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## CHAPTER 26

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## AFFECTIVE SOCIAL LEARNING

*A Lens for Developing a Fuller Picture of  
Socialization Processes*

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FABRICE CLÉMENT AND DANIEL DUKES

### THE PERPETUATION OF CULTURAL FORMS

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C26.P1 SOCIOLOGY and anthropology owe their scientific legitimacy to the idea that certain entities that furnish our social environment exceed mere individual existences. Indeed, languages, laws, customs, and religions were there before we were born and, for the most part, will still be there after we die. At the same time, these entities, social and cultural in nature, need to be “taken up” by people of flesh and bone in order to be perpetuated. The question of cultural transmission is therefore absolutely central to social sciences, since it explains how it is possible for social entities to persist in time despite the inexorable loss of their individual, physical constituents. *Socialization* is the umbrella term that refers to the process by which new individuals—infants or immigrants for example—internalize the norms and ideologies of their increasingly familiar society.

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Strangely enough though, socialization is considered by most social scientists as a black box from which individuals progressively emerge to become full members of their group, community, society, or culture. On the one hand, sociologists and anthropologists detail the norms and values that characterize a culture; on the other hand, psychologists tend to focus on individual development of cognitive abilities, leaving aside the importance of the social context in individual maturation and adaptation to the specific form of life of their community. To fill this gap, we propose that affective processes play a crucial role in the transmission of culturally shared values. By detecting and interpreting others’ affective expressions, new members of any given social group are able to figure out what is “expected” from them.

## ~~BOURDIEU AND THE HABITUS~~

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Sociology is rich with statistical correlations demonstrating that individuals are profoundly marked not only by the socialization process itself, but by the specific cultural form that the socialization process takes (e.g., Bourdieu, 1979). One of the main factors involved is the parents' socioeconomic status (SES): for instance, the chances of a child doing well at school, attending a good college, and having a well-paid job depend largely on their parents' SES. Pierre Bourdieu was one of the first sociologists to propose an explanation of this *social reproduction* (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). According to Bourdieu, children growing up in upper-class families are immersed from a very young age in a universe where reading stories, expressing oneself with appropriate language, arguing, and being curious are all highly valued skills. This way of behaving and thinking, what Bourdieu called the *habitus*, is precisely what is expected of children when they begin formal education (Bourdieu, 1984). Those who have been *prepared* for school will do well: they already know how to *play the game* and, as such, their attitude is appreciated by the teachers, who cannot help but like them more than those who cannot stay in their place, distracted and undisciplined. Being comfortable and appreciated in the school environment, these players do well, get excellent grades, and are therefore highly motivated academically, leading them, on average, to successfully pursue their careers in academia and beyond.

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This process is not without ideological consequences. In the end, each of these players will have the feeling that they have earned their high salary and fulfilling way of life, winning the game through their own individual endeavors, and that while others had their chances, they gave them away. At least it could easily appear so. It is therefore important, not only for scientific reasons but also politically and morally, to understand how societies' ways of being, doing, thinking, and feeling come to be transmitted. In other words, if we collectively intend to give to everyone the same chances in life and avoid any latent form of inequality, it is crucial to identify the proximal mechanisms—to open the black box as it were—to explain the functional reproduction of any society (see Erickson & Cottingham, this volume).

## ~~IMITATING APPROPRIATE BEHAVIORS~~

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The question of imitation is hardly new and, in fact, was already present in the minds of two of the most influential founders of sociology. For Gabriel Tarde, cultural transmission was achieved by working through imitation (Tarde, 1903); for Emile Durkheim, it was through education (Durkheim, 1968). Both of them identified a valid but incomplete mechanism.

C26.P6 **Firstly**, it is of course true that humans are great imitators, a competence that has probably been selected because of the necessity for our species to acquire a very large number of *good tricks*, developed by others, in order to survive (Dennett, 1997; Henrich, 2017). Children not only imitate from a very early age (Meltzoff, 1985) but they also tend to overimitate a model when they do not understand the function of the observed behavior (Gergely et al., 2002). One of the most famous cases in the literature is the “Bobo doll” experiment conducted in the 1960s by Albert Bandura and his colleagues (Bandura et al., 1963). They showed that preschoolers who could observe an adult behaving aggressively toward a big doll mistreated the doll once left alone in the room with it. This experiment paved the way for research in social learning and showed that imitation can therefore explain how many social ways of behaving (walking, moving, speaking, etc.) are sustained over the generations through individual social members.

C26.P7 However, socialization cannot be entirely reduced to ways of behaving. In particular, social groups differentiate themselves by different systems of *values*: what is considered as important, worthy of interest, or indeed of sacrifice, can vary considerably in space and time. To explain such differences, Durkheim insisted on the role of formal education at school. For him, a sufficient degree of homogeneity is necessary for a society to survive and “education perpetuates and reinforces this homogeneity by fixing in the child from the beginning the essential similarities which collective life demands” (Durkheim, 1972, p.207).

C26.P8 Indeed, it is in accounts of the early immersion of an infant in a particular society’s system of values that some of the best explanations of the child’s subsequent behavior and cognition can be found. However, the nature of the psychological mechanisms that ensure that newcomers are able to figure out the values proper to a given culture are not well understood. It has been shown that infants are not born as a blank slate on which experiences inform all learning but, rather, that they are naturally endowed with competencies at (or closely following) birth in order to navigate their natural and social environment (e.g., Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994; Kaufmann & Clément, 2014). In the social domain, newborns demonstrate, for instance, a preference for faces (Johnson et al., 1991) and they even show a rudimentary form of gaze following (Farroni et al., 2004).

C26.P9 For cultural values, research in infancy has recently tended to focus on the active role of individual achievement as an explanation for socialization, and in particular on how an infant can improve their social skills in terms of recognizing other people’s emotions, socioemotional learning, and, for example, how it predicts early school success (Denham et al., 2014) or its link to prosocial behavior (Brownell, 2016; see Camras & Halberstadt, 2017, for an overview of affective social competence and socioemotional learning programs). Our suggestion is that affective processes play a crucial role in the transmission of culturally shared values (see Halberstadt et al., this volume). While Tarde and Durkheim focus either on implicit (imitative) or explicit (educative) explanations for the transmission of values, an encompassing model has to integrate the fact that one does not necessarily need imitation or direct education to acquire cultural values.

## THE AFFECTIVE SOCIAL LEARNING MODEL

Affective social learning (see Figure 26.1) is the name we have given to a process of social transmission of value—a process, we argue, that builds the bridge between the sociological focus on social structures and the more individualistic psychological approach of socialization. This socioaffective path of value transmission explains how the learner (an infant or out-group member, perhaps) can rely on someone else as a guide or model to what is relevant in the environment. In other words, the infant can use the other person as an exemplar of the group to gain knowledge about what counts as worthy, inspiring, awesome, frightening, or disgusting to the members of that group. In this way, an object that may have previously been ignored has become relevant to the child through their observations of the model (to whom they defer) and, in particular, that model's affective engagement with the object in question.


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### PEDAGOGY

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The affective social learning model proposes that the social transmission of values can follow four different paths, although these paths should be seen as points on a continuum rather than as entirely independent of one another. Our first focus of proximal mechanisms entails a form of social transmission that requires an intentional effort from the model; such explicit and conscious teaching is undoubtedly important to our species (see Figure 26.2). According to Gergely and Csibra (2009), we humans

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


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**FIGURE 26.1** The Relational Triangle of Affective Social Learning.

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**FIGURE 26.2** The Proximal Mechanisms of Socialization as Components and Dimensions of Affective Social Learning.

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are endowed with an innate ability to teach and be taught—a *natural pedagogy*. From the teacher’s perspective, this ability translates as a very specific way to communicate with a “learner.” For instance, adults tend to speak to a child in *motherese* or “baby talk”—a specific intonation with a higher and wider pitch, slower speech rate, and shorter utterance, that differentiates it from the speech used with adults (Fernald, 1985). Similarly, when showing an infant how to do something, adults tend to exaggerate their actions, highlighting the most relevant aspects of action sequences and attracting and maintaining the infant’s attention; this pattern of action has been called “*motionese*” (Brand et al., 2002). Even if *motherese* and *motionese* are produced in a nonconscious way by the model, driven by the pedagogical setting, pedagogy nevertheless requires the model to be conscious of the transmission procedure. On the one hand, the model needs to represent the state of knowledge they are trying to improve; on the other hand, they have to figure out the kinds of information susceptible to help the child to move forward (what Vygotsky called the “zone of proximal development”). Pedagogy is therefore cognitively quite complex to master and its usage seems to be restricted to our species.

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From the “learner’s” perspective, these expressive patterns also automatically trigger certain reactions. For instance, the higher pitch almost instantaneously attracts infants’ attention, who consequently start to watch more carefully what the model is doing/showing. Importantly, children consider what is shown to them in such a fashion as being *generalizable*. This has been demonstrated by Gergely and his colleagues (Egyed et al., 2013). When an experimenter addressed the infants with ostensive signals of communication before showing joy/interest or dislike/disgust for an object, children generalized the value of this object, handing the object that had been attended to with joy/interest to a second person when prompted to give them one of the two objects. Without any communicative signaling, infants offered the object significantly more often to the person that demonstrated their own interest for it, but not to a second person. It is as if, in the expressive-pattern condition, the infant learned that the object is “to be liked/interesting” as a general rule. In other words, from an early age, children

seem to be sensitive to cues signaling that the information given to them is relevant and that they can extend this newly acquired knowledge to other social contexts.

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A certain number of features about this pedagogical stance must be highlighted (Clément & Dukes, 2017). Firstly, this kind of transmission is guided by the model. Of course, the learner intends to obtain new information and can even ask questions to satisfy their curiosity; the model is nevertheless responsible for the transmission process to be successful. Secondly, pedagogy can be seen as a powerful way not only for helping the learners to memorize different sorts of cultural content, but also for them to become sensitive to what is *culturally relevant* for their caregivers. Indeed, as pedagogy requires time and effort from the model, this latter has to be motivated to continue their teaching. This condition is met when the model is aware that they are transmitting valuable skills and knowledge to the pupil. For example, by explaining, in detail and with patient enthusiasm, how to transfer one's body weight from one ski to the other in order to turn, parents simultaneously demonstrate that this activity is important for the members of their social group. Thirdly, to be effective, this transmission requires a sort of emotional engagement. People can try, because they think it could be an asset for their children, to teach them how important classical music is. However, if the models do not manifest a real interest for that music, it is more than probable that this lack of affective investment will be detected. It has been shown that interest can be detected by adults (Dukes et al., 2017), and it is more than likely that even infants, when observing, can feel if adults are truly interested or not. Without this genuine interest, we predict that it would be hard for children to endorse this activity as something that is truly valuable. Finally, the importance of pedagogy in what is considered as essential and valuable in a community is actually difficult to evaluate. Anthropologists and cultural psychologists have, for instance, described explicit acts of transmission as being rare in traditional societies (Rogoff, 1990). Therefore, to acquire a fuller picture of how culture is transferred from generation to generation, we need to consider the other proximal processes included in affective social learning.

## ~~BEYOND PEDAGOGY~~

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While the impact of others' emotional expressions is well demonstrated (even if not always entirely focused upon) in natural pedagogy, one of the main characteristics of pedagogical transfers is that they mostly rely on language. However, there are types of communication that do not require any linguistic exchange and that can nonetheless be very informative when evaluating aspects of our environment. As adherents of the appraisal theory of emotion insist, emotions are to some extent evaluations of our environment and of the objects that can be found there (Roseman, 1991, Scherer, 2009; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).

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When unsure or unable to evaluate a particular object (or event or person), perhaps because you are unfamiliar with it, or because it is partially occluded, it might be possible to use other people's emotional expressions to do the appraising for you. An expression of joy, awe, or interest indicates that a given object is relevant for that person in a particular way. Additionally, if this someone is a loved parent or another person you

C26.P15 readily trust, you will then have a strong tendency to consider this object in a positive light (see Broesch & Carpendale, this volume). On the other hand, an expression of disgust or contempt will elicit a specific negative evaluation. This third-party evaluation has been called social appraisal by Manstead and Fischer (2001).

## Social Referencing

C26.S7 Social appraisal can be broken down further into two different social learning processes (although see Walle et al., 2017, for a contrasting opinion). The first process, *social referencing*, was made famous by experiments initiated by Joseph Campos and his colleagues (Sorce et al., 1985). In the classic “visual cliff experiment,” infants aged 12 months were placed on a large plexiglas-topped table. Half of the table had a checkerboard pattern just underneath the surface and was therefore apparently judged secure by the babies. However, halfway across was a visual cliff: the pattern was no more just underneath the surface, but rather 30 cm below, triggering a sense of uncertainty, even if the plexiglas top continued. The experimenters asked the infants’ mothers to either facially express a positive emotion (e.g., joy or interest) or a negative emotion (e.g., fear or anger). As there was a desirable toy at the other end of the apparent drop, the babies wanted to cross the table. As they reached the “cliff,” they started visually “interrogating” their mother—referencing her. When the mothers adopted a positive facial expression, most babies appeared to appraise the situation as being safe and consequently crossed the table. However, they stopped crawling when they were confronted by a negative emotion.

C26.P16 This experiment showed, for the first time, that babies are able to use others’ nonverbal emotional expressions to modify their behavior, to evaluate their environment. Social referencing is ubiquitous during socialization. Children regularly check, by watching their caregivers, whether what they are doing is “OK.” Their “teachers” do not need to do much: a nod, a smile, or a frown can all communicate a certain evaluation of what is going on. In a way, it is a form of affective “nudging,” where the emotional signals orient the learner to value the social environment in the “appropriate” way. It is important to note that, in such conditions, it is the learner—usually the child—that turns intentionally to the caregiver for an appraisal of the situation. The latter is therefore aware of this demand and, usually, answers to it by expressing something facially. Social referencing is therefore a case of social learning that involves an intersubjective exchange between a person who is asking for evaluative help and another person who is ready to help by offering an emotional expression. However, this is only one of two processes of social learning that constitutes social appraisal.

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## Affective Observation

Consider a caregiver pushing an infant in a stroller. It appears that most parents in Western culture choose to orient the stroller in a way that allows their infant to see what is in front of them. The infant is therefore not in a position that enables them to see the

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face of their caregiver (who in any case may, for example, be concentrating on something they have seen on their smartphone). This position is a perfect observational standpoint for the infant. During their ride, they can watch a myriad of events and, at the same time, people's reaction to these events. In particular, they can observe the emotions displayed by people and link them with whatever the people are reacting to. Depending on who is expressing these emotions, one can expect a more or less deep effect on the infant's own appraisal of the object. Very young children are, for instance, already more attentive to in-groups (Frick et al., 2017), and this ability is precious to figure out what is socially relevant for people of their group. Similarly, children are sensitive to consensus, and this sensitivity is important to detect what is relevant for most of the members of their community (Bernard et al., 2015). Prestige or hierarchy is also detected at a young age, and children tend to be more sensitive to prestigious or dominant characters (Cheraffedine et al., 2015). In all these situations, the people who are transmitting what is valuable in their culture do not have to intentionally communicate their appraisal of a given situation. These are the socially relevant people who, by their natural reactions to the happenings in their environment (admiring, being scandalized, disgusted, etc.), are implicitly teaching the infant in the stroller how to evaluate, how to value, how to feel. The infant learners are not asking for these appraisals: they are simply curious to discover what is socially relevant and, by observing, can take advantage of others' reactions.

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In other cases, an event suddenly happens, and people do not know how to evaluate it, so they turn to others to figure out how to appraise it. The classic experiment demonstrating this effect in adults was conducted by Latane and Darley in the 1960s. When participants were put with two confederates in a room that began filling with smoke, they did not know how to react. They therefore observed the confederates' reactions. When the confederates remained passive, the participants did not react, deciding, through their observation of the others' appraisal of the situation, that the smoke was not dangerous; their reaction was very different when confederates expressed anxiety (Latane & Darley, 1968). Throughout our life, we constantly rely on others' emotional reactions when taking decisions. This is valid for deciding what piece of art to love as well as what kind of car to buy. As this type of social learning does not require the "teachers" to intentionally communicate their appraisal, we called this kind of social learning *affective observation*.

## EMOTION CONTAGION

The final way in which we will consider how emotions impact social learning and cultural transmission is more basic still: *emotion contagion*. It is acknowledged that, in certain contexts, emotions can be contagious. This has been noticed even for newborns, by Sagi and Hoffmann (1976). They recorded babies' cries and played them in a nursery, observing that even 1-day-old babies cried significantly more often than those exposed to silence or to a synthetic cry that resembled a baby's cry. The babies were sensitive to

C26.S9 the emotion, simply by being confronted by it. Even if they do not really understand what is happening, some somatic markers will be formed (Damasio, 1994), and this sound will be enough to trigger some positive feelings in the future, just as in the case of the “madeleine” that the famous French writer Marcel Proust used to eat with his grandmother (Proust, 2003). This process can explain why certain atmospheres, places, or people become associated with certain emotions, even if people might not be able to describe exactly with what these emotions are associated. During the socialization process, these atmospheres will then play the role of “attractors.” People will be attracted by those things that trigger warm and sweet feelings, and this approach behavior will most likely end with an increasingly more positive appraisal. Similarly, they will avoid situations that trigger negative feelings, and this will lead to negative evaluations of the specific objects that constitute these situations.

C26.P20  
C26.P21 By putting together emotional contagion, affective observation, social referencing, and natural pedagogy, our objective is to integrate different and worthwhile perspectives explaining how social values are transmitted in one model: *affective social learning* (Dukes & Clément, 2019)—how what we feel about the objects in the environment develops. These proximal mechanisms of cultural transmission, structured along a dimension of intentionality, enable us to specify how society is able to reproduce and how values can be transmitted from generation to generation, and to understand why something that is considered as essential in one place can be judged as futile by a neighbor. This model has the advantage of being compatible with the main intuitions of the social sciences, demonstrating the importance of social transmission in the construction of personal identities. At the same time, it provides a framework that is in line with the most recent discoveries of the psychological bases that enable social learning. Affective social learning opens, then, the possibility to describe with more precision how individuals become the inheritors of a cultural legacy thanks to evaluations that are made by the people we trust and with whom we share our lives.

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