

Multiculturalism, Social Citizenship and Political Attitudes & Behaviors among Immigrants and their Children

Alexandra Filindra, PhD.
University of Illinois at Chicago
Aleka@uic.edu

Anita Manatschal, Ph.D.
Université de Neuchâtel, Switzerland
anita.manatschal@unine.ch

Abstract

The policy feedback literature has focused on the way material benefits from policies create political constituencies and encourage political engagement. More recent work related to immigrant integration policy has shown that the effects of policy are both material and psychological (or symbolic) and they can influence not just direct beneficiaries, but spillover to families and networks. Drawing on this extant research, and using data from the CCES and a new immigration policy database, we show direct and spillover effects of state-level immigrant integration policies on political attitudes and behavior of immigrants, their children, and their Latino co-ethnics.

Introduction

What is the relationship between the immigrant integration policy context and political attitudes and behaviors of immigrants, their children, and their co-ethnic groups? Does the “context of reception” (Portes and Rumbaut 2001) at the state-level influence whether or not these groups become politically active? Theories of “policy feedback” suggest that policies can create “clients” who mobilize politically to protect and expand benefits or avoid burdens (e.g., Pierson 1993; Mettler 2002; Campbell 2003). Policies can also create citizens by setting the terms of inclusion into the political community (Bloemraad 2006; Haney-Lopez 2006). Over time, these policies can create structural inequalities across groups, privileging some and marginalizing others (Mettler 1998; Uggen and Manza 2002).

More recently, scholars have shown that policy effects are not limited to direct beneficiaries of a policy, but they can spillover across generations and social networks to families, peer groups, and co-ethnic communities (Condon et al. 2016; Gelatt et al. 2017). Policy effects have been classified as either material or symbolic/psychological. Thus in

addition to influencing the availability of material resources to groups, the policy context can act as a signal of inclusion or exclusion that affects group members' sense of belonging, psychological well-being and political efficacy (Filindra et al. 2011). This newer literature suggests that a variety of behaviors, including political behaviors can be affected by the policy context through material and symbolic mechanisms. The scholarship on policy threat has come to indirectly validate some of these expectations. Studies of political moments of high threat towards immigrants and Latinos have documented that policy threat can contribute to the political socialization and mobilization of targeted communities (e.g., Ramirez 2013; Pantoja et al. 2001; Pantoja and Segura 2003).

We test for spillover material and psychological policy feedback effects of state-level immigrant integration policies. Specifically, we test for policy effects on approval of government officials, registration to vote, and self-reported voting. We draw our individual-level data from several waves of the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES). Our key independent variables which are drawn from a newly developed database of state-level immigration legislation (Filindra and Pearson-Merkowitz 2016),¹ are four policy indices measuring change over time in inclusion or restriction in the domains of social welfare and language facilitation. We find evidence of both material and psychological spillover effects among immigrants and Latinos co-ethnics.

Policy Feedback Theory

The policy feedback theory suggests that distributive and redistributive policies create clients among groups that directly benefit from such programs. These clients are more likely to exercise the rights of political citizenship to protect and expand their material gains (Pierson 1993; Campbell 2003; Mettler 2002). Not only do policies encouraging political participation, but studies in the domain of immigration show that public policy determines the criteria for inclusion into the political community itself and provides incentives and disincentives for people to naturalize (Bloemraad 2006), or to

¹ Support for data collection for the state-level immigration legislation database was provided by the Pew Charitable Trusts and the Russell Sage Foundation. The analysis and views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Pew Charitable Trusts or those of the Russell Sage Foundation.

engage in the non-electoral civic realm (Cinalli and Giugni 2011; Manatschal and Stadelmann-Steffen 2014).

Among others, feedback effects can develop from citizenship and voting policies that target groups by race, gender, religion, criminal record, or other characteristics. Over time, such policies lead to structural inequalities as privileged groups have greater access to the political system than do marginalized groups (Uggen and Manza 2002; Mettler 1998). For example, until 1952, immigrants from many Asian countries were barred from naturalization and thus from voting (Tichenor 2002). Today, more than 11 million people are undocumented and thus lack a path to citizenship and political rights. But it is not only policies that control naturalization that influence political participation. Voter ID policies discourage political participation among marginalized groups (Barreto et al. 2009; Alvarez et al. 2008). Exclusion from the social welfare system negatively contributes to educational outcomes for the children of immigrants, indirectly affecting their political engagement (Condon et al. 2016; Filindra et al. 2011).

Spillover of Policy Feedback Effects

The policy feedback literature has focused on the effects of policy on targeted groups. However, the effects of policy are not limited to group material well-being of target groups. First, there is evidence that the material effects of policy can spillover across broader communities and peer networks (Condon et al. 2016). Second, scholars have suggested that policies can act symbolically as signals of inclusion or exclusion and thus have psychological and attitudinal effects on both direct targets and broader communities (Filindra et al. 2011; Condon et al. 2016). Studies in a variety of fields from sociology to public health have shown that the policy context matters not only in the types of behaviors it targets for regulation. Rather, the policy context can also influence attitudes and behaviors in unintended ways (e.g., Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Bloemraad 2013; Gelatt et al. 2017).

All public policies have specific target groups whose behavior they seek to modify in some way. At the same time, the effects of policy can spillover, and influence broader groups. In the case of immigrants, policy can affect families, peer groups, and even the entire co-ethnic group. For example, the exclusion of legal permanent residents from cash assistance programs affects not only the immediate beneficiary but also her family. Parents may have to work longer hours to make up for the loss in income or children

may have to drop out of school to support the family. Or increased immigration enforcement may make it more difficult for undocumented immigrants to find work forcing them to rely more on family members for subsistence. In terms of political involvement, these policy effects can make it more costly for naturalized immigrants and their U.S. born children to learn about candidates and parties and engage in the political process. These effects can further spillover through co-ethnic communities as the collective resources of immigrant networks are reduced as a result of the policy change.

According to Condon et al. (2016), the effects of policy can be material or symbolic. These are the two key mechanisms that essentially create the policy feedback process. By material effects, the authors mean burdens or benefits that a policy ascribes to a given population. For example, the exclusion of immigrants from social welfare or restrictions on employment impacts the group's aggregate economic resource. By symbolic or psychological effects, Condon et al. (2016) mean policy influences on people's social identities, sense of community membership, and feelings of belonging or threat. For example, immigration enforcement can make targeted immigrants, their families, and their communities more fearful of authority, less trusting, and less politically efficacious (Abrego 2011; Rocha et al. 2015). These psychological effects of policy can in turn influence political engagement. The literature on policy threat has documented that the introduction and enactment of restrictive immigration policies at the national or state level can mobilize immigrants and their co-ethnics (Ramirez 2013; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Pantoja et al. 2001).

The Immigrant Integration Context in the States

The 21st century has witnessed heightened immigration policy activism in state legislatures. As Figure 1 shows, since 2005, states enacted 796 substantive pieces of legislation, many restrictive and some inclusive (Filindra and Pearson-Merkowitz 2016).

[FIGURE 1-HERE]

This state activism occurred partly because of changes in the demographic and partisan environment and partly because of the federal government's failure to enact comprehensive immigration reform. Federal legislation enacted in the 1990s devolved to the states decisions related to legal permanent resident access to the social welfare net (Filindra 2013). At the same time, Washington set up the scaffolding for the establishment of a multi-level immigration enforcement system that could involve law

enforcement at all levels of government (Provine et al. 2016). Detention and deportation of immigrants, even those with legal status, became significantly more streamlined and routinized in the past two decades.

In addition to social welfare and enforcement, states have become heavily involved in regulating non-citizens in many domains of life. Over the past two decades, states enacted legislation, pertaining to education, driver's licenses and identification, healthcare, family law, gun control, property rights and housing, language facilitation, voting rights, and employment. All these laws fall under the general category of immigrant integration policy since they mean to define the social, political, and economic rights/privileges of non-citizens and assisting them in exercising such rights/privileges.

Integration policies can be further subdivided into categorical and multicultural policies (Filindra et al. 2011; Manatschal 2011; Koopmans et al. 2012). Categorical policies determine whether and to what degree noncitizens belonging to specific legal categories (e.g., legal permanent residents, refugees, undocumented) have social, economic, and political rights. Multicultural policies, by contrast, target heritage communities that have large immigrant populations but can also have large citizen population. Multiculturalism policies such as recognition of language rights and policies that require important services to be provided in a person's native language can facilitate noncitizens in their exercise of rights. Both types of immigrant integration policy may have material and symbolic effects that spillover to the broader community. However, categorical policies that target the economic resources of individuals are likely to have stronger material effects than multicultural policies that target the cultural resources of a community. Both types of policies can have strong symbolic effects as both can act as signals of inclusion or exclusion.

Hypotheses

In general, we are interested in how changes in integration policies over time affect political attitudes and behavior among immigrants and, via spillover, their descendants, when compared to natives, who are neither directly nor indirectly affected by - and should thus not react to - such policy changes. Based on the theory outlined above, we test four hypotheses reflecting four possible policy change scenarios:

H1 (positive feedback). Approval of elected officials among policy beneficiaries and those in their extended groups (spillover) increases relative to natives who do not belong in the extended group when categorical and/or multicultural integration policies become more inclusive.

H2 (negative feedback). Approval of elected officials among policy beneficiaries and those in their extended groups (spillover) decreases relative to natives who do not belong in the extended group when categorical and/or multicultural integration policies become more exclusionary.

H3 (threat). Registration and voting propensity among beneficiaries and those in their extended groups (spillover) increases relative to natives who do not belong in the extended group when categorical and/or multicultural integration policies become more exclusionary.

H4 (no threat). Registration and voting propensity among policy beneficiaries and those in their extended groups (spillover) decreases relative to natives who do not belong in the extended group when categorical and/or multicultural integration policies become more inclusive.

Data & Methods

In this study, we investigate three aspects of political engagement: attitudes about officeholders and specifically the state governor, registration to vote, and voting. In this study, we define “immigrants,” the target group of integration policies, as foreign-born citizens, noncitizens, and US born children of at least one foreign-born parent. In other words, our immigrant category comprises first and second generation immigrants. Natives, in turn, are defined as non-immigrants who live since three generations or longer in the US. Depending on the analytic model, the immigrant category is slightly modified: since noncitizens are not eligible to register and vote, they are, for instance, omitted in the analyses on political participation. In these models, our immigrant category consists of naturalized citizens and the US born children of at least one foreign-born parent. Data limitations drive our definitional choices. Even a large dataset such as the CCES does not include large enough samples of immigrants (let alone naturalized citizens) in each state.

We test our hypothesis using data from two sources: the CCES and a new state-level immigration policy dataset. Individual-level data were drawn from the 2006-2014 *Cooperative Congressional Election Study* (CCES). The CCES includes representative samples at the state level. Although each CCES wave includes a very large number of respondents, the incidence of naturalized immigrants, our population of interest, is small. For that reason, we pooled data for the 2006 and 2008 waves and also for the 2012 and 2014 waves (respondent samples per state for different nativity status are reported in Appendix A1). Another advantage of combining data from presidential and midterm election years is that we end up with comparable groups before and after integration policy change, assuring that our analyses on political behavior and attitudes are not driven by a specific type of election.

We specify models with three dependent variables, all of them binaries: approval of the state governor, registration to vote, and voting. We include several individual-level control variables to reduce residual variance and increase the precision of our statistical tests. In accordance with the literature on (immigrant) political behavior, we control for age, gender, education, marital status, labor force participation, income and home ownership (Cho 1999; Ramakrishnan 2005; Verba et al. 1995). Racial background was included to account for the high mobilization of black voters in 2008 and 2012 (Kasinitz et al. 2008; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). The models further control for the political ideology and party identification of the respondents which are key predictors of approval of elected officials but also political participation (for detailed information on all variables see Appendix A2).

Key Independent Variables: Integration Policy Change Indices

We drew state-level integration policy data from a database of all immigration-related legislation introduced and enacted in the 50 states from 1990 to 2015 (Filindra and Pearson-Merkowitz 2016). Our key independent variables are four policy indices expressing the *change* of state integration policy legislation between 2005 and 2011. We include this one-year lag with respect to the individual outcome variables, as we assume there is a delay between when policies take effect and when they affect immigrant political attitudes and behavior. Existing research on integration policy highlights the multidimensional nature of integration policy by distinguishing policies regulating integration into the political-legal, socio-economic, or cultural domain (Entzinger 2000;

Manatschal 2011; Koopmans et al. 2012). In line with this differentiated scholarly approach, the policy change measures capture two central dimensions of immigrant integration policy: how state policies deal with cultural difference in terms of language policies, and how they regulate immigrants' access to social benefits. For each of the two policy fields, language policy and access to social benefits, we distinguish two contrasting policy indices, representing inclusive and restrictive policy changes respectively (Figure 2).

[FIGURE 2-HERE]

To capture policy change between 2005 and 2011, we extracted policy information for language and social benefits policy from this database, and created additive count indices, expressing the number of restrictive or inclusive policy enactments in a given year. Details on the policies included in the indices can be found in the Appendix.

The four policy change indices express the total count of policy changes between 2005 and 2011, i.e. how many restrictive and inclusive language and social benefits policies were enacted between 2005 and 2011 in a given state (Appendix A3). In the period under study, policy making activities have been more intense in some policy fields than in others. As Appendix A4 shows, most policy provisions enacted restrict access to social benefits. The respective index also exhibits the highest score per state with 12 policy items being enacted in Georgia between 2005 and 2011 (Appendix A3). The case of Georgia also shows that restrictive policy provisions do not preclude inclusive policy change, as Georgia passed 6 inclusive social benefits policies in the same period. To be able to disentangle policy effects in the empirical analysis, it will thus be important to distinguish between inclusive and restrictive policy changes. The least active area regards restrictive language policy changes, where only three states enacted one restrictive policy in the period studied.² Since we expect that the intensity of policy change along the four indices matters, we prefer bare additive count indices instead of averaged or weighted indices, as count indices allow for a straightforward analysis of how policymaking intensity affects immigrants' political behavior and attitudes compared to natives.

² Restrictive language policy legislation was more frequent during the so called "Official English Movement" in the 80's, 90's and early 2000's (Citrin et al. 1990; Liu et al. 2014).

Method: Difference-in-Difference Analysis

Our study employs a difference-in-difference (DiD) design. This is a statistical technique that attempts to imitate an experimental research design using observational data. The basic idea of this design is that not everyone is affected by a certain treatment in the same way, or at the same time, which makes it a popular method to study the effect of policy intervention or changes on specific segments of the population (Lechner 2010). One of the main assets of this design is that it can credibly address concerns of endogeneity, by limiting the effects of observable and unobservable confounders on the outcomes under investigation.

In our case, the basic assumption of the DiD design is that immigrants are directly affected by integration policy change over time, whereas natives are not. As a consequence, we would expect that integration policy changes alter immigrant political attitudes and behavior when compared to the native reference category. The dependent parameter of interest is therefore the *difference* between immigrant and native attitudes and behavior *before* and *after* integration policy change.³ The resulting immigrant-native gap can be perceived as a state-specific indicator, which is influenced by contextual factors such as the change in state level integration policy over time. The DiD design applied in this study allows us to test how restrictive or inclusive *change* in state integration policy between 2005 and 2011 affects the immigrant-native gap regarding political attitudes and behavior.

To this end, we construct four comparison groups. The two treated groups comprise immigrants before and after integration policy change, and the two non-treated groups are composed of natives pre- and post-integration policy change. This pre- and post-test with comparison group design captures any unobserved differences between states before policy change occurred, allowing us to identify the effects of policy change. To see how integration policy change affects political behavior and attitudes of immigrants when compared to natives, we run logistic regression analyses including interaction effects between immigrant background and the four policy indices.

Although this quasi-experimental method controls for unobserved and observed differences prior to policy change, we include state and year fixed effects to account for any potential differences between states or trends over time, which could explain

³ To model the temporality of policy change, individual observations in the CCES waves from 2006 and 2008 (pre-change) were attributed policy change values of zero, whereas observations from the waves 2012 and 2014 (post-change) received the policy change values reported in Appendix A3.

different outcomes in political behavior and attitudes. Thus, the coefficients on the DiD estimators, meaning the interaction terms between immigrant background and the four policy change indices, indicate how the difference in voting behavior, registration and governor approval between immigrants and natives in a state changed as the policy context in a state changed between the two periods.

Results

Our empirical analysis on the hypothesized relationship between integration policy change and immigrant political attitudes and behavior proceeds in three steps. The analysis starts with the postulated direct and spillover effects of policy change on the immigrant-native gap regarding political attitudes (governor approval) and behavior (voter registration and voting). To test for potential spillover effects on specific ethnic groups, step two checks whether integration policy change influences attitudes and behaviors of Latinos (high immigrant community) as compared to whites (low immigrant community). Additional robustness checks, which support the main findings reported in the analysis presented below, are discussed in step three.

As the immigrant background coefficients in Models 1-3 in Table 1 show, approval of the governor among immigrants is significantly higher compared to natives. However, immigrants have a lower propensity to register to vote or to effectively vote than do natives. These findings are independent of the policy context and consistent with extant literature on immigrant voting behavior (Maxwell 2010; DeSipio 1996). Immigrants' lower likelihood to register and vote when compared to natives is often attributed to their lack of political socialization (Ramakrishnan 2005; Cho 1999; Bass and Casper 2001).

The parameters of central interest are the interaction terms between status (immigrants v. natives since the third generation or longer) and integration policy change, as we are interested in how the immigrant-native gaps in a state change as the integration policy context in a state changed between the two observation periods. In line with our theoretical expectations, approval of the governor increased more strongly compared to natives in those states with inclusive integration policy changes (Model 1 in Table 1). We observe these positive interactions between immigrant background and

inclusive integration policy change for both, language and social benefits policy. Conversely, restrictive integration policy change decreases governor approval significantly among immigrants when compared to natives, approximating thus the level of native approval. However, this effect was statistically significant only in the case of restrictive change in social benefits policy. Restrictive language change has no significant moderating effect on the immigrant native gap regarding governor approval, which is not surprising, given the low variance of this index (Appendix A1). Yet the coefficient still points in the expected negative direction, in line with our expectations.

[TABLE 1-HERE]

A contrasting and weaker pattern emerges for voter registration and voting (Models 2 and 3 in Table 1). In line with our theoretical expectations of a *mobilizing effect of threat*, restrictive policy change significantly increases immigrants' propensity for political participation when compared to natives, reducing thus the negative participation gap between the two groups. Again, only a restrictive change regarding access to social benefits moderates the gap between immigrants and natives significantly, whereas the interaction term remains insignificant for restrictive language policy change. We observe this mobilizing effect of threat in terms of more restrictive access to social benefits for both manifestations of political behavior, voter registration, and, to a lesser extent, voting.

For a substantive interpretation of the significant policy interaction effects, and to visualize how the immigrant-native gaps are moderated by integration policy changes, Figures 3 and 4 present the predicted probability plots based on the analyses from Table 1. As Figure 3 shows, the positive governor approval gap between immigrants and non-immigrant natives increases in inclusive policy change contexts. This increase amounts to plus 3 percentage points for inclusive language policy change, and plus 9 percentage points for inclusive social benefits change. Conversely, the positive approval gap is reduced and turns even negative - although the gap is no longer significant once it turns negative - when there has been a restrictive change in access to social benefits (minus 8 percentage points). Figure 4 shows, in turn, that the negative participation gap observed for voting and registration is significantly reduced if there has been a restrictive change in social benefits policy. The reduction of the immigrant-native participation gap amounts to minus 2 percentage points for each dependent variable, voting and voter registration.

To sum up, the main results reported in Table 1 and Figures 3 and 4 suggest that immigrants are very attentive to the political context they are exposed to, as they even react to short-term policy changes affecting their life conditions. In line with our theoretical expectations, our results reveal a feedback effect on immigrants' political attitudes, whereas their political behavior in terms of voter registration and voting is mobilized through threat, i.e. if immigrant rights to social benefits are restricted at the state level.

[FIGURES 3 AND 4-HERE]

As a second step, we tested whether the effects observed for immigrants spillover to other groups such as the larger ethnic community immigrants identify with. As Condon et al. (2016) demonstrate, attention to spillover effects is particularly important when immigrant groups are the target population because of deep ties with broader minority communities and mixed status families. To test potential spillover effects of this kind, we switch the focus of the analysis to Latinos, a high-immigrant ethnic group, and compare them with whites. Once again, we test whether the attitudinal and behavioral gaps between the two groups are moderated by integration policy change.

The results from Model 4, Table 2 show that there is no significant difference in governance approval between Latinos and whites in states with no integration policy change. Yet, and corresponding to the pattern observed for immigrants versus natives, we find that inclusive integration policy change significantly increases governor approval among Latinos when compared to whites. Again, this holds for both policy domains. Restrictive change in access to social benefits, in turn, decreases Latinos' governor approval when compared to whites. Overall, our evidence suggests that policy feedback effects on attitudes spillover to Latinos.

[TABLE 2-HERE]

There are no signs that the same happens with political mobilization through threat (see Models 5 and 6 in Table 2). To start with, Latinos have a lower probability of voter registration or voting than Whites, net of integration policy change. However, neither propensity for voting nor for voter registration is significantly altered among Latinos versus Whites by changing integration policy contexts. The fact that there are spillover effects for attitudes, but not for political behavior, makes intuitively sense, given that the ethnic group of Latinos, which comprises also non-immigrants (here

defined as third generation and longer in the US), is not in the same way threatened by these policies as immigrants of the first or second generation. In other words, while Latinos may react to changing integration policy contexts in a solidary manner with immigrants by expressing increased or decreased governor approval due to their close links with the immigrant community, these policy changes do however not represent a sufficient threat to mobilize Latinos politically.⁴

As a third and final step, we conducted a series of additional analyses to test the robustness of the main results. To start with, and as Appendix A5 shows, using a series of state control variables instead of state fixed effects produces very similar results to the ones reported in Table 1. One might further object that our immigrant category is too broad and heterogeneous to test policy effects. This could be the case for social benefit policies, which target various groups of non-citizens ranging from undocumented to legal permanent residents. Restricting the analysis to noncitizens versus citizens instead of immigrants versus natives is challenged by the small number of noncitizen respondents in the survey: the sample of noncitizens for the period 2006 and 2008 comprises only 641 individuals, whereas for 2012 and 2014 we count 1695 noncitizen respondents. In spite of these small numbers, running the model explaining government approval for noncitizens as compared to citizens' across US states still results in a significant ($p = 0.07$) and positive interaction term for inclusive social benefits change, in line with our expectations (Appendix A6). Non-citizens, who are directly affected by regulations concerning access to social benefits, increase state governor approval compared to citizens if there has been an inclusive policy change in this field.⁵ Additional tests for second-generation immigrants compared to natives further reveal that the moderating effects of integration policy change on political attitudes and behavior also hold for second-generation immigrants only, in spite of the reduced sample size in these models (Appendix A7). Overall, and in spite of data limitations, the additional analyses on immigrant subgroups corroborate our assumption that "immigrant" is a meaningful analytic category in this context. At the same time, future analyses based on larger immigrant samples might reveal even

⁴ The same analyses for Asians - another high-immigrant group - compared to Whites reveal very similar results as the ones presented here for Latinos versus Whites (analyses not reported here).

⁵ Analogous tests for voting and voter registration are not possible, since noncitizens are not eligible to vote.

stronger patterns for specific subgroups, which are more directly targeted by specific integration policies, such as noncitizens.

Discussion

Our analysis suggests that the policy context does have an effect primarily on attitudes but we also detect a small signal in terms of political behavior. Positive change in either social welfare policies that categorically impact non-citizens or in language facilitation policies that impact cultural groups significantly increases approval of the state's governor among immigrants relative to natives. Similarly, a negative shift in social welfare inclusivity leads to a decline in the gap in governor approval between immigrants and natives. A negative change in language facilitation policy also leads to shrinking the gap in governor approval between the two groups, but this is not statistically significant.

Given our broad definition of the immigrant category which includes not only the foreign born but the children of foreign born parents, our findings as they pertain to political attitudes indicate the existence of important spillover effects of the policy context. The existence of spillover effects is further validated by our comparison between Latinos and whites, which is largely consistent with the analysis of immigrants and natives. Taken together, our findings suggest that the political attitudes of both direct targets and those who belong to their families, peer groups and co-ethnic communities are influenced by the state policy context.

Our findings on political behavior also support the assumption of significant, albeit substantially weaker, policy change effects. This is expected given the broad group definitions that we employ in our analysis. Consistent with theories of policy threat, our data show that a negative change in social welfare policies that categorically impact non-citizens drives up registration and voting among immigrants and their children relative to natives. This is not the case for language facilitation policy where we find null results. Positive policy change, in terms of more inclusive social services or greater linguistic facilitation, appears to have no corresponding effect on registration or voting for immigrants. Neither do we find any statistically significant or substantively meaningful effects for our Latinos v. white comparison for either negative or positive policy change. Taken together, these results suggest that material deprivation more so

than lack of cultural facilitation triggers threat effects producing a policy feedback loop. These effects are small but notable given the limitations of our dataset. Furthermore our results suggest asymmetry in response to losses as compared to gains, consistent with insights from prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kahneman et al. 1982).

We are unable to detect spillover political participation effects into the broader Latino community as a result of negative change in the immigration policy context whether in terms of social benefits or linguistic facilitation. This suggests that policy spillover effects may diminish as we move further out from the direct targets. Alternatively, it is possible that spillover effects in terms of political participation may be policy specific. The main changes to social welfare policy as it relates to non-citizens took place in the 1990s. The residual changes that took place between 2005 and 2012 may not have received sufficient media and interest group attention to produce a mobilization effect in the broader community. Certainly, extant findings discuss mobilization effects of threat in the context of substantial public and media attention (e.g., Prop. 187; HR 4437) (Ramirez 2013; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Pantoja et al. 2001). Consequently, it may be the case that future research will detect policy feedback effects among the broader Latinos community when taking into account immigration enforcement or labor policies which were central to the agenda in the 2000s.

Conclusion

In his ecological model of human development, psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner (1979) argued that human behavior is shaped by the interaction of the individual with her social and political environment. People receive cues that influence their behavior and attitudes not only from proximal sources such as the family, friends, and co-workers, but also from the macro-social context that is the political and policy environment within which they live (Filindra et al. 2011). Formal rules that target groups on the basis of their immigration status or their culture can have important effects on political behavior and attitudes. They can modify the material base of individuals, families, and entire communities increasing the cost of political engagement. The context of reception can also emit signals of welcome or exclusion that can have profound effects on social identities and how people understand their place in the community.

The policy feedback literature has generally focused on the direct material effects of policies on client groups. The political implications are tied to a rational calculus that explains political participation as a response to impending losses or desired gains. Our work shows that policy feedback effects, whether positive or negative, can spillover to kinship communities such as families and co-ethnic groups. The material effects of policy seem to be the most impactful in terms of political participation effects. However, the symbolic or psychological pathways that link policy to political behavior are equally important though more challenging to pin down. New data both qualitative and quantitative are needed to help us understand the complex relationship between policy and behavior as mediated by psychological factors such as emotions, attitudes, and affect.




Figure 2. Dimensions of Immigrant Integration Policies


Language	Rights		
		Inclusive <i>Index 1</i>	Exclusive <i>Index 2</i>
	High Facilitation <i>Index 3</i>	Highest level of integration	(unlikely)
	Low Facilitation <i>Index 4</i>		Lowest level of integration

Table 1 – The moderating effect of integration policy change on immigrant-native gaps in political attitudes and behavior

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
	Governor approval	Voter registration	Voting
Immigrant background (ref.cat.: natives [third generation+])	0.06*** (0.01)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.03)
Inclusive language policy change (ILP)	0.02*** (0.00)	-0.01+ (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)
Exclusionary language policy change (ELP)	-0.35*** (0.04)	0.01 (0.07)	0.02 (0.1)
Inclusive social benefits change (ISBP)	-0.02*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Exclusionary social benefits change (ESBP)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
<i>Individual controls</i>	✓	✓	✓
<i>State FEs</i>	✓	✓	✓
<i>Year FEs</i>	✓	✓	✓
Immigrant * ILP	0.01** (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Immigrant * ELP	-0.09 (0.11)	0.04 (0.17)	0.17 (0.18)
Immigrant * ISBP	0.03** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Immigrant * ESBP	-0.02*** (0.00)	0.02** (0.01)	0.01+ (0.00)
Constant	0.27*** (0.05)	0.68*** (0.08)	-0.49*** (0.10)
Observations	134,002	140,110	93,997
AIC	181232	42944	52562


Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Logistic regression (log-odds, standard errors clustered by state in parentheses). Year and state fixed effects included. Individual controls omitted to save space include age, gender, race, education, employment, marital status, family income, homeownership, as well as political ideology and party identification. The immigrant dummy in model 1 comprises immigrant citizens and non-citizens, whereas in voting models 2 and 3 it includes only immigrant citizens.

Figure 3 – Predicted probability plots for government approval



Notes: Predicted probability plots based on Model 1 in Table 1 (significant immigrant*policy change interactions only).

Figure 4 – Predicted probability plots for voter registration and voting



Notes: Predicted probability plots based on Models 2 and 3 in Table 1 (significant immigrant*policy change interactions only).

Table 2 – The moderating effect of integration policy change on Latino-White gaps in political attitudes and behavior

	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
	Governor approval	Voter registration	Voting
Latino (ref.cat: White)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.14)
Inclusive language policy change (ILP)	0.02 (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)
Restrictive language policy change (RLP)	-0.37*** (0.05)	-0.01 (0.1)	0.02 (0.10)
Inclusive social benefits change (ISP)	-0.04*** (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Restrictive social benefits change (RSP)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.01* (0.0)	0.00 (0.00)
<i>Individual controls</i>	✓	✓	✓
<i>State FEs</i>	✓	✓	✓
<i>Year FEs</i>	✓	✓	✓
Latinos * ILP	0.01** (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Latino * RLP	-0.03 (0.15)	0.04 (0.2)	0.05 (0.26)
Latino * ISP	0.12*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Latino * RSP	-0.04*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Constant	0.36*** (0.05)	0.60*** (0.08)	-0.52*** (0.11)
Observations	113426	118019	80893
AIC	152596	35605	43480

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Logistic regression (log-odds, standard errors clustered by state in parentheses). Year and state fixed effects included. Individual controls omitted to save space include age, gender, race, education, employment, marital status, family income, homeownership, as well as political ideology and party identification. Models 2 and 3 are restricted to citizens.

Appendix

Appendix A1 – Respondents per state and nativity status

	"First generation" (noncitizens in parentheses)	"Second generation"	"Third generation plus"
Alabama	70 (18)	76	2204
Alaska	16 (2)	28	384
Arizona	238 (41)	449	3978
Arkansas	45 (15)	66	1626
California	1852 (410)	2916	12374
Colorado	141 (25)	208	2780
Connecticut	147 (38)	279	1678
Delaware	27 (5)	54	592
District of Columbia	24 (11)	35	251
Florida	1582 (298)	1448	9443
Georgia	338 (76)	334	4876
Hawaii	48 (10)	66	444
Idaho	33 (8)	72	988
Illinois	432 (86)	662	6087
Indiana	105 (25)	153	3669
Iowa	61 (14)	60	1853
Kansas	63 (13)	78	1915
Kentucky	58 (14)	79	2354
Louisiana	64 (12)	75	1924
Maine	25 (8)	86	1078
Maryland	233 (54)	272	2798
Massachusetts	240 (57)	451	2743
Michigan	209 (40)	410	5601
Minnesota	133 (36)	156	3017
Mississippi	27 (6)	29	1219
Missouri	106 (21)	147	3751
Montana	16 (3)	52	705
Nebraska	35 (9)	54	1243
Nevada	130 (28)	210	1757
New Hampshire	29 (6)	80	1002
New Jersey	507 (82)	642	3618
New Mexico	46 (10)	104	1249
New York	1036 (209)	1417	7201
North Carolina	239 (64)	256	4816
North Dakota	14 (7)	27	382
Ohio	240 (46)	366	6713
Oklahoma	59 (11)	62	1814
Oregon	137 (24)	292	2955
Pennsylvania	309 (59)	525	7494
Rhode Island	34 (9)	75	598
South Carolina	93 (20)	119	2386
South Dakota	6 (1)	18	531
Tennessee	99 (16)	118	3227
Texas	878 (205)	1089	10311
Utah	83 (20)	123	1465
Vermont	12 (3)	47	422
Virginia	286 (61)	329	4083
Washington	264 (75)	397	4109
West Virginia	20 (4)	28	1173
Wisconsin	116 (18)	211	3636

Wyoming	9 (3)	31	349
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Note: CCES data from 2006, 2008, 2012 and 2014.

Appendix A2 – codebook CCES

Variable	Summary statistics	Operationalization/source*
<i>Dependent variables</i>		
Governor approval	Share (strongly or somewhat approve): 52%	Dummy: 1 = strongly or somewhat approve, 0 = strongly or somewhat disapprove
Voter registration	Share (registered to vote): 92%	Dummy: 1 = registered to vote, 0 = not registered to vote
Vote	Share (voted): 87%	Dummy: 1 = voted, 0 = did not vote in most recent election
<i>Individual covariates</i>		
Immigrant	Shares All immigrants: 15% 1 st generation: 6% 2 nd generation: 9%	Dummy: 1 = immigrant background, 0 = native since three generations or longer
Noncitizen	Share (noncit.): 1%	Dummy: 1 = citizen, 0 = noncitizen
Age	Mean: 49.9 SD: 16.2 Min.: 18 Max: 100	Age (in years) of respondent
Gender	Share (Male): 47%	Dummy: 1 = male, 0 = female
Race	Shares White: 76% Black: 11% Hispanic: 7% Asian: 2% Other: 4%	5 categories
Education	Shares Primary education: 3% Secondary education: 55% Tertiary education: 42%	Highest completed level of education, 3 categories: (1) no or primary education; (2) secondary education; (3) tertiary education
Employment	Shares	4 categories

	Full-time: 41%	
	Part-time: 10%	
	Unemployed: 7%	
	Other: 42%	
Marital status	<i>Shares</i>	5 categories
	Married: 58%	
	Domestic partnership: 4%	
	Separated/divorced: 13%	
	Single: 20%	
	Widowed: 5%	
Family income	Mean: 6.2	12 categories, numerical order :
	SD: 3.1	1) less than \$10,000
	Min.: 1	2) \$10,000 - \$19,999
	Max.: 12	3) \$20,000 - \$29,999
		4) \$30,000 - \$39,999
		5) \$40,000 - \$49,999
		6) \$50,000 - \$59,999
		7) \$60,000 - \$69,999
		8) \$70,000 - \$79,999
		9) \$80,000 - \$99,999
		10) \$100,000 - \$119,999
		11) \$120,000 - \$149,999
		12) \$150,000 or more
Homeowner	<i>Shares</i>	3 categories
	Own: 68%	
	Rent: 28%	
	Other: 4%	
Political ideology	<i>Shares</i>	5 categories
	Very liberal: 9%	
	Liberal: 18%	
	Moderate: 35%	
	Conservative: 26%	
	Very conservative: 12%	
Party identification	<i>Shares</i>	7 categories
	Strong democrat: 24%	
	Not very strong dem.: 12%	
	Lean dem.: 11%	
	Independent: 13%	
	Lean republican: 11%	
	Not very strong rep.: 10%	

Strong rep.: 19%

*State covariates***

Organizat. density	Mean: 1.4 SD: 2.2 Min.: 0.11 Max.: 37.8	Number of 501(c)3 organizations in a state per 1000 residents Sources: National Center for Charitable Statistics, Population Division of the US Census Bureau, own calculation
% unemployed	Mean: 6.9 SD: 2.1 Min.: 2.6 Max.: 13	Average unemployment rate per state (in %) Source: UKCPR National Welfare Data
% urban	Mean: 79.6 SD: 12.1 Min.: 38.2 Max.: 100	Share of population living in an urban area (in %) Source: Decennial Census, U.S. Census Bureau
% Bachelor degree or higher	Mean: 28.4 SD: 4.5 Min.: 15.1 Max.: 55.1	Share of the population over 25 years with bachelor's degree or higher (in %)
% foreign born	Mean: 12.2 SD: 7.6 Min.: 1.2 Max.: 27.4	Share of foreign born immigrants (in %) Source: American Community Survey
% Hispanics	Mean: SD: 12.3 Min.: Max.:	Share of Hispanics (in %) Source: American Community Survey
% Black	Mean: 15.1 SD: 12.3 Min.: 0.5 Max.: 47.3	Share of African Americans (in %) Source: United States Census Bureau
GDP	Mean: 48635 SD: 9651 Min.: 28348 Max.: 178660	Gross domestic product per capita (in USD) Source: UKCPR National Welfare Data
Democratic governor	<i>Share (dem. gov.):</i> 45.9%	Dummy: 1 = Democrat, 0 = Republican Source: UKCPR National Welfare Data
Democrats in Senate	Mean: 0.47 SD: 0.15	Fraction of the State Senate that is Democrat Source: UKCPR National Welfare Data

	Min.: 0.13 Max.: 0.96	
Democrats in House	Mean: 0.49 SD: 0.14 Min.: 0.13 Max.: 0.92	Fraction of the State House that is Democrat Source: UKCPR National Welfare Data
Education spending	Mean: 2662 SD: 434 Min.: 1744 Max.: 4986	Local and State education spending (in USD) per capita Source: US Government Spending
Welfare spending	Mean: 730 SD: 321 Min.: 267 Max.: 2959	Local and State welfare spending in \$ per capita Source: US Government Spending
Protection spending	Mean: 678 SD: 179 Min.: 327 Max.: 1849	Local and State protection spending in \$ per capita Source: US Government Spending

* All individual variables stem from the Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES) 2006, 2008, 2012 and 2014

** For robustness check in Appendix A5

Appendix A3 – Four policy change indices (2005-2011) by state

	Language policy change			Social benefits policy change	
	Inclusive	Restrictive		Inclusive	Restrictive
Alabama	1	0	Alabama	3	10
Alaska	0	0	Alaska	0	0
Arizona	0	0	Arizona	0	11
Arkansas	0	0	Arkansas	0	0
California	9	0	California	1	2
Colorado	1	0	Colorado	3	8
Connecticut	0	0	Connecticut	0	0
Delaware	0	0	Delaware	0	0
District of Columbia	0	0	District of Columbia	0	0
Florida	1	0	Florida	0	0
Georgia	1	0	Georgia	6	12
Hawaii	0	0	Hawaii	0	0
Idaho	0	1	Idaho	0	3
Illinois	1	0	Illinois	2	0
Indiana	0	0	Indiana	0	9
Iowa	1	0	Iowa	0	0
Kansas	0	1	Kansas	0	0
Kentucky	0	0	Kentucky	0	0
Louisiana	3	0	Louisiana	0	0
Maine	0	0	Maine	0	0
Maryland	0	0	Maryland	2	4
Massachusetts	2	0	Massachusetts	0	0
Michigan	0	0	Michigan	0	0
Minnesota	0	0	Minnesota	0	0
Mississippi	1	0	Mississippi	0	0
Missouri	0	0	Missouri	0	0
Montana	0	0	Montana	2	0
Nebraska	1	0	Nebraska	1	4
Nevada	0	0	Nevada	0	0
New Hampshire	0	0	New Hampshire	0	0
New Jersey	2	0	New Jersey	0	0
New Mexico	0	0	New Mexico	0	0
New York	3	0	New York	0	0
North Carolina	1	0	North Carolina	3	0
North Dakota	0	0	North Dakota	1	1
Ohio	0	0	Ohio	0	0
Oklahoma	0	1	Oklahoma	0	0
Oregon	0	0	Oregon	0	0
Pennsylvania	0	0	Pennsylvania	0	7
Rhode Island	1	0	Rhode Island	0	0
South Carolina	1	0	South Carolina	3	9
South Dakota	0	0	South Dakota	0	0
Tennessee	1	0	Tennessee	0	8
Texas	6	0	Texas	0	5
Utah	1	0	Utah	0	2
Vermont	4	0	Vermont	1	0
Virginia	3	0	Virginia	0	0

Washington	2	0	Washington	2	0
West Virginia	0	0	West Virginia	0	0
Wisconsin	1	0	Wisconsin	0	0
Wyoming	0	0	Wyoming	0	0
<i>Min.</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>Min.</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>
<i>Max.</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>Max.</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>12</i>

Appendix A4 – Four policy indices and their measurement

<i>Language policy</i>		<i>Social benefits policy</i>	
<i>Inclusive</i>	<i>Restrictive</i>	<i>Inclusive</i>	<i>Restrictive</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requirement of state agencies to provide foreign language information on websites • Requirement of provision of services or information in the person's language • Establishment of Office for New Americans • Provision of funding for non-profits working with non-English speaking populations • Allowance of exams in other languages • Provision for court translators/interpreters • Provision for translators/interpreters for other essential services (e.g., hospitals) • Appropriate funding for translators/interpreters • Increase in funding for translators/interpreters • Establishment of right to interpreting services in court • Creation of program for citizenship/naturalization services • Requirement that voting materials be available in foreign languages • No requirement of English proficiency for social services, healthcare, or housing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • English as official language of the state • Requirement for jurors to be citizens • Requirement of English fluency for benefits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LPRs eligible for TANF • Expansion of LPR eligibility for TANF • Refugee/asylees eligible for TANF • Non-citizen victims of domestic abuse or human trafficking eligible for TANF • LPRs eligible for General Assistance • Expansion of LPR eligibility for General Assistance • Refugee/asylees eligible for General Assistance • Non-citizen victims of domestic abuse or human trafficking eligible for General Assistance • Inclusion of TPs, PRUCOL, and other categories of legal residents in TANF • LPRs eligible for Food Stamps (SNAP) • Expansion of LPR eligibility for Food Stamps (SNAP) • Undocumented eligible for Food Stamps (SNAP) • Refugee/asylees eligible for Food Stamps (SNAP) • Expansion of refugee/asylee eligibility for Food Stamps (SNAP) • Non-citizen victims of domestic abuse or human trafficking eligible for Food Stamps (SNAP) • LPRs eligible for unemployment assistance • Undocumented eligible for unemployment assistance • LPRs eligible for disability benefits • Expansion of LPR eligibility for disability benefits • Refugee/asylees eligible for disability benefits • LPRs eligible for pensions • Refugee/asylees eligible for pensions • No requirement of state identification for disaster relief assistance • No requirement of state identification for public health assistance for immunizations • No requirement of state identification for community-based food assistance (e.g., soup kitchens) • Requirement that only the immigrant's income be used in determining an immigrant's eligibility for benefits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requirement that state agencies collect data and report on the number of ineligible non-citizens applying for benefits • Requirement that state agencies collect data and report on the number of LPRs/refugees applying for benefits • Restriction of LPR eligibility for TANF • Restriction of undocumented eligibility for TANF • Requirement of verification of status for TANF • Restriction of LPR eligibility for General Assistance • Exclusion of LPRs in the 5 year gap from general Assistance • Restriction of undocumented eligibility for General Assistance • Requirement of verification of status for General Assistance • Restriction of LPR eligibility for Food Stamps (SNAP) • Restriction of undocumented eligibility for Food Stamps (SNAP) • Requirement of verification of status for food stamps • Restriction of LPR eligibility for unemployment assistance • Restriction of undocumented eligibility for unemployment assistance • Requirement of verification of status for unemployment assistance • Restriction of LPR eligibility for disability benefits • Restriction of undocumented eligibility for disability benefits • Restriction of refugee/asylee eligibility for disability benefits • Requirement of verification of status for disability benefits • Restriction of LPR eligibility for pensions • Restriction of undocumented eligibility for pensions • Discussion of SAVE program • Requirement that eligibility for benefits be verified through use of SAVE • Imposition of new identification requirements for social/health benefits • Search for implementation of new identification requirements for social/health benefits • Imposition of criminal penalties for obtaining social services for unqualified individuals • Requirement that the sponsor's income be included in determination of an immigrant's eligibility for benefits • Requirement that state agencies/service providers turn over undocumented immigrant applicants to federal authorities

Notes: Indices extracted from database constructed by Filindra and Pearson-Merkowitz (2016)

Appendix A5 – Robustness check I: State control variables instead of fixed effects

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
	Governor approval	Voter registration	Voting
Immigrant background (ref.cat.: natives [third generation+])	0.06*** (0.01)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.02)
Inclusive language policy change (ILP)	0.02*** (0.00)	-0.01+ (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Exclusionary language policy change (ELP)	-0.17*** (0.03)	0.10* (0.5)	-0.12* (0.05)
Inclusive social benefits change (ISBP)	-0.02*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)***
Exclusionary social benefits change (ESBP)	0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
<i>Individual controls</i>	✓	✓	✓
<i>Year FEs</i>	✓	✓	✓
State controls			
Organizational density	0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
% unemployed	-0.11*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
% urban	-0.01*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
% Bachelor degree or higher	-0.01*** (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)
% foreign born	0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01+ (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
% Hispanic	0.01*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
% Black	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
GDP	0.1*** (0.00)	0.01+ (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Democratic governor	0.12*** (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)
Democrats in Senate	-0.55*** (0.05)	-0.16+ (0.10)	0.06 (0.09)
Democrats in House	0.72*** (0.06)	0.29* (0.12)	0.10 (0.13)
Education spending	0.01+ (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)
Welfare spending	0.01***	0.00	0.00

	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Protection spending	0.01***	0.01*	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Immigrant * ILP	0.01**	0.0	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Immigrant * ELP	-0.09	0.03	0.17
	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Immigrant * ISBP	0.03***	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Immigrant * ESBP	-0.02***	0.02**	0.01+
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Constant	0.89***	0.70***	-0.43***
	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Observations	133,028	138,806	93,027
AIC	181482	42721	52238

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Logistic regression (log-odds, standard errors clustered by state in parentheses). Year fixed effects included. Individual controls omitted to save space include age, gender, race, education, employment, marital status, family income, homeownership, as well as political ideology and party identification. The immigrant dummy in model 1 comprises immigrant citizens and non-citizens, whereas in voting models 2 and 3 it includes only immigrant citizens.

Appendix A6 – Robustness check II: noncitizens versus citizens

	Governor approval
Noncitizen (ref.cat.: citizen)	0.13*** (0.05)
Inclusive language policy change (ILP)	0.02*** (0.00)
Exclusionary language policy change (ELP)	-0.35*** (0.04)
Inclusive social benefits change (ISBP)	-0.02*** (0.01)
Exclusionary social benefits change (ESBP)	-0.01*** (0.00)
<i>Individual controls</i>	✓
<i>State FEs</i>	✓
<i>Year FEs</i>	✓
Noncitizen * ILP	0.01 (0.01)
Noncitizen * ELP	0.09 (0.40)
Noncitizen * ISBP	0.06+ (0.04)
Noncitizen * ESBP	-0.02 (0.01)
Constant	0.27*** (0.05)
Observations	134,002
AIC	181269

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Logistic regression (log-odds, standard errors clustered by state in parentheses). Year and state Sharefixed effects included. Individual controls omitted to save space include age, gender, race, education, employment, marital status, family income, homeownership, as well as political ideology and party identification. Since voting and voter registration require citizenship status, we can only run the governor approval model for noncitizens.

Appendix A7 – Robustness check III: second-generation immigrants versus natives

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
	Governor approval	Voter registration	Voting
2 nd gen. (ref.cat.: native)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Inclusive language policy change (ILP)	0.02*** (0.00)	-0.01+ (0.01)	-0.01+ (0.01)
Exclusionary language policy change (ELP)	-0.35*** (0.04)	0.02 (0.08)	0.03 (0.10)
Inclusive social benefits change (ISBP)	-0.02*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Exclusionary social benefits change (ESBP)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
<i>Individual controls</i>	✓	✓	✓
<i>State FEs</i>	✓	✓	✓
<i>Year FEs</i>	✓	✓	✓
2 nd gen. * ILP	0.02*** (0.00)	0.0 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
2 nd gen. * ELP	-0.10 (0.14)	0.20 (0.25)	0.12 (0.23)
2 nd gen. * ISBP	0.05*** (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
2 nd gen. * ESBP	-0.02*** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Constant	0.24*** (0.05)	0.71*** (0.08)	-0.46*** (0.10)
Observations	126,096	133,249	89,833
AIC	170448	39365	49250

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Logistic regression (log-odds, standard errors clustered by state in parentheses). Year and state fixed effects included. Individual controls omitted to save space include age, gender, race, education, employment, marital status, family income, homeownership, as well as political ideology and party identification. First generation immigrants omitted.

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