance, reinforcing rather than dismantling the frame *Fighting against Evil* as essential to OUR identity. This section will not repeat this analysis, and instead will focus on the ways in which profiling certain aspects of this frame can help to keep reinforcing its relevance when interpreting international conflicts, even when conflicting facts emerge.

(12) "History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action." (G.W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 17, 2002)

It is with this quote that President G.W. Bush opened his National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, in order to prepare his country to defend against this new threat. Following this "path of action," on March 17, 2003, the President delivered a speech in which he announced a final ultimatum to Iraq:

(13) "All the decades of deceit and cruelty have now reached an end. Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing." (G.W. Bush, 17.03.2003)

Accordingly, the second Gulf War was launched two days later. However, America's choice to engage in a military conflict was far from unanimous within the international community. Although G.W. Bush's strategy highlighted the need for "new methods of deterrence" due to the new nature of the threat encountered, the legitimization of war still relied on the use of war as a last resort. As Bush repeatedly reminds the American Nation in his address, diplomatic efforts had been going on for decades, with the aim to get Iraq to disarm and in so doing remove the threat posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). As Iraq still had not fully complied in March 2003, the President of the United States declared that it was time to take further action, but that was not the opinion of the U.N. Security Council, and the United States failed to get a resolution to authorize the use of force. In fact, just ten days before the President's address, U.N. Chief Inspector Hans Blix made his twelfth report on the situation in Iraq, which was in line with his previous reports indicating that although Iraq had not complied with the "immediacy" aspect of the demand to disarm, it was now being "proactive" and was showing signs of cooperation. Besides signs of Saddam's cooperation, Blix added that the evidence of the presence of a nuclear program was not all that conclusive. According to a U.N.'s press release (05.06.2003), "it is not justified to jump to the conclusion that something exists just because it is unaccounted for." What Blix made evident was that inspectors needed more time (Powell, 2004); what was questioned was therefore precisely that the time to act had come.

Was the war announced by President Bush on March 17, 2003 then really a last resort? We saw in Chapters 7-9 that American War Rhetoric tended to hide any path other than that of immediate action, and to hide the fact that inaction could have positive effects. The Blix Report, along with the U.N.'s veto to use force seems to highlight that in that case, war was not necessarily the way for-

ward. Given that G.W. Bush's argumentation revolved around the construction of a terrifying threat which needed to be removed immediately, how did the emergence of new, contradictory facts not lead to the collapse of his strategy? The construction of war as a last resort seems to play a rather important role in the conceptualization of US as a peaceful people, concerned with saving innocent victims and protecting OUR own nation, but only inflicting harm onto brutal enemies who cannot be reasoned with. In that sense, can the President continue to rely on the frames on which American War Rhetoric is built? Can *Fighting against Evil* retain its relevance, when the evil dictator is showing signs of cooperation, and no evidence of weapons has been found? In order to answer these questions, this section takes an in depth look at the President's address to the Nation (17.03.2003) following the release of the Blix Report, as he went against the U.N.'s authority by warning of the inevitability of military conflict.

10.3.1. America fights... to punish a lawless enemy

The U.N.'s role might be summed up as that of a regulator of international relationships. When serious crimes are committed, its role might be perceived as that of a judge's, ensuring that the appropriate sentence is agreed on. This means that when war is agreed on, the U.N.'s approval acts as a form of insurance that war is indeed lawful, and that no other way could have been used to meet the demands of justice. As George W. Bush decided to go against the U.N.'s judgement, does this make his decision unlawful? According to a Gallup Poll following the U.N.'s veto, it was found that

> "while many Americans are uneasy about a war without U.N. backing, most don't blame Bush for the impasse, even in the face of heavy U.S. and international media criticism that he botched the diplomatic job. Most Americans say Bush is doing a better job handling the Iraq situation than the U.N. is." (*USA Today*, 16.03.2003)

How then does President Bush determine THEIR guilt (and suppress his)? I argue that although the facts seem to contradict the main frames of American War Rhetoric, it is by sticking closely to these frames that President Bush is able to establish that THEIR guilt justifies OUR action. We saw in Chapters 3-6 that the construction of a binary opposition between US and THEM portrayed THEM as a lawless group, devoid of humanity and mercy, and making US a trustworthy nation whose main concern is to see that justice has been done. In his address to the Nation, Bush's strategy revolves around focusing on the *character* of the actors involved. There are certain things that do not change, and by ignoring them, it is the peace and security of the world which is in jeopardy. The threat which THEY pose to OUR country, and to the rest of the world, is thus construed as stemming from

THEIR unreliable, unpredictable character, rather than from the certainty of THEIR possessing WMDs, or from evidence found to incriminate THEM.

(14) "The Iraqi regime has used diplomacy as a ploy to gain time and advantage. It has uniformly defied Security Council resolutions demanding full disarmament. Over the years, U.N. weapon inspectors have been threatened by Iraqi officials, electronically bugged, and systematically deceived. Peaceful efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime have failed again and again — because we are not dealing with peaceful men."

(15) "The regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep hatred of America and our friends. And it has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qaeda."

The extensive use of the present perfect throughout the entire speech presupposes the strong possibility of recurrence of past crimes, but with the added threat that more powerful weapons might be used. What is often referred to as the 'existential value' of the present perfect (McCawley, 1971; Michaelis, 1994), coupled with the use of adverbs/adverbial phrases expressing repetition and systematicity ("uniformly," "over the years," "systematically," "again and again") allows for the prediction of future events based on the enemy's character. Statements which highlight the consistent repetition of the enemy's deceptive actions only appear to be relevant to the present if the hearer assumes that they constitute a strong basis for future predictions and for the assessment of the current threat. If that was not the case, then the enemy's sudden appearing willingness to cooperate would point to the conclusion that WE do not need to intervene after all. Therefore, although (14) does not assert that peaceful efforts *now* would definitely fail, the presupposition that they would is a pre-condition to the relevance of the utterance. The final observation that "we are not dealing with peaceful men" confirms the relation of Cause-Effect between the enemy's character and the consistent failure of past diplomatic efforts, leading the hearer to infer that the same relation can be used to predict the future, and that a new attempt would be pointless, and unnecessarily costly too. The rest of the speech aims at strengthening this prediction. One might not know for certain what weapons Iraq does possess, but WE do know *about* THEM: who THEY hate, what THEY are capable of (15), etc. By making salient Saddam's deceptive nature, when Bush states that "the Iraqi regime has used diplomacy as a ploy to gain time and advantage," the hearer is led to infer that the current appearance of diplomacy is yet another ploy. The construction of the enemy as essentially opposed to US favors the retrieval of this conclusion (which is not stated explicitly), as it aims at representing US as a just, trustworthy group, and THEM as inhuman and not deserving of OUR trust. In this context, the salience of the enemy's history of character failings, leading to representations of the enemy as breaking all social contracts, serves to activate the hearer's cheater detection mechanism, as defined by Cosmides (1989), which reinforces the reasoning which places THEIR untrustworthiness at the heart of the issue, as well as the conclusion that THEY need to be excluded

from further interactions. We now turn to some of the various linguistic/cognitive mechanisms which G.W.Bush uses to keep grounding his argumentation in the familiar frames of American War Rhetoric:

• MEANS FOR ACTION/EVENT

We saw in Chapter 4 that conceptual metonymies served the purpose of sorting the actors of the conflict, so that only THEY could be perceived as the violent ones, and that only THEY could be blamed for the unraveling of the conflict. To that end, the means that THEY use metonymically stand for the whole action or event. As a result, violence is reserved to the conceptualization of the Other, while WE are understood in terms of OUR ideals. This speech is no exception.

(16) "Free nations have a duty to defend our people by uniting against the violent."

With (16), G.W Bush summarizes the situation by construing the conflict as an opposition between a community of nations governed by ideals (freedom), and an outside group defined by the way in which they behave: with violence. Their leader, Saddam Hussein, is not perceived as a legitimate ruler; instead, he is said to "*cling to* power," highlighting the manner in which he gets to and maintains his power: unlawfully, and going against natural forces. President Bush then warns that these methods will not work with US, and America "will not be intimidated by *thugs and killers*." Once again, it is the means which are used to deter US which are foregrounded, and which in fact define the enemy: MEANS FOR PERSON.

President G.W. Bush does indeed highlight the deceitful and unlawful means which Iraq consistently resorts to when dealing with US and with its victims. While "the world has engaged in 12 years of diplomacy," THEY use diplomacy as a "ploy" (14). It is precisely because of THEIR deceitful nature that immediate action is required, as "we cannot live under the threat of *blackmail*" (my emphasis), yet another unlawful method which THEY use to get to THEIR end. Finally, G.W. Bush also points out that this enemy they are dealing with does not abide by the rules of warfare, making THEIR actions not only unpredictable but also dishonest:

(17) "Terrorists and terror states do not reveal these threats with fair notice, in formal declarations."

By contrast, G.W. Bush reminds the public that his authorization to use American forces falls under his duty as Commander-in-Chief, in accord with the "oath" which he swore and which "[he] will keep." As a result, the interpretation of THEIR eventual cooperation as a sign of good faith clashes with everything that Americans know of THEIR character. The construction of US vs. THEM thus

serves to prevent access to the interpretation of THEIR sudden willingness to disarm as a message that WE need not consider THEM a threat. In that context, this assumption becomes a lot more costly, in terms of relevance. Instead, all the evidence points at another ploy which WE should not dismiss. As a result, should confrontation occur, it is to be understood to be of THEIR doing. In other words, THEY are guilty, WE are not.

• Structure of the confrontation and assignment of blame

(18) "If we must begin a military campaign, it will be directed against the lawless men who rule your country and not against you."
(19) "If war comes, do not fight for a dying regime that is not worth your own life."
(20) "Should Saddam Hussein choose confrontation, the American people can know that every measure has been taken to avoid war, and every measure will be taken to win it."

While OUR part in war is one of obligation (18), for Saddam Hussein it is a choice (20). The event structure is as follows: SADDAM (AGENT) - WAR (ACTION). From the perspective of the Iraqi people and of the Iraqi military, it is not US who are seen to come to them, invading their country and initiating combat; rather it is "war" (19), a war prompted by their own leader. And to those who claim that America's interventions in other countries' affairs is to account for THEIR hatred, G.W. Bush responds with the following:

(21) "The United States and other nations did nothing to deserve or invite this threat. But we will do everything to defeat it."

What does the frame activated by "invite" entail in (21)? If one invites someone to one's home, then the other's presence in one's home is perceived as a result of one's signal, and it is also often perceived as welcome and desirable, although that does not have to be the case. A relation of Cause-Effect thus links the act of inviting and the presence of the invitee. As a result, if the United States did nothing to "invite this threat," not only is the existence of the threat within OUR home presupposed, but WE are also to be disassociated with its coming into existence. The pronoun "it" continues to presuppose the existence of THEIR threat. As it is already there, the way WE choose to respond to it (potentially with military force) is therefore construed as a REACTION rather than as the SOURCE of THEIR hatred and of THEIR actions against US. As the source of the conflict has already been identified, and in a context where the opposition between US and THEM is salient, the retrieval of OUR part in causing conflicts is a lot more costly.
The next part of G.W. Bush's strategy is then not to restrict the conceptualization of the enemy as the group who initiated the threat, but also as encompassing those who refuse to see this threat as

worth responding to (in a similar manner to Reagan, see sub section 10.2.1.1). Blame is therefore entirely displaced from the Bush administration and instead extends to those within the U.N. Security Council who chose to veto the authorization of force.

10.3.2. America fights... to defend OUR identity, OUR morality

On legal grounds, the legitimization of military action appears to rely on the construction of war as a last resort. After having established that a certain protocol has been followed, international organizations might then vote to approve the move to launch war. On moral grounds, the conceptualization of an enemy that is devoid of humanity goes a long way to ease acceptance of the necessity for war. This aspect of the argumentation for immediate action can be especially important when obstacles turn up and question the legitimization of war on legal grounds. In the case of the Iraq War, the U.N.'s refusal to approve of military action does directly question whether it was acceptable for President G.W. Bush to issue an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, raising concerns over America's supremacy in international matters. In 10.2, we discussed the profiling of positive attitudes towards STRENGTH, which fit in well within a context where an emphasis on tradition directed the hearer's attention towards America's past achievements. In this instance, America's MORAL STRENGTH is made particularly salient, so that even when the decision to take military action does not follow the normal procedures, it can still be made legitimate on the grounds of morality. What is important to note is that various elements of a frame can be made more or less salient, depending on the needs of the discourse. Under the principles of MORAL STRENGTH, evil is not restricted to those who actually commit evil acts. By making that aspect of the frame of morality salient, those who do not oppose these acts get construed as instruments of the same evil, choosing to let THEM get away with THEIR lawless existence and behavior, and by doing so also emboldening THEM.

Displacement of US vs. THEM

When the facts do not play in the favor of those who push for immediate military action, when no incriminating evidence can be found, or when international organizations do not back military action with their official approval, one key strategy is thus to align those who reject fighting with THEM, reinforcing binary reasoning. To that end, G.W. Bush's discourse is centered around the conceptual metaphor A NATION IS A PERSON. Within this conceptualization, nations have

"friends" who support each other. The Iraq War is not intended to hurt the nation of Iraq; rather, its aim is to "tear down the apparatus of terror," to destroy a machine operated by an inhuman enemy. While the NATION AS PERSON metaphor is extremely useful in shaping the understanding of international relationships, it also serves as the basis for the construction of OUR MORALITY. Since A NATION IS A PERSON, each nation has personal qualities, and flaws. This allows for the sub-metaphors: A STRONG NATION IS A BRAVE PERSON, from which it follows that A WEAK NATION IS A COWARD, one that lacks fortitude. While the legality of matters can be up for debate, there is no compromising on MORAL STRENGTH.

(22) "These governments share our assessment of the danger, but not **our resolve** to meet it. Many nations, however, do have **the resolve and fortitude** to act against this threat to peace." (My emphases)

(23) "Should enemies strike our country, they would be attempting to shift our attention with panic and **weaken our morale** with fear. In this, they would fail. No act of theirs can alter the course or shake **the resolve of this country**. We are a peaceful people - yet we're **not a fragile people**, and we will not be intimidated by thugs and killers." (My emphases)

What sets America apart is not a defiant attitude; it is its resolve, its strength of character. "Our resolve" (22) is not just that of the Bush administration; rather, it is shared by all Americans, since the founding of the United States of America. The conceptualization of MORAL STRENGTH allows for the comparison within a conceptual blend of America's determination to keep its commitments, of its "resolve," which is even stronger than its buildings. Indeed the comparison is made possible thanks to the salience within the context of the 9/11 attacks, in response to which the War on Terror was launched (and which the Iraq War is part of). In (23), President G.W. Bush thus concludes that even if the enemy manages to strike and inflict damage on America, its resolve cannot be shaken. America's core will remain intact, and it is this identity which WE must preserve at all times. It is therefore a necessity to go against those who would advocate inaction in the face of evil, and who would weaken America's resolve. In (22), President G.W. Bush points out that "these governments share our assessment of the danger." In other words, they share "our" interpretation of the enemy's character and of their actions, and what it implies for the security of all free nations. Within the frames of American War Rhetoric, and given the salience of MORAL STRENGTH, there is only one possible response, that to take immediate action. In this case, the U.N.'s veto can only be perceived as the result of a lack of determination, of their succumbing to fear rather than stepping up and taking a stand against evil. The mental structures which make up reasoning based on the concept of MORAL STRENGTH contribute to hiding the possibility that there might be legitimate reasons not to act, and that inaction could in fact better serve the cause of peace. By making the structures of MORAL STRENGTH more salient, a significant cognitive benefit is made available when

interpreting the U.N.'s lack of support as a result of personal weaknesses: that of rallying the public around OUR identity.

The governments responsible for the final decision not to authorize the use of force are therefore opposed to US on the grounds of morality, and in that sense become aligned with THEM. President G.W. Bush goes further in this alignment by making the promoters of inaction instruments in THEIR evil. Inaction is indeed construed as the active choice to let THEM grow stronger, and it should be held accountable. Should "we" side with the U.N. and choose the path of inaction, "in one, or five years, the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over." This eventual confrontation would be to THEIR advantage, cause more losses along the way, leading the President to insist on holding all who shall contribute to the making of such evil responsible.

(24) "And all Iraqi military and civilian personnel should listen carefully to this warning. In any conflict, your fate will depend on your action [...] War crimes will be prosecuted. War criminals will be punished. And it will be no defense to say, 'I was just following orders.'"
(25) "In the 20th century, some chose to appease murderous dictators, whose threats were allowed to grow into genocide and global war."
(26) "Responding to such enemies only after they have struck first is not self-defense, it is suicide."

With utterances (24) to (26), President G.W. Bush makes available the direct relation of Cause-Effect which links the initial decision not to take action and the final result of war crimes such as genocides being committed, even if it is by other people. Every single individual's responsibility in condoning the enemy's actions is therefore highlighted. It is also true for the Iraqi soldiers following Saddam Hussein's orders. Although the legal system might hold Saddam Hussein as the main culprit, President G.W. Bush reminds them that "[their] fate will depend on [their action]" (24), that beyond their physical security, their morality and integrity are also at stake.
In (25), the hearers are led to retrieve the implicature that all 20th century leaders had an active role to play in the dictators' crimes. The act of "allowing" is not passive, and invokes a particular event structure: AGENT — INSTRUMENT — ACTION. Genocide did not happen overnight, it was there all along in the form of a threat who 20th century leaders "chose" not to act on. "Choosing" implies that one is aware of the object of choice. While G.W. Bush does not clearly state that past leaders are partially guilty of Hitler's and other dictators' crimes, by using the verb "chose," the hearer is led to retrieve that implicature. If one "chooses" something, then one would need to be acquainted with what that something is. If one has a choice between two objects, hidden inside one left and one right hand, one might not know what it is that is hidden. However, the awareness that

one is taking part in the activity remains, and that one's choosing is linked by a relation of Cause-Effect to the acquiring of the final object. With (25), G.W. Bush is thus implying that the 20th century leaders who "chose to appease murderous dictators" were aware of the capabilities of those murderers. If one abides by the discourse's construction of the enemy as an unreasonable, irrational, inhuman creature, then surely one must conclude that there is no appeasing such a group. The implicature that these leaders were somehow aware that appeasement would not work, and that terrible crimes might be committed is thus made available, and highlights each individual's responsibility in choosing to condone or not perpetrators of evil.

Finally, (26) construes inaction now as suicide. Once again, the suicide input space contains at its heart a relation of Cause-Effect between the deceased's actions and the final result of death. In a conceptual blend, the transfer of this relation to be applied to those who advocate inaction allows for the compression of the chain of events leading to potential future crimes against US. As a result, the hearer is led to imply that should a future, devastating attack occur on American soil, those who opposed immediate action in the present will be (at least partially) to blame. Being strong-willed in keeping one's commitment is therefore not only the right thing to do, it is what will ensure OUR physical security too. If the enemy is that who harms US, then all who are to blame for the harm inflicted on US could be classified as such. In this context, where attacks on the United States are construed as the result of inaction, which itself is seen as the translation of moral weakness, the interpretation of the U.N.'s veto as the voice of reason is a lot more costly.

10.3.3. America fights... to follow higher orders

If America does not follow the U.N.'s recommendations, it does not appear as reckless or unreasonable, because it is seen to follow the rules of logic, as well as higher orders:

- Following the rules of logic

One striking aspect of G.W. Bush's address is its emphasis on logic as dictating OUR actions. This might first seem slightly counter-intuitive: can morality be reduced to the rules of logic? In fact, the organizational frame provided by the MORAL STRENGTH metaphor follows very clear logic rules: if evil occurs, it must be punished. There is no grey area here, you can either do the right thing, or not. If you do not stand up to evil, you are then partially aligning yourself with that evil. The salience of logic is really important here, so as to obfuscate claims that G.W. Bush's refusal to follow U.N. regulations stems from a thirst for power, imperialistic desires, or simply from narcis-

sistic grounds, and to make less accessible that the U.N.'s veto was, on the other hand, the effect of using reason. For example, it would be possible to argue that G.W. Bush's ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, despite the U.N.'s veto, might be interpreted as an impulse or as a retaliatory move, stemming from a desire to control everything. It is precisely this type of interpretation which his discourse attempts to hide, or rather to make irrelevant.

In order to build up his argumentation, G.W. Bush consistently resorts here to logical connectors (mainly "yet," and "so"), so that his conclusions appear as the only reasonable ones.

(27) "For the last four and a half months, the United States and our allies have worked within the Security Council to enforce that Council's long-standing demands. **Yet**, some permanent members of the Security Council have publicly announced that they will veto any resolution that compels the disarmament of Iraq."
(28) "We are a peaceful people - **yet** we're not a fragile people."
(29) "War has no certainty, except the certainty of sacrifice. **Yet**, the only way to reduce the harm and duration of war is to apply the full force and might of our military, and we are prepared to do so." (My emphases)

"Yet" acts as a connector between two otherwise separate clauses. But it can also constrain the inferential process by announcing that the preceding clause contains within itself some form of expectation, which the next one will defy. Morency (2015: 108) notes the various uses of "yet," one of them being that of a contrast marker. In that case, the contrast may be "set up [...] either directly – between the semantics of each term or clause, or indirectly – between implicated meanings, or between a semantic meaning and an implicated meaning." The contrasts which result from the interpretations of (27), (28) and (29) can be said to be made indirectly, as the expectations which get defied are implicated. In cases such as (28) or (29), should the conclusion reached in the second clause be accepted, then the expectations which it defies can effectively get rebuked without their logic being explicitly outlined.

In (27), the hearer is led to retrieve the implicature that the collaborative work to enforce the U.N. Security Council's long-lasting demands, that is the enforcement of justice, should have led to the confrontation of Saddam Hussein. Previously in the speech, G.W. Bush reminds the hearer of the mission of the United Nations, which "we believe in:" "One reason why the U.N. was founded after the Second World War was to confront aggressive dictators, *actively and early*, before they can attack the innocent and destroy the peace" (my emphasis). This is what is then later referred to as the "Council's long-standing demands." "Yet" therefore constructs the current situation as a paradox: since a danger has been identified ("the danger is clear," in G.W. Bush's words), and since the U.N. aims at enforcing justice by stopping evil-doers actively and early, rather than after the crimes have been committed, then one should expect the U.N. to have unanimously backed the use of force against Saddam Hussein. In other words, it is the U.N. that is defying expectations, not US. The

conceptualization of the members opposed to action as weak thus allows to reconcile this paradox, while maintaining the integrity of the world's mission to protect peace. The question is, who should lead that mission?

In (28), "yet" leads the hearer to infer that the conceptualization of 'peaceful' as 'opposed to military action' is erroneous. At the very beginning of his speech, G.W. Bush mentions that "we are not dealing with peaceful men," to argue that diplomacy cannot work in these circumstances. In a pre-war context, "peaceful" is to be understood as 'aspiring to peace,' and to go even further, as 'ready to sacrifice what is necessary in order to protect peace.' As G.W. Bush points out with utterance (29), war might involve sacrifices, but there are circumstances in which these sacrifices are necessary in order to secure peace. Let us go back to the interpretation of "yet." In (28), "yet" implies that there is an expectation (which is not necessarily right) that in order to be peaceful, one must avoid war, at all costs. However, G.W. Bush argues that in a context where the United States is dealing with people who have no regard for peace, this would come at the cost of being weak, and "we're not a fragile people." Indeed, accepting peace in these circumstances is here equated with living under the constant threat of blackmail, living in constant fear. If one rejects that "we" are "fragile," then one must also let go of the expectation that peace can be obtained without war in all circumstances.

A similar argument is made in (29), where "yet" points to the expectation that a President's role is to avoid placing his people in situations where sacrifices need to be made, to protect his people. In that case, where there is no definite evidence that the United States is in immediate danger, then one could argue that military action should be avoided. However, the rest of the utterance construes harm as unavoidable. In order to reduce it, it then makes more sense to tackle the issue immediately, when WE are stronger. In order to accept the conclusion of this logical argument, the hearer also needs to presuppose that Saddam Hussein will need to be confronted at some point, *and* that the longer "we" wait, the stronger he will be. All these utterances thus contribute to the opposition between the conceptualization of PEACEFUL as 'aspiring towards peace,' and that of PEACEFUL as 'never resorting to war.' The first one is being promoted as the most sensible one and is compatible with OUR decision to engage in war. Apparent incompatibilities can be reconciled, without the speaker explicitly stating that it is wrong to assume that one can always stay out of war. Positive attitudes towards STRENGTH as the willingness to sacrifice for peace are thus also reinforced.

• Following higher orders

This leads us back to the main question: why does America act? If one was to understand PEACE as the absence of war, then answering this question could not lead to the conclusion that "we are a peaceful people." We have seen that America is seen to answer to the rules of morality. These rules get construed as a form of higher order, so that the grounds for action are displaced from following regulations, as would be the case in a normal conflict, to answering the call of humanity. This is compatible with the salience of MORAL STRENGTH, which directs the hearer's attention to what drives humans' actions, to the essence of one's actions, rather than to the practicalities of a potentially flawed rule-based system.

(30) "This is not a question of authority, it is a question of will."

In (30), "will" and "authority" are construed within alternative spaces. While authority can act as an instrument to serve the will to act, the two do not have to work together. In this context, the absence of definite incriminating evidence against Iraq, which prevents the execution of authority, does not have to contradict the organizing structure of the space containing America's "will," or in other words the laws of morality. In this particular case, the 'normal' course of action is therefore irrelevant: the decision to engage in military action does not fall within the realm of following official regulations; rather, it is to be construed within a separate space: it is a question of will. The "question" therefore is not "should we act?," but rather "will we act?," "will we step up?" In order to make his case, G.W. Bush relies on the conceptual metaphor MORAL IS UP:

(31) "The United Nations Security Council has not lived **up** to its responsibilities, so we will **rise** to ours." (My emphases)

I argue here that this speech construes the United States as a form of SUPER NATION, responding to higher orders. This interpretation is made available through the salience of America's special role, its unique identity and its burden throughout the tradition of American War Rhetoric, which highlights that the online interpretation of utterances cannot solely rely on the immediate context. In (31), the highest order is that of responsibilities, of moral duties. The U.N. is not conceptualized as being above the United States in a typical hierarchy. Instead, the hearer's attention is drawn towards what sits above us all: our responsibilities. We have seen in Chapter 9 that the conceptualization of MORALITY on a vertical axis promotes the conceptualization of action as the only way to resolve issues, to live up to one's responsibilities. In this case, America does not just complete its ordinary duties, it "rises" to its responsibilities. In the blend, G.W. Bush does not appear as defying the U.N., or as stepping on its authority, going over its head. Indeed, G.W. Bush's decision does not

get construed as unlawful, or even as a confrontation with the U.N. The event is construed as a MOTION, an upwards MOTION resulting from OUR being compelled to act righteously, thus removing the violence of the decision (Hart, 2013b) and making inaccessible its interpretation as an affront to legal authorities. If the U.N. does not live up to its responsibilities, it does not follow that neither should "we." OUR taking the lead by "rising" to the occasion is not in spite of the U.N.'s veto, it is caused by it: the same responsibilities remain above us all, and if the U.N. does not live up to them, then "we" shall take the lead. I will go even further by saying that contextual assumptions allow the hearers to construe the United States as a SUPER NATION:

(32) "As we enforce **the just demands of the world**, we will also honor the deepest commitments of our country [...] The power and **appeal of human liberty** is felt in **every life and every land**. And the greatest **power** of freedom is to overcome hatred and violence, and turn the creative gifts of men and women to the pursuits of peace." (My emphases)

While deriving the construction of AMERICA AS A SUPER NATION solely from (31) and (32) might be far-fetched, I argue that the conceptualization of morality throughout the corpus, and of US as a unique nation, chosen (by God?) to fulfill a special mission can influence the interpretation of utterances such as (31) and (32), leading to the potential interpretation that WE ARE A SUPER NATION.

As NATIONS ARE PEOPLE, all nations are seen to have a role to play in the maintenance of peace and order in the world. However, there is not one country which acts as an international judge, having the authority to enforce international law and punish criminals. While some organizations were created in order to see that international crimes should not be committed and indeed should be punished, the United States can choose in this instance to act of its own accord and without the backing of a U.N. resolution. The United States's role is not to enforce the will of the U.N. or of other international organizations; it is to "enforce the just demands of the world," and it is construed as such in the rest of the corpus. What America is concerned with is to respond to the "appeal of humanity," especially in situations where no one else has heard it, or no one else has the powers to answer it. In a conceptual blend, the elaboration stage portrays America as a super hero, whose authority does not fall within the bounds of the judicial system, as its sole concern is to hear the cry of humanity and use its powers to answer it. Here, "the greatest power of freedom is to overcome hatred and violence," in situations where hope might be incredibly hard to find. In the rest of the data, America is regularly construed as having been gifted the "machinery of freedom," whose power is to suppress violence, hence America's mission to extend that power to the rest of the world. How-

ever, the explicit conceptualization of America as a super hero might, in some cases, be counter productive, as it might confirm concerns of narcissist desires. Nevertheless, it is made accessible here and as such contributes to displacing the grounds of America's action from following official regulations, to answering the appeal of humanity, thus reinforcing its identity and with it the frames of American War Rhetoric. While following the U.N. might act as assurance that OUR use of war is lawful and legitimate, not abiding by U.N. resolutions does not have to mean the opposite, if WE abide by 'higher' criteria. Instead of making US guilty of not following international regulations, appearing to act in order to assert OUR supremacy, WE are construed as answering an appeal which is "felt in every land and every life," aligning US with the rest of humanity, and portraying the U.N. as having made a decision which goes against the interest of the people it is supposed to serve. Finally, the salience of character traits as a determining factor of the decision to act or not to act also makes available the assumption that the U.N. does not necessarily have all the right answers, that it can fail in its mission. This allows for the frame *Fighting against Evil* to remain relevant here, despite a lack of incriminating evidence.

OUR STRENGTH at the service of humanity

Through the conceptualization of US as responding to the needs of humanity, whether that involves or not the actual representation of a super hero, OUR STRENGTH can appear as solely serving the needs of the people, whether that refers to citizens of remote nations or to Americans. OUR STRENGTH is put to good usage, to the restoration of justice where the legal system in place or the leaders of foreign nations fail their people. Positive attitudes towards the use of one's resources (or powers) to benefit the greater good are therefore reinforced once more.

G.W. Bush's strategy to remain within the frames of American War Rhetoric, making MORAL STRENGTH even more salient than in the rest of the data, successfully hides the interpretation of the U.N.'s veto as reasonable, and as leading to the long-term desired effect of peaceful relationships between the nations of the Middle East, as well as between the United States and the rest of the world. Indeed, it is important to note that nowhere in his speech does G.W. Bush mention the grounds on which the veto was issued, such as the conclusions of the Blix report, which pointed to other interpretations of what the United States deemed to be evidence of the presence of a nuclear program, and especially to evidence that Iraq was showing signs of cooperation. By making relations of identity stand out, the capacity to spot evil gets based on character. In that context, the most relevant interpretation seems to be that THEY cannot be trusted, and so that being pro-active is the

world's safest choice. America fights to defend the rights of humanity; not to expand its own power. As mental structures, what makes the use of familiar frames particularly useful might well be the relations which they make quickly accessible. By shifting perspective within a frame, one can then maintain certain relations, even when new, potentially conflicting facts come to sow discordance within a well-established belief system.

Chapter 11: Breaking with the frames

11.1. Opposing war with metaphors

This chapter explores the issue of opposing war. We have seen that the frames upon which American War Rhetoric is built make salient positive attitudes towards STRENGTH, particularly MORAL STRENGTH, and relations of Identity. In that context, opposing war can easily be construed as a sign of weakness, or as lacking the courage to do what is right. Lakoff (2002) argues that opposition can never be successful if it is done within the frames which construct the opposition's discourse. Using Clinton's discourse, we will see whether this can be explained by the reinforcing of relations within a frame.

(1) "I know that the United States cannot, indeed we should not, be the world's policeman. And I know that this is a time with the Cold War over that so many Americans are reluctant to commit military resources and our personnel beyond our borders. But when brutality occurs close to our shores, it affects our national interests. And we have a responsibility to act. (Clinton, 15.09.1994)

In (1), Clinton acknowledges that the United States should not be "the world's policeman," a metaphor meant to criticize America's stance and interventions in international affairs. The negation rejects that America should endorse this role; however, it does not negate but rather reinforce the frame which the conceptual metaphor activates. This is based on Lakoff's insights on the use of frames:

When we negate a frame, we evoke the frame. Richard Nixon found that out the hard way. While under pressure to resign during the Watergate scandal, Nixon addressed the nation on TV. He stood before the nation and said, "I am not a crook." And everybody thought about him as a crook. (Lakoff, 2014: 1)

The metaphor in (1), and more importantly the context in which it is used, thus evokes the frame of authority, and that of responsibility. Let us first examine the world's policeman metaphor as it was originally intended, that is as the formulation of the critique that America might abuse its authority to assert its superiority in the world. The following schema illustrates the construction of that critique, but we will see that its interpretation in (1) is unlikely to reach the same conclusions:



Fig. 23: Conceptual Network for "the world's policeman"

In (1), Clinton agrees that it is right to question America's place, and that the resort to war should always be carefully weighed, not only to preserve the country's resources, but also to preserve its identity and to make sure that it always fights for the right reasons. Despite that, I argue that Clinton's discourse still maintains the overall relevance of the overarching frame *Fighting against Evil.* Although the above schema might show us how the metaphor is to be understood, that does not determine its efficiency. As (1) occurs in a context where America's presence abroad is generally understood within the frame *Fighting against Evil*, is it efficient in dismantling that frame? By calling America the world's "policeman," what is made directly available is the person, rather than the institution, whose job it is to enforce the law. As a result, in order to interpret the metaphor of AMERICA AS THE WORLD'S POLICEMAN, the hearer is led to transfer from the input space of police forces the individuals who make up the police, thus also making accessible inferences relating to potential abuses of power. In a context where STATES ARE PEOPLE, this can lead to the interpretation that there should not be one single person (or rather, nation) responsible for the enforcement of justice, as the most relevant interpretation. However, that is not the same as saying that this makes it an effective metaphor to challenge long-established frames, such as that of America's responsibility, of which Clinton reminds the public in (1).

We have seen that the efficiency of persuasive mechanisms lies within their constraining effects. In the context of American War Rhetoric, the image of America as a bully, as fighting in order to establish its supremacy, is left in the background of the interpretation process. The world's policeman metaphor first seems to make that representation readily available; however, I argue that it is not efficient to bring down the frames upon which American War Rhetoric is built, because it does not make opposing views *irrelevant*. Indeed, the policeman cannot be entirely disassociated with the institution it represents, and by extension, with the need for authority. The metaphor thus also evokes the frame of authority and peace regulation, which in our data is consistently perceived as something positive and necessary, because of THEM. This is precisely what lies at the heart of the frame *Fighting against Evil.* And while the world's policeman metaphor might lead to the conclusion that it should not always be up to America to intervene in international conflicts, that there might be conflicts where in fact its intervention is not welcome and might make things worse, it does not negate the need for authority to combat chaos and preserve peace. In fact in (1), Clinton goes on to justify that in this particular case, America does have the authority to take action: because THEIR "brutality" is here located "close to our shores," affecting "OUR national interests," it appears to be perfectly within OUR jurisdiction to take action. Once again, OUR action is linked by a relation of Cause-Effect to the protection of America's safety, of its identity, and to the resolution of the conflict. It is that relation of Cause-Effect which is at the heart of *Fighting against Evil,* highlighting OUR impact on the dissolution of violence. Clinton then concludes that it is indeed "our responsibility to act." As long as intervention in military conflicts is construed as the fighting of evil, maintaining tight relations of Identity, opposing war can be very difficult without being criticized for being a coward, or for being weak. If Clinton had chosen to construe the issues at stake *solely* by resorting to a humanitarian frame, for instance, one could easily avoid that criticism, by profiling the need to protect one's own interests. Indeed a humanitarian frame would not make available THEIR presence, THEIR identity as the trigger for OUR action. And in that context, as Clinton himself points out, if not US, then who is going to take up that fight? Indeed, in the face of such evil, the retrieval of inferences that OUR intervention could have damaging effects seems a lot more costly.

Even with the world's policeman metaphor, what appears in the blend is a relation of responsibility between those who have the power to bring down violence, and the conflicts caused by perpetrators of evil. The potential criticism which it leads to appears irrelevant, because in the face of such "brutality," skeptical attitudes towards authority do not seem relevant; they do not serve to answer the

question: if not US, then who? Indeed (1) does not contradict the presence of evil, or the need to eradicate it. If we look at the interpretation of "brutality" in (1), what is profiled are the MEANS FOR THE EVENT; the means with which the enemy chooses to achieve their goals stand in a metonymic relationship with the whole conflict, and that metonymic relationship gets tightened in the blend, so that THE ENEMY IS BRUTALITY. In other words, identity remains at the heart of the interpretation of the issues at stake. As CBT allows us to make apparent the ways in which the different elements in the blend are connected, we are in a better position to evaluate the efficiency of the metaphor not only in the context where it is uttered, but also over time, as a way to dismantle the long-established frame *Fighting against Evil*. I argue that the salience of the notions of responsibility and identity contributes to maintaining the relevance of that frame, making criticisms of America's involvement less salient. In (1), by constraining the opposition (to war) to this one metaphor, Clinton can effectively combat opposing views by making the image of an intimidating America irrelevant in the current context. More generally speaking, by making apparent the need for authority when faced with evil, that frame can in fact get strengthened, and so does its influence over time.

11.2. Obama and the Iraq War

Clinton's aim in (1) was to undermine opposition to war, as he argued that it was, in this case, very much necessary. On the other hand, Obama's challenge was to oppose an ongoing war, which he was very much set against when it was launched by his predecessor. When Obama was nominated for the American Presidency, he indeed promised a stark change from the previous eight years: "It's time for us to change America." According to him, his Republican opponents had got it wrong, they had got America wrong. The change advocated would encompass every single area of the American political landscape, thus extending to America's foreign policy. One issue was America's withdrawal from the war in Iraq. We have seen that inaction gets portrayed throughout the data as a lack of direction, a lack of moral strength which cannot possibly lead to the consolidation of peace. In that sense, one might argue that it might be more effective to break entirely from those frames in order to persuade the American public to end a war which was once portrayed as a number one priority. Actually, the reality is not that straightforward. In the context of the War on Terror, it is particularly difficult to establish when the objectives to end the war have been met. Does the war end with the arrest of terrorist leaders? With the certainty that the threat of terrorism has been removed? In the case of the Iraq War, did the demise of Saddam Hussein signal the finalization of America's in-

volvement? Or should peace and democracy as we know it be restored to the country before American troops can safely withdraw, without endangering peace? As we saw in Chapters 3-9, the frames on which American War Rhetoric is built rely on the construction of America's mission as a journey, an *ongoing* journey, as the state of world peace is never truly achieved. In order to put a stop to OUR involvement, when peace has not yet been fully reached, is it then necessary to break with those frames?

The main issue is that at the heart of those frames is America's special identity, America's greatness. And at the heart of that identity is the belief in a continuum, starting from America's independence. It is this special identity which drives OUR journey. The mention of America's mission to defend freedom activates the concept of American exceptionalism. In that sense, it would seem that breaking with the mission frame could come at a very high cost. Indeed, would breaking with the frames entail letting go of America's special identity? Would it entail breaking from (or at the very least questioning) the values on which the United States was built, the values set out by the Founding Fathers, to whom current Americans owe their own freedom? In this section, I argue that the analysis of Obama's discourse when arguing for the end of the Iraq War confirms how deeply entrenched these frames are, particularly those of responsibility and (moral) strength. While arguing for the end of America's involvement, Obama is compelled to continue to promote strength, and therefore to reinforce the frames on which American War Rhetoric is built, while pushing for a change of direction. In order to examine Obama's strategy in context, it is useful to go back to his nomination acceptance speech. Indeed, it is at that point that Obama started to argue for an immediate need for change. It is at that point that America was on the watch for his every word, and that his words convinced Americans that he would best represent "We, the People." An important part of his strategy was to portray the end of the Iraq War as part of a well-founded, thought-through plan, rather than as the abrupt decision that it was no longer OUR number one priority, or even that WE could not win it. The war needed to be part of America's journey, driven by a higher purpose which Obama started to set out prior to the beginning of his Presidency.

11.2.1. A truthful President

(2) "I stood up and opposed this war, knowing that **it would distract us from the real threats we face** [...] And today, as my call for a time frame to remove our troops from Iraq has been echoed by the Iraqi government and even the Bush administration, [...] John McCain stands alone in his stubborn refusal to **end a misguided war**." (Obama, 28.08.2008, my emphases)

Ending the war in Iraq was indeed on Obama's agenda ever since his nomination for the Presidency. As such, his discourse on ending the war was grounded in his overall strategy of appearing as a truthful President. Rather than breaking entirely with the frames of American War Rhetoric, Obama detached himself from a tradition of self-centered leaders and aligned with the people; not just the Americans he was addressing at the time, but the people who have been forming the American identity since the Founding Fathers left them with their legacy. Obama thus presents himself as "knowing" about "the *real* threats" which America faces, arguing to "fight the terrorists who *actually* attacked us on 9/11" (my emphasis). The use of these adjectives/adverbs alerts the hearers to the status of their current leaders' as 'cheaters' (breaking a contract of the American democracy), thus constructing Obama as the restorer of truth. While in isolation, these might have a limited effect; in the context of a general strategy to construct himself as a 'real American,' coming from poverty and relating to the people's experiences of reality, and therefore as a trustworthy representative of "We, the People," these utterances allow for the reinforcement of the image of a truthful President, and can thus influence the interpretation of a war promoted by his opponents as "misguided."

11.2.2. Reality of war vs. metaphorical talk

This alignment with "We, the People," and the focus on the reality of people's struggles throughout Obama's discourse allows for his concerns regarding the war in Iraq to be portrayed as stemming from a constant desire to put America and Americans first. In order to argue against those who would wish for America's military involvement to continue, Obama's discourse makes more easily available the reality of war, all the while warning against the dangers of 'metaphorical talk' when dealing with such serious issues. Following are selections of utterances illustrating different aspects of the reality of war which Obama chooses to profile:

- Reality for OUR soldiers

(3) "Ours is a bond forged by shared bloodshed and countless friendships among our people. We Americans **have offered our most precious resource**, our young men and women, to work with you to rebuild what was destroyed by despotism, to root out our common enemies, and to seek peace and prosperity for our children and grandchildren, and for yours."
(4) "And for you and your families, the war does not end when you come home. It lives on in the **memories of your fellow soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who gave their lives**. It endures in **the wound that is slow to heal, the disability that isn't going away, the dream that wakes you up at night, the stiffening in your spine** when a car backfires down the street."
(5) "You teach us that **the price of freedom** is great." (Obama, 27.02.2009, my emphases)
(6) "We cannot sustain indefinitely a commitment that has put **a strain on our military** and will cost the American people nearly a trillion dollars." (My emphasis)

• Reality for the civilians
(7) “Diplomacy and assistance is also required to help millions of displaced Iraqis. **These men, women, and children are living — are a living consequence of this war**.” (My emphases)

• Reality of OUR involvement
(8) “We have learned that we must always **weigh the costs of action** and communicate those costs candidly to the American people.” (Obama, 27.02.2009, my emphasis)
(9) “You don’t defeat a terrorist network that operates in eighty countries by **occupying Iraq**. You don’t protect Israel and deter Iran by **talking tough** in Washington.
(10) “John McCain likes to say that he’ll follow bin Laden to the Gates of Hell - but he won’t even go to the cave where he lives.”
(11) “I’m committed to building our civilian national security capacity so that **the burden is not continually pushed onto our military**.” (Obama, 27.02.2009, my emphases)

Utterances (3) to (11) show that Obama does not refrain from making available the dire consequences of war, for all parties involved, from the devastation imposed by combat to the lingering of that devastation once the war has ended. “The price of freedom is great” (5), and must carefully be weighed against all the other factors before making a decision on the initiation or pursuit of military action. In (9), Obama activates the frame of “occupation,” an entirely different frame where WE are invaders who are concerned with OUR own gains, regardless of the consequences for those involved. In that frame, WE are the ones associated with violence; the defense of freedom does not appear as driving OUR action, but as a disguise to promote OUR self-advancement. The *occupation* frame thus seems to be a very effective way to break with that of *Fighting Evil,* but it is not the overall strategy which Obama chooses when arguing to end the war, and is restricted in this corpus to utterance (9).

The reality of war described by Obama is contrasted with his opponent’s use of metaphorical language, which gets constructed as the signal of empty promises. In (9), Obama labels his predecessors’ seemingly forceful policies as a mere matter of “talking tough.” In this conceptual blend, words appear to be assigned a form of strength. However, when placed against the reality of serious issues, the strength of these words gets construed as worthless. In (10), Obama creates a direct contrast between McCain’s use of metaphorical language, that is his opponent’s promise to “follow bin Laden to the Gates of Hell,” with the reality of the soldiers’ task to actually track and bring him down, which involves directing soldiers to bin Laden’s *physical* location. It is through Obama’s overall strategy to show concern for the reality of situations that the hearers are here led to reinforce the conceptualization of Obama’s plan for America’s involvement in Iraq as more realistic in protecting the interests of all involved, and more importantly in protecting Americans’ national security. This is an important part of his strategy to counter accusations that Obama, and more broadly the Democratic Party are not “tough” enough to defend America’s interests. The salience of MORAL

STRENGTH, and more generally of the frames upon which American War Rhetoric is built, makes such accusations readily available to Obama's opponents.

By making more easily accessible the reality of war, Obama slightly breaks away from the tradition of American War Rhetoric, which tends to hide that reality in order to promote the acceptance of military action. A mirroring effect seems to be apparent here: hiding the reality of war in order to push for military action, vs. making it available to argue for its end. It is worth noting that even in the first scenario, the reality of war is not completely hidden - rather it is the reality of THEIR evil which is profiled. When urgency is required, dwelling on the reality of war (although it cannot be escaped) would also be counter-productive. What Obama's discourse shows us is that when the reality of war is profiled, if the reality of THEIR evil also remains at the forefront of the interpretation process, the frames of American War Rhetoric can still end up getting strengthened. Indeed, when arguing for an end to the war, the availability of its costs does not simply serve to make the point that when these are too high, the war should end. Rather, it also serves the purpose of positive self-presentation, as Obama gets portrayed as a truthful President who is concerned with improving Americans' reality, and who is aware of the reality lying behind the government's policies. What is profiled is not reality vs. idealism, where the horrors of war might be seen as a contrast with the ideal of peace; rather, it is reality vs. empty talk. Obama thus highlights precisely what certain metaphors tend to hide. In that constrained context, making the reality of war salient does not have to contradict America's strong stance.

(12) "We are the party of Roosevelt. We are the party of Kennedy. So don't tell me that Democrats won't defend this country. Don't tell me that Democrats won't keep us safe." (Obama, 28.08.2008)

With (12), Obama acknowledges the criticism that Democrats are not strong enough to defend America. Still, he aligns himself with a tradition of powerful, respected leaders. Through conceptual blending, the relation of Analogy which links Obama with his predecessors gets compressed into Identity, so that the Democratic Party can be seen to embody the strength of its most influential leaders. Obama is thus rejecting the conclusion that anything other than the STRICT FATHER model gets equated with weakness. Given the prominence of MORAL STRENGTH within American War Rhetoric, even when arguing for the war to end, it is therefore important to construe that choice as not diminishing America's strength, or its leader's ability to defend the American nation.

In the next utterance, Obama reconciles the concepts of strength and of diplomacy, so that the lack of military action does not get interpreted as a weakness which would leave the United States vulnerable to other world powers:

(13) I will end this war in Iraq responsibly, and finish the fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. I will rebuild our military to meet future conflicts. But I will also renew the **tough, direct diplomacy** that can prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and curb Russian aggression."
(14) "Finally, I want to be very clear about my strategy — that my strategy for ending the war in Iraq does not end with military plans or diplomatic agendas; it **endures** through our commitment to uphold the sacred trust with every man and woman who has served in Iraq." (My emphases)

In (14), Obama specifies once more how one should think about the "end of the war." America's withdrawal is not to be construed as a clear-cut point, beyond which OUR involvement stops. Instead, America's involvement "endures through our commitment." It is strong and will remain strong as long as "we" uphold "our" values. The focus is still on America's MORAL STRENGTH, not because it is devoted to apply the full strength of its military power in Iraq, but because the commitment of his people gets construed as the source of that strength, as a responsibility surviving generations and carrying through American history.

In fact, it is precisely this focus on the people which allows Obama to start his transition within the frames, rather than, in fact, break with them. Rather than constructing the war in Iraq as entirely wrong in order to argue for it to end, Obama focuses on the strength of the people who carried that war. In that light, his new strategies do not get constructed as a break from America's tradition, but rather as a continuation of that same, enduring commitment. Nevertheless, his approach to foreign policy shows an evolution in the sense that it strives to respond to the needs of all people involved: Americans (their interests and their security), Iraqis, and the future of the Middle East. This makes for a more comprehensive approach, viewing foreign policy as a response to those needs, be it through engaging or *not* engaging in military action. This comprehensive approach is indeed what allows Obama to portray those who seem to defend war at all times as stubborn leaders. By profiling the people as the source of OUR STRENGTH, Obama makes available the idea that action does not necessarily entail *military* action; that strength does not necessarily entail the deployment of military troops. In other words, he deviates from the typical binary opposition between action and inaction, where action is linked to the deployment of American strength, generally through military intervention. We have seen that in the data, opposing views tend to be constrained to the promotion of inaction. Obama's strategy does not involve painting a more favorable image of inaction, or constructing inaction as a positive, third option. Indeed the latter would be at odds with the salience of ACTING IS MORALITY (see Chapter 9), and would therefore be rather costly. What he does,

however, is to broaden the definition of what 'acting' means, so that it is not constrained to military action. It is in that light that Obama approaches the issue of America's withdrawal, as a transition on an ongoing JOURNEY. This "new era of American leadership and engagement" which he lays out in his discourse is not exactly new, but rather appears as a transition: a change of direction that preserves America's greatness and its commitments to the defense of freedom abroad.

11.2.3. Negotiating the transition

The argument for the end of the Iraq War is based on the conceptualization of that war as a devotion of all of America's resources to a single area, thus neglecting other threats which WE might face. Similar strategies as those which were outlined in Chapters 7-9 are used to trigger fear, such as the construction of the current situation as an economic transaction, which America will undoubtedly lose unless a change occurs:

(15) "We've also taken into account the simple reality that America **can no longer afford** to see Iraq in isolation from other priorities." (Obama, 27.02.2009, my emphasis)

The War in Iraq is thus construed as the isolation of one issue among many, a policy which is deemed too costly, and which America "can no longer afford." The promoters of the war appear to be blinded by this one war, failing to see other concerns which also affect the United States. Pursuing the war effort is not only costly in terms of human lives, it also endangers US in the long term. The end of the Iraq War should not be seen as the promotion of inaction in the face of brutality, but in fact as an active step towards the protection of the people's interests. OUR withdrawal should not appear as an abrupt event, where America leaves a difficult situation behind. Indeed that interpretation might be more easily available if inaction had been promoted as a better way to demonstrate OUR peaceful attitude. Rather, Obama constructs the current situation as a TRANSITION in OUR journey towards peace. The next passage highlights the construction of this transition phase in context, and its analysis will attempt to evaluate its efficiency to shape the American mind *against* the current handling of the war (but not against war itself).

(16) "There are those who will try to prevent that future for Iraq, who will insist that Iraq's differences cannot be reconciled without **more killing**. They represent the **forces** that destroy nations and lead only to despair, and they will test our will in the months and years to come. America too has known these forces. We endured the pain of civil war and bitter divisions of region and race. But hostility and hatred are no match for justice. They offer **no pathway to peace**, and they must not **stand between the people of Iraq and a future of reconciliation and hope**.
So to the Iraqi people, let me be clear about America's intentions. The United States pursues no claim on your territory or your resources. We respect your sovereignty and the tremendous sacrifices you have made for your country. We seek **a full transition to Iraqi responsibility** for the security of your country. And **go-**

ing forward, we can **build a lasting relationship founded upon mutual interests and mutual respect** as Iraq takes its rightful place in the community of nations." (My emphases)

In this passage, Obama slightly departs from the main frames of American War Rhetoric, by making available the conceptualization of US as engaging in war for the wrong reasons. In (16), the war *in its current form* does not appear to serve any positive purpose. As the continuation of the war is construed as "more killing," the means of achieving OUR ends stand in a metonymic relationship with OUR current part in the war, should WE choose to keep it going. WE are not exempt from resorting to violence here. A new form of binary opposition thus emerges, as OUR continued military intervention cannot be seen as having any positive end. Another aspect of war appears in discourse, so that continued participation in war (from OUR side, or from the Iraqis') gets construed as succumbing to evil. Those who would promote a continuation of the war do not appear as reasonable or acting to save their ideals; rather, they are "forces" which will pull US and Iraq down, forces which "test our will," that is forces which are directly opposed to America's moral strength. This interpretation is reinforced by the presence in the context of the construction of civil war as immoral. Just before this passage, Obama praised the Iraqis for their "resilience" which allowed them to "step back from a descent into civil war." We have discussed the presence of MORAL IS UP in the hearers' cognitive context, and its constant reinforcement throughout the data. This vertical construction of morality entails that IMMORAL IS DOWN, and in this case, engaging in a civil war is construed as going down, leading the hearer to imply that it is not just destructive but also immoral. In that context, the stubborn continuation of a war which has already served its purpose gets portrayed as fighting for the sake of fighting, as an obstacle on the journey towards peace and justice. As it can "only lead to despair," no good can come out of it, and it must be rejected. It is not the war itself which is rejected, but rather its handling by stubborn, blind-sighted leaders. This is in fact very similar to Reagan's strategy to re-interpret the Vietnam War, despite the fact that the two leaders are promoting a radically different program.

It is important to note that the end of the war does not signal the end of OUR JOURNEY, and does not reject America's involvement in Iraq altogether. Obama's strategy is to construct America's withdrawal as a TRANSITION on OUR JOURNEY, on a journey which the American people have always been part of. The main point is therefore that Obama's policies do *not* in fact depart from the long-standing mission frame. As a result, OUR initial part in war can be part of the journey (Obama's original opposition to the war does not take away from the American soldiers' contribution to "the future of reconciliation and hope" envisioned for Iraq), just as much as OUR withdrawal is.

The profiling of a transition (further explored in 11.2.4) allows to include the Iraqi people too (16), giving them the lead in securing their future. If OUR initial engagement in war testified to OUR responsibility to serve the cause of peace, that responsibility is now mutual; in that phase of transition, it is now up to the Iraqis to take up their responsibility, and it is America's to allow them to do so. This transition approach thus construes Iraq as an equal, ready to join the community of nations which WE are part of. What Obama tries to achieve is to get the hearers to view his current policies, and more generally the principles of the NURTURANT PARENT frame of morality (Lakoff, 2002: 108) which they activate, as a continuation of America's long-standing journey, rather than as a break which is to be accounted for by his political beliefs.

11.2.4. A part of the plan

11.2.4.1. The next step on OUR JOURNEY

Following are selections of utterances from Obama's discourse to illustrate various focuses of the metaphor:

• STRATEGY AS A JOURNEY
(17) "My administration will provide more assistance and **take steps** to increase international support for countries already hosting refugees." (My emphasis)
(18) "**The starting point** for our policies must always be the safety and security of the American people." (Obama, 27.09.2009, my emphasis)

• Focus on the destination
(19) "We will not let **the pursuit of the perfect stand in the way of achievable goals**."
(20) "As we remove our combat brigades, we will **pursue** the second part of our strategy." (My emphases)

• Focus on the direction
(21) "(We've also taken into account the simple reality that America can no longer afford to see Iraq in isolation from other priorities.) We face the challenge of **refocusing** on Afghanistan and Pakistan [...]"
(22) "**Going forward**, we can make a difference on several fronts."
(23) "We must work with our friends and parters to establish a new framework that **advances** Iraq's security and the region's [...] and **going forward**, the United States will pursue principled and sustained engagement with all of the nations in the region."
(24) "This reflects a fundamental truth: We can no longer deal with regional challenges in isolation [...] That is why we are **refocusing** on Al Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan [...] as we **carry forward** this agenda."
(25) "However, a strong political, diplomatic, and civilian effort on our part can **advance** progress and help lay a foundation for lasting peace and security." (My emphases)

• Focus on the lead
(26) "Our mission will change from combat to supporting the Iraqi government and its security forces as they **take the absolute lead** in securing their country."
(27) "This effort will be **led** by our new Ambassador to Iraq."
(28) "John McCain **stands alone** in his stubborn refusal to end a **misguided war**." (Obama, 28.08.2008, my emphases)

Utterances (17) to (28) highlight some of the main ways in which Obama constructs his strategy to end the war as a JOURNEY. It has a starting point (18), follows specific steps (17), and it is focused

on actually reaching a destination, in the shape of achievable, realistic goals (19). In the blend, America's blinded focus on Iraq is an obstacle to its journey, because it takes US away from ever reaching OUR destination and as such poses a risk to OUR security. What is needed now is to let Iraq take the lead in their own affairs (26), and to change direction, to "refocus" on other areas of concern (21, 24), thus bringing to the hearers' attention more dangers and threats which America faces. This strategy is not a failure of American leadership; rather, it is focused on keeping a forward momentum, on actively working to reach that longed-for destination. In short, it is part of the same journey which America has been on since the beginning of its history.

The main difference lies in the parts of the organizing frame which are being profiled. We have seen that throughout the data, a strong emphasis was placed on the end, the destination, and on following the right direction to reach it (in that sense we saw that the opposition between forward and backward tended to be profiled). These are also emphasized here. However, Obama warns Americans that solely having a destination is not enough; one must take the right steps, continually re-evaluate that "we" are heading in the right direction. Every step matters here. By frequently acknowledging the challenge which "refocusing" represents, a new element makes its way into the final blend: potential flaws in the (previous) steps taken to reach OUR destination. Obama's portrayal of his strategy vs. that of his predecessors' is of one which has a clearer perspective, able to take into account *all* of the relevant factors (and that includes knowing when "we" have gone wrong). By contrast, his opponent appears to be stuck, blind-sighted by his focus on Iraq, which prevents him from seeing the bigger picture.

11.2.4.2. A chapter within OUR history

(29) "By any measure, this has already been a long war. For the men and women of America's Armed Forces, and for your families, the war has been **one of the most extraordinary chapters of service in the history of our Nation**." (Obama, 27.02.2009, my emphasis)

Whether Obama agreed with it in the first place or not, the Iraq War is not to be discarded or forgotten, and that is especially true for the sacrifice of countless American soldiers. Indeed, a complete rejection of the war would be at odds with Obama's emphasis on the soldiers' achievements, and could make his strategy less efficient. In that sense, Obama's strategy aligns with Reagan's when reinterpreting Vietnam, as the failure of previous administrations does not extend to rejecting the war altogether. The Iraq War is here construed as a "chapter" within the "history of our Nation." This chapter has now come to an end, and it is time for America to move forward with the next ones. Within this blend, the Iraq War is linked by a relation of Part-Whole to the rest of American history.

The Whole is here brought into focus, highlighting the importance of keeping the bigger picture within sight when thinking about American foreign policy. This conceptualization reinforces the conception of Obama's strategy as part of the Whole; it can be seen as the next chapter, rather than as turning back and thus erasing the contribution of the American soldiers who served in the war, or even as giving up on Iraq's future. Throughout his discourse, Obama insists on the capacity for his policies to lay solid foundations. These foundations are part of a bigger structure too, and are in fact the most crucial part, ensuring its stability.

Whether Obama's strategy is construed as a step forward on America's journey, as a chapter within America's history, or as a foundation for lasting peace, these conceptual blends each contribute to the conceptualization of the strategy to end the war as part of a long-term, well thought-through plan. In fact, they are all in keeping with Obama's overall perspective on the government's role to serve the American people, and to put them first. In his nomination speech, Obama laid out his plans to "keep the American promise alive," both in America and abroad, to "restore [the] legacy" which his predecessors had "squandered." According to Obama, the government's role is to enable that promise to stay alive. The personification of the "American promise" places it at the heart of the American identity. It is what has survived generation after generation since the days of the Founding Fathers. Obama himself embodies that promise, as he was able to rise from poverty and to succeed as a politician, and to provide for his family. From the beginning, Obama insisted that his goal was to get back to America's core values. It is in that context that his arguing for the end of the Iraq War is to be interpreted: as part of a plan larger than himself, at the heart of which lies the belief in a continuum which started with the Founding Fathers.

In terms of relevance, this interpretation offers great cognitive benefits, as it allows the hearer to reconcile the interpretation of the Iraq War with the restoration of America's greatness, "so that America is once again that last, best hope for all who are called to the cause of freedom, who long for lives of peace, and who yearn for a better future." This would not have been possible with the occupation frame, with a complete break from the frames of American War Rhetoric. Within this interpretation, ending the war does not entail that America has failed; it does not necessarily lead to the disillusion that America's identity is not what it claims to be. Instead, Americans can keep hold of that belief in America's ideals and in its special identity. What makes Obama's interpretations particularly relevant is thus the way in which they do not let go of that continuum, which would represent the highest (psychological) cost of breaking with the frames. Besides, by profiling differ-

ent aspects of the same, familiar frames, rather than breaking with them, cognitive costs might also be reduced. The trigger of positive emotional effects as Obama's new plan seems to fit within the broader conceptualization of America's identity might contribute to optimizing relevance, which might explain why the reinforcing of overarching frames which organize various aspects of reality can be effective when new facts emerge.

• Conclusion: OUR STRENGTH driving America's JOURNEY

(32) "We have the most powerful military on Earth, but that's not what makes us strong [...] Instead, it is that American spirit - that American promise - that pushes us forward even when the path is uncertain." (Obama, 28.08.2008)

Throughout his discourse, Obama argues that OUR strength does not necessarily need to translate into using the full force of OUR military. Dominance in the Middle East is not what makes US strong. Nevertheless, positive attitudes towards OUR STRENGTH and what makes US unique continue to be reinforced. Indeed, OUR STRENGTH comes directly from the people, and in that sense, Obama's discourse reinforces positive attitudes towards the government's role to serve the people, and to put that strength to the best possible use: to engage in war when necessary, and to withdraw at the right time too. America's strength is not to be discarded as a weapon of intimidation, it is something to embrace, and reminders of its special status can allow to share feelings of pride. Although Obama criticizes his predecessors' precipitation to resort to war in Iraq, his arguing against the war did not break with the existing frames, and by remaining within those frames, they are in turn reinforced. This does not mean that continued participation in war always needs to come out as the only option - but rather that an active, strong stance is required (even when one is withdrawing from war), along with the safeguarding of America's legacy.

Although the construction of his policies as the next step on America's journey might be effective in reconciling America's part in the Iraq War and the nation's greatness, one might wonder about the long term effects of such discursive constructions, that is on the potential future need to argue against entering a foreign conflict, given the salience of the frames of American War Rhetoric in the political context. The need for Democrats to maintain an appearance of strength through their opposition to the Iraq War, for instance, seems to point to that salience. In order to break with the frames, one might need to portray America's part in military conflicts as essentially harmful (as would be the case for an occupation) (Lakoff, 2006), which would come at the great psychological cost of questioning the foundation of the American identity, and of the sacred tradition to defend freedom.

11.3. Concluding remarks

The aim of Chapters 10 and 11 was to analyze what happens when conflicting facts emerge, carrying with them the possibility to dismantle the frames of American War Rhetoric. Whether it was revelations of covert operations, the U.N's opposition to America's use of force, or even the mere activation of the idea that it might not be America's sole responsibility to fight all the villains in the world, one is led to wonder: how can the frames on which American War Rhetoric is built withstand the test posed by these shocking revelations, or even by acute questioning? If our sole answer is that these facts "bounce off," while the frames remain the same, one might run the risk of over-interpreting the data, so that it might always fit the frames. I argue in this concluding section that the resort to various theoretical frameworks can guard against that risk, allowing us to answer not only how facts can "bounce off," but also why.

The combination of CBT and RT when evaluating persuasion can help to avoid over-interpreting the data. The framework of CBT helps to highlight the relations which govern a frame. Alongside CBT, RT's reliance on the communicative event allows to show how a metaphor or utterance is interpreted in context, rather than to serve the analyst's needs. Another advantage of this combination, beyond the online analysis of utterances, is to examine the impact of cognitive mechanisms over time. In the cases which we have analyzed where discrepancies might arise, or where a withdrawal of American troops was suggested, a villain was always identified, maintaining the frame *Fighting against Evil*. As Obama promoted the end of the Iraq War, the evil represented by terrorism remained a central target and concern, and an active involvement to fight it was still advocated (just not solely in Iraq). Furthermore, the analysis of conceptual blends also allows to demonstrate why it is up to US to fight this evil, as the issues of the present are consistently and directly linked to America's core, often through the compression of vital relations into relations of Identity. I therefore conclude that the frames of American War Rhetoric run deep, but they are not set in stone. They run deep and so cannot be easily escaped. The associations between action and morality are so entrenched that they might constitute an underlying feature of American political discourse, and their influence might last beyond their activation in discourse. But they are not set in stone, and it is possible to negotiate within the frames, and perhaps even to break from them. The use of RT can then help the analyst to evaluate which might be a more effective move in terms of persuasion.
Let us get back to Obama's desire to end the war in Iraq. The context in which this happened was that of a Presidential election. In this context, the values which Obama made particularly salient as

part of his campaign were those of the American dream: the idea that hard work can lead to opportunity; the exceptionalism of the American character, which is fully revealed in times of adversity; more broadly, the greatness of America, and the pride of being American, of being part of this great Nation and all that that entails. Now back to the war. What ways might be available to Obama to end a war which was initially construed as the fight against the world's greatest evil?

(A) Break entirely from the frames of American War Rhetoric. Call a spade a spade, and expose the reality of the war to the American people. This might seem to fit in well with Obama's strategy to establish himself as a truthful President. One might thus go with Lakoff's suggestion (2006), to frame the war as an "occupation." The reason why this frame is so opposed to the frames of American War Rhetoric is that here, America would appear as the villain, disregarding the rules of the civilized world and imposing its authority on the world. In that frame, the conclusion that war needs to end would come quite naturally. However, it would come at a great cost. As most Presidential candidates, Obama was trying to offer hope to the American people. The salience of values highlighting America's greatness would thoroughly clash with the exposure of the war as an occupation. In this frame, how might one make sense of the soldiers' sacrificial and extremely hard work, to do something which is morally wrong? To get US more, by taking what is not OURS to take, rather than to work to obtain what one truly deserves? In this context, the interpretations resulting from the occupation frame are made less easily accessible, and in that sense would not easily meet expectations of relevance.

(B) Maintain the frames of American War Rhetoric, but change direction: focus on individual leaders' flaws, rather than on America's mistakes. This was Obama's chosen strategy, as detailed in this chapter. What this frame offers is hope that this redirection might better serve the needs of Americans, while staying true to its identity. It might then be a lot more economical, as the solution proposed not only fits the frames of American War Rhetoric, but is also coherent in the context constructed as part of a Presidential campaign.

I would add to finish that maintaining long-established frames might not always be the most effective strategy, as it might not always maximize relevance. Taking into account expectations of relevance is key, not only relevance to serve the purpose of comprehension, but also "relevance to believe" (de Saussure, 2011: 37).

Chapter 12: Conclusion

12.1. Summary of findings

This thesis was concerned with the efficiency of persuasive discourse, specifically when what is being argued is the need to go to war, and despite the unveiling of covert operations and the disillusion that followed the end of the Vietnam War. What the Pentagon Papers revealed was not limited to the factual evidence that certain operations had taken place without the public's knowledge; rather, they highlighted that America's part in that war was not necessarily motivated by selfless reasons, and that perhaps inaction on OUR part would have been more beneficial. The Pentagon Papers thus unveiled precisely what the discourse around America's military engagements strives to make inaccessible. The question which initially motivated this thesis revolved around the realization that these shocking revelations did not lead to a change in the President's rhetoric, and certainly did not lead to a less 'pro-war' agenda. In that context, how and why can American War Rhetoric successfully shape the American mind to go to war? And what might be the implications for the wider study of persuasive discourse? These are the two broader questions raised in the introduction, and the aim of this concluding chapter is to provide answers, following from the analyses of American War Rhetoric conducted in Chapters 3-11. The first level of questioning relates to the discourse itself, and so this section will start with a review of findings from the corpus-based analyses. Such empirical analyses are not only valuable to get to a better understanding of how a particular type of discourse works; by asking how *and why* American War Rhetoric works, they can also lead to fruitful theoretical discussions, which we will move to in 12.2.

One of the questions raised in Chapter 1 was whether any recurring patterns appeared to govern the discussion of America's involvement in military conflicts, across a wide time frame within which American Presidents were faced with very different circumstances. The way the chapters which tackled the data's analyses were organized was meant to highlight the identification of two main patterns, which emerged out of the analysis of similar constraining effects over time and among various strategies.

- US vs. THEM

The analyses within Chapters 3-6 all pointed to an ongoing dichotomy between the two groups US and THEM. US vs. THEM is generally thought of as a strategy which aims to enhance OUR posi-

tive (superior) portrayal while (or through) negatively portraying THEM as inferior (van Dijk 1998). In order to account for the efficiency of this strategy, it is crucial to understand how the construction and cementing of a binary opposition constrains the conceptualization of US, and of the enemy. In the context of American War Rhetoric, the portrayal of OUR group as superior might lead to undesired effects, such as the assumption that America's actions abroad reflect an over-inflated sense of ego and a desire to impose one's culture on others. What our data shows is that American War Rhetoric does not merely aim at portraying US as a moral group, acting on behalf of freedom and peace; it is also not merely about portraying THEM as evil, with no regard for the well-being of humanity. Rather, it is about constraining the representation of US, so that WE cannot be seen as sharing any traits with THEM, and about constraining the conceptualization of THEM, so that the enemy is construed as one who does not share any traits with US: in other words, there is only one villain. It is through cementing this type of reasoning that interpretations of OUR actions as demonstrations of self-advancement, perceived by the rest of the world as an imposition, can be successfully blocked. The analysis of a wide set of data showed that the President's speeches do not just contribute to the legitimization of America's action in specific circumstances. Rather, American War Rhetoric aims at influencing the fundamental understanding of US and THEM, at reinforcing a type of reasoning which leads to conclusions that OUR resort to war is to be understood in fundamentally different terms from THEIRS. American War Rhetoric thus strives to provide its hearers with what I have called a reading grid, which might be defined as a visual representation of what Persuasive War Rhetoric does, in accordance with the questions set out in Chapter 1. This reading grid is made up of strictly separated categories for US and THEM, so that what WE do cannot fall within THEIR type of evil, and so that THEIR actions cannot be seen to be backed by any sort of ideal or worthy motive. Briefly put, OUR resort to war serves the realization of ideals, while THEIRS embodies violence, and more broadly what is wrong with the world.

Among the various linguistic ways to achieve these constraining effects, Chapter 3 explored the significance of Discursive Presuppositions, as pre-conditions to the relevance of utterances relating to America's part in the conflicts, so as to constrain the understanding of concepts such as DEMOCRACY solely to the ideal which it represents (DEMOCRACY*). This contributes to hiding the reality of the American soldiers' involvement, and to ease the hearer's acceptance of OUR resort to war. It comes in stark contrast with a construction of the enemy which dehumanizes the latter, as seen in Chapter 4. This can be achieved through the use of metaphors, where the enemy is construed as an animal, or as a disease. The use of CBT was found to be particularly helpful to show

how dehumanization occurs through the profiling of certain relations within a blend. Alongside CBT, the use of RT when analyzing metaphors helps to avoid over-generalizations and see how one metaphor can be used for different purposes. For example, the use of OSTRICHES as one input space does not quite reach the same dehumanizing effects, but rather serves to align parts of the group US with THEM to dismantle opposition to war. By doing so, the opposition between the two groups keeps getting cemented, as well as a binary type of reasoning.

The use of metaphors about US and THEM was seen to provide the hearers with reasons for why WE/THEY do what WE/THEY do (Chapters 4 and 5). This points to a special place for metaphors within Persuasive War Rhetoric (and as we will see in 12.3, within persuasive discourse in general). It is this understanding, grounded in that of identity, which can account for the efficiency of American War Rhetoric to ease acceptance of OUR resort to war. However, it is important to note that the discourse creates coherence beyond the use of metaphors. Chapter 6 thus explored other mechanisms, like construals of EVENTS, which are consistently used to promote a simplified understanding of the conflict. Even though such analyses are generally within the realm of Cognitive Linguistics, inputs from RT are valuable to account for the efficiency of persuasive discourse. For instance, if war is understood as an EVENT, the actor who initiates the event is the one who is at the origin of violence: the enemy's resort to violence is therefore to be understood as evidence of THEIR evil nature. But the analysis does not stop there: once the initiating actor has been identified, relevance can be achieved, and the conceptualization of OUR part as contributing to the unravelling of evil is made a lot less easily accessible. This is what makes constraining mechanisms effective in the first place.

As each strategy or mechanism analyzed in Chapters 3-6 was seen to cement a fundamental opposition between US and THEM, which the tightening of relations of Identity effectively illustrates, the mere mention of THEIR evil, however remote, becomes enough to make each conflict directly relevant to US. Even though metaphors about THEM are more prevalent than those about US, the discourse is very much about constructing and reinforcing particular conceptualizations of US. The construction of US in our data might be summed up by the profiling of unity between America's past, present and future, providing the right reasoning frame so that acting against THEM can always come out as the right answer to current issues. This is important, as there often comes a point in discourse when immediate action becomes necessary: either WE act now, or it will be too late. The cementing of a timeless opposition between US and THEM thus acts as a pre-condition to the

relevance of immediate action, so that the conveying of urgency does not get blocked by the question: why US?

• Immediate Need for Action

Chapters 7-9 dealt with the second main aspect which was found to recur in the data: arguing for an immediate need for action. As we have just seen, its efficiency partly relies upon the successful construction of a fundamental opposition between US and THEM. Chapters 7-9 then tackled the construction of urgency, which relies upon the conceptualization of the present moment as holding the key to OUR future, and of that of action as the only way to move forward and in fact to achieve anything. The resort to metaphor, or perhaps more generally to conceptual blending, was found to have a significant impact on triggering and maintaining these conceptualizations. One of the main aspects of metaphor interpretation which was discussed was the role of more conventional or even of primary metaphors, those whose influence might not easily be seen, but which have a direct influence over the direction of the inferences promoted in discourse, that is in constraining those to an immediate need for OUR action.

The main strategy relies upon linguistic mechanisms which allow to construct the issues at stake in such a way that only two options are made apparent. The interpretation of the issues is thus constrained, so that a third option does not get accessed: that inaction can also achieve peace. This is made possible through manipulating the context, for example with DPs (Chapter 7), by profiling the needs of the present, so that "inaction" gets interpreted as "inaction in the context of a present threat." The threat of the conflicts was seen to rely upon its inevitable (in the absence of immediate action), rather than upon its imminent nature. This is important, because it places OUR responsibility to change the course of the future at the heart of the understanding of the threat. The three chapters showed that the discourse makes salient *direct* relations of causality. Popa (2020: 977) explains that "a distinctive feature of causal relations is their asymmetric character: causes bring about their effects, while effects do not bring about their causes." White (2006: 132) reviews evidence for what is referred to as the "causal asymmetry bias":

> Once the roles of cause and effect are assigned to objects in interactions, people tend to overestimate the strength and importance of the causal object and underestimate that of the effect object in bringing about the outcome.

The strategies which have been explored in these chapters feed perfectly into this causal asymmetry bias. Once OUR action has been identified as an 'effect' of OUR responsibility, it becomes increas-

ingly difficult to conceive of OUR action as a potential cause in the unraveling of certain issues. This is what I have referred to as indirect Cause-Effect relations, which refer to the impact over time of America's *repeated* interventions in world conflicts, rather than to the impact of its intervention in single events. Due to the causal asymmetry bias, and in a context which profiles direct Cause-Effect relations, often as a response to an urgent threat, the conceptualization of indirect causal relations, that is of the impact of America's repeated actions, might be more costly, and thus appears irrelevant. This analysis also highlights contributions both from CBT (which clearly shows which relations are profiled), and from RT. Once OUR action has been identified as the Cause, whose Effect is the resolution of conflicts and preservation of freedom, the conceptualization of a third option which would favor OUR inaction now to reach peace can be seen as *irrelevant* (rather than inaccessible in the strictest, physical understanding of the term), and the interpretation process can stop.

The consolidation of certainty in OUR positive action was at the heart of the analyses in Chapters 7-9. Anything less than certainty would indeed jeopardize the conveying of urgency. This does not arise out of the outlining of a perfectly logical argument, where military action might be seen to follow from a series of logical steps. As Fauconnier and Turner (2002) point out, what such arguments lack is a global feeling of understanding, as access to the first steps of a lengthy logical argument becomes less and less accessible as discourse progresses. This global feeling of understanding, which Fauconnier and Turner argue is made possible thanks to the Unpacking principle (2002: 332-3), is a major strength of conceptual blending. In fact, the efficiency of all the constraining mechanisms studied in Chapters 7-9 might be said to lie within the fact that they are mechanisms which we trust. Conceptual blending does not just allow for creative uses of language; it is central to "the way we think" (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). Chapter 8 tackled reasoning from the 'unreal'; while at first glance, such reasoning might appear to have no strong basis for decision making, particularly when the decisions involve the loss of human life, this does not reflect the way in which we use counterfactual reasoning, which is in fact a very trustworthy way to reach conclusions which have the capacity to affect our understanding of the world (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 231; Coulson & Pascal, 2006). Finally, the emotions which get triggered as a result of blending can also constitute a trustworthy guide, directing the hearers to the conclusion that something is not right and needs to be done, now. This is in keeping with findings from Evolutionary Psychology on the significance of emotions, particularly the affect-as-evidence hypothesis, which, as we saw in Chapter 1, "holds that self-generated experiences of affect might serve as evidence of evaluative beliefs, just as sensory

experiences routinely serve as evidence for descriptive beliefs about the world" (Clore & Schnall, 2008: 3).

This leads us to a significant discussion on the role of positive emotional effects within persuasive discourse. This will be further explored in 12.3; at this point, it suffices to say that the sharing of fear, as opposed to the communication of the President's fear which might appear more subjective, was found to be particularly influential in blocking access to interpretations of OUR inaction as fruitful or positive. This is one way in which emotions might be said to impact the interpretation process. However, what Chapters 7-9 also showed is that the triggering of positive emotional effects, in the form of much less strong emotions, that is through conveying positive feelings relating to the coherence of the interpretation of OUR action within a wider conceptual and belief system, is also crucial to the efficiency of the identified linguistic strategies pushing for immediate action.

It is important to note that this overall coherence does not mean that contradicting facts cannot occur. This is what Chapters 10 and 11 focused on, particularly the negotiation of these conflicting facts to continue reinforcing the patterns which emerged in Chapters 3-9.

• Negotiating the frames

Several examples were examined: Reagan's re-interpretation of the Vietnam War to re-establish OUR noble cause (the one which WE all share in), through the lens of the selfless soldier; G.W Bush's discourse as he successfully pushed for war despite the fact that the arguments which he initially claimed made war necessary could not be proven; and finally Obama's negotiation of withdrawal from Iraq. The main point here was to show that when opposing parties voice their concerns by keeping within the general frames of American War Rhetoric, the latter can still end up being reinforced. In other words, constraining mechanisms continue to be effective, because they can also impact voices of opposition. In fact, Presidents often openly refer to these opposing voices, and in doing so can also constrain the interpretation of conflicting views (in this case of the choice not to take immediate action), so that they get construed as being misguided. This raises an important point regarding the mechanisms of constraint: what is 'hidden' by constraining mechanisms is not made inaccessible, in the strict sense of the term. Opposing voices are not suppressed or censored, indeed they might be fully acknowledged. But this does not make constraint any less effective, as these opposing voices can still be kept within the frames which support American War Rhetoric, thereby reinforcing rather than dismantling them.

The following table aims at summarizing the findings from the corpus-based analyses conducted within Chapters 3 to 11:

Discursive Need	A/ Overarching Strategy	B/ Linguistic strategy	C/ Constraining effects: What is made available	D/ Constraining effects: What is not made available
Answering: Why should WE fight?	**US vs. THEM**	- Presupposition - Metaphor - Alternative space builders	THEY fill the role of villain/cheater	- Legitimization of THEIR action - OUR wrong motives/means
Answering: Why fight now?	**Inevitable Threat**	- Presupposition - Metaphor - Counterfactual Blending	Direct Causality: OUR action -> Resolution of issues (Cause) —> (Effect)	- Positive effects of inaction - Negative effects of action

Table 4: Persuasive War Rhetoric

In this table, (A) represents the two pillars of Persuasive War Rhetoric. It is important to note that these two pillars are not to be seen as entirely independent; in other words, utterances cannot be categorized using an either/or dichotomy. Nevertheless, they have been identified as two distinct pillars, in the sense that they give rise to distinct constraining effects (C, D). It is also important to point out that (B) is not to be understood as an exhaustive list - the main point is that the constraining effects of the mechanisms listed in (B) are the same, so that an overall picture of coherence gets built. The efficiency of Persuasive War Rhetoric lies within the last two columns, (C) and (D). More specifically, I argue that relevance is achieved when the effects described in (C) are reached; those in (D) can then remain inaccessible, because they appear irrelevant. More than a useful tool in the analysis of online utterances, relevance is essential to understand the efficiency of constraining mechanisms, and thus of persuasion.

12.2. Theoretical review

The complementarity of Cognitive Linguistics and of Cognitive Pragmatics, specifically of CBT and RT, is not a new idea (Tendahl & Gibbs, 2008; Tendahl, 2009; Wilson, 2011). However, it is one which tends to be restricted to the interpretation of metaphor, and which has not really gained

the empirical field. What this thesis provides is precisely a large empirical study which makes use of both frameworks, with the aim to support claims of their complementarity, but also to expand the theoretical discussion. The use of real life data is indeed very valuable to test the validity of theoretical claims. 12.2.1 will first explore what frameworks did not work for the purposes of this thesis, so as to better explain in 12.2.2 what makes the combination of CBT and RT particularly fruitful for the study of persuasive discourse.

12.2.1. Topoi in CDA

The notion of topoi has already been briefly discussed In Chapter 7. We have seen that constraining mechanisms are at the heart of the efficiency of persuasive war rhetoric. Topoi might seem particularly well suited to the analysis of constraining mechanisms, as they are defined as "warrants" which "justify the transition from the argument or arguments to the conclusion" (Kienpointner, 1992: 194). As "warrants," topoi thus seem like a very useful strategy to evade critical engagement. In other words, they might constitute the perfect tool to analyze and explain constraint for the needs of argumentation: hearers are led to jump directly to conclusions, allowing for persuasion to occur, even when the logic of the argument it rests upon might not be founded. However, I argue that topoi do not account for why constraint works in the first place. This does not mean that the study of topoi is not useful, indeed it offers valuable observations and insights into the ways in which people might accept conclusions; but it does not help to answer *why* persuasive discourse can be effective, which was identified as one of the main questions for this thesis in Chapter 1.

One problem with identifying a list of topoi is that it might lead to the illusion that this is how persuasion works; perhaps that these shortcuts are somewhat present within our mind. It is important to note here that this last point is not what the study of topoi within CDA states at all. Nevertheless, the identification and formation of topoi lists seems problematic, as it might result in the representation of topoi as propositional, and that is the reason why I have chosen not to do so in this thesis. Let us take a quick look at some of the topoi which would be relevant to American War Rhetoric in order to illustrate this last point, namely the topos of threat; the topos of law; and the topos of history:

"The topos of danger or topos of threat is based on the following conditionals: if a political action or decision bears specific dangerous, threatening consequences, one should not perform or do it. Or, formulated differently: if there are specific dangers and threats one should do something against them [...]

> The topos of law or topos of right can be condensed in the conditional: if a law or an otherwise codified norm prescribes or forbids a specific politico-administrative action, the action has to be performed or omitted [...]
>
> The topos of history can be described as follows: because history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation (allegedly) comparable with the historical example referred to." (Wodak and Meyer, 2001: 75-6)

What is missing is an explanation as to why and how these conclusions are reached, and more importantly what makes them compelling and efficient. Following from the practical analyses of American War Rhetoric conducted in the previous chapters, I argue that it is more useful to analyze how the concepts at stake are constructed in discourse. We have seen for instance that the conceptualization of HISTORY as a PERSON, and more specifically as a JUDGE was significant within our data, and can account for constraining effects on the interpretation process (in some cases, this might be because continuity keeps getting profiled as a relevant criterion). If we look at the topos of law, its condensation into a proposition might appear restrictive, and might fail to account for the integration of certain seemingly inconsistencies. On the other hand, if the analyst looks for ways in which LAW is constructed within a corpus or speech, we might get to a better understanding of the grounds on which action is being promoted. Specifically, how are WE constructed, and how do WE relate to LAW? This would allow to emphasize which aspect of a concept is being profiled in discourse, for example, so that a country whose identity partly revolves around a high respect for justice might be seen, in a specific instance, to legitimately disregard legal protocols. In other words, the analyst's questioning might turn to what it is that makes the abiding of the law an effective, persuasive argument, in a given context, to legitimize a particular course of action.

Besides, this approach might be better suited to account for the effects of discursive practices over time. For example, alongside the conceptualization of HISTORY as a JUDGE to whom WE shall answer, WE are construed as a single entity, uniting Americans from the time of the Founding Fathers to the present. The combination of these two conceptualizations is very influential, and can account for the repeated efficiency of arguments such as that which states that America must learn from history and take action now, in order to fulfill its life purpose: defending freedom in the world. Here are a few questions which might then be better suited to the study of persuasive discourse, in the context of political discourse: what concepts are construed as closest to OUR identity? On what grounds do WE appear to act, or in this case, on what grounds does OUR engagement appear acceptable? Finally, who are THEY? How is each group conceptualized? Indeed, the definition of what makes an enemy goes a long way to get to OUR core values, those that are non-negotiable,

and around which other concepts such as LAW or MORALITY might revolve. In a metaphorical system where PEACE and FREEDOM are construed as people in need of OUR defense; where MORALITY is construed as the ultimate standard against which WE are judged, defining OUR strength (or weaknesses); where HISTORY is also construed as a PERSON, who will judge US for OUR choices throughout time and hold US accountable; where international law is defined by human beings, some of whom might be too weak to do the right thing; then, within this conceptual system, one can easily get to the conclusion that bypassing international law might be acceptable, without portraying US as power hungry, but rather as moral "freedom fighters." In this conceptual system, MORALITY and STRENGTH might be said to be at the core of OUR identity; the analysis of their discursive construction will then be very useful, drawing a form of conceptual map from which new inferences can be made. The constraint on reasoning can be made clearly apparent: by making certain concepts more salient, others can be made less relevant (such as the value of international law, for instance), thus accounting for 'jumps' to conclusions which might not follow certain rules of logic. These conceptual maps are not set in stone and can constantly be renegotiated in discourse: although the main elements might remain the same, the relations between them might evolve (or perhaps the other way round might be true). The discursive study of concepts might then provide more flexibility than that of topoi, and might thus be better suited to contribute to the understanding of persuasive communication. This leads us to the fruitful combination of CBT and RT, to account for the way in which concepts are constructed in discourse, along with their impact on reasoning.

12.2.2. Successful combination of CBT and RT

The main benefit of combining frameworks is to get to a better explanatory account of the very complex phenomenon that is persuasion. In Chapter 1, we raised the question: how and why can persuasive discourse be effective? The frameworks of CBT and of RT, being grounded in cognition, can offer a well-rounded answer, allowing the analyst to tackle both the online interpretation and effectiveness of an utterance, or of a speech, and the effects of discourse in the long term. Following from our corpus-based analyses, this subsection concludes on the ways in which both frameworks complement each other, specifically to analyze two main types of constraints: those affecting local comprehension, and those that relate to matters of global reasoning.

• Matters of local comprehension

When it comes to matters of local comprehension, one conclusion which stems from the analyses conducted in Chapters 3-9 is that RT can enrich CBT accounts of interpretation. Firstly, we have seen that RT can act as an engine of selection, driving the constraints on blend formation, and on their elaboration, where the hearer's creativity might run free. Some theories which are focused on providing rules of interpretation might appear too prescriptive, and in that sense can fail to account for language's creativity. On the other hand, where there are no limits to creativity, persuading a large audience, such as that of the American population, might be an impossible task. This is one of RT's great advantages. CBT has occasionally been criticized for being too descriptive, "accounting for everything and hence explaining nothing" (Coulson and Oakley, 2000: 186). Fauconnier and Turner (1998) then responded to such criticism with their suggestion of optimality principles, constraining the formation of blends. These optimality principles include the following: integration, topology principle, web principle, unpacking principle, good reason principle and metonymic tightening. I suggest that a principle of relevance might suffice, accounting for constraints on blend formation (as an 'engine of selection'), as well as on the elaboration stage. I argue that RT's grounding in the communicative event can effectively explain why certain elements get transferred to the blend, while others do not. By using the single principle of relevance, one can avoid issues related to over-interpretation. Indeed the vast number of optimality principles might induce some subjectivity on the analyst's part, as the latter might be tempted to choose the principle which best suits his/her needs. I also argue that the constraints on blend formation only arise as they occur within a communicative event, making RT better suited to explain these constraining effects. Finally, as all of the optimality principles emphasize matters of efficiency, they are all perfectly compatible with the more encompassing principle of relevance. In the context of American War Rhetoric, we have seen that relevance can explain why the use of a source domain such as that of BUSINESS, which in other contexts might make salient the notion of profit seeking, did not lead to the conceptualization of America as a power-hungry nation in the blends.

This leads us to RT's second advantage. A CBT analysis can effectively show what the use of a metaphor highlights, and what it hides. But that is just one part of the interpretation process; indeed for persuasion to occur, the interpretation process needs to stop, so that the hearer's attention is not drawn to those elements which a metaphor might hide. As we have seen in previous chapters, this certainly does not mean that such elements are physically inaccessible. Indeed we have seen exam-

ples where the President explicitly refers to those critical voices which portray America's actions in a much less favorable light. Comprehension or belief do not imply a lack of access to conflicting views, which was one of the main issues raised in Chapter 1. What matters is that the relevance of the choice of metaphor itself is established, so that the interpretation process might stop, and so that these 'hidden' elements do not appear to be relevant enough to challenge the final interpretation. We have seen that this might happen once the role for villain has been filled, for instance; or once the effect of America's action has been established. So if a renowned scholar like Chomsky voices the fact that America's actions in a particular conflict are far from exemplary and are in fact pretty brutal - this does not appear relevant, because in a constrained context which profiles an US vs. THEM dichotomy, once THEY are seen as the villain, OUR less than exemplary actions can get interpreted on a different scale.

The efficiency of blending is said to lie within its ability to reduce the scale of events. RT can expand upon the reasons why that is effective: its framework can show what the relevant criteria are for the interpretation of the issues at stake; what rules the establishment of a reduced scale and how it might impact the interpretation of the conflicts. If we take the Rape of Kuwait metaphor which governed the Gulf War Rhetoric, what was made salient in discourse were matters of humanity. That is what allows for the fact that Kuwait's past actions were far from innocent to be successfully disregarded. On the scale of humanity, THEY are the ones who violated the world's trust. And on that scale, THEY are the ones who need punished.

When it comes to matters of local comprehension, RT can therefore enrich CBT analyses, by explaining a) what elements get profiled within a blend, and b) why the elements which are said to remain in the background do not get picked up to threaten the persuasive efficiency of blending. As a result, the conclusion that arises out of each and every conflict is that WE have no choice but to take action. But the efficiency of persuasive discourse goes beyond the repetition of good metaphors, or of effective speeches.

- Matters of global reasoning

When it comes to matters of global reasoning, CBT can be seen to enrich the framework of RT. This combination is especially significant to account for the effects of a type of discourse in the long-term. What we have seen with the analysis of American War Rhetoric is that CBT does not just

highlight the reasoning (through the relations that appear in a blend) that takes place online - it shows how the reasoning promoted in discourse relates to a broader understanding of identity, tradition, causality, history, time passing, etc. This offers several benefits. Firstly, it grounds the interpretation process in familiar conceptualizations, in familiar reasoning patterns *which we can trust*. Secondly, it allows to make apparent elements which can account for effective persuasion, but which would not get highlighted by RT (when used on its own), because they might initially appear to be outside of the immediate context. CBT's main appeal is that it allows to highlight relations not only within mental spaces, but also across broader conceptual networks. In the context of American War Rhetoric, the aim is that the course of immediate action promoted by the President appears to make sense within the broader conceptual system of the American identity. To that end, compression and the tightening of relations within a blend are particularly useful. The fact that the interpretation of America's involvement abroad appears to follow similar reasoning patterns as those which are used to construct its domestic policy agenda, for instance, or as those which make sense of the resolution of other moral problems, of one's understanding of responsibility, etc., plays a significant part in the persuasive efficiency of American War Rhetoric. It is what allows it to remain effective over time, despite the unveiling of a government's deceptions or the emergence of conflicting facts. This relates to what was said in Chapter 1 about the understanding of persuasion, which is often linked to attitude changes. Persuasion might for instance be "defined as a process in which people change their opinions as a consequence of discourse" (van Dijk, 1998: 244). I mentioned in Chapter 1 that an added focus on the reinforcement of prior beliefs might better serve the understanding of what makes persuasion effective, and I argue that the framework of CBT can be used to strengthen that claim. Indeed CBT analyses can allow the analyst to go beyond the domain of local comprehension, by emphasizing matters of general reasoning, where the reinforcement of entrenched relations or frames can be made clearly apparent.

The following schema aims at providing a clear picture of the interaction of CBT and RT frameworks when analyzing persuasive communication:



Fig. 24: Mutual inputs of CBT and RT

This distinction between the interpretation of utterances online and the long-term impact of discursive strategies is especially important to account for the effectiveness of persuasive communication, and to highlight the benefits of using complementary frameworks. Empirical linguistic analyses, especially when they cover a wide time frame, can thus fruitfully serve theoretical discussions. Indeed the incorporation of CBT and RT does not just serve the elaboration of thorough linguistic analyses; going back to the questions raised in Chapter 1, this would relate to *how* persuasion works. This combination can also comment on the reasons *why* persuasive discourse can be so effective, and I will conclude this summarizing section with Belaj's insights on Conceptual Blending:

"There is a phenomenon in our physical world where ease of interpretation depends on the relationship between light and dark. This phenomenon, we believe, strongly corroborates our approach to conceptual integration through the prism of the metaphorical relationship between light and dark. Namely, elements and stages of conceptual integration can be compared to a photograph, i.e. to the process of making a photograph. A part of the camera, the blend, is responsible for achieving the optimal relative amount of light and dark thus making the photograph clear and sharp. We could draw two parallels between the process of making a photograph and the process of conceptual integration. Since visualization is one of the most important elements of conceptualization, the first parallel that can be drawn is that between the blend as part of the camera which strikes the right balance between light and dark in a photograph on the one hand, and on the other, the cognitive mechanisms in the brain which regulate the relationship between the known and the unknown, focused and defocused elements in creating the blend. The other parallel may be drawn between the results of these two processes: the photograph as a visual phenomenon, which exhibits an ideal balance between light and shadow on the one hand; and on the other, the blend as a conceptual phenomenon, i.e. the clear and focused conceptual photograph where the elements of light and dark metaphorically map onto the conceptually known and unknown elements recruited from input spaces into the blend." (Belaj, 2005: 129)

The photograph analogy seems particularly insightful, and it hints at the first reason why conceptual blending can serve persuasive discourse: if the conditions are right, we tend to trust the interpretations which arise from conceptual blending. I expand upon this analogy by adding the notion of relevance. The image of a photograph exemplifies the fact that access to contradictory information is not blocked. Rather, it is left in the background, it is defocused. More than that, it gets portrayed as a 'darker constituent,' one that does not affect the overall interpretation given by the photograph. When the balance of light and dark is right, when the result is sharp, then the efficiency of the pho-

tograph lies in the fact that it might appear as an illusion of reality (hiding its own perspective), thus constraining not only the interpretation of the issues at stake, but also the hearer's understanding, beliefs, and what he/she considers as truth. At this point, the analogy can be extended, and we could say that when the balance is right, when the photograph appears sharp, optimal relevance has been achieved. This is where constraints on understanding and truth might occur, making it difficult to see that other perspectives might be useful or necessary. Once we accept the photograph as being accurate, its interpretations can then be accepted as 'truths.' This concluding image points to the benefits of further research on the mechanisms of constraint, so as to establish how discourse can contribute to constraining not only the hearer's interpretations of the issues at stake, but also knowledge and truth. This chapter's last section then explores how one might take this type of analysis further.

12.3. Limitations and further developments

12.1 and 12.2 highlighted the benefits of analyses based on a wide selection of data, to serve the understanding of a particular type of discourse, and to prompt theoretical discussions, or to support theoretical claims. Before moving onto ways in which the research conducted in this thesis might be pursued, a few limitations of this type of study have been identified.

12.3.1. Limitations

The comprehensive nature of this work, stemming from analyses which cover a wide time frame, might be said to be its main strength. Nevertheless, it is important to note that it also has some limitations. Firstly, the efficiency of persuasive mechanisms, especially their long-term effects, is not easily quantified. As a result, this type of study does not easily lend itself to the formulation of experiments which could add valuable support to the claims made in this concluding chapter. Such experiments have been extremely useful to demonstrate the impact of metaphors on reasoning (Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011). These experiments did not merely confirm that metaphors could constrain reasoning, but also how, depending on where in the text they were found. The use of real life data such as the speeches that were used in this thesis could strengthen linguistic experiments; however, looking at the study of American War Rhetoric, this might prove to be a rather difficult endeavor. A few problems arise: firstly, the lack of access to the audience's reactions. In the case of political discourse, one can look at the message itself, but the latter is not followed by direct reac-

tions, which would be very useful to comment on the effects of discourse. Polls are sometimes available, but they do not necessarily target the areas of research which are of interest. In the case of American War Rhetoric, the efficiency of the President's discourse can be observed thanks to the non-problematic pursuit of pro-war policies, which Bacevich (2010) sums up as "America's path to permanent war." We have seen for example that in cases where the President needs to argue against war, he can feel compelled to frame his criticism in a way that does not lead to the conceptualization of war as evil. In our data, Obama's plans to withdraw from Iraq did not move away from a strong international stance, and his discourse continued to praise the American soldiers' efforts over the past few years. This might be surprising, given his strong opposition to the launch of the war. This was years before his presidency, and as a result it was not included in our data. But it is interesting to note that before moving on to the reasons why he thought that the Iraq War should not happen, he chose to start by stating that he is not opposed to war. This was his opening sentence: "Let me begin by saying that although this has been billed as an anti-war rally, I stand before you as someone who is not opposed to war in all circumstances." (Obama, October 2, 2002) After outlining the reasons why he understands the necessity of war in certain circumstances, such as those which drove America to war in the past, he eventually moves onto his criticism of a "dumb war" (Obama, October 2, 2002). One could then argue that this difficulty to oppose war betrays the efficiency of American War Rhetoric. However, it is not something which one can clearly pinpoint, and as a result, the analyst's subjectivity in evaluating persuasion cannot entirely be removed.

This leads us to the second type of limitation, which relates to the assessment of persuasive mechanisms in the long-term. Chapter 1 briefly answered Billig and Marinho's criticism of "analysts [who] do not tend to base such claims on examining what receivers might be doing when they receive messages, but on linguistically examining the messages themselves" (2014: 6). Indeed we saw that the framework of Cognitive Pragmatics does allow us to make such claims, even in the absence of data regarding "what the receivers might be doing when they receive messages." Nonetheless, the analysis of a wider selection of data, stretching over decades, adds an extra difficulty, in the sense that the receivers of Reagan's discourse differ from Obama's. Although the long-term effects of persuasive discourse are a fascinating object of study, and one which would benefit from further research, the evaluation of where such effects come from is even more difficult here, given the vast number of variables which might affect one's beliefs, from personal traits and preferences to the constant emergence of new economic, social and political issues, media influences, etc. Hence the significance of selecting frameworks which can guard against over-interpreting the data. The choice

and restriction of sources is also important. While American War Rhetoric is targeted at the entire nation, corpora which are made of data issued from media articles, or from social media posts might face stronger limitations. Personal bias might indeed play a much bigger part in their efficiency, and it might then be difficult to assess whether discursive mechanisms merely reflect or strengthen such biases.

Discourse analysis is by no means a perfect science. But based on recent research on the links between language and cognition, the study of the former provides valuable insights into the latter. Being aware of those limitations is an important aspect if one wants to make any valuable critical observation.

12.3.2. Further developments

This subsection aims at starting a discussion on developments which might follow from the findings of this thesis, as outlined in 12.1 and 12.2. The first one concerns contributions to a unified theory of metaphor, which I argue would serve to better understand the mechanisms of constraint, and of persuasive discourse in general. Firstly, further work on the significance of positive emotional effects could a) reinforce the links between CBT and RT; and b) point to metaphors' 'special role' in persuasive communication.

12.3.2.1. Towards a unified theory of metaphor

Chapter 1 raised the following question: Are there any linguistic mechanisms which […] have a particular impact on the hearer's reasoning about war? I have argued that the study of American War Rhetoric testifies to the special place of metaphor, going against some of the tenets of RT. The constraint on reasoning which metaphors can induce is often related to its uses within political or persuasive discourse. I argue here that a fully-fledged theory of metaphor should encompass its uses and its effects across all discourse types. Although the property of metaphors to expand and constrain reasoning is most obvious when the issues dealt with are unfamiliar or abstract, it is indeed not restricted to their use in political discourse. Further research into a more unified theory of metaphor, appealing to its general properties, might then be required. I do not mean 'unified' in the way that Relevant Theorists have suggested, that is a theory which aligns metaphor with other figures of speech such as hyperbole. What I argue should be the focus of further studies, and what I focus on here is the broader search for coherence which governs the interpretation process, and which is often identified as one of metaphors' main functions (Kovecses, 2005, 2015; AllBritton et

al., 1995). In persuasive communication, metaphors can provide coherence on several levels: at the level of the argument (where an argument is made), at the level of discourse, and at the level of beliefs. I suggested in previous chapters that the "all-clarifying" feeling which certain conceptual blends can provide arises from the trigger of *positive emotional effects,* (as defined in Chapter 4, and based on research by de Saussure and Wharton (2019)), and I link here those effects with the broader notion of coherence. The search for coherence is a fundamental aspect of the interpretation process within persuasive discourse. In fact, the presupposition of coherence acts as its first constraint. The notion of positive emotional effects might merit further consideration, following from the analyses in this thesis which have shown that it is fit to tackle:

a) the sharing (rather than communicating) of strong emotions. The way that these are shared is what makes them particularly efficient in terms of persuasion. In that sense, positive emotional effects have been linked with the interpretation of metaphors and more broadly the elaboration of conceptual blends;
b) the sharing of less strong emotions, such as those which arise out of one's perception of coherence. In that sense, positive emotional effects can result from the use of effective metaphors, whatever their usage. In poetry, the repeated use of metaphors can provide the hearer with a reinforced feeling of understanding, as each metaphor might strengthen the overall coherence of the poem. The hearer/reader can thus get a deeper sense of understanding, of the poem itself and of the poet's meaning. Beyond stronger emotions which the interpretation of a poem might trigger, this is in itself satisfying. I thus argue that the persuasive power of metaphors lies in their ability not to expand reasoning, but rather to provide the hearer with the feeling that the resulting interpretation fits with an existing set of beliefs, with the feeling that coherence has been achieved.

It is not within the scope of this thesis to tackle the use of metaphors in poetry. Nevertheless, the notion of positive emotional effects might be a particularly interesting object of study, in that it might illustrate a similarity of effects within metaphor usage across a multitude of domains. The notion of positive emotional effects also seems to suit the integration of CBT and RT. Let us start the discussion here, by exploring how the notion of positive emotional effects, when studied within the frameworks of CBT and RT, can contribute to explaining metaphor's special place within cognition, and more specifically within persuasion. When positive emotional effects are triggered as a result of conceptual blending (particularly when metaphors are involved), can we then assume that relevance has been achieved, and thus that the interpretation process can stop? If that is the case, then the effectiveness of metaphors as a persuasive mechanism might be said to lie within their abil-

ity (in the right context) to establish their own relevance to interpret the issues at stake. In this context, positive emotional effects might be best understood as a form of feedback, confirming a metaphor's own suitability, and thus contributing to bypassing the hearer's critical evaluation. The acceptance of a metaphor would then be a powerful element to constrain (rather than expand) reasoning. Indeed, the triggering of positive emotional effects could account for the difficulty to see things in a different way once a metaphor has been accepted. At the elaboration stage of conceptual blending, the hearer might then be able to connect with other parts of his/her already established belief system, or with personal experience, thus reinforcing the overall feeling of coherence, that is the feeling that the metaphor "fits."

Let us add now to the analysis started in Chapter 2 about concept narrowing and broadening, to see how one might take it further by incorporating the findings summarized in this concluding chapter. One example which Wilson and Carston (2006: 6) use to discuss concept broadening is the following:

(1) The reservoirs are dry.

In this example, "'dry' may be used literally, approximately ('almost DRY'), or as a hyperbole ('substantially closer to DRY than expected or desired')" (Wilson & Carston, 2006: 6). While I do not disagree with Wilson and Carston's analysis, I argue that CBT can provide insights into reasons why such utterances can be used to trigger criticism. Let us imagine that (1) was used as a comment criticizing the government's actions. The mental space which gets built when interpreting (1) would then also show a relation of Cause-Effect between the government's past actions and the result which is exaggerated in (1). Whether (1) is understood as an approximation or a hyperbole, the speaker's motive is to get people's attention, to shock in order to prompt action. In other words, the aim is to highlight the link, the vital relation between an agent (here the government) and negative consequences which might be difficult to get back from. RT's account shows that metaphors do not require special interpretative mechanisms and follow the same path as utterances such as (1). This is not questioned here. I would add, however, that metaphors can go further in the construction of *coherence*, as suggested in this subsection. While (1) might appear to comment on one particular situation, conceptual integration networks have the potential to build coherence on a much broader level, accounting for a person's personality (see the penny example in Chapter 4), for example, or in this instance perhaps for the government's *consistent* disregard for the way in which their actions might affect individuals, which might then prompt someone to argue that a change of leadership is needed. Taking the analysis further, one might argue that when a metaphor seems to fit (or in this case the formation of an ad hoc concept), should positive emotional effects get triggered, as the in-

terpretation of one particular issue is related to the hearer's broader understanding of the world (or here of the current government's policies and leadership), optimal relevance is achieved, and persuasive effects are maximized.

Finally, although relevance-theoretical accounts of metaphor tend to reject its special status, our account of metaphors' special role relating to the notion of coherence could also be seen to be relative to relevance, if one draws on research by Reboul and Moeschler (1996: 15). Reboul and Moeschler talk about judgments of coherence, which are directly correlated with what they call the retrieval of a global intention, which is to be related to Wilson and Sperber's notion of communicative intention (2004: 611). So how does this relate to the role of metaphors? In the context of American War Rhetoric, the speaker's global intention is made clearly manifest: it is to relate to the American public the latest *relevant* information on America's National Security; more precisely, it is often made explicit as an explanation (rather than a debate) as to why the current issues directly affect Americans, why they affect US, that is the identity of Americans, that which has been consolidated since America's founding. The global intention might then also be understood as the President's wish to communicate why his policies make sense within the broader concept of the American identity. The persuasive impact of metaphors might then be understood as the confirmation that the interpretation of the discourse does indeed fit that global intention; in that sense, that the metaphors chosen meet expectations of relevance, leading to positive judgements of coherence.

12.3.2.2. Beyond American War Rhetoric

The initial question which motivated this thesis was based on the observation that the language of American War Rhetoric did not seem to change, despite the revelations and disillusion that followed the Vietnam War. What the study of American War Rhetoric, from Reagan to Obama, has showed, is that it might well be because it has not changed that it could remain effective. Beyond reaching a better understanding of American War Rhetoric, these conclusions have allowed for insights into effective persuasion, and into the linguistic mechanisms which support it. Following from this analysis of American War Rhetoric, I have identified several objects of study which would benefit from further research.

Analyses incorporating CBT and RT, to comment both on the online and long-term effectiveness of discourse, can be declined on several fronts:

- Methodological:
  - Based on the observations made in 12.2.1, drawing a 'conceptual map' might serve the analysis of persuasive discourse, which would benefit from further research if one was to use it as a fully-fledged methodology. Depending on the type of discourse, certain themes seem inevitable, such as that of identity. One might then start with how identity is construed in discourse. When identifying persuasive strategies, the following questions might also be useful to draw conceptual maps: what relations are profiled when interpreting metaphors (or other mechanisms)? What notions are made salient in the immediate context? What frames are salient in the tradition which the discourse belongs to? How does the discourse tap into/deviate from those frames? And how might this affect the costs/benefits of the interpretation process?

- Theoretical:
  - Another potential area of study might be that of 'core metaphorical construals.' This is based on Oswald and Rihs's research on extended metaphors as argumentative devices (2013). One of the ideas raised is that the use of extended metaphors can lead to the perception of a metaphor's own relevance. Beside the Rape of Kuwait, extended metaphors are not a big feature of American War Rhetoric. However, we have noted similar effects, and these might be due to the reinforcement and extension of 'core metaphorical construals,' which might then be linked to the continued efficiency of a discourse over time.
  - Certain linguistic mechanisms and theoretical notions seem to lend themselves particularly well to analyses incorporating CBT and RT. Further research on their role in persuasion might be particularly interesting: metonymy; positive emotional effects and metaphor; persuasive impact of the exploitation of attitudes in discourse. The latter might be particularly interesting in cases where mistrust of the speaker, or of political leaders in general, might be at stake. Besides, based on research which has shown that attitudes, unlike emotions, are not subject to temporal constraints (Clore & Schnall, 2005), the exploitation of attitudes in wide corpus-based analyses might serve to better understand the effects of persuasive discourse in the long-term;
  - The benefits of interdisciplinary approaches are not limited to the combination of CBT and RT. Further research on the incorporation of Evolutionary Psychology to Cognitive Linguistics/ Pragmatics, focused on the role of emotions when promoting war, might add to the analysis' s explanatory power;

- Scientific: We have seen here that the unveiling of deceptions was not necessarily enough to jeopardize the efficiency of persuasive discourse. Similarly, if we think about the manipulative power of advertising, the unveiling of the techniques used might not diminish their impact on our behaviors. Further research on the intricate links between manipulation, deception, and persuasion might be necessary. I argue that this in fact points to potential gaps within definitions of manipulation which see covertness as an essential criterion to its efficiency (Parret, 1978; Maillat & Oswald, 2009; Al-Hindawi and Kamil, 2017). Perhaps a clearer distinction could be made between deception and manipulation (the former could then retain the covertness criterion), leading to a broader definition of manipulation which might serve a better understanding of the impact of language on one's reasoning and behavior.

- Finally, practical:
  - Certain topics seem to naturally follow from the conclusions raised in this chapter, such as: the study of 'false beliefs' (which we have hinted at here with the development of the belief that Iraq was directly involved in the 9/11 attacks, despite the fact that the President never stated that link); going further, one could also focus on the elaboration and maintenance of conspiracy theories;
  - Finally, the danger of consistently resorting to binary oppositions (perhaps the latter could be analyzed within social media discourse) could serve practical purposes, such as that of raising awareness to the real impact of one's language on the consolidation of divisions, which appears to be a growing issue in our society. It is indeed important to remember that although our understanding of cognition has evolved, this expanded knowledge does not necessarily translate into a wide awareness among the public of what it is that language does and how influential it is, or into a reduced impact of manipulative strategies. Rather than raising awareness of facts which might discredit the validity of certain policies, awareness of the prevalence of binary constructions and their impact on the constraint on reasoning, or perhaps of what it is that leads to one's perceptions of what is 'normal,' might then be a lot more beneficial. Raising awareness among the wider public of how reasoning and understanding work *and fail* might contribute to triggering critical evaluation when it is needed.

To finish on a slightly more positive note, I suggest that there are ways to combat the dangerous effects of constraint, even in cases where disillusion has become prominent. In the context of terrorism, in an attempt to determine whether terrorism constitutes a crime against humanity, or an act of

war on terror, Ivie (2005: 131) favors "the more complicated 'both/and' answer," which "would acknowledge that terrorism is both a different kind of war and a unique form of crime." I argue that the widespread use of 'both/and' constructions in the discourse of foreign politics would allow to integrate various frames, and so counteract the effects of constraint. Indeed, I believe it is necessary to think of new ways to conceptualize international relationships, in order to make apparent their unique and complicated nature.

> Is it too much to hope that next time around before we start doing violence to people, we can ask what violence we are doing to truth? Can't we protest when our leaders distort objective realities and send the truth down the memory hole? If not, we might as well join Orwell's defeated character, Winston Smith, drinking Victory Gin at the Chestnut Tree Cafe and writing in the dust on the table, ''2 + 2 = 5". (Bell, 2008: 39)

One broader purpose of this type of work is to raise awareness of the ways in which we can be unconsciously influenced. In the case of American wars, the justification of military action relies upon a particular conceptualization of the world, of America's place in it, and of what makes an action moral. Reasoning in general is built upon our conception of what we understand to be true. By being aware of what it is that we consider to be true, by questioning the application of certain truths to different issues, we might be able to be more critical of what we hear as well as of how we speak ourselves, potentially cementing some unhelpful ways to reason about the world. It might then not be too much to hope to escape Orwell's fictional warnings, of which Bell reminds us of above (2008: 39).

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