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Do we need multiple questions to capture feeling threatened by immigrants?

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ABSTRACT

Across Europe some individuals observe immigration with unease and feel threatened by immigrants. Most relevant surveys ask about ‘immigrants’ in the generic sense, but some differentiate between specific immigrant groups. This article uses 24 questions on potential neighbours to systematically vary the characteristics of immigrants in a representative survey in Switzerland, 2013. Respondents systematically consider immigrants from distant cultures and those more likely to receive welfare benefits as more threatening. At the same time, those who feel threatened by one kind of immigrants also tend to feel threatened by others: We can validly express opposition to immigrants in a single dimension. Questions about immigrants in the generic sense likely capture the right correlates, but they may miss differences in the level of threat evoked by different immigrants.

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It has become cliché to open articles on immigration referring to the increasing number and diversity of immigrants. Some individuals observe these changes with unease, have negative attitudes about immigrants, and feel threatened by the presence of them. Numerous articles have examined who among the population most likely opposes immigrants and immigration (see Pettigrew 2016; or Pottie-Sherman and Wilkes 2017 for recent reviews). Most survey-based research on this topic, however, relies on questions about ‘immigrants’ in the generic sense (Timberlake et al. 2015; Turper et al. 2014). A common question is: ‘Do you think the number of immigrants to [country] nowadays should be [increased/decreased]?’. This article demonstrates that people react differently to different immigrants: Culturally distant immigrants and those seen as potential burdens to the welfare state evoke more threat. At the same time, I show that responses to different immigrants correlate highly: Research on attitudes to immigrants in the generic sense is viable, including research combining variables into scales, although it may miss differences in the extent of threat evoked.

Scholars have long studied intergroup relations, particularly regarding ethnic and racial groups (Pettigrew 2016). Studies highlight relations between groups, perceived hierarchies of groups, and stereotyping especially of out-groups. In recent years, responses to

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immigrants and immigration are increasingly studied, including in Europe (Lahav 1997; Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013), where the difference between the 'native' or '*autochthonous*' population and immigrants is salient and politicized (Van der Brug et al. 2015). Perceived threat constitutes a core mechanism in the literature on attitudes to immigrants and ethnic/racial out-groups: Intergroup relations are depicted as a zero-sum game, where different groups compete over limited resources. The presence of immigrants is seen as a threat, and this perception of threat translates into antagonistic responses such as negative attitudes to immigrants or votes for anti-immigrant parties (Heath et al. 2019). We can distinguish economic and cultural threat (McLaren 2003) – immigrants seen as unwanted competitors in the labour market or a burden to the welfare system on the one hand (known as 'realistic threat', Bobo and Hutchings 1996), or immigrants as undermining cultural traditions and values on the other hand (known as 'symbolic threat', Manevska and Achterberg 2013). In both cases, individuals may feel threatened directly (individual threat), or perceive society at large being threatened (collective threat).

Research has paid less attention to the reactions different kinds of immigrants evoke. Many studies make the assumption that a larger share of immigrants means greater perceived threat, but supposedly groups competing 'more' in this purported zero-sum game evoke greater threat (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010): groups with similar labour-market positions (Pecoraro and Ruedin 2019). Yet, studies often make no distinction between immigrant groups and combine questions in scales (de Rooij, Goodwin, and Pickup 2018). Asking questions about 'immigrants' in a generic and undifferentiated way may mask differences because respondents distinguish between immigrant groups (Ford and Mellon 2019; Jungkunz, Helbling, and Schwemmer 2019; Valentino et al. 2017), and exclusionary attitudes can be directed at specific racial and ethnic groups (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009). Indeed, attitudes to immigrants from rich and poor countries differ – and vary with average economic threat (Gorodzeisky 2011). Consequently, some studies consider the share of immigrants from richer or poorer countries or from predominantly Muslim countries as predictor variables for attitudes or support for the far right (Baur, Green, and Helbling 2016; Heizmann 2016). For instance, Kustov (2019) draws on regional variation in the immigrant population in Spain to demonstrate that aggregated attitudes are more negative in areas with more immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries and immigrants from less developed countries. By contrast, there is the argument that individual-level attitudes to immigrants are driven by a generalized predisposition to think in terms of in-groups and out-groups (Kinder and Kam 2009; see also work by Schwartz et al. 2014 on basic personal values). This leaves researchers on attitudes unclear whether they need to differentiate immigrant groups in their studies: whether one or many questions are needed.

This article uses a representative sample from Switzerland, 2013, to show that some immigrants systematically evoke more threat than others. Reactions to internal migrants and international immigrants from neighbouring countries are largely indistinguishable, but the population tends to perceive culturally distant immigrants and those more likely to rely on the welfare state as more threatening. Put differently, reactions to immigrants vary according to cultural and economic reasoning: ethno-racial profiling and fear of the cost of immigration. At the same time, I show that responses to different immigrants correlate highly, and research on attitudes to immigrants in the generic sense is viable to identify which members of the majority population feel most threatened by immigrants, as far as this is meaningful and relevant. This means that research on 'immigrants' in a

generic sense and research using scales to combine different questions remains valid, although important nuances may be missed.

Threat evoked by immigrants: one or many questions?

We can expect different responses to different immigrants – and thus a need for multiple questions –, because not all immigrants compete equally with the native population, and because perceived threat and competition can work through economic and cultural channels. Economic threat locates the source of negative responses in unwanted economic competition over scarce resources such as jobs, accommodation, or welfare benefits (Borjas 1999; Polavieja 2016). Accordingly, members of the majority population oppose immigrants in an attempt to maintain a certain living standard and prevent the negative consequences of labour-force competition like lower wages and the risk of unemployment. Put differently, the emotional response can be understood as a by-product of economic competition more generally, and we can postulate that members of the majority population perceive as more threatening immigrants who compete more directly with them. Within the economic channel, researchers frequently highlight the impact of immigrants on the welfare state: Where the number of welfare recipients increases, either tax burdens increase – which would make high earners react more –, or welfare provisions are cut so that individual recipients receive less – which would make low earners react more (Jaime-Castillo, Marqués-Perales, and Álvarez-Gálvez 2015; Schmidt-Catran and Spies 2016). In both cases, we can expect greater perceived threat from immigrants who are more likely to receive welfare benefits. These perceptions are affected by considerations of deservingness: the view that as non-citizens who have not contributed to the welfare system (they have not paid in much), immigrants do not deserve support (Ford 2016). Immigrants are seen as ‘taking out’ of the system more than they deserve (see van Oorschot 2000 for a discussion of perceived deservingness), which puts the entire welfare system at risk. Past receipt of welfare benefits is a clear signal that a person likely needs assistance in the future. We can also argue that low-skilled workers are at greater risk of welfare in times when low-skilled and unskilled jobs are cut.

Cultural threat constitutes a second dimension, focusing on values, religion, traditions, national identity, or the particular way ‘things are done’ in a place. For instance, McLaren and Johnson (2007) describe views that Muslim immigrants in Britain are less attached to the country and do not share British customs. Researchers tend to assume that more immigrants (of a certain kind) lead to stronger negative reactions, although this assumption is contested (see Pottie-Sherman and Wilkes 2017 for a review). Empirically, differentiating economic from cultural threat can be difficult: Low-skilled immigrants may also be opposed because they tend to come from countries seen as culturally distant. Factors like language, values, religion, but also visible markers such as skin colour and dress can act as signals of cultural distance (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; see also Ebner and Helbling 2016; Fetzer 2013). Groups perceived as different more generally evoke discomfort and feelings of threat, at least initially (Allport 1954; DeSipio 2012). Fetzer (2000) uses media reports to demonstrate that cultural distance has historically been associated with threat and opposition. The presence of immigrants with different religion, values, and lifestyles can implicitly question and ostensibly threaten the local culture or way of life (Manevska and Achterberg 2013).

Two dimensions expectation: We can expect that respondents independently perceive as more threatening immigrants who are more likely to receive welfare benefits and those from countries with more distant cultures. It follows that at least two questions are needed to capture feelings of threat.

While existing studies do not vary the immigrant groups systematically to focus on economic and cultural threat, include only a few immigrant groups, or do not capture threats to the individual, several studies suggest that reactions across the population are similar (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Harell et al. 2012; Strabac and Listhaug 2008). Shaver et al. (2016) suggest that respondents may confound different immigrant groups, and many studies have validated the common approach of combining responses to similar questions about different kinds of immigrants into scales (e.g. Bahry 2016; Davidov et al. 2014; Weber 2015). Using data from the European Social Survey 2008, Meeusen and Kern (2016) identified a common (general) prejudice component that unites cultural and economic concerns.

Indeed, there is no contradiction to emphasize the presence of two channels – economic and cultural (e.g. Gorodzeisky 2011; Hellwig and Sinno 2017) – and high correlations between questions. Such results suggest that some individuals react more to immigrants than others, but most members of the majority population tend to react in relation to both channels rather than privileging say ethno-racial profiling or fear of economic costs. This is different from Raijman and Semyonov (2004) who, in the case of the attitudes Israeli Jews and Arabs have towards immigrants, suggest that the two groups in society may oppose immigrant workers for somewhat different reasons. Here, I focus on reactions of the majority population, and we can expect high correlations – especially if collective evaluations are dominant as suggested by Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015).

Single dimension expectation: We can expect that economic and cultural threat affect all members of the majority population, and thus that we find high correlations between questions on different immigrants. It follows that a single question can capture feelings of threat.

The implication for researchers is, that if attitudes to different immigrants can be summarized into a single dimension, and if the correlates for different immigrants are substantively the same, research on ‘immigrants’ in a generic sense remains valid – irrespective of possible differences in which immigrants evoke more threat. The evidence in existing studies is mixed, but they do not directly address whether one or two (multiple) dimensions should be used.

To start with, only a few studies have included evaluations of more than one immigrant group. Timberlake et al. (2015) use a split-ballot survey design to highlight that stereotypes affect the assessment of some immigrant groups but not of others, but did not explore the nature of the economic and cultural channels. Ford (2011) used nationality to capture cultural distance in Britain, but failed to take into consideration different skill levels. This is also the case in Gorodzeisky (2011) where reactions to immigrants from poorer and richer European countries are differentiated – other studies tend to combine these two questions in analysis. Gorodzeisky indicates different reactions depending on the economic situation of the country of the respondent. Neither Gorodzeisky nor Ford differentiate cultural and economic differences systematically: While their evidence is convincing, they do not account for the fact that culturally similar immigrants – from other European countries, or in Ford’s example white Australians – tend to work in

higher-skilled jobs than immigrants from culturally distant countries. More recently, Ford and Mellon (2019) used a Europe-wide survey experiment using functionally equivalent immigrant groups in each country. They suggest that economic differences matter more than cultural differences – in their case non-European immigrants.

Other experimental research comes to conclusion that highly skilled immigrants are preferred across the population (e.g. Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Naumann and Stoetzer 2018; Valentino et al. 2017). Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015) capture reactions to five different immigrant groups. They find that the same immigrants are preferred across the population, and interpret this as evidence for collective threat: People do not feel threatened as individuals, but are afraid of the negative impact of immigration on their society. Contrary to the questions used in this article, Hainmueller and Hopkins asked whether the different immigrant groups should be admitted to the country, a question which is poorly suited to capture individual threat perceptions because respondents can oppose immigrants for many reasons. This is also the case for Harell et al. (2012) who used a similar research design and asked whether the immigrants should be given a work permit or citizenship – two decisions that unlikely affect the respondents directly or invoke threat.¹

Other studies rely on an indirect description of immigrants. For instance, Hellwig and Sinno (2017) cover economic and cultural difference by asking reactions to Muslim immigrants and Eastern European immigrants in Britain. While their survey experiment indicates an intriguing trade-off between the two, their analysis hinges on the assumption that Eastern European immigrants are perceived as economic competitors but not as culturally different. Similarly, some researchers compare reactions to immigrants – without further information – with responses to say Muslim immigrants (see Shaver et al. 2016; Strabac, Aalberg, and Valenta 2014; Strabac and Listhaug 2008 for studies implementing such a design). A challenge for such studies is that the amount of information provided about immigrants affects the way they are evaluated and what stereotypes respondents have about immigrants (Lee and Fiske 2006): The observed differences may be due to the amount of information provided rather than different evaluations. These studies that include multiple immigrant groups tend to skip considerations whether differentiating groups is necessary to understand perceptions of threat.

Methods & data

To ascertain that cultural distance and skills are differentiated, the survey used in this article presents a range of specific immigrants where the economic and cultural dimensions are systematically varied in 24 questions. I systematically vary skills, previous receipt of welfare, and cultural distance in realistic vignettes. Three of the questions concern internal migrants; as far as I could determine, only de Rooij, Goodwin, and Pickup (2018) explicitly consider that members of the majority population can evoke feelings of threat. The inclusion of immigrants from other cantons helps distinguish reactions to newcomers from reactions to foreign citizens. The question also serves as a baseline to compare reactions to other immigrants against. Cultural distance constitutes a major channel proposed in the literature, and is captured via nationality: Immigrants can come from another canton of Switzerland, another Western European country (low cultural distance), or from predominantly Muslim countries in South-Eastern Europe (high

cultural distance). Similar distinctions are commonplace across the Western world (Strabac, Aalberg, and Valenta 2014). With explicit variation in skills, the article also accounts for the second channel proposed in the literature. Using a vignette design, question order is fully randomized, which reduces the impact of priming while a large sample is retained. Unemployment for the groups considered is low, although for some groups of foreign nationals it can be substantially larger than for the majority population. While low-skilled workers are more likely among immigrants from South-Eastern Europe, all scenarios provided are realistic (Piguet 2013).

This article uses a representative survey on how concerned or threatened respondents feel about different immigrants in Switzerland.² It was carried out by *gfs.Zürich* in May 2013 using telephone interviews of individuals eligible to vote: Swiss citizens aged 18 or over ($N = 1008$, AAPOR Response Rate 3 of 23.8%).³ The canton of Ticino was not covered for reasons of research economy (4.2% of the population); for age and sex, random quotas were used. Switzerland is a country with a high proportion of immigrants among the population and immigration is highly politicized: asylum seekers and recently 'Muslim' immigrants like in other European countries, but also the number of immigrants and their integration into the mainstream society (Ruedin, Alberti, and D'Amato 2015). Existing literature on attitudes to immigrants suggests that Switzerland is comparable to other countries in Western Europe, and by implication of Ruedin (2019) apparently beyond the Western world. With 26%, the share of foreign citizens among the permanent population is among the highest in the world, and immigrants can be found across the country, with no clear territorial clustering beyond the commonly found larger share in urban centres. The immigrant population is diverse, with the largest groups from neighbouring countries as well as Southern and South-Eastern European countries due to former guest-worked agreements (Zufferey, Steiner, and Ruedin 2020, see Appendix 1 for a list of the main nationalities). Studies on attitudes to immigrants in Switzerland highlight both economic and cultural factors, with a focus on the individual characteristics that shape attitudes to immigrants and related trust, and how these interact with contextual variables (Davidov et al. 2014; Freitag and Rapp 2015; Green, Fasel, and Sarrasin 2010; Green et al. 2015; Pecoraro and Ruedin 2016). There is no evidence that attitudes to immigrants have changed substantially in the wake of the 'refugee crisis' of 2015. Contrary to the present study, existing work in Switzerland does not take into consideration that immigrants are proportionally over-represented at both the low-skilled and the high-skilled ends of the labour market, which makes identifying economic versus cultural concerns difficult.

The survey was designed to capture reactions to different kinds of immigrants. It systematically varies characteristics in 24 separate vignettes. Three vignettes on migrants from a neighbouring canton are included to cover so-called internal migrants. The strength of this survey is that many kinds of different immigrants are covered and that the questions are specific, relating to realistic events and specific kinds of immigrants rather than referring to generic groups that can be ambiguous (Blinder 2015; Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Timberlake et al. 2015). At its core, the survey uses a classic question from social psychology that asks what groups of people respondents would not like to have as neighbours, capturing the concern and threat that different immigrants evoke at an individual level. The question is adapted in two forms to ask about different kinds of immigrants in realistic vignettes and to cover threat by a wide range of immigrants. One variant asks about a family moving to the neighbourhood, the other variant

asks about individuals sitting next to the respondents on the bus (a common situation in Switzerland; see [Appendix 2](#) for full question wordings and descriptive statistics). The question on the bus was necessary to ask about immigrants who are unlikely neighbours, such as tourists from various countries. In line with most research on attitudes to immigrants, immigrants and children of immigrants are not explicitly differentiated. Studies on discrimination in the Swiss labour market suggest that children of immigrants are not perceived much differently from their parents (Zschirnt 2019).

For both question variants a range of different immigrants are offered as potential neighbours, with carefully chosen characteristics to isolate relevant influences that shape perceptions of threat. Respondents were asked to express *how concerned or threatened* they feel about each potential immigrant on a scale 1–10. This leads to a more fine-grained picture than is possible with, for example, the World Value Survey where the response variable is binary for each group asked and the groups offered are not chosen systematically. To capture cultural distance, the survey draws on nationality and contrasts countries from predominantly Christian Western Europe with predominantly Muslim countries from South-Eastern Europe. Other questions draw on countries from Asia (Japan, Vietnam, and India) and Africa (Ghana) to capture ethno-racial difference. A question each explicitly tests for both the headscarf as a marker of religious and cultural difference, and dark skin as a marker of racial difference. To capture potential burden to the welfare state, the questions systematically specify the skill level of the immigrants – making the explicit assumption that in the current economic climate low-skilled immigrants are more likely to depend on welfare benefits than highly-skilled immigrants. At the same time, previous receipt of welfare benefits is systematically included as a clear signal of being a potential burden to the welfare state.

The responses are skewed, with 33% of respondents indicating that to them none of the immigrants presented is threatening (see Wright, Levy, and Citrin 2015 for a description of this phenomenon, reporting 40% in their case). I suspect that this is partly due to heightened sensitivity to the topic at the time of data collection, because the political debate related to the popular initiative on the automatic expulsion of criminal foreigners in Switzerland was in full swing. In this context, self-monitoring tendencies may lead to a larger number of socially desirable responses. Since the endpoints in the questions are not anchored, I do not attempt to interpret the responses in absolute terms. This is also done in light of findings by Iyengar et al. (2013) that respondents react more negatively to generic groups than to individuals or specific immigrant groups. However, because I anticipated social desirability, I included an additional question on a Roma beggar to check that the instrument works. Indeed, the mean response to the Roma beggar indicates three times as much threat than for internal immigrants, or twice as much as a family from South-Eastern Europe who previously drew social benefits.

The analytical strategy is two-fold. First, I use the answers to the 24 questions as predictors with perceived threat as the outcome. The response to each question constitutes an answer, clustered within individuals. Whether the threat is economic or cultural in nature is derived from the description of the immigrants in the question. I also present models with control variables for the respondents: once for education (typical number of years, treated as continuous), self-monitoring ('I try to approach others without prejudice, because this is important to me personally', 5-point scale treated as continuous), and age, and once additionally for fearful personality (10-point scale, treated as continuous), anti-immigrant

ideology (based on closest party, using expert positions Ruedin (2013)), gender, and whether the respondent is active in the labour market. These variables constitute alternative explanations and may influence how the outcome variable is understood by the respondents. Second, I use factor analysis to show that these different reactions capture the same construct: Reactions to one kind of immigrants are related to reactions to others. I further demonstrate that the same correlates are substantively important in multivariate regression analysis for different immigrants, and in scales averaging across questions, suggesting that analyses on ‘immigrants’ in the generic sense are valid. For the regressions models, I use the R package brms as a frontend to Stan (Buerkner 2017; Carpenter et al. 2017). The default broad priors are regularizing but uninformative.

Findings: more threat with perceived cultural distance and welfare cost

If we can identify two distinct channels for threat, we possibly need multiple questions. Consistent with this, immigrants with greater cultural distance and at higher risk of drawing social benefits are perceived as more threatening than other immigrants. A set of nine questions on immigrants as potential neighbours is used to capture the level of perceived threat as cultural distance and risk of welfare receipt are varied. Figure 1 gives the coefficients and 95% credibility intervals of two regression models with the level of threat as the outcome variable. The first model (in black) includes the different neighbours. The second model (in dark grey) includes all control variables (see Appendix 4 for full tables, including alternative models). To vary cultural distance, immigrants either




Figure 1. Threat evoked by different immigrants as potential neighbours. Notes: outcome variable: threat (‘Tell me how concerned or threatened you feel’); default linear Gaussian model; reference: Swiss, highly skilled; point estimates $\pm 95\%$ credibility intervals; grey model includes individual-level controls; $N = 1008$, data: gfs/swissstaffing 2013.

come from a neighbouring canton (internal migrants), from Western Europe, or from predominantly Muslim South-Eastern Europe (SEE). We can observe more perceived threat as we move towards greater cultural distance (vertically, towards the bottom in [Figure 1](#)). In all cases, immigrants from South-Eastern Europe are perceived as more threatening than the other immigrants. By contrast, responses evoked by internal migrants and immigrants from Western European countries are similar, suggesting that cultural distance rather than foreign nationality leads to threat. The coefficients for low-skilled internal migrants and low-skilled immigrants from Western Europe are substantively indistinguishable.

To vary the risk of drawing social benefits, previous experience of receiving social benefits and low skill levels signal an increased risk of drawing social benefits. The instances of previous welfare benefits were set to medium skills to allow a comparison to the 'average' person without previous welfare benefits. In all cases, respondents perceive highly skilled immigrants as less threatening than immigrants with low skills (within each of the three groups, compare Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Helbling and Kriesi 2014; Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013), but the differences are substantially small. By contrast, the threat evoked by previous welfare benefit – a clearer signal of being a potential burden to the welfare system – is substantively larger for all groups considered. This is in line with Hjorth (2016) who found greater opposition to immigrants with more children, which he interpreted as greater collective economic threat (see also Iyengar et al. 2013). We also note that while the difference between internal migrants and immigrants from Western Europe is negligible for highly skilled and low skilled migrants, immigrants from Western Europe who have received benefits in the past evoke substantively more threat than internal migrants.

Cultural distance appears to be dominant, with highly skilled immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries in South-Eastern Europe seen as more threatening than any group of Western European immigrants, even those Western European immigrants who have received welfare benefits in the past. This clear role of cultural difference contradicts Strabac, Aalberg, and Valenta (2014) who report no difference in attitudes between 'immigrants' in general and 'Muslim immigrants'. Here I use questions on specific immigrants to ensure that respondents have comparable images in mind, something not assured when asking about broad groups like immigrants in general. The results also contradict Iyengar et al. (2013) and Turper et al. (2014) who found cultural differences to be less important than skill levels, but it is uncertain whether their respondents became aware of their subtle cultural manipulation. By contrast, the results are in line with studies using groups that are readily comparable: Hjorth (2016) who found greater opposition to Bulgarian immigrants than Dutch immigrants in Sweden, and Creighton and Jamal (2015) who used an experimental approach to establish greater opposition to Muslim immigrants than to Christian immigrants in the US. Similarly, Shaver et al. (2016) report more negative reactions to Muslims and Arabs than to 'immigrants' in New Zealand.

Using a series of 15 questions on immigrants sitting next to the respondents on the bus, the picture can be refined – potentially identifying additional channels and a need for further questions to measure threat adequately ([Figure 2](#)). Here the relative placement of coefficients is of interest. There is tentative evidence that lack of cultural distance leads to greater threat when applied to foreigners (compare Adida 2011). Among immigrant businessmen, it is cross-border workers who are perceived as most threatening: a population largely indistinguishable from the resident population regarding language,




Figure 2. Threat evoked by different immigrants on the bus. Notes: outcome variable: threat ('Tell me how concerned or threatened you feel'), default linear Gaussian model, reference: businessman from Western Europe; point estimates $\pm 95\%$ credibility intervals; grey model includes individual-level controls; $N = 1008$, data: gfs/swissstaffing 2013.

looks, or commuting distance. The mean threat level for a businessman who is evidently a cross-border worker is higher than for businessmen from Western Europe or Asia. If anything, the response to cross-border workers is more positive in the areas heavily affected than in the areas where cross-border workers are uncommon (see [Appendix 5](#) for a map). This may indicate that collective threat perceptions are captured rather than individual threat through increased competition (compare [Pettigrew 2016](#)), or that collective threat perceptions at the national level are stronger than those at the regional level.

Using questions on tourists it can be ascertained that cultural distance is not just an expression of coming from a predominantly Muslim country. The threat evoked by a tourist from Western Europe is lower than that by a tourist from Asia. For tourists economic competition can be ruled out as the mechanism, important because we often struggle to disentangle cultural from economic reasons, given that immigrants from more distant cultures tend to have lower education and skills ([Turper et al. 2014](#)). Comparing job-seekers from India with those from South-Eastern Europe underscores that respondents react to politicized cultural distance (Islam, 'otherness'; see [Berkhout and Ruedin 2017](#) on the politicization of Muslims) rather than geographical distance and cultural difference as such: A job-seeker from geographically distant India is perceived as less threatening than a job-seeker from a predominantly Muslim country in South-Eastern Europe.

Greater threat is associated with differences in language, skin colour, and cultural markers. Beginning with language, a craftsman speaking the local language brokenly is perceived as less threatening than one speaking a language that cannot be understood.

This suggests that efforts to become part of society are met with more positive reactions (see also Hopkins 2015 on the importance of accents). The broken language skills seem to signal an effort on part of the immigrant (Goldstein and Stecklov 2016). Such an effort is impossible for skin colour: Immigrants with dark skin evoke similar responses to immigrants with a headscarf as a cultural marker, perhaps slightly less negative. By contrast, the response to job-seekers from Africa may be slightly more negative than that to a job-seeker from predominantly Muslim South-Eastern Europe. Both kinds of difference – skin colour, headscarf – seem to be used to draw boundaries and evoke some degree of threat. By contrast, citizenship seems unimportant when it comes to reactions to immigrants. Respondents generally do not perceive immigrants from Western Europe as threatening: be this as tourists, job-seekers, or businessmen. This is also true for the countries that traditionally supply most low-skilled workers to Switzerland – Italy and Portugal – where the reported threat is indistinguishable from low-skilled internal migrants reported in the context of Figure 1.

Responses to different immigrant groups can be combined

While clear differences in the responses to different immigrants exist, we can combine the responses. Individuals who feel threatened by one kind of immigrant tend to feel threatened by other immigrants (Sniderman et al. 2002): The same immigrants tend to evoke threat across the majority population. Conceptually, we can address this as a question of data reduction (principal component analysis) or identifying the number of dimensions in the data (exploratory factor analysis). In either case, the 24 questions used in this article constitute a reliable scale (adjusted Cronbach $\alpha = 0.96$), as do the 9 questions on neighbours ($\alpha = 0.92$), and the 15 questions on the bus taken separately ($\alpha = 0.95$). A single factor seems to suffice to capture which immigrants are perceived as threatening, even when we include a wide range of different immigrants. Table 1 shows the factor loadings of an exploratory factor analysis with one factor extracted: They are all clearly above the common threshold of 0.4 used to determine that a particular question relates to the underlying factor (James et al. 2013). Given that all factor loadings are high, a single factor seems to be enough to summarize the questions. With this conclusion that one factor can reasonably summarize the different dimensions, factor solutions with more than one dimension are explicitly not precluded – depending on the fit statistic and research question such solutions may be slightly better fits (with the data at hand, the lowest RMSEA was achieved with a 3-factor solution, where the questions on the bus, questions on neighbours, and neighbours from South-Eastern Europe are differentiated).⁴ Without clear theoretical indications to the contrary, however, the single factor solution provides a valid and readily interpretable interpretation. The conclusion that a single factor suffices also follows the

Table 1. Factor loadings of an exploratory factor analysis.

N1	N2	N3	N4	N5	N6	N7	N8	N9						
0.59	0.64	0.54	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.70						
B1	B2	B3	B4	B5	B6	B7	B8	B9	B10	B11	B12	B13	B14	B15
0.71	0.69	0.75	0.79	0.65	0.79	0.82	0.81	0.72	0.80	0.65	0.79	0.77	0.71	0.47

Notes: Given are the factor loadings of the 24 questions on neighbours with a single factor extracted. Refer to Appendix A1 for full variable descriptions.

high Cronbach α , which suggest redundancy in the scales. This is the case, even though with categorical data treated as continuous, we often overestimate the number of factors (van der Eijk and Rose 2015). Using a principal component analysis with a single factor extracted, the minimum factor loading is 0.55, suggesting that the questions can be reduced to a single scale. The Very Simple Structure (VSS) criterion achieves a maximum with one factor (Revelle 2017), both suggesting that the different questions capture the same underlying construct.

In a final step, I use a series of multiple regression analyses to demonstrate that the correlates for attitudes to different immigrants are generally substantively the same. This implies that a single question can adequately capture the threat immigrants evoke. To do so, I use regression models with the same predictor variables, but vary the outcome variable across models. This way we can examine whether the same predictor variables tend to be associated with attitudes to immigrants. As a reference model, all 24 questions are combined into an additive scale, and then I run the same model with each of the immigrants separately. The additive scale and a scale based on factor loadings correlate at $r = 0.999$. Because a third of respondents reported no threat at all, I use zero-inflated negative binomial models (ZINB) after recoding the scale to start at zero, both for the scale and the individual outcome variables. In the first stage, the models predict reporting any threat at all, using self-controlling tendencies as the predictor. In the second stage, the models predict threat with the following variables: education, self-controlling, age, being of a fearful tendency, political ideology, gender, and being active in the labour market. Across all outcome variables, individuals with a fearful disposition report greater threat irrespective of the particular kind of immigrant or whether questions on different immigrants are combined (see Appendix 4, which also includes OLS models with the same substantive results). In the data at hand, people with conservative political views have consistently more negative views about all immigrants, as do older people in almost all instances. Typically, higher levels of education come with less perceived threat, but as with the labour market status, we observe substantive uncertainty around these estimates, and they credibly could include zero. We find no evidence that respondents with low levels of education would feel particularly threatened by low-skilled immigrants.

Yet, the multiple regression analyses also demonstrate that there are subtle differences regarding self-monitoring tendencies as a correlate. Generally, people who are self-monitors state that they feel less threatened by immigrants, even after taking into consideration the association between self-monitoring and reporting any threat at all in the first stage of the models. The coefficient, however, is notably smaller for some immigrants: low-skilled immigrants and job-seekers from a neighbouring country (B10), businessmen (B1, B2), and immigrants from Italy and Portugal (B14, B15) where many guest-workers were recruited in the past. In sum, correlates for different immigrants tend to resemble one another, although when we consider specific immigrants rather than combining questions, social desirability around stereotypes may influence the results. Given that such stereotypes likely vary across time and countries, we need to interpret carefully comparisons across time and space, especially when we examine attitudes to specific immigrants. At the same time, analyses about 'immigrants' in the generic sense are valid in the sense that they identify who feels more threatened by different kinds of immigrants.

Discussion and conclusion

This article examined whether we need multiple questions to adequately capture if respondents feel threatened by immigrants. To do so, it looked at which kinds of immigrants are perceived as more threatening than others, but also highlighted that studies capturing attitudes to immigrants in a generic (or aggregated) sense correctly identify who feels most threatened by immigrants and opposes them. By using a fine-grained approach, I could demonstrate that reactions to different immigrants vary systematically. Immigrants with greater cultural distance and at risk of receiving welfare benefits are more likely to evoke threat. In the survey, reactions to internal migrants and immigrants from other Western European countries are largely indistinguishable – as long as they have not previously received social benefits. The increased mobility within the European Union and associated countries was largely seen positively by the majority population at the time of the survey (compare Fetzer 2013).

The analysis suggests that it is often warranted and valid to measure reactions to immigration with generic questions on ‘immigration’ and ‘immigrants’ using a single question, or aggregating questions on different immigrant groups – as is commonly done. A fine-grained approach focusing on specific groups is not required *if* we are primarily interested who is likely to respond negatively to immigrants. Although immigrants who are culturally distant and those likely to be a burden to the welfare state evoke more threat, empirically the responses are all linked. This indicates that measured attitudes do not simply reflect social desirability (compare An 2015): Depending on the research application, the common approach of combining survey questions on different kinds of immigrant groups is justified.

For other research questions, we require multiple questions to tease out subtle differences in attitudes. For instance, more than one question is required to demonstrate that perceptions of threat can work through (at least) two channels – economic and cultural concerns –, even though the responses to these channels correlate. In line with much recent literature, I have shown that collective concerns about the economic impact of immigration on society and the welfare state in particular can yield negative reactions (compare Pettigrew 2016). With previous receipt of welfare benefits as a signal, we can observe more negative responses. At the same time, cultural distance is also associated with negative responses, in line with Turper et al. (2014) who noted that economic characteristics are important alongside non-economic or cultural ones (see also Pecoraro and Ruedin 2019; Polavieja 2016). Ford and Mellon (2019) report that the preference for highly skilled immigrants trumps cultural difference, but they do not go as far as some other recent contributions that seem to suggest that economic factors were largely irrelevant (e.g. Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Margalit 2015). While this article demonstrates that both economic and cultural factors correlate with attitudes to immigrants, it explicitly does not try to identify the relative importance of these factors: On the one hand, it is conceivable that other factors also influence opposition to immigrants, on the other hand, Hellwig and Sinno (2017) demonstrate that cultural and economic differences can be dynamic and vary according to the framing of the context, implicitly questioning whether such a comparison is meaningful (see also Lahav and Courtemanche 2012).

Immigration seems to be an important source for identification: against the ‘other’. Rather than immigrants as such, boundaries seem to focus on immigrants from cultures

perceived as distant, notably Islam (Berkhout and Ruedin 2017; Helbling 2014; Savelkoul et al. 2011). Yet, we also observe negative reactions to cross-border workers where lack of cultural distance and national boundaries coincide. Contrary to what Zárate et al. (2004) argue, I do not find that all kinds of minor cultural distance lead to negative reactions: Internal migrants are not perceived as threatening, despite a question that highlighted difference ('from a neighbouring canton') over national unity. More work in this direction is needed to better understand how the absence of cultural distance can shape attitudes (Adida 2011).

A drawback of generic and aggregated questions on 'immigrants' is that we are unable to ascertain what exactly we are measuring: We do not know whom respondents have in mind when answering questions about 'immigrants'. Blinder (2015) and Blinder and Allen (2016) suggest that the immigrants survey respondents have in mind are those I have shown here to evoke greater levels of threat: immigrants from different cultures, and those more likely to pose a burden on the welfare state. It follows that generic questions may overestimate the actual opposition to immigration and perceived threat, but the extent to which they do will depend on current political debates, question wordings, and the politicization of immigrant groups, all of which can influence the salience of specific immigrant groups (Lahav and Courtemanche 2012). For instance, despite constituting the largest immigrant group in Western European countries, immigrants from other Western European countries are not generally politicized (Fetzer 2013; Van der Brug et al. 2015). This makes responses more difficult to compare across contexts, and questions of measurement invariance all the more important (Davidov, Schmidt, and Billiet 2010). Put differently, we should be careful to interpret differences in the level of threat and negative attitudes across time and space, and with generic questions on 'immigrants' we risk over-estimating negative reactions to immigrants and immigration.

To conclude, on the one hand we observe systematic differences in responses to different immigrants, suggesting that for some research applications more than one question is necessary to capture the threat evoked by immigrants. Both cultural and economic characteristics of immigrants can increase threat perceptions and negative attitudes: Immigrants from more distant cultures and those more likely to pose a burden on the welfare state evoke more threat. On the other hand, we can combine questions on different immigrants into a single dimension, and the correlates of the threat evoked by different immigrants tend to be the same. This means that for many other research applications – particularly if we are interested in who in the population feels more threatened or has more negative attitudes – we can validly combine different questions, use single questions, and draw on abstract questions on 'immigrants' in general.

Notes

1. A different line of research is traced by the many field experiments on ethnic discrimination (see Zschirnt and Ruedin 2016 for a review). Here reactions to different immigrant groups are compared, but by design the mechanisms behind these reactions remain unknown.
2. I will make available the data to other researchers upon publication along with replication material, <https://osf.io/bnftz/>.
3. In Switzerland, citizenship is not automatically obtained at birth, and there are strict cultural requirements for naturalization.

4. The 2-factor solution differentiates between the 'bus' and 'neighbour' questions, not cultural and economic channels.

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Appendices

Appendix 1. Main immigrant groups in Switzerland

Table A1. Main immigrant groups in Switzerland.

Country of origin	Share of foreign population	Context of arrival
Italy	15.4%	guest-workers in post-War period
Germany	15.1%	substantial increase after establishment of free movement in 2008
Portugal	13.1%	substantial increase after establishment of free movement in 2008; many low-skilled workers
Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia)	14.2% (4.7% Serbia, 4.5% Kosovo, 3.2% North Macedonia)	guest-workers in post-War period, refugees because of the Yugoslav Wars (particularly 1992–5, 1999)
France	5.7%	increase after establishment of free movement in 2008; cross-border workers
Spain	3.7%	guest-workers in post-War period
Turkey	3.6%	guest-workers in post-War period

Data: BFS STATPOP (je-d-01.02.04.07); Foreign population as of 2013; numbers for Serbia include individuals from Yugoslavia who cannot be attributed to a specific successor state in the data.

Appendix 2. Question wording and descriptive statistics

Introduction to the survey: ‘We are conducting a short survey on sympathies and fears of the population in relation to people from their neighbourhood or from more distant areas’.

Question block on neighbours: ‘Suppose in your neighbourhood an apartment becomes vacant. In what follows, several families are mentioned as possible neighbours. Tell me for each family how concerned or threatened you feel. [10 represents a major threat, 5–6 is a medium-sized threat and 1 means no or almost no threat. With the numbers in between you can grade your answers.]’

Question block on bus: ‘Imagine you take the bus and someone sits down next to you. In what follows, different people are mentioned. Tell me for each person how concerned or threatened you feel’.

Years of education: compulsory school not completed \equiv 7 years; compulsory school, elementary vocational training \equiv 9 years; general training school, apprenticeship, full-time vocational school, maturity (high school) \equiv 12 years; technical or vocational school; higher vocational college \equiv 15 years; university \equiv 18 years.

Self-monitoring: ‘I try to approach others without prejudice, because this is important to me personally’. [strongly agree / agree to / neither / disagree / strongly disagree].

Gender: male (reference), female.

Ideology: ‘Which party corresponds most – in its objectives and demands – with your own views and wishes?’ On the basis of the party mentioned, the party positions on immigration and integration were allocated, using values from CHES 2011.

Appendix 3. Immigrant groups and mean threat

Table A2. Immigrant groups and mean threat.

	Group	Mean threat	St Dev
N1	a family from a neighbouring canton, occupation: architect	1.27	0.92
N2	a family from a neighbouring canton, occupation: cleaner	1.39	1.03
N3	a family from a neighbouring canton, occupation medical staff, in the past received welfare benefits	1.61	1.35
N4	a family from Denmark, occupation IT specialist	1.35	0.98
N5	a family from Austria, occupation: lorry driver	1.41	1.06
N6	a family from France, occupation: office worker, in the past received welfare benefits	1.79	1.56
N7	a family from Albania, occupation: chemical engineer	2.15	1.92
N8	a family from Turkey, occupation: kitchen aid	2.21	1.86
N9	a family from Kosovo, occupation: works at the local administration, in the past received welfare benefits	2.51	2.18
B1	a businessman from Belgium	1.34	0.97
B2	a businessman from Japan	1.38	1.00
B3	a businessman who is obviously a cross-border commuter	1.57	1.38
B4	a craftsman who speaks broken German	1.68	1.27
B5	a craftsman who speaks a language you cannot understand	1.94	1.70
B6	a tourist from the Netherlands	1.29	0.88
B7	a tourist from Vietnam	1.60	1.37
B8	a young man from Turkey, obviously looking for work	2.05	1.81
B9	a young man from India, obviously looking for work	1.84	1.60
B10	a young man from Austria, obviously looking for work	1.39	0.98
B11	a young man from Ghana, obviously looking for work	2.15	1.92
B12	a woman wearing a headscarf	2.05	1.98
B13	a person with dark skin	1.92	1.67
B14	a person from Portugal	1.45	1.11
B15	a person from Italy	1.39	1.04
B16	a Roma beggar [female]	3.77	2.76

'Tell me how concerned or threatened you feel'. Data: gfs/swissstaffing 2013.

Appendix 4: Regression tables

Table A3. Full model, neighbours.

	Estimate	1 – 95% CI	1 + 95% CI
Intercept	1.10	0.34	1.84
Swiss, high skills (reference)	.	.	.
Swiss, low skills	0.11	–0.02	0.24
Swiss, benefits	0.36	0.23	0.48
Western Europe, high skills	0.08	–0.05	0.21
Western Europe, low skills	0.16	0.04	0.29
Western Europe, benefits	0.54	0.41	0.67
South-Eastern Europe, high skills	0.94	0.81	1.07
South-Eastern Europe, low skills	1.08	0.96	1.21
South-Eastern Europe, benefits	1.33	1.21	1.46
Years of education [7–18]	–0.02	–0.06	0.01
Self-monitoring [1–5]	–0.23	–0.33	–0.13
Age [18–95]	0.01	0.01	0.02
Fearful personality [1–10]	0.16	0.11	0.20
Right-wing ideology [0–10]	0.06	0.04	0.08
Female	0.05	–0.12	0.22
Active in labour market	0.02	–0.17	0.20

Notes: outcome variable: threat ('Tell me how concerned or threatened you feel'), default linear Gaussian model, 95% credibility intervals; data: gfs/swissstaffing 2013.

Table A4. Full model, bus.

	Estimate	1 – 95% CI	1 + 95% CI
Intercept	1.28	0.59	1.97
Businessman, Western Europe (reference)	.	.	.
Businessman, Far East	0.05	–0.05	0.16
Businessman, cross-border worker	0.24	0.13	0.34
Craftsman, broken German	0.39	0.29	0.50
Craftsman, incomprehensible	0.60	0.50	0.71
Tourist, Western Europe	–0.02	–0.13	0.09
Tourist, South East Asia	0.25	0.13	0.35
Jobseeker, South-Eastern Europe	0.75	0.64	0.86
Jobseeker, India	0.53	0.42	0.63
Jobseeker, Western Europe	0.11	0.01	0.22
Jobseeker, Africa	0.90	0.80	1.01
Headscarf	0.80	0.69	0.90
Dark skin	0.64	0.53	0.75
Person from Portugal	0.12	0.01	0.22
Person from Italy	0.09	–0.02	0.20
Years of education [7–18]	–0.02	–0.05	0.01
Self-monitoring [1–5]	–0.20	–0.30	–0.11
Age [18–95]	0.01	0.00	0.01
Fearful personality [1–10]	0.14	0.10	0.19
Right-wing ideology [0–10]	0.06	0.04	0.08
Female	0.13	–0.03	0.29
Active in labour market	–0.05	–0.23	0.12

Notes: outcome variable: threat ('Tell me how concerned or threatened you feel'), default linear Gaussian model, 95% credibility intervals; *N* = 1008, data: gfs/swissstaffing 2013.

Appendix 5: Map of threat by cross-border worker




Figure A1. Mean threat from cross-border worker.

Notes: the canton of Ticino (white, southeast) is not included in the data. The mean threat in the cantons most affected by cross-border workers (Geneva, Jura, Basel, along the Western border) is 1.38, compared to the mean for all other cantons at 1.57. Data = gfs/swissstaffing 2013, *N* = 1008.

Appendix 6: Multiple regression models

Table A5a. Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) regression model, neighbours.

	Combined	N4	N5	N6	N7	N8	N9
Years of education [7–18]	–0.045	<i>–0.056</i>	<i>0.016</i>	<i>–0.018</i>	–0.041	<i>0.001</i>	–0.030
Self-monitoring [1–5]	–0.161	<i>0.001</i>	<i>0.058</i>	–0.163	–0.158	–0.102	<i>–0.044</i>
Age [18–95]	0.011	0.018	0.014	0.013	0.008	0.011	0.013

Notes: outcome variables given in the column heading (refer to Table A1), threat ('Tell me how concerned or threatened you feel'); self-monitoring was used to predict whether any threat is reported in stage 1 because many respondents reported no threat at all (zero inflation); 'combined' refers to all question (neighbours, bus) combined; constant not reported, the 95% confidence interval of coefficients given in italics includes 0, $N = 1008$. data: gfs/swissstaffing 2013.

Table A5b. OLS regression model, neighbours.

	Combined	N4	N5	N6	N7	N8	N9
Years of education [7–18]	–0.764	–0.022	<i>0.005</i>	<i>–0.020</i>	–0.056	<i>–0.024</i>	–0.064
Self-monitoring [1–5]	–5.550	–0.090	–0.069	–0.358	–0.369	–0.359	–0.440
Age [18–95]	0.203	0.006	0.005	0.012	0.010	0.013	0.022

Notes: outcome variables given in the column heading (refer to Table A1), threat ('Tell me how concerned or threatened you feel'); 'combined' refers to all question (neighbours, bus) combined; constant not reported, the 95% confidence interval of coefficients given in italics includes 0, $N = 1008$. data: gfs/swissstaffing 2013.

Table A6a. Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) regression model, bus.

	Combined	B1	B2	B3	B4	B5	B6	B7	B8
Years of education [7–18]	–0.045	<i>–0.054</i>	–0.102	–0.090	–0.040	–0.046	<i>–0.041</i>	–0.099	–0.038
Self-monitoring [1–5]	–0.161	<i>0.063</i>	<i>–0.032</i>	<i>0.002</i>	–0.168	–0.119	<i>–0.187</i>	–0.145	–0.153
Age [18–95]	0.011	0.011	0.013	0.014	0.006	0.011	<i>0.006</i>	0.008	0.009
	Combined	B9	B10	B11	B12	B13	B14	B15	
Years of education [7–18]	–0.045	<i>–0.034</i>	<i>–0.013</i>	<i>–0.011</i>	–0.060	–0.045	–0.067	–0.061	
Self-monitoring [1–5]	–0.161	–0.175	–0.199	–0.114	–0.097	–0.188	<i>–0.040</i>	–0.122	
Age [18–95]	0.011	0.011	0.011	0.012	0.013	0.005	0.015	0.011	

Notes: outcome variables given in the column heading (refer to Table A1), threat ('Tell me how concerned or threatened you feel'); self-monitoring was used to predict whether any threat is reported in stage 1; combined refers to all question (neighbours, bus) combined; constant not reported, the 95% confidence interval of coefficients given in italics includes 0, $N = 1008$, data: gfs/swissstaffing 2013.

Table 6b. OLS regression model, bus.

	Combined	B1	B2	B3	B4	B5	B6	B7	B8
Years of education [7–18]	–0.428	<i>–0.019</i>	–0.038	<i>–0.044</i>	–0.034	–0.040	<i>–0.011</i>	–0.055	–0.059
Self-monitoring [1–5]	–4.973	–0.084	–0.102	–0.135	–0.204	–0.316	–0.122	–0.209	–0.451
Age [18–95]	0.241	0.003	0.006	0.008	0.004	0.011	<i>0.002</i>	0.007	0.011
	Combined	B9	B10	B11	B12	B13	B14	B15	
Years of education [7–18]	–0.428	–0.045	<i>–0.009</i>	<i>–0.022</i>	–0.081	–0.046	–0.032	–0.023	
Self-monitoring [1–5]	–4.973	–0.325	–0.138	–0.384	–0.424	–0.403	–0.113	–0.168	
Age [18–95]	0.241	0.013	0.005	0.016	0.015	<i>0.005</i>	0.007	0.005	

Notes: outcome variables given in the column heading (refer to Table A1), threat ('Tell me how concerned or threatened you feel'); combined refers to all question (neighbours, bus) combined; constant not reported, the 95% confidence interval of coefficients given in italics includes 0, $N = 1008$, data: gfs/swissstaffing 2013.

Table A7. Extended Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) regression models, neighbours.

	Combined	N4	N5	N6	N7	N8	N9
Years of education [7–18]	<i>-0.035</i>	<i>-0.066</i>	<i>0.010</i>	<i>-0.005</i>	<i>-0.040</i>	<i>0.020</i>	<i>-0.028</i>
Self-monitoring [1–5]	<i>-0.078</i>	<i>0.103</i>	<i>0.336</i>	<i>-0.089</i>	<i>-0.015</i>	<i>-0.052</i>	<i>0.021</i>
Age [18–95]	<i>0.014</i>	<i>0.025</i>	<i>0.027</i>	<i>0.016</i>	<i>0.008</i>	<i>0.011</i>	<i>0.012</i>
Fearful personality [1–10]	<i>0.172</i>	<i>0.199</i>	<i>0.126</i>	<i>0.132</i>	<i>0.129</i>	<i>0.112</i>	<i>0.070</i>
Right-wing ideology [0–10]	<i>0.072</i>	<i>0.043</i>	<i>0.101</i>	<i>0.074</i>	<i>0.088</i>	<i>0.064</i>	<i>0.069</i>
Female	<i>0.057</i>	<i>-0.073</i>	<i>0.320</i>	<i>0.033</i>	<i>-0.018</i>	<i>0.196</i>	<i>0.113</i>
Active in labour market	<i>-0.090</i>	<i>0.283</i>	<i>0.422</i>	<i>0.160</i>	<i>-0.288</i>	<i>-0.179</i>	<i>-0.119</i>

Notes: outcome variables given in the column heading (refer to Table A1), threat ('Tell me how concerned or threatened you feel'); self-monitoring was used to predict whether any threat is reported in stage 1; combined refers to all question (neighbours, bus) combined; constant not reported, the 95% confidence interval of coefficients given in italics includes 0, $N = 1008$, data: gfs/swissstaffing 2013.

Table A8. Extended Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) regression models, bus.

	Combined	B1	B2	B3	B4	B5	B6	B7	B8
Years of education [7–18]	<i>-0.035</i>	<i>0.004</i>	<i>-0.049</i>	<i>-0.044</i>	<i>-0.051</i>	<i>-0.051</i>	<i>-0.035</i>	<i>-0.090</i>	<i>-0.006</i>
Self-monitoring [1–5]	<i>-0.078</i>	<i>0.096</i>	<i>-0.088</i>	<i>0.155</i>	<i>-0.060</i>	<i>-0.083</i>	<i>-0.050</i>	<i>0.001</i>	<i>-0.032</i>
Age [18–95]	<i>0.014</i>	<i>0.017</i>	<i>0.018</i>	<i>0.010</i>	<i>0.006</i>	<i>0.016</i>	<i>0.003</i>	<i>0.016</i>	<i>0.006</i>
Fearful personality [1–10]	<i>0.172</i>	<i>0.262</i>	<i>0.249</i>	<i>0.092</i>	<i>0.128</i>	<i>0.154</i>	<i>0.155</i>	<i>0.254</i>	<i>0.112</i>
Right-wing ideology [0–10]	<i>0.072</i>	<i>0.082</i>	<i>0.105</i>	<i>0.105</i>	<i>0.061</i>	<i>0.081</i>	<i>0.082</i>	<i>0.063</i>	<i>0.081</i>
Female	<i>0.057</i>	<i>0.196</i>	<i>0.113</i>	<i>0.234</i>	<i>0.234</i>	<i>0.223</i>	<i>0.231</i>	<i>0.137</i>	<i>0.153</i>
Active in labour market	<i>-0.090</i>	<i>0.256</i>	<i>0.050</i>	<i>-0.129</i>	<i>-0.159</i>	<i>-0.092</i>	<i>-0.458</i>	<i>-0.167</i>	<i>-0.373</i>
	Combined	B9	B10	B11	B12	B13	B14	B15	
Years of education [7–18]	<i>-0.035</i>	<i>0.019</i>	<i>0.005</i>	<i>0.021</i>	<i>-0.043</i>	<i>-0.026</i>	<i>-0.004</i>	<i>0.017</i>	
Self-monitoring [1–5]	<i>-0.078</i>	<i>-0.013</i>	<i>-0.089</i>	<i>0.0001</i>	<i>-0.085</i>	<i>-0.051</i>	<i>-0.062</i>	<i>-0.0001</i>	
Age [18–95]	<i>0.014</i>	<i>0.013</i>	<i>0.012</i>	<i>0.014</i>	<i>0.012</i>	<i>0.008</i>	<i>0.015</i>	<i>0.008</i>	
Fearful personality [1–10]	<i>0.172</i>	<i>0.152</i>	<i>0.229</i>	<i>0.100</i>	<i>0.080</i>	<i>0.190</i>	<i>0.315</i>	<i>0.200</i>	
Right-wing ideology [0–10]	<i>0.072</i>	<i>0.062</i>	<i>0.074</i>	<i>0.082</i>	<i>0.110</i>	<i>0.093</i>	<i>0.141</i>	<i>0.160</i>	
Female	<i>0.057</i>	<i>0.285</i>	<i>-0.024</i>	<i>0.335</i>	<i>0.092</i>	<i>0.196</i>	<i>-0.185</i>	<i>-0.026</i>	
Active in labour market	<i>-0.090</i>	<i>-0.055</i>	<i>0.009</i>	<i>-0.066</i>	<i>-0.143</i>	<i>-0.368</i>	<i>-0.158</i>	<i>-0.197</i>	

Notes: outcome variables given in the column heading (refer to Table A1), threat ('Tell me how concerned or threatened you feel'); self-monitoring was used to predict whether any threat is reported in stage 1; combined refers to all question (neighbours, bus) combined; constant not reported, the 95% confidence interval of coefficients given in italics includes 0, $N = 1008$, data: gfs/swissstaffing 2013.