SOM

EUROPEAN COMMISSION
European Research Area

SEVENTH FRAMEWORK
PROGRAMME

Funded under Socio-economic Sciences & Humanities

SOM Working Papers

Paper Number 2012-08

Patterns of Claims-Making on Civic Integration and Migration in Europe: Are Muslims Different?

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Support and Opposition to Migration: A cross national comparison of the politicization of migration (SOM)

http://www.som-project.eu/

Patterns of Claims-Making on Civic Integration and Migration in Europe: Are Muslims Different? *

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8 May 2012

Abstract

Of the various immigrant and minority groups in Western Europe, Muslims are frequently singled out for their alleged cultural distance and lack of interest to participate in social and political life. Mutual distrust between Islamic organizations and political actors seems to be rising. This paper is interested in patterns of discursive interaction between Muslim groups on the one hand, and other political actors on the other hand. It examines seven European societies with varying proportions of Muslims among the population, distinct traditions of citizenship policies, and different levels of electoral success of parties voicing anti-Islam positions. Using a political claims analysis covering 1995 to 2009, we show that there are substantial differences between countries in the use of migrant-group categories. These differences do not fit the policy tradition typology suggested by (Koopmans, 2007), and we identify significant changes over time. Of the various groups, we find that Muslims are differentiated in the news media. The proportion of claims by Muslim organizations is nowhere in proportion to their size in the population, and indeed claims about Muslims are more common. This suggests that the construction of Muslim groups as a

*The research leading to these results was carried out as part of the project SOM (Support and Opposition to Migration). The project has received funding from the European Commission's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) under grant agreement number 225522. This paper was presented at the *Muslims and Political Participation in Britain* conference in Edinburgh, 21 April 2012.

politically relevant category is largely done by non-Muslim political actors. The frames used in claims about Muslims differ significantly from those used for other immigrant groups. Whereas the most common frames for immigrants more generally are instrumental, for Muslims identity-based arguments are invoked more frequently. Moreover, we find that Muslims are talked about almost exclusively in connection with integration rather than immigration.

1 Introduction

One key concern in comparative politics is the relationship between social differences and political differences. In their classic study, Lipset et al. (1967) highlight the importance of the historically instituted and socially embedded divisions in European societies, and their political translation into (party) political organizations. Social divisions, such as those between capital and labour, between religious and non-religious sections in society, and, in more contemporary terms, between 'winners' and 'losers' of globalization (Kriesi et al., 2006; Hug and Kriesi, 2010; Bauman, 1998), form the base for differences between political groups within countries, and between party systems across countries. These differences are institutionally reinforced and are historically persistent in, most importantly but not exclusively, the party system. In contrast, others, such as Van Der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) and Green-Pedersen (2010), in the tradition of Schattschneider (1960), highlight the limited carrying capacity of political systems for reflecting social differences. That is, out of a multitude of social differences and conflicts, politicians attend to only one or two of these differences simultaneously. Consequently, certain 'issues are organized into politics, while others are organized out' (Schattschneider, 1960, p.69). In this perspective, the activities of politicians – for instance when making public claims, organizing potential constituents, or constructing differences between social groups – are at least as important in shaping political differences as the actual social-structural composition of society. We are interested in the circumstances under which subsections of society become politically meaningful categories as object of policy, a source of political contestation or a base for political mobilization.

In this paper, we relate to this discussion and modestly and indirectly assess the relative importance of actual social-structural differences, political institutional structures and (party) political strategies on the construction of political opposition and (political-)sociological categories. One of the most important new potential social category is based on migration to and within Europe. We examine the differ-

ences between several European countries and over the past 15 years, in the way in which people with a migrant background as a new group in society and potential social-political category become part of – or are differentiated from – existing political opposition and interrelationships. We seek to find out in what way people with a migration background present themselves and are addressed as a distinct political category. This presentation could be as a general migrants group, as a group denominated by religion (e.g. Islam), or with reference to race or administrative status. We focus on political contestation on migration and civic integration issues because the construction of migrant group categories is most likely to occur on these issues.

The assessment of migrant group categorization is important in more societal terms, especially following Muslim extremism in relation to the events in New York in 2001 and later in Madrid and London. This is the case because issues related to Islam have become politically contested. For this reason we focus especially on patterns of discursive interrelationships between Muslim groups and other political actors. While Muslim groups are central, the study also tells us something about other migrant groups and, as the mirror-image, about the apparent identification of the non-Muslim groups.

We use a large-scale claims analysis of newspapers in seven countries: Austria, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. These are European societies with varying proportions of Muslims among the population, distinct traditions of citizenship policies and political institutions, and different levels of electoral success of political parties voicing anti-Islam positions. The countries vary on all potential explanations for differences in group categorizations: actual sociological differences, institutional structures and (party) political strategies in the construction of political opposition, and (political-)sociological categories. This makes it challenging to identify a the relative importance of each of them. Therefore, beyond a seven country comparison, we also look into changes over time between 1995 and 2009, especially contrasting the pre 2001 and post 2001 period.

Our theoretical outline and analysis consists of two stages. First we examine the constitution of migrants in general, and Muslim migrants more specifically, as a distinct and 'validated' category of political contestation (as objects of policy, or claimants). We build upon the finding by Koopmans et al. (2005, p.107–45) that there are fundamental differences in the categorization of migrant minorities between especially Germany, France and the United Kingdom. We assess this typology beyond these three countries. Second, we address aggregate differences over time and between countries in the topic and arguments (widely

referred to as 'frames') in which Muslim groups are included, compared to non-Muslim migrant groups. We thus assess two questions: What kind of migration-related group categories are used in political debate on migration and integration? And under which circumstances do we find a religion-based migrant identity?

We continue this paper with a brief theoretical outline, a methodological section, the principal analysis, and a conclusion.

2 Theory

2.1 Political Classification of Migrant Groups

Several migration-related collective (political) identities or social categories may be expressed in the public sphere. Koopmans et al. (2005, p.114–5) identify four distinctive ways: status categories, racial categories, religious categories, and categories drawing on country of origin or ethnic identities. The first category includes undifferentiated identities, such as being a migrant or belonging to a minority group, but also includes references to the specific administrative status that migrants have received, such as being a asylum-seeker, refugee, or foreign citizen. The second category, racial identities, refers to differences based on blood relations and has an Anglo-American tradition. The third category highlights that migrants could also be discussed or organize themselves on the basis of a common religious background. In the context of this paper, because of its focus on questions of immigration and integration, we reduce this category to Muslims. In the fourth category ties with the country of origin provide identification and a potential base for political mobilization. Koopmans et al. (2005, p.115) also define a fifth hybrid category and a combination variant of the country of origin category. We will disregard these for the sake of clarity.

In very broad terms, these discursive identities, categories or frames can be explained by either strategic choices on the part of political actors or opportunity structures that vary by country and over time. These political explanations may, at least partially, be shaped by more contingent or socio-structural factors. In the following lines, we present a parsimonious model that includes factors that are more structural in nature, factors that relate to political behaviour, and more contingent factors such as specific events.

First, as regards the strategies of actors, political actors seek to use terms that are favourable for their political positions and arguments. This is often called framing (Benford and Snow, 2000) and the theoretical mechanisms vary between government (e.g Kernell, 1997), political parties (e.g. Schattschneider, 1960, p.60–75), and social movements

(e.g. Lipsky, 1968). The migrant-group identities are the result of discursive interaction and need not be chosen or expressed by the migrant group itself. In sociological terms, we refer to 'categories' rather than 'groups' (Jenkins, 1997). Put differently, other political actors, such as government policy makers, political parties or the news media, employ certain categories or identifications in public debate – strategically or as unintended policy consequence. The use of certain denominations is often contested. As with all mediated politics, the public employment of migrant-categories requires the 'collaboration' of journalists. In contested circumstances, political actors seek the validation of certain terms. The news media provide such validation, as Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993, p.116) write 'receiving standing in the media is often a necessary condition before targets of influence will grant a movement recognition and deal with its claims and demands'. In addition to what Gamson and Wolfsfeld outline, such validation need not only allow claims-making, but it also makes it possible that a group becomes an object or addressee of political claims. In the interaction between journalists and political actors, the media 'validates' the existence of specific groups in political terms.

Second, in more structural terms, the different social categories and identities used are part broader discursive, political, historical and institutional structures that provide or restrict the use of one category over others. This should produce typical national differences. Koopmans et al. (2005) finds that discursive opportunity structures and policy traditions come a long way in explaining country differences in the presence of certain migrant identifications (see also: Koopmans and Olzak, 2004; Koopmans and Muis, 2009).

Third, phenomena outside politics such as major events or longer term trends potentially affect the migrant-group categories used. For instance, Lipset et al. (1967) point to industrialization of the economy, or economic growth more generally, as a prerequisite to political conflict between labour and capital and as decreasing the likelihood of conflict structured on a centre-periphery contrast (see also: Lipset, 1960). The actual absence, presence or size of certain social groups should determine the way they are involved in politics. That is, without immigrants there can hardly be political contestation on migration issues. Major external political or non-political events, abroad or at home, could further affect the ways in which migrant-groups define themselves, or how they are addressed in public and public debates.

2.2 Expectations on Differences Between Countries in Migrant-Group Classification

In any case, actors within specific contexts shape the migrant-group categories commonly used. The use of these categories are indicated by more migration-specific factors that we discuss now. Continuing our outline above, we expect countries to differ depending on three factors: political strategies of political parties – more specifically anti-immigration parties, citizenship policies, and social-structural composition. Figure 1 summarizes the expected relationships.

First, we think it is more likely that non-migrant actors – instead of migrant political actors – determine the socio-political categorization of migrant groups. Of these actors, political parties stand out. The nature of party political mobilization, and party political relationships within the party system are very important in the determination of party strategies regarding migrant-group categorization (e.g. Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008; Brug et al., 2009). Several party system characteristics could be included, such as the dimensionality or polarisation of the party system. In this paper, we focus on the electoral success of anti-immigrant parties. The presence of such parties in national legislatures should make it more likely that migration is politicized in general, and more likely that Muslim are considered a distinct category within the migrant population.

Second, Koopmans relates the aforementioned identification to dominant citizenship policies. Typically, according to Koopmans (2007, p.701–2), 'the differences in claimsmaking [related to migrant groups] emphasize national origin in Germany, race in Britain and (...) differentialist identities in France', and this is related to 'dominant discourses on citizenship'. More specifically, in countries with 'thicker' or ethnic citizenship traditions, such as the Netherlands and Switzerland, we should expect higher proportions of national and ethnic identification. In contrast, in countries with traditionally civic citizenship regimes, such as Britain, we should find lower proportions of national and ethnic identification. We focus on differences in policy traditions instead of the discursive structures mentioned above. Discursive structures are very difficult to disentangle from the actual migrant-group categories. The independent and dependent variable, while conceptually different, are in that case empirically too closely connected to differentiate as distinct meaningful phenomena.

Third, in order for social categories to have some meaningful referent, we should find that larger proportions of migrants, and larger proportions of certain subgroups of migrants, are positively related to the use of these categories in the political sphere. All the coun-



Figure 1: Conceptual model of migrant categorization

tries included in this paper are 'receiving countries', albeit at different rates and with very different immigration history. Moreover, the demographic composition of the immigrant population present in the different countries varies significantly, notably also with regard to Muslims (Berkhout and Sudulich, 2011b; Cunningham, 2011; Peintinger, 2011; Ros, 2011; Ruedin, 2011; Vangoidsenhoven, 2011; Wunderlich, 2011). The different immigration history and resulting composition of the immigrant population, along with very different developments in recent years make for a fruitful comparison.

Furthermore, real events shape migrant categories. In our study this implies that violent Muslim extremism in New York in 2001 and later in Madrid and London provided an extreme form of 'validation' of Muslims as a politically relevant group. In all countries in our study, we should therefore find fewer Muslim group references before 2001 than after 2001.

Last, migrant-group classification always occurs in the context of political debate. This affects the range of group-categories that could plausibly be used. For instance, it does not make sense to talk about illegal migrants in the context of political debate on civic integration policies, as illegal migrants commonly do not have access to such policies. We should therefore find more frequent use of status categories on migration topics, and more frequent use of religious categories in

the context of debate civic integration topics. For similar reasons we expect that the arguments used to justify the position of the political actors is related to the migration-group classification. That is, when political actors provide instrumental, pragmatic, and usually policy-related arguments, they should refer to policy status categories. In cases where political actors justify their position in reference to their own or others' identity or culture, this should be related to the use of religious or ethnic migrant-group categories.

3 Data and Methodology

This paper uses quantitative methods to address the way Muslims are portrayed in claims in the news. The analysis is largely kept descriptive, focusing on patterns of claims-making: Muslims as claimants, Muslims as targets or objects of claims, and the different frames used in claims about Muslims. The study looks at claims about the issue of immigration and integration in a relative broad sense. We cover government activities relating to the entry and exit of people from the country, including the general policy direction, the institutional framework, issues of border controls, visa policies, and actions related to illegal entry. We also cover social, cultural and economic conflicts, as well as issues related to social cohesion if they involve migrants. In this context we cover government policies on targeted integration, language and citizenship programmes, and issues on how migration affects existing government programmes such as housing, education, or policing. As such, we also include coverage on the activities, problems, and social contributions of migrant communities. The approach taken is notably broader than for example by Koopmans et al. (2005), EURISLAM, or the LOCALMULTIDEM project. On the other hand, it is narrower than the EUROPUB project, which also includes other issue domains.

Using data from a large-scale media study, the paper provides aggregate statistical analyses of the patterns of claims-making across time (1995–2009) and across countries. The overall media study covers over 13 000 articles from both quality and tabloid newspapers; in this paper we use a sub-sample of articles focusing on claims in a regular random sample made within the country of study, covering a total of 8454 claims. This sample is noticeably larger than in Koopmans et al. (2005). The rich data set allows for descriptions such as the number of claims made, but also the topics addressed and arguments used (Berkhout and Sudulich, 2011a). The cross-country comparison compares the situation in Austria, Belgium, Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland. In all countries, we include

a broadsheet and tabloid newspaper to capture the range of news media, and the differences in news reporting that may exist – although for the results presented in this paper we find no significant differences between newspapers. The number of claims per country ranges from 664 in Ireland to 1968 in the Netherlands, with a mean of 1208 claims.

As is common in claims analysis, we make a distinction between a subject actor (i.e. the claimant), the object actor (about whom the claim is), the topic of the claim, as well as the frame used to justify the claims. The subject actor is the individual or usually organization making a claim about immigration and integration. The object actor describes the group whom the claim addresses. This group can be a specific immigrant group, or a specific section of the population that is the object of policy. The claim in each case is a statement by the subject actor that would affect the object actor. Claims normally imply changes in policy that are sought by the subject actor. Table 1 summarizes the different aspects of claims-making.

Variable	Part of Claims-Making
Subject actor	Makes the claim
Object actor	About whom the claim is made
Frame	Justification used in the claim
Topic	The topic or issue of the claim

Table 1: Elements of claims-making: subject actor, object actor, frame, and topic of a claim.

With regard to claimants, we do not distinguish between different Muslim organizations, and treat them as a single category. This approach is necessary to maintain a reasonable sample size, although with additional coding, it would be possible to differentiate between different Muslim organizations. Moreover, since we have no specific expectations on different kinds of Muslim organizations, and do not assume that many political actors or the general public make clear distinctions between different Muslim organizations, we refrained from differentiating between different (kinds of) Muslim organizations at this stage. With regard to object actors, however, we use a slightly more nuanced approach for some of the analyses. Namely, we sometimes draw a distinction between Muslims as a group in the unorganized sense and Muslim organizations – that is formal organizations. Most of the time, however, this distinction between Muslims as a group and Muslim organizations does not bear on the results, and we combine the two for the sake of a clearer presentation.

In this paper, we approach politicization through salience, which is reflected in the number of claims made about a group or issue of immigration or integration.

4 Findings

4.1 Categorization of Migrant Minorities

Table 2 gives the percentage of claims about migration-related sections or groups in society. The first column gives the distribution of claims about the different groups for all seven countries jointly. Overall, by far most claims are made about status groups – immigrant groups principally defined by their legal or administrative status. Claims about religious groups, racial groups, or migrant groups from specific countries or cultures are far less common. If a claim is classified as being about a religious group, this simply means that in this particular claim reference was made to religion rather than legal status to identify the group. Of course members of groups identified by religion also have a particular legal status, but the claimant in this instance chose to highlight religion. It is in this sense that we can talk about immigrant and minority groups being constituted. As apparent in table 2, however, the distribution of claims about these different groups varies significantly across countries. Whereas claims about status groups are the most common claims in all countries, the percentages vary notably. In this sense, there are important differences across countries, but we cannot determine the clear typology identified by Koopmans et al. (2005).

	All	AT	BE	IE	NL	ES	CH	UK
Status Groups	82.77	90.44	81.72	98.18	78.27	94.82	79.03	57.59
Racial Groups	4.14	1.46	1.84	1.16	0.65	1.64	0.85	24.82
Religious Groups	10.45	7.32	14.10	0.17	12.22	0.27	19.39	16.60
Migrant Groups	2.64	0.78	2.35	0.50	8.86	3.27	0.73	0.99

Table 2: Proportion of claims about status groups, racial groups, religious groups, and migrant groups respectively. The first column shows the situation for all countries jointly; the other columns show the distribution for each country (Austria, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, Britain).

Worth highlighting is certainly also the high percentage of claims about racial groups in Britain. Another notable case is Switzerland,

where there are comparatively many claims about religious groups. In the Netherlands, there are also many claims about religious groups, but the proportion of claims about migrant groups is also sizeable. A different situation can be observed in Spain and Ireland, where almost all claims are about status groups.



Figure 2: Developments over time in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and Britain. Status groups are given in black, racial groups in red, religious groups in blue, and migrant groups in green. The three points in time refer to the period from 1995–9, 2000–4, and 2005–9 respectively.

Figure 2 shows the developments over time for six of the seven countries under study. Three periods of 5 years are included to highlight changes over time. The notable changes over time highlight a dynamic nature not apparent in the typology presented by Koopmans et al. (2005). In Austria, we see the proportion of claims about religious groups increase over the years (blue line). Between 1995 and 1999, just 1.53 per cent of claims in Austria concerned religious groups. In the

most recent period between 2005 and 2009, this proportion increased to 11.07 per cent of claims: a 7 time increase. A similar development can be observed in Belgium. While the increase in claims about religious groups was not as pronounced as in Austria, we nonetheless observe a 3 time increase from 4.92 per cent of claims in the first period to 16.79 per cent of claims more recently. Although claims about racial groups are rare, in relative terms their decline over time is notable in Belgium. Also relevant in relative terms is the increase in claims about migrant groups, a 3 time increase during the time observed. Taken together, we observe a clear and marked decline in claims about status groups. Instead in Belgium migrant groups and particularly religious groups are addressed in claims on immigration and integration.

The changes over time observed in the Netherlands are notable for two things. First, there has been a marked shift from status groups (black line) to religious groups (blue line) and particularly migrant groups (green line). Second, in contrast to the situation in the other countries, the outlined shift was not steady over time. The proportion of claims about religious groups increased around 2 times between the first two periods covered. Since then, the proportion of claims about religious groups has declined notably, although there is still a clear increase from 6.62 to 11.72 per cent of claims between the first and third period. Similarly, the increase in the proportion of claims being about migrant groups has not increased steadily over time.

We also observe interesting changes over time in Spain. Between the first and second period, there is a clear shift in that claims about racial groups have virtually disappeared (red line). Whereas 8.7 per cent of claims between 1995 and 1999 were about racial groups, between 2000 and 2004, only 0.26 per cent of claims were about racial groups. The situation that resulted for the second period resembles that of Ireland, where we observe no significant changes over time, and virtually all claims are about status groups. However, between the second and third period, we observe a continued increase of claims about migrant groups in Spain (green line), from 2.38 to 4.9 per cent of claims about immigration and integration. By contrast to the situation in Spain, the changes in Switzerland have been both continuous and drastic. The proportion of claims about religious groups (blue line) has increased for Switzerland 3 times between the second and third period, or 4 times over the entire period.

The changes for Britain have been varied. For the first period between 1995 and 1999, we observe 48.62 per cent of claims about racial groups (red line). In this context it is worth recalling that we only look at claims concerning immigration and integration. By the second period, this has declined drastically to 18.22 per cent of claims.

During this second period, status groups have become numerically dominant (black line), with 77.33 per cent of claims. Since then, however, another radical change has occurred: the proportion of claims about religious groups has increased 8 times from 3.56 to 28.3 per cent of claims (blue line). To put this increase into perspective, in the third period, there have been more claims about religious groups than about racial groups.

Looking at developments across time, it is striking to see that the number of claims about Muslims increased over time. In the late 1990s, Muslims were not among the ten most common object actors. Put differently, at the time claims were made about other groups, such as asylum seekers or refugees. It was only in the early 2000s that Muslims became more politicized as a group. This pattern of change can be found particularly in Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland. Switzerland stands apart from the other countries in this regard, because the politicization of Muslims has recently reached levels that make Muslims the most common among groups addressed by claims on immigration and integration. This development is reflected by the 2009 popular initiative on banning the construction of new minarets in Switzerland. Using the data at hand, we are unable to determine a causal direction: although it is plausible that the popular initiative has increased the politicization of Muslims, it is also possible that the increased politicization of Muslims simply culminated in the successful plebiscite. A different story emerged in the Netherlands, where Muslims do not appear to be politicized more in recent years. Instead, we see steady levels of politicization of Muslims over the years. This is in contrast to the very low levels of politicization found in Spain and particularly Ireland.

It is valuable to examine the developments of claims in individual countries, because this highlights that the classification by Koopmans et al. (2005) is only a snapshot, and that the way migrant groups are constituted varies not only between countries, but also notably across time. In the following lines, we examine a particular group in detail: Muslims as subject actors, as object actors, as well as the frames and topics used in claims about Muslims. We pay attention not only to differences across countries, but also across time, and where feasible across countries and time. These descriptions help understand how Muslims are portrayed in the seven countries under study.

4.2 Muslims as Subject Actors

In this and the next section we zoom in and examine the role of Muslims more closely. In this section we look at Muslims as *subject* actors.

To begin with, we are interested in how common it is for Muslims to appear as claimants on issues of immigration and integration in the news. The most common claimants are governments with 30.55 per cent of claims. By contrast, Muslim organizations are not part of the most common claimants. In fact, looking at all countries jointly, they are responsible for only 2.65 per cent of claims in the news. This is noticeably less than the 9.81 per cent of claims made *about* Muslims – claims where Muslims are the object actor. If the number of claims made *by* Muslims seems like a small number, let us bear in mind that the most common subject actors are generic categories that comprise many different specific actors. For example, the numerically dominant claimant across countries are governments, a category that includes government and government representatives, including spokespersons, ministers (of any ministry), but also vaguer references such as 'the state'. Among the groups that are specifically identifiable in the data, Muslims are as visible as other groups. Indeed, with 2.14 per cent of claims, all other religious organizations make about the same proportion of claims than Muslim organizations. This is not to say that with regard to immigration and integration all other religious organizations had the same position in society as Muslim organizations, but merely to put the number into perspective.

In the preceding paragraph we looked at the seven countries jointly, ignoring differences that may exist between countries. Indeed, there are significant differences across countries in the extent to which Muslim organizations are present as claimants in the news. Leaving aside the generic groups of claimants – such as government or the judiciary – there are interesting differences across countries. For instance, in Austria, human rights and solidarity organizations are significant claimant, responsible for 3.24 per cent of claims in the news. Muslim organizations make 2.66 per cent of claims, which is slightly more than Catholic organizations (1.66% of claims). In Belgium, pro-minority organizations (5.34% of claims), human rights organizations (3.73% of claims), and anti-racist organizations (4.18% of claims) are all more significant claimants than Muslim organizations with 2.96 per cent of claims. In Switzerland, the proportion of claims made by Muslim organizations (2.74% of claims) is similar to that made by pro-minority organizations (2.25% of claims). To put these numbers into perspective, consider the 3.32 per cent of claims made by human rights and solidarity organizations, but also the fact that Catholic (1.37% of claims) and especially Protestant organizations (0.68% of claims) appear with far fewer claims in the news in Switzerland. Let us recall, however, that this section is about salience and that the term significance therefore simply refers to the number of claims appearing in the news media –

the impact of these claims, either on policy or the public debate on immigration and integration, is a different question.

Not in all countries are civil rights organizations equally dominant when compared to Muslim organizations. In the UK, anti-racist organizations are the biggest of the specific subject actors (2.19% of claims), although with 2.49 per cent of claims in the news, Muslim organizations are also a significant subject actor. In the Netherlands, Muslim organizations are the most significant of the specific actors (4.26% of claims); notably human rights and solidarity organizations have fewer claims in the news (1.54% of claims).

The situation is quite difference in Spain and Ireland, where there are very few claims by Muslim organizations (0.52% of claims in Spain, and 0.31% of claims in Ireland). In Spain, pro-minority organizations (3.67% of claims) and human rights organizations (1.05% of claims) are more significant in terms of the number of claims in the news. In Ireland, human rights organizations (6.97% of claims), and pro-minority organizations (6.35% of claims) are significant subject actors. Despite of what may expect, Catholic organizations (0.31% of claims) also make very few claims on immigration and integration.

Looking across the seven countries under study, it is apparent that in most countries, Muslim organizations are more active as claimants than more established religious organizations. By contrast, civil society organizations in most cases are more prominent as claimants in the news. Attempting to make sense of this difference, let us recall that these differences are not differences about claims in the news as such, but specifically about claims in the news concerning immigration and integration. Put differently, it is likely that for other issues, the proportion of claims made by the different types of organizations varies in a different way.

Because of the relatively small number of claims made by Muslim organizations in some countries and some periods, it is not feasible to compare developments over time within all countries. Notable perhaps is the difference between Spain and the United Kingdom with regard to the terrorist attacks in 2004 and 2005 respectively. Looking at the development over time, there is no discernible increase in the number of claims made by Muslim organizations in Spain, whereas in the United Kingdom, there is a clear increase in the number of claims between 2004 and 2006. In the period between 2001 and 2003, 1.78 per cent of claims in the United Kingdom were made by Muslim organizations. Between 2004 and 2006, this increased to 3.98, and subsequently declined to 1.79 per cent of claims in the news between 2007 and 2009. This increase in claims made by Muslim organizations can be observed both in absolute numbers and as the proportion of all claims.

The proportion of Muslims as part of the general population is non-negligible in most of the countries under study. Given their size, Muslims can be regarded as important stakeholders in society. In democracies such as in the countries covered, the inclusion of all stakeholders is an important pillar of legitimacy (Dahl, 1989; Mansbridge, 1999; Sisk and Reynolds, 1998). Although Muslims do not appear among the most common claimants, it is clear that Muslims as stakeholders are not *absent*, suggesting some degree of legitimacy. Moreover, the fact that many more claims are made about Muslims than by Muslims suggests that it is primarily *other* (non-Muslim) subject actors who define Muslims as political actors.

4.2.1 Explaining Differences in Claims-Making

Let us now turn to possible explanations for differences across countries and time. As visible in figure 3, there is a certain association between the proportion of Muslims as part of the total population and the proportion of Muslims as proportion of the foreign-born population (r=0.53). This association, and the analysis in the following, does not appear dependent on the way we capture the proportion of Muslims in the population. The same substantive results can be obtained when looking at the proportion of Muslims within the foreign-born population (as opposed to the general population as was done in figure 3). Indeed these two variables of the share of Muslim population are strongly correlated (r=0.81). In order to heave a meaningful comparison, we have not included estimates of the total Muslim population in each country – including local-born Muslims along with foreign-born Muslims.

It is also worth noting the different dynamics in the countries under study. For most countries, there is a non-linear trend between population size and claims made. Put differently, an increase in population size appears to some degree to be associated with more claims made by Muslim organizations. Quite different is Spain, where there are fewer claims by Muslim organizations as the Muslim population grew. In Switzerland there are more claims made by Muslim organizations, despite a relative decline in the population. This relative decline is caused by a sharp increase of non-Muslim immigrants. Notable is also the Netherlands, where the share of the Muslim population did not grow significantly between 2002 and 2007, yet the number proportion of claims has declined.

A different explanation for the different proportion of claims made by Muslims – both across time and countries – is the presence and strength of anti-migrant parties. However, there is no apparent association between the two (r=0.32). Indeed, the share of anti-immigrant



Figure 3: There appears to be a relatively strong association between the proportion of Muslims in the population and the proportion of claims made by Muslim organizations.

parties in parliament seems unrelated to the number or proportion of claims made by Muslim organizations.

A third explanation for the differences in claims made by Muslim organizations across countries and time is the citizenship regime of a country. To this end we have expanded the MIPEX data backward over time (Niessen et al., 2007; Huddleston et al., 2011; Berkhout et al., 2012; Cunningham, 2012; Peintinger, 2012; Ros, 2012; Ruedin, 2012; Vangoidsenhoven, 2012; Wunderlich, 2012), and complemented with a series of questions on asylum policies to get a fuller picture of citizenship regimes. This comprehensive measure of immigration and integration policies captures the citizenship regime of a country in a dynamic manner.

There is no clear association between the citizenship regime and the proportion of claims made by Muslim organizations in the area of immigration and integration (r=0.26).

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)	-0.0341	0.0203	-1.69	0.1101
MusPro	0.4132	0.3294	1.25	0.2266
am.parties	0.0748	0.0453	1.65	0.1171
policy	0.0007	0.0004	1.99	0.0632

Table 3: Regression (OLS) with the proportion of claims by Muslim organizations as dependent variable, and with the proportion of foreign-born Muslims as part of the population, the seat share of anti-immigrant parties, and citizenship regime/policy as independent variables. This analysis does not correct for autocorrelation within countries and time periods. $N = 21$

If we combine these three explanations in a simple regression analysis (table 3), the suggestion that the proportion of Muslims in the population is a significant factor no longer seems supported. Once also considering the share of anti-immigrant parties in parliament and the citizenship regime, the proportion of Muslims in the population no longer seems a relevant explanatory factor. If anything, the type of citizenship regime – as approached by the expanded MIPEX score – may be significant.

4.3 Muslims as Object Actors

So far, we have shown that there are significant differences between countries in the number and proportion of claims Muslim organizations make. In this section, we focus on Muslims as object actors: as

groups and individuals addressed by claims. As outlined at the beginning of this paper, in some of the analyses we draw a distinction between Muslim organizations and Muslim as a group.

There are important differences between Muslims as claimants and Muslims as receivers of claims. Whereas Muslims are not among the most common makers of claims, they are a common target of claims made in the news (9.81% of claims). This is particularly the case for Muslims as a group (6.94% of claims in the news), although claims about Muslim organizations are also common (2.87% of claims). There are significantly more claims about Muslim organizations than for other religious organizations (0.21% of claims). This is not entirely surprising, given the association between religion and immigration in the case of the Muslims.

Table 4 shows the proportion of claims in the news that are about Muslims as a group and Muslim organizations specifically. On the one hand, the table outlines important differences between countries – be this differences in the way claims about Muslims are formulated, or be this in the existence of politically relevant Muslim organizations. On the other hand, we should not interpret these numbers too much, since they may simply reflect other (unobserved) country differences, including coding effects.

	AT	BE	CH	ES	IE	NL	UK
Muslims (as group)	5.92	8.02	12.23	0.24	0.00	7.78	11.09
Muslim organizations	1.86	3.13	0.72	2.41	0.92	6.01	3.03

Table 4: Percentage of claims made about Muslims as a group and Muslim organizations in the seven countries.

4.3.1 Explaining Claims About Muslims

There are significant differences across countries in the extent to which claims are made about Muslims, and whether Muslims as groups or Muslim organizations are highlighted. The situation in Austria corresponds roughly the situation across countries, and can serve as the baseline for comparison in table 4. The extent to which claims are made about Muslims varies across countries. Generally very few such claims are made in Spain and Ireland. At the other end of the scale, in Belgium and Switzerland there are many claims about Muslims. In Switzerland, more than 12 per cent of claims on the issue of immigration and integration are about Muslims. This compares to Muslims constituting 8 per cent of the foreign population in Switzerland, and

just 2 per cent of the general population. However, the proportion of foreign-born Muslims in the population is higher in Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands than in Switzerland, and the proportion of Muslims in the population seems unable to explain (all) of this difference. Looking at the development in Switzerland, it is apparent that the political debate is disconnected from the share of Muslims in the population. The proportion of Muslims in Switzerland has not changed dramatically between 1995 and 2009. At the same time, the proportion of claims about Muslims has increased drastically between 1995 and 2009. Put differently, there are a great number of claims about Muslims in recent years, despite no real change in population size. By contrast, the stipulated association between claims about Muslims and their share in the population may exist in Austria and Belgium. In the Netherlands the situation is indeterminate, with a decline in claims about Muslims despite no real change in the proportion of Muslims in the population. Similarly, in Spain we observe an increase of the Muslim population over time, with no discernible impact on politicization: the proportion of claims about Muslims does not appear to increase. Across countries, the association between these two variables in relatively weak (r=0.44).

The situation in the United Kingdom is notable in two ways. First, Muslims in the United Kingdom are relatively numerous and visible. Against this background, the proportion of claims about Muslims may seem low (14% claims about Muslims). Second, there are many claims about blacks (4% claims about blacks). In no other country under study are there so many claims about a specific minority group other than Muslims, and in no other country are racial categories common in the context of debates on immigration and integration.

A different explanation for the number of claims about Muslims is concerned with the association between the vote share of anti-migrant parties and the proportion of claims made about Muslims. The correlation between these two variables is relatively weak (r=0.39). A third explanation is concerned with the association between the vote share of anti-immigrant parties and the proportion of claims made about Muslims. There is no real correlation between these two variables (r=0.27).

Looking at these three explanations jointly in a simple regression (table 5), we see that the proportion of Muslims in the population indeed seems unrelated the the number of claims made about Muslims. By contrast, we find significant associations for the proportion of anti-migrant parties in parliament and for the citizenship regime. Put differently, when the proportion of Muslims in the population is taken into consideration, the weak correlations between the number of claims

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)	-0.2021	0.0821	-2.46	0.0248
MusPro	0.3905	1.3352	0.29	0.7735
am.parties	0.5046	0.1837	2.75	0.0138
policy	0.0042	0.0015	2.82	0.0118

Table 5: Regression (OLS) with the proportion of claims about Muslims (groups) as dependent variable, and with the proportion of foreign-born Muslims as part of the population, the seat share of anti-immigrant parties, and the citizenship regime/policy as independent variables. This analysis does not correct for autocorrelation within countries and time periods. $N = 21$

about Muslims on the one hand and anti-migrant parties in parliament and the citizenship regime turn into significant associations.

4.4 Frames Used for Muslims

In this section we look at the most common frames used for Muslims. The most common frames used for immigrant groups – all kinds of immigrant groups – are questions of human rights (17.1% of claims), followed by instrumental frames without further distinction (9.5% of claims), and frames of moral principles (9.2% of claims). Next are a list of instrumental frames: questions of domestic security (9.1% of claims), state efficiency and efficacy (9.1% of claims), as well as economic interests (8.2% of claims). Questions of cultural traditions generally play a much smaller role in claims about immigration and integration (4.8% of claims).

By contrast, different frames are used predominantly when claims are made about Muslims. On the one hand, there some subtle differences between organized and unorganized Muslims, on the other hand, the difference to other immigrant groups is striking. For Muslims in the unorganized sense, questions of cultural traditions are invoked very frequently, as is national identity. Many of the claims grouped under international security concern questions or allegations of terrorism. Looking at Muslim organizations, the difference in terms of national identity is perhaps notable. Questions of national identity are more common for Muslims as a group than for Muslim organizations. Interesting are perhaps the most common frames used by Muslim organizations in claims about Muslims. The most common frame are cultural traditions, followed by human rights. Questions of security are invoked far less frequently when Muslim organizations make claims about Muslims than when other claimants make a claim.

	Immigrant	Muslim
Instrumental	58.11	33.00
Identity	10.43	34.00
Moral Principles	31.46	33.00

Table 6: Most common frames used for (non-Muslim) immigrant groups, and Muslims respectively. This tables includes all countries jointly, given are the percentages of claims using a particular kind of frame.

If we group the frames used and focus on the difference between instrumental frames, questions of human right and moral principles, and identity frames, the difference between claims about immigrants and minorities generally and Muslims becomes even more apparent. Table 6 outlines the most common types of frames for immigrant groups (left). More than half the claims are instrumental claims. Looking at claims about Muslims in the same table (right), the predominant type frame is not the instrumental one, but identity frames. The proportion of claims invoking moral principles and human rights is similar to that used for immigrant groups more generally. These differences are as predicted in our theoretical part.

Most of the frames used for Muslims are noticeably different from the frames used for the other immigrant and minority groups. At the same time, the specific frames used in claims about Muslims vary to some degree between countries, although there are common frames that are shared across a few countries. For example, religious identity is a common frame in Belgium and the Netherlands, and to a lesser degree in Austria and the United Kingdom. Similarly, religious rights come to the fore in Belgium and Switzerland. Frames related to terrorism are common in the United Kingdom, but interestingly not so in Spain. This is surprising given that both countries were the scene of terrorist attacks.

There are also some interesting changes over time in the specific frames used in claims about Muslims: whereas religious *rights* were highlighted in 1995-99, and again in 2005-09, in between religious *identity* was dominant. There is no immediate link to the terrorist attacks in the United States, given that in the months around 9/11, the religious identity frame is not dominant. A medium-term influence, however, cannot be ruled out.

Moreover, as can be expected, Muslim organizations frame questions of immigration and integration differently from other actors. For all other actors, however, the commonly used frames are in line with our expectation: Identity frames are more common for Muslims,

whereas instrumental frames are more common for other immigrant and minority groups. With regard to frames of human rights and moral principles, there does not appear to be a clear difference between Muslims and other immigrant groups.

4.5 Topic of Claims

Each claim about immigration and integration is about a certain topic. In the following, we look at the topic of claims used in claims about Muslims, and compare these to the topics uses in claims about immigrant groups more generally. Overall, the most common issue is integration in society (22.6% of claims), followed by concerns over security (17.7% of claims). For Muslims as a group, the issues mentioned in claims are notably different. Whereas concerns for integration in society are the most common topic for Muslims and other immigrant groups alike, the proportion is different. 68.28 per cent of claims about Muslims concern integration in society, compared to 22.59 per cent of claims for immigrant groups more generally. Indeed, we observe that all of the most common topics for Muslims concern integration – into society, related to security, in political terms, or into the economy. The situation is similar for Muslim organizations, although here questions of security – once again in relation to integration – are more common than for Muslim groups.

	Immigrant	Muslim
Immigration	53.00	2.32
Integration	47.00	97.68

Table 7: Most common topics used for immigrant groups (non-Muslim), and Muslims respectively. This tables includes all countries jointly, given are the percentages of claims using a particular kind of topic.

If we reduce the number of categories, the differences between immigrant groups more generally and Muslims becomes even more apparent (table 7). Whereas there seems to be some balance between questions of immigration and integration for other immigrant groups, for Muslims almost all claims concern integration in one way or another. The difference between Muslims as a group and Muslim organizations in this case seems negligible. These findings are as expected: We find that the topic of claims about Muslim is mostly about integration, for other immigrant and minority groups there is more of a balance between questions of integration and immigration.

5 Conclusion

In this paper we examined what kind of migration-related group categories are used in political debate on immigration and civic integration. More specifically, we are interested in the circumstances under which we find a religion-based migrant identity. We started this paper by contrasting two perspectives on the relationship between social and political differences. On the one hand, macro-level social differences may be expected to translate relatively directly into political differences, on the other hand, various strategic and actor-related factors, promote (or restrict) the political translation of social differences. Our interest is in the political categorization of migrant groups. In this we followed Koopmans et al. (2005, p.114–5) in identifying four different identities: administrative or general status, racial, religious, and country of origin or ethnic identities.

We specifically focus on Muslim groups since several events and anti-Islamic political mobilization make them the most likely case where we expect differences in categorization. This provides us with leverage to assess some of the potential explanations for differences between countries in the political use of migration-related group categories. We expected these differences to depend on three factors: (1) on political strategies of political parties, more specifically anti-immigration parties, (2) on citizenship policies, and (3) on the socio-structural composition. In this context, country differences are inherently difficult to assess, because there are few comparable countries compared to the number of differences. We partially addressed this by looking at changes over time as well as the immediate context of the political debate (topic and arguments).

First, we found substantial differences between countries in the use of migrant-group categories. Claimants in all countries mostly relate their claims to very broad, status-related categories, such as minorities, migrants or asylum-seekers. They differ in the use of the smaller racial, religious and country-of-origin categories. Among the smaller categories, the main difference lies in the way Muslims as a group category are employed. Although we find significant differences across countries, these differences do not fit the policy tradition typology suggested by Koopmans (2007). That is, for instance, Muslim categories are relatively common in the United Kingdom and Switzerland, whereas we expected racial and country-of-origin categories respectively to feature prominently in these countries. This may be related to our somewhat broader policy topic demarcation including not only issues of immigration but also issues of integration. Our attention to integration issues could make it more likely find religion-based mi-

grant categories. It also makes it theoretically less probable to expect strong linkages between citizenship regime, mainly consisting of migration policies, and classifications used in more general migration and integration policy debates.

However, we think that the difference between our findings and Koopmans' is more likely to be explained by more fundamental assumptions about (1) the static, independent nature of country-types, and (2) the interrelationship of policy regimes of political contestation. On the first, in our analysis of changes over time (figure 2), we found a substantial rise of the use religious categories in all countries in our study except in Spain and Ireland. This suggests that the employment of migrant-group categories in the public sphere is more dynamic than can be captured in country-types. The observation of similar trends (increase of the religious category) in different countries also suggests that the countries are more similar than any typology would present them. On the latter, it seems that Koopmans et al. (2005) assume a stronger relationship between the policy arena and the political arena than is the case in reality. In other words, while we do not challenge Koopmans citizenship typology, we do not find that it is strongly related to political contestation. Policy and political arenas seem to operate in relative isolation. More bluntly, it seems that religious categories are not used in (citizenship) policy arenas whereas they are, or have become, part of political discourse.

Second, when it comes to our analysis of Muslims as a particular migration-related group a couple of things stand out. To start, the construction of, and 'validation' by the media, of Muslim groups as a politically relevant category is largely done by non-Muslim political actors. That is, Muslim organizations make few political claims relative to the proportion of claims made about Muslim groups in society. Muslim groups tend to be the *object* of claims instead of the *subject* (claimant). This suggests, in theoretical terms, the 'validation' of groups by the media is only partially related to actual political strategies of certain groups, and certainly not always politically favourable as suggested by much of the social movement literature (e.g Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993).

In relation to that, we find that in countries where (and at moments when) anti-immigrant parties have substantial parliamentary presence, Muslim groups are more frequently targeted as object of political claims. This is what we expected on the basis of literature on party systems and party political strategy. It suggests that migrant classification is at least as much an actor-driven phenomenon as it is determined by discursive opportunities or policy traditions. This, however, does not mean that social-structural circumstances do not

matter. As comes out of the Irish and Spanish data, a minimum level of migration and the presence of migration-related groups seems to be required for political contestation that differentiates among various migration groups.

Third, our analysis of the immediate political context of claims-making suggests that this could be a more fruitful level of theory formation than the country level discussed earlier. That is, at the meso-level of topic fields we found an exceptionally clear difference between migration- and integration topics on the one hand and the categorization of Muslims a distinct group on the other hand. A similar phenomenon was observed in the correlation between the use of identity frames and the targeting of Muslims as opposed to other migrant groups.

Taken together, our results suggest that, in theoretical terms, macro-level factors, such a socio-structural and political institutional variables are only part of the story, and definitively need be combined with lower level variables. These are partially found at the actor level, but also at topic domain levels. Such a combination, for instance, would – beyond macro-level structural factors – take into account the emergence and decline of issues on the policy agenda of countries.

In terms of societal relevance, our analysis of the emergence of Muslims as a migrant category has shown that political debate is more volatile, and thus probably more responsive to immediate concerns, than suggested by the sole analysis of changes of policies. Furthermore, it seems that for Muslims in Europe, becoming a distinct social category is, to say the least, probably a mixed blessing.

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