

Come from Away: Internal Migration and Nativist Attitudes in Canada

Isabelle Côté

ilcote@mun.ca

Didier Ruedin

didier.ruedin@unine.ch

Submitted version

This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Côté, Isabelle, and Didier Ruedin. 2026. 'Come from Away: Internal Migration and Nativist Attitudes in Canada'. *Social Science Quarterly* 107 (4): e70174, which has been published in final form at <https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.70174>. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.

Supplementary and replication material: <https://osf.io/x5wg3/>

Abstract

Opposition to internal migration is widespread but far less studied than attitudes toward international migration. Why are some individuals opposed to the relocation of fellow citizens within their own country? Using an original survey of 4,052 respondents in Canada, we develop an index of internal-migration nativism ($\alpha = 0.78$) and analyze its correlates. We find that opposition to internal migration exists in Canada, albeit at lower levels than opposition toward international migrants. Opposition is strongest among individuals with pronounced regional identities and attachments to subnational units, and, unexpectedly, among those who report lower levels of economic anxiety. We then explore factors associated with individual and subnational variations in nativist attitudes. By introducing a within-country measure of nativist attitudes in a decentralized federal context, this study opens new avenues for research on opposition to human mobility across regions and territorial scales.

Keywords: internal migration, nativism, Canada, federation, political attitudes

Introduction

There is a longstanding and global history of fierce opposition to domestic population movements across political systems and geographical boundaries. Internal migration – i.e., the various forms of population movements occurring within a country’s national borders, be they ‘forced’ (e.g. internally displaced persons) or ‘voluntary’ (e.g. economic migrants)— has contributed to fueling hostility, riots, and violence in many countries of the Global South, such as India (Bhavnani and Lacina 2015; Tumbé 2023), Indonesia (Côté 2022), Malaysia (Sadiq 2009), and Nigeria (Awosola 2021). Yet, reactionary opposition to internal migration is not unique to the Global South, as illustrated by developments in Switzerland (Ruedin, 2020), Scotland (McKinley and McVittie 2007) and the United States (Lacina 2026; Maas 2021).

In Canada — the ‘poster child’ of multicultural diversity —, internal migrants from the province of Newfoundland and Labrador found themselves at the center of social media vitriol when they were “accused” of contributing to the re-election of a minority Liberal government in the 2019 federal elections, and were, as such, “no longer welcome” in Alberta after “stealing jobs for years” (Tobin, 2019). However, this kind of backlash against internal migrants is not new. Québécois have long criticized the migration of English-speaking elites to the province (Juteau, 2004), whereas Newfoundlanders have developed the label “Come From Away” (CFA) to describe residents of Newfoundland who, although they are Canadian citizens, are non-natives to the province or territory.

Opposition to internal migration has intensified globally since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, as population booms in rural areas have sparked local resentment, putting a strain on everything from schools to housing and roads (Ahasan and Korte, 2023). In some cases, locals perceived return migrants as a direct threat to the security of their communities and as potential carriers of the virus (Rajan and Bhagat, 2021). As a result, a growing number of subnational governments around the world, including those in China and India (Bui and Côté, 2022) and in Canada (Hughes and Frame, 2021), sought to exert more control over their internal borders during the pandemic.

Why are some individuals opposed to the relocation of fellow citizens to their home regions? Despite the salience of this phenomenon, there is a dearth of scholarship on attitudes and policy responses to internal migration, as this issue has been overshadowed by the extensive literature on international migration (Adida, Lo and Platas, 2019; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Harrell et al., 2012; Kinder and Kam, 2009; Kustov, 2022; Ruedin, 2019; Solodoch, 2021; Weber et al., 2024). This means that we have insight into

why and how immigration may fuel tension or opposition in the host communities, but less about the factors shaping attitudes towards *internal* migration. This underexplored conceptual distinction is important. While internal and international migration share key constitutive features — for instance, compositional population changes at the local level — and may even intersect (e.g. Lyons and Ford, 2007), there are reasons to believe that attitudes towards newcomers may vary substantially depending on whether people are relocating domestically or internationally. The fact that internal migrants share a common citizenship — and in many cases, the same language and ethnicity — with local residents significantly reduces the political and cultural distance between the two groups, making it harder to activate boundary-making processes and to construct them as ‘others’ who need to be excluded. Besides, while opposition to international migration can easily translate into restrictive border policies, “activists objecting to internal mobility typically have no realistic prospects of sovereignty, physical bordering of space, or even control over de facto residency” (Lacina, 2026; 171), highlighting a core asymmetry between internal and international migration politics. If different processes and policy responses are involved, then a specific theory of nativism in situations of shared citizenship — and oftentimes common ethnicity — is needed.

Relying on an original survey of 4,052 respondents conducted in the spring of 2024, we develop a new *Nativism-Internal Migration Index* (NIMI) and examine the factors affecting attitudes and policy responses to internal migration in Canada. While this research builds on the vast literature on attitudes towards *international* migration, it also draws on the scholarship on “nativism” — i.e., “intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign connections” (Higham, 1981: 4). This framework provides a useful lens to investigate these questions since what is deemed “foreign” can be only one internal border away. Nativism simultaneously highlights the reification of a group as the “natives”¹ deserving of rights and the exclusion of another group (that may or may not be ethnically distinct) due to the cultural, economic or demographic threats it is perceived to pose. This juxtaposition is particularly acute in federal states, where the decentralization of economic and political power allows subnational units to advocate or implement policies that might restrict or influence internal migration (Sadiq, 2009; Maas, 2020; Côté and Raatikainen, 2020), and in the case of ethno-federal states, where the recognition of ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity may fuel opposition to internal migration (Gagnon and Tremblay, 2020).

¹ ‘Native’ is a general term implying that a person/thing originates from a particular place. While it may be used to refer to Indigenous/Aboriginal people (as opposed to settlers), in this paper, it refers to people who self-identify as having ‘roots’ in a given locale, as is the norm in the scholarship on nativism.

Canada, a decentralized federal state with two ‘founding [ethnic] nations’ and one of the highest rates of internal migration globally (Bell et al., 2015) is thus a ‘most likely’ case, allowing us to explore multiple theories of opposition to internal migration and logics of boundary-based membership. As Flyvbjerg (2006, 229) notes, extreme ‘most likely’ cases are particularly valuable “because they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied”, making them highly suitable for a study that aims to uncover the drivers behind opposition to internal migration. We expect insights from our Canadian case study to travel to other federal systems with regionally concentrated ethnocultural populations. Similar dynamics may also emerge in non-federal contexts marked by decentralization or secessionist pressures, such as the United Kingdom and Indonesia. As such, this study provides a necessary first step toward a broader research agenda on subnational expressions of ethnocultural boundary enforcement within federal and/or decentralized states.

Although a comprehensive theory of attitudes towards internal migration is beyond the scope of this article, examining how individuals think about *internal* population flows can help shed light on opposition to international migration and human mobility in general. This study compares attitudes towards internal and international migration, as well as their individual and contextual predictors. We find that substantial opposition to internal migration exists in Canada, though at lower levels than opposition to international migrants. At the individual level, opposition is more prevalent among individuals with stronger subnational identities, those who feel a stronger attachment to the subnational level rather than to Canada as a country, and — surprisingly — those who are less economically anxious. Consistent with the cultural and sociotropic explanations prevalent in the literature on immigration attitudes, this evidence highlights the portability of boundary-based membership across territorial scales: the mechanisms structuring attitudes towards immigrants also seem to operate with respect to internal migrants within federal systems in context of shared citizenship — and even shared ethnicity.

Attitudes towards Internal Migration

The vast scholarship on attitudes toward immigration broadly converges on four theoretical explanations (see Weber et al. 2024). First, egocentric economic concerns posit that individuals evaluate immigration based on expected personal material impacts. If migrants compete with locals on the job market or negatively affect wages, opposition to migration is expected to ensue. In contrast, sociotropic economic concerns emphasize perceptions of immigration’s impact on the national economy, public finances, and

welfare state. Such concerns often manifest in preferences for high-skilled migrants with higher levels of education, employability and language skills (e.g., Adida, Lo and Platas, 2019; Solodoch 2021). Third, cultural concerns highlight the perceived threats migrants may pose to host communities' national identity or social cohesion. Host communities may show preferences for co-ethnic migrants or oppose those from a different religious background (e.g., Kinder and Kam, 2009; Turgeon and Bilodeau, 2014). Finally, humanitarian concerns capture the perceived deservingness of certain vulnerable migrant groups, for instance, prioritizing climate refugees over economic migrants (e.g., Henning et al., 2022).

Across studies, countries and datasets, a consistent pattern emerges: attitudes towards immigration are more strongly shaped by beliefs about sociotropic and cultural impacts rather than egocentric economic concerns (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Davis et al, 2019; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Harrell et al., 2012; Miller 2020). Emerging work on emigration (e.g. Kustov 2022) indicates that the same sociotropic logic also extends across migration direction — that is, individuals oppose both immigration and emigration when they are perceived to threaten the national collective. Of particular relevance to this study is the literature distinguishing how ethnocultural versus civic conceptions of belonging affect attitudes towards immigration. For Wright, Citrin and Wand (2012), an 'ethnocultural' conception of identity draws sharp, exclusionary lines around who legitimately belongs within a territory, and is associated with nativism and ethnic prejudice. By contrast, a 'civic' conceptualization allows for conditional inclusion based on conformity to shared rules, making boundaries more flexible but still normatively enforced. Exploring this "fundamental divide", Young and Goidel (2025: 146) found that the more exclusive one's definition of national identity, the more likely one is to embrace nativist politics. Once such 'latent nativist beliefs' align with 'catalytic conditions' (e.g. large-scale immigration) and 'political entrepreneurship', nativism is more likely to (re)emerge. Such sociopsychological approaches emphasize the role of group-related identity and prejudice in shaping attitudes towards (im)migration.

If the literature on attitudes towards international migration is rich, studies exploring attitudes toward internal migration are comparatively sparse. This is surprising considering that rates of domestic mobility are significantly higher than international mobility: approximately 10% of the world's population lives in a different region of their birth country, compared to 4% living in a different country (Lacina, 2026: 101). In Canada, just under 15% of the population lives outside their province of birth (Statistics Canada, 2018) and in 2022/2023, 348,370 Canadians moved between provinces, with Alberta leading in net gains (+56,245) — the highest annual net gain ever recorded for any Canadian

subnational unit.² Although interprovincial migration has recently trended downward,³ it is likely to remain an important demographic driver as the Canadian government seeks to remove structural barriers to internal mobility to respond to economic pressures, including U.S. tariffs, and to foster a nation-wide labor market.⁴ Across the democratic world, freedom of movement within a country's borders has been a cornerstone of democracy and is often enshrined in constitutions, as highlighted by debates over mobility during the Covid-19 pandemic (Piccoli et al. 2021). This raises a central question: Why are some individuals opposed to the internal relocation of their fellow citizens?

The literature on nativism provides an important additional — and often overlooked — lens through which to answer this question. While the term is frequently used to refer to White nationalist populism and xenophobia associated with figures such as Donald Trump (Mudde 2017; Young, 2017; Young and Goidel, 2025), it does not apply exclusively to anti-immigration positions or the American context. In 'Strangers in the Land', one of the most influential academic work on nativism, John Higham (1981:4) defines nativism as "intense opposition to an *internal minority* on the ground of its foreign connections". The concept has since been applied beyond the United States, including in contexts as diverse as Canada (Gordon et al., 2019), the Netherlands (Kestic and Duyvendak, 2019), Scandinavia (Hellström and Hervik, 2014), New Zealand (Wilson et al., 2022), India (Bhavnani and Lacina 2018), Russia (Fediunin, 2023), and Uganda (Green, 2007). In each case, what is considered different, unfamiliar or 'foreign' is highly dependent on time and place. As Guia notes, "the concept of nativism is highly malleable, elastic and, semantically fluid. It is like a scaffolding in which nativist agents introduce the context-specific content for each unit, be it a city, a region or a country." In large ethnically-diverse states, what is deemed 'foreign' may be only one (internal) border away, underscoring the importance of integrating both internal *and* international migrants into the study of nativism.

There exists significant conceptual overlap between nativism and other related terms (see e.g. Côté et al., 2025). But contrary to localism or 'localness' (i.e. belief that locals have more rights than non-locals to certain benefits of a particular place, Lacina 2026:9) and 'NIMBYism' (i.e. opposition to newcomers driven by economic concerns over scarce local resources, Levitz 2024), nativism involves two interconnected processes. It entails the collective attempts by self-identified natives to secure exclusive rights to resources based on their 'roots', as well as efforts to justify subordinate policies toward those who lack

² <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/91-215-x/91-215-x2023002-eng.htm>

³ <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-630-x/11-630-x2017002-eng.htm>

⁴ <https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2025/03/05/first-ministers-statement-eliminating-internal-trade-barriers>

such roots — processes referred to by Fry (2007: 5) as naturalization and denaturalization. These processes typically result in a wide array of ‘pro-local’ policies aimed at reinforcing local political and economic preeminence (see Lacina, 2026:158; Xhardez et al., 2025) though sometimes, they may lead to formal restrictions on internal migration, either to preserve characteristics deemed essential to a given unit, or on the grounds that newcomers represent a “danger to the system” due to their primal sympathies lying outside of the political unit (Guia, 2016:11).

The few surveys that have investigated opposition to internal migration have largely been conducted in postcolonial or non-Western contexts (e.g. Gaikwad and Nellis, 2017; Bhavnani and Lacina, 2018; Côté and Raatikainen, 2020; Singer and Quek, 2022) and point to two main explanations: economic conditions and regional identity. The economic explanation suggests that opposition to internal migration arises when local governments fail to mitigate the effects of sudden population growth on receiving communities by redistributing resources (Bhavnani and Lacina, 2018). Communities facing dwindling resources (Homer-Dixon, 1994) and a more competitive labor market (Goldstein and Peters, 2014; Higham, 1981) are thus more likely to oppose migration and support mobility restrictions (Perea, 1997). More recently, a post pandemic ‘economics of nativism’ has emerged, linking housing shortages to increased demand from newcomers, which drives up prices and property taxes (The Economist, 2025).

HYP 1: Respondents experiencing economic anxiety are more likely to exhibit nationalist attitudes.

The second explanation centers on regional identity. In large countries, internal migrants may belong to different ethnic groups, speak different languages or practice different religions. The potential for ‘clash[es] of national identity’ (Goldstone, 2002; Teitelbaum and Winters, 1998), in which host societies perceive their cultural traditions as threatened, underpins many efforts to preserve local culture and restrict mobility. Recent surveys by Lacina show that U.S. adults with the strongest national pride are also the most supportive of place-based discrimination targeting both international migrants *and* internal migrants (Lacina, 2026: 70). Attitudes toward internal migration may also reflect a sense of group position (Blumer, 1958). For example, Gaikwad and Nellis (2017: 469) find that members of the Muslim minority in Mumbai, India, view internal migrants more favorably than members of the Hindu majority, regardless of skills level, in an effort to achieve “safety in numbers”. Another dimension of regional identity — particularly salient in large federal states such as Canada, the United States, and Germany — is partisanship, defined as a strong psychological attachment to a political party or ideology. In such contexts, partisanship can reshape regional identity by shifting focus away from local culture and

history toward values and traits associated with political affiliation (Pears and Sydnor, 2022). For example, the relocation of a ‘progressive’ Californian to deeply conservative Texas may be perceived as a threat to regional identity.

HYP 2a: Respondents exhibiting a strong regional identity are more likely to exhibit nativist attitudes.

Relatedly, in multilevel political systems such as federal states, individuals may exhibit varying degrees of attachment to the national, provincial and local territorial units. Such variations have been shown to shape attitudes toward ethnocultural diversity (see Bilodeau et al., 2020). Extending this argument, when diversity originates from other subnational regions, individuals with strong subnational attachments may be more likely to oppose internal migration. Conversely, those with stronger national attachments may be less likely to perceive internal migrants as ‘others.’

HYP 2b: Respondents exhibiting stronger subnational attachments are more likely to exhibit nativist attitudes.

Data and Methods

Our analyses rely on original data collected from an online survey of 4,052 respondents conducted between April 1st and April 25th, 2024.⁵ For the purpose of this survey, the study

⁵ Participants were recruited via “Asking Canadians” (AC) — and its French counterpart “Qu’en pensez-vous” —, a Delvinia survey research company. AC’s online samples are drawn from a panel comprised of individuals across Canada who have agreed to receive invitations to participate in survey research. Recruitment to AC’s online panel proceeds through diverse means. Participants are recruited via co-registration on partners’ web and social networking sites; targeted emails legitimately sent by online partners to their members or subscribers; and through their “Refer-a-friend” program. No specific response rate can be calculated for an online survey because, unlike telephone surveys, it is not possible to evaluate whether people refused to participate or did not read or receive the invitation. While our study does not utilize any incentives to encourage participation, Asking Canadians (AC), from which we received our sample, maintains its online panel through the use of various incentives. Some members may have been motivated to participate in the AC panel by the opportunity to collect points (e.g., 25 to 50 Aeroplan points) which may, in turn, be redeemed for prizes. Such methods of “panel maintenance”, as they are called, are standard in online survey research. Importantly, AC panel-members who decline to participate in our study should be no less likely to access AC incentives than those who choose to participate. AC’s panel and panel statistics are continuously monitored by their panel management team and compared with Statistics Canada census data to ensure it reflects the Canadian population as a whole in respect to a number of demographic and socio-economic characteristics including gender, age, education, income, rural/urban residence and migration status. This representativeness holds in our sample. The survey took approximately 15 minutes to complete.

population included only permanent residents or citizens of Canada who were at least eighteen years of age at the time of the survey. The survey is nationally representative and includes five oversampled subnational units: British Columbia (N=628), Alberta (N=619), Ontario (N=724), Quebec (N=1,673), and Newfoundland and Labrador (N=208). Coverage of other provinces and territories is more limited.⁶ The theoretical arguments reviewed above guided the choice of oversampled cases,⁷ although the analysis focuses on individual-level variance.

Outcome: Nativism (index)

We developed a new *Nativism-Internal Migration Index (NIMI)* by modifying the *Nativism Index* originally developed by Ipsos (2016) to capture the perceptions that *internal* migrants (rather than *international* migrants) take jobs and social services from native populations and weaken the province or territory (rather than the country). The original *Nativism Index* drew on anti-immigrant attitude items from the *General Social Survey* (Smith et al. 2018) and the *World Value Survey* (Inglehart et al., 2014). Since its development, studies have found the original *Nativist Index* to be a robust measure with strong internal consistency and high convergent and divergent validity in both U.S. and global samples (Young et. al., 2019; Young and Goidel 2025; Zhao, 2019).

Similar to the original *Nativism Index*, the *NIMI* is composed of five slightly reworded items: (1) “Interprovincial migrants take away jobs from people who are from your province/territory”; (2) “Interprovincial migrants take important social services from people who are from your province/territory”; (3) “When jobs are scarce, employers should


All things considered, the early 2020s being a time of global insecurity with a global pandemic and multiple large-scale armed conflicts, such circumstances may have temporarily polarized attitudes on im/migration restriction and responses on predictor variables such as economic anxiety and the need for nativist protection.

⁶ Manitoba N=52, New Brunswick N=40, Northwest Territories N=6, Nova Scotia N=52, Prince Edward Island N=8, Saskatchewan N=30, Yukon N=3, Nunavut is not covered. N=9 respondents did not declare their province/territory and are removed from all analyses.

⁷ We made sure to include Ontario and Quebec, the largest Canadian provinces (economically, politically and demographically speaking). We also made sure to have a large sample in Alberta and British-Columbia, two provinces with the largest influx of internal migrants in recent years. We also included smaller provinces like Newfoundland and Labrador, to examine opposition to internal migration in smaller and declining demographic and economic markets. Finally, the disproportionately large sample from Quebec was done so in order to explore whether minority nations/ethnically-distinct provinces like Quebec are most likely to oppose migration of non-co-ethnics (see e.g., Turgeon and Bilodeau, 2014), and to allow for a comparison between French and English-speaking residents. A total of 200 responses were also collected from the various remaining provinces and territories.

prioritize hiring people from people who are from your province/territory over people originating from elsewhere in Canada”; (4) “Your province/territory would be better off economically if all interprovincial migrants who wanted to come could come to your province/territory”; (5) “Your province/territory would be stronger if it stopped inter-provincial migration. As shown in **Figure 1**, compared to the Ipsos survey (2019) on attitudes toward immigration in Canada (shown in red), levels of nativism toward internal migrants in Canada are substantial but consistently lower across all questions (shown in blue). For this analysis, each item is coded on a 1-9 scale (1=strongly disagree; 9=strongly agree). Items are summed to create a total score where higher values indicate greater nativism (mean= 4.4, median= 4.4, 25% quantile= 3.2, 75% quantile= 5.4, full range (1 to 9) observed).⁸

Figure 1: Percentage of Canadian respondents who agreed with questions on internal migrants (NIMI, 2024) and international migrants (Ipsos Nativism Index, 2019)



Although subnational units lack direct control over internal migration, prior research shows that sub-national governments have routinely sought — and in some occasions, implemented — formal and informal restrictions on internal mobility, including pro-local discrimination (e.g. job quotas, language requirements, or residency rules) or community property rights, and in rare cases, formal border controls (e.g. Côté, 2025; Lacina, 2026; Maas, 2020; Sadiq, 2009; Xhardez et al., 2025). While subnational units have fewer policy levers than national governments, this does not imply a lack of interest in regulating internal mobility. The survey items therefore capture attitudes towards a broader set of

⁸ **Appendix A2** includes the distribution of responses for each of the questions in NIMI as well as the standard deviations as a measure of spread.

exclusionary attitudes and policy preferences related to internal migration, allowing us to better explore the mechanisms underlying opposition to newcomers without the confounding factors of shared citizenship status or large ethno-cultural differences.

Predictors: Economic Anxiety, Regional Identity, Subnational Attachment

As predictors, we constructed an index of regional identity, an index of economic anxiety, and a measure of subnational attachment relative to national attachment. Building on commonly used national identity index (e.g. Young and Goidel, 2025), the regional identity index combines six items adjusted for the regional level⁹ (Cronbach alpha= 0.85), with higher values indicating stronger regional identity. Economic anxiety is measured using a three-item index¹⁰ (Cronbach alpha= 0.80), where greater values indicate greater anxiety. Subnational attachment is operationalized as a binary indicator equal to 1 when the average attachment to one's town or province/territory exceeds attachment to Canada.¹¹

Control Variables

We include variables capturing individual and contextual characteristics associated with nativist attitudes. Prior research identifies age, education, income, political identification, migration status, community size, and gender as key predictors (Dražanová 2020; Young and Goidel 2025). Overall, lower-educated, older men who identify with conservative political parties and who live in rural areas are most likely to express anti-immigration or nativist attitudes. In her meta-analysis, Dražanová (2020) also found that people born in a given country tend to be more anti-immigration than people who have themselves re-located. Finally, evidence on income is mixed, with some studies linking economic

⁹ (1) "Having been born in your province/territory.", (2) "Having lived in the province/territory for most of one's life.", (3) "Grandparents having been born in the province/territory.", (4) "Being able to speak the language spoken by the majority of the population in the province/territory (e.g., French in Quebec, English in other Canadian provinces).", (5) "Following the province/territory's customs and traditions.", (6) "Considering oneself to be a true member of the province or territory." All scales are measured on a scale from 1 to 9.

¹⁰ (1) "Thinking about the economy, over the past year, has Canada's economy gotten worse, better, or stayed the same?"; (2) "Thinking about the economy, over the past year, has your province/territory's economy gotten worse, better, or stayed about the same?"; (3) "Over the past year, has your financial situation gotten worse, stayed about the same, or improved?". All scales are measured on a scale from 1 to 9. In Appendix A8, we show that each component separately leads to the same substantive conclusion, with the personal situation somewhat more associated with the outcome than the other two.

¹¹ Question wording: "How strongly do you feel attached to the following:" (1) Canada, (2) Your province/territory, (3) Your Village/Town/City. Attachment is measured on a scale from 1 to 9.

vulnerability to exhibiting anti-migration views, whereas others found a small, though statistically significant correlation between income and nativist sentiments.

Contextual factors such as the proportion of migrant population and GDP per capita may also shape attitudes. Regions with large migrant communities (Wilkes et al., 2008) and those with higher unemployment and slower economic growth (Goldstein and Peters, 2014) are expected to exhibit more negative views of migration.

To minimize omitted variable bias and ensure that cases are comparable in the regression models, we include the following controls: age group (18-24 [reference], 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65+), female gender identity (reference: other gender identities), highest level of education (ordered categories, with reference “Completed technical, community college, CEGEP/collège classique”), household income grouped (<20k, 20-49k, 50-99k [reference], 100-199k, 200-299k, 300k+), community size (self-declared, <1k, 1-29k, 30-99k [reference], 100-999k, 1m+), birthplace (binary indicator for being born in another province/territory); party identification (categorical, New Democratic Party, Liberal [reference], Conservative, People’s Party, Green Party, Bloc Québécois, other). We also include provinces/territories as random intercepts in the regression model to account for (undefined) differences at the provincial level. Question wordings are provided in **Appendix A1**.


Analytical strategy

We estimate regression models with the the nativism index (NIMI) as the outcome variable and the predictors and controls described above. Data are analyzed at the individual level. To ensure robust estimates — particularly given small sample sizes in some regions —, we employ Bayesian regression with non-informative priors that regularize without introducing subjective information (Goodrich et al. 2024). To address missing values, we use multiple imputation (van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011; Bürkner 2017). Results are substantially similar with and without imputations. Given ongoing debates about imputing outcome variables (or in our case NIMI; von Hippel 2007), we report separate models with and without multiple imputations. In **Appendix A4**, we replicate the substantive results with two extended versions of NIMI. The main findings remain unchanged across specifications.

Results: More nativism with regional identity and subnational attachment, and less with economic anxiety

In **Figure 2**, we present the results from the individual-level regression model with NIMI as the outcome. The figure displays the regression coefficients as dots and their associated uncertainty as credible intervals. The coefficients for regional identity and subnational attachment lie to the right of the dashed zero line, while the coefficient for economic anxiety lies to the left. This indicates that individuals with greater economic anxiety tend to exhibit lower levels of nativism, after accounting for regional identity and subnational attachment. Conversely, individuals with stronger regional identity and those who feel more attached to their town or province/territory than Canada tend to exhibit higher levels of nativism. Importantly, none of the uncertainty crosses the zero line, suggesting that the estimates are sufficiently precise to support substantive interpretation. A full regression table can be found in **Appendix A3**.

Figure 2: Individual-level model of nativism (index), Canada, 2024




Notes: Outcome variable: nativism (NIMI). The points indicate the coefficients of the regression model, with the lines indicating uncertainty in terms of standard errors (MAD; thick line 1 standard error, thin line 2 standard errors). The two indices are on the same scale (1 to 9), while subnational attachment is a binary indicator. The model adjusts for individual-level factors (shown separately in **Figure 3**) and province/territory (shown separately in **Figure 4**) using random intercepts. Non-informative priors were used for regularization.

In **Appendix A4** we replace the outcome with two extended versions of the nativism index and find no substantial differences. In **Appendix A5**, we present results after using multiple imputations to retain respondents with missing data. The results remain substantively unchanged, suggesting that missingness does not bias the findings.

Exploratory associations with nativism

In this section, we present the estimates for the control variables from the model in **Figure 2**. We do so in an exploratory spirit, to sketch a descriptive portrait of the ‘internal nativists’. **Figure 3** shows that several control variables are associated with variations in nativism, even after accounting for economic anxiety, regional identity, and subnational attachment.

Figure 3: Further associations for nativism (index), Canada, 2024



Notes: Outcome variable: nativism (NIMI). The points indicate the coefficients of the regression model, with the lines indicating uncertainty in terms of standard errors (MAD; thick line 1 standard error, thin line 2 standard errors). These coefficients were included as control variables in Figure 2, and presented here as exploration. See appendix A7 for exploratory models without the predictors.

We observe an association for age, where contrary to expectations, older individuals tend to exhibit lower levels of nativism. Given that these estimates adjust for key predictors, it


is not surprising that uncertainty is relatively high, as indicated by the wide intervals. For gender, the uncertainty is sufficiently large that a null effect remains plausible, and in the absence of strong theoretical expectations, we refrain from further interpretation. With respect to education, individuals with lower levels of education appear more likely to exhibit nativist attitudes, although the uncertainty remains substantial. Compared to technical education, the reference category, individuals with tertiary education are less likely to express nativist attitudes. Individuals in lower-income households tend to exhibit higher levels of nativism. Interestingly, respondents with household incomes above 300k show higher levels of nativism than those with incomes between 200k and 300k, indicating a potential non-linear relationship, consistent with prior research (Dražanová 2020; Young and Goidel 2025). Political identification shows a clear association along a left-right dimension. Individuals affiliated with the Bloc Québécois –a party political party whose *raison d'être* is to promote Quebec's regional identity and attachments at the expense of the Canadian federation—, still exhibit lower levels of nativism than those affiliated with the Conservative Party of Canada or the People's Party, all else equal.

While many of these associations mirror those from research on international migration, two results diverge. First, individuals living in larger communities are more likely to exhibit nativist attitudes towards internal migrants — once we have accounted for other variables. Second, individuals who have themselves moved to a different province or territory also tend to exhibit higher levels of nativism, after adjusting for other variables in the model. This suggests that the experience of moving to a new province or territory does *not* reduce exclusionary attitudes toward other internal migrants — a conclusion also reached by Lacina (2026) in her survey work comparing the attitudes of “locals, settlers, and strangers” toward pro-local policies in the United States, which underscores once again the multiple overlaps between internal and international migration.

Exploring differences between subnational units and possible reasons

In this section, we explore differences in nativism between subnational units. Given the limited number of provinces and territories and the cross-sectional nature of the data, we proceed cautiously and interpret these results as suggestive rather than definitive. **Figure 4** shows substantial uncertainty, with many intervals crossing the zero line.

Figure 4: Provincial intercepts for nativism (index), Canada, 2024



Notes: Outcome variable: nativism (NIMI). The points indicate the random intercepts of the provinces/territories in the regression model, with the lines indicating uncertainty in terms of standard errors (MAD; 1 standard error). The model adjusts for individual-level factors: economic anxiety, regional identity, subnational attachment, gender, income, education, and others (shown separately in **Figure 2** and **Figure 3**). Non-informative priors were used for regularization. The lines in solid black represent oversampled provinces/territories with larger samples.

Focusing on provinces with larger sample sizes and using one standard error as a criterion for interpreting results, we find partial support for theoretical expectations. Theory suggests higher nativism in provinces with larger shares of internal migrants, such as Alberta, British-Columbia, Ontario and Quebec. **Figure 4** shows relatively higher levels of nativism in British Columbia and Alberta, while estimates for Ontario are imprecise and include zero. Quebec, by contrast, exhibits comparatively lower levels of nativism. Interpretation remains tentative, however, as the theory does not specify clear thresholds for ‘high’ or ‘low’ nativism.

A second expectation links nativism to economic conditions, with higher levels predicted in provinces experiencing greater economic strain. This would suggest higher nativism in poorer provinces such as Newfoundland and Labrador. However, **Figure 4** suggests no clear difference in the levels of nativism in Newfoundland and Labrador, though these estimates are again imprecise and include zero.

Finally, we consider whether the presence of cultural differences between hosts and migrants might shape exclusionary attitudes. To explore this effect, we zoomed in on Quebec, where the majority language is French but English is also widely spoken, especially in migrant communities. **Figure 4** does not support the claim that more opposition to migration would occur where there is a linguistic distinction between the host community and the internal migrants. In **Appendix A6**, we have split Quebec into two categories according to the language spoken by the respondent. While both coefficients are negative — indicating relatively lower levels of nativism — the coefficient for English-speaking Quebec (-0.42, SE 0.08) is slightly more negative than that for French-speaking Quebec (-0.34, SE 0.08). Given the scale of the outcome variable, these differences are negligible. Overall, we find limited and inconclusive evidence for contextual effects related to migration flows, economic conditions, or cultural (i.e. linguistic) differences. These findings should be interpreted as preliminary and point to the need for further research on contextual determinants of internal-migration nativism.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study provides the first systematic descriptive portrait of attitudes towards internal migrants in Canada. By extending the concept of nativism beyond international migration to include internal mobility, our study offers an opportunity to test whether boundary-based conceptions of belonging operate across multiple territorial scales. Our survey reveals substantial opposition to internal migration within the Canadian federation. While these nativist attitudes are somewhat less pronounced than those towards international migrants (see **Figure 1**), their very existence suggests that ‘not all Canadian citizens are treated equally’ and warrants further explanation. Why are some individuals opposed to the relocation of fellow citizens to their home regions?

Corroborating key insights from the literature on international migration, this study shows that regional identity and sociotropic economic concerns outweigh egocentric economic anxiety as predictors of opposition to internal migration. Respondents with stronger regional identity are most likely to display nativist attitudes toward internal migrants, supporting *Hypothesis 2a*. While this finding aligns with the literature on opposition to international migration, it is somewhat unexpected in the Canadian context, where internal migrants — for example, individuals moving from Toronto to Halifax — are often assumed to share similar linguistic and cultural backgrounds with the local population. Strong identification with a territorial identity remains the most powerful predictor of boundary-restrictive attitudes. Yet, much of the existing scholarship has focused on *national*-level

boundary constructions, overlooking *subnational* expressions of ethnocultural boundary enforcement of the sort revealed here. This distinction is important given that local and sub-national contexts shape who is perceived as part of the cultural outgroup and which latent boundary markers are activated in the process (Weber et al. 2024:26). For these reasons, more work is needed to disentangle what exactly makes an internal migrant culturally distinct from, or similar to, the host population in context of shared citizenship or even shared ethnicity.

A promising research avenue is to disentangle the two components of our regional identity index: the *cultural* considerations (e.g., speaking the majority language or following local customs) and *place-based elements related to roots* (e.g., having been born or having lived most of one's life in a province). In a context where cultural differences are relatively limited (with the notable exception of Quebec), claims to regional rootedness may play a particularly important role. This insight resonates with the “political value of time” discussed by Elizabeth Cohen's (2018), which suggests that time invested in a particular place— through residence, social ties, and participation — generates claims to belonging and priority over resources. From this perspective, individuals who have accumulated more “place-based time” may perceive newcomers, even fellow citizens, as lacking equivalent temporal investments and therefore as less entitled to access local opportunities.

A smaller but positive correlation also exists between subnational attachment — defined as stronger attachment to one's town or province/territory than to Canada as a country — and nativist attitudes. While this supports *Hypothesis 2b*, it also reinforces the importance of place-based approaches to understanding nativism.

Perhaps the most surprising finding is the negative relationship between economic anxiety and nativist attitudes, which contradicts *Hypothesis 1*. Respondents with *lower* levels of economic anxiety tend to exhibit *higher* levels of nativism. One possible explanation is that internal migrants may sometimes be perceived as addressing labor shortages rather than exacerbating competition. For instance, interprovincial migrants to Newfoundland and Labrador have helped fill critical gaps in sectors such as healthcare and the oil and gas industry (Fang et al. 2020). In this context, lower economic anxiety may reduce the perceived need for incoming labor, potentially fostering more protectionist attitudes. Another explanation relates to local housing markets. Individuals with lower economic anxiety may reside in regions with already high housing costs and may perceive internal migration as further driving up demand and prices. The finding that residents of larger communities may be more likely to exhibit nativist attitudes is consistent with this

interpretation. Together, these results point to the need for further research on the interaction of egocentric and sociotropic economic concerns and nativist attitudes.

The Canadian case is particularly appropriate to test whether boundary-based conceptions of belonging operate across multiple territorial scales, given the strength of provincial identities, the presence of linguistic territoriality and the distinctive historical development of regional political culture. That being said, we expect our findings to apply to other federal states, such as Russia or India, with large regional economic disparities and regionally concentrated ethnic populations. Additional comparative work would help situate these findings in a broader perspective. The literature on nativism in the Global South has long recognized that both internal and international migrants can become targets of exclusionary policies (e.g., Weiner, 1978). It also suggests that forced internal migrants — such as those displaced by climate change or conflict — may be received more favorably than those who relocate voluntarily within a country (Arias and Blair, 2021; Barter and Côté, 2015). Whether similar hierarchies of internal migrants exist in the Global North remains an open question. Indeed, Weber et al.'s (2024: 36) meta-analysis highlights important differences in host-community attitudes across developed and developing countries, with sociotropic concerns playing a less prominent role in the latter. A more integrated— and less siloed — approach to the study of human mobility would significantly benefit the field of migration politics.

All in all, this article makes notable contributions to the literature on nativism and opposition to population movements. Conceptually, it extends the study of nativism beyond its usual focus on international migration by demonstrating how exclusionary logics can also operate *within* national borders. Methodologically, it develops original survey measures to capture the previously underexamined phenomenon of opposition to internal mobility. Empirically, it generates novel data on attitudes towards internal migration in Canada, a high-immigration federal state often described as an 'outlier' for its low (international) nativism (Young and Goidel, 2025). Theoretically, it underscores the portability of boundary-based logics across territorial scales, suggesting that the mechanisms structuring attitudes toward immigrants may also shape attitudes toward internal migrants within federal or decentralized systems.

References

- Adida CL, Lo A, Platas MR (2019) Americans preferred Syrian refugees who are female, English-speaking, and Christian on the eve of Donald Trump's election. *PLoS ONE* 14(10): e0222504. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222504>
- Ahasan. N and G. Korte (2023) Pandemic Population Boom In Rural Hotspots Sparks Resentment. Bloomberg. September 11. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-09-11/pandemic-population-boom-in-rural-hotspots-sparks-resentment>
- Arias, Sabrina B. and Christopher W. Blair (2021) Changing Tides: Public Attitudes on Climate Migration. *Journal of Politics* 84(1): 561-567.
- Awosola, Rasaq Kayode (2021) Nativism in Nigeria: The Struggle for Ownership and Control of Resources. In *Xenophobia, Nativism and Pan-Africanism in 21st Century Africa: History, Concepts, Practice and Case Study*, edited by Sabella Ogbobode Abidde and Emmanuel Kasonde Matambo, 269- 283. New York: Springer.
- Barter, Shane and Isabelle Côté (2015) Strife of the Soil? Unsettling transmigrant conflicts in Indonesia. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 46(1): 60-85.
- Bell, M., Charles-Edwards, E., Ueffing, P., Stillwell, J., Kupiszewski, M. and Kupiszewska, D. (2015), Internal Migration and Development: Comparing Migration Intensities Around the World. *Population and Development Review*, 41: 33-58. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2015.00025.x>
- Bhavnani, Rikhil R. and Bethany Lacina (2018) *Nativism and Economic Integration Across the Developing World: Collision and Accommodation*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Bhavnani, Rikhil R. and Bethany Lacina (2015) The effects of weather-induced migration on sons of the soil riots in India. *World Politics* 67(4): 760-794.
- Bilodeau, A, Gagnon, A, White, SE, Turgeon, L & Henderson, A (2020), 'Attitudes toward ethnocultural diversity in multilevel political communities: Comparing the effect of national and subnational attachments in Canada', *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjaa020>
- Blalock, Hubert M. Jr (1967) *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations*. New York: Wiley.
- Blumer, H. (1958). Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position. *Pacific Sociological Review*, 1(1), 3-7. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1388607>
- Bosniak, L. S. (1997). 'Nativism' the Concept: Some Reflections (1997). *Immigrants out*. The New Nativism and the Anti-Immigrant Impulse in the United States. New York: New York University Press, 1997.
- Bui, Dung and Isabelle Côté (2022) *The Return Migration, Health Threat and Conflict Nexus: Insights from India and China*. Defense and Security Foresight Working Paper. https://uwaterloo.ca/defence-security-foresight-group/sites/ca.defence-security-foresight-group/files/uploads/files/dung_cote_dsfsg_working_paper_2022_the_return_migration_health_threat_and_conflict_nexus.pdf [last accessed July 16, 2025]
- Bürkner, Paul-Christian (2017). 'Brms: An R Package for Bayesian Multilevel Models Using Stan'. *Journal of Statistical Software* 80 (1): 1-28. <https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v080.i01>.
- Ceobanu, Alin M. and Xavier Escandell (2010). Comparative Analyses of Public Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration Using Multinational Survey Data: A Review of Theories and Research. *Annual Review Sociology*. 36:309-328. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.012809.102651>
- Cohen, Elizabeth F. (2018) *The political value of time: citizenship, duration, and democratic justice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Côté, Isabelle (2025). "When municipalities get involved: internal migration restrictions in Batam, Indonesia", *Migration Studies*. 13(3): <https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mnaf038>
- Côté, Isabelle, Matthew I. Mitchell and Catherine Xhardez (2025), 'Nativism Within': Rethinking Opposition to Internal Migration'. Presented at the *Canadian Political Science Association, Toronto*, June 3-5.
- Côté, Isabelle (2022) "Internal Migration and Resource Conflict: Evidence from Riau, Indonesia." *Journal of Global Security Studies* 7(1).
- Côté, Isabelle. and M. Raatikainen (2020) "Opposition to Internal Migration: Evidence from Asia" in Tremblay and Gagnon [eds], *Federalism, Democracy and National Diversity in the 21st Century*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.187-207.
- Davis, Nicholas T., Goidel, Kirby, Lipsmeyer, Christine, Whitten, Guy and Clifford Young (2019) 'Economic Vulnerability, Cultural Decline and Nativism: Contingent and Indirect Effects', *Social Science Quarterly*, 100(2): 430-446.
- Devellis, Robert F. (2003) *Scale Development: Theory and Applications*. Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Dražanová, Lenka (2020) *What factors determine attitudes to immigration? A meta-analysis of political science research on immigration attitudes (2009-2019)*. EUI Working Papers. RSCAS 2020é86. Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies. Migration Policy Centre.
- Fang, T; J. Zhu and P. S. Jaia (2020) *Solving for Shortages in Newfoundland & Labrador: Employer Experiences and the Labour Market Across Atlantic Provinces*. Public Policy Forum: <https://ppforum.ca/publications/solving-for-shortages-in-newfoundland-labrador/>.
- Fediunin, Jules Sergei (2023) Conceptualizing Nativism in Authoritarian Russia: From Nationalist Ideology to Antimigrant Riots. *Nationalities Papers* 1-27. doi:10.1017/nps.2023.60
- Flyvbjerg, Bent. "Five Misunderstandings About Case Studies." *Qualitative Inquiry* 12, no. 2 (2006): 219-45.
- Fry, B. N. (2007). *Nativism and immigration: Regulating the American dream*. New York: New York: LFB Scholarly Pub.
- Gagnon, Alain-G. and Arjun Tremblay, eds. (2020) *Federalism and National Diversity in the 21st Century*. Cham: Springer International Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38419-7>.
- Gaikwad, N., & Nellis, G. (2017). The majority-minority divide in attitudes toward internal migration: Evidence from Mumbai. *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(2), 456-472. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12276>.
- Goldstein, Judith L. and Margaret E. Peters (2014) Nativism or Economic Threat: Attitudes Towards Immigrants During the Great Recession. *International Interactions* 40(3): 376-401.
- Goldstone, Jack A. (2002) Population and security: how demographic change can lead to violent Conflict. *Journal of International Affairs* 56(1): 3-21.
- Goodrich, Ben, Jonah Sol Gabry, Imad Ali, and Sam Brilleman. 2024. 'Rstanarm: Bayesian Applied Regression Modeling via Stan'. R. <https://mc-stan.org/rstanarm>.
- Gordon, Joshua, Jeram, Sanjay and Clifton van der Linden (2019) The two solitudes of Canadian nativism: Explaining the absence of a competitive anti-immigration party in Canada. *Nations and Nationalism* 26(4): 902-922.
- Green, Elliott. D. (2007). Demography, diversity and nativism in contemporary Africa: Evidence from Uganda. *Nations and Nationalism*, 13(4), 717-736. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2007.00317.x>.
- Guia, Aitana. (2016). *The concept of nativism and anti-immigrant sentiments in Europe*. EUI MWP; 2016/20.

- Hainmueller, Jens and Daniel J. Hopkins (2014) Public Attitudes Toward Immigration. *Annual Review Political Science* 17: 225-249.
- Harrell, Allison, Stuart Soroka, Shanto Iyengar, and Nicholas Valentino (2012) The impact of economic and cultural cues on support for immigration in Canada and the United States. *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 45(3): 499-530.
- Hellström, A., & Hervik, P. (2014). Feeding the beast: Nourishing nativist appeals in Sweden and in Denmark. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 15, 449-467. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-013-0293-5>.
- Henning, K., Steimanis, I. & Vollan, B. (Climate) Migrants welcome? Evidence from a survey experiment in Austria. *Reg Environ Change* 22, 108 (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-022-01955-7>
- Higham, J. (1981). *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925*. New York, NY: Athenaeum.
- Homer-Dixon, Thomas (1994) Environmental scarcities and violent conflict: Evidence from cases. *International Security* 19(1): 5-40.
- Hopkins, Daniel J. (2010) Politicized places: explaining where and when immigrants provoke opposition. *American Political Science Review* 104(1): 40-60.
- Hughes and Frame (2021) 'What could the Taylor decision mean for interprovincial travel' <https://www.mccarthy.ca/en/insights/articles/covid-19-what-could-taylor-decision-mean-interprovincial-travel>
- Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A., Moreno, C., Welzel, K. Kizilova, J., Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos P, Norris, E. Ponarin, and B. Puranen et al. eds. (2014) World Values Survey. Madrid: ID Systems Institute.
- Ipsos Online Survey (2016) 1,005 Adults 18+
- Juteau, Danielle (2004) Pure laine Québécois: the concealed ethnicity of dominant majorities. In *Rethinking Ethnicity: Majority Groups and Dominant Minorities*, edited by Eric P. Kaufmann, 84-101. London, UK: Routledge.
- Kešić, J., & Duyvendak, J. W. (2019). The nation under threat: secularist, racial and populist nativism in the Netherlands. *Patterns of prejudice*, 53(5), 441-463.
- Kinder, Donald R. and Kam Cindy D. (2009) *Us against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion*. Chicago: University Chicago Press. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-013-9263-z>
- Kustov, Alexander (2022) "Bloom where you're planted": explaining public opposition to (e)migration', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 48 (5): 1113-1132.
- Lacina, Bethany (2026) *Strangers and Settlers: Migration Politics in a Local's Work*. Oxford University Press.
- Levitz, Eric (2024) 'How NIMBYs are helping to turn the public against immigrants', Vox, February 18; <https://www.vox.com/24074353/immigration-housing-zoning-canada-biden-trump>
- Lyons, Lenore T. and Michelle Ford (2007) 'Where Internal and International Migration Intersect: Mobility and the Formation of Multi-Ethnic Communities in the Riau Islands Transit Zone', *International Journal on Multicultural Societies* 9(2): 236-263.
- Maas, Willem (2020) Citizenship and Free Movement in Comparative Federalism. In *The European Union and Beyond: Multi-Level Governance, Institutions and Policy-Making*, edited by Jae-Jae Spoon and Nils Ringe. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers/ECPR Press. <https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781785523359/The-European-Union-and-Beyond-Multi-Level-Governance-Institutions-and-Policy-Making>.

- Mass, Willem (2021) Money in Internal Migration: Financial Resources and Unequal Citizenship. In *Money Matters in Migration: Policy, Participation, and Citizenship*, edited by Annette Schrauwen, Tesseltje de Lange, and Willem Maas, 317-335. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009042505.018>.
- McKinlay, A. and C. McVittie (2007) Locals, incomers and intra-national migration: Place-identities and a Scottish island. *British Journal of Social Psychology*. 46: 171-190.
- Miller, S. V. (2023). Economic anxiety or ethnocentrism? An evaluation of attitudes toward immigration in the U.S. from 1992 to 2017. *The Social Science Journal*, 60(4), 818-837. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03623319.2020.1782638>
- Mudde, Cas (2017) Why nativism, not populism, should be declared word of the year. *The Guardian*, December 7. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/dec/07/cambridge-dictionarynativism-populism-word-year>
- Pears, Emily and Emily Sydnor (2022) 'The Correlates and Characteristics of American State Identity', *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 52(2): 173-200.
- Perea, J. F. (Ed.). (1997). *Immigrants out!: the new nativism and the anti-immigrant impulse in the United States* (Vol. 76). NYU Press.
- Piccoli, Lorenzo, Jelena Dzankic, Didier Ruedin, and Timothy Jacobs-Owen. 2022. 'Restricting Human Movement during the COVID-19 Pandemic: New Research Avenues in the Study of Mobility, Migration, and Citizenship'. *International Migration Review*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01979183221118907>.
- Rajan, S Irudaya, and R. B. Bhagat (2021) Internal Migration and the Covid-19 Pandemic in India. In *Migration and Pandemics: Spaces of Solidarity and Spaces of Exception*, edited by Anna Triandafyllidou, 227-248. Springer Nature Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81210-2_10.
- Ruedin, Didier (2019) Attitudes to immigrants in South Africa: personality and vulnerability, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 45(7): 1108-1126.
- Ruedin, Didier (2020) Do we need multiple questions to capture feeling threatened by immigrants? *Political Research Exchange* 2(1): 1-24.
- Sadiq, Kamal (2009) When being 'native' is not enough: Citizens as foreigners in Malaysia. *Asian Perspectives* 33(1): 5-32.
- Singer, David A. and Kai Quek (2022) Public Attitudes toward Internal and Foreign Migration: Evidence from China, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 86(1): 82-106.
- Smith, Tom W., Michael Davern, Jeremy Freese and Michael Hout (2018) *General Social Surveys, 1972-2016*. NORC, ed. Chicago, IL: NORC at the University of Chicago.
- Solodoch, Omer. (2021). Do Sociotropic Concerns Mask Prejudice? Experimental Evidence on the Sources of Public Opposition to Immigration. *Political Studies*, 69(4), 1009-1032.
- The Economist (2025) 'Your guide to the new anti-immigration argument', March 13. <https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2025/03/13/your-guide-to-the-new-anti-immigration-argument>
- Teitelbaum, Michael S. and Jay Winters (1998) *A Question of Numbers: High Migration, Low Fertility and the Politics of National Identity*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Tobin, Stephanie (2019) 'Online name-calling between Alberta, NL, an unexpected postelection fallout', CBC News, October 23. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/nl-alberta-online-comments-electionfallout-1.5331654>
- Tumbe, Chinmay (2023) *Towards an Inter-State Migration Council*, State Capacity Initiative Working Paper No. 2023-4. Centre for Policy Research, February.

- Turgeon, Luc and Antoine Bilodeau (2014) Minority nations and attitudes towards immigration: the case of Quebec. *Nations and Nationalism* 20(2): 317-336.
- van Buuren, Stef, and Karin Groothuis-Oudshoorn. 2011. 'Mice: Multivariate Imputation by Chained Equations in R'. *Journal of Statistical Software* 45 (3): 1-67. <https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v045.i03>.
- von Hippel, Paul T. 2007. 'Regression with Missing Ys: An Improved Strategy for Analyzing Multiply Imputed Data'. *Sociological Methodology* 37 (1): 83-117. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9531.2007.00180.x>.
- Weber, Sigrid, and Stoop, Nik and Van der Windt, Peter and Zhai, Haoyi (2024) *A Meta-Analysis of Attitudes Towards Migrants and Displaced*. MPRA. Paper: 122629
- Weiner, Myron. (1978). *Migration and the rise of nativism. In Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press
- Wilkes, Rima, Neil Guppy, and Lily Farris (2008) 'No thanks, we're full': individual characteristics, national context and changing attitudes towards immigration'. *International Migration Review* 42(2): 149-166
- Wilson, Chris, Sanjal Shastri, and Henry Frear (2022) Does the Scale or Speed of Immigration Generate Nativism? Evidence from a Comparison of New Zealand Regions. *Journal on Migration and Human Security* 10(1): 1-22.
- Wright, M., Citrin, J. and Wand, J. (2012), Alternative Measures of American National Identity: Implications for the Civic-Ethnic Distinction. *Political Psychology*, 33: 469-482. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00885>.
- Xhardez, Catherine, Lamarche, Alexandra, Côté, Isabelle, and Matthew I. Mitchell (2025) 'Navigating Internal Migration: Policy Responses and Dynamics in Federal States'. Presented at the *American Political Science Association*, Vancouver, September.
- Young, Clifford and Kirby Goidel (2025) *Nativist Nation: Populism, Grievances, Identity and the Transformation of American Politics*. Berlin: De Gruyters Series in Race, Ethnicity and Political Communication.
- Young, C., K. Ziemer and C. Jackson (2019) 'Explaining Trump's Popular Support: Validation of a Nativism Index', *Social Science Quarterly* 100(2): 412-418.
- Young, Julia G. (2017) Making America 1920 Again? Nativism and US Immigration, Past and Present. *Journal on Migration and Human Security* 5(1): 217-235.
- Zhao, Yikai (2019) 'Testing the Measurement Invariance of Nativism', *Social Science Quarterly* 100(20): 419-429
- Zuber, Christina I. (2020) Explaining the Immigrant Integration Laws of German, Italian and Spanish Regions: Sub-State Nationalism and Multilevel Party Politics. *Regional Studies* 54(11): 1486-1497.