Université de Neuchâtel
Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines
Institut de Psychologie et Education

Beyond Collective Memory

A Sociocultural Perspective on Historical Representations

Thesis per article presented to the Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences

For the title of Doctor in Human and Social Sciences

By

Constance de Saint-Laurent

Under the Supervision of

Professor Tania Zittoun

Jury

Doctor Ignacio Brescó de Luna, Aalborg University

Professor Michèle Grossen, Université de Lausanne

Professor Jaan Valsiner, Aalborg University

Thesis defended on January 22nd, 2018

unine
UNIVERSITÉ DE
NEUCHÂTEL

Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines
Espace Louis-Agassiz 1
CH - 2000 Neuchâtel
Tél : +41 (0)32 718 17 00
Fax : +41 (0)32 718 17 71
secretariat.lettres@unine.ch

IMPRIMATUR

La Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines de l'Université de Neuchâtel, sur les rapports de Mme Tania Zittoun, directrice de thèse, professeure à l'Université de Neuchâtel ; M. Ignacio Brescó de Luna, professeur associé, Aalborg University, Danemark ; Mme Michèle Grossen, professeure, Université de Lausanne ; M. Jaan Valsiner, professeur, Aalborg University, Danemark autorise l'impression de la thèse présentée par Mme Constance de Saint-Laurent en laissant à l'auteur la responsabilité des opinions énoncées.

Neuchâtel, le 22 janvier 2018

Le doyen
Pierre Alain Mariaux

To Denise and Elisabeth

Acknowledgements

It is surprisingly hard, after writing so much in the past few months, to sit by the computer and write these acknowledgements. I have received so much help, support, and encouragements over the past four years and a half that words can only fall short of the gratitude I feel towards those who have participated, in one way or another, to the realisation of this thesis.

I would like to first thank my grandmothers, who supported me through my studies and beyond, and who always encouraged me to follow my dreams. They have been, until the very end, examples of how strong a woman can be and showed me that will can accomplish anything. Their stories of "the war", as they used to call it, and of their lives in Africa lulled my childhood and certainly participated to my interest in history. But, more importantly, they taught me the virtue of finding beauty in others and in the world, even in the darkest of times. I am forever grateful to have had them in my life.

I would like to thank my parents, who have supported me through the ups and downs of life. I wouldn't be there without them, in more ways than I can count. They have, every day, encouraged me to think, to question, and to debate, even with them. The thesis would not exist if they had not showed me the value of intellectual curiosity. But, mostly, they taught me that charity, empathy, and honesty matter more than titles, wealth, or recognition, and not to stop at appearances. I would also like to thank my sisters, who have been so much more than that: Judith, Gaëlle, you have been my supports, my friends, my confidents, my travel companions, my advisors… You have showed me the values of camaraderie, cooperation, and collaboration.

I would also like to thank Tania Zittoun, who has supervised this PhD, for her direction, input, and feedback. Beyond this thesis, she has offered me invaluable opportunities, collaborations, and the freedom to pursue my own goals. I have been extremely lucky to have her as a supervisor and as a guide during this intellectual journey. I would also like to express my gratitude to the colleagues with whom I shared this journey, and whose discussions enriched this thesis. In particular, I would like to thank Teuta Mehmeti, who has provided a 24/7 text support and has showed an impressive patience with my constant complaining, and Déborah Levitan, whose encouragements picked me up every time I thought I couldn't do it, as well as Stéphanie Breux, Romain Boissonnade, Flavia Cangia, Elisa Cattaruzza, Josephine Convertini, Fabienne Gfeller, Sophie Lambolez, Léonie Liechti, Gabriel Macedo, Gail Womersley, and all the

colleagues with whom I have had the pleasure to work. I would also like to express my gratitude to Marie-France Allaz, who has been both a wonderful support and a blast of fresh air in the institute. You all made this journey not only doable, but also fun and enjoyable.

I also benefitted from a wealth of discussions with wonderful researchers, whose thinking and feedback have enriched this thesis. In particular, I would like to thank the members of the Jury, Ignacio Brescó de Luna, Michèle Grossen, and Jaan Valsiner, for precious advice and feedback, as well as Sarah Awad, Alex Gillespie, Pernille Hviid, Jack Martin, Cathy Nicholson, Sandra Obradović, Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont, Jakob Waag Villasden, and Brady Wagoner, the members of the Kitchen seminar in Aalborg, the Studio in Neuchatel, the Cupsynet Doctoral Network, the COST Action Network on representations of history, and all those who participated in the Doctoral Meetings. This research would not have been possible without the constant debates and discussions I had the pleasure of being part of. I would also like to thank the University of Neuchâtel, its Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences, its Institute of Psychology and Education, as well as the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Swiss Academy of Humanities and Social Sciences for their financial support.

I am also extremely grateful to the people who took part in my studies and to those who made the fieldworks possible. The Théâtre Océan Nord and the Academy of Special Education in Warsaw welcomed me and supported me in realising the various studies of this PhD, and I thank them from the bottom of my heart. In particular, I would like to thank Adeline Rosenstein, Maciej Karwowski, Iza Lebuda, Léa Drouet, and Isabelle Nouzha, without whom this project would not have been possible.

Finally, I would like to thank Vlad Glăveanu, for his support, his encouragements, and his feedback. You have been there every step of the way, you have listened and discussed every section of this thesis, and, more importantly, you have always believed in this project even when I didn't believe in it myself. I am forever grateful to have you in my life.

Abstract

It is common wisdom that we, both as individuals and as members of societies, should learn from the past in order to avoid repeating the mistakes both us and others have made. Unfortunately, research on the topic has shown that we do quite the contrary: our collective memory, or our lay representation of the past, tends to present a rather biased, glorifying, and unilateral version of history and to reflect our national or social interests over the ones of others. The aim of this thesis is to go beyond this conception of collective memory, and to explore how exactly people construct, mobilise, transform, and challenge representations of history. To do this, I propose to adopt a sociocultural perspective, that considers culture and minds as interdependent, self and other as co-constituted, and the person as agentic and developing throughout the life-course. Based on this approach, four studies are proposed – three empirical and one transversal. In the first study, I look at how collective memory is constructed in interactions by analysing the transcripts of parliamentary debates on immigration. In the second study, I reconstruct the trajectories of intellectuals and artists who came to question hegemonic historical representations, to explore how collective memory develops over the life course. In the third study, I analyse how people reason about a recent event – the Ukrainian conflict that started in 2015 – and history through a dialogical experiment where people were confronted to diverse representations of history. Finally, in a last transversal study, I look at how collective memory is mobilised to imagine the future and represent the world. This leads me to conclude that historical representations are dynamic symbolic resources, constructed in interactions and developed throughout the life-course, through the use of social and cultural resources as well as a wide range of psychological processes, in order to give meaning to the world. And thus that the question is not what we learn from history, but how we learn from it.

Key Words: Collective Memory, Historical Representations, Sociocultural Psychology, Qualitative Studies, Dialogicality, Life-Course, Meaning-Making, Future Imagination.

Résumé

Le sens commun dicte que nous, individus et collectifs, devrions apprendre du passé pour éviter de répéter les erreurs que nous avons pu commettre. Malheureusement, les recherches sur le sujet ont plutôt démontré le contraire : notre mémoire collective, c'est-à-dire nos représentations de l'histoire, a tendance à présenter une version de l'histoire à la fois biaisée, glorifiante, et unilatérale qui reflète nos intérêts nationaux et sociaux. Cette thèse a pour but de dépasser cette conception de la mémoire collective et d'explorer comment exactement les gens construisent, mobilisent, transforment et questionnent les représentations de l'histoire. Pour ce faire, une perspective socioculturelle est adoptée, qui considère que personnes et cultures sont interdépendantes, que le soi et l'autre sont co-constitués et que la personne est un agent qui se développe tout au long de la vie. A partir de cette approche, quatre études sont construites – trois études empiriques et une étude transversale. La première porte sur la construction de la mémoire collective dans les interactions, à travers l'analyse de débats parlementaires sur l'immigration. Dans la deuxième étude, les trajectoires de vie d'intellectuels et d'artistes qui ont remis en question des représentations historiques dominantes sont reconstituées, pour explorer comment la mémoire collective se développe au cours de la vie. Dans la troisième recherche, une expérience dialogique est utilisée, où les participants sont confrontés à divers discours sur un évènement récent (le conflit en Ukraine qui a débuté en 2015), pour analyser comment ils raisonnent sur l'histoire. Enfin, la dernière étude, transversale, analyse comment la mémoire collective est mobilisée pour imaginer le futur et représenter le monde. A partir de ces quatre études, il est conclu que les représentations historiques sont des ressources symboliques dynamiques, construites dans les interactions et tout au long de la vie, à travers l'utilisation de ressources sociales et culturelles et d'une multitude de processus psychologiques, dans le but de donner du sens au monde. Et donc que la question n'est pas tellement ce que nous apprenons du passé, mais comment nous l'apprenons.

Mots Clés: Mémoire Collective, Représentations Historiques, Psychologie Socioculturelle, Etudes Qualitatives, Dialogicité, Trajectoires de Vie, Construction de Sens, Imagination du Futur.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ... iii

Abstract ... v

Résumé ... vii

Table of Figures ... xvii

Table of Tables ... xix

Chapter 1. A Sociocultural Perspective ... 1

I. Introduction ... 3

II. Sociocultural Psychology ... 6

A. The Sociocultural Approach ... 6

B. Epistemological and Methodological Implications ... 11

C. A Brief Introduction to a Complex History ... 14

D. Three Sociocultural Perspectives ... 17

1. Semiotic Theories and Perspectives ... 18

2. Dialogical Theories and Perspectives ... 19

3. Mediated Activity Theories and Perspectives ... 21

E. The Approach Adopted in This Thesis ... 22

Chapter 2. Collective Memory From a Sociocultural Perspective ... 25

I. Introduction ... 27

II. Social Thinking ... 27

A. Social Cognition and Reasoning ... 28

B. Social Representation Theory 29
C. Discursive Theories 31
D. Ongoing Debate 33
III. Collective Memory 34
A. The Historical Roots of Collective Memory 35
B. Collected Memory 36
C. Psychosocial Memory 38
D. Collective Remembering 40
1. Discursive Approach 41
2. Mediated Approach 42
3. Narrative Approach 44
E. Collective Memory in This Thesis 45

Chapter 3. Studying Collective Memory 49

I. Introduction 51
A. The Sociocultural Approach 51
B. Research Process 54
C. Position of the Researcher 59
II. Methods 61
A. Study 1: Collective Memory in Interactions 63
1. Questions and Design 63
2. Elicitation 64
3. Analysis 66
B. Study 2: Trajectories of Remembering 67
1. Questions and Design 67
2. Elicitation 68

3. Analysis 71

C. Study 3: Historical Reasoning 72

1. Questions and Design 72

2. Elicitation 73

3. Analysis 77

D. Study 4: Temporal Heteroglossia 78

1. Questions and Design 78

2. Elicitation and Analysis 78

III. Introduction to the Empirical Papers 79

A. Abstracts and Summaries 79

B. Modifications to the Papers 86

Chapter 4. Collective Memory in Interactions 87

I. Collective Memory in Parliamentary Debates on Immigration (Paper 1) 89

A. Abstract 89

B. Introduction 89

C. Collective Memory and Meaning Making 93

D. Collective Memory in Interactions 94

1. Dialogism as a Theoretical Tool: Intersubjectivity in Meaning-Making 94

2. Dialogism as a Methodological Tool: Identifying Traces 95

3. The Data: French Parliamentary Debates on Immigration and Integration ..97

4. Method: Reconstructing Narratives 98

E. Stories and Meanings 102

1. The Left: The Revolution, Colonisation, Slavery, Third republic, World War II & Decolonisation 102

2. The Right's Contestations: Dictators and Mere Traditions 107

3. The Right's Republican Pact 110

4. The Left's Contestation: The Universality of Human Rights 115

5. Epilogue 116

F. Discussion 116

1. Meanings in Construction 117

2. Negotiation of Meanings 118

3. Senses and Significations 120

4. Meanings and Boundaries 121

G. Conclusion 122

Chapter 5. Collective Memory and the Life Course 125

I. Trajectories of Resistance (Paper 2) 127

A. Abstract 127

B. Introduction 127

C. Trajectories of Remembering 129

D. Reflecting on History 132

E. Case 1: Dominique 133

F. Case 2: Genevieve 137

G. Resources for Resistance 140

H. Conclusion: Resisting Whom, Why and How? 142

II. Remembering and the Life-Course (Paper 3) 144

A. Abstract 144

B. Introduction 144

C. Collective Remembering 145

D. Trajectories of Remembering 147

E. Data and Method 150

F. Case Study: Alain 152
G. Discussion 156
H. Conclusion 158

Chapter 6. Historical Reasoning 161

I. Emergence in Historical Representations (Paper 4) 163
A. Abstract 163
B. Introduction 163
C. Sociocultural Psychology, Dialogism and Everyday Thinking 164
D. Collective Remembering 166
E. Beyond Memory, Narratives and Representations: Historical Reasoning 168
F. Studying Historical Reasoning 170
G. Analysing the Sources and Resources of Historical Reasoning 173
1. Meaning 174
2. Sense 176
3. Factual Knowledge 179
4. Schemas 182
H. Conceptualising Historical Reasoning 185
I. Conclusion 187
II. Processes of Historical Reasoning (Paper 5) 189
A. Abstract 189
B. Introduction 189
C. Historical Reasoning 191
D. A Dialogical Experiment 195
E. Processes of Historical Reasoning 196
1. Analogies and Generalisations 198

2. Imagination, Identification, and Perspective Taking 200

F. Conclusion 203

Chapter 7. Collective Memory and Future Imagination 205

I. Thinking Through Time (Paper 6) 207

A. Abstract..207

B. Introduction 207

C. Memory and Imagination..208

D. Remembering History and Imagining the Future...210

E. Collective Memory to Imagine Collective Futures..211

1. Frames of Reference in Parliamentary Debates on Immigration 212

2. Analogies in Historical Reasoning 215

3. Generalisations: Metamemory and Personal World Philosophies.................218

F. Thinking Through Time: Temporal Heteroglossia in our Representations of the World 220

Chapter 8. Conclusion...223

I. Introduction 225

II. Addressing the Research Questions 226

A. Collective Memory in Interactions 226

B. Resisting and Challenging Representations..228

C. Constructing Historical Representations 230

D. Mobilising Collective Memory..231

III. Theoretical and Methodological Contributions 232

A. Theoretical Contributions..232

1. Collective Memory as a Symbolic Resource...233

2. Collective Memory as Constructed in Dialogues 233

3. Collective Memory as a Developmental Process...234

4. Collective Memory as a Reasoning Process 235

5. Collective Memory as a Tool to Think About the World..............................235

6. Beyond Collective Memory 236

B. Methodological Contributions...237

IV. Limits...238

V. Future Perspectives...240

VI. Implication for Education, Policy, and Society 242

References...245

Appendices..275

Appendix A. Table of Parliamentary Debates (Study 1) 277

Appendix B. Secondary Sources: Governmental Documents (Study 1) 279

Appendix C. Summary of the Bill (Study 1) 280

Appendix D. Analysis of the Parliamentary Debates: Paper and Pen (Study 1) 281

Appendix E. Analysis of the Parliamentary Debates: Example of Figure (Study 1) 282

Appendix F. Interview Guide (Study 2) 284

Appendix G. Authorisation to Record (Study 2) 287

Appendix H. Example of Trajectory (Study 2) 288

Appendix I. Interview Guide (Study 3) 289

Appendix J. Experimental Material (Study 3) 292

Appendix K. List of Vignettes (Study 3) 294

Appendix L. Participation Information Sheet (Study 3) 304

Appendix M. Informed Consent (Study 3) 306

Appendix N. Authorisation to Record (Study 3) 307

Appendix O. Cover for the Debriefing Document (Study 3) 308

Table of Figures

Figure 3-1 The research cycle according to Valsiner (2014b) 55

Figure 3-2 The research cycle in this thesis (CM=Collective Memory) 57

Figure 5-1. Collective memory as oriented, culturally mediated and dialogical action.................147

Figure 5-2. Collective memory as a developmental process with socially located self, in interaction with a socially located other, using cultural resources...149

Figure 6-1 Sources of tension and resources for historical reasoning...187

Figure 6-2 Historical reasoning: resources and sources of tensions (adapted from section I) ...193

Figure D-1 Dialogical analysis of the parliamentary debates (paper and pen) 281

Figure E-1 Dialogical analysis of the parliamentary debates: example of figure...........................283

Figure H-1 Example of paper and pen analysis of a trajectory: overview 288

Figure H-2 Example of paper and pen analysis of a trajectory: zoom on the analysis 288

Figure H-3 Example of paper and pen analysis of a trajectory: zoom on the data 288

Figure J-1 "Dinner party tables" for the qualitative experiment: presentation 292

Figure J-2 "Dinner party tables" for the qualitative experiment: choosing a table 292

Figure J-3 "Dinner party tables" for the qualitative experiment: opening a chair 293

Figure J-4 "Dinner party tables" for the qualitative experiment: opening a statement.................293

Table of Tables

Table 3-1 Summary of the research questions and methods 62

Table 3-2 Key to the Transcripts 71

Table 3-3 List of vignettes per table...74

Table 3-4 Types of vignettes and how many times they were picked...75

Table 3-5 List of the papers and abstracts 79

Table 4-1. Example of the use of "schematic narrative templates" to reconstruct the narratives underlying the references made to history 101

Table 6-1. Summary of the vignettes presented to the participants 171

Table 6-2. Processes of historical reasoning 197

Table A-1 Details of the parliamentary sessions 277

Chapter 1.

A Sociocultural Perspective

I. Introduction

Remembering history, where we have been, and how it brought us to where we are today, matters for a number of reasons. First, and at a very pragmatic level, it matters for questions of reparation and reconciliation: agreeing on a common narrative about the past, after a conflict, means agreeing about who should carry the blame and pay reparations, and who was victimised and should now be protected. Reaching such a common narrative, however, is often extremely difficult, if not impossible, and much work has been devoted to the study of processes of reconciliation (e.g., Murakami, 2012). Second, remembering history matters for ethical reasons: we have a duty to remember those before us, especially those who participated, through their life or through their death, to the construction of the world as we know it today. Commemoration, thus, is an important part of social life – from museums to war memorials – and it has been a frequent object of study (e.g., Nora's "Lieux de mémoire", 1997).

Third, the way we remember history plays an important role in how we understand the present. On the one hand, it can justify and explain the status quo by including it in a continuous narrative. On the other hand, it can serve as the basis for social critique by de-naturalising the present situation and highlighting the social and cultural conditions under which it was forged. This is, for instance, the work of Foucault's genealogical method (e.g., Foucault, 1993): by uncovering the historical roots of a phenomenon, not only does it become possible to shed a critical light on its existence, it reminds us that it is not a 'natural' category but a recent historical development. Fourth, remembering history matters for the lessons it may teach us for the future. Indeed, what better source of knowledge about humanity, societies and civilisations than our collective past? Being able to learn from the past has become an object of popular knowledge – as in the maxim "Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it" – and is often considered a central element of historical representations, albeit a rather understudied one (e.g., Merck, Topcu, & Hirst, 2016).

These two last consequences of the way we represent the past – for the present and for the future – imply that historical representations are not simple reconstructions that aim at reflecting the reality of what happened as best as possible. Quite often, on the contrary, lay representations of history are constructed, mobilised, materialised, and transmitted for social and political purposes (e.g., J. H. Liu & Hilton, 2005). From the politicians who want to impose a specific vision of the world and its future (e.g., de Saint-Laurent, Brescó de Luna, Awad, & Wagoner,

2017) to the everyday glorification of the past to feel better about one's social group (e.g., Favero, 2010), our uses of the past reflect more the underlying motivations of the speaker than the factual reality of what happened. This is the aspect of historical representations that has been the most studied in psychology, highlighting its role in intergroup conflict and international politics (e.g., Delori, 2011; Rosoux, 2001), in creating often exclusive social identities (e.g., Raudsepp & Wagner, 2012) or in political rhetoric (e.g., Tileagă, 2013).

What the research on historical representations has thus shown, globally, is that we do not learn from the past but instead use it to defend our own interests. The danger is double here. On the one hand, not learning from history means repeating similar mistakes, being blind to important societal signs, and ignoring the past experiences that could allow us to better anticipate the future. On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, constructing and propagating glorified versions of the past means defending some of the most negative aspects of our societies – implying that periods characterised by slavery, sexism, segregationism, colonisation, or extreme poverty were actually a golden age one should be nostalgic for – and refusing to see our role in the status quo. By defending a version of the past where we are systematically the heroes championing justice, equality, and human rights we become blind to the dynamics by which injustice, inequality, and deshumanisation are made possible, and how we, through the societies we live in, participate in them.

In this context, understanding how we represent the past and how we come to question and challenge historical representations is a pressing issue. The aim of this PhD thesis is to be a first step towards this ambitious goal. In particular, it is an attempt to answer four questions:

1) **How are representations of the past discussed and mobilised in interactions?**

2) **How do people come to resist or challenge hegemonic representations of the past?**

3) **How are new historical representations produced?**

4) **How are they mobilised to imagine collective futures**?

In this **first chapter**, I set up the theoretical and epistemological background of this work by presenting the sociocultural psychological approach. In **Chapter 2**, I present the literature on social thinking and collective memory in psychology, and I outline what a sociocultural and dialogical perspective on historical representations would entail. In **Chapter 3**, I introduce the three studies carried out to answer these questions and the methodologies used. Chapters 4 to 7, composed of six scientific papers, present the theoretical foundation of each study and the results. In **Chapter 4**, on "Collective memory in interactions", a set of parliamentary debates on

immigration is analysed, focusing on the dialogical aspects of historical representations (question 1). **Chapter 5**, on "Collective memory and the life-course" presents the trajectories of remembering of artists and intellectuals who came to resist or challenge hegemonic representations of the past (question 2). In **Chapter 6,** entitled "Historical reasoning", a qualitative and dialogical experiment is used to explore how historical representations are constructed and challenged (question 3). In **Chapter 7**, a transversal analysis of all three studies is presented, exploring how historical representations are mobilised to imagine collective futures (question 4). Finally, in **Chapter 8**, I outline some of the consequences of a truly sociocultural and dialogical approach to historical representations.

II. Sociocultural Psychology

Sociocultural psychology is a sub-discipline of psychology better characterised by its theoretical and epistemological foundations than by a specific object of study. Often defined in opposition to "mainstream" approaches to psychology or adjacent fields (Shweder, 1990), it is also more united by the research practices it rejects than by what it shares (Valsiner, 2009). Consequently, trying to provide a coherent and exhaustive presentation of cultural psychology is a nearly impossible task that will not be attempted here. Instead, I propose to introduce the main aspects of the sociocultural approach, a brief history of the field, and the main trends of thought that emerged from this approach based on one criteria: that these trends shed the brightest of lights on the theories presented or developed in the rest of this dissertation. This means that aspects of sociocultural psychology that would be deemed essential by other researchers will be only evoked in passing – most notably Activity theory (see section D.3). Of course, that is not to say that these perspectives on cultural psychology are less important, useful, or representative of the field, but simply that they are less central to the theories introduced, the fieldworks conducted, and ideas developed in this dissertation.

Before introducing the sociocultural approach to psychology, a brief note on the choice of terms is required. Indeed, this perspective has many names: sociocultural psychology, cultural psychology, social and cultural psychology, or cultural-historical psychology. While they all refer to slightly different groups of researchers and practices, they can all be said to belong, very broadly speaking, to a similar tradition – with the exception, perhaps, of cultural-historical psychology. As such, these terms are often used interchangeably throughout this dissertation. Generally, however, the term sociocultural psychology is used, to emphasise the importance of the social – and not only cultural – aspects of this approach and because of its relative simplicity.

A. The Sociocultural Approach

Sociocultural approaches to psychology share three main assumptions: 1) the interdependence between person and culture; 2) intersubjectivity as constitutive of the self; and 3) the self as a developing agent. First, persons and culture are *interdependent*. Participation in culture shapes human minds (Bruner, 1990) at two levels. On the one hand, it dictates what is possible,

acceptable, and expected in social encounters. On the other hand, it offers symbolic and material resources to think, act, and give meaning to the world in ways that are always unique. This double role of culture – as a set of normative practices and representations and as a tool to challenge and create new practices and representations – is well captured, for instance, by the study of autobiographical memory. Indeed, sociocultural approaches to autobiographical memory (Nelson, 2003, 2007; Nelson & Fivush, 2004) have shown that telling one's life is shaped by the local cultural practices that surround autobiographical narratives – from what types of events should be included to whether personal narratives are encouraged at all – practices that constrain what narratives are considered possible, acceptable, or expected. However, these "constraints" are also used as tools to build narratives that give people's life meaning and direction and participate in the construction of a sense of self. This is also what makes mind and culture *interdependent* (and not a unidirectional relationship): culture is perpetually renewed every time it is used, and it does not exist outside of the practices and representations that it shapes. As a result, culture is a very difficult term to define (see Jahoda, 2012 for a historical discussion). This is because, in the words of Valsiner (2014, p. 35):

> Culture is a process, not an entity. Culture has no agency – the human beings do – yet the power of culture is in the actions of the human agents. Culture does not cause anything, yet human beings operating through culture in goals-oriented ways tore-organize their worlds. In short, it is us, the human beings in any part of the world, who make culture, maintain it, and who destroy it.

Moreover, while the concept of culture is extremely useful, precise definitions of the term are futile and tend to be lists of the types of practices and representations researchers want to study (Jahoda, 2012) or to be constructed with the aim of excluding any non-human behaviour (de Saint-Laurent, 2015b; B. King, 2002). One way around this issue has been to define, instead, what would a psychology interested in culture study, as did Shweder (1990, p. 1):

> Cultural psychology is the study of the way cultural traditions and social practices regulate, express, transform, and permute the human psyche, resulting less in psychic unity for humankind than in ethnic divergences in mind, self, and emotion. Cultural psychology is the study of the ways subject and object, self and other, psyche and culture, person and context, figure and ground, practitioner and practice live together, require each other, and dynamically, dialectically, and jointly make each other up.

The second assumption of sociocultural psychology, already hinted at in Shweder's definition, is that of the importance of intersubjectivity. While most approaches in psychology would agree that self-other relations are extremely important, what sets sociocultural psychology apart is that it considers intersubjectivity to be *constitutive* of psychological phenomena: it "understand[s] cognition, emotion, memory, identity, personality, and other psychological constructs as relational entities that emerge out of interactions with others within a sociocultural context" (Kirschner & Martin, 2010, p. 1). This assumption can be traced back to the works of two early twentieth century psychologists: Lev Vygotsky and George Herbert Mead. For Vygotsky, social interactions are what allow for the development of children. He argued that the path from the child to the sign passes through the other (Vygotsky & Luria, 1994), that is, that children learn to use and then understand cultural tools – two different steps for Vygotsky – through interactions with adults who guide the child's participation in various activities (Rogoff, 1990). The development of the use of signs – in the form of language – qualitatively reorganises cognition, allowing the development of what Vygotsky called "higher mental functions" (Van der Veer, 2012; Vygotsky & Rieber, 1997). These functions also developed over the course of history, leading Vygotsky to argue that in human development two lines are intertwined: philogenesis and ontogenesis (Vygotsky, 1978). His approach, "cultural-historical psychology", is thus central to current sociocultural psychology, as it considers both cultural and social interactions to be constitutive of the human psyche.

George Herbert Mead is less often credited in sociocultural psychology or even in psychology at large (Farr, 1996) than Vygotsky, yet he laid the ground for much of the current sociocultural perspective on the role of social interactions (e.g., Gillespie, 2006). Mead was interested, among other things, in the development of consciousness, which he believed to be the ability to look at oneself as if other, from an outside perspective (Gillespie, 2005, 2006). He argued that this ability develops through participation in "social acts" and the use of oral speech (Mead, 1977). Social acts are activities that require more than one social position, such as teaching/being taught or giving/receiving. In time, we take these different positions, either in imagination (as in children's play) or in reality (through, for instance, reciprocity). In doing so, we learn to look at ourselves from the perspective of others because we have, to certain extent, been there before. For instance, I can imagine what it would be for a friend to receive the birthday present I choose for her because I have, in the past, received birthday presents of the same kind. For Mead, oral speech played a similar role, but with an added advantage: because we can hear ourselves speak, speech allows being simultaneously in the position of speaker and audience. Telling a moving story, for instance, can affect us as much as it affects our audience. This is because:

> Memory is also a performance to the self. This is where the part of the power of many therapeutic practices resides: Retelling one's life is an opportunity to look at the past through the perspective of others, and thus to give it new meanings (de Saint-Laurent, 2017, p. 10)

It is also through perspective taking that symbols become significant, because they intertwine "two or more attitudes that belong to the two or more positions within a social act" (Gillespie, 2005, p. 32). Thus, for Mead, social interactions are at the roots of both self-consciousness and the symbolic function.

The third assumption of cultural psychology is that of the paramount importance of human development and agency. It considers the person as developing through 'irreversible time' (Valsiner, 1994). As already discussed in the first two assumptions, people develop in time through culture and social interactions. However, development, in sociocultural psychology, is not limited to the idea of maturation, but it considers that the self develops throughout the life course (Zittoun, 2012). Through time, people engage in multiple spheres of experience, encounter different systems of values and meanings, and participate in various cultural practices (Zittoun, 2006, 2012; Zittoun et al., 2013). People learn to integrate those into meaningful positions, values, and ideas (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015), and to use them to create unique trajectories (Zittoun & de Saint-Laurent, 2015). That is, through time, they become intentional agents able to shape their social and cultural environment as much as it shapes them.

This makes of development a central concept for sociocultural psychology, but it has three other main consequences. First, it means that it considers human activity and the environments it constructs to be characterised by intentionality (Shweder, 1990). Conversely to most of psychology, then, it understands the person as a wilful agent interacting in an environment constituted of and by other wilful agents, and not as the result of the blind influence of external variables (Valsiner, 2012a). Or, as Kirschner & Martin (2010, p. 12) explained:

> The explicit goal of many psychologists has been (and continues to be) to predict and control behavior, and the existence of human freedom calls into question the viability of such a project. Yet in spite of such a widespread commitment to determinism, many applications of psychological theory and research in education, psychotherapy, and numerous other social institutions and situations tend to assume (at least tacitly) that human beings are capable of making choices and responding in creative and unforeseeable ways, and of asserting themselves in thought and action to improve their own lives and those of others. […] [Thus]

> without a viable, nonreductive, yet nonmysterious conception of human agency, psychology lacks the theoretical resources necessary to support not only its claims with respect to application and relevance, but also its status as the social science primarily concerned with an understanding of human experience and action. Even the word "action" denotes a kind of agentive intentionality that seems missing from much contemporary theory and inquiry in the discipline.

The second consequence of the emphasis on agentivity is that human beings need to be studied as developing "wholes" and not as personality traits, neurological reactions, or sum of social influences (Kirschner & Martin, 2010) that can be isolated in time. Indeed, agency and development presuppose that there is a subject who, through time, integrates these elements into 'something more': the whole is greater than the sum of the parts because the whole is a conscious, wilful being with a past who thinks, feels, and acts as such and thus can always "override" any parts of the sum. While we are not always coherent and unified selves (Hermans, 2002) who hold coherent and unified representations of the world (Jovchelovitch, 2002), studies on identity and autobiographical memory do show that we nonetheless thrive for a sense of continuity and coherence, which develops over time (Habermas, 2007), and plays an important part in how we decide to act in the present (de Saint-Laurent & Zittoun, in press).

The third consequence of considering the subject of psychology as an developing and intentional agent is that it implies a certain degree of self-consciousness. More specifically, people react to the discourses of psychology – and more generally science – and are affected by what it says about them. Indeed, as Shweder (1990, pp. 3–4) puts it:

> It is a principle of cultural psychology – the principle of intentional worlds – that nothing real "just is," and that realities are the product of the way things get represented, embedded, implemented, and reacted to in various taxonomic and/or narrative contexts.

And he later adds (Shweder, 1990, p. 31):

> It would seem to follow that if realities are not independent of our representations of them and involvement with them, then the raising of questions, even "scientific" questions, is no innocent act. Asking people what they want to do is a way of promoting autonomous decision making. Asking about the potential uses of something is a way of constituting it as instrumental.

The problem of psychology is not just that knowledge is never neutral and it is always constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1966), but that psychological knowledge constructs the very reality it tries to study (Gergen, 1973). A poignant example of this phenomenon is the notion of self-esteem, a concept that was 'constructed' by researchers to describe people's representations of their own performances and that now permeates most of Western education. Considering human beings as intentional agents thus has tremendous consequences for psychological research, a point addressed in the next section (section B).

In summary, sociocultural psychology studies human beings as intentional agents who develop in irreversible time, and who represent the world, give it meaning, and act within it through the use of symbolic and material tools that are socially introduced, culturally and historically located, and which, in turn, participate in their own construction. This approach has important epistemological and methodological consequences, presented in the next section. Its complex history is then briefly summarised (section C), and three main sociocultural perspectives are presented (section D). Finally, the specific approach used in this thesis is introduced (section E).

B. Epistemological and Methodological Implications

The basic assumptions of sociocultural psychology have important epistemological and methodological consequences and, at the methodological level, there are at least five main implications (which are discussed further in Chapter 3.I.A). First, sociocultural psychology considers that the unit of analysis should be human beings as wholes and the networks of interdependence in which they develop. Simply put, it means that the main level of analysis in psychology is the person in her context. The notion of context is notoriously difficult to define, but it is here understood as the interactions between the individual under study and the subjects and objects in her environment – thus defining context according to what the individual *interacts with* and not to *everything present* in the environment (Grossen, 2001)[1]. Sociocultural studies never focus solely on "sub-psychological" elements (e.g., studying personality traits independently of anything else) or on "supra-psychological elements" (e.g., studying groups as super organisms). Of course, this is not to say that sociocultural psychology is not interested in any sub- or supra-psychological aspects, but that they are always studied in relation to the person.

[1] This also means that theories, by making some elements of the environment relevant for the person, participate in the construction of the context.

Second, it considers that psychological phenomena are by essence qualitative (Valsiner, 2012a) and should be studied as such. It is not 'against' quantitative methods per se – although many of its advocates are – but considers them to be adapted only in some occasions and not all (Valsiner, 2012a). Globally, it adopts an 'ideographic' approach – focusing on specific, local meanings and activities – instead of the 'nomothetic' approach favoured by most of modern psychology – which attempts to propose general laws of behaviour (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010). Indeed, "the mind, according to cultural psychology, is content-driven, domain-specific, and constructively stimulus-bound; and it cannot be extricated from the historically variable and cross-culturally diverse intentional worlds in which it plays a coconstituting part." (Shweder, 1990, p. 13). Thus, sociocultural psychology is necessarily an ideographic science (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010), although whether it should lead to generalisations or not is still open to debate, as are many methodological positions in the field (Cole, 1996). Generally, however, it can be said that sociocultural approaches encourages qualitative descriptions and analyses of psychological phenomena, considering them to be always local and unique, in opposition to the natural sciences methods favoured by most of psychology (Valsiner, 1987).

Third, sociocultural psychology tends to adopt methods that include a temporal dimension, usually focusing on development and/or processes. Indeed, considering human beings as developing agents living interdependently from their social, cultural, and material contexts implies understanding psychological phenomena as dynamic (Valsiner, 2014a) – unfolding during the activity and in interaction with a non-static environment – and the result of a developmental trajectory (Vygotsky & Rieber, 1997) – where symbolic and material tools are progressively introduced in socially and culturally constrained activities. Whereas most of psychology has been interested in the basic structure of the mind and what externally determines it (Shweder, 1990), sociocultural psychology has been interested in how meanings, representations, and actions are constructed, making of it a 'necessarily' developmental science (Zittoun & Glăveanu, in press).

Fourth, sociocultural psychology considers that the methods of the human and social sciences to be necessarily different to that of the natural sciences (Kirschner & Martin, 2010). While much of psychology has tried to reproduce the methods of the latter in an attempt to defend its status of 'real science' (Valsiner, 2012a), sociocultural psychology has adopted a different approach, summarised by Kirschner & Martin (2010, p. 15):

> Rather than seeking to construct cause-and-effect models, to predict and control behaviour, or to "carve nature at its joints" […], sociocultural theorists are more likely to envision their purpose as the achievement of an increasingly adequate

> (thought never perfect, timeless, or completely unambiguous) understanding of phenomena of interest.

This is because, in Cole's words (1996, p. 20):

> For the cultural-historical sciences the answers to real questions depend upon the particular assumptions and point of view afforded by the culture in question, and both the method of arriving at an answer and what constitutes a problem or an answer are locally contingent, not universal.

While most sociocultural psychologists would agree that we need to go "back to the study of psychological dynamics in all of its complexity", "we are still at a loss about how to do that" (Valsiner, 2012a, p. 5).

As a consequence, and this is the final methodological implication, sociocultural psychology has a preference for 'open' methods that adapt to the phenomena being studied, considering that "there are no 'right' (or 'wrong') methods in any science. Instead, the methods emerge from the encounter of the theory and practice with the phenomena. They are tools for new understanding, rather than symbols of 'being scientific'" (Valsiner, 2014a, p. 36). It is thus against the idea that laboratory experiments are the best way to investigate psychological phenomena: while it is not against laboratory experiments in some specific cases – as used, for instance, in some microgenetic studies (Wagoner, 2009) – it considers that "psychological analysis should begin with an analysis of people's everyday activities, rather than with abstract principles embodied in experimental procedures" (Cole, 1996, p. 33). In any case, it is against any method that claims to study human psyche outside of the 'noise' of the sociocultural environment, as usually done in quantitative laboratory experiments. As Shweder (1990, pp. 7–8) noted:

> The experimental lab is still treated as a privileged space, where, quite fantastically and against much evidence, it is conveniently assumed that one can physically enter a transcendent realm where the effects of context, content, and meaning can be eliminated, standardized, or kept under control, and the central processor observed in the raw.

Globally, it rejects any method that claims to be able to produce an 'absolute truth' that transcends contexts, any method that is presented as the most efficient tool for scientific investigation, regardless of what is being investigated.

At an epistemological level, thus, most of sociocultural psychology adopts a constructivist perspective, considering all knowledge to be contingent on the context within which it was produced. However, this is not a theoretical necessity deriving from the sociocultural axioms, and this thesis adopts a more pragmatist approach that will be presented later in more details (see section E). Generally speaking, it can be said that while sociocultural psychology is built around a constructivist approach, the role given to empirical reality varies immensely, from perspectives that defend the need for a critical but more systematic use of empirical data (Cornish & Gillespie, 2009) to perspectives that encourage employing and constructing more abstract generalisations (Valsiner, 2014a).

The methodological and epistemological implications of the sociocultural approach can be summarised in two main points. First, by considering that knowledge is socially and culturally located, it invites researchers to continuously question their practices. Objects of study, the way we decide to study them, and the theories we build on are never neutral. This is perhaps the most important lesson sociocultural psychology has to offer to researchers: we should always be self-reflective on the methods we use and the knowledge we are trying to construct. Scientific research, thus, is a perpetually renewed attempt to produce knowledge that may be useful, transform the way we understand the world, or simply and controversially shake some of our most deep-seated beliefs. The second point, however, is that there is no perfect method: neither the laboratory experiment nor the most grounded action-research can claim to produce 'absolute truth' or the most useful/beautiful/transformative truth. In conjunction, these two points paint a picture of the social and human sciences quite at odd with the positivist message of modern psychology: scientific investigation, in sociocultural psychology, is the constant attempt to question, perfect, and adapt methods of investigations to do justice to the elusive nature of psychological phenomena.

C. A Brief Introduction to a Complex History

Now I have introduced the main theoretical, methodological, and epistemological assumptions of sociocultural psychology, a short introduction of the history of the field is due. It was not used as a way of introduction, as is often customary, for one reason: sociocultural psychology has a multiple and complex history that make it a difficult entry point into the discipline. And indeed, depending on who is writing the history of cultural psychology, it was born four times: with Vico's new science (Shweder et al., 2007), in Wundt's second psychology (Cole, 1996), with

Vygotsky's cultural-historical psychology (Van der Veer, 2012), or in the second cognitive revolution (Bruner, 1990). Let us consider each of these 'births' in turn, before turning the 're-birth' of the discipline in the late 1980s.

Vico is often credited as the early father of human sciences, one of the firsts to have defended the idea that the study of man should not employ the same methods as the study of nature (Jahoda, 2012). He defended this idea in "The new science" (Vico, 1999), first published in 1725, a regularly rediscovered work. He also believed that imagination was a central human ability (Zittoun, 2015), which was essentially, for him, about giving meaning to the world (Verene, 1981), and which has inspired some scholarship on the topic both in psychology and philosophy. However, globally, the works of Vico are difficult for the modern reader, and most references to "the new science" are left as quick mentions at the beginning of longer historical discussions.

A more commonly mentioned date for the birth of cultural psychology is the end of the 19th Century, in Wundt's Leipzig laboratory (Cole, 1996). Wundt is generally considered to be the father of scientific psychology, yet he did not stop there: while he believed that elementary psycho-physiological phenomena should be studied with basic experiments, he also argued for a second psychology that would study complex human behaviours by "considering successively the main forms of expression of the folk mind" (Wundt, 1916, p. xiii) under the heading of *Völkerpsychologie*. "The central aims of *Völkerpsychologie* were to investigate the psychological aspects of groups of people living in communities bound by common language, myths, and customs" (Diriwächter, 2012, p. 45). These two forms of psychology remained separated, although it was not Wundt's aim, as Diriwächter (2012, p. 50) explains:

> Wundt felt that creative synthesis was the necessary link between the lower mental processes (i.e., sensory perceptions) and the higher processes that give our life meaning. The higher ones were the foundation of *Völkerpsychologie*. However, it needed to be understood that *Völkerpsychologie* was not really a self-standing discipline; rather, it was intimately connected to the lower processes – that is, those connected to physiology (Wundt, 1917), albeit this connection was never truly shown.

But the second psychology of Wundt was forgotten by most, and his experimental work, instead, paved the way for modern scientific psychology – at least in psychology's historical narrative (de Saint-Laurent, 2015a; Jahoda, 2007).

The third possible birth of sociocultural psychology can be found in the works of Lev Vygotsky, Russian psychologist in the early twentieth century, under the name 'cultural-historical psychology'. The influence of Vygotsky on sociocultural psychology is undisputable (see section II.A), and he has more generally left his mark both on psychology and education. The central idea of Vygotsky's approach was "that the child's naturally given mental processes become transformed by the acquisition of speech and meanings. Through speech the child acquires a worldview that reflects reality in a more adequate way" (Van der Veer, 2012, p. 58). He also believed that speech and meaning are socially transmitted and culturally developed, making of him the author of one of the first fully developed sociocultural theories in psychology. However, it is not until the 1980s that his work became widely known in the West, slowly supplanting the works of more traditional developmental psychologists like Piaget (while they actually shared many ideas now attributed to Vygotsky, see Van der Veer, 2012).

The fourth potential birth of sociocultural psychology followed the cognitive revolution of the 1960s. The cognitive revolution was supposed to bring back the psychological subject that behaviourism had made disappear, yet it lost its way, in particular by relying too much on the computer metaphor (Bruner, 1990). As Shweder (1990, p. 20) puts it:

> Ironically, right in the thick of the cognitive revolution, the psyche and the person were nowhere to be found in psychology, as the discipline designed to study the soul, the subjectivity, the person, the rational strivings of human beings for dignity and self-esteem had turned away from those themes and returned to the mechanistic investigation of automatic processes and deep abstract mathematical forms.

Some disappointed psychologists started to propose a second cognitive revolution in the early 1980s, under the name of cultural psychology. As Valsiner explains (2012a, p. 4):

> Although it began from the educational and developmental concerns in the 1980s that mostly used the ideas of Vygotsky as the center of their new efforts, by 2010s the effort also includes social psychology – both in Europe and the United States – where the generic label "social" becomes frequently taken over by "cultural".

It is this last approach that is often designated under the name 'social and cultural psychology'.

The history of sociocultural psychology is thus complex and multiple, among other things because while "we know that culture's journey into psychology has already been in the making

for over a century" (Valsiner, 2009, p. 7), "culture is a traveller, still negotiating its entrance into the walled city of psychology" (Valsiner, 2009, p. 5). However, if general agreement on the birth of sociocultural psychology is quasi impossible, it is more generally accepted that it was 'reborn' in the late 1980s to early 1990s – the story of this approach is "ultimately [...] a story of cyclical return" (Shweder, 1990, p. 1) no matter from whose perspective it is told. In 1990s, many publications defending this return became available, for instance in the form of original books (e.g., Cole, 1996; Rogoff, 1990; Shweder, 1990; Wertsch, 1998), re-editions (e.g., the edition of the complete works of Vygotsky for the first time in English), and scientific journals (*Culture & Psychology,* created in 1995 by Jaan Valsiner). Ever since, the field of sociocultural psychology has continuously expended and been applied to a multitude of topics – from the sociocultural psychology of religion (Belzen, 2010) to that of imagination (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016) and creativity (Glăveanu, 2010).

D. Three Sociocultural Perspectives

As sociocultural psychology 're-appeared' in psychology, it took diverse forms. Several attempts have been made to classify them, but no agreement has so far been found. In what follows, I propose to present the main theoretical perspectives that have been developed in sociocultural psychology in the past few decades, selecting and organising them based on two criteria: 1) that they illustrate a central aspect of sociocultural theory and practice; 2) that they fit within the sociocultural tradition as defined in this chapter. Three approaches were thus chosen: semiotic perspectives, dialogical perspectives, and mediated activity perspectives, which are discussed in turn. Two important candidates were thus removed: narrative approaches – as they fit under the semiotic and mediation perspectives – and discursive approaches – as they do not fully fit within the frame of sociocultural psychology (see however Chapter 2.II.C, Chapter 2.III.D.1, and Chapter 2.III.D.3 for discussions of these approaches).

Each of the perspectives presented below insist more on some sociocultural axioms than others, and the presentation will focus on what aspects are made salient by each perspective. However, it needs to be noted that none of them 'ignores' important parts of the sociocultural traditions, and that they are often used in conjunction. They are sometimes used as theories – that explain different aspects of the human psyche and can be used with other theories – and sometimes as perspectives – that encourage looking at a phenomena from a specific standpoint.

1. Semiotic Theories and Perspectives

Semiotic theories are interested in how human beings produce meanings about their environment, others, and themselves. In the words of Valsiner (2014, p. 1), we are:

> … compulsive meaning-makers – whatever we encounter in our lives we need to *make sense of*, rather than only *react* or *act upon*. Or even more precisely, as we *react to* and *act upon* the world in the middle of which we live, we construct it as *meaningful to ourselves*. And it is that meaningful way of living that is central to us.

Semiotic approaches have thus defended the idea that meaning making is central to thinking, and that in terms of reasoning it is on par with formal logic (Bruner, 1990, 2003), if not more important.

Sociocultural semiotic approaches find their roots in the works of Charles Sanders Peirce, more commonly known as the father of pragmatism. Peirce, however, also developed a complex theory of how meaning is made, and in particular of signs. He considered that the dyadic relation between the sign and the object it referred to was not enough to understand semiosis, and instead proposed a triadic relationship between sign, object, and interpreter (Peirce, 1991), thus making of the subject an essential part of meaning-making. For Peirce (1985, p. 5), a sign:

> … is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*.

Because this interpretant is itself a sign, it creates an "infinite chain of interpretation" or thought (Misak, 2004, p. 10).

Peirce's semiotic has inspired many theories in psychology and beyond, following more or less closely his original work, and sociocultural psychology is no exception. On the one side, some researchers have based their theories on Peirce's works and expended them further. For instance, Jaan Valsiner has proposed a "sociocultural psychology of dynamic semiosis" (Valsiner, 2014a, p. 18), arguing, among other things, that we use and construct dynamic hierarchies of signs that allow us to develop a meaningful relation to the world, but also to others and ourselves. On the other side, some sociocultural psychologists have taken inspiration from Peirce but proposed models more distant from his original theory – although by no means incompatible. Tania Zittoun, for example, has developed a model of meaning making based on a *semiotic prism*, made

of the dynamic relations between person, object, shared signification, and personal sense (Abbey & Zittoun, 2010; Zittoun, 2006, 2017, see also Chapter 4.I.F.3 and Chapter 6.I.G).

Semiotic approaches, globally, have been interested in how signs are produced, shared, and used. As such, they have mainly focused on the 'cultural' dimension of sociocultural psychology – while by no means ignoring its social dimension, as Zittoun's work show – by emphasising the role of shared symbols in psychological processes. They have also opened the grounds for new understandings of higher mental functions, such as imagination (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016), and have been at the basis of Bruner's narrative approach (Bruner, 2003, and see also section Chapter 2.III.D.3).

2. Dialogical Theories and Perspectives

Dialogical approaches stem from the works of Bakhtin, a mid-twentieth century Russian literary critic. He argued that speech is always dialogical – it is always a reply to something and an anticipation of the next turn – a phenomena he called *addressivity* (Bakhtin, 1986). He also proposed the notion of *heteroglossia* (Bakhtin, 1981) to designate the fact that any discourse is made up of the heterogeneous voices of others and borrows from different linguistic genres. Indeed, Bakhtin defended the idea that speech is always a quote from someone else, as we learn language through others' use of it and not through dictionary definitions (Bakhtin, 1986).

His theories have been used in psychology, and more particularly in sociocultural approaches, to argue "that human nature and human life are constituted in interrelations with 'the other', that is, in *other orientation*" (Linell, 2009, p. 13). By claiming that discourses are always oriented towards others and borrowing from them, dialogical approaches defend the idea that intersubjectivity – "broadly speaking, […] the variety of possible relations between people's perspectives" (Gillespie & Cornish, 2010, p. 19) – is central to the development and use of language, but also more generally of any psychological process. These approaches have very successfully spread in sociocultural psychology, as dialogism is both a theory and a method (see Chapter 4.I.D) that allows researchers to take into account the role of social interactions beyond the interactions themselves, that is beyond face to face verbal encounters (although developping truly dialogical methods has proven extremely difficult, see Grossen, 2010).

While dialogism has been a growing field, "peeking under this umbrella term reveals a heterogeneous assemblage of scholars seeking shelter, sometimes more unified by trying to avoid

the rain than their choice of umbrella" (Gillespie, 2011, p. ix). However, dialogical approaches do share two common assumptions, as expressed by Grossen & Salazar Orvig (2011, p. 492):

> The first is that language and communication play a central role in human development; the second is that the term "dialogue" does not only refer to face-to-face interaction, but more generally to the fact that any discourse (even a dialogue with oneself) echoes the voices of discourses that were held elsewhere at other times and in other situations.

Two main sociocultural research traditions have emerged out of dialogism in the past few decades. The first one, led by the work of Ivana Marková, has focused on the role dialogism – in the form of thematic oppositions (Marková, 2000) – plays in the way we represent alterity and social objects (Marková, 2003, 2016). These dialogical oppositions between and within the representations are what fuels thinking and are at the basis of common sense (see also section Chapter 2.II.B). From this perspective, knowledge and representations are the product of a dialogue of perspectives that exist in an irreducible tension. Studies in this area have analysed, for instance, the often latent oppositions between and within social discourses (Léchot, Grossen, Laufer, Ansermet, & Germond, 2013) or the different social voices present in one's discourse (Gillespie, Cornish, Aveling, & Zittoun, 2008).

The second research tradition that emerged, in sociocultural psychology, out of Bakhtin's ideas is Herman's dialogical self theory, that he defined as follows (Hermans, 2002, p. 148):

> In a most succinct way, the dialogical self can be described as a dynamic multiplicity of I-positions in the landscape of the mind, intertwined as this mind is with the minds of other people. In a sense the dialogical self is a "society of mind" because there is no essential difference between the positions a person takes as part of the self and the positions people take as members of a heterogeneous society.

In other words, the dialogical self theory posits that since mind is dialogical, and since these dialogical voices represent social positions, we can study minds as dialogues between different positions. While this theory can be criticised on multiple grounds – for example for the fact that it defines these I-positions in a rather static manner, that it tends to overlook the relations between the voices, or that it overly relies on social metaphors – it has also produced very interesting studies. For instance, Aveling & Gillespie (2008) have used it to analyse the different

positions assumed by second generation Turkish migrants in London, showing the tensions between their British and Turkish I-positions and how they construct hybrid identities.

3. Mediated Activity Theories and Perspectives

The third line of research that can be found in sociocultural psychology is centred on the notion of activity. Although research in this field is often grouped under the heading of "Activity theory" or "CHAT" (Cultural-Historical Activity Theory), not all the theories and studies falling within this tradition have adopted this terminology, hence the choice of the terms "mediated activity theories". Most sociocultural psychology approaches have more or less directly claimed to follow a Vygotskian perspective or to be interested in Soviet psychology, but mediated activity theories are probably its most direct descendants (Dafermos, 2014). They follow the works of Vygotsky and his successor Leontiev, and consider that human activity is symbolically, socially and materially mediated. They have focused, for instance, on how people learn to participate in collective activities (Rogoff, 1993), on the tools they use to do so (Wertsch, 1998), on the effects of the systemic organisation of human activity (Engeström, 1987), or on the historical, social, and ontological development of symbolic action (Boesch, 1997).

Engeström (1999) has distinguished between three generations of activity theory. The first generation corresponds to Vygotsky's work, who was interested in how our relation to the world and our actions are *mediated* by cultural-historical tools (Wertsch, 2007, see also Chapter 2.III.D.2), in particular signs (Vygotsky & Luria, 1994). The second generation begun with Leontiev, who introduced two major changes to Vygotsky's approach. First, he emphasised the collective nature of human action, and proposed a model of activity that "turned the focus on complex interrelations between the individual subject and his or her community" (Engeström, 1999, para. 6). Second, while Vygotsky was more interested in sign mediation – so in language activities – Leontiev's work emphasised the role of social and material mediation, and was thus more interested by concrete activities (Van der Veer, 2012). The third generation of mediated activity theories stem from the works of Engeström himself, who argued that activity theory needs "to understand dialogue, multiple perspectives and voices, and networks of interacting activity systems. In this mode of research, the basic model is expanded to include minimally two interacting activity systems" (Engeström, 1999, para. 8). He thus expanded the basic activity triangle he had proposed based on Leontiev's work – a set of triangles putting activity at the intersections between subject, object, and community – and proposed to study activity as the

interaction between several activity triangle representing different perspectives, such as professionals/users or teachers/learners (Engeström, 2001, 2009).

While this approach has proved a very useful tool to study action in organisations, in schools, and so on, it can also be criticised for the rather static structure it imposes on activity. Taken to the extreme, it encourages researchers to "fill in" the activity triangles, instead of understanding ever moving, changing, and open systems in their interactions. Moreover, because it focuses primarily on concrete activities, it is adapted for the study of socially, historically, and spatially/temporally well delimitated activities. However, it is quite ill fitted for the study of complex psychological processes that develop at the intersection of multiple contexts and through participation in a wide range of activities, as is the case for the phenomena studied in this dissertation. The exception here is represented by the first generation of mediated activity, which inspired Wertsch's sociocultural theory of collective memory and will thus be extensively referred to throughout this thesis.

E. The Approach Adopted in This Thesis

The approach adopted in this thesis is located within the field of sociocultural psychology. More specifically, it defends the idea that the object of psychology is the person, as an intentional agent, acting in a specific sociocultural context and interacting with others by using symbolic, social, and material tools. It also considers that three elements play fundamental roles in psychological processes: meaning-making, as the ability to transcend the here and now, alterity, as ability to transcend the self, and agency, as the ability to transcend the present conditions.

In consequence, the present work borrows from all three families of theories and perspectives presented above. As they all follow the basic sociocultural axioms, they are globally theoretically, methodologically, and epistemologically compatible. However, this compatibility is often superficial: while all these theories conceptualise human psyche in broadly similar terms and often borrow from each other, they also study it from sometimes widely different angles. Attempting to take them all into account at once is thus an impossible juggling act. In this thesis, they are thus combined either 'locally' (in relation to a very concrete or specific issue), 'partially' (only some aspects of the theory are considered), or they are simply used in turn.

This thesis also takes inspiration from critical psychology, an umbrella term that regroups approaches that consider issues of power to be central to both practices and the construction of knowledge (Teo, 2015). Some attempts have been made to combine critical and sociocultural

approaches (Ratner, 2002, 2008), but they have adopted a very macro and sociological perspective. However, as Shi–Xu (2002, p. 72) explains:

> … in doing cultural psychology we must pay attention to power asymmetry and power struggle as an essential and integral part of culture and, therefore, of psychology. We need to realize, in other words, that we are not merely dealing with 'culture interacting with psychology', as is usually understood, but perforce encounter the seen but unnoticed political issues of domination, prejudice, exclusion and resistance and, consciously or inadvertently, make our own political choice, that is, take sides.

While the notion of power is largely absent from this thesis, at an explicit level, it is in the background of this research and stimulated the research questions introduced earlier (Section I).

Finally, the epistemological perspective adopted in this work is not, contrary to most of sociocultural psychology, constructivist. While I agree that knowledge is always a construction from a certain perspective, I also believe that constructivism runs the risk of making reality disappear by studying the construction of knowledge completely independently from reality (as Berger & Luckmann, 1966 advocate). Instead, I consider, following Searle (1995), that there are different types of 'truth' about which different types of claims can be made. While the significance of World War II is what Searle would call an ontologically subjective claim, the fact that it started in 1939 is ontologically objective: it rests on socially constructed knowledge, such as knowledge of time divisions, what constitute a war and how it may be started, but it is true within this system of knowledge[2]. Much of the knowledge produced in psychology is based on ontologically subjective claims – about meanings, values, emotions, and so on – but it should not all be reduced to that. While this distinction is not necessarily major in most psychology studies, it will matter for the subject at hand (see Chapter 6 and Chapter 8), for representations of history intertwine both types of claims.

More globally, the epistemology adopted in this thesis is pragmatist, following in particular the works of James (1922) and Peirce (1955). Pragmatism considers that the 'truth value' of an idea does not reside in whether it is a correct representation of reality, but whether it "works", that is whether it allows human action (Rorty, 1998). This implies that whether an idea is true or false is

[2] This claim may be open for discussion for historians, but this is because they operate within the system of knowledge of their discipline, which does not fully match the one of everyday discourses on history.

not an absolute quality of the idea, but depends on the interests of the person holding it. In that sense, it is very close to constructivist approaches, as it considers that truth is plural and a matter of perspective, but it differs from constructivism in the sense that it discriminates between ideas based on their pragmatic value. The theories, methods, and data one should use to produce scientific knowledge thus depend on the question asked, not on a absolute hierarchy of research practices (Cornish & Gillespie, 2009). In the specific context of psychological research, it means that it also values ideas that shed new light on the phenomenon, that have positive consequences for practice, or that question the status quo (Cornish & Gillespie, 2009), making it an epistemology easily compatible with critical perspectives.

Now that I have set the general theoretical and epistemological grounds for this thesis, it is time to turn to towards the more specific topic of this dissertation, the construction and use of collective memory.

Chapter 2.

Collective Memory From a Sociocultural Perspective

I. Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the literature on collective memory in psychology, and the theoretical approach adopted in this regard. Before fully entering the topic of representations of history, however, a slight detour through the research on how people represent the social world or construct knowledge about it is necessary, as it shaped much of the scholarship on historical representations. It is this field of study that I propose to regroup under the heading of "social thinking" and that will be the topic of the next section. I will then present the history of the concept of collective memory, and discuss how it is used today in psychology, discussing in more details the social and cultural perspectives. Finally, I will introduce the approach chosen for this thesis.

II. Social Thinking

Social thinking has been, more or less directly, one of the central topics of psychology, especially in social, sociocultural and some forms of cognitive psychology. By social thinking I mean all forms of psychological processes oriented towards social others, social groups, societies, and communities, and that aim at representing, understanding, evaluating, and giving meaning to them. This has been studied under a large range of headings, from social cognition and social knowledge to categorisation and attribution. Social thinking is thus meant to be a large umbrella term covering a wide array of studies that have investigated and theorised how we relate to the social world. As we will see, representations of history, as they are studied in this thesis, fall in this broad category of social thinking. It is therefore important to introduce it here for two reasons. First, psychological research on historical representations derives, in large parts, from the research on social thinking, although this is not often made explicit. Presenting this literature first will thus clarify some of the approaches, theories, and shortcomings of the literature on historical representations. Second, not all of the work on social thinking has been translated into the research on representations of history, yet it has the potential to shed new light on how

people relate to the collective past. The perspective outlined at the end of this chapter (see section III.E) thus also takes inspiration from them.

There are many ways to approach the topic of social thinking, as the literature on the subject is both rich and fragmented. In what follows, I first present the research on social cognition and reasoning, regrouping within it a large range of studies that have made the core of mainstream social psychology, but that are not central to the present thesis. Second, I introduce the theory of social representations, a theory closely linked to the question of how people represent history. Third, I present the discursive approaches to social thinking, which have inspired much of the sociocultural literature on historical representations. Finally, I summarise the debate between these two last current of thoughts and link it to the sociocultural approach outlined in the previous section.

A. Social Cognition and Reasoning

Social cognition refers to the research that is placed at the meeting point between social psychology and cognitive psychology (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Globally, it regroups the research done in social psychology that has been interested in how we understand, categorise, and evaluate others (Doise, 1993). While it 'belongs' more to the field of social psychology, it has taken inspiration from cognitive psychology, and in particular from the literature on reasoning (see for instance Carlston, 2013). Globally, actually, most of the research on social thinking in mainstream social psychology have been strongly influenced by cognitive psychology (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), and a quick detour through the literature on reasoning can shed new light on how they have approached the topic.

The most prominent theory of reasoning in cognitive psychology at the moment remains Evans' dual process theory (Evans, 1989; Evans & Over, 1996). According to this theory, we use two different forms of reasoning: the learnt and conventional type of reasoning that follows formal logic, and a more adaptive, personal type of reasoning that is natural logic. This second type of logic is subject to many reasoning biases that make people select, in reasoning tasks, wrong answers because they seem plausible or correct to the participants. While Evans considered this type of logic to be adaptive – allowing people to respond quickly to the demands of everyday situations – this 'natural' form of reasoning was meant to explain errors of judgement and was given, even in Evans' theory, a lower status; while formal logic is the educated way to produce a correct answer, natural logic is the instinctive incorrect response to the task.

This perspective permeates much of the research on social cognition. Social psychology research on stereotypes, categorisation, and attribution has consistently shown that we misjudge others even in the face of clear evidence – for instance, even when contact should reduce our prejudice (Hewstone & Brown, 1986) or when we have been warned of our own errors of judgement (Katzev & Brownstein, 1989). However, by adopting a universalistic and deterministic perspective on social thinking, it has also constructed human behaviour as such. That is, by understanding social cognition as a natural and instinctive form of reasoning, it has shown little interest for how exactly people think and, for instance, how they reflect and contest the results of scientific research regarding their own behaviour (Gergen, 1973). Instead, it has reified its own representations of social thinking by devising experimental methods that would show, in the 'clean' environment of the lab, that people do indeed systematically misjudge others and social situations, and that they are subjects to a multitude of biases and influences that determine the responses they give.

The point here is not to dismiss all the research done in mainstream social psychology, for it has also brought some very interesting findings on group dynamic and how we understand our social environment. The problem with such research, however, is that it presents only a one sided picture of phenomena it considers universal and essential to human psychology, when evidence has shown even the most basic attribution processes to be contingent on the cultural context (see Farr & Anderson, 1983 for a review and alternative explanation). Implicitly, it also encourages an opposition between the 'good' logic of the educated elite against the instinctive reactions of lay people, an opposition already present in Le Bon's (1896) picture of the crowd as a barbarian horde. This is exactly the dichotomy the next approach aimed to tackle.

B. Social Representation Theory

Social representations theory was developed by Serge Moscovici (1961) in a study on the reception of psychoanalysis in France in the late 1950s. His aim was to understand how groups of people understood psychoanalysis and made sense of it, using a form of logic he called 'common sense'. More generally, he was interested in the production and communication of social knowledge, and he developed the notion of social representations to designate it, as (Moscovici, 1973, p. xii):

> …a system of values, ideas and practices with a twofold function: first to establish an order which will enable individuals to orient themselves in their

> material and social world and to master it; and secondly, to enable communication to take place among the members of a community by providing them with a code for social exchange and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their individual and group history.

There are thus two central aspects to social representations. First, they make the unfamiliar familiar: they enable people to grasp new and complex social objects by *anchoring* them into other known objects and by *objectifying* them – that is, by turning abstract ideas into concrete objects (Moscovici, 1984). Second, they are public and socially shared, by which I mean that they are part of the public discourses (in the media but also in everyday conversations) held by different social groups. In this sense the 'social' of social representations and of social thinking are not the same – the latter refers to the object of knowledge, while the former refers to the knowledge itself – although there is a strong overlap between the two. Indeed, social representations participate in the construction of social reality, and as such they are also ideological: they have the potential to impose certain representations of the world, reflecting the unequal distribution of power in the public sphere (Jovchelovitch, 2007b).

Following Moscovici's work, two strong traditions of social representations emerged. The first one, led by Abric (1994) in France, proposed a structuralist model of representations, distinguishing, for instance, between core and peripheral elements. This approach inspired much of the work presented in section III.B (and will be further discussed there). The second tradition was developed in the UK under the influence of, among others, Ivana Marková, Gerard Duveen, and Robert Farr. It adopted a more dynamic and open understanding of social representation theory (L. Liu, 2004), perhaps closer to what its original author intended. It also furthered Moscovici's theory, for instance by including the dimension of time (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999), by reflecting on its relation with identity (Duveen, 2001), or by expending on the symbolic function (Jovchelovitch, 2007b; Zittoun, Duveen, Gillespie, Ivinson, & Psaltis, 2003). Ivana Marková (2003) proposed to adopt a dialogical perspective on social representations, considering social representations to be the product of irreducible thematic tensions (Marková, 2000, see also section Chapter 1.II.D.2).

C. Discursive Theories

Discursive psychology was born out of the same discontent with the first cognitive revolution as sociocultural psychology (Harré & Gillett, 1994), but its main roots are in a different literature: it follows the works of Austin, and Berger and Luckmann. Austin (1975) was a philosopher of language best known for his speech act theory. His idea was that utterances can be statements that are either true or false, but they can also 'do' things, such as performing an apology, making a promise, or insult someone. He actually argued that all utterances perform something, even statements, and thus that discourse is a form of action – the succession of *speech acts*. Berger & Luckmann (1966), on the other hand, were sociologists who were interested in the sociology of knowledge and how reality is built (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 15):

> … the sociology of knowledge must concern itself with whatever passes for 'knowledge' in a society, regardless of the ultimate validity or invalidity (by whatever criteria) of such 'knowledge'. And in so far as all human 'knowledge' is developed, transmitted and maintained in social situations, the sociology of knowledge must seek to understand the processes by which this is done in such a way that a taken-for-granted 'reality' congeals for the man in the street. In other words, we contend that *the sociology of knowledge is concerned with the analysis of the social construction of reality*.

They actually introduced the term 'social construction' to refer to the fact "the worlds in which we all live are not just there, not just natural objective phenomena, but are constructed by a whole range of different social arrangements and practices" (Potter, 1996, p. 12).

Discursive psychology is thus interested in how discourses construct reality. It follows, according to Potter (1996), three main principles. First, it is anticognitivist: it opposes itself to cognitive psychologists on the grounds that they take "for granted that there [are] mental processes "behind" what people [can] be observed to do" (Harré & Gillett, 1994, p. 9). For discursive psychology, on the contrary (Harré & Gillett, 1994, p. 22):

> … [the] delineation of the subject matter of psychology has to take account of discourses, significations, subjectivities, and positionings, for it is in these that psychological phenomena actually exist. For example, an attitude should not be seen as a semipermanent mental entity, causing people to say and do certain

> things. Rather, it comes into existence in displays expressive of decisions and judgments and in the performance of actions.

Discursive psychology thus considers that what psychology should study is what we *do* and not what the researcher thinks is *in the head* of the participants – such as, for instance, mental representations. Second, as its name indicates, it is centred on the idea of discourse, and especially on the idea that psychology should analyse discourses as sequences of acts that are performed (Potter, 1996). This because it considers that "discursive phenomena, for example, acts of remembering, are not manifestations of hidden subjective, psychological phenomena. They are psychological phenomena" (Harré & Gillett, 1994, p. 27). Discourse, in this perspective, is where psychological processes take place, and it is thus where they should be studied.

Third, discursive psychology gives an important place to rhetoric. As explained by Billig et al. (1988, p. 3):

> Individuals are not to be seen as being fully preprogrammed by neatly systematized plans of action, which are awaiting the appropriate triggering stimulus and which obviate the need for all deliberation. Rather, the contrary themes enable people to discuss and puzzle over their everyday life, and in this respect the rhetorical skills of argument are closely linked to the skills of thinking.

Indeed, if psychological processes are to be found in discourse, then people's rhetoric abilities become psychological skills. As Harré & Gillett (1994, p. 27) put it:

> The production of psychological phenomena, such as emotions, decisions, attitudes, personality displays, and so on, in discourse depends upon the skill of the actors, their relative moral stranding in the community, and the story lines that unfold.

Research in discursive psychology is thereby focused on two questions (Harré & Gillett, 1994): 1) what resources (systems of signs, mainly) do people have to reach their goals and how do they use them? And 2) how do people construct agreed upon phenomena (e.g., what it is to produce scientific knowledge, what constitutes a memory, what it is to be creative, and so on) which they can describe using these resources? It has looked, for instance, at how the notion of 'false memory' has been constructed, and how it has been used to disqualify certain testimonies

(Brown & Reavey, 2017), or at how the choice of vocabulary in psychology construct an image of an objective science by removing mentions of the psychological subject (Billig, 1998).

D. Ongoing Debate

The strong debate between the tenants of social representation theory and discursive psychologists has been going on for more than thirty years, with the latter being one of the most vehement critics of the former (e.g., Potter & Litton, 1985). On the one hand, discursivists oppose the notion of social representations on the ground that it is a cognitive theory (Potter & Edwards, 1999), which assumes that people have mental representations of things 'stocked' in their heads. While the notion of representation suggests that there is something 'in the mind' of the subject, the idea that these representations are shared – for it is often the meaning given to the social component of social representation – does imply that there is a 'thing' of which people can 'stock a copy'. And it is indeed how the theory has been used by some within social psychology (see section III.B).

On the other hand, some researchers working with the theory of social representations have argued that it belongs to a dialogical epistemology, that is "an epistemology of human cognition, communication and, more generally, of the human sciences, which [is] concerned with the study of symbolic thoughts expressed in language" (Marková, 2000, p. 424). From this perspective, thus, social representations are not 'static things in the head' but meanings given to social objects through the use of language. These are shared with others because they can be communicated, but more fundamentally because we use shared systems of signs that "promot[e] some – rather than other – interpretations of the current state of affairs" (Valsiner, 2014a, p. 100). One fundamental difference is thus that while discursive psychology considers thought to be private speech (Harré & Gillett, 1994), researchers using a dialogical epistemology tend to argue that thought and language are deeply interdependent, but not the same thing.

Tenants of social representation theory have also argued that although there are limits to the notion of representation, one cannot do away with them (Marková, 2000). Doing so would mean doing away with the subject and letting "behaviourism [in] by the back door" (Jovchelovitch, 2007a, p. 128) by reducing psychology to behaviour – this time in the form of discourse. Indeed, while cognitive approaches have created "a mind without history", behaviourism created "a history without a subject" (Jovchelovitch, 2007a, p. 130). By focusing solely on discourse – not necessarily by denying the existence of the rest but by considering it impossible to study and not

including it in psychological theories (e.g., Middleton & Brown, 2005) – discursive psychology replaced agentivity by the intentionality of acts of language: if everything is constructed in discourse, then subjects have no history, no future, and no intentions outside of it. This is why discursive psychology does not fully belong to sociocultural psychology as it has been defined in this thesis (section Chapter 1.II.A).

We will briefly come back to this debate in subsequent sections (III.B and III.D.1), once the notion of collective memory has been introduced. For now, suffice to say that the approach taken in this dissertation borrows from discursive psychology – as it has offered valuable theories and studies on how people construct history – but fits more within a social representation paradigm. However, as will be seen (section III.E), there are also some fundamental differences between this paradigm and the approach developed in this thesis, mainly because they focus on quite different phenomena.

III. Collective Memory

Now that the sociocultural orientation of this thesis and the theoretical foundations of the literature on social thinking have been laid out, we can turn toward our topic of interest: the study of historical representations. As a reminder, this thesis aims to explore how people construct, appropriate, mobilise, and challenge representations of the past. This can be subdivided in four questions:

1) **How are representations of the past discussed and mobilised in interactions?**
2) **How do people come to resist or challenge hegemonic representations of the past?**
3) **How are new historical representations produced?**
4) **How are they mobilised to imagine collective futures**?

In psychology, and more generally in the social sciences, these phenomena have been studied under the heading of "collective memory". As a starting point, collective memory can be defined as the representation social groups have of the historical past. It is usually associated with the idea that they adopt biased versions of history, glorifying the actions of local heroes and

presenting others as more violent or less civilised than them. As we will see, however, there are many understandings of the concept of collective memory, making of this a heteroclite field.

In this section, I review the literature on collective memory in psychology, looking in particular at how different approaches have conceptualised the psychological processes behind historical representations. However, one of the difficulty one faces when trying to review the field of collective memory, as Olick (1999) noted, is that although a multitude of approaches exist, they are non paradigmatic and thus there is no clear way to distinguish between them and to 'classify' them. Yet, a certain 'order', as artificial as it may be, is necessary to be able to discuss more globally the advances and limits of a field. Below such an attempt is made. It does not follow a chronological order (see for instance de Saint-Laurent, 2017, for a chronological account), but rather the theoretical connections between different approaches. And because of the psychological orientation of this thesis, it is also from this perspective that the field is approached and the literature to be included has been selected. However, our starting point remains its historical origin in sociology – in the work of Maurice Halbwachs.

First, I present the historical roots of the concept of collective memory. Second, I introduce the 'collected memory' and 'psychosocial memory' approaches, which stem principally from the social cognition and social representations traditions, respectively. I then move on to the sociocultural and discursive approaches, that have looked at memory as a discursive practice, a form of mediated action, and as narrative reasoning. I conclude this section by presenting the perspective on collective memory that will be adopted in this thesis. This will provide the starting point for the studies reported in the empirical chapters (Chapter 4, Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7), but further literature and theoretical discussions are included in each chapter, where links are made to other fields of study and theories that can shed light on collective memory in general and the question treated in each study in particular.

A. The Historical Roots of Collective Memory

Collective memory is a concept born in sociology in 1925, in the writings of French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, a student of Durkheim. It is thus quite naturally that it was formulated as a social approach to memory. Actually, Halbwachs' interest was not so much to study how people represent history, but to understand how (small) social groups remember their past (Halbwachs, 1992). He argued that all memory is social memory, and that what we remember about our past is linked to the groups we shared it with: not only did all of our past take place in social groups –

family, friends, co-workers, etc. – but when we part from them we also part from the memories we shared with them (Halbwachs, 1950). To a large extent, then, his work on collective memory would find more resonance today in social approaches to autobiographical memory than in the current understandings of collective memory. However, he also defined collective memory in opposition to history – as the living memory of the group against the dead frame of history – oscillating in his work between a sociological perspective inherited from Durkheim and a very psychological approach to memory (Déloye, 2002).

By the time Halbwachs' work resurfaced, saved from oblivion more than 30 years after its original publication in French, collective memory had taken a decisively more historical and sociological turn. Indeed, it is not until the late eighties that the concept of collective memory became a topic of research, mainly in history (e.g., Nora, 1997) and anthropology (e.g., Connerton, 1989). There, collective memory became what (large) social groups – primarily the nation – remember of their past and how it is embodied in public spaces and oral traditions, in opposition to formal history. As explained above, this distinction was already central to the work of Maurice Halbwachs, but the other aspects of his theory – the links with psychology and individual memory – took a back seat. As the concept of collective memory spread to social sciences and humanities, becoming an important object of study in sociology, anthropology, history, political sciences, and literature, the transformation of its meaning became widely accepted – to the point that is now often ignored by those who use it.

Although almost all the theories presented in this section can be grouped under the general heading of collective memory and claim to follow Halbwachs work, it is usually more because they share a common interest – representations of history and/or socially shared memories – than a certain set of theoretical, methodological or practical assumptions. To distinguish between these different approaches, new designations are proposed and explained for each category.

B. Collected Memory

Collected memory is neither the first born of collective memory, nor even a name scholars would give to their own work. It is, however, the main approach to collective memory in psychology, especially in social psychology, and it is thus a good starting point. The termed was coined by sociologist Jeffrey Olick, and aimed at making a distinction between a *collective* memory that would study social manifestations of history and a *collected* memory that would simply aggregate individual memory to produce an artificial picture of how the past is collectively

remembered (Olick, 1999). Although the critique made may be a bit harsh and caricatural, it does not fall far off what is often done in social psychology when studying collective memory. Individual responses are collected, either through interviews or more often questionnaires, and statistically analysed to find what is the collective memory of the group, under the assumption that societies are simply equal to the sum of their members. This type of research is, nonetheless, quite popular: it has the aura of science only large international samples can provide, and it rests on basic psychological methods easily adaptable to the topic (that is, mainly questionnaires).

Because it is a popular approach, collected memory includes a quite vast spectrum of studies, making the above criticism very fitting in some cases and rather caricatural and simplistic in others. At one end of the spectrum lie large cross-cultural studies, asking hundreds or thousands of participants to fill up questionnaires, to rank historical figures in terms of importance or to provide a short description of WWII (e.g., J. H. Liu et al., 2005), providing fascinating but often shallow data. On the other end of the spectrum are small(er) scale studies, where members of specific social groups are interviewed about a historical event that is significant to them, asked to tell its story or explain why it matters to them (e.g., Hewer & Kut, 2010), often offering a deeper understanding of how the past is remembered. However, what unites the collected memory approach is the underlying assumption that it is the collection of individual memories that produces collective memory. Collective memory is sometimes, in this case, seen as a prolongation of autobiographical memory (Kansteiner, 2002), and is thus simply the product of episodic memory. Because this assumption is shared with collective remembering approaches, presented below, its implications and limits will be discussed there as well.

The majority of collected memory studies, however, do not build on autobiographical or episodic memory, but usually consider, more or less explicitly, that collective memory is a form of social representation (e.g., Haas & Jodelet, 2000; Jovchelovitch, 2012; J. H. Liu & Hilton, 2005; Wagoner, 2015). Because social representation theory is (originally) interested in how scientific knowledge is transformed and shared by lay people (Moscovici, 1961), it seems quite self-evident to use it to study collective memory. From this perspective, then, collected memory is produced by the transformation of historical knowledge into a common-sense representation of the past that fits the needs of the group: positive self image, easy communication, anchoring of new information, and so on (e.g., Psaltis, 2012; Wertsch & Batiashvili, 2012). The process of collected memory is a process of deformation and diffusion, but not of (knowledge) construction: it is a common-sense appropriation of the knowledge produced by others, experts in the subject matter. This is also because, generally, collected memory studies use a static and structuralist version of social representations, that understands them as something that can be

collected in a questionnaire and then aggregated in a unified picture that characterises the collective memory of a specific group.

Studies in this area have yielded, nonetheless, very interesting findings. They have shown, for instance, that the collective memory of nation groups often takes the form of a myth of origins that is deeply linked to national identity (J. H. Liu & Hilton, 2005), as it defines on what basis the group was created and around what values. Other studies have demonstrated that groups which are in conflict will often hold widely opposed versions of the same past, presenting the ingroup as heroic or victimised and the outgroup as the villain or the oppressor (Bar-Tal, 2014). These narratives are not just deeply linked to the identity of the group, they also define how others are seen. Indeed, collective memory is often used to justify stereotypes about others, on the grounds that if they have consistently behaved in a particular way throughout history then it must be 'in their nature' to do such things (Raudsepp & Wagner, 2012). As a result, representations of the past can play a prominent role in conflicts, and participate in their intractability by presenting the other group as the author of unforgivable wrongs or as essentially different from the ingroup, both in terms of values and behaviours (Licata, Klein, & Gély, 2007).

As may be apparent from above, collected memory approaches have not only used social representation theory, but also the work done on social cognition. This area of research has indeed been strongly influenced by mainstream social psychology studies on stereotypes, group dynamic, attribution, categorisation, and so on. As such, it has also created a picture of collective memory as ruled by the same principles, ignoring how historical narratives can also participate in reconciliation (Nicholson, 2017) and resistance (Awad, 2017), and setting up studies that would only confirm this evaluation (de Saint-Laurent et al., 2017). Consequently, although collected memory research has presented a very interesting picture of collective memory, it should be approached cautiously. In particular, one should guard against overly generalising these findings and limiting the role of historical representations to questions of identity and intergroup conflict.

C. Psychosocial Memory

Another perspective on collective memory has emerged from social psychology in the past few years, although from slightly different roots. It did not start, as collective and collected memory did, out of an interest for how people remember history and other collective events, but was born out of autobiographical and episodic memory studies, where the importance of social interactions in individual memory quickly became clear (Fivush, 2011; Nelson, 2007). As a result,

some started applying the methods – especially experiments – and theories – mainly concerning group dynamics – of social psychology to memory. Studies were made, for instance, on reminiscence of major events in groups, showing how what people choose to include or omit is influenced by the stories told by others, and will have long term effect on what is actually remembered afterwards (Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012). Other studies, more closely linked to autobiographical memory, have looked at the family transmission of memories. They have showed, for instance, how it participates to a sense of continuity with one's family (Fivush, Bohanek, & Duke, 2008), or how family narratives can be transformed over several generations to show one's ancestors in a better light (Welzer, Moller, & Tschuggnall, 2013).

In many ways, this approach is closer to Halbwachs' original work than any other presented here, as it is a truly social and psychological approach to memory. However, it also means that it is further away from our topic of interest: because it focuses on how people remember in groups, it usually does not cover historical events but only recent collective events[3]. Theoretically, and although most tenants of this approach do claim that they belong to the wider field of collective memory studies (e.g., Coman, Brown, Koppel, & Hirst, 2009), their interest lies more in psycho-social memory than in representations of the historical past. Methodologically, however, it is easier to study how people discuss major events that will soon be part of history, because it allows researchers to bring together in the lab participants who do not know each other and yet will have a common event to discuss.

In terms of processes, the psychosocial approach is quite similar to collected memory, although social representation theory is usually left out in favour of work done on memory. Indeed, because it is interested in social influence, its main objects of study are the transformations – most often in the form of biases – of memory. Although this time the deformation goes from individual souvenirs to a collective and homogeneous story, instead of from scientific knowledge to lay representations, the basic mechanism remains the same: collective memory is the product of the distortion social groups operate on the (more accurate) accounts of past provided by experts, actors and eye witnesses. There is, of course, much to learn from these processes, and social psychological approaches to collective memory have a lot to add to the debate – although, as we will see, it's object of study is rather different from the one of this thesis (see section E).

[3] The exceptions here are studies on family memory, which may include historical events. However, they are generally interested in how people remember the stories told by the previous generations and transform them, and thus do too fall rather outside the scope of this thesis.

Considering everyday thinking about history primarily in terms of loss of information, biases and conformism with others, however, is giving a quite narrow picture of how people construct representations of the past, one that tends to cast a rather large shadow on people's ability to speak and act as reasonable, thinking beings. This is exactly what the approaches discussed next aimed to overcome.

D. Collective Remembering

The term collective remembering made its first noticeable entrance in memory studies in the eponym book edited by Middleton & Edwards in 1990. However, the idea to replace "memory" with "remembering" dates back from Frederic Bartlett's work in the early 20th century. Bartlett's (1932) argument for this change of terminology was that memory is not about 'storing' static (and in experiments at the time, often meaningless) content for later retrieval, but about being able to reconstruct past experience to adapt to present challenges. In particular, he showed how people asked to repeat, at different intervals, a story that makes little sense to them would progressively rationalise and conventionalise their version of the story more at each recall. This is what he called "an effort after meaning". He also introduced to psychology the notion of schema, which he considered to be generalisations of past experiences (see Chapter 6.I.G.4). He believed that schemas organise remembering, and he was very interested in people's ability to "turn upon their schema", that is, to reflect not just on what they remembered but also on the processes through which they remembered.

The change of terminology from collective memory to collective remembering thus implied moving from understanding it as the ability to store information to conceiving it as an action oriented toward an aim (Wertsch, 2002). This resulted in a renewed interest for the environment in which the person remembers, from the social groups one belongs to, to the cultural context that shapes how and what actions should be carried out. It also meant considering the main process of collective memory to be memory – a sometimes problematic assumption, as we will see. However, beyond the original interest for collective memory as (a mnemonic) activity and for contextualisation, there is not always much else that unites collective remembering approaches. Indeed, in the three main approaches presented below, the first one stems from the works of discursive psychology, the second is more closely linked to the sociocultural mediated action perspective, and the third follows Bruner's narrative approach.

1. Discursive Approach

Middleton & Edwards (1990) were the firsts to claim the name of collective remembering – although others soon followed – to designate the activity of constructing discourses on the historical past. In fact, discursive approaches to collective memory have conceptualised it as a social and discursive activity that makes certain claims about the past and hereby constructs a certain social reality (Edwards, Middleton, & Potter, 1992). Because this is a social activity, cultural and social norms, values, and practices play a central role in the construction of collective remembering, prescribing what counts as memory and how it should be presented. However, the scope of this approach is not limited to discourses, as it considers non-discursive forms of memory to be social activities regulated in a similar manner (Brown, Middleton, & Lightfoot, 2001). Thus, discursive approaches to collective memory have also looked at the role of memorials (Poulter, 2017), museums (Katriel, 1994), and more globally at the materiality of commemorative practices (Murakami & Middleton, 2006). But the field has tended more and more to be mainly interested in collective practices of memory – as in court cases (Brown & Reavey, 2017), archives (Brown et al., 2001), or professional settings (Middleton, 1997) – and not in collective memory per se, often with the assumption that these two are actually the same (Middleton & Brown, 2005).

Discursive approaches have looked at the production of discourses on the past in everyday life, and have been especially interested in how they are produced in specific cultural contexts and through specific social interactions. This has been done by considering collective remembering as a performance (Brown et al., 2001) and by focusing on the cultural, social and material conditions that make such discourses possible, but far less by looking at how people actually think about the past, in part because of the disappearance of the subject in discursive psychology (see section II.C). Moreover, pushing discursive approaches to their extreme has led to two main drawbacks. First, understanding collective memory primarily as discursive performance can be deeply problematic from an epistemological and ontological standpoint. Indeed, it takes talking about the past to be a discursive action that must follow a certain number of norms to be properly executed – which often involves using a coherent narrative – and where judgments of truth and falsity are procedural and normative, but not about ontological truth (Brown & Reavey, 2017). Although this is an interesting perspective on how truthfulness is assessed in social settings (much research has indeed shown that we tend to value form over content, e.g., Herlihy, Jobson, & Turner, 2012), and memory is never a “copy” of the past, it does not mean that it cannot be true or false (see section Chapter 1.II.E for a discussion): I can say as much as I

want that I won an Olympic medal, I can even believe it, it will never mean that it did happen nor that this distinction should not matter for memory research.

Second, by emphasising that collective memory is a discursive performance, this approach to collective memory has had a tendency to reduce its aims to that of persuasion and argumentation, overlooking the construction of meaning that was so important to Bartlett. On the one hand, it has made discursive approaches very efficient in analysing how the past is mobilised in public settings, for what purpose and with what consequences. For instance, Billig (1995) showed how our discourses on our own country's history tend to legitimise nationalism, presenting it as 'banal' and making it largely invisible, while our discourses on the past of other countries construct their nationalism as irrational and dangerous. On the other hand, however, it has pushed issues of power, social struggle, identity, etc. so much to the forefront that it gives a picture of collective memory where everything that is said about the past is either the product of a calculation or coerced by social structures. While it offered a welcome criticism to overly individual and cognitive theories of both personal and collective memory, discursive memory has also, however, sometimes taken a step too far, for instance claiming that any impression we may have that our memories and the way we understand the past are personal is nothing more than an illusion (Middleton & Brown, 2005).

2. Mediated Approach

Around the same period as the discursive approach, James Wertsch proposed a mediated perspective on collective memory – also borrowing from dialogical approaches – and summarised in the book *Voices of Collective Remembering* (Wertsch, 2002). Wertsch was originally interested in Vygotsky's work, and in particular in the idea that human activity is mediated by cultural tools (see section Chapter 1.II.D.3). During a stay in Russia, he was confronted to the very different collective memory he encountered there, where a widely different narrative of World War II, for instance, is defended. He thus started applying his theory on the role of action and mediation (Wertsch, 1998) to the study of collective memory. And he explains (Wertsch, 2002, p. 13):

> … remembering is a form of mediated action, which entails the involvement of active agents and cultural tools. It is not something done by an isolated agent, but it is also not something that is somehow carried out solely by a cultural tool. Both must be involved in an irreducible tension. This has several implications, perhaps

> the most important being that because cultural tools reflect particular sociocultural settings, mediated remembering is also inherently situated in a sociocultural context.

Wertsch conceptualised collective remembering as an action done by an agent, using cultural resources, and in interaction with the voices of others – although he did very little to theorise the last point, in spite of the title of his book – that exist in an irreducible tension. He considered, in particular, that memory relies both on material tools, such as computers and notebooks, and on cultural resources, for instance how to tell a story, that make remembering possible. But because these tools do not in themselves remember, it means that remembering is located at the intersection between agents and the tools they use.

Wertsch used this approach to study collective memory primarily in Russia, which led him to three main theoretical propositions. First, he proposed to distinguish between the *production* of collective memory and its *consumption* (Wertsch, 1997). Indeed, he noticed that while states and other official institutions did try to produce a representation of history that would fit their best interest, people did not blindly repeat these stories but consumed them according to their own agenda. Hence, in spite of the colossal Soviet propaganda about its own history, changing with the political flavour of the moment, a widespread expression in the population at the time said "we never know of what yesterday will be made". This led Wertsch to a second distinction, between the *mastery* and the *appropriation* of historical narratives (Wertsch, 2002). While historical representations can be mastered – that is known and understood by people – they may not be appropriated – that is that they do not become part of the people's representation of the past. In the case of the USSR, it meant that while people mastered very well the official narratives and could repeat them in public, which was a matter of safety, they would not believe them and they would discuss the past in a very different way in private. Both of these conceptual distinctions give the impression that Wertsch's understanding of collective memory is more positive and less caricatural than what was seen in the collected memory and discursive memory approaches, giving the room for people to contest historical representations and presenting them as 'agents'. However, as with the social and interactional dimensions of collective remembering, Wertsch's position on this remained more a declaration of intention than a real theoretical inclusion and, in more recent works, he simply defined collective memory as the biased representations of the past that aims at showing one's group in the best of light (Wertsch & Batiashvili, 2012).

One of Wertsch's latest theoretical contributions to collective remembering is the idea of 'narrative templates' (Wertsch, 2008). Narrative templates are cultural tools that offer a schematic

narrative organisation of events and meanings and that shape how the past is remembered. They are used to organise multiple historical events, giving an impression of historical continuity and consistence. For instance, Wertsch observed that the stories he collected in Russia often followed the same pattern: 1) initial situation where Russian live in peace; 2) aggression by an outsider; 3) crisis; 4) resolution of crisis by the heroic actions of Russia, acting alone (Wertsch, 2002). Narrative templates are thus something widely spread within a national culture, and that play a primordial role in the content and organisation of collective memory. It is exactly this narrative aspect of historical representations that is at the heart of the next approach.

3. Narrative Approach

Narrative approaches to collective memory appeared in the late nineties, and were fathered by at least two different fields – making it a less unified area than the two previous ones. On the one hand, they are the product of the appropriation of the topic by cultural psychologists following Bruner, who had argued for the importance of narrative reasoning as a way to think about the world (Bruner, 1987, 1991). On the other hand, they are the result of the emerging interest for narratives and life stories in autobiographical memory and identity research (McAdams, 1988, 1993; Nelson, 2006), applied to collective memory. This approach emphasises the narrative structure of memory, and the role of narrative schemas in the construction of representations of the past, and some of Wertsch's work thus also belong to this category. Although most of collective memory research today shows some interest in one way or another for narratives, narrative memory approaches are characterised by the central role they give to story telling, seen both as the canonical form for memory (Brockmeier, 2002b) and the way cultural contexts shape recall (Wertsch, 2008).

This approach therefore links the processes through which people remember the collective past to narrative reasoning. This offers the advantage of highlighting the importance of meaning making in memory – an important part of Bartlett's criticism – while making the study of collective memory quite straight forward. Indeed, if its canonical form is a story, then one needs only to find what is the plot and who are the protagonists to have all the information necessary to study how people understand the past. And it is indeed, most of the time, what happened in narrative studies of collective remembering: they focused far more on the content of the stories told than on the processes through which they were produced – often out of a far greater interest for the effects of narrative construction on identity (e.g., Gómez-Estern & de la Mata

Benítez, 2013; Kulyk, 2011). Moreover, most of the research on the processes through which historical narratives are constructed has disregarded the idea of narrative reasoning – at the centre of Bruner's work – and instead focused on the normative role of culture in the way stories are told (in the form, for instance, of Wertsch's narrative templates).

Narrative approaches have offered rich descriptions of collective memory in specific contexts, but have also proposed theoretical contributions and have participated to a better understanding of how it shapes identity. For instance, Brescó de Luna (2017) has argued that historical narratives use *prolepsis*, "the narrative manoeuver consisting of narrating or evoking a future event in advance" (Brescó de Luna, 2017, p. 280). By doing so, they implicitly defend a certain vision of the future, embedded in the representation of the past: narratives of golden ages and declines, for example, imply that a regrowth is to come. Hammack (2010), on the other hand, showed how shared narratives participate in the construction of identity, and how collective stories are nonetheless adapted to create a unique identity, by analysing the discourses of Palestinian youths who built their identities by using the shared theme of loss and dispossession.

However, the narrative approach has suffered two important flaws. First, it has not been fully able to provide an account of how people actively produce meaning about the past in cultural contexts where myriads of narratives are available and when cultures are always multiple, contradictory and open to alternatives (Billig, 1987), and thus where stories, however shared as they may seem, are always contested. Second, it has had a tendency to collapse all memory into the idea of "narratives on the past", often neglecting other forms it may take. At best, it has led researchers to overlook memory that does not take a narrative form, at worst it has led them to commit the psychologist fallacy (James, 1890), by assuming that for any reference to the past there is a story underlying it and to be discovered – hidden in the head of the research participant (de Saint-Laurent, 2017).

E. Collective Memory in This Thesis

The aim of this thesis is to study the construction, mobilisation, and contestation of representations of history. As such, part of the literature presented above, although able to bring interesting insights into the questions that will be treated, is a bit outside of our scope. In particular, the literature on collective memory that considers it to be the result of memory processes is not especially adapted to the study of historical representations: not only it solely covers recent events – the ones we lived through – but it supposes a fundamental difference

between these and the representations of the historical past. This position is hard to justify, as it means making a difference in terms of processes we assume to be taking place but that may not show in practice or that are too deeply intertwined (de Saint-Laurent, 2017). How to know, more than 70 years after it took place, if my grand-mother is remembering World War II or relying on what she heard about it ever since?

Similarly, studies that focus on collective memory as a collective phenomenon – mainly collected approaches – are partly off the topic of this dissertation. If this may sound a bit confusing, this is because the word 'collective' has a double meaning in this context. On the one hand, it means 'the memory of collective events', but on the other, it designates 'the memory of the collective'. This second meaning does not fit within the scope of this thesis; because I am interested in how historical representations are constructed and contested – and not how they are shared – the phenomena that interest me are at the limit of social representations, where they appear, disappear, and stop being 'social'. This is not to say, of course, that I do not take psychological phenomena to be deeply social, as we will see. It simply means that the present thesis focuses on processes and practices that are outside of the full scope of social representations.

As implied in the title of this thesis, I also propose to move 'beyond collective memory'. Beyond the rhetorical move, there are two reasons for this call. First, as has been seen in this non-exhaustive literature review, collective memory is a polysemantic term that covers a multitude of interrelated yet different phenomena. It is thus necessary to move beyond the term of collective memory to be able to avoid confusion and propose further theoretical advances, that take the differences between the phenomena into account. Second, and as has been argued above, a large part of what is designated by the term collective memory is not 'memory' in the psychological sense. Moving beyond this term thus means moving beyond the idea that everything that is said about the past is the result of a single process – memory.

At a more 'political' level, however, it implies questioning who has expertise on the topic, beyond the researchers investigating the phenomenon. If representations of the past are the memory of someone, then this person, however biased, has a strong legitimacy over what can be said about that past. No matter how flawed my memory may be, I do have more legitimacy in claiming that some events took place or not in my childhood than any one who did not witness them or know me as child. However, if representations of the past are not a person's memory, then she does not have a particularly legitimacy in talking about it. I may have grown up in France, for instance, I am not more legitimate, when I talk about the Revolution, than say, a person who has extensively read on the topic. This distinction is particularly important in an era

where claims based on 'feelings' and 'impressions' are gaining more and more traction (de Saint-Laurent et al., 2017; Keyes, 2004): talking about collective memory does imply, to a certain extent, that the French, the Poles, or the British do have more legitimacy in discussing their past – because it is theirs – than anyone else, including the 'others' who may have suffered from it. Moving beyond the term of collective memory, then, also means questioning such problematic consequences.

The term 'collective memory' is still often used in this thesis, however, because it is the field of research within which it fall. It is used to designate representations of history, both in their individual and collective manifestations. By historical representations, I mean any symbolic construction of people, events, or occurrence that belong to the collective past (see Chapter 6 for a more precise definition). Specific theoretical constructions are proposed in each study, but as a starting point it can said that the approach adopted in this thesis considers collective memory to be the construction of meaning about the collective past, done by intentional agents, in interactions with others, and through the use of cultural tools. It thereby builds on the different literatures presented in Chapter 1 and this chapter. First, it follows the basic assumptions of sociocultural psychology, considering psychological processes to be characterised by agentivity, the orientation towards others, and cultural mediation. Second, it borrows from social representations theory, conceptualising collective memory as a symbolic representation of the past. Third, it uses the discursive approach, understanding historical representations as intentional constructions, although it does not limit it to discourse. Finally, it highlights the importance of meanings, considering that one of the central aims pursued by people when they remember the historical past is to give it meaning, in line with Bruner's work, Bartlett's ideas, and semiotic perspectives on sociocultural psychology.

With this perspective, I hope to shed new light on the processes behind collective memory. Indeed, what is missing from the literature is a better understanding of how, within social and cultural contexts that both scaffold and constrain thinking, people produce unique discourses on the past. In particular, contestations of nationalist, glorifying, biased, and one-sided versions of history that underline racist, discriminatory, and belligerent representations of the world have been left understudied, by overly focusing on the social and often national dynamics of collective memory. There is thus a pressing need to study how unique representations of past are constructed and mobilised. Unique does not mean solely personal (they do use shared resources, are done in interactions with others and often with collective goals) but that they answer questions and construct meanings that echo the person's own dilemmas, values, and understanding of the world. In a world that offers so many resources, discourses and

interpretations of the past, how do people make sense of history in a way that makes sense to them? As this (non-exhaustive) review of psychological perspectives on collective memory revealed, theories focusing on the processes of collective memory are generally lacking (Kansteiner, 2002). How, then, can we understand how people produce meaningful discourses on history, mobilise them, and contest the ones of others?

In order to answer these questions, four studies have been devised, each along with a theoretical model aimed at understanding a specific aspect of collective memory. In Chapter 4, I address the question of how representations of the past are discussed and mobilised in interactions, proposing a dialogical and semiotic perspective on the topic. In Chapter 5, I explore how people come to resist or challenge hegemonic representations of the past, constructing a developmental model of our relation to history and building on the literature on the lifecourse. In Chapter 6, I use the literature on reasoning and history education to propose a model of how historical representations are produced. Finally, in Chapter 7, I present a transversal analysis of all the studies, looking at how people mobilise historical representations to imagine the collective

Chapter 3.

Studying Collective Memory

I. Introduction

How to study collective memory from a sociocultural perspective? How, in particular, to capture the dynamic, dialogical, and cultural aspects of the phenomenon? In this chapter, I introduce the studies developed for this thesis, all based on the sociocultural approach outlined in the previous chapters. First, I recapitulate the methodological and epistemological stance adopted in this dissertation. Second, I present the research processes used, in particular iteration and abduction, as well as my position as a researcher. Third, I introduce the four studies conducted, their rationale, how the data was collected, and how it was analysed. Finally, I briefly present each of the papers.

A. The Sociocultural Approach

As we have seen in the previous chapter, sociocultural psychology is not only characterised by a set of theoretical assumptions, but also by their epistemological and methodological consequences. In Chapter 1.II.B, five main consequences were identified, that I propose to summarise here alongside their practical results.

First, sociocultural approaches consider that the basic unit of analysis for psychological phenomena is the person as a whole, living interpedently with her social, material, and cultural context (Valsiner, 2014a). This is not to say that, at a practical level, one needs to include 'everything' that makes a person and her environment, or that no references can be made to other levels of analysis, which would be both impossible and pointless. But it means, on the one hand, that researchers need to study psychological phenomena as part of this whole and, on the other, that they must be sensitive to the fact that various elements of the context may become extremely relevant. Practically, this implies that research protocols and analyses must take the subject as a unique meaning-making agent into account, and that both the method and the data recorded must be able to account for the context within which the person is inscribed (Brinkmann, 2013). This includes a wide range of practices, depending on what phenomena is investigated and how, going from collecting supplementary data on both persons and contexts in order to include it in the analysis to devising methods that reflect on how the tasks were understood by participants.

Second, sociocultural psychology is interested in local meanings and activities, and not in the development of universal laws predicting behaviour, considering the latter a vain endeavour. This is not to say that it is against generalisations – with some of its tenants actually advocating that this is the only way for sociocultural psychology to be scientific (Valsiner, 2014a) – but it defends a very different perspective on how to produce them. Indeed, because humans, the activities they carry out, and the contexts within which they live are always unique, generalisation cannot be obtained through the statistical analysis of "representative" data – as it is the norm in mainstream quantitative psychology studies – which often only reflect how WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic) people behave in lab experiments. On the contrary, sociocultural psychology considers that generalisations can be made even from single case studies (Zittoun, 2017b), in particular through the use of abduction (see section B), by using the inference to the best explanation (Evers & Wu, 2006). On the one hand, focusing on the psychological processes of people living interdependently from their social, cultural, and material context means that such processes can be generalised as long as one does not loose sight of how the expression of said processes will always be unique and context-bound. On the other hand, because sociocultural psychology is not a predictive science, it gives a different meaning to the idea of generalisation: it is not about concluding that all/most individuals, under certain conditions or displaying certain characteristics, will behave in a certain way, but about understanding what, in specific contexts, will participate in the meaning people give to the situation and how they react to it, as well as what psychological processes may be involved. As a consequence, sociocultural psychology favours rich qualitative analyses over quantitative research.

Third, sociocultural approaches consider that psychological processes unfold in time (Valsiner, 1994), and that people develop throughout the life course (Zittoun, 2012). Thus, the best way to study the human psyche is to adopt a developmental perspective. Moreover, as this field of research is interested in how psychological processes take place – and not in linear causal relations or the quantification of specific behaviours or states – it is necessary to use a dynamic perspective that can capture these processes as they unfold. In practice, this has taken place at a variety of levels, from philogenesis to microgenesis (see Boesch, 1997 for a cross level analysis). Globally, however, it can be said to have encouraged three types of studies: historical studies, focusing on how a(n often social) phenomena has evolved across time (e.g., Danziger, 2008); lifecourse and developmental studies, using longitudinal or trajectory analyses to investigate the development of psychological processes during the course of living (e.g., Hviid, 2008; Zittoun, 2017a); and microgenetic or interactional studies, concentrating on the moment to moment

changes in interactions or in textual data (e.g., Wagoner, 2009). These studies do not just attempt to capture changes between different periods of time, but also how such changes unfold. Sociocultural research thus tries to investigate the dynamic nature of psychological phenomena, and not just to compare changes between static 'recordings' of different stages of development.

Fourth, sociocultural psychology considers that the methods of the human sciences should necessarily be different than that of the natural sciences (Kirschner & Martin, 2010). Many of the reasons for this difference have already been highlighted in the previous paragraphs, from the fact that psychology is not a predictive science to the importance it gives to time and contexts, which are not well captured by traditional quantitative experimental studies. One additional reason is that sociocultural psychology considers all knowledge to be constructed from a specific perspective. As a result, the objectivity towards which natural sciences methods are oriented is impossible, and in the social sciences it often leads to the normalisation of certain perspectives over others (Valsiner, 2012b), either because they are left unquestioned by scientists and policy makers or because they serve their own interests. At a practical level, it means that the methods used in sociocultural studies try to capture, as best as possible, the phenomena under investigation, but do not consider that some methods are inherently better than other (Cornish & Gillespie, 2009). This branch of psychology does tend to prefer, however, methods that allow researchers to analyse people's understanding of the world they live in and how they act within it, for instance through qualitative interviews, participant observations, or multi-method case studies.

This leads us to the fifth methodological consequence of the sociocultural approach: methods should adapt to phenomena and research questions and should thus be innovative, open ended, and developed reflexively. Because the perspective adopted in this thesis is pragmatist, and not only constructivist, I also consider that in the face of a specific question and specific phenomenon not all methods are 'equal', especially in the face of the 'broader' objective one is pursuing. It is thus important to clarify, beyond the research question, what type of knowledge one is seeking, for it changes how it can be reached. In the case of this thesis, the aim is not to test specific hypotheses or to analyse particular settings, but to shed new light on the processes behind the construction and uses of collective memory, among other things by proposing new theoretical perspectives on these phenomena. That is, my general objective is to propose alternative ways to understand, conceptualise, and analyse collective memory that could allow us to appreciate how it is constructed and used *beyond* one-sided, hegemonic, and often nationalist accounts of the past. Following the principles of sociocultural psychology, my aim, at a methodological level, is thus to develop qualitative methods that can help us understand how

this phenomena take place, while taking into account the cultural, social, and situated nature of human activity. Doing so means building on a wide range of existing practices of data collection and analysis to build tools adapted to my specific research questions and objectives. The next section presents the processes that were used in my attempt to do exactly this.

B. Research Process

The research process used in this thesis is iterative and abductive, and is inspired by Valsiner (2014b). Before introducing the adaptation made to this model, I will start with a brief presentation of the "research cycle" in sociocultural psychology, according to Valsiner (2014b) and depicted in Figure 3-1. This process, as most qualitative research, is iterative (Yin, 2011): the "object of study is progressively constructed" and "constantly adjusted to the characteristics and complexity of human and social phenomena" (Anadon & Guillemette, 2007, p. 30, my translation). In this view, the progressive characterisation of the object of study allows for researchers to produce a fine-tuned understanding of phenomena and to reflect on how they construct knowledge about it. For Valsiner (2014b), this cycle comprises four elements, and a 'by-product': 1) basic assumptions, that are axioms from which the researchers starts; 2) phenomena, that is what are we trying to study; 3) constructed methods, or the means by which we investigate the phenomena; 4) constructed theories, that can explain the phenomena. The relation between phenomena and methods produces data – that does not represent the phenomena but is derived from its interaction with the method – that in turn can inform theory. This is the only relation, in the research cycle, that is not bidirectional. The cycle, thus, is not actually circular, but a dynamic relation between elements that participate in the construction of scientific research.

In the present thesis, for instance, the literature on sociocultural psychology presented in Chapter 1 outlined the basic assumptions from which this research starts. Chapter 2 introduced some of the theories that have been constructed about historical representations, and concluded by specifying what phenomenon exactly this thesis is trying to explore. The aim of the present chapter is to summarise the methods constructed, before presenting the data derived in the subsequent chapters. The final presentation of the literatures and the methods in a dissertation may give the impression of static set of ideas and theories that were selected, organised, and adopted before any work could start, when they have evolved greatly through the years during which this thesis was developed. Unfortunately, this presentation is unavoidable, in the interest

of both clarity and simplicity. However, the evolution of my research project is better reflected in the empirical chapters, as they are composed of six papers (four articles and two book chapters) that were progressively written and published as each study was conducted. It is to account for these changes that this format was chosen.



Figure 3-1 The research cycle according to Valsiner (2014b)

This format cannot, nonetheless, fully reflect the dynamic through which these studies have been developed, in part because this 'cycle' takes place at two levels. First, it occurs during single studies, that do not follow a linear process – as the language of most of psychology would have us believe (Billig, 2013) – but display a constant adjustment between the different elements of the cycle. Indeed, reality always has the potential to surprise us, new literature gets added, methods have to be adapted to new constraints, or we may come to question assumptions we did not even know we had. This is not just that scientific research is much more messy than its final presentation in neatly organised journal article would have us believe. It is also that following a strictly linear process would mean exercising a level of control over what is it to be found, how, and with what consequences, that would sterilise the whole endeavour and render investigation simply useless.

The second level at which the research cycle takes place is during the development of a wider research programme, where several studies of the same or related phenomena are successively conducted. In this case, each 'cycle' leads to the construction of a new study, which adds a 'layer' to the construction of each pole. It can also allow the exploration of a phenomenon from

different perspectives, as a form of triangulation especially useful when one wants to shed new light on an object. This is thus the method adopted in this thesis: the set of studies presented in this work was developed through an iterative process, where the phenomenon under investigation, the theory, and the methods are progressively constructed at each cycle and adjusted for the different research questions. This is what is presented in Figure 3-2, as an adaptation of Valsiner's model.

A few adaptations were done to Valsiner's research cycle in this figure, to better represent the cycle of this thesis. First, the "basic assumptions" are here taken as meaning 'basic assumptions about the phenomenon', that is the suppositions and hypotheses about collective memory that prompted the realisation of each study. Second, the word "constructed" was removed before theories and methods, as it suggests that some theories and some methods could be instead 'given', when both are always constructed. Third, "phenomena" and "derived data" were replaced by "data", considering that the phenomenon is constructed through the theory and the choice of data to analyse, and it permeates the whole process. This also reflects the fact that every element of the research cycle is a construction, and it is thus the data produced by the theory and method that is part of the study, while the phenomenon is what the whole process is set to delimitate and investigate. Fourth, the "method" was here taken to mean the 'method of analysis of the data'. Usually, 'method' covers both the collection of the data and its analysis, which can be confusing in this kind of schematisation. It was thus decided to separate them, and a clear distinction will be made between them when each study is presented (see section II).

Finally, the cycle was transformed into a spiral, to represent the evolution of the project through time. This is, of course, an artificial rendering of the process, making each study look artificially linear. However, its aim is to present how, generally, this thesis was developed, and some simplifications were necessary. Each 'round' of the spiral summarises the research cycle for one research paper, with the colour code explained in the legend. Two of the studies have been split into two 'rounds', each corresponding to a different type of analysis of the data and a different level of theoretical construction. The spiral is exited through a "provisional conclusion" (box 25), presented in the final chapter of this thesis. This conclusion is provisional not in the sense that it will be rewritten in the future, but in the sense that the conclusion to a research project is always temporary – until the next study – and that the 'spiral of research' can only be artificially closed.



Figure 3-2 The research cycle in this thesis (CM=Collective Memory)

The first way to move from one part of the circle to the other is through abduction, that is the inference to the best explanation. This form of reasoning was introduced to the human sciences by Peirce (1998), and is very popular in qualitative research (Anadon & Guillemette, 2007). Indeed, it presents an alternative between deduction – that relies on the supposition that there are general laws from which behaviours can be deducted – and induction – that takes as a point of departure only the empirical observation of reality (Brinkmann, 2012). Instead, it infers, from the observations of the phenomenon, which theory could best explain it (Zittoun et al., 2013), and it thus fits very well within a sociocultural paradigm. It has also been considered to be a pervasive process, corresponding to what is often termed, in research, as an 'insight' (Anderson, 1986).

The second way to move from one element of the cycle to the other is through systematisation, a term of which sociocultural and critical psychologists have often been wary, on the basis that it may lead to reductionism (e.g., Hacker, 2012). However, the idea here is not to reduce phenomena to laws of interactions and ever-simplified systems, but to systematise the processes by which we develop knowledge about them. While intuition, subjectivity, and improvisation do lead to great insights, it is through the systematic consideration of their consequences – or systematic investigation – that conclusions can be reached (de Saint-Laurent, in press). For instance, one may find an interesting occurrence in the data and use abduction to produce the best possible explanation. However, it is through the careful consideration of all related occurrences in the data that one can draw conclusions about it. I believe that while many sociocultural psychologists would reject the notion of systematisation, this corresponds to what most of them describe when presenting the methods they used.

This systematisation, in the research cycle, takes place at two levels. First, as in the example above, it takes place at a micro-level. There, it provides principles to organise each step, for instance how the literature will be explored or how the data will be analysed. This is also what makes the process necessarily iterative: each insight leads to a systematic re-reading of the theory/method/data/assumption, that may in turn lead to new ideas. Second, this process takes place at a more general level, where it insures the coherence of the broader project. It is through systematisation that theory and data, for instance, can form a consistent whole: any change in one leads to the systematic reorganisation of the other, making sure that they remain relevant for each other as the research evolves. The two previous chapters are an example of such systematisation: while they do not cover exactly the literature that was originally used to set up the different studies of this thesis nor how it was used, they do present a systematic re-reading of the theories and assumptions that, after numerous iterative cycles, make the present work as

coherent as possible. Thus, this process does not only insure that different aspects of the phenomenon have been thoroughly studied. It also makes sure that the research cycle – necessarily iterative, and necessarily changing the object of study through time – does not produce incoherent studies where assumptions, theories, data, and analyses do actually talk about completely different objects. In this perspective, the iterative process of scientific investigation is driven by the alternation of abduction and systematisation, between insights and methodical evaluation.

C. Position of the Researcher

The sociocultural approach does not only encourage scholars to reflect on how they produce knowledge, but also on their position as researchers. This includes a wide range of practices, depending on what is investigated and how. In this thesis, this reflection focused on five main points. First, it meant reflecting on my relation to the object of study. In particular, it involved thinking about the reasons why this topic seemed interesting to me and what I was hoping to find there. This allowed me to keep a 'reasonable distance' towards my object by avoiding to develop studies in contexts that interested me but where it would have been difficult not to overly project myself on the participants or the historical events studied. This is not to say, of course, that one must necessarily remain 'cold and distant' in order to be objective – an impossible aim in any case – but that it is important to be aware of the limits of our critical capacities when exploring topics 'too close to home'. Reflecting on why I chose that topic was also important to make sure that I was not simply finding what I wanted to find. Thus, while I believe that it is necessary to have a deep connection to one's subject in order to carry out such a long project, it is essential to reflect on this connection. In this thesis, it was done by questioning – regularly and as it evolved – what exactly it was that I was trying to do with this research and by alternating between immersion in the topic and taking distance (Valsiner, 2002).

Second, it meant reflecting on the ethical choices made, and on the relation to the research participants. This played out differently in the various studies conducted, as the first one involved naturally occurring data, the second one qualitative interviews, the third one an experiment, and the last one used the data collected in the previous studies. In all cases, I followed the ethical standards of the Swiss Psychological Society and of the Institute of Psychology and Education of the University of Neuchâtel. In the qualitative experiment, however, I found them insufficient and provided the participants with additional information

(see section II.C.1 for a full description). More generally, adopting an 'ethical' perspective on my research participants meant: 1) taking into account the fact that they are 'full' human beings who cannot be reduced to my scientific interests or their participation in a research project and thus whose perspective needs to be respected (which was in part done through the use of a sociocultural type of methodology); 2) respecting their time and effort by providing as clear information as I could (e.g., how long the interview would last and what was its aim); and 3) trying to make the process as pleasant as possible, for instance by letting them chose the location of the interview or by accommodating the process to their constraints (mainly time).

Third, reflecting on my position as researcher also involved accepting the fact that my presence, my position, my ways of interacting and asking questions, of understanding my topic, are never and cannot ever be neutral. Who I am, as a person existing much beyond my academic activities, participates to the construction my object of study and how my participants come to understand it and react to it. This is not to say, however, that everything is so contingent on the perspective of the researcher that data and theories are entirely produced by it and cannot make sense outside of it. A balance has to be found between considering that researchers merely 'record' an existing reality and that they completely construct it through their interaction with the object and their participants (Brinkmann, 2016). In practice, this meant questioning and taking into account, at every step, my position and how it was reflected both in the theories constructed and the interactions with my participants.

Fourth, it meant always trying to be surprised by the data and the results of the analysis. Following Latour (2000), I take scientific investigation to imply that the object of study needs to be able to 'object' to what we say about it and do with it. That is, if nothing can go against the theories and knowledge we are trying to construct, then nothing stands against ideas that do not 'work', to use pragmatist standards. This is a form of falsifiability, in Popper's sense, but in a more general meaning, as it does not only concern theories. In this thesis, it entailed leaving room, in the interactions with the participants, for objections, comments, disagreements, and surprises. It also implied accepting that the methods developed and the theories from which they derived might not work, and that perhaps some ideas needed to be abandoned. Although it happened in many (micro)-instances, it was especially strong on one occasion: in the case of the first interview conducted for study 2, where the participant objected to my questions – that were focused on the effect of context – to insist on what was important to her – her own past in front of the past – leading me to revise my assumptions about people's relation to the past and, in particular, how explicit they could be about it (see section II.B).

Fifth, it meant adopting a critical position towards my topic of research. In particular, it meant taking for granted neither the 'findings' of collective memory nor how this phenomenon had been understood by researchers. This does not imply that the research that had been previously conducted was in any way irrelevant, but it assumes that critical knowledge, that questions the status quo and provokes further reflexion, is more fertile than the repetition and/or extremely limited extension of existing studies. Generally, thus, the aim of this thesis has been to develop ideas and theories at the limits of what has been done in collective memory. This objective there was not just to 'fill in the gaps' of the literature – and while many gaps were identified in this work none can be said to have truly been filled. But exploring the unexplored aspects of a phenomenon is, I believe, one of the most efficient ways to expend our theories about it. This is what I attempted to do in this thesis, by developing a set of sociocultural studies on collective memory, which I will now present.

II. Methods

Four studies were developed for this thesis, each answering a different yet interrelated research question on collective memory – but also answering questions more specific to each fieldwork. Each of the papers that constitute the four next chapters includes a methodological section, presenting how each data set was collected and analysed. In this section, I present a brief overview of each research method used, explain the rationale behind the choices made, and provide additional information about every study that did not fit in the research papers. Table 3-1 presents a summary of the methods used in this thesis, based on the classification of Bauer, Gaskell, & Allum (2000). Their taxonomy distinguishes between the general research design, the method through which data is elicited and collected, the way it is analysed, and finally the general research interests – the types of knowledge one aims to produce. Because this final dimension was already treated in the previous sections and is generally the same for the whole project, it was replaced by the research question behind each study.

Table 3-1 Summary of the research questions and methods

	Question	Design	Elicitation	Analysis
Study 1	How are representations of the past discussed and mobilised in interactions?	Naturally occurring data	Corpus construction	Genealogical, dialogical and narrative analyses
Study 2	How do people come to resist or challenge hegemonic representations of the past?	Case studies	Qualitative individual interviews	Life trajectory and life positioning analysis
Study 3	How are new historical representations produced?	Experiment	Qualitative microgenetic experiment, qualitative interviews	Reasoning and thinking processes
Study 4	How are they mobilised to imagine our collective futures?	Secondary analysis	Secondary analysis of the data sets from the previous studies	Uses of the past to imagine the future

Generally, and as explained above, the methods were chosen for their fit with the research questions and the global aims of this thesis, which at times meant developing new methods. A secondary aim was to use a diverse set of methods, for two reasons. First, because mixed methods allows for triangulation (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007), which is always advised but is even more required when one investigates new aspects of a phenomenon, as is the case here. Second, one of the aims of this thesis is to go beyond our current understanding of the form and uses of collective memory, understanding in large part shaped by the methods of investigation that have so far been employed to explore historical representations. Using a diversity of methods has the potential, thus, to shed more light on the phenomenon.

A. Study 1: Collective Memory in Interactions

1. Questions and Design

The first study looked at collective memory in interactions, and at how the past is mobilised. The assumption was that if our representations of the world in general, and of history in particular, are dialogical – i.e., that is that they exist in tension with their alternative – then this is how they should be studied. Our discourses on history are always a reply to someone else, and studying them in interactions allows us to capture part of this (but a part only, as we do not only address present others). This is especially true in situations where the diversity of public discourses on the topic is represented, as it offers the possibility to observe how they interact and are co-constructed. For this reason, this study focused on political discourses in parliamentary debates, as they represent a unique opportunity to observe the interactions between perspectives that make up most of the public discourses on an issue, and between people who have often been exchanging on this for a long time. Thus, it allows for the study of historical representations and their use as they 'naturally' occur both in interactions and through time.

'Naturally' here refers to the type of data used, not to an assumption about the genesis of the phenomenon. Indeed, parliamentary debates are a form of 'naturally occurring data', which designates any data that would have occurred in the same way independently of the researcher's intervention (Potter, 2016). This type of data is particularly favoured by discursive psychologists (Flick, 2014), on the ground that data collection that requires an intervention from the researcher produces data about the research process and how participants react to it, more than about the phenomena under study. Others have criticised this distinction, arguing that speech is always provoked by something and uses the 'way of speaking' associated with the local practice. Interviews and focus groups are thus as 'natural' as anything else (Speer, 2002), and they offer the advantage of being able to build a rapport with the research participants (Griffin, 2007). While I agree in large part with these arguments, the aim here was to analyse how collective memory is mobilised in interactions. Doing so through focus groups, for instance, without prompting participants to talk about history directly, would have meant gathering a high volume of overall data in order to have sufficient references to the topic of interest, which would have been impossible in the context of this project. A total of 107 hours of speech was analysed, or around 900 pages of transcripts. To obtain the equivalent through focus groups – although of

course data sets of such different nature cannot be considered 'equivalent' in any way – would have meant conducting and transcribing 25 focus groups of four hours each.

Another advantage of this type of data is that it is public. In the words of Zittoun & Gillespie (2011, p. 5):

> Using […] publicly available data, can […] work against fragmentation […] by enabling other researchers, through access to the data that we analyzed, to deepen, extend, critique or complete our analyses. If other researchers can access the primary data on which our analyses are based, we enhance transparency and possibly the quality of research.

Indeed, there have been many pledges, in recent years, for transparency through sharing research data. However, this is often difficult in practice, especially in psychology where it raises important ethical questions: while analyses can be anonymised by removing information that would permit the identification of the participants, it is difficult (and often impossible) to do so with interview transcripts where removing all concerned information would denature the interview. Public data, such as the one used in this study, solves this problem, all the more when it concerns public figures who know that their interventions will be analysed – if not by researchers, at the very least by journalists and fellow politicians.

2. Elicitation

The data was collected using the "corpus collection" method, where sources of data are not selected through randomisation or with the aim of being generally representative, but by choosing data that can best answer the research questions (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000). This process necessarily includes some arbitrariness, especially as corpora are selected before the analysis (Barthes, 1977). However, it has the advantage of focusing resources where they theoretically and methodologically should matter the most, and it is thus very adapted to qualitative research (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000). In the case of this study, it involved first selecting what type of political debate to focus on. I chose to analyse parliamentary debates on immigration, for two reasons. First, collective memory has been shown to be linked to national identity, and it was thus likely to be discussed in this context and to be largely mobilised. Second, work done on ideological dilemmas has highlighted how the need to choose a path for action – such as voting on a bill – forces people to chose between the contradictory positions they often hold on a object (Billig et

al., 1988). Parliamentary debates on immigration thus have the potential to lead to interesting interactions and position statements on national identity, and in some cases on collective memory.

Once the general type of data had been selected, the specific debates had to be chosen. I decided to focus only on one set of parliamentary debates but taking place over several weeks, so I could follow the development of the references to history[4]. Moreover, the idea was to look at processes, not to be representative of all discourses on collective memory in this context. The debates chosen were the French parliamentary debates on "Immigration and Integration" for the bill number 2986 voted on 2006. They were selected because of their length (107 hours), because they allowed me to have extensive ethnographic information (as I was still living in France at the time of the bill), and because they were the 'starting point' of many subsequent debates on immigration (including almost annual parliamentary debates on the topic in the years that followed). The detail of the parliamentary sessions analysed can be found in Appendix A (p. 277), and they cover all the debates on the bill number 2986. Secondary sources were consulted to inform the analysis, including the bill itself and the reports on which it was officially based. The list is presented in Appendix B (p. 279), and the bill is summarised in Appendix C (p. 280). The transcripts of the 16 parliamentary sessions were downloaded from the French Parliamentary website[5] and uploaded in the research software Nvivo.

Beyond the original question the study was design to answer, and that is related to the general project of this thesis, additional questions were developed in relation to the more specific topic of this study, discussed in more details in Chapter 4. Indeed, the research also focused on the construction of the nation through the use of collective memory, and how it reflects on who is considered as 'acceptable' for the nation group and who is not. A specific theoretical framework to investigate this question is set up in Chapter 4.

---

[4] The data was originally collected for a Master's dissertation (de Saint-Laurent, 2012), that focused on dialogue in democratic institutions. The background information on the bill comes from this dissertation, but the theories, methods, and analyses introduced in the present work were all developed exclusively for this thesis.

[5] http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr

3. Analysis

Three types of analysis were used successively to analyse the data, briefly presented here as they are detailed in Chapter 4. First, I used Gillespie's genealogical method (Gillespie, 2006) in order to select all the intercepts that referred to history, directly and indirectly. It meant coding for all the direct references to history, uses of expressions linked to historical events, and the direct and indirect quotations of historical actors. This amounted to 65 intercepts, ranging from one to 15 lines (except for a lengthy argument of 250 lines), and involving no more than three speakers (12 in the case of the longer argument). These excerpts were coded using Nvivo, then printed and cut to be analysed with a paper and pen, deemed more flexible.

The second analysis carried out involved placing the segments along two axes: thematic and dialogical. The thematic axis concerned the content of the intervention, and especially to which historical events it referred. The dialogical axis meant looking at how the different interventions 'replied' to each other, either directly (one parliamentary group evokes event A, an other immediately responses on event A or by invoking event B) or indirectly (responses delayed in time and indirect quotation of the other). To do this, the excerpts were numbered in order of appearance and dated, and then organised on a large sheet of paper were the vertical axis represented the events evoked and the horizontal one the interactions (presented in Appendix D, p. 281). The excerpts were then clustered by emergent themes and connections were made between the events used as a 'response' to the other (marker pen on the figure in Appendix D, p. 281). The Parliament was divided into two groups (Left and Right) at this stage, regrouping the official parliamentary groups into broader ones, as further distinction proved not to be analytically significant[6]. The organisation of the excerpts was then schematised (see Appendix E, p. 282), and used as a frame to analyse and present the results.

The third analysis aimed at reconstructing the stories introduced by the participants, going beyond the fragmented data that the excerpts offered. A narrative analysis was used for this, for two reasons. First, narration is a form of thinking (Bruner, 1986), used to organise the world and make sense of disruption (Murray, 2015), including when discussing history (Brockmeier, 2002b). As such, narrative analysis is a useful tool to understand how meaning is constructed in discourse, and it has been the basis of much qualitative analyses (Polkinghorne, 1995). Second, it is possible to use this type of analysis to go beyond the fragmented data obtained, because

[6] But see de Saint-Laurent, 2012 for more details about the French National Assembly composition at that time.

collective memory uses *schematic narrative templates* (Wertsch, 2008), or general story lines that are repeated over several stories. By superposing different partial stories, one can 'complete' the stories and produce more robust interpretations – by basing them on several narrations instead of just one. This method was used both to reconstruct the stories discussed by the participants and to trace how the different narrations related to each other – by sharing a template – or not.

B. Study 2: Trajectories of Remembering

1. Questions and Design

The second study looked at how people come to resist or challenge hegemonic representations of the past. By hegemonic representations, I mean any representation that is widely shared and unchallenged within a social group (Moscovici, 1988). Following the first study, where it was found that people sharing a similar sociocultural background may hold quite different versions of the past, it asked how does their personal trajectory inform how they relate to the past. The original aim of the study, however, was slightly different: it was to explore how different contexts – introduced to the participants in the form of small scenes – produce different stories about history and may or may not lead to reflexivity. Only one participant took part in the study, interrupting it to explain how, actually, it was her personal history in front of history that shaped her answers. Because of the interest of her explanations, and of her eagerness to present her personal trajectory as a 'reason' for her relation to history, I decided to adapt the study accordingly. In particular, it seemed that while context mattered, it mattered more on the long term, and that people would not produce widely different version of history just because the temporary context they were in varied. This is well expressed in Valsiner's quote of Zittoun:

> As Tania Zittoun (2008) has explained it, ". . . there is no such thing as a context-free competence or skill. However, the setting is not everything; every activity is also undertaken by a person, actively making sense of the situation, of its whereabouts, its goals and its resemblances with other situations met by her—these processes being in large part not conscious." (p. 439)

As the study changed, a new rationale was developed. In order to study how people's trajectory would shape their understand of history, and how they would – or would not – adopt a critical

perspective on collective memory, I decided to construct case studies analysing the life-trajectory of people who had developed a specific relation to the past. This meant, on the one hand, adopting a developmental perspective on collective memory, very much in line with the sociocultural principles and presented in more details in Chapter 5. On the other hand, using case studies would allow me to finely analyse the developmental processes behind collective memory, while still being able to produce generalisable results (Zittoun, 2017b).

2. Elicitation

The elicitation method used was qualitative interviews, because they "provide in-depth information pertaining to participants' experiences and viewpoints of a particular topic." (Turner, 2010, p. 754). This is a frequently employed method in qualitative research, to the point of being quasi-systematically used – and overused – regardless of its fit with the research questions (Potter & Hepburn, 2005). However, it is a good mean of collecting biographical data (Hopf, 2004), as long as one remains aware that the data thereby obtained is not a 'perfect account' of reality but a construction in the interaction with the researcher (Brinkmann, 2016). While answering the research question could have been done, in an ideal world, through a longitudinal study – perhaps the most fitted way to study any developmental process – the means required to do so were beyond what was possible in this thesis, especially in terms of time. Nonetheless, a posteriori accounts also present their own advantages: they may not always produce the most factually accurate narratives, yet they are meaningful ways, for the participants, to explain who they are today and why they think the way they do. That is, while they may not produce the most detailed accounts of what happened, they provide the most *relevant* accounts, as time may have given distance to the participants to reflect, and because subsequent events may have highlighted important aspects of one's life that did not seem so relevant at the time.

The specific method used was a semi-structured interview, that is somewhere between the informal conversation and the standardised interview (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2003). This method, in conjunction with a narrative approach, is best fitted for the collection of biographical data (Hopf, 2004). Interview technics especially designed for the collection of life story exist (e.g., Atkinson, 2001; Rosenthal & Fisher-Rosenthal, 2004), but the interest here was not in the whole life story of the person, but on the evolution, in time, of their relation to history. Moreover, although people are quite familiar with mainstream autobiographical accounts, the same cannot be said about the history of their relation to history, which may require more specific prompts.

Instead, participants were encouraged to tell stories about different episodes or aspects of their lives related to history, an open form of narrative interview (Hopf, 2004).

The interview guide was divided in nine sections, summarised below (the full version can be found in Appendix F, p. 284):

1) Introduction: presentation of the project, conditions of participation, authorisation to record (Appendix G, p. 287), and if they have additional questions on the study
2) The play (see below): questions about the theatre play, what they thought of it, and its effect on their opinion
3) Relation to history: place of history in their life, important events, place in their family
4) Personal history in history: historical events that have had a place in their personal story or in their family history
5) Historical reflexivity: moments where they changed perspective on an event or were confronted to different perspectives
6) History education: what they think about how history was taught to them and how it is taught today, what they would change
7) Direction of history: general ideas about the 'course' of history
8) Demographic questions: nationality, age, occupation, studies
9) Questions and comments: if they want to add something and answering their questions on the study

The follow-up questions encouraged the participants to elaborate on: 1) examples if not already provided; 2) resources used when discussing or thinking about history; 3) with whom they would discuss these things or from whom they learnt it; and 4) if it changed in time. The form of the questions followed the guidelines of Kvale & Brinkmann (2009) and King & Horrocks (2010). In terms of general rapport with the participants, the attitude adopted started by following Kvale & Brinkmann's (2009) 'guided conversation', but evolved throughout the study. Indeed, I came to consider that the asymmetry between interviewee and interviewer could not fit within the frame of a 'conversation', and realised that conceiving it as such could be confusing for the participants. Instead, I considered that my role as an interviewer was to provide a clear frame of interactions for the interviewees and to give aims as explicit as I could. While, in a conversation, the responsibility for the elaboration of the setting is shared by the participants, it is not the case in an interview. Specifying my expectations, through explicit guidelines and instructions, thus provided a more reassuring frame for the interviewees, where they knew what was expected of them and why, even if it meant creating more constraints.

The interview participants were contacted around a theatre play that offered a critical and pluri-vocal perspective on the history of the Israel-Palestine conflict (Rosenstein, 2014). The aim of the sampling was not to be 'representative', but was chosen for two theoretical reasons (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Valsiner & Sato, 2006). First, because the play proposed a very critical perspective on history, and that it was advertised as such, it made it very likely that the participants would have themselves developed a critical relation to history or at the very least to have been pushed to reflect on the topic by the play itself. Second, because the play was complex and dialogical, it landed itself to a multitude of interpretations, making the participants' understanding of the play an interesting way to 'check' the effect of their life-story on their relation to history. Participants were told, upon being recruited for the interviews, that I was a psychologist interested in their relation to history, but that I was neither interested in historical accuracy nor a historian or a specialist on the topic.

The size of the sample was chosen following the principle of saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), that is "when the collection of new data does not shed any further light on the issue under investigation" (Mason, 2010, para. 2). Such saturation is always temporary – something new can always be discovered in the analysis and not be saturated – but generally speaking, we can say that saturation is reached when adding new data does not add to the model constructed from the analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In the case of this study, saturation was reached after 7+2 interviews in a four steps process: 1) seven interviews were conducted, transcribed, and analysed; 2) a model was proposed based on theses; 3) two further interviews were conducted, transcribed, and analysed; 4) the new analyses did not add to the existing model, leading me to conclude that saturation, for this model, had been reached. While this is a small sample, the 'modest' aims of the study (to look at how some people come to challenge hegemonic representations of the past) and its inscription in a larger project made saturation easier to reach (Mason, 2010).

Nine interviews were thus conducted in February and March 2014 in Brussels (7) and in May and June 2015 in Geneva (2), where the play was shown at these periods, with spectators (7) and members of the staff around the play (2). The interviews were conducted in French, which was the mother tongue of most of the participants (7) and spoken fluently by all, and in face to face (8) or by Skype (1). The participants varied in age (from 37 to 65), in gender (6 men and 3 women), and in nationality (four Belgian, one French, one German, and three bi-nationals either half French or half Belgian). What united them, however, were their professional and personal activities, as all were involved in social, intellectual, artistic and/or activist work at different degrees. They were not selected on this basis, but this did make of them, in spite of their other characteristics, a quite homogenous group – not a problem in this case as I was interested,

among other things, in what made them critical about history, and this was often linked to these social activities.

The interviews took place in the participants' home or workplace (4) or in cafés (5), depending on their preference. They lasted between 45 and 90 minutes and were all audio recorded, before being transcribed with the help of the software Sonal (for the 2014 interviews) and Dragon Naturally Speaking (for the 2015 interviews). Both help make the transcription process faster, but still require for the researcher to work very closely with the data and to listen to the recordings several times, and this familiarisation process is an important step in the analysis (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). The transcription method was adapted to the aims of the research, which in this case did not require a fine-grained analysis of the transcripts. A simplified method was thus chosen, where all the verbal data was transcribed but the intonations were not. The key to the transcripts is presented in Table 3-2.

Table 3-2 Key to the Transcripts

Symbol	Meaning
…	Short pause
[x seconds]	Pause of more than 2 seconds
(laughs)	Non verbal reactions, interruptions, noises, etc.
[text]	Overlaps
[…]	Segments of the text removed to shorten the quote, with no alteration of meaning

3. Analysis

The analytical methods used for this study are detailed in Chapter 5, but can be briefly summarised here. Three rounds of analyses were carried out. First, I used Rosenthal's (1993) life-story analysis to reconstruct the participants trajectory. Using the software Nvivo, the data was coded according to which period of the participant's life the segment was about. Once the interviews were divided in sections for each period of life, they were printed, cut, and ordered, hereby putting the stories told in a chronological order. An example of what this paper and pen analysis looked like can be found in Appendix H (p. 288). The second analysis was based on the theoretical model developed for the study and presented in Chapter 5. It focused on the

moments of transitions and ruptures in participants trajectories (Zittoun, 2006, 2012; Zittoun et al., 2013), on the resources they used in these periods, and on the interlocutors with whom they would talk about history. Two case studies using this analysis are presented in the first paper of the Chapter 5.

The third analysis carried out, presented in the second paper of Chapter 5, used Martin's (2013) Life Positioning Analysis to unpack the social dimension of the model constructed in this study. It looked, in particular, at the social positions assumed by the participants across the life course, at how they evolved with each transition, and how they related to each other to potentially form an integrated position. This is this type of analysis that is shown in Appendix H (p. 288), although left voluntarily blurry, as the analysis was not yet fully made anonymous at that stage. Indeed, the anonymity of the participants was preserved in a two-step process. First, all mentions of specific names were removed from the transcripts. Second, biographical elements were changed after the analysis, once it was clear which elements were important for the analysis or not, as the presence of too many biographical details made it too easy to identify some of the participants.

C. Study 3: Historical Reasoning

1. Questions and Design

The third study aimed to explore how new historical representations are produced. In particular, I wanted to investigate further the role of the elements that had seemed, in the second study, to provoke ruptures in people's understanding of history or to act as resources in transitions to new representations. The design chosen to explore this question was experimental, as this type of design is the simplest and most efficient way to observe the participants' reaction to a predefined stimulus (Moscovici & Perez, 2003). More specifically, I used a qualitative experiment, which shares some basic characteristics with its quantitative counterpart, yet differs widely in some other aspects. On the one hand, qualitative experiments do use, too, the introduction of a stimulus to provoke a certain reaction that is then measured and analysed. On the other hand, they do so within a very different paradigm. First, this type of experiment does not consider that there is a direct causal link between the stimulus and the response, but that the reactions of the participants are the product of the interactions between them, as wilful agents, and the task

proposed by the experimenter. Second, it is not interested in the quantification of reactions to variables, but in the processes that the participants display to solve the task. Qualitative experiments, thus, are not interested in *quantifying* the results of *causal* relations, but in analysing the *dynamic relations* between participants and the tasks given to them.

While qualitative experiments now seem quite the oddity – the word experiment being strongly associated with "mainstream psychology" – it has not always been the case. Indeed, the methods used by Bartlett (1932), Vygotsky (1981), and Piaget (1964) were all forms of qualitative experiments, and they have inspired generations of researchers who still today conduct studies using methodologies that are rooted in these works (e.g., Breux, Arcidiacono, & Perret-Clermont, 2014; Mehmeti & Perret-Clermont, 2016; Wagoner & Gillespie, 2014). Moreover, qualitative experiments do offer some advantages over other qualitative methods – although this, of course, always depends on the research questions one is trying to answer – and there is much to gain by reinstating them in qualitative studies. First, experiments allow researchers to use a broad range of interventions, not limiting these to interview questions, and therefore are more adaptable to specific research questions. Second, they systematise the material proposed to the participants, offering the possibility to compare patterns of interactions between different people. Third, qualitative experiments do not consider that the participants' answers are a reflection of their reality outside the laboratory, a common mistake in qualitative interviews (Brinkmann, 2016), but the product of their understanding of the task at hand. As such, they are especially fitted to the study of psychological processes, especially microgenetically (Wagoner, 2009), through the observation and analysis of the processes by which people make sense of the experimental situation and start to act within it.

2. Elicitation

The experiment designed for this study was divided in two parts. The first part was a qualitative interview, asking participants to choose three historical events important to them and to explain why. The questions and follow-ups aimed at reproducing, in a shorter version, the type of data obtained in the second study, and thus to have some background information that would help interpret the participants responses to the experiment. All the questions can be found in the detailed interview guide in Appendix I (p. 289). The second part of the study was the qualitative experiment per se. The participants were told that they were to take part in a "fake dinner party", represented by a cardboard game-like set (Appendix J, p. 292), composed of four tables. Each

table was attributed a side of the on-going (at the time, May 2015) Ukrainian conflict: Ukraine, Russia, Local Population, and International Community. Inside of each table were four chairs, each having inside a statement about the conflict (Appendix J, p. 292). Participants were to pick a chair, open it, read the statement to themselves, summarise it to me, and then explain how they would feel about someone saying that to them and what they would reply. At the end – usually after picking a total of four vignettes – the participants were asked where they would want to sit and why.

Table 3-3 List of vignettes per table

1) Russia is invading Ukraine		3) Desire for freedom after direct/indirect Soviet/Russian rule for so long
Experience based perspectives	**UKRAINIAN SIDE (all partisan perspectives)**	*Fact based perspectives*
2) Russia uses propaganda in the East		4) Fighting the corruption

5) Sniper debate		7) Referendum
Neutral perspectives	**INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (all fact based perspectives)**	*Partisan perspectives*
6) Breach of international treaties on how to carry out hostilities		8) Plane Crash

9) Russian soldiers' mothers not knowing what happened to their children		11) Eastern Ukrainian population stuck in the middle of the conflict
Neutral perspectives	**LOCAL POPULATIONS (all experience based perspectives)**	*Partisan perspectives*
10) Tatar population victims of the Ukrainian and now the Russians again		12) Someone from Eastern Ukraine who fled from the conflict

13) Russia is always presented as the bad guy, no matter what happens		15) Crimea used to belonged to Russia
Experience based perspectives	**RUSIAN SIDE (all partisan perspectives)**	*Fact based perspectives*
14) Russians have a special relation to Ukraine, always have, so it's the West's fault		16) The Maiden movement is full of neo-Nazis

The full details of the vignettes are presented in Appendix K (p. 294), and a summary is presented in Chapter 6. Each vignette varied along two dimensions: being partisan (either pro Russia or pro Kiev) or neutral, and being based on factual information or on personal experience. Table 3-3 presents the list of vignettes and how they were organised, and Table 3-4 presents the types of vignettes and how many times each have been picked. They were composed using newspapers articles and online videos (details in Appendix K, p. 294), and included only information that had been verified against several sources. Based on the results of study 2, they aimed at exploring the effects of new factual information and of testimonies on the potential changes of representation of the conflict and its history. The orientation of the vignette – partisan or neutral – aimed at representing the different sides of the conflict and making sure that participants would necessarily encounter vignettes they would agree with and disagree with – although it proved more interesting than this in the results.

Table 3-4 Types of vignettes and how many times they were picked

	Experience based	Fact based	Total
Pro-Kiev	3 vignettes picked 11 times	3 vignettes picked 9 times	6 vignettes picked 20 times
Neutral	2 vignettes picked 7 times	2 vignettes picked 5 times	4 vignettes picked 12 times
Pro-Russia	3 vignettes picked 9 times	3 vignettes picked 6 times	6 vignettes picked 15 times
Total	8 vignettes picked 27 times	8 vignettes picked 20 times	16 vignettes picked 47 times

The Ukrainian conflict was chosen because of its deep historical roots, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, and because of its temporal proximity: it made it both likely that participants would talk about history while discussing it and recent enough for them to remember its main aspects without having a fully formed representations of it. The population chosen was Polish, for two main reasons. The first one was that issues of national identity have been shown to be an extremely important aspect of collective memory and it was thus important to have a population were the event would potentially resonate at such a level. However, because this is an experimental design, there were ethical issues with taking a population too close to the conflict, hence the choice of a "neighbouring" country. Second, Poland was chosen for its accessibility:

speaking only French and English, I needed a population where I could easily find participants who would be able to speak one of these languages.

The original aim was still to have a varied Polish population, using my numerous contacts in London, where a wide range of Polish people speak English fluently. It turned out to be nearly impossible, and only one interview was conducted this way. The problem seemed to be, from the answers I gathered, that people were afraid not to be knowledgeable enough to participate. While I tried as much as possible to reassure them on this point, it proved quite ineffective. In the end, the majority of participants (10 out of 11) were contacted through the Academy of Special Education of Warsaw, where members of staff put me in contact with their friends, family members, and colleagues. All of them thus had quite intellectual professions – the only ones who agreed to participate – a pitfall I did not manage to avoid. However, the wide range of answer produced showed that it was not as much a problem as I first thought.

The participants varied in age (27 to 42) and gender (four men and seven women). All were Polish, but four had lived or were living abroad at the time of the interview. Most were fluent in English, but two showed stronger difficulties in expressing themselves in English. The depth of the analysis was adapted to these linguistic constraints. The experiments and interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes, for an average of 75 minutes. All were audio recorded. Each participant was given, at the start of the experiment, a participation information sheet (Appendix L, p. 304) summarising the study, its aims, their rights, and my contact information. This was accompanied by an informed consent form (Appendix M, p. 306) and an authorisation to record (Appendix N, p. 307). Following the interview, all the participants were sent a debriefing document (cover in Appendix O, p. 308, content in Appendix K, p. 294), restating the aims of the study and presenting how the vignettes were composed and from which sources. All the interviews were then transcribed with the help of the software Dragon Naturally Speaking, using the transcription key presented in Table 3-2.

The same principles of saturation were used for this study as for the previous one. However, the more ambitious goals required collecting more data, while the design imposed a different unit of analysis – the vignette – as well as stronger analytical constraints: because of the amount of data collected per participant, it was necessary to keep their number relatively small, simply because I would not have been able to process more in the context of this study. In the end, 11 interviews were conducted, for a total of 37 events discussed in the first part and 47 vignettes picked in the second part.

3. Analysis

The data was analysed using the software Nvivo, and four rounds of analysis were carried out. In the first round only the first part of the experiment – the qualitative interview – was analysed. Using the events chosen by the participants as the unit of analysis, I looked at 1) what event they chose; 2) what meaning they gave to it; 3) with which others did they talk about it; 4) what alternative versions, if any, they had been confronted with; and 4) what types of resources they used (e.g., factual information gathered in books, family stories, media reports) to construct the event. This served, in conjunction with the demographic information gathered about the participants, to contextualise their answers and to help in the interpretation of their answers.

The second and third analyses focused on the qualitative experiment itself, and used the reply to the vignette as the unit of analysis. It looked at three categories of elements: 1) the resources used to reply to the vignette and the sources (TV, school, friends…) from which they came, as well as the type of information used (factual knowledge, witness accounts, historical concepts…); 2) the processes displayed by the participants when mobilising resources (categorisation, narration, imagination…); and 3) the reaction to the vignette, that is what the participants reacted to, how, and whether they generally agreed or not with the vignette. The categories were open, informed by theory, and evolved as the analysis progress. The third analysis compared all the responses of the participants to a specific vignette or category of vignettes (e.g., all the neutral vignettes, or all the ones based on facts) and all the responses given by a specific participant to the material.

Based on the second and third round of analysis, a model of historical reasoning was developed, presented in Chapter 6. This model focuses on the elements used in historical reasoning – meaning, sense, factual information, and schemas – and the processes through which historical representations are produced – such as perspective taking or through the use of analogies. These new analytical categories were then used to re-analyse the data: while they had emerged in the interaction between the data – or more precisely its analysis – and the theory, refining them required to systematically apply them to the data. The papers included in Chapter 6 primarily focus on the three last rounds of analysis – using the first one to contextualise the data – and are centred on the model of historical reasoning thereby developed. The first paper explores the elements of the model, while the second paper presents the main psychological processes that were found to be associated with historical reasoning.

D. Study 4: Temporal Heteroglossia

1. Questions and Design

The fourth study looked at how collective memory is mobilised to imagine collective futures. This question grew out of two interests. First, I wanted so study what people mobilise collective memory for, not just how they discuss it. Second, it appeared in the three first studies that collective memory was often used to discuss potential future scenarios, a use that both interested and intrigued me. This fourth study is thus a secondary analysis across the three first datasets.

2. Elicitation and Analysis

There was no elicitation method per se for this study, as the extracts were selected from existing data. For the first dataset – the parliamentary debates – I focused only on the segments that had been found through the genealogical analysis, that is where collective memory was used or referred to, and I selected all these where a claim about what the future could or should be was made, directly or indirectly. For the two other datasets – qualitative interviews and qualitative experiment – I selected all the segments where participants were referring to collective futures. This was because there were actually no instances where the participants discussed the future without mentioning the past – perhaps because people quasi-systematically use the past to talk about the future, but probably because of the context of the interview, that they knew to be about history.

The data thereby selected was then analysed by focusing on: how did participants connect the past and the future; how did they justify the connection, if they did; and how was the past used to construct the future. The segments were then grouped in three broad categories, according to the type of use they made of collective memory to imagine the collective future. The results are presented in Chapter 7.

III. Introduction to the Empirical Papers

A. Abstracts and Summaries

This thesis is composed of six empirical papers – four articles and two book chapters – all peer reviewed. Below is the list of the papers, alongside with their abstracts and source, presented in Table 3-5. A short summary of their role in this thesis is also provided.

Table 3-5 List of the papers and abstracts

Paper 1 – Chapter 4 – Study 1	
Title	**"I Would Rather be Hanged Than Agree With You!": Collective Memory and the Definition of the Nation in Parliamentary Debates on Immigration.**
Type	Published peer reviewed article
Length	≈ 13 800 words
Summary	This paper focuses on the uses of collective memory in French parliamentary debates on immigration and on the interactions between the different groups represented. It also looks at how collective memory is mobilised to give meaning to the nation group and at the consequences it has over who is let into the country or not. To do so, it proposes a dialogical understanding of collective memory, building on the literature on dialogism but also boundary and meaning-making, and symbolic resources. Using a dialogical and narrative analysis, it concludes that the stories told by the different parliamentary groups reply to each other, and that this is made possible by the fact that members of parliament share some historical representations, albeit giving them different meanings.
Abstract	This paper explores the meaning attributed to the national group as an entry point into how boundaries between the in-group and the out-group are formed. To do so, it focuses on the representation of the past of the group, taken as a

	symbolic resource able to produce a raison d'être for national groups, and does so within a dialogical framework. Using the transcripts of the French parliamentary debates on immigration from 2006, it proposes a qualitative analysis of collective narratives of the past along three axes: 1) what meaning do they give to the nation, 2) how is such a meaning produced, and 3) how do the stories told by different groups reply or relate to one another. By identifying the main narratives found in the data and how they relate to each other – within and between groups – it proposes to see collective memory as itself the product of symbolisation processes and, therefore, as a cultural tool especially powerful to produce meaning about the present. This paper also argues that collective memory is a situated construction negotiated with – or contested by – others, made possible by the presence of common historical benchmarks to which different meanings may however be attributed. Finally, it proposes to understand "immigration talk" as potentially the product of the identity questions faced by the national group, rather than the other way around.
Reference	de Saint-Laurent, C. (2014). "I would rather be hanged than agree with you!": Collective memory and the definition of the nation in parliamentary debates on immigration. *Outlines. Critical Practices Studies, 15*(3), 22-53.

Paper 2 – Chapter 5 – Study 2	
Title	**Trajectories of Resistance and Historical Reflections.**
Type	In press peer reviewed book chapter
Length	≈ 7 300 words
Summary	This paper introduces a developmental perspective on collective memory through the notion of 'trajectory of remembering'. Building on the sociocultural literature on the life-course, it looks at how people's representations of history are shaped by the ruptures and transitions they went through. I analyse how two intellectuals and artists came to resist hegemonic representations of history, focusing on what provoked ruptures and on the resources used by the participants to overcome them. It concludes that two main categories of elements

	seem to play a role in this regard: cultural tools, such as historical books, and (trusted) others, who may offer alternative accounts of what happened.
Abstract	Collective memory, the one-sided and subjective vision the group holds of its own past, plays a central role in defining who we believe we are and what the world is supposed to be. As such, being able to challenge what is said of the past offers the possibility to imagine futures and build identities outside of what is commonly accepted in society, thus providing roots for resistance. This paper proposes to reconstruct the trajectories of two intellectuals and artists interviewed in Brussels to understand what may have led them to question traditional narratives of the past, and in some cases to actively resist them. It concludes that the encounter with several tools, such as historical books or the discovery of others' alternative narratives, may foster resistance; they not only encourage individuals to question specific historical discourses, but participate in the construction of a "meta-memory": a general representation of historical discourses.
Reference	de Saint-Laurent, C. (2017). Trajectories of resistance and historical reflections. In N. Chaudhary, P. Hviid, J. Villasden, P. Marsico & J. Valsiner (Eds.) *Resistance in everyday life: Constructing cultural experiences* (pp. 49-63). Singapore: Springer

Paper 3 – Chapter 5 – Study 2	
Title	**Personal Trajectories, Collective Memories: Remembering and the Life-Course.**
Type	Published peer reviewed article
Length	≈ 6 900 words
Summary	This paper builds on the notion of trajectory of remembering and proposes a model to conceptualise the developmental approach to collective memory. It then uses a case study to further unpack one of the dimensions of the model: self-other relations. Using the neo-Meadian literature on Position Exchange Theory, it applies a Life Positioning Analysis to the study of a trajectory of remembering. This leads me to conclude that people may assume different

	positions towards history – witness, scholar, critic… – that evolve in time and may inform how they understand history today.
Abstract	How do we understand the broad history to which we belong? What meaning do we give to it and what role does it have in our lives? This paper proposes to approach collective memory from the perspective of the subject, adopting a developmental perspective to explore how people build specific relations and representations of the historical past. Building on the literature on collective remembering and on life-course studies, it conceptualises memory an as oriented, culturally mediated and dialogical action with a developmental history, embodied in 'trajectories of remembering'. This conception is applied to the life trajectory of Alain, a 44-year-old Belgian journalist, with a particular interest in the social and intersubjective dimensions of collective remembering. From this analysis, it will be concluded that people's relation to history is the product of the different positions they assume through time. The study of these successive experiences and their integration can thus shed new light on how we relate to history and give it meaning.
Reference	de Saint-Laurent, C. (2017). Personal trajectories, collective memories: Remembering and the life-course. *Culture & Psychology, 23*(2), 263–279.

Paper 4 – Chapter 6 – Study 3	
Title	**Historical Reasoning: A Cultural Psychology Perspective on Emergence in Collective Memory.**
Type	Submitted peer reviewed article
Length	≈ 10 900 words
Summary	In this paper, I explore how representations of history emerge, proposing the notion of 'historical reasoning'. Building on the literature on collective memory and history education, I consider historical reasoning to be the process by which people construct, maintain, contest, and challenge historical representations. Using this concept to analyse the results a qualitative experiment highlighted the importance of four elements: meaning (as the shared signification given to the

	event), sense (as the personal signification and 'resonance' of the event), factual knowledge (as the factual details about the event), and schemas (as forms of organisation of information learnt from past experiences or generalised from multiple events). Each element is presented in turn, alongside excerpts from the data, and an integrative model is proposed in the end.
Abstract	Collective memory, the lay representations of history, is an important component of the way we relate to the social world, giving it origin and meaning. Because of its fundamental social and cultural dimensions, most studies have been devoted to the exploration of what representations of the past exist in the public sphere, how they are transmitted – and at times transformed in the process – and how they rely on cultural elements, principally shared narratives. However, little is known as to how new representations of the past emerge, and more specifically how representations that diverge from the 'mainstream' narrative are developed as people reflect on history. In this article, I propose to answer this question by adopting a sociocultural perspective on collective memory. I start by proposing the notion of historical reasoning, defined as the process by which people construct, maintain, contest and challenge historical representations. It is then used to analyse a qualitative and dialogical experiment where participants were confronted with different positions on the on-going Ukrainian conflict. I conclude this analysis by proposing a model of historical reasoning as resting on four main dimensions: meaning, sense, factual knowledge and schemas. Finally, I argue that this is opening a new, complementary field of study for collective memory.
Reference	de Saint-Laurent, C. (Submitted). Historical reasoning: A cultural psychology perspective on emergence in collective memory. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science*.

Paper 5 – Chapter 6 – Study 3	
Title	**Collective Memory Beyond Memory: Psychosocial Processes in Historical Reasoning.**
Type	Submitted peer reviewed article
Length	≈ 6 500 words
Summary	This papers looks at the processes involved in historical reasoning. Building on the previous paper, it presents the twelve psychological processes that were found to be used in historical reasoning in the qualitative experiment. Two series of processes are then discussed in more details: analogies and generalisations, on the one hand, and imagination, identification, and perspective taking on the other. I argue that the first category is used in an attempt by the participants to provide an 'objective' account of the past, while the second one is used to construct accounts that are seen as 'subjective'.
Abstract	Collective memory is often studied as the one-sided, biased representation of history, which underpins many nationalist discourses. This paper, on the contrary, starts from the premise that this only one aspect of collective memory and proposes to explore how historical representations are not only constructed, but also challenged and transformed. First, I propose the notion of historical reasoning and argue that studying its processes requires moving beyond memory. Second, I present a model of historical reasoning and apply it to the study of a qualitative and dialogical experiment, where participants are confronted to different perspectives on a collective event. Third, I present the twelve processes that were found in the data, and I conclude that historical reasoning relies on both 'objective' and 'subjective' aspects. Finally, I discuss some of the potential consequences of this model for the field of collective memory.
Reference	de Saint-Laurent, C. (Submitted). Collective memory beyond memory: Psychosocial processes in historical reasoning. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science.*

Paper 6 – Chapter 7 – Study 4	
Title	**Thinking Through Time: From Collective Memories to Collective Futures.**
Type	In press peer reviewed book chapter
Length	≈ 6 800 words
Summary	This paper proposes a transversal analysis of the three previous studies. It discusses the links between collective memory and the imagination of collective futures, building on both literatures. It then presents the three ways that collective memory was found to be used to imagine the future in the studies conducted in this thesis: as a frame of reference, as a source of experience and examples, and finally as a generalisable experience from which representations of the world are constructed. This secondary analysis will lead me to argue that representations of the world are characterised by the simultaneous presence of multiple periods of time (temporal heteroglossia), allowing us to "think through time".
Abstract	In this chapter I look at the links between collective memory and the imagination of collective futures. Drawing on works on imagination and autobiographical memory, I first discuss the role of past experiences in imagining the future. I then explore the consequences of this perspective for collective memories and collective futures, which will lead me to argue that the former provides the basis for the latter. Three case studies are presented, each illustrating a different type of relation between collective memory and imagination. This will lead me to the conclusion that representations of the world are characterised by "temporal heteroglossia", the simultaneous presence of multiple periods of time, and that they mediate the relation between collective memory and imagination, allowing us to "think through time".
Reference	de Saint-Laurent, C. (In press). Thinking through time: From collective memories to collective futures. In C. de Saint-Laurent, S. Obradović, K. Carriere (Eds.) *Imagining collective futures. Perspectives from social, cultural and political psychology.* London: Palgrave.

B. Modifications to the Papers

The papers are reproduced as they were published or submitted, except for a few modifications. First, the references were updated: in press papers that have been published since were corrected, references to the other papers in this thesis were replaced by cross-references, and the individual reference lists were replaced by a general reference list at the end of the thesis. Second, footnotes on the transcription methods and anonymisation of data, which were repeated for each paper, have been removed after there first occurrence. Third, spelling and grammatical mistakes were corrected. Fourth, the format was changed, to follow the copyright guidelines – often preventing me from reproducing the papers with the editor's formatting – and to have a unified presentation. Fifth, the presentation of the quotes from the data was updated, as some editors refused the use of the signs [and]. The language, however, was not changed, which means that some of the papers use American spelling, while the rest of this thesis is written in British English.

Chapter 4.

Collective Memory in Interactions

I. Collective Memory in Parliamentary Debates on Immigration (Paper 1)

Article published as:
de Saint-Laurent, C. (2014). "I would rather be hanged than agree with you!": Collective memory and the definition of the nation in parliamentary debates on immigration. *Outlines. Critical Practices Studies, 15*(3), 22-53.

A. Abstract

This paper explores the meaning attributed to the national group as an entry point into how boundaries between the in-group and the out-group are formed. To do so, it focuses on the representation of the past of the group, taken as a symbolic resource able to produce a raison d'être for national groups, and does so within a dialogical framework. Using the transcripts of the French parliamentary debates on immigration from 2006, it proposes a qualitative analysis of collective narratives of the past along three axes: 1) what meaning do they give to the nation, 2) how is such a meaning produced, and 3) how do the stories told by different groups reply or relate to one another. By identifying the main narratives found in the data and how they relate to each other – within and between groups – it proposes to see collective memory as itself the product of symbolisation processes and, therefore, as a cultural tool especially powerful to produce meaning about the present. This paper also argues that collective memory is a situated construction negotiated with – or contested by – others, made possible by the presence of common historical benchmarks to which different meanings may however be attributed. Finally, it proposes to understand "immigration talk" as potentially the product of the identity questions faced by the national group, rather than the other way around.

B. Introduction

The definition of the nation, who may belong to it and what is the essence of its members, has become a central question in the management of immigration in most Western countries, especially in Europe. The resurgences of nationalism, the multiplication of bills to limit

immigration, the apparition of extreme right parties in European parliaments, are all raising the question of how we define national group boundaries and on what ground. Much research has been done in the past decades on how groups are defined in opposition to an out-group, from Tajfel's first findings (e.g., Tajfel, 1970, 1978) to Reicher's model of the processes by which the in-group is sacralised and the out-group demonised (Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008). Here emerges the image of a "natural" drift of group organisation: if we are together, it is against others who are not like us and will never be.

Far from trying to endorse or oppose such a conception of intergroup relations, this paper aims at approaching this issue through a slightly different angle: the question of the meaning we attribute to the existence of the groups we belong to – and to the fact that we belong to them – and those we do not. Following Dahinden & Zittoun (2013), it proposes to explore how meaning is produced for the group, considering it as interrelated with the question of its boundaries, as "it is impossible to create a meaning without actually creating the boundary between that meaning and what differs from it, and reversely" (Dahinden & Zittoun, 2013, p. 202). From this perspective, "in-groups and out-groups are […] the result of symbolic and social boundary work of actors. Social differences – the distinction between "us" and "them", thus in-groups and out-groups – and corresponding boundary processes are historically constructed in specific contexts and are variable, hereby involving a broad range of actors" (Holtz, Dahinden, & Wagner, 2013, p. 234). In the case of nationalism, this implies that the meaning we build around "the nation" will produce a symbolic boundary that may be turned into a social one (Lamont & Molnár, 2002). It will thus have repercussions on the line we draw between who is allowed in the country (and will obtain a visa or work permit) and who is not, as well as how outsiders are perceived.

It is not my aim, then, to define what the nation is, but to consider how the meaning of this particular 'object' is constructed and negotiated, and the implications it may have in people's life. Indeed, what Dahinden & Zittoun (2013) express about religion can be applied to the nation as well, that is that "it is not a natural, substantivist cultural difference with regard to religion which is the *raison d'être* for the existence of religious groups, but that subjective mobilisation of such ideas and symbols by actors – in terms of meaning making and boundaries – produce the groups in question" (p. 201).

This also implies, in the case of groups such as nations, that the meanings we produce and use do not only determine the limits of the group, but the relevance of the said group in organising and explaining the social world for its actors. Indeed, not all memberships unleash passions, nor

do they take on the same dimensions for all the members of a given group. Group memberships, as the groups themselves, are multiple, dynamic, historical and contextual (Gillespie, Howarth, & Cornish, 2012). However, it seems that some of them "stick", whether in time (becoming part of history) or for those who hold them (becoming part of their identity). Their perspectival nature does not prevent them from becoming hegemonic elements of our social environment. In such a context, I believe it is worth asking what meaning we attach not only to the delimitations we draw in the social field – the "us" against "them" – but to the existence of the group itself. Exploring the meaning attributed to the nation to produce its boundaries – and how it may be contested – may therefore be a step towards a better understanding of the increasing importance of immigration in political discourses.

To explore such processes, parliamentary debates on immigration can be a good starting point. Indeed, they constitute the place where the boundaries of the group are officially discussed, negotiated and defined. If boundaries tend to be at times blurry and are perpetually renegotiated in social interactions (Lamont & Molnár, 2002; Pachucki, Pendergrass, & Lamont, 2007), then focusing on the moment where symbolic boundaries are turned into legal social boundaries through a public debate may shed light on how their meanings are constructed. Although parliaments may not be the place where decisions are actually taken (Manin, 2008), they remain a solemn public arena, where different positions are officially discussed and contested. As such, they constitute a form of 'political show' (Landowski, 1977), where publicly taken positions may become part of history[7]. They are also the place where public opinion – as an artefact created by the media and supposed to represent the spirit of the time on a specific issue (Landowski, 1989) – as it is represented by the members of parliament, is crystallised to produce the rules the group is going to live by.

What is interesting here is the idea that parliamentary debates *should* be the place where the nation is represented in its plurality, no matter whether this is really the case and, for those debates on immigration, where the nation discusses the right for outsiders to enter the group.

[7] See for instance the name of the journal in which the official transcripts of the debates are published, which is simply called "Journal Officiel".

The following is therefore an analysis of the meaning given to the national group in French parliamentary debates over a bill on "Immigration and Integration" from 2006[8].

It is important to note and explain, from the start, the absence of two elements from this paper. First, the notion of power will implicitly appear here and there in the analysis, but it will remain a ghostly shadow compared to its importance in intergroup interactions and the management of immigration. Far from denying the importance of power in the understanding of such situations – or any situation, for that matter – it is here taken for granted. Indeed, immigration *is* a question of power, of how a group may impose barriers – material and symbolic – to prevent others from entering its territory and of how powerful groups may become attractive to outsiders. Democratic politics is often but the tussle to obtain the power conferred by the adhesion of the nation to the ideas of the party, power that legitimates the tentative of the group to create a world in its image. And social representations, with the specific point of view on reality they stand for, position actors in relation to each other and may grant power and legitimacy to those able to impose their vision of the world (Jovchelovitch, 2007b). As such, every element of discourse analysed here, every meaning produced, every argument, contestation, silence, etc., is, without a doubt, also a matter of power. It thus will remain the background against which this study rests, although one mainly implicitly referred to.

Similarly, racism – and other forms of discrimination – will not be discussed here. How political discourses create and sustain racial and religious discrimination has been discussed elsewhere (for studies on French parliamentary discourse, see Van Der Valk, 2003; Van Dijk, 2001), and it will be taken as a given here that parliamentary debates have the potential to do so - and in the case of debates on immigration, often do. And that, unfortunately, it is commonly what is at stake with immigration policies.

In this paper, first, I will present the lens that was used to explore meaning-making – collective memory as the collective imagination of the past – and attempt to build a theoretical framework for its study in group interactions. From this, three questions will be defined: 1) what meaning do the stories told about the past produce for the group? 2) how is such a meaning produced? and 3) how is such a meaning negotiated with the others present in the debate? A method to explore these questions in relation to the data will then be proposed, and the results of this

[8] The data comes from a master dissertation done under Alex Gillespie's supervision at the London School of Economics (de Saint-Laurent, 2012), a dissertation which is used here for background information as it presented a preliminary analysis of the data.

analysis presented. Finally, an attempt to draw their practical and theoretical consequences for boundary work will be made.

C. Collective Memory and Meaning Making

If "meaning making designates the process by which human beings make the world readable, valuable and actionable, through the use of semiotic means" (Dahinden & Zittoun, 2013, p. 187), then focusing on the apparition and utilisation of such semiotic tools in the discussion of the boundaries of the national group may provide an interesting entry point into the way meaning is produced.

With this idea in mind, what is proposed here is an analysis of the references made to history in a specific set of parliamentary debates. Indeed, the way the group represents its past and organises it along culturally shared story lines is part of the group's identity and confers meaning to its actions and existence (Wertsch, 2002, 2008; Wertsch & Batiashvili, 2012). What we, collectively, choose to forget, to sacralise or to question is never left to chance (Ergur, 2009), and the stories we decide to tell relate to what we believe about ourselves and the groups to which we belong (Halbwachs, 1950). Such stories may therefore play a central role in social identification (e.g., J. H. Liu & Hilton, 2005; J. H. Liu, Wilson, McClure, & Higgins, 1999) and in present group interactions (Delori, 2011). Indeed, "if history can subjectively shape social imagination and be reinterpreted depending on the present conflicts and needs, it can also provide the temptation to reproduce the patterns of the past" (Leveau, 1994, p. 159). The negotiation of the narratives of the past is thus also a political issue (Rahman, 2010), where what is said is a reconstruction that may be used to shape national identities (Gavriely-Nuri, 2013) or to give meaning to present issues (Lee, 2014).

Moreover, as expressed in the definition of meaning-making proposed above, the possibility offered by representations of the past to play an important role in identity construction is not simply due to the direct justifications of the existence of the group. Indeed, as culturally shared symbolic elements, they may constitute symbolic resources. That is, they can be used to produce meaning for the ruptures experienced in the present (Zittoun, 2006; Zittoun et al., 2003).

In the case of the nation, transitions between historical periods, where old meanings cannot stand anymore, may involve a specific use of the representation of the collective past as a symbolic resource, as it may be the case today with the transition from local organisation to globalisation. A world where multicultural contacts are in constant augmentation, where the

existence of the nation may be experienced as threatened by others – be it in economic, cultural or territorial terms – potentially leads to the renegotiation of the permeability of the group and its *raison d'être*. As a result, exploring the references made to history as possible traces of such movements, participating to the rewriting or strengthening of national myths, may constitute a valuable entry point into the meaning given to the nation and how its borders are delimited. This paper thus adopts a socio-cultural psychological perspective on memory, considering that discourses about the past carry with them "a series of momentous suppositions about the world", and giving it meaning (Brockmeier, 2002a, p. 10).

It is worth noting that representations of the past will be grouped under the heading of *collective memory* in what follows. However, *collective memory* originally referred solely to the history of the group as it is remembered by those who lived it (Halbwachs, 1950), while the rest of the past of the group falls under the heading of *cultural memory* or *collective imagination of the past* (Rautenberg, 2010). Many authors have already taken the liberty to do so – as it is the case for the vast majority of the studies quoted here – and although such a distinction is no doubt of a great interest, it is this general sense of collective memory that will be used here.

D. Collective Memory in Interactions

Part of the interest in data such as parliamentary debates is that it allows us to study collective memory in interactions, and therefore to analyse it along with the contestations it may lead to. However, it also implies that a framework is needed to take into account such a dynamic. In this regard, dialogism can be a good theoretical and methodological tool.

1. Dialogism as a Theoretical Tool: Intersubjectivity in Meaning-Making

As a theoretical orientation, dialogism allows us to understand the multiplicity of knowledge and of how culture may be used to build different meanings or types of knowledge. Indeed, it stands on "the assumption that human nature and human life are constituted in interrelations with 'the other', that is, in *other orientation*" (Linell, 2009, p. 13). Drawing on the works of Vygotsky, it also considers that every use of tools and signs is mediated by others (Vygotsky & Luria, 1994), making the basic unit of analysis a triangular relation between self, other and object. As a result, every idea produced contains its alternative (Billig, 1987; Gillespie, 2008). If mental life exists in

relation to an "other", real or imagined, then ideas emerge at the interplay of sameness and difference with the other.

In the case of collective memory, which may at times seem to reduce discourses to a single voice by downplaying "ambiguity and doubt" (Wertsch & Batiashvili, 2012, p. 38), this means that the stories told about the past have to be understood as part of a larger conversation – here again, real or imagined – where what is said can always be contested or renegotiated (e.g., Kulyk, 2011; Rosoux, 2001). Indeed, what we say is always a reply to someone else, and an anticipation of the reaction of the person to whom the speech is addressed (Bakhtin, 1986). Insisting on specific actors' intentions, historical causalities and significance is also meant to indicate that perspectives from which ambiguity, doubt and opposing representations are conceived as possible.

Therefore, collective memory has to be taken as a co-construction between several perspectives on historical events. Moreover, if representations always include in some way their alternative, it suggests that mobilising the associated meaning also mobilises a network of opposed significations, contributing to the dynamic of meaning making processes. Although research on collective memory tends to give a static and unified picture of its content in a given population, careful longitudinal analysis shows that the accounts people give of the past are dynamic and multiple (Fasulo, 2002; Gavriely-Nuri, 2013), and thus that it is necessary to take into consideration the context within which remembering occurs in order to understand the stories being told (Brockmeier, 2002a; Fasulo, 2002).

2. Dialogism as a Methodological Tool: Identifying Traces

The above theoretical considerations have methodological implications for the study of meaning as emerging from intersubjective interactions, and especially for how it can be traced in discourse. Indeed, central to dialogical analysis is the idea that the voices of others can be found in speech: as words and their meanings are not learned from dictionary definitions, every speech act is in a way a quote from someone else (Bakhtin, 1986).

Analysing the main voices present can thus help us understand what the speech is a reply to, to whom it is addressed and therefore which "larger conversation" it is part of. Because of this, voices may also constitute the clearest traces of the social and historical context of the utterance (Gillespie & Cornish, 2010). And if meaning emerges in relation to another and is dependent on social, cultural and historical context, then analysing these voices may be indispensable to understand meanings and their associated processes.

Moreover, the issue here is that naturally occurring data, such as parliamentary debates, only offers traces of phenomena like the use of symbolic resources. It would be foolish to expect people to naturally engage in lengthy conversation about the meaning of events such as World War II, and even more on how they produced such meanings. To overcome this issue, Gillespie's genealogical method proposes to analyse dialogic overtones, or traces of past uses of the utterance, to go "beyond the presentation of recorded data" (Gillespie, 2006, p. 156) and "reconstruct the complex social processes through which [the discourse] has been forged" (p. 157).

Here, such a method would allow for the reconstruction of the processes by which meaning was attributed to the nation through collective history using relatively fragmented data. To do so, Gillespie proposes to search for *referenced traces* of the object we wish to study, *symbolic resources* or cultural elements that are being brought in to make sense of the situation, *echoes* or implicit traces of voices. And, last but not least, *voices*, or direct quotations.

Adapting such a framework to the data and the study of the use of symbolic resources, several elements were added or modified. First, indirect references to historical events were added to direct references, with for instance expression like "the foundational principles of the Republic" indirectly referring to its foundation, that is, the French Revolution. Second, collective memory being itself a symbolic resource, it is the elements in relation to which it was evoked that were coded – that is, the elements that were justified or made sense of by using a reference to history. Third, echoes, usually referring to unmarked quotations, included references to the words of historical speakers even when no quotation was made, such as when a MP (Member of Parliament) said about the parliament: "where Jaurès expressed himself". Here, a voice is evoked, that of the 19th century French politician, although his words are not uttered – possibly because they are supposed to be known by all. Finally, quotations did not only include quotations of historical speakers, but also evocations of the use by others of references to the past, whether they were indeed made or they were supposed. For instance, a Right-winged MP told a Radical Left colleague that: "your remarks as those of someone nostalgic for communism, Mister Brard". Here, it is the past use of the symbol of communism that is assumed and interacted with, which fits with the aim pursued when identifying voices.

3. The Data: French Parliamentary Debates on Immigration and Integration

The data used consisted of the official transcripts of fifteen sessions of parliamentary debates, which took place in France between May 2nd, 2006 and May 17th 2006, as well as the vote session of June 30th, 2006, all made available to the public on the parliament official website. This constitutes the whole of the examination of the bill number 2986 on "Immigration and Integration" by the National Assembly, one of the two organs of the legislative power in France and, here, the first one to officially discuss the bill, for a total of one hundred and seven hours of debates.

Parliamentary days are usually organised in three sessions – morning, afternoon, evening – lasting around 4 to 6 hours, and often finish in the middle of the night. For these reasons, and because an impressive number of bills are discussed every year, only a limited number of deputies – the members of the National Assembly – participate in the discussion of a bill (here, around 20, out of 577 deputies).

The transcripts contain the participants' whole interventions and interruptions from the opening to the end of the sessions, as well as general reactions of the Assembly – such as laughter or exclamations – which are usually attributed to a whole parliamentary group. These groups are central to the Assembly's structure, as speaking times and turns, seats, places in commissions, etc., are allocated to a parliamentary group and not to specific members. Furthermore, the allegiance to one's group is necessary to run for the next elections, and therefore taken very seriously by the MPs (Abélès, 2001).

The Right side of the hemicycle, author of the bill and constituting the majority, was represented by one parliamentary group, the Union for Popular Movement, whereas the Left was represented by the Socialists (Socialist Party, second group of the parliament) and the Radical Left (Communist and Republican Deputies), although both groups defended a very similar line. The last parliamentary group was constituted by the Centrists[9].

The aim of the bill, proposed by the Right-winged majority, was to drastically reduce the number of long-term visas accorded to foreigners through a tightening of the delivery conditions for illegal migrants, migrant's families and those married to EU citizens. Although the bill contained several important measures to reach such a goal, the most symbolic one – which is also the one

[9] In the interest of clarity, the organisation of the French political groups, the parliaments and the French political system as a whole have been simplified here. The original analysis was however made without these truncations.

that was discussed the longest – consisted in the annulation of a law from 1997 which allowed illegal immigrants who could prove that they had lived in France for at least ten years to apply for a resident permit. As the measure had always concerned a very limited number of people (3,000 a year, in a country counting more than 65 million inhabitants), those opposed to the bill saw there a populist decision from Sarkozy[10] to satisfy his most radical electorate, and its reinstitution was the first decision on immigration taken by the Socialist government[11]. For the defenders of the bill, however, it was considered as a proof that the previous system was encouraging illegal immigration.

The context of the bill was one of great political tension and this law – the second one proposed by Nicolas Sarkozy on immigration – polarised the French public sphere and became a symbol of the ideas defended by its author during the following campaign for the presidential elections (Girier, 2007). As a result, the parliamentary groups were, in the debates, mostly organised around the notion of majority (Right) and opposition (Left), with the exception of the centrist minority and a couple of Right-winged deputies (de Saint-Laurent, 2012). However, the deep *clivage* between Right and Left – so central to the French political life that it shapes "the individual political identifications and the processes of politicisation which underlie them" (Haegel, 2005, p. 46, our translation) – started much earlier to these debates (Rose & Urwin, 1970).

4. Method: Reconstructing Narratives

The analysis of the data took place in three steps. The genealogical method presented above was used as a first step to identify the excerpts relevant for the investigation of the role of collective memory in giving meaning to the national group; the software used for this segment of the analysis was Nvivo. In order to preserve the dynamic nature of interactions, the coding included whenever possible also the elements to which participants replied as well as the reactions to their reply.

[10] President of France from 2007 to 2012, who made of immigration one of the main topic of his 2007 electoral campaign.

[11] "Circulaire Valls" dated November 28th, 2012, that actually reduced the necessary presence to five years.

To define what would constitute historical time without entering in a debate only remotely relevant to this study, it was decided to stop at the most recent events among those mentioned that would conventionally be considered as part of history in France, namely decolonisation. It amounts to 65 intercepts, all of which are rather short (between 15 and 1 lines, with no more than 3 participants, excluding general reactions from the Assembly) except for a lengthy (and heated) conversation on World War II (around 250 lines, with 12 participants).

Because of the length of the debates and the evolution of my own sensitivity to indirect references, the extraction of the references was done in two times: first through careful readings of the whole of the debates, second through a key-words research. The key-words were chosen from the 49 excerpts obtained within the first step, and aimed at pinpointing indirect references made through expressions clearly linked elsewhere to history. 16 excerpts were added, mainly referring to the French Revolution and the Enlightenment. Unfortunately, several implicit references certainly have eluded me, a pitfall impossible to avoid.

The second step consisted of coding the extracts thereby obtained along two axes. First, the events referred to were thematically coded (do they talk about World War II, the French Revolution, colonisation, etc.?), trying to map out the historical periods represented and regroup similar references. Second, the groups the speakers belonged to were coded, with two categories: political party and side of the political spectrum. The categories proposed here not only follow the groups that seem, as seen above, to be central to the representations of the MPs (and are the only ones they evoke for the in-group in the debates), but, as will be seen, are also relevant to the analysis.

For the third step, the concept of "schematic narrative templates" (Wertsch, 2008) was used to reconstruct the narratives of the past present in the data. Narrative templates are general story lines common to several stories within a given cultural-historical context, and they are especially present in collective memory, where national groups tend to use a single story line to narrate a multitude of historical events (Wertsch, 2002, 2008). This concept was thus used to reconstruct the narratives from the very heterogeneous and fragmented excerpts obtained. For this purpose, the different fragments of stories present in the data were superposed, with the aim of finding the common general narrative. Following the findings presented above on symbolic resources, it was considered that elements of the past that are used similarly in discourse probably have a similar meaning for their user, facilitating the superposition of elements from different stories.

Table 4-1 offers an illustration of how this reconstruction was made for a limited segment of the data. In row 1, the references made to World War II and colonisation by Left-winged deputies

are synthesised and then superposed according to how they were used (e.g., the Right is compared to both the colonisers and the Vichy regime[12], all three being presented as classifying men on unfair grounds; it is therefore assumed that the colonisers and the partisans of the Vichy regime play the same part within the schematic narrative templates). In row 2, the underlying stories are reconstructed (sections not in italic) and in row 3 a possible common narrative is proposed. Finally, the missing parts of the stories, in italics in the table, are hypothesised from the narrative template. Whenever a story could not be reconstructed this way – because the general narratives did not match – the main story lines found in the data were still used to shed light on the underlying story, as collective memory tends to organise the past along a continuous line (Wertsch, 2002).

Because of this very reconstructive aspect of the analysis, all the interpretations were checked against complementary sources (systematic research in French newspapers for references to similar events by politicians, consultation of the different participants' blogs and websites, consultation of some of the history books used in political schools, etc.) and involved multiple excerpts and data sources.

The analysis that follows, carried out on all of the data, presents 1) the stories told by the Left, 2) how they were contested by the Right, 3) the stories told by the Right, and 4) the contestations they led to from the Left. The interpretation of the meaning these stories give to the national group and how it may have been produced is proposed at each step, in order to render clearer how such propositions were built. A similar aim underlies the ordering of the data, starting each time with the most frequent reference. However, two remarks deserve to be made about their initial organisation in the data. First, the references to history are spread throughout the debates, although the three sessions that followed the opening statements – where public attention tends to diminish – showed a higher concentration. Second, the contestations usually happened during the same session – or at least the same day – as the original reference, with the evocation of the USSR being the only exception.

[12] The Vichy regime governed Southern France during World War II and collaborated with the Nazis. This part of French history is however often minimised and the Resistant movement is brought to the forefront.

Table 4-1. Example of the use of "schematic narrative templates" to reconstruct the narratives underlying the references made to history

	Historical event	Main elements of the story		
1. References in the data	*Colonisation*		Comparison of colonised populations with today's immigrants	Comparison of the Right's policy with the one of the colonisers
	World War II	Quotations of French "resistants" presented as defending the same ideas as the Left	Comparison of the immigrants to those oppressed by Nazism	Comparison of the Right's policy with the one of the Vichy regime
2. Underlying stories	*Colonisation*	*The Left defending…?*	… the populations oppressed by colonisation…	… against the colonisers
	World War II	The resistants…	*… defending the victims of World War II…?*	… against the Vichy regime.
3. Common narrative templates		The Left-winged[13] hero…	… defending oppressed people…	… against the defenders of oppressive ideologies.

The ethnographic and historical elements that were used to interpret the references are added along the way. These are based on my experience of the stories surrounding history in France, heard in the media, at school, known from popular culture or political discourses, and were confronted to those of several French colleagues. They however remain subjective, as would any interpretation of such cultural elements[14]. Because the focus of this study is on the dynamic

[13] All the resistants quoted were associated later with Left-winged political organisations.

[14] However, as already stated, all the interpretations made here were checked against secondary sources.

aspect of the use of collective memory, I do not believe this to be a major shortcoming: what matters here is the journey, notwithstanding the doubts that may surround its starting point.

E. Stories and Meanings

1. The Left: The Revolution, Colonisation, Slavery, Third republic, World War II & Decolonisation

The Left's references to history concern a rather wide array of events, from slavery to the Vichy regime during World War II, and go back as far as Leonardo da Vinci and François Ier (king of France during the Renaissance). Most of them concern World War II and/or colonisation (17 references), and are used to defend the idea that the treatment of immigration by the Right resembled the logic of these periods, as one of the aim of the bill was to increase the number of qualified immigrants and restrict access to the country for unqualified ones.

Excerpt 1[15]:

> Jean-Pierre Brard (Radical Left): I can very well picture him, filling up his basket on the international market […] plundering the developing countries of their life forces! You want to plunder them today like the colonial troops did yesterday!
>
> 03.05.2006, first session[16]

[15] Because of the heterogeneity of the data and its interpretation as a whole, the excerpts presented here should not be considered as either representative nor as summarising the data, but as illustrations.

[16] All quotes from the debates are designated by author, date and parliamentary session. The transcripts do not contain page or paragraph numbers. The political affiliations of the participants were added in brackets for clarity, [...] replaces the parts of the interventions that were removed. Comments about the reactions of the assembly, in italics and in brackets, are part of the original transcripts. All translations were made by the author.

Excerpt 2:

Arnaud Montebourg (Socialist): An immigration that you decided to abuse by making resurface the shadows of a neo-vichyssoise ideology of sorting men out.

03.05.2006, third session

Excerpt 3:

Jérôme Rivière (Right): I suffer when I receive, at the Strasbourg Court, lessons on the respect of Human Rights by judges coming from the Ukrainian, Azeri, Turkish or Georgian systems, to quote only a few of the countries [that signed the treaty on the European Court of Human Rights].

Several Socialist and Radical Left MPs: This is scandalous!

Bernard Roman (Socialist): Soon with the yellow star!

Jean-Pierre Brard (Radical Left): This is Gobineau!

03.05.2006, first session

Gobineau was a French intellectual from the end of the nineteenth century, considered as the father of racial demography and as an important source for Hitler's ideology, and "neo-vichyssoise" refers to the Vichy Regime, Petain's regime in Southern France which collaborated with the Nazis.

What appears here is the use of the past by the Left – and more specifically the meaning attributed to it – to make sense of the present. The proposition of the Right to focalise on qualified migrants is interpreted as "colonial plundering". This differentiation between "qualified" and "unqualified" (to which excerpt 2 seems to be a reply, although it is not clear in the transcripts) and the one between democratic and undemocratic cultures (excerpt 3) is attributed a similar meaning as the one of World War II: the application of an ideology – such as Gobineau's – that differentiates between men on unjustifiable grounds.

The analogies made between different historical periods seems to be made possible by the identification by the Left-winged deputies of recurring actors across history: the Right is seen as comparable to the colonial troops, because the aim of their actions is represented as similar, and similar also to the the Vichy regime, because of its ideology. This is especially visible here:

Excerpt 4:

> Jean-Pierre Brard (Radical Left): Really, two France are in confrontation, as throughout History: the one of Coblence[17] against the one of the Revolution; the one of Paul Reynaud against the one of the Popular Front; the one of Napoleon and Josephine against the one of Toussaint Louverture and Victor Schoelcher […] The one that supported Franco, Salazar, Mobutu (protestations on the Right's benches) against the one that defended Grimau, Cunhal, Lumumba,…
>
> Several Right-winged deputies: And Stalin! And Stalin!
>
> Jean-Pierre Brard (Radical Left): …the France that supported the colonial wars against the France in solidarity with the oppressed populations! […] We will fight you with every fibre and ounce of strength we have!
>
> 02.05.2013, third session.

The country is here divided in two sides, the oppressors and those defending the oppressed, that are associated throughout history not only because they defended the same things, but also because they opposed the same people. This continuity of historical characters, allowing for history to go on as an uninterrupted story of social and political oppositions, can also be found in the multiple references connecting the World Wars – especially the second one – and colonisation. The idea defended by the Left when referring to both events is that of a debt towards the former French colonies. For instance, after arguing against the tightening of the conditions to obtain a visa, a socialist deputy said:

[17] All the historical figures evoked here work in opposing couples: 1) Coblence was the city where many noble men, accompanied by the king's brothers, took refuge during the Revolution. 2) Reynaud was a French politician known for his economically liberal positions during the social movement of the Popular Front. 3) Toussaint Louverture and Victor Schoelcher are important figures of the anti-slavery political fight, during the 18th century in the French colonies for the former, and in the 19th century metropolitan France for the later. Napoleon I (evoked here with his wife Josephine) reinstituted slavery in the French colonies by the end of the 18th century. 4) Franco, Salazar and Mobutu, 20th century dictators in Spain, Portugal and the Republic of Congo, were opposed to by Grimau (Spanish politician executed during Franco's dictatorship), Cunhal (Portuguese politican, major opponent of the Estado Novo, Salazar's party) and Lumumba (Congolese independence leader, executed shortly after Mobutu's putsch).

Excerpt 5:

René Doisière (Socialist): Because, Mister Vanneste, the colonised came in the cold, mud and rain to fight and often die so that France could live!

03.05.2006, second session

This association of past actors with current ones, of those who died "so that France could live" with the current immigrants – condition under which Doisière's argument can hold – is here made possible by a generic "the colonised". The reference is not to their ancestors or their fellowmen – some of which indeed died in the conditions described – but to a term encompassing all the population that have been at one point or another victims of colonisation.

It therefore seems that, for the Left, history is a continuous line able to explain the present because it is populated by the same characters. These characters perpetually confront each other along the same story line: that of oppressed people (the colonised, the Jews, the starving farmers of the Revolution, the factory workers of the Popular Front…) confronted with the ideologies of their tyrants (the Vichy Regime, the colonial troops, Napoleon, Franco…). This aspect of history is presented as forgotten by the Right: the interpellation of Vanneste (Right-winged deputy) in excerpt 5, just after he made a discourse, seems to be an echo of his words, and for the Left it justified a reminder of the past.

In this story, the role that the Left aims at filling (already hinted in excerpt 4) can be found in the voices they are ventriloquing, through quotations and echoes: the World War II resistant René Char as well as Jean Jaurès, one of the most famous Left-wing French politicians of the end of the nineteen century. The importance of the words of the latter is highlighted in the following excerpt:

Excerpt 6:

Jean-Yves Le Bouillonnec (Radical Left): How can you, at the National Assembly tribune…

Jean-Pierre Brard (Radical Left): Where Jaurès expressed himself!

Jean-Yves Le Bouillonnec (Radical Left):…evoke the European Human Right Declaration in such terms?

03.05.2006, first session

Without entering in details, Jaurès was, with Zola, one of the main defenders of Dreyfus in the affair of the same name (which led Zola to write his famous "J'accuse"), which polarized the French political world between Right and Left at the beginning of the twentieth century, and revealed itself to be due to the anti-Semitism of an important part of the French population. These events, with the Popular Front, constitute landmarks of the Third Republic, a period characterised by an important political instability in France but one that also led to the development of the French social model (employees' protection, right to strike, paid holidays, etc.).

In this excerpt, the Right is seen by the Left as violating the principles of the National Assembly: the Right-winged deputy Jérôme Rivière had just given a speech implying that the European Declaration of Human Rights was encouraging unwanted immigration and should not be respected in the same way by countries from Western Europe as it was by those from Eastern Europe, speech of which excerpt 3 is the conclusion. The reference to Jaurès at this moment, and especially to the discourses he made at the exact place the members of parliament are nowadays performing theirs, seems to indicate that for the Left he is one of the historical figures who gave the institution its sanctity, and therefore the former deputy that should be followed. It seems here, quite logically, that the role the Left-winged deputies aim at filling is the one of defenders of the oppressed – like Jaurès here, and the resistants in the case of World War II – faced with the partisans of the oppressing ideology.

A model of how collective memory is used to produce meaning for the Left seems here to emerge, fitting with Wertsch's perspective on collective memory where a single general story line is used to organise the past. Here, what is at stake in the various historical events presented is seen as similar to what is at stake in the debates, and the meaning of one event is transferred to the others by the identification of similarities between the characters, whether in terms of ideologies defended or groups they belong to. This interpretation is made all the more plausible by the fact that more than a third of the references to history made by the Left concern several historical periods that are evoked as equivalent (such as in excerpt 4). Thus, this bill is given the same meaning as these events did: that of a social and political struggle between the defenders of the oppressed and those collaborating with the oppressors. It is the story of humanists (Jaurès, French resistants, those "in solidarity with the oppressed populations"…) defending the victims (colonised, factory workers, Jews…) against oppressors. Or, more exactly, those who collaborated with them: it is not the colonisers that are present here, but their troops and supporters; the Nazis are never directly mentioned, but the Vichy Regime and Gobineau are. Furthermore, all the collaborators referred to are French: it is thus the national group that is seen

as divided along the line humanist/non-humanist, at least since the Revolution, the first event to be mentioned by the Left and that fits well into this grand narrative.

2. The Right's Contestations: Dictators and Mere Traditions

Such a representation of history by the Left is, of course, not left uncontested by a Right casted out in the role of the internal tyrant, in the same vein as the Nazis, Napoleon and Mobutu are. Its contestations take mainly two forms: the delegitimisation of the Radical Left MPs through references to the USSR, and of the Socialist through the contestation of the importance and meaning of the Popular Front.

The USSR, either directly referred to or through evocations of Stalin, the Soviet Union, the Gulags or the KGB, is the historical period, with the French Revolution, to which the Right-winged MPs refer to the most, with 14 spontaneous references. These are only addressed to Radical Left deputies, and it therefore is the only historical argument of the debates intended for a specific parliamentary group instead of a full side of the Assembly's hemicycle. It also is the only one made from the very first session of the debates and attributed to part of a parliamentary group in the transcripts (shouting "And Stalin!" in excerpt 4). These comments are mostly made when a Radical Left member condemns the positions of the UMP as anti-humanist, although it concerns a rather wide array of topics, and usually take the form of "what about Stalin?", or are expressed as in the following extract:

> Excerpt 7:
>
> Jean-Pierre Brard (Radical Left): when I fight against your bill, I am faithful to my anti-colonial tradition. […]
>
> Christian Vanneste (Right): You are talking about the Soviet colonies?
>
> 03.05.2006, first session

It seems that these references are made to support two arguments. The first one, found in the above excerpts, is that the Radical Left is not qualified to make comments about the Right's policies, especially in terms of Human Rights, because it supported a dictatorship, of which Stalin is the symbol. A second argument can be found in the following extract:

Excerpt 8:

> Jean-Pierre Brard (Radical Left): Le Pen doesn't need to have a seat here: he is represented by his adepts!
>
> Christian Vanneste (Right): So is Stalin!
>
> 03.05.2006, first session

Here, the FN – Extreme Right party of which Le Pen is the leader – and the Radical Left are put at the same level by the Right-Winged MP, when numerous declarations of the Right had insisted on how necessary it was to make sure that the FN would not reach the parliament. The reason invoked by the Right is that the FN is the line on the right not to be crossed, notably because it is not a Republican party. The argument appearing here is therefore that not only that the Radical Left is not legitimate in its comment, it might not be legitimate at the National Assembly either because its underlying ideology runs contrary to the Republican principles of the parliament, close as it is to a despotic regime.

Another line of contestation of the stories told by the Left consists in comments on the Popular Front, last major event of the Third Republic – which terminated in World War II and of which Jaurès was an MP – and that opposed employers and factory workers over the access to social rights. One form of contestation consists in recasting this event as a mere tradition:

Excerpt 9:

> Patrick Braouezec (Radical Left): besides, Sir Minister, I believe that it would be appropriate for you to watch some of your words. I completely agree with you when you say that every person living on the French territory must accept the values and principles of our Republic. I am not, however, when you start evocating the French traditions, which, I believe, foreigners do not have to adhere to.
>
> Claude Goasguen (Right): The Popular Front, it is a tradition!
>
> 04.05.2006, first session

As will be seen later, the events central to the history of the country for the Right are presented as creators of "principles" for the Republic, and the Right-winged MP's comment can therefore be read as an attempt to undermine the importance given to the Popular Front by the Left.

Moreover, because the Popular Front ended with the access to numerous social rights, it is also possible to see here a "reminder" by the Right that such rights are a custom, not an obligation. However, some other references to this period shed another light on this contestation:

> Excerpt 10:
>
> René Doisière (Socialist): France has been, ever since the Revolution, considered as the country of Human Rights, and it has, except during the period of the Vichy Regime…
>
> Jérôme Rivière (Right): Which has its origins in the Popular Front!
>
> René Doisière (Socialist):…been a safe haven for all the persecuted.[18]
>
> 03.05.2006, second session

This causal link between World War II and the Popular Front comes from the idea – actually defended by the leader of the Vichy regime himself (Milza & Bernstein, 1987) – that the Third Republic ended in great political instability and with a country weakened by years of social protests, and therefore left France unable to defend itself at the beginning of World War II. The argument here seems to be double. First, as it is implied in the excerpt, if the Vichy Regime – associated to the Right in several occasions, such as in excerpt 2 – has existed in the first place, it is because the Left had left the country drained. The second argument, lurking behind the first one, is that the Left's insistence in pursuing what is but a mere social tradition did already cost the country a humiliating defeat and an anti-Semitic authoritarian regime. Pursuing the same aims today would be naive as it could lead to a similar situation. If the Right delegitimises the radical-Left through references to the USSR, doubting that it should even be present in the parliament, here it delegitimises the principles of the Left at large, through the contestation of the event that for the Left led to the implementation of its values.

---

[18] "Un lieu d'asile", literally: "a place of asylum", expression that thus has more direct links with immigration than "safe haven", although it is the closest translation.

3. The Right's Republican Pact

These two forms of contestation, both leading to the delegitimisation of the Left-winged participants, go alongside the defence of a competing narrative by the Right. However, their references to the past, although concerning a much reduced array of events, are significantly less explicit and much more varied in their content than those of the Left. The following is therefore an attempt to reconstruct the general narrative, and special attention was dedicated to making these interpretations as congruent as possible with the rest of the debate and the additional data collected on the participants. Because of the heterogeneity of the data, and to keep this section to a reasonable length, only part of it presented here.

The main reference to history made by Right-wing MPs, besides the USSR, concerns the French Revolution (14 spontaneous references), although it is often done indirectly through two main topics. First, Right-winged MPs refer to or quote Rousseau on numerous occasions, the ideas of the Enlightenment philosopher being often considered – with Voltaire's – as the roots of the French Revolution[19]. The first reference to him is made on the afternoon of the first day of the debates, and is therefore one of the first references made to history in the debates:

> Excerpt 11:
>
> Alain Marsaud (Right): […] Thus it is not the world offering itself to France, but France offering itself to the world as long as it has the capacity to do so.
>
> This conception, noble and imminently rousseauist, is however very naïve: its only short-term consequence will be a race to the bottom for our social organisation.
>
> 02.05.2006, third session

At the same time, this is the only reference to the philosopher that is a critique of his ideas, most of the others resembling the following one:

[19] Idea that can be found in the official high-school programs in history and philosophy, for instance.

Excerpt 12:

Christian Vanneste (Right): You say that immigration is a fact. But a fact does not make a right.

Jérôme Rivière (Right): Very good!

Christian Vanneste: And you know who said that? Jean-Jacques Rousseau!

Thierry Mariani (Right): Very good!

04.05.2006, first session

The main idea kept from Rousseau by the Right is that of a civil pact, already hinted at in excerpt 12, and in the following raised to the rank of a "common sense principle":

Excerpt 13:

Richard Mallié (Right): There is no need to go back as far as Rousseau's civil pact to understand that living together comes with rights, but also duties. This common sense principle is all the more true when it concerns the foreign nationals that we welcome.

04.05.2006, first session

Except in the first reference, Right-wing deputies present themselves as in line with Rousseau's ideas. The original opposition to Rousseau, presented in excerpt 11 and commonly found with Right-winged MPs (Julliard, 2012), and the shift towards this second position – that remained the one taken throughout the debates – may be explained by the fact that this argument could be seen as all the more convincing by the Right-winged MPs as it uses ideas usually associated with the Left (Julliard, 2012). However, it may also be a form of contestation of the stories told by Left: it insists on how similar their ideologies are, whereas the Left presents them as profoundly different. And it is a sign that collective memory is indeed constructed in the situation – and thus evolves with the interactions that are taking place – although this is the only clear trace found.

Another set of references from the Right is linked, indirectly, to the French Revolution, and specifies the grounds for this pact: it consists of quotations from the Declarations of the Rights

of Man and of the Citizen made in reference to the "foundational principles of the Republic". The later expression is linked – at least on the French Republic official website *vie publique*[20]– to the maxim "*liberty, equality, fraternity*", and both are important products of the French Revolution. The idea defended here by the Right-winged MPs is that the bill needs to respect those principles, and only those, and that it does (see for instance excerpt 3). Human rights are evoked frequently in the debates, but only the Right refers to "the Rights of Man and of the Citizen", a direct product of the French revolution, while the Left always refers to its "Universal" or "European" versions. Such a difference in point of view is best illustrated in the following extract. It is a reply to the Right-winged MP Christian Vanneste, who defended the idea of establishing a contract with newly arrived immigrants that includes their obligation to respect and follow "the French principles".

> Excerpt 14:
>
> Patrick Braouezec (Radical Left): When Mister Vanneste affirms that the French law needs to be obeyed, nobody is saying the contrary, but let's not ask more from foreigners, not matter what their situation is, than from the French.
>
> Serge Blisko (Socialist): Equality!
>
> Christian Vanneste (Right): The Rights of the Citizen are not just the Human Rights!
>
> Patrick Braouezec (Radical Left): To obey to the Republican principles, nobody in this hemicycle would think of questioning this principle. However, obeying "French principles", I admit that I don't know what this mean. I know universal values, but I don't know French values. I know some Republican principles, I know the French law, but I don't see why France would have specific values.
>
> Jacques Myard (Right): French specificity does not exist?
>
> 04.05.2006, first session

The first reply by a Right-winged MP, Christian Vanneste, makes a distinction between two kinds of rights: the Human Rights, which concern everyone, and the Rights of the Citizen, which

[20] www.vie-publique.fr

concern only the French population. This remark seems to advocate that foreigners do indeed have more duties and fewer rights than the French population, being a reply to an MP arguing the contrary. The second intervention, by Jacques Myard, shed light on why it is believed to be so: France is a singular country. The Right-winged deputies thus resist the reduction of the rights of the French population to the Human Rights and of the French values to that of the rest of the world.

A story of the "French specificity" can be drawn from this: what made France is a pact that followed the Revolution. It is the central event in the history of the country – the only national event lengthily referred to – whose associated political ideology, seen as its origin, refers to a 'civil pact'. The opposition between universal rights and those specific to the French can be read as a necessary condition for the existence of the group: in excerpt 11, for instance, the opposite is presented endangering social organisation; in excerpt 14, the Rights of the Citizen as a protection from foreign values; and in excerpt 3, its European counterpart – more universalist – as an obstacle. Then, the Right-winged MPs may consider this pact as built to protect the interests of the group, and therefore that its principles do not concern outsiders. A Right-winged MP, for instance, presented this bill as necessary to stop "desperate populations" from massively migrating to France, point immediately followed by "it respects the French history, its traditions, and it defends its foundational principles" (Guy Teissier, Right, 05.05.2006, third session). And for outsiders to be accepted into the group, the original pact needs to be reiterated: the bill they defend proposes a contract with immigrants (excerpt 14), which aims at insuring that the duties coming with the pact are respected (excerpt 13).

Two other specifications of this pact are worth noting. First, the group seems to be seen as an indivisible and sovereign whole, idea that stems from the French Revolution as well (Debbasch, 1988). This appears in the last event mentioned by the Right, World War II, evoked through the symbol of the "yellow star". Julien Dray, a socialist MP, had just countered a Right-winged MP by telling him to go back to the circumscription where he was elected. It was taken as major insult, and the Right's reply triggered a lengthy and heated argument:

Excerpt 15:

Claude Goasguen (Right): I would like to remind my colleague that, in this Chamber, there is no deputy of Levallois, Saint-Denis or the 16th arrondissement (*"Yes, there is" on the benches of the Socialists and Radical Left*). Here are only representatives of the national sovereignty. Therefore, you do not have to assign yellow stars to one or another! (*Exclamations on the Socialists' benches.*)

05.05.2006, second session

It seems that what was undermined by Dray's comment is the idea of the country as an indivisible whole represented by the MPs, idea profoundly insulting for the Right-winged MPs (the session was suspended twice and six points of orders were raised in relation to this incident), possibly because this wholeness is linked to the question of national sovereignty. This interpretation seems to fit with the reference to the "yellow star", reminder of the last period during which France lost its sovereignty on its territory, and during which it was split in two parts: World War II.

Second, it seems that what does not directly follow from the Revolution is either considered as a mere tradition (see excerpt 9 with the Popular Front), or as being irrelevant to the definition of the nation:

Excerpt 16:

Arnaud Montebourg (Socialist): A third of the French population has an ancestor, a grand-father or a grand-mother, a foreign parent, and the French Republic always worked this way: as a mix!

Jérôme Rivière (Right): So did the monarchy!

02.05.2006, third session

Here, the argument of the French cultural "mix" is countered on the grounds that if it was also true of the monarchy, it is not a specificity of the Republic and thus no a valid argument to defend immigration.

The French Revolution is interpreted as the "founding act" of the nation: it is the establishment of the Republican Pact, a meaning produced with the use of the French Enlightenment philosophers. It organises how other historical events are interpreted and attributed meaning in

turn: the Popular Front becomes a mere tradition, the USSR the proof of the lack of republicanism of the Radical Left MPs, and colonisation is attributed "positive aspects" (Christian Vanneste, Right, 10.05.2006, second session) because it does not fall outside of the rules of the nation: to protect its members, first and foremost. Conversely to the Left, then, the Right does not use a single narrative repeated over multiple events, but a 'grand narrative' from which all the others are derived.

4. The Left's Contestation: The Universality of Human Rights

This story line is rarely contested by the Left directly, except in the case of Rousseau, where it led to a few reactions, all presenting his ideas as misunderstood by the Right:

> Excerpt 17:
>
> Serge Blisko (Socialist): I find you a little bit rigid and hard for a Rousseauist, Mister Vanneste.
>
> Christian Vanneste (Right): Reread Rousseau, you will see that he was far more rigid than I am. […] He defended the death penalty, do not forget about that!
>
> 04.05.2006, first session

However, indirect contestations can be found. Indeed, where the Right refers to the Declaration of the Right of Man and of the Citizen, product of the French Revolution, the Left refers exclusively to Human Rights in general or to the European Declaration of Human Rights in particular – except when quoting the Right – as can be seen for instance in excerpt 6. With the insistence of the Right on the importance of the specificity of 'French values', it can be seen as a tentative contestation by the Left, on the ground that Human Rights are universal (see for instance excerpt 14). It seems that although the Left also considers the French Revolution as a central event in French history – see for instance excerpt 10 where it is implicitly presented as the beginning of democracy – the meaning attributed to this event is rather different for these groups. For the Right, it is a founding act that lay the rules for the future, whereas for the Left it is where the fight for democracy started (see Julliard, 2012 for a similar interpretation). It is the first event evoked by Brard, Radical Left member, in his litany of social or political struggles (excerpt 4), but it is certainly not over: the Popular Front, the World Wars, decolonisation, and now this bill, followed. Similarly, none of them seem to deny the importance of Rousseau's

philosophy, nonetheless they argue about what his words actually meant. Where the Right's contestations included a tentative to unify the Socialist and their ideology under the banner of the Enlightenment, the Left here insists on what makes them different, and considers that if the Right-winged MPs think otherwise, it is because they misunderstood their ideas, whether it is Rousseau or how Human Rights are universal. The importance for the Left not to see its ideas reduced to that of the Right is well highlighted in this reply of Radical Left member to a Right-winged MP:

Excerpt 18:

Jean-Pierre Brard (Radical Left): I would rather be hanged than agree with you

06.05.2013, first session

5. Epilogue

The bill discussed in the debates analysed here was adopted on the 24th of July 2006, with very little modifications, and was followed by further restrictions on immigration in July and November of the same year. In May 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy created the ministry of "immigration and national identity". In reaction, 8 out of the 12 historians of the soon to be "National City of the History of Immigration" immediately resigned. In their official statement, they accused the state of trying to define the identity of its members, adding that this new ministry "is in line with a discourse that stigmatise immigration. The aim of the National City for the History of Immigration was to bring people together and orientated towards the future, around a common history that everyone could have made his" (our translation). This rapprochement between the management of immigration and the question of the national identity made them consider their mission impossible.

F. Discussion

It is now possible to return to our three original questions: 1) what meaning do the stories told about the past produce for the group? 2) how is such a meaning produced? and 3) how is such a meaning negotiated with the others present in the debate? Because the two first questions are extremely interrelated, they will be treated together.

1. Meanings in Construction

It appears that some of the stories told about the past are indeed used to produce meaning about the nation, as well as about other historical events.

For the Left, the numerous fights for the Human Rights that took place in the history of the country give to its existence the sense of an on-going struggle for the implementation of a humanistic ideology, perpetually endangered by the ideologies of oppressive others, of which the Right is a representative. What matters about the past are the various actors' intentions – oppressing, defending ... – and how they made the different groups relate to each other.

For the Right, the past, read as the establishment of an exclusive contract between equal citizens, makes of the nation a place where civic life can go on, on the basis of a mutual agreement, one that only its members are legitimate to negotiate. Here, the past is used to define a starting point where the rules have been laid down and that gives legitimacy to the group's existence. Stepping out of such rules would imply creating "something else", something that would not be the French nation anymore.

This transfer of meaning from past to present seems to be done, in the case of the Left, by analogies, where the meaning of one event is transferred to another one because they are seen as similar. It allows the organisation of multiple events along a single line, shown by the rather wide array of historical periods they refer too, thus offering a sense of continuity. For the Right, a historical event is turned into a founding act, creating a form of 'grand meaning' that organises how other events are going to be understood. It permits the production of several different meanings for the past – from a threat to national sovereignty with WWII to the 'battle' for Republicanism with the Cold War – that follow from a single original meaning: the Revolution as the signing of a Republican pact.

And it appears here that collective memory is not simply potentially a symbolic resource, but may also be considered as the product of such a meaning-making process itself. Using, as done in these parliamentary debates, one historical event to give meaning to others – whether it is because they are seen as being fundamentally similar or because one gave rise to the others – is indeed a way to use cultural elements to make sense of the past. Then, it is not only the present that is given meaning through the use of collective memory, but the past itself is given a sense of continuity and a specific meaning (see Favero, 2010 for an illustration of a similar process).

If symbolic resources allow participants to link past and present, to organise experiences along a meaningful line (Dahinden & Zittoun, 2013), then the fact that collective memory already is the

result of the use of other cultural elements to make sense of a disrupted past is not at all that surprising. And this makes of collective memory an especially interesting symbolic resource in producing meaning, for this entails that it can itself be renegotiated in the process.

Moreover, organising the past along a meaningful line is one of the functions of narratives (Bruner, 2003). One of their characteristics, pointed out by Aristotle (quoted in Bruner, 2003), is that they are always based on the structure 'familiar-rupture of the familiar by a *peripetia*' or there would not be a story (a *peripetia* being an incident or turning point usually taking place in a dramatic story). Then, if symbolic resources are cultural elements used to make sense of ruptures, and if stories are themselves about such ruptures and how life-like characters reacted to them, they are especially fitted for such a role. It may thus be because stories are themselves the product of a symbolisation of the unexpected that they can in turn help us to produce meaning around present ruptures (see Zittoun, Cornish, Gillespie, & Aveling, 2008 for an illustration of a similar case).

The stories told here are indeed about ruptures: with the monarchy, with the ideologies previously defended, with an "other" that threatens the life of the group or its ideology, etc. Therefore, it is possible to see collective memory as a construction in a specific situation that aims at giving meaning (Bartlett, 1932) by inscribing it into an on-going chain of events that would go beyond the experienced rupture (de Saint-Laurent, 2014). The way meaning is produced may also change how collective memory is used as a symbolic resource, by attributing a different "momentum" to the flow of historical time. Indeed, using analogies seems to provide meaning for a rather wide range of events. However, it does not open up new possibilities for the future, as it is the eternal replay of the same story. As for the use of a 'grand meaning', it seems on the contrary to allow the production of a range of meanings, provided that they fit with the original one. However, it excludes elements that do not seem to fit with the general story line.

2. Negotiation of Meanings

Although each side of the political spectrum seems to organise the past around its own specific narrative, the groups also seem to reply to each other through a series of oppositions. To a founding act (Right) is opposed the idea of a fight that seems to never end (Left); to a unifying contract (Right), incompatible ideologies (Left); to French specificities (Right), universal values (Left)…

The stories they tell may call for such oppositions. In the case of the Right the other's views, perspectives, and voices are considered as either similar to the ones of the rest of the group or illegitimate, limiting recognition to similarity and leaving no space for the expression of the other's singularity. As for the Left, the dichotomy operated does not go without a judgment on the validity of the other's knowledge: what differentiate the opposed sides of the conflict is here judged in terms of respect for desirable values, as expressed in the various Human Rights Declarations. For the other, the only options are either to agree, or to be cast out as the "bad guy" in the conflict.

What we have here are also two types of discourses that may reinforce each other: one may react to the tentative to turn the debate into a monologue, such as the Right does, by insisting on what make them profoundly different, which seems indeed to be the reply of the Left. And the other may try to demonstrate that they believe in the same things – and therefore think similarly, such as what is done by the Right through references to Rousseau – as a way to refuse to be considered as the "villain" of the story, position in which the Left is casting out its opponents.

Such an opposition can also be understood through the different aims pursued by the majority and opposition in parliamentary debates. Indeed, we do not remember by reading fixed traces of the past, but by reconstructing what was perceived along more or less socially shared story lines and in order to serve a specific interest (Bartlett, 1932).

For the Right, representing the majority at the time, the aim seemed to be to persuade the other of the validity of its position, which is after all often the purpose of a debate, parliamentary or not. The evolution of the Right's position on Rousseau, for instance, seems to fit with this objective: from a characterisation of Rousseau's ideas as naïve and endangering social order, the Right moves to argue that its bill follows the ideology of the Left's favourite philosopher.

For the Left the situation is rather different: it represents the opposition, and the overwhelming majority of Right-winged MPs in the parliament very attached to this bill makes persuasion a quite unrealistic aim. The objective that the Left seems to pursue is in line with its official name in the parliament: the opposition. Indeed, in the stories they tell, the Republican pact and the Revolution are quite left out, and an important number of events are highlighted instead. However, in many other circumstances, the "foundational principles" of the Republic were made central by Left-winged politicians. For instance, the socialist Education Minister and former member of parliament, Vincent Peillon, proposed shortly after taking his function the creation of "moral and civic teaching" classes in every high school where the same principles would be

taught[21]. Where in other circumstances both sides could agree on the importance of these principles[22], in the debates the Left oppose them by insisting on other principles and other events.

3. Senses and Significations

In spite of the profound oppositions between the two main parliamentary groups, common symbols exist, making communication possible between them. Indeed, the emergence of signs and meaning in the triangular relation self-other-object allows for a distinction to be drawn between what they mean for the person and what is assumed to be common in relation to the other. That is, between the socially shared meaning of a sign (signification), and a personal one taken when it is associated with experience and given an emotional tonality (sense) (Abbey & Zittoun, 2010).

Here, the different groups share common signs – the 'yellow star' as a symbol of discrimination, the French Revolution as the creation of modern France, etc. – that enable communication by ensuring the existence of a common ground. However, the sense given to them may widely differ. For instance, the Revolution may be presented by both sides as the act that founded the French Republic, but the particular sense given by the Right is that of a contract making life in common possible. As for the Left, it is the beginning of a 'humanist fight', which has yet to be won.

If "by establishing some shared semiotic systems, group of people can also agree on certain interpretations of the world and then generalise them into values or full *Weltanschaugen* which then ground the organisation of the civil society" (Dahinden & Zittoun, 2013, pp. 187–188), this discrepancy between the meanings given the nation goes hand in hand with a different vision of the world and of the future of the group. However, the common sign may give the MPs the impression that this is not the case, and it gives a place where to ground their oppositions.

---

[21] Proposition made in September 2012, with a first application in September 2013 (see Le Monde, dated 09.09.2013 "*Vincent Peillon présente sa "charte de la laïcité"*").

[22] A research in the French newspapers « Le Monde » (centre left) and « Le Figaro » (centre right) for the period between the 1st of January 2013 and the 1st of September 2013 showed that it had been defended by both Left-winged and Right-winged politicians, but that it concerned the latter more than 70% of the time.

This opposition may also be a product of the French political organisation. The cleavage between Right and Left, accentuated by an electoral system privileging bipartism (Rose & Urwin, 1970), rests on this paradox: to be on a "side" implies the existence of another side, which at the same time belongs to a unique "whole". The parliament then becomes more than an "electoral show", and is also the place where differences can be re-enacted to justify the existence of such an opposition.

In this game of "who am I", where each side is defined as much by what its members say than by what it refutes in the other, it is the object of the discourse that tends to disappear. Occupied as they are in defining who they are, what the nation is and is not, what defines their political ideas, one character, which yet should be central to the debates, is surprisingly mute. In spite of how often MPs infer the mental states of immigrants – to ask whether they want to "integrate" themselves to French society or not, mainly – they are at most referred to as victims to be protected, not as agents of their own, and often as a foreign body to be excluded from the national group.

4. Meanings and Boundaries

These meanings produced around the nation in these parliamentary debates may have significant implications for the boundaries of the group. Defining the group as united by a republican pact signed several hundred years ago, that ensures that a set of values is respected by all, allows limiting the access to the group to those who accept the pact and its values. It presents 'being French' as the access to specific rights, and makes of the inclusion into the national group an honour that implies respecting the duties defined by the original group.

On the contrary, defining the group as the place where a constant struggle between defenders of the oppressed and collaborators of the oppressors takes place renders another boundary more salient: the one between humanists and non-humanists. Not only the nation cannot be reduced to the desired group – for some of its historical members would then be left out – but this new group includes members far outside the national group. In that case, the nation is not a relevant group to organise the social world.

These divergent visions also produce different separations in the National Assembly: between Right and Left and between Republican parties and the 'extremes'. And it is indeed the two separations that can be found in the discourses of politicians and the political media in France.

Thus, it is not only the boundaries of the group that are negotiated here, but the very possibility to impose some inside the national group.

The stories told and the meaning they produce also seem to attribute legitimacy to the various groups. Where the Right recognises the place of the Socialists in the "national representation", the various "extremists" have no right to speak. For the Left, the Right seems to be legitimate only as an adversary of its ideologies.

However, perhaps more interesting are the groups whose voices are not delegitimised – which implies considering the possibility of the alternative – but who remain silent in the stories of the MPs. The immigrants are notably silent in these stories, if not completely absent. Even in the case of the Left, where they are presented as a group to be protected, they do not appear as full characters, but as the object over which the 'heroes' and the 'villains' fight. The Right and the Left discourses about immigration may often be deeply opposed, but paternalism and discrimination are two faces of the same token that essentialises differences (Costa-Lascoux, 2001, p. 129).

G. Conclusion

This paper has aimed to analyse the meaning given to the nation as a producer of specific boundaries. It focused on collective memory, as it provides justification of the group's existence and identity for its members. This has led me to argue that the meaning given to the group may not only determine where its boundaries are placed and how permeable they are, but how relevant they may be for its members. Here, the stories told by the Left renders the national group relatively irrelevant in explaining the social world – because no relevant characteristics unify its members. On the other hand, the stories told by the Right make the national group relevant because it defines its members as holding certain common values that are necessary to the common good of the group.

In the multiplicity of the memberships displayed here – parliamentary group, side of the political spectrum, national institution, country… – it seems that the meaning given to the groups may determine how important they are in organising the world of those who hold them. If for the Right the nation allowed the existence of all the other groups, for the Left it made the political oppositions more salient than the nation.

Although boundary work is often understood as a perpetual renegotiation between dominant and dominated groups (Lamont & Molnár, 2002), this study highlights how, even within the majority, opposing discourses around the meaning of the group foster the reinforcement of boundaries, their mobility, call them into question, delegitimise actors, etc. It also points to the fact that, beyond the question of the meaning of the nation, also lurks the question of how we represent culture. In one case, it is represented as a unified group where each member holds a set of value similar to those of the rest of his group and, in the other, as people in contact with a common set of values and who choose between them, positions commonly found even psychological studies of culture (Valsiner, 2007, p. 10).

This paper also argued that the ruptures experienced in the past of the group are given a meaning through their narration, and that such a meaning seems to be applied to the present crisis. Identifying the events of the past that are represented as bifurcation points, and opening a dialogue to render explicit the meaning given to them, can therefore be a step forwards towards the imagination of a collective future.

However, the existence of common benchmarks is necessary for such a dialogue to take place. In the specific case of immigration, the relative lack of symbolisation of one of its last turning points may be where lies the rub: decolonisation is only indirectly evoked in the debates and, in spite of a growing interest for the remembrance of the independence wars, it often leads, in official discourses (e.g., Lang, 2001), to a certain paralysis (Blanchard & Veyrat-Masson, 2008).

But retribution and the recognition of past crimes are not all that is at stakes in the construction of a common narrative of colonisation and decolonisation between the French population and the immigrants from its former colonies. To invent a common future, in a multicultural society marred neither with discrimination nor with paternalism, may require writing a common past, and producing a meaningful narrative.

Finally, and although the analysis proposed here does not allow us to generalise these conclusions to the problem of immigration in Europe or to the increase of "immigration talk", it does point towards an interesting possibility.

Indeed, the importance of immigration in political discourses, at least in France, cannot be explained by an increasing number of foreigners migrating to the country. For the period evoked the most in the debates, from 1998 to 2006, the absolute number of immigrants may have increased, but the proportion of immigrants out of the total population living in France did not

change[23]. And what appears in the data is not a strong focus on the immigrants themselves, or how they may threaten the country, but on what it means to be French, and the place of the country in the world – expressed through the question of its specificity.

If one cannot deny that parts of the population may indeed *feel* a stronger presence of immigrants in their countries, the question arises of whether immigration prompts the debate over identity in societies becoming increasingly multicultural or, on the contrary, whether national identity becomes at times problematic enough for groups to perceive outsiders as a threat because they reactivate this unresolved issue?

As stated at the beginning of this paper, nations are not "natural" categories, but products of histories, discourses and practices embedded in specific socio-cultural contexts. One may then wonder if the current transformations in the global order, whose origins can be found in globalisation, the financial crisis or the ecological challenges that await us, are not forcing us to rethink the place of our countries in the world. And therefore, for us to wonder, once more, who we are.

[23] And in some categories only. In others, a reduction can even be observed. See for instance the 3rd governmental report on the "General orientation of the immigration policies" (Secrétariat général du comité interministériel de contrôle de l'immigration, 2007).

Chapter 5.

Collective Memory and the Life Course

I. Trajectories of Resistance (Paper 2)

Chapter published as:
de Saint-Laurent, C. (2017). Trajectories of resistance and historical reflections. In N. Chaudhary, P. Hviid, J. Villasden, P. Marsico & J. Valsiner (Eds.) *Resistance in everyday life: Constructing cultural experiences* (pp. 49-63). Singapore: Springer

A. Abstract

Collective memory, the one-sided and subjective vision the group holds of its own past, plays a central role in defining who we believe we are and what the world is supposed to be. As such, being able to challenge what is said of the past offers the possibility to imagine futures and build identities outside of what is commonly accepted in society, thus providing roots for resistance. This paper proposes to reconstruct the trajectories of two intellectuals and artists interviewed in Brussels to understand what may have led them to question traditional narratives of the past, and in some cases to actively resist them. It concludes that the encounter with several tools, such as historical books or the discovery of others' alternative narratives, may foster resistance; they not only encourage individuals to question specific historical discourses, but participate in the construction of a "meta-memory": a general representation of historical discourses.

B. Introduction

> Resistance is not a mode of transformation but a process of reaffirmation. The proper object of resistance is to defend or restore a set of principles whose authority has been undermined.
>
> Pottage (2013, p. 263)

There are many ideas, people would easily agree, worth resisting for: freedom, human rights, the rights for all to a decent future, etc. but the duty to truthfully remember history probably would not be one of them. Or, clearly, it would not be very high in the list of our priorities. What is worth fighting for is what is ahead of us, not what once was and will never be again. In such a

fast-paced world, one would have to be a fool to give priority to history and memory over information technology and creativity. Yet, what would the present and the future be without the past? When faced with a personal choice, don't you look into your past to try to find what could be the best solution? When imagining where you will be in 10 years, don't you draw on where you were 10 years ago and what you remember of others' evolution? It is not any different with history (Wertsch, 1997): How can groups, such as nations, know who they are today and where they are going without looking at their past?

The way we, as groups, remember historical events – which constitute our *collective memory* – changes how we act in the present and plan for the future (J. H. Liu & Hilton, 2005). By transforming history into collective myths, we put forward versions of the group that are to our advantage (Wertsch & Batiashvili, 2012). Unfortunately, this is often done at the expense of others, who can be presented as essentially different (Raudsepp & Wagner, 2012) and with whom conflict may thus, at times, be encouraged (Delori, 2011). And because narratives on history illustrate certain ways of interacting with others (Leveau, 1994), they can also serve as the basis for the exclusion of others seen as historically "alien" to the group (Chapter 4). By adopting specific narratives about the past of our social groups and, just as importantly, by forgetting other elements (Brockmeier, 2002b), we position ourselves towards the present situation (Is it an injustice? The apogee of a century-long battle for our rights? The end of a golden age?) and give it meaning and direction. If the past matters, then, it is not so much in itself, but because of what it reveals about us and our future (Dudai & Carruthers, 2005).

Research on representations of history has, so far, mainly focused on how social groups remember past events. The conclusion has generally been that groups transform and deform history to show themselves in the best light possible (Wertsch & Batiashvili, 2012). It has opposed history and memory on the grounds that one is systematic and objective while the other is the subjective glorification of the group's past (Wertsch & Batiashvili, 2012). But how to understand, then, the processes by which some come to question history and doubt the greatness of the past actions of their group? If many do indeed defend and repeat narratives that serve the interests of their countrymen and their own – a quick look at any country's extreme right party discourses illustrates this – others do become critical. And criticizing the nation's past is a way to question the status quo: it has the potential of delegitimizing existing relations of power by uncovering the conditions under which they were forged. It is thus, in many ways, a matter of resistance.

This chapter proposes to look at the trajectory of two women who came to resist hegemonic discourses on the past of their group. By going beyond social representations of history, it aims to look at how individual people make sense of the past and, thus, illustrate how alternative understandings of the world may be forged. I will first introduce the concept of *trajectory of remembering*, which I will then use as an analytical tool in the presentation of two case studies: Dominique and Genevieve. The analysis of their trajectories will be used in an attempt to uncover the types of resources one may use to resist hegemonic representations of history. Finally, the effect of such resources on resistance will be discussed.

C. Trajectories of Remembering

In traditional collective memory studies, the "collective" part tends to get the better end of the stick. Indeed, it is often not so much about memory – after all, being French does not mean that I can "remember" the Napoleonic wars – but about social representations (Wagoner, 2015) – as a French person, I share with my fellow citizens certain representations, often historically dubious, of who Napoleon was. Research has thus focused on collective manifestations of representations of the past, as displayed in memorials, school history textbooks, commemorative practices, movies, and political discourses (Beim, 2007). Although this has made the discovery of extremely interesting mechanisms possible – for instance, how historical events tend to be systematically deformed by groups to fit their existing cultural narratives (e.g., Chapter 4; J. H. Liu & Hilton, 2005; Wertsch, 2008) – it has also occulted how the person locally produces discourses on the past. And indeed, I do not talk about Napoleon in the same way when I am back home, conversing about current politics with my family, or where I live in a Swiss Canton that was invaded and occupied by Napoleon's army. And, perhaps more importantly, I would probably not have chosen him as an example if I had not been writing this chapter on the day of the 200th anniversary of the Waterloo battle and just read a newspaper article on the topic.

This is what the cultural psychology of collective memory – *collective remembering* – has tried to take into account when studying discourses on the past. First, it has focused on the tools one may use to remember (Wertsch, 2002) – textbooks, public discourses, memorials, etc. – and made a distinction between the production and the consumption of narratives (Wertsch, 1997). Collective manifestations of the past are not what people actually remember: they are cultural elements produced by the collective (often the state) to put forward a certain understanding of what happened. But when people use, in turn, these narratives, they do not do so passively:

remembering history is an action (Wertsch, 2002), a reconstruction made in the specific context of the discourse (Wagoner, 2012). To go back to the example of Napoleon, being exposed to narratives about him in history classes as a child and reading an article about him today does not mean that I blindly repeat these discourses. However, they are resources that I use to talk about the past and advance, or resist, a certain representation of it.

Second, collective remembering studies have focused on another fundamental element of the context within which people remember: interactions with others. As any other human activity, collective remembering is not done in a vacuum, and even less in a social vacuum. Discourses on the past are always addressed to others (Wagoner, 2012), and shape and are shaped in interactions (Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012). That is, talking about history and the way it is done locates people in the social field – as members of a specific group, tenants of a specific worldview, etc. – and is a reply to what has been said by others (Chapter 4). In that sense, collective remembering is *dialogical*: it is the product of interactions with present and absent others; the present others with whom I am conversing and the absent others whom I am replying to and whose reactions I am anticipating (Bakhtin, 1986).

Going back to the example of Napoleon, it means that I produce different discourses with my family or with my colleagues at work because these are shaped in my interactions with them. When talking about Napoleon with my family, I am reacting to the comparisons they might make between him and current politicians, as well as prolonging a long public debate about whether he should be remembered as a military genius or a dictator. What I say about him positions me on the political spectrum and towards my own family's political orientations. However, when I talk about Napoleon with my Swiss colleagues, I am responding to a very different debate: the question is not whether he was a good or a bad leader – it is commonly accepted that he was a tyrannical invader – but whether I, as a French person, will attempt to defend him or side with the people he attacked. What I say about him in this context positions me as either a blind patriot or defender of my country (and in some ways as an ungrateful immigrant), or as enlightened enough to see the ills of my country and the goods of the one I live in (and thus as a good immigrant). That is not to say that I hold almost schizophrenic discourses on history: I do not defend Napoleon in one case and bash him in another. But the ways in which I talk about him and defend my opinion will be deeply different because I am addressing a very different audience, with whom I share very different resources and pursue different aims (see de Saint-Laurent & Zittoun, in press, for a full explanation of this model of remembering).

But what, then, explains how two different persons, in a similar context, will say very different things about history? How come my sister and I – sharing the same culture, broadly the same education and being from the same generation – will tell, in the same conversation, extremely different stories about Napoleon? Because we have, ourselves, our own history. What research on collective memory and on collective remembering has for now largely ignored is that people have a "history in front of history", what I propose to call a *trajectory of remembering*. To conclude my Napoleon example – and I promise to drop it here – what would probably make my sister and me talk about him in different ways are our own different pasts. While I studied social sciences in the UK, my sister studied law and lived in the US. When I was in a context where Napoleon was considered to be the evil man finally defeated in Waterloo and the one who attempted to destroy local cultural differences, she studied the man at the origin of the first civil code and lived in a country where Napoleon was one of these French exotic things, almost at the same level as baguettes and berets. Thus, when we talk about him today, our discourses are not just forged in the interactions with others and objects – to borrow Grossen's notion of context (Grossen, 2001) – but also by our own past.

Humans live and develop in irreversible time (Valsiner, 1994), creating unique trajectories (Zittoun et al., 2013). These trajectories can account for how people relate to the world, give meaning to it and adopt or resist meanings proposed by others (Zittoun, 2006, 2012). Indeed, throughout our life, we internalize social and cultural values and systems of meaning and multiply experiences from which we can take a distance and draw generalizations (Zittoun, 2012). In time, we develop *personal life philosophies* (PLP) – personal understanding of the meaning of life that take the form of more or less simple philosophical maxims – and we use them to interpret new experiences (Zittoun et al., 2013). Our past, through the experiences we have, the values and ideas we are introduced to, and the meanings we give to it, shapes how we understand and act in the present. And although this idea is, in the end, quite basic for any clinical psychologist, it is often forgotten in other areas of psychology.

What I propose here is thus to adapt this literature on trajectories and ruptures to collective remembering and to conceptualize the latter as the developmental process by which a socially located self, in interaction with a socially located present and imagined audience, uses cultural resources to produce a discourse on the historical past (see de Saint-Laurent & Zittoun, in press, for a similar account but of autobiographical memory). By developmental process, I mean that such discourses are characterized by change and transformation across the life span and its study thus requires a life course perspective (Elder, 1998). Studying individual trajectories, then, implies focusing on the moments of transitions and ruptures, on the construction of new meanings they

may lead to and on the resulting intransitive (irreversible) qualitative changes that can happen in any period of life (Zittoun, 2012). In other words, this perspective takes as the unit of analysis the interrelation between the discourses of the self and the unfolding course of one's life. It is thus especially interested in how experiences of change lead to the production of new meanings about the world and one's life.

In the following, I propose to apply these concepts to the trajectories of two Belgian women interviewed on their relationship to history. I hope thus to demonstrate: (1) that people's past accounts of history can indeed be understood as forming a trajectory; (2) that these trajectories can inform how people remember and understand the past; and thus I intend (3) to draw some insights, in the end, into how such trajectories can inform our understanding of resistance throughout the life course.

D. Reflecting on History

The data presented here is part of a wider project focusing on personal trajectories of remembering (see also section II). It is focused on a theatre play offering a critical-historical perspective on the Israel–Palestine conflict (Rosenstein, 2014). As the play was advertised as offering a critical perspective, it meant that it was likely that the members of the audience had developed at one point or another a critical outlook on history or were at least open to the idea. The semi-open interviews conducted with them aimed at uncovering how they came to see the play or participate in it, as well as their past encounters with history (in school, at home, during travels, etc.). Each interview lasted between 45 and 90 min and all were done in French.

Of the nine interviews conducted in Belgium and in Switzerland, two were chosen for this chapter: the cases of Dominique and Genevieve. Dominique and Genevieve are both women in their late fifties or early sixties, and both are involved in activities that could be described as "resistance" to the social situation in their country. While one is working for a charity helping local populations in social and cultural difficulties, the other has been involved in political and militant organizations. They were chosen because: (1) they are comparable on many aspects (age, gender, background, etc.) and yet illustrate different processes of remembering and using the collective past; and (2) they are both involved in "resistance" actions and are thus very good candidates for our purposes.

The data was first analysed with the help of narrative and trajectory analysis (Rosenthal, 1993). The interviews were cut into segments referring to different periods of the participants' life and

then organized in chronological order. This allowed me to focus on the transitions and ruptures in their understandings of history and their relation to it. Each period was analysed with the general model proposed above, which means, concretely, looking at: (1) the content of the discourses reported about history (e.g., what is the story about); (2) the resources that have been used to construct said discourses (e.g., referring to books, using metaphors …); (3) the audiences to whom these discourses are addressed (e.g., traces of voices of others, replies to quoted discourses …); and (4) the transformations and continuities with the previous period (e.g., Is the general narrative frame similar? Are the resources different?). However, the tendency to present the past as an explanation for the present (Cameron, Wilson, & Ross, 2004) – probably especially strong when talking to a psychologist, whose job is often perceived as one of explaining people's behaviours as a consequence of their past – needs to be taken into account to avoid overinterpretations.

Because of the vast amount of autobiographical data presented, important alterations were made to both cases in order to ensure anonymity. These modifications were done after the full analysis in order not to alter critical elements. These transformations concern names, places, dates, occupations, and when necessary historical events that were changed into equivalent ones for our purposes.

E. Case 1: Dominique

Dominique is a Belgian woman born in the 1950s in a family of communist artists. The first part of her life is characterized by the gap she feels between what she is told at home and what is taught to her in the religious school to which her parents sent her for education. This is how she explains it, by referring to an incident that took place when she was eight years old:

> D: My parents always told me that Julien Lahaut – well, you're not Belgian, so Julien Lahaut is a communist who screamed "long live the republic" when… when the King Baudouin was taking the oath. So you know there was Leopold III who collaborated [with the Nazis]… and he never came back, then there was a regency, and when his son came of age… […] Well, it was a huge mess. It was not just the question of the return of the king; it was that people had the option between […] a more Socialist or a more Catholic Belgium. […] So this guy yells "long live the republic" […] and [later] he got shot down at home. They rang his bell, shot through the door, and they killed him. In 1950. Well… that's what my

> parents always told me. And one day, at school, we talk…we talk about the king. And I tell this story. And they tell me it's not true. […] That it's a lie. So I have always learned that the official story had nothing to do with the true story. […]
>
> C (the author): And how did you react when you were a little girl […]?
>
> D: I learned that I'd better shut up. […] I didn't belong to the right social class. […] So pfff, I'd better not be… I would say politely, they would tell me it was wrong, and I would shut my mouth.

In this extract, Dominique shows the gap in understanding history between home and school. At home, her parents would tell her stories that illustrated their convictions and discuss historical events through these lenses. However, when she tries to talk about this with a different audience, she gets told off and learns to stay quiet. She clearly sides with her parents – they tell the "true story" she opposes to the "official" one – but, perhaps, does not master enough, as a child, the resources they use to build this story and thus cannot defend it at school.

As she grows into an adolescent, however, her relation with both her parents and school changes. She says about school:

> D: I was pretty happy about how I was taught history, because in my school there were humanists and leftists, and so I was always taught history between economical causes and consequences. […] So I was always very conscious, well, made conscious, but in a well-argued manner, about the accumulation of capital […] so each time I was reading a book about that I was thinking, well yes!

Here, we can note two main changes in this period, as compared to her early childhood. First, there seems to be a change in the type of audience that school represents: it is now a place where you can learn from "humanists", and not a strict Catholic school where she feels she does not belong. Second, she starts being given resources to understand history: although we can assume that her parents – that she defines as very communist – already made her familiar with historical discourses centred on the notion of capital, she adds this time "but in a well-argued manner". Where her parents' stories had left her without the resources to defend them, she seems here to be introduced to new tools that help her forge her own opinion. If the last sentence gives us a clue about the type of resources she starts using, these are developed in the following extract about her relations at home, where she talks about her mother:

> D: And it's true that she used to annoy me a lot because for instance, when Stalin died she cried about it. And… well… she didn't understand a thing about de-Stalinization. Yes, well, she didn't read a thing either. But me, I had read, I was twelve and a half, thirteen, and I had read lot of things and I would think: but how can she not know? And how can she…I was shocked by the lack of analysis, […] of objective support. […] And for me, the historical critique was part of my survival, maybe. Because I had an extremely violent, extremely anger prone mother. And so it was in my best interest to know very well… that.

Here, we can see a shift at home: the family discourses that she used to take for granted are now considered as the ones without "objective support". In the following years, Dominique enrols in a Trotskyist group because it was "against Stalin" and her parents. She reports that she argued about these issues with her mother, and that she started reading a lot, not only about the roots of communism, but also World War II. From a little girl listening avidly to her parents' stories about the past, she becomes an adolescent arguing against them with the help of what she learns in school and in books, which seems to be a way to resist her "extremely violent" mother. And in the following years, she takes part in political movements against colonialism and in women rights demonstrations, against her parents' approval, and develops new friendships in these militant groups. But if she opposes her parents, she interestingly does so while remaining extremely close to their values: she still identifies herself as a communist, but of a different kind. It seems that she found a way to position herself that would not alienate her at home or in school and yet allow her to have her own voice.

Not much seems to change in Dominique's relation to history in the following decades. While the late 1980s are marked by the birth of her two sons, she is surprisingly silent about the collapse of the USSR. But when asked, at the end of the interview, which historical event she would love to change most, she replies:

> D: I don't know. I don't know, I don't know. [3 s] Because I don't see one event… ok, when the Vietnamese thumbed their nose at the Americans, we could only be happy. [2 s] To do what? [3 s] That's it.
>
> C: hum…
>
> D: When the Chinese separated themselves from the yoke of… the Soviets, but to do a cultural revolution… with the horrors they did. And a society, I would

> say, more than unequal… I am not talking about misery in… in economical misery. I'm talking about intellectual misery.

She does not seem to propose events she would like to change, but events on which her interpretation changed: from the hope of an international Trotskyist revolution that would show another communism than Stalinism, it turned into despair about yet another communist inspired dictatorship. The difficulty to make sense of this turn of events is made clearer when I ask her about how she thinks current events will be remembered in the future, for instance the Arab Spring (the interview took place in March 2014). She replies:

> D: For me there is not one and only one Arab Spring. But for me all these stories about Islam I don't care. […] The Taliban are not funny, but the Red Guard was not either. […] I don't know what we will remember of it [4 s] these are countries…None of them, although they produce necessary resources, none of them has its own industry. […] They are consumers of the powerful countries, […] [like us] who are hands and feet tied to the American older brother.

After this, she goes on about the capitalist system, and concludes that we are all "fully enslaved" to it. What is interesting here is that Dominique's discourse does not change: in the stories she tells about the 1990s and onward, she refers to the same audience (especially her mother and her friends in militant groups), uses the same resources (mainly books and newspaper articles) and tells similar stories about class warfare and the opposition between the Americans and others, whether they are soviets, communists, socialists, etc. The world, however, did change: communism ended in a way that did not leave much hope for its partisans in Western Europe, and international politics have seen the arrival of new major players – mainly India, China and Brazil – that make reading the world in terms of USA/Russia opposition look slightly dated. As a result, Dominique seems to take a certain distance from her past understandings of history – as for instance when she talks about Vietnam – and to take part in less political actions: she reports participating in unionist movements during these years, but no mention is made of political engagements, in stark contrast to what she reports of the previous decades. In today's world, her positioning seems at times problematic; she talks about a few recent incidents where she quite strongly argued against interlocutors in ways quite at odds with the situation.

However, this (relative) lack of change does not need to be interpreted as an inability to adapt to the present. Instead, it can be interpreted as quite functional: 40 years on, Dominique is still able to maintain a relationship with her difficult mother and yet to resist her by arguing for a different

understanding of the collective past. If the end of communism is not evoked by Dominique as a strong transition in her relation to history, it may then be because it did not change much the opposition to her mother's favoured communism. If resisting hegemonic representations of history fuelled Dominique's social and political engagement, it seems also to have been a resource to resist difficulties in her own family.

F. Case 2: Genevieve

Genevieve is a social worker born in the 1960s to a Belgian father and a Polish mother. Although her father is fascinated by history, especially World War II, they do not talk much about it at home. Her mother, who left Poland after World War II, only tells stories about pre-war Poland, with one notable exception:

> G: And my mother for instance, well… often in these situations people who suffered a lot they don't talk about, about that part of their life, me, when I was a kid, she would talk to me about her house that was like an absolute Eden. Until 39. […] The only comments that I got when I was a child was if I did not eat, "you will finish your plate", very calmly, not even angry, not even, not even rising her voice, "you will finish your plate because people in the ghetto they ate the grass in between the pavements". Bang. […] But this is, this a way to… how are we going to call this way to tell a story, for instance, what is this way to tell history, if your mother tells you that when you're a child? […] And that, at the same time, you are nourished by what the ghetto was because we had books in the library with well, images and all, so I knew very well.

Here, it seems that while Genevieve gets knowledge about the past from books she reads on her own and does not discuss with her parents, such knowledge is made alive by her mother's discourses and is actually necessary to interpret them. In interaction with her mother, and using the books she read as resources to represent the past, Genevieve builds a story of what happened, or at least an image strong enough to stick with her 40 years later. Very early on, then, she is put in a position where she has to construct her own understanding of the past, between the remarks of her mother – which do not really amount to a story – and what she discovers, alone, in books. In that sense, she is a quite obvious illustration of the model self-other-cultural

tool presented above: she constructs a representation of history through the interaction with others and the use of cultural resources.

In the early 1980s, however, an experience profoundly changed her relation to history. She moved to Poland, against her mother's advice, and was asked by a Belgian newspaper to interview Polish people who resisted during World War II. As her mother had left her country before the 1950s, she had depicted a rather different Poland than what Genevieve found when she arrived, during a period of great repression. And she says:

> G: I arrived, so naïve, thinking the Poles are such patriots it will be so easy to interview them on, on resistance during World War II. What I didn't know is that most of them thanks to the great Yalta were sent by Stalin to Siberia for 15 years. […] It was dangerous to leave them in this new communist country that had such a radiant future, we were not going to keep people of the old regime who were going to mess it up. […] If I had interviewed them one or two years before, when […] when the wind of freedom was rising, I think they would have told me many things. But they had just had a lid closed on their faces […] and Jaruzelski [the Soviet-controlled Polish president] was there with his tanks. So I was confronted with people who did not want to talk at all, because they were scared, simply. So I had to develop all sorts of strategies to interview them. And that's where I realised that there are really two histories, you see. […] People would yell at me. […] "you know that us, we fought for you, and we all ended up behind the iron curtain and that, we were here, and there", and it's true that the Poles were everywhere, in Africa and in the UK, that, that, "this is the payback we got, we ended up behind the iron curtain and in Siberia, so please excuse me but we don't really want to…" And we were never told that in school.
>
> C: Yes…
>
> G: Never never never never never. [2 s] And so there were really two readings of history that… that were, were… for me it was the first time that I was really shaken to the core thinking [2 s] things are never really black and white. Things are never told… It's not because I learnt it in school that it is true. It's not because I read it in a book that it is true. And ever since, I, I, I, well my parents used to read a lot […] and they just died and, and, and I wonder but what am I going to do with all these history books because these are stories that are already

> not true anymore today because in the meantime researches were done that show [that they were wrong].

During her stay in Poland, two "lessons" seemed to change Genevieve's relation to history. First, as she says, she discovered that history is multiple and thus a matter of perspective. Interestingly, she did so by interacting with a group to which she, in some ways, belongs, being Polish and identifying as such (she reports being "yelled at" by these interviewees for being Polish and yet not speaking the language, which means that she introduced herself as Polish). Second, she learnt something that was never (with much insistence on the never) introduced to her in school, and the intensity of her reaction looks like a response to the level of the betrayal. Interacting with these Polish resistants and discovering their story make her question what she has learnt so far and how simple – "black and white" – it looked. And these doubts seem to remain today, as the end of the excerpt shows.

If this event left Genevieve very sensitive to the perspectival nature of history, her journey does not end there. About ten years later, just after the Scud crisis with Saddam Hussein, she visited Israel, during a period of great tensions. She talks about the religious extremists there and how they have a very specific discourse on history. I ask her what they say:

> G: Well, that it's the holy land and, there is no discussion to have. It's, it's always the same story, you see. It's, it's, they are the chosen people, the thingy, and well everything we know, you see. Without, with no possibility to have a dialogue with these people…they are really insane, you know. […] I was walking with a friend who was 55 at time and who was wearing a shirt with sleeves up to here [shows her wrists] and who had just left this button open [shows her neck] and she was called a Nazi. Well first the insult has nothing to do with [laughs], well, nothing. You just want to tell them, "poor dude, just shut up".

This experience seemed to have put a limit to her openness to the diversity of perspectives on history: if the others refuse dialogue – because they are not accessible to logic – then it is pointless to engage with them. If she can interact with their arguments and the resources they use to build their accounts of the past – she does so just after in the interview – she cannot or will not do so with their perspectives. And this leads her, at times, to a paradox: although she defends a perspectival understanding of history, she also insists on how "real facts" have shown these extremists were wrong about it, and she uses them to dismiss their perspective.

As a young girl, Genevieve's relations to history had been mainly centred on the books she would read and the remarks from her mother, full of connotations. A first transition, however, changed her understanding of "official" accounts of the past. Others, and what they had to say about history from their own perspective, thus became a great resource to understand the past. A second transition put a limit to this openness to other's discourses: those who are not rational and refuse alternatives should not be interacted with. In a way, it is possible to see this second transition as a "re-balancing" of Genevieve's relation to history. Indeed, although openness and flexibility are often considered as quite desirable psychological qualities – ensuring people's adaptability – taken to the extreme they also leave people at the mercy of any change in their environment and may threaten their sense of coherence and stability. In the case of Genevieve, it meant accepting discourses that ran contrary to other convictions she had – like the fact that a woman should be allowed to unbutton the uppermost button of her shirt in public. Hence, developing a "rule" to resist some perspective – history should not be discussed with those who are not accessible to logic and reason – may be a way to strike a necessary balance.

G. Resources for Resistance

Through these two case studies, I have attempted to show how people's relation to history can be understood as the product of a trajectory marked by ruptures and transitions, the internalization of social and cultural values, the construction of new meanings, and, in the end, by intransitive qualitative changes. In the first case, that of Dominique, the analysis highlighted how the internalization of her family's values created a rupture in school, from which she concluded that she did not fit in there and should therefore remain silent. This meaning was challenged during adolescence, when she was faced with teachers more open to her values and a difficult relation with her family. This second transition led her to develop her own version of her family's values – allowing her to both resist her mother and socialize in militant groups – through the use of books and various specialized texts. This second understanding is still what she uses today to interpret history. In the second case, that of Genevieve, the analysis showed how she started using books and pictures to make sense of the discourses of her mother, which were full of historical connotations. However, a strong rupture occurred when she visited Poland as a young adult and was confronted with new discourses about history. This made her question what she had learned before – and what she had not been told – and to develop a rather

perspectival understanding of history. However, a second rupture occurred a decade later, limiting the discourses she would agree to be open to.

In both cases, personal trajectories shaped how the participants remember and understand the past, which is actively acknowledged in the interviews: both Dominique and Genevieve themselves refer to their past to explain their present understanding of history. Past events do not just influence their relationship to history: through time, experiences create layers of meaning through which the past can be understood. Indeed, meanings do not cancel each other out but, through consecutive ruptures, participate in the construction of a rich system of values and understanding of the world. Contradictions and paradoxes, then, are part of their trajectories and are forged through contradictory and paradoxical experiences. As a result, each person's representation of history is unique, even within a rather homogenous social group – here both participants belong to the same generation and grew up in quite close social classes with leftist values. This is especially clear in the way they react to the play they went to see: Genevieve questions the "missing perspectives" in the story and Dominique talks about her pro-Palestinian activism in her youth and economic questions.

Through these trajectories, Dominique and Genevieve seem to have developed a general understanding of history that they apply to the various events they talk about in the interviews. Indeed, they generalize from experience both how history is built or ought to be built – for instance, when Genevieve "discovers" that history is a matter of perspectives – and general story lines that organize how they talk about subsequent events – for example, when Dominique talks about the Arab Spring and develops a narrative based on economic transformations. I propose to call these generalizations about memory *meta-memory*. This form of memory rests on cultural concepts and cultural narrative templates (as described, for instance, by Wertsch, 2008), which are culturally shared ways to understand the world or to tell a story, but it differs from them since it is built and given value and meaning through personal experiences. It thus has a deeply personal resonance, as do Personal Life Philosophies (Zittoun et al., 2013). For instance, one can learn in school that there is always more than one side to a story (cultural concept), but this is not the same thing as discovering it through the encounter with another telling an extremely different story about a past one considered to know, like Genevieve did.

What is also notable here is that two types of tools seem to play a central role in the transformation of these women's representations of history. First, books and other textual resources (as they may be presented in school) are recurrent resources. Surprisingly, however, very few references are made to historical movies and novels, when they are usually considered

as extremely important resources for collective memory. However, participants may simply choose not to refer to those in the context of the interview. Second, interactions with others and the stories they tell are an important resource too. Interestingly, it seems that the "channel" through which a rupture is brought about is also the one that will be later favoured. Indeed, for instance, Genevieve's first rupture is introduced through the discourses of others, and it is what she later uses as a resource to build narratives on the past. Dominique, on the other hand, is first unsettled by discourses in school and yet it is through the textual resources introduced by teachers later in her life that she builds her representations of the past. But both tools – others and texts – share a common feature: neither is blindly used, but they are instead a resource with which one interacts and dialogues in order to build an account of the past. For instance, when Dominique reads, as a young teenager, communist manifestos and historical books, she agrees with some ("thinking well yes!") and yet remains critical in front of others (especially those which overlook economical dimensions, as she explains later in the interview). Remembering and resisting, thus, are deeply oriented towards others and built in the interaction with their voices, whether it is in face to face or through books and other media.

H. Conclusion: Resisting Whom, Why and How?

In this chapter, I have argued that personal trajectories, through rupture and reorganizations, lead to specific ways of remembering the past and thus, potentially at least, to resistance towards hegemonic or one-sided representations of history. In the cases of Dominique and Genevieve, this was done through the use of textual and dialogical resources that helped them both build unique accounts of the past and criticize "official" narratives. Because it led them to activism and social action, through a critique of how power dynamics were forged, their "trajectories of remembering" are also trajectories of resistance. What the analysis showed, however, is that such resistances were first brought about by personal ruptures that needed to be overcome.

Reflecting further on the two stories discussed here we can conclude that, at a collective level, resistance presents us with three paradoxes. It is about resisting changes, yet time is irreversible, and this implies that often resistance is about bringing new changes to "restore" what was lost (the paradox of novelty). It is against a power whose legitimacy is seen as undermined, yet it uses (at least initially) "illegitimate" power to defend its cause (the paradox of power). And it is about ethics and rights, yet it also assumes to be defending higher values than others hold and thus ultimately depends on whose perspective you are taking (the paradox of ethics). Thus, if

resistance is a collective phenomenon, embedded in social action, it is only at the level of the individual engaged in the act of resistance and in the light of his/her personal trajectory that it takes its full meaning. This leads us to the final paradox of resistance, that of otherness: resisting hegemonic representations of the world (here, in the form of the meaning given to its past) involves resisting the discourses of others, yet it is these discourses that shape personal trajectories.

II. Remembering and the Life-Course (Paper 3)

Article published as:
de Saint-Laurent, C. (2017). Personal trajectories, collective memories: Remembering and the life-course. *Culture & Psychology, 23*(2), 263–279.

A. Abstract

How do we understand the broad history to which we belong? What meaning do we give to it and what role does it have in our lives? This paper proposes to approach collective memory from the perspective of the subject, adopting a developmental perspective to explore how people build specific relations and representations of the historical past. Building on the literature on collective remembering and on life-course studies, it conceptualises memory an as oriented, culturally mediated and dialogical action with a developmental history, embodied in 'trajectories of remembering'. This conception is applied to the life trajectory of Alain, a 44-year-old Belgian journalist, with a particular interest in the social and intersubjective dimensions of collective remembering. From this analysis, it will be concluded that people's relation to history is the product of the different positions they assume through time. The study of these successive experiences and their integration can thus shed new light on how we relate to history and give it meaning.

B. Introduction

When Milgram (1974) designed his famous experiment on obedience to authority, he clearly had in mind the events of the Second World War. He was trying to understand how such atrocities happened, and his research led him to the conclusion that it was not the 'nature' of the German people at the time that made them possible, but the authoritarian aspects of the regime they were living in. His theory has since been much criticised, with for instance Reicher's (Reicher et al., 2008) study showing how the ambient discourses led people to believe they were acting for the greater good, and not just under the pressure of authority. However, the same assumption underlies both studies: if we can learn from what happened in history, maybe we can make sure it will not be repeated in the future. Or, in the words of common sense: 'those who do not learn

from history are doomed to repeat it'. Nonetheless, research on the memory of the collective past has tended to show that we actually do the contrary: we use references to history to defend identity projects, we are quite insensitive to facts, we tend to reduce it to a single minded story where what matters are the intentions of the actors and we often use it to make our differences with others 'essential' to who we are (Raudsepp & Wagner, 2012; Wertsch & Batiashvili, 2012). How to understand, then, the discrepancy between these uses of collective memory?

So far, collective memory has mainly been explored through a social or sociological lens, focusing on the role of culture and society in shaping what we say about our collective past. By doing so, it has proved a useful tool to study how groups remember and mobilise the past, especially in times of conflict (e.g., Wertsch & Batiashvili, 2012) or when their identity becomes problematic or threatened (e.g., Hammack, 2010). It has, however, also painted a biased picture of how we relate to history, as it has primarily focused on how it is mobilised by societies facing a troubling past or a troubling present (de Saint-Laurent, 2017). Little attention has been given to the person who remembers and how unique understandings of history are forged. Adding such a psychological perspective to the study of collective memory could help us understand how some accounts of the past may be one-sided and encourage conflict while others may foster reflection and open up new possibilities for the future. In this paper, I propose to adopt such a perspective, looking at the developmental trajectory of our relations to history. In a first section, I will draft what may be gained from this approach and summarise previous studies' findings. Based on these, I will propose to investigate further the role of interactions with significant others through a Life Positioning Analysis (LPA; Martin, 2013). In a second section, I will apply this method to the life story of Alain, a 44-year-old journalist in Belgium. This will lead me to conclude that collective memory is produced by different yet complementary social positions that may be experienced through the life-course, and it is by giving them meaning and integrating them in unique ways that relations to history are forged. The aim of this paper is therefore to propose a new perspective on collective memory, centred on the person as she moves through life and society, and to illustrate it with a case study.

C. Collective Remembering

How can we adopt a psychological perspective on collective memory, focusing on the person who remembers, and yet not lose sight of the important social and cultural aspects highlighted in the literature? One way to do this is to adopt a sociocultural and developmental perspective, as it

has been done in life-course studies (Zittoun, 2012). On the one hand, looking at the development of a psychological function is a highly efficient way to reintroduce the individual in psychology (Zittoun, 2006). On the other hand, sociocultural approaches to psychology have placed culture and social interactions at the centre of human development (Valsiner, 1987). I thus propose to investigate people's *trajectories of remembering* and how they may forge their (unique) discourses on the historical past. To do so, I will first summarise the main findings of sociocultural approaches to memory, and especially collective memory, to then introduce what a life-course perspective entails and an integrative model.

The main contribution of sociocultural psychology to the study of collective memory has been to conceptualise it as an action – *collective remembering* – rather than as a static and more or less accurate representation of what happened (Wertsch, 2002). Indeed, most of the mainstream literature on collective memory has focused on how the past is 'stored' in the mind to be later retrieved (Danziger, 2008), modelling memory as an archive (Brockmeier, 2010) where souvenirs remain unchanged except by the deteriorating power of time. Sociocultural approaches, on the contrary, have proposed to understand collective memory as a reconstruction of the past, following the pioneer work of Frederic Bartlett (1932). In fact, Bartlett's most important insight was to focus on the adaptive nature of memory rather than on its fallibility. He theorised its main function as oriented towards the present – it allows us to adapt past action to the present situation – making accurate reproductions of the past irrelevant in everyday life (but see Brown & Reavey, 2017, for an interesting discussion of this idea).

Sociocultural approaches have also investigated the role of cultural tools in constructing accounts of past. In particular, they have explored the prominent role of cultural narratives in shaping discourses on history (e.g., Brescó de Luna, 2009; Brockmeier, 2002b; J. H. Liu & Hilton, 2005; Wertsch, 2008). Wertsch, for instance, conceptualised collective memory as an action mediated by the use of cultural tools, which include official text and stories told about history as well as narrative templates that illustrate how stories are to be told in a specific cultural context (Wertsch, 2002, 2008). This model stemmed from the works of Lev Vygotsky, who posited that all human activities are mediated by the use of cultural tools and/or signs (Vygotsky, 1978). Vygotsky also argued that they exist in a triangular relation including self and others, through which such tools and signs come to be mastered (Vygotsky & Luria, 1994). Human cognition, thus, is dialogical in nature (Fernyhough, 2008), that is, it is fundamentally oriented towards the other (Linell, 2009). Some sociocultural approaches to collective memory have thus focused on the dialogical aspects of memory, looking at how stories told about the past are deeply related to what others say about history (see Chapter 4). The sociocultural approach to

collective memory is summarised in Figure 5-1, which presents this phenomenon as a dialogical, culturally mediated and oriented action.



Figure 5-1. Collective memory as oriented, culturally mediated and dialogical action

The above model offers an interesting entry into the processes by which the past is reconstructed, from a psychological perspective. It does, however, present memory as an 'amnesic' phenomenon, where the person who remembers is interchangeable with any other because she is deprived of the past that makes her who she is. In other words, by presenting memory as an atemporal function, it disconnects it from the subject who does the remembering.

D. Trajectories of Remembering

In order to put the psychological subject back at the centre of memory processes, and yet not loose sight of their social and cultural dimensions, I propose to adopt a sociocultural developmental perspective on collective remembering (see also section I and de Saint-Laurent & Zittoun, in press). Such a perspective recognises that human life takes place in irreversible time (Valsiner, 1994), creating unique trajectories (Zittoun et al., 2013) that can account for how we relate to the world and give it meaning (Zittoun, 2006, 2008, 2012). Across the course of our life, we become familiarised with different values and systems of meanings or draw generalisations from our experiences. These may be internalised – although they are often resisted too – and given a personal meaning through life experiences (see for an example section I).

New meanings and values are more likely to emerge in times of rupture and transitions, when 'the obvious suddenly comes into question' (Zittoun, 2006, p. 6) and they are thus the privileged 'unit of analysis for studying psychological change' (Zittoun, 2006, p. 2). In this context, culturally shared elements such as stories or systems of values can become symbolic resources to

make sense of the situation at hand (Zittoun, 2006; Zittoun et al., 2003). If new meanings are produced, the rupture may in turn lead to transitions, characterised by intransitive qualitative changes (Zittoun, 2012). Ruptures are subjectively experienced by the person, although they are often associated with socially marked events (entering school, starting to work, marriages, divorces, etc.).

Thus, the notion of trajectories used in this paper does not refer to the objective track outlined by socially recognised milestones (e.g., graduating from school, getting married, retiring) or periods of life (e.g., adolescence, adulthood), but to the subjective path constructed by the interaction between the discourses of the self and the unfolding course of one's life (see section I). As such, a trajectory is not static – new ruptures always have the potential to lead to the reevaluation of the significance of this or that event – but is, in a given context, the most meaningful way to explain where one stands today. Transitions and the ruptures that provoke them can be more or less general (Zittoun, 2006): they can concern central aspects of one's life (starting a new job, losing a partner, becoming a parent. . .) or be quite peripheral (developing a new hobby, changing one's understanding of an event by learning new facts, breaking a friendship. . .). Clearly, one's relation to history falls, most of the time, in the second category. However, what 'counts' as peripheral or central will depend on the person and her circumstances: changing jobs, for someone who does not care much about this aspect of their life, might be less important than discovering new information about the wrongdoings of one's family during Second World War, for instance.

Is it possible, then, to consider discourses on history as the product of a developmental trajectory, as forged through the ruptures and transitions one experiences in life? What would be the consequences of such an approach? A proposition of a model is presented in Figure 5-2 (see also de Saint-Laurent & Zittoun, in press, for a full presentation), and it tries to bring together the literature on collective remembering and life-course studies. It conceptualises collective memory as an oriented action done in interaction with others and mediated by cultural resources, with both a developmental history for the person who remembers (past recalls) and a specific location in her life-course (place of the central triangle in irreversible time). Understanding discourses on history, then, entails understanding how they transform over time (developing from the 'past recalls' triangle) and what they subsequently allow the person to do (the 'action orientation' triangle), that is, the person's *trajectory of remembering*. These are best studied, as life-course studies have shown, by focusing on the ruptures and transitions in one's relation to the past. However, this model does not just extend in time but also across social and cultural dimensions. Thus, changes in these dimensions should be given particular attention, for example,

new interlocutors, access to novel information, development of alternative social positions for the self, mastery of different narrative frames, emergence of new concepts and understandings of history, etc.



Figure 5-2. Collective memory as a developmental process with socially located self, in interaction with a socially located other, using cultural resources

This model has been applied in previous – albeit limited – research (de Saint-Laurent & Zittoun, in press; see also Bauer & Gaskell, 1999 for the original Toblerone model). This research has highlighted the need to unpack further one important dimension of the model: the relation self-other and its evolution over time. The importance of this dimension is double. First, from a sociocultural and developmental perspective, and to paraphrase Vygotsky, the path from the self to the tools and signs one uses passes through the other (Vygotsky & Luria, 1994). In other words, the resources one uses to talk about history – from the historical facts presented to the narrative frames used to organise and interpret them – are first introduced by others and used with others. Thus, studying the relationships through which people have discovered history offers the possibility to understand which resources, information, values and representations are available to them and what importance they may give to them. Second, from a collective memory perspective, and as has been seen above in this paper, it is important to understand to which social groups people belong. However, group memberships are multiple, subjective, dynamic and historical (Gillespie et al., 2012), and a single categorisation is both impossible and unable to shed light on people's specific relations to the past. Focusing on how people socially position themselves vis-à-vis others, throughout the life-course, allows us to account for the fact that group memberships evolve through time, are always multiple, and to study how these are

navigated to create unique yet coherent understandings of the historical past. Indeed, if we use culturally constrained narrative frames and defend socially sanctioned versions of the past, alternatives are always available (see Chapter 4), both within and between groups. A life-course perspective on the self-other relations through which historical representations are forged may thus shed new lights on how collective memory can at times produce extremely reflexive accounts of the past and in others by the justification for violent conflicts and nationalisms.

This is what I propose to do in this paper, with the means of LPA (Martin, 2013). It stems from Position Exchange Theory (Gillespie & Martin, 2014; Martin, 2013), a theory that considers both the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of self and intersubjective action to be made possible by position exchange – actual or symbolic – and the integration of positions. For instance, it is by successively experiencing being taken care of (by one's parents) and taking care of (symbolically by playing with dolls), that children learn to take the perspective of their parents, albeit in a limited manner at first, and to look at themselves from this perspective. It is also through the integration of these positions that 'caring' becomes a significant symbol (Gillespie, 2005, 2006), integration that will continue throughout the life-course (for instance, when one experiences becoming a parent). LPA thus focuses on the different social positions one comes to occupy in life, their evolutions and the relations between them. Because social positions are relational, they capture quite well the dynamic between self and other, and because LPA is interested in their evolution across time, it fits well with a life-course approach.

By using LPA to investigate people's *trajectories of remembering*, my aim is to answer the following questions: (1) what are the different positions one comes to assume in front of collective memory; (2) how do these relate to the positions of others and (3) in what way can their evolution in time shed light on how the person understands the past?

E. Data and Method

In order to explore people's relation to history, nine interviews were conducted in Belgium and in Switzerland in February and March 2014 and June 2015. Participants were recruited around a theatre play (spectators and production team) on the Israel-Palestine conflict by Adeline Rosenstein (2014). The play presents a unique, historical and polyphonic perspective on the conflict and thus is of double interest for this research. First, this was an opportunity to recruit participants who were interested in the topic, comfortable talking about it (likely to be made more knowledgeable on historical issues by participating in these kinds of events) and had had

experienced changes in their relation to history (at the very least because the play in itself had the potential to cause a (micro)rupture in people's understanding of history). Second, the complex yet critical nature of the play landed itself to multiple interpretations and thus could be used to investigate how different people gave it different meanings. Most of the participants were members of the audience (seven), and the rest were part of the team around the play.

Each interview lasted between approximately 45 and 90 minutes, and the questions were open ended. Their aim was to explore the participants' relation to history and its development over time. In practice, it means that participants were asked which historical events were important to them, how they had become so, what resources they used to understand these events, with whom they talked about history, and any changes they may have experienced because of this. They were also asked how they thought history should be taught to children in practice – in an attempt to encourage overly general or ambivalent participants to position themselves – and what was for them the 'direction' of history, if any – to push, on the contrary, overly particular interviewees to produce generalisations. Follow-up questions were guided by the theoretical model (especially when asking about past recall, potential tools and interlocutors) or by my own desire to obtain more information about the events to which the participants were referring[24]. This meant, on a few occasions, venturing quite far from the topic at hand, particularly when the participants' relation to history seemed linked to other aspects of their lives (e.g., a broader vision of politics, religious beliefs.). The interviews were all conducted in French, which was the mother tongue of most of the participants, and in 'relaxed' settings (café, participant's garden, etc.), except for one interview conducted through Skype.

The interviews did not follow a chronological order – going from the participant's first relation to history and then moving all the way to the present – because it was assumed that most people would not have any experience in narrating such a trajectory. The questions were simply organised to facilitate the task of the interviewee. I then used a narrative and trajectory analysis (Rosenthal, 1993): the interviews were divided in sections corresponding to different periods of life and then re-ordered chronologically to create a 'reconstructed' trajectory. After this, a LPA (Martin, 2013), adapted to the model presented in Figure 5-2, was carried out. It focused, for

[24] The level of details voluntarily given by participants varied widely, not least because of the perceived nationality difference, as expressed explicitly by some of the participants. The case study used in this paper focuses on an interviewee who grew up in Belgium and probably assumed that I was Swiss because of my university affiliation. He was thus usually quite explicit.

each period, on (1) the ruptures experienced, (2) the positions adopted, (3) the interactions with others, (4) the resources used, (5) the outcomes of the transition and (6) the broader qualitative changes to which these may have led. In the following, I will present one example of a trajectory with the case study of Alain[25]. He was chosen because his trajectory is both complex – and thus it illustrates dynamics found in many separate interviews – and he is very explicit about his relation to history, making of him an exemplary case.

F. Case Study: Alain

Alain is a 44-year-old journalist, who was born and grew up in Belgium. He comes from a family with very limited education – his parents did not finish school – where people do not talk about history. As an adolescent, he is sent to a strict catholic school, known for the high level of its students and the difficulty of its examinations. And he explains, after I ask him how it was:

> I remember an especially scary history exam. I would say it was more, well, encyclopaedic. It was not polemical at all. Well, it was in a way because ignoring polemical aspects of the debate is polemical.

Here, Alain is put in the position of an ignorant learner, who has to repeat the 'truth' told by the knowledgeable professor. History does not have a personal meaning, but it is the factual, cold past found in encyclopaedias and needs to be learnt by heart. However, a first rupture occurs when he turns 18 and starts university. Indeed, when I ask him what changed his relation to history after adolescence, he replies:

> I started university in 1989 […].So it was the fall of the wall, you see […] When you enter university, in political science in 1989, you find yourself, well, in one of the richest intellectual period […] And a positive one. I mean you were not born […] in 1940, you see […] It's quite the opposite […] So yes, it was a turning point. Because all my childhood had been cradled by the Soviet Union[…] by the cold war, by the iron curtain, by these countries that we watch from the afar and look retrograde and scary and threatening […] I am actually the opposite of my

[25] Names, places, occupations and any other information that could lead to the identification of the participant were changed.

> father, if you want, or my parents' generation. I mean, me, my dad did his military service in Cold War Germany […] in 1963 […]. when the Cold War was getting really strong […] And me, I become of age and I don't do a military service […] because I was in the first generation in Belgium […] liberated from it. So conversely to my dad […] well, the historical paradigm changed. I mean, you are 18, at university watching the wall fall and my dad […] I mean he is 18, in his uniform, watching the wall.

The fall of the Berlin wall and wider societal changes it led to act here as a trigger, as the rupture from the previous period 'cradled by the Soviet Union'. By using the stories his father told him as a resource, as a point of comparison, he makes both of them enter history. Indeed, until then his father's past was just a story (as Alain said clearly in the interview, his parents did not talk to him about history as a child, and yet he knows this part of his father's life), but it is the stark contrast between the two men that gives the moment a historical dimension. Or, as Alain powerfully says: 'you are 18, at university watching the wall fall and my dad. . . I mean he is 18, in his uniform, watching the wall'. He experiences a new position: he is a witness of history as it unfolds, in front of a father who was oppressed by it. The result of this transition is that Alain starts travelling around eastern Europe: he decides to go discover these countries on the other side of the iron curtain and goes to witness their historical change. And he says:

> It went all so fast. And all of the sudden we all wanted to go there […] So I took Russian classes […] and I went to the Baltic States in 94 […] and Romania in 1995. And it was terrifying […] the poverty […] And people at the time, I remember a young guy in the mountains who was saying: you in Europe you're not doing a thing for us and all, and I said wait, one day you'll be part of the EU and he said no, it's not possible. And I'm very happy now they are part of it. So I was right.
>
> […] And people were starting to talk a lot about the communist years and all […] and make jokes about it […] I don't remember a specific one, but I remember people were doing it a lot at the table.

We can see in this excerpt the prolongation of the change started in 1989, where Alain positions himself as a witness of history. However, several differences can be noted here. If his father disappears from the story, new protagonists emerge. In the background, we can guess the presence of Alain's university colleagues ('we all wanted to go there'). He also starts interacting

with people during his travels, who tell him stories about their version of history, the 'communist years'. However, these voices can be interpreted more as resources to understand a past he did not experience than full interlocutors with whom the past is debated: he remembers them talking and joking about history, but mainly among themselves. This interpretation is also based on the way Alain positions himself in the excerpt: as a privileged witness of post-communist history. And, in this sense, the populations he interacts with are closer to the position of his father than to his, as they are considered oppressed by history. His position of 'privileged witness' is especially salient when he talks about meeting a young Romanian in the mountains: he sees so much what is going on that he can accurately 'predict' what will happen next more than the locals themselves.

When I ask him what changed next, he replies:

> There is no real turning point [after that] […] but maybe it was when I discovered Edward Said when I was […] a student in Cambridge […] We were very much on orientalism, on questions about inventions, imagination […] for political usages. Maybe it was stronger in the UK than here [in Belgium] […] And, evidently […] when you are interested in this post-Soviet universe […] you have all of history to rewrite, because it was essentially a propaganda regime […] For academics like us, everything was to be rediscovered […] And Edward Said is a guy that really helped me in that.

Although Alain starts this excerpt by denying that there was any turning point after the rupture that 1989 was, what he says just after clearly shows that a change did occur here. Discovering Edward Said – and, he later says, Foucault – may not indeed be a rupture, but actually a new resource to help him make sense of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the events that followed it. This new resource, in the form of historical concepts ('orientalism' and, although he does not specify it, probably Foucault's genealogism) seems to provoke two major changes from the previous period. First, Alain realises that history is something that is written by people with specific political agendas and thus that it can be re-written, for instance, by people like him. Second, it turns history into something that is debatable with others ('we were very much on Orientalism. . . ') in particular intellectual contexts ('maybe it was stronger in the UK than here'). Interestingly, the position Alain gives himself ('academics like us') is actually an anticipation of what comes next (he did not become an academic until after Cambridge). It may, however, reflect how this perspective was made possible by what he experienced there. When he, later on, does start his academic career, he explains:

> What interested me at the time was to see how universities bore responsibilities in […] the creation of conflicts, in the development of nationalist ideas […] as was the case in Caucasus […]
>
> [So] then I travelled. I went to universities, I went to the American University in Beirut […] to see for instance […] how their stories, you see for instance the Maronites saying that they are not Arabs but Phoenicians […] There is always this historical reflex […] a bit everywhere. And I mean it's typically a very academic construction […] to say yes but us we are not like the others […] You see the others, there, the Shiites and all, it's not us […] Us, we are Lebanese because we are the heirs of the Phoenicians […] and we have an ancestral history behind us, so all of the sudden we are worth much more than others.

Alain's professional transition seems to have brought quite a few changes. If he keeps interacting with fellow academics, it is not anymore as debate partners, but as these others who write history in dangerous ways. He later insists on how these are bad academics, from bad universities, and that not all are like that. It may be an attempt to further distance himself from them, but might also be an effort to show to me, the academic who is interviewing him, that he does not paint all of us with the same brush. To develop his position of 'good' academic, analysing how others produce (dangerous) historical discourses, Alain uses two different types of the resources. First, he uses generalisations and concepts (and describes the situation in Lebanon as 'typical', as something that is 'always' like that 'everywhere'), similar to what he did in the previous period with Said and Foucault. Second, he travels and goes to discuss with locals, as he did after the fall of the Berlin wall. Thus, it seems that in his academic career, Alain managed to integrate the resources and the positions he developed during previous periods of his life: he is both the intellectual capable of historical critic, thanks to the concepts he has come to master, and the privileged witness, who travels to go experience history first hand.

Alain does not report much change in his position in the years that follow. He leaves academia and becomes UN consultant on the crisis he studied in his PhD, when he worked on historical nomadism as a justification for deportation in a specific conflict[26]. After a few years, he changes careers again, and he is now a journalist specialised on the same topic. However, his perspective on history did not change and becoming a journalist can be seen as the 'final' integration of his

[26] This is left voluntarily vague in order to preserve anonymity.

two positions: a reporter, between witness and analyst. And, when I ask him what were his thoughts on the theatre play he saw before I recruited him to participate in this research, he says:

> I think that in terms of ideas we are on the same page […] I was happy to meet people who echo in some ways […] things that are close to what we do and well, in an other area of the world, but where I see they reflect on sedentarism, on indigenousity, on roots and well, on deportations as well.

When asked what they thought of the play or what they saw in it, no other participants referred to these dimensions (this includes more than the nine interviewees of this specific project, as the play became part of a broader project, 'Le Théâtre de la Connaissance', a year after this research was conducted). What Alain saw in the complex and multivocal theatre production, then, appears to be the result of his own, personal relation to history, forged through the different ruptures and transitions he experienced. And although not all participants gave the play such a unique meaning, others who like him developed a rather strong conception of history tended, too, to understand the play as defending a view similar to theirs, or at least to present the Israel-Palestine conflict as illustrating their views (see, for instance, section I, where a participant adopting a rather communist perspective presents the situation as linked to capitalist issues).

G. Discussion

By reconstructing Alain's trajectory, we have seen him move through a series of different positions: the passive recipient of history, the witness and then privileged witness, the intellectual re-writing history, the critical scholar and finally the reporter. Each position was enriched by the previous ones but also gave Alain a unique perspective on history. Not only did he integrate, in the end, several perspectives, but his final position may also be seen as a reflection of where he started: who is the audience he is seeking by being a journalist, if not the ignorant recipient of history, like he used to be as a child? His trajectory, then, is not a linear progression, a perpetual replacement of a perspective by a new one, but the expansion, along social dimensions, of his understanding of how the past is built. The positions he consecutively takes are also dependent on how others place themselves and interact with him: to be the passive recipient of history, there needs to be someone transmitting said history; to be a witness, there needs to be both actors to observe and a future audience to whom one can testify; to be an intellectual re-writing history, someone must have badly written it before; to be a critical scholar, a scientific

community to challenge must exist and, finally, to be a reporter requires both someone to do something worth reporting and having someone to whom it can be reported. The developmental trajectory of collective remembering, then, can be interpreted as the successive discovery and experience of the multiple positions that make talking about history possible.

What characterises Alain's relation to history is not so much the social groups to which he belongs at a given moment in time, but how he resolves (or not) the tensions between the different versions of history that are proposed to him by these groups. This trend can be found throughout the data, and not only in the case of Alain. Most participants (seven out of nine) reported being faced with contradictions in the way they learnt history (often between school and home, but also between family and friends, between different family members, or because they were told new stories as they grew older), and all proposed 'composite' accounts of history, borrowing from the different social groups they have been acquainted with throughout their life. At times, it is done through a very conscious and reflexive process, where participants explain having actively sought new meanings after experiencing a rupture. At others, larger societal circumstances seem to constrain very much what can be said or not. Similarly, some participants resolve the tensions and contradictions they are subjected to by creating new meanings for history (as Alain with 'nomadism'), while others seek answers in existing ideologies (see section I for an example with communism).

Going back to the model proposed at the beginning of this paper, we can say that different positions offer different tools and afford different interpretations of the past. For instance, when positioned as an academic, Alain adopts a very critical reading of history based on concepts developed by preeminent intellectual figures, and it is only later that he becomes wary about the 'bad academics' who rewrite history – an interpretation of the past less directly afforded by the situation. It thus seems that the tools available to the person and the others with whom one interacts both open up new possibilities to think about the past and constrain them – opening the central triangle in the figure and yet delimitating it. Through time, however, people discover new resources and explore multiple positions, allowing them to go beyond the constraints of the present situation (or, at times, increasing them further). What may produce reflexive accounts of the historical past, then, in opposition to nationalistic ones, is the exposition to both alternative versions of history and to resources allowing one to make sense of the contradiction. In other words, opening new horizons (expanding the symbolic space of the triangle in the figure) is productive insofar as one disposes of resources that can frame the problem and give meaning to the situation.

Of course, the research presented here is limited, not only because it is based on nine interviews but also because of the type of participants involved: mainly intellectuals and artists with a specific interest in history (at least enough to go see a theatre play on the topic). If this facilitated the study of how new positions may be taken – most participants had travelled extensively, lived abroad at one point, changed careers multiple times or experienced a high social mobility – it did so within a very particular population. It may, thus, reflect dynamics that are specific to them. However, self-other relations and position exchange are fundamental psychosocial processes no matter what population is studied. But, if we have seen here how Alain adopted different positions, two central questions remain: how are certain positions blocked and rejected, for we do not always welcome the perspective of others? And how are these experiences of alterity mobilised to produce new understandings of the past? Answering these questions, with the help of a microgenetic method, will be the main purpose of the study following this research (see Chapter 6).

H. Conclusion

The aim of this paper has been to propose a sociocultural and developmental model of collective memory and to apply it on a case study, with a specific focus on the role of self-other relations. I hope to have demonstrated, with the analysis of the trajectory of Alain, that such an approach can shed new light on how history is understood by people, in part because of the complex relation between self and others in collective memory. This approach does not only have analytical consequences, however. From a theoretical perspective, it involves a shift from theories focused on explaining how the image of the group is defended through biased versions of the past – borrowing from research on stereotypes, intergroup relations, social identity, etc. – to theories interested in social thinking, meaning making and perspective taking (see Chapter 6). At a deeper level, it means moving away from theories that treat people as the passive recipients of representations imposed by the social group to which they belong, and going towards theories able to grasp how people navigate complex social environments and assume multiple identities that forge how they think about the world. The challenge, then, is propose a model of collective memory that accounts for both what is shared and what is unique in the person's relation to the past, and how collective dynamics and personal understandings co-constitute each other.

From a methodological perspective, the consequences are double. First, it highlights the necessity to develop methods focusing on processes and interactions – that is looking at how the

person and her context evolve through time – instead of content – that is mapping out what is said about the past and not so much how these discourses are constructed. Second, it requires studying people and how they conceive the world, instead of events and how they are perceived, as is usually done in collective memory research. Although being able to grasp the public discourses surrounding an event is a very interesting and relevant endeavour, the study of collective memory cannot be limited to it.

Finally, this has important practical consequences. To go back to the original question of this paper, how to understand both extremely reflexive and extremely nationalist accounts of history? If I believe that the analysis of the case of Alain offers hints as to what the answer may be – that it depends on both the sociocultural conditions of the person and the meaning she gives to them – the real issue here is how we may encourage people to be more reflexive about history and to resist the temptation to write a glorified 'national novel' (to borrow an expression favoured by French politicians who wish to impose such a version of the past). Conceiving collective memory as a representation more or less imposed by the group means that not only reflexivity is impossible – or limited to a very small intellectual elite of which the researcher is often presented as being a member – but that the only form of education possible is at best rote learning, at worst propaganda. In the end, then, understanding how collective memory transforms through time and how people resist hegemonic representations of the past is as much a societal as it is a theoretical challenge.

Chapter 6.

Historical Reasoning

I. Emergence in Historical Representations (Paper 4)

Article submitted as:
de Saint-Laurent, C. (Submitted). Historical reasoning: A cultural psychology perspective on emergence in collective memory. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science* (Special issue "Uses of the past: History as a resource for the present")

A. Abstract

Collective memory, the lay representations of history, is an important component of the way we relate to the social world, giving it origin and meaning. Because of its fundamental social and cultural dimensions, most studies have been devoted to the exploration of what representations of the past exist in the public sphere, how they are transmitted – and at times transformed in the process – and how they rely on cultural elements, principally shared narratives. However, little is known as to how new representations of the past emerge, and more specifically how representations that diverge from the 'mainstream' narrative are developed as people reflect on history. In this article, I propose to answer this question by adopting a sociocultural perspective on collective memory. I start by proposing the notion of historical reasoning, defined as the process by which people construct, maintain, contest and challenge historical representations. It is then used to analyse a qualitative and dialogical experiment where participants were confronted with different positions on the on-going Ukrainian conflict. I conclude this analysis by proposing a model of historical reasoning as resting on four main dimensions: meaning, sense, factual knowledge and schemas. Finally, I argue that this is opening a new, complementary field of study for collective memory.

B. Introduction

The way we represent the historical past, and the meaning we give to it, is of tremendous importance for collective life: it has the power to shape social identities (Hammack, 2010), to define our future (Brescó de Luna, 2017), to change how we relate to others (Delori, 2011), or to give meaning to the present (see Chapter 4), among other things. The functions of collective memory, and the consequences it may thus have on our lives, have been the focus of numerous studies, and part of the rational used to justify most of memory research. Because of this the

contents, biases and inaccuracies of collective memory – and how, for instance, we tend to prefer narratives that are in our favour – have been the topic of most of the research in the area. From the representations of Nazism in German movies and literature (Berghahn, 2006; Fuchs, 2006) to how Argentinian youth understands Spanish colonisation (Carretero & Kriger, 2011), or how the Egyptian revolution is remembered (Awad, 2017), much attention has been devoted to the way people picture the past, with what deviations from what actually happened and with what consequences. This body of literature has shed light on very interesting aspects of collective memory: how, for instance, we tend to give excessive agency to historical actors (e.g., Wertsch & Batiashvili, 2012); how what we forget is as meaningful as what we remember (Brockmeier, 2002b); or how we use simple and culturally shared narrative structures to talk about widely different historical periods (J. H. Liu & Hilton, 2005).

However, there has been little research focused on the processes through which collective memory is produced (Kansteiner, 2002). For instance, most studies on the role of narratives in collective memory have aimed at unpacking the stories told about history, their underlying assumptions, and their consequences, but have shown less interest in how the narratives themselves have been constructed (for a notable exception see Brescó de Luna, 2009). This article, on the contrary, argues that people actively produce unique and meaningful accounts of history, and its main aim is to explore how new representations of history may emerge in the process. First, I explore the notion of 'everyday thinking' from a sociocultural and dialogical perspective. Second a brief review of the literature on collective memory is presented, focusing on collective remembering, the area that has more or less explicitly tried to tackle the question of the production of collective memory. Third, the notion of *historical reasoning* is proposed, defined as the process by which people produce representations and discourses about an historical object. This notion is then applied to the analysis of a qualitative and dialogical experiment, looking at what prompts *historical reasoning* and the resources it uses. Finally, I propose an integrative model of historical reasoning.

C. Sociocultural Psychology, Dialogism and Everyday Thinking

Sociocultural psychology, a discipline that (re-)emerged in the past 25 years or so, is especially adapted to the study of phenomena – such as collective memory – that are at the intersection between social, cultural and psychological processes. It is because sociocultural psychology considers that people actively construct their environment and that cultural tools and 'Others'

mediate their relation to the world (Vygotsky & Luria, 1994). Moreover, people use complex thinking in everyday life in order to act in the world and give meaning to their experiences (Bruner, 1990; Wertsch, 1998). From this perspective, then, the representations we have of the world are both unique – they are constructed in the moment-to-moment exchanges to give sense to the on-going flow of experience – and socially and culturally shared. On the one hand, people become familiarised with the various systems of values, social representations, ideas, norms and practices through interactions, and the way they understand the world is thus fundamentally social and cultural. On the other hand, people build unique perspectives by appropriating and integrating this multiplicity into representations of the world that are meaningful and specific to them (see Chapter 5).

This is in large part because the ideologies and representations put forward in our cultures and social environments are not as unified – or 'monological' – as it often seems at first sight. First, people move between multiple spheres of experience where different values, practices, and representations are in order (Zittoun & Grossen, 2013), and these can become sources of tension or integration as people move through life (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015). Second, group memberships are not as static and unified as they are often presented: people belong to multiple groups, move between them, and these groups evolve in time (Gillespie et al., 2012). People's social identities and social representations are thus never monological, multiplicity that manifests itself, for example, in hyphenated identities (Ali & Sonn, 2010) and cognitive polyphasia (Jovchelovitch, 2002). Last but not least, representations and ideologies are themselves dialogical (Marková, 2003), as they exist in tension with their own opposites (Billig, 1987). For instance, ideologies such as democracy exist in a tension with the idea of authority, fuelling many societal debates that are activated, for instance, when one talks about educational or political practices (Billig et al., 1988). These dialogical oppositions are at the heart of representations (Marková, 2000) and drive everyday thinking (Billig et al., 1988).

Indeed, they create *dialogical tensions* that both offer a space and a need for discussion: if no alternatives existed, there wouldn't be a need or a possibility for dialogue and debate (Billig et al., 1988). In this context, social representations of history – understood here in the narrow sense of the socially shared representations of a historical event (J. H. Liu et al., 2005) – are only part of the story of collective memory. What is missing is a clear understanding of how people navigate the dialogicality of the representations of history they come in contact with, as sociocultural approaches to collective remembering have attempted to do.

D. Collective Remembering

Sociocultural approaches to memory find their roots in the works of Bartlett (1932), who proposed to conceptualise memory as the activity of reconstructing a past experience with the aim of adapting it to a present situation. Because of his interest for memory as an adaptive activity – and not as an ability to accurately store information to be later retrieved – Bartlett preferred the term "remembering" to that of memory. As a result, when social, cultural, and discursive approaches took an interest in collective memory in the 1990's, it chose the term "collective remembering" (Middleton & Edwards, 1990), and showed two main interests. First, it has focused on how memory is performed in discourses, and how it is shaped by cultural and social practices and expectations (e.g., Middleton, 1997; Middleton & Brown, 2005; Middleton & Edwards, 1990). Second, it has been interested in the role of narratives, that are conceptualised in sociocultural psychology as both a form of thinking (Bruner, 2003) and a cultural tool that shapes memory (Brockmeier, 2002b). Globally, thus, studies in collective remembering have largely focused on how social context and cultural practices shape memory, filling the gaps left by cognitive and experimental research. However, this has sometimes been done at the expense of a full consideration of the 'person who remembers' (de Saint-Laurent, 2017) by overlooking the psychological processes behind collective remembering, reducing them to a social and cultural construction.

Yet, as noted in the previous section, sociocultural psychology offers a particularly adapted frame for the study of everyday thinking, including collective memory. This is well reflected in the works of James Wertsch, a sociocultural psychologist who took an interest in collective remembering at the end of the nineties. Wertsch defined collective remembering as an action mediated by the use of textual resources (Wertsch, 2002) and narrative tools (Wertsch, 1997). In other words, people actively reconstruct the past by using the social and cultural resources available in their environment – they are not just constrained by them. Wertsch also distinguished between two levels of agency: the one of producer of historical narratives – usually the state – and the one of consumer of such resources – usually lay people (Wertsch, 1997). However, this is, I believed, what partially sterilised the debate on how representations of the past are produced, as it reduced the role of lay people to that of consumers, and implicitly presented the 'producers' (policy makers) as masterful tacticians. Indeed, this distinction limits the question of the production of historical narratives to issues of power and control, presenting people in powerful position as calculating and manipulating the public, when they often share the very representations they are trying to transmit (see Chapter 4). As a result, sociocultural

theories of collective remembering have been more concerned with how people consume social and cultural representations and narratives of the past, and with the effects of political agendas on the production of collective memory, but much less with how collective memory is actually produced.

One important issue in this regard, left by Wertsch's work, is how to understand the ways in which people, living in environments full of social and cultural tools, choose and made use of the resources available to them. If the cultures and societies they live in are profoundly dialogical, how do they navigate this dialogicality? This question was the object of two previous studies. In the first one, looking at how collective memory is negotiated in parliamentary debates (Chapter 4), it was found that people belonging to the same social group tend to share a general understanding of history, but give it different significations. That is, having a shared *meaning* enables communication, but people can give it a very personal *sense* (Zittoun, 2017c). In the case of collective remembering, this implies that the distinction between production/consumption is not a sharp division and that both sides participate in our understanding of historical events and our ability to communicate about it. In the second study, the aim was to look at individual *trajectories of remembering* to see how unique representations of history emerged (Chapter 5). It was found that three elements had the potential to change people's relation to history: 1) learning new factual elements from trusted sources; 2) discovering alternative perspectives from others that are either trusted or that one identifies with; and 3) learning new historical concepts, either about the events themselves (e.g., learning about Orientalism) or about history in general (e.g., discovering that memory is perspectival). These elements can create ruptures in the way people understand history, and lead to the production of new representations of the past. Successive ruptures can later be integrated into broader representations, leading to 'thick' and sometimes seemingly contradictory understandings of history (Chapter 5).

The results of these two studies suggest that people develop a unique sense of history through ruptures that lead to the emergence of new representations of the past. However, the data that has been collected so far consisted of accounts, by the participants, of changes they experienced in the past, not moment-to-moment changes. How do new representations of history actually emerge microgenetically? What circumstances make ruptures and change possible? What processes do people use to construct new representations? What types of changes emerge from this? Or, to put it more simply: how is collective memory produced?

E. Beyond Memory, Narratives and Representations: Historical Reasoning

Answering these questions involves a shift in paradigm and a change of vocabulary. Indeed, the term 'collective memory' is misleading on two accounts. First, it is not clear what is considered to be collective here: what is remembered or the remembering itself? Although it has been commonly accepted that collective memory is about history and the past of social groups – and it is how it has been studied so far – it has also often been assumed that remembering these things was a collective affair too, as it relies on collective sources. This has led, I believe, to much confusion about the exact nature of what collective memory is set to study: is it the socially and culturally shared representations of the past? The stories we tell about history? The memory we have of our social groups? What lay people understand of history? All of these interpretations co-exist in collective memory research, and yet, as intertwined as they may be, these are quite different phenomena. Second, the term memory itself is source of much confusion: where is memory in my representation of World War II? Where is it in my understanding of Antiquity? Yes, memory allows me to talk about these periods, but in the same way that it allows me to speak English. The term memory, of course, does not solely designate the cognitive ability to retain information from the past, and has at times been used – albeit quite metaphorically – to talk about anything where such information is deposited. However, from a psychological perspective, this is not (primarily) memory, and yet it has been treated as such by some psychologists, leading for instance to the problematic claim that collective and autobiographical memory are the same thing (Echterhoff, 2011).

To avoid these pitfalls, I propose to use the notion of historical reasoning, as a way to designate the action by which people produce discourses on the collective past and use them to give meaning to the present, or direction to the future. This makes clearer both the object (history) and the process (giving 'reasons' to past events) that I aim to study here, and it removes the confusion that comes from using a term that has become far too polysemous. Indeed, the term 'reasoning' was chosen not just to highlight the cognitive, active and at times 'reasonable' aspects of historical thinking, but mainly to stress the orientation of this activity: towards finding "reasons" – in the largest meaning this term can take, from causes and motivations to theories, ideologies, and cosmogonies – for history. Furthermore, it allows us to make claims and draw on conclusions about a specific aspect of collective memory – how *individual* people make sense of *history* and not how *groups remember* their past – and not the whole field at once. What I propose here, then, is to consider historical reasoning as one facet of collective memory, the one that focuses on how people make use and sense of the shared narratives, collective representations,

official discourses, and all the other social and cultural resources on history that are available in their environment.

Historical reasoning – and its better known sibling historical thinking – has long been an object of study in history education research, where it has been defined as "a process in which central facts and concepts are arranged to build an interpretative historical case" (van Boxtel & van Drie, 2004, pp. 89–90). It has been used mainly to talk about children's understanding of history, although it has, at times, been applied to history research itself (e.g., Ringer, 1989) or more exceptionally to political sciences (Redhead, 2002). It is usually employed in reference to the types of reasoning children need to acquire in order to think about history like professionals would, and experts are often used as the baseline for comparison of performance (van Drie & van Boxtel, 2007). Five main abilities have been highlighted so far in education research (van Drie & van Boxtel, 2007): asking historical questions (e.g., van Drie & van Boxtel, 2011), using sources (e.g., Barton, 1997; Wineburg, 1991), contextualising (e.g., Reisman & Wineburg, 2008), arguing (e.g., Pontecorvo & Girardet, 1993) and using concepts (e.g., Schoeman, 2007). Historical perspective-taking has been recently appearing as a potential sixth ability, although a common definition remains to be found (Hartmann & Hasselhorn, 2008; Páez, Bobowik, & Liu, 2017).

Historical reasoning has thus been used, so far, to refer to the abilities children must acquire in order to understand history as a discipline, but not directly in connection to collective memory, perhaps with the assumption that this is exactly the type of memory history education is meant to prevent. Comparing collective memory and history education research indeed paints a surprising picture: if children produce historical reasoning that follow the model, albeit imperfectly, of experts (Monte-Sano & Paz, 2012), adults consume the historical narratives and representations produced by powerful others (Wertsch, 1997). Applying the notion of historical reasoning to adults would allow us not only to understand how they think about history – beyond cultural narratives, representations and remembering their past – but also to make the link between history education and adults' understanding of history.

The idea of *historical reasoning* requires a few adaptations to be applied to collective memory. First, because of its focus on history teaching, it has being primarily interested in the skills one needs to develop to be able to think like a historian, and has not shown much concern for the psychological processes involved when one reasons about history. Second, because it rests on a rather normative definition of history – as the 'proper' way to talk about the historical past – it has not questioned the type of information on which historical reasoning is built, beyond the

issue of the evaluation of sources by students. Third, and for similar reasons, it has not problematised what the result of historical reasoning actually is, beyond 'proper' history. That is, it assumes that there is both a set of 'valid' information to start from, that children need to identify, and a 'valid' answer they should arrive at.

To overcome these issues, I propose to clarify what the source and product of historical reasoning is, borrowing from the concept of social representations. "A social representation is a system of values, ideas and practices" that "enable individuals to orientate themselves in their material and social world and to master it", and for "communication to take place among members of a community by providing them with a code […] for naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their individual group history" (Moscovici, 1973, p. xiii). Social representations have, of course, already been linked to collective memory (Haas & Jodelet, 2000), but usually to find the collective representation of history of a given population (e.g., J. H. Liu et al., 2005). Adapting the concept of social representations to historical reasoning, I propose instead to define historical representations as a system of values, ideas and practices about history that enables people to give meaning to it and to communicate about it. It is thus a flexible system of knowledge about the past that allows people to adapt to the present, in a way similar to Bartlett's ideas about memory. Historical reasoning, then, is the process by which historical representations of the collective past are constructed, maintained, contested and challenged. As such, understanding emergence in collective memory means answering two questions: 1) what kind of dialogical tensions prompt historical reasoning? And 2) how are new representations of history built though historical reasoning?

F. Studying Historical Reasoning

In order answer these questions, a qualitative experiment was carried out, as a privileged method to study microgenesis (Wagoner, 2009). Indeed, the aim of qualitative experiments is to produce qualitative changes, in order to analyse the processes through which these changes occur. In the case of historical reasoning, it involved constructing a task that had the potential to change the participants' understanding of an historical event, to then analyse how various resources and processes were mobilised in the participants' response. The task was thus built to introduce participants to new facts and new subjective perspectives on an event, following the results of the study on *trajectories of remembering* (see Chapter 5 and de Saint-Laurent, in press) and thus constituting a *dialogical experiment*. The event chosen was the Ukrainian conflict, as it had both

complex historical ramifications and yet was recent enough at the time of the interviews (mid 2015) to make it likely for most participants to be able to discuss it at ease – and hopefully also for them to be more open to change. All the participants were Polish, and the population was then selected using historically structured sampling (Valsiner & Sato, 2006). The aim was to find a population that would be concerned by the conflict, as identification with one side or the other changes how people react to new information (Leone & Mastrovito, 2010), and yet distanced enough to make the use of an experimental method like the one required here ethically appropriate.

Table 6-1. Summary of the vignettes presented to the participants

Table	Statement	Side	Perspective based on
Ukrainian table	01. Statement from the Ukrainian Military Spokesman claiming that Russia is invading Ukraine using figures from the American intelligence source	Pro Kiev	Facts
	02. Statement from a Ukrainian professor explaining the role of Russian propaganda in Eastern Ukraine	Pro Kiev	Facts
	03. Ukrainian protestor explaining that all they wanted was to be free of Russian influence	Pro Kiev	Experience
	04. Ukrainian writer explaining the role of corruption in motivating the demonstration	Pro Kiev	Experience
International table	05. British journalist arguing that we don't know what is really going in Ukraine, as we don't even know which side the snipers who attacked protestor were working for	Neutral	Fact
	06. Japanese journalist arguing that both side are doing terrible things by using illegal and violent weapons	Neutral	Fact
	07. American journalist explaining that although the referendum in Crimea is dubious, most Crimean are Russian, so we don't have the right to prevent them for becoming part of Russia	Pro Russia	Fact
	08. Irish journalist explaining that there are now recording and photographs that prove that Russia and the separatists are very probably behind the plane crash	Pro Kiev	Fact

Local table	09. Mother of a Russian soldier demanding to know what happened to her son who died on a mission he was told was in Russia, but who was filmed in combat in Ukraine	Neutral	Experience
	10. Tatar activist explaining how for them the conflict in Crimea didn't change anything, as neither side as ever respected their human rights	Neutral	Experience
	11. Local woman stuck in Eastern Ukraine explaining how she used to defend Kiev, until they started being bombed, and the Russians were the ones sending humanitarian help	Pro Russia	Experience
	12. Local woman who had to flee Eastern Ukraine because of the attacks, accusing those who stayed behind of defending Russia	Pro Kiev	Experience
Russian table	13. Russian migrant in Western Europe explaining how the Russians are always seen as the "bad guys", when other countries do terrible things too	Pro Russia	Experience
	14. Mayor of a small Russian town near Ukraine arguing that they always had a special relation with Ukraine, and that it is because the US and EU meddled that the problems started	Pro Russia	Experience
	15. Russian member of parliament explaining how Crimea was a gift from the USSR to Ukraine after WWII, made illegally	Pro Russia	Fact
	16. Russian journalist explaining that many protesters on the Maiden square were Neo-Nazis and that some of them are now members of the Ukrainian government	Pro Russia	Fact

The experiment was structured in two parts. In the first part, participants were asked to choose three historical events that were important to them and to explain why they chose them. The aim was to obtain some background information on the participants' relation to history, the resources they used and the general representations they had of it. In the second part, participants were asked to take part in a 'dinner party', represented by a set of cardboard tables, and to pick different vignettes containing statements about the conflict. The tables were organised by 'side' of the debate: Ukraine, Russia, International community, Local population. Participants chose from which table to pick each statement, but the specific statement was taken at random. On average, they each picked four texts, usually evenly distributed between the tables. After each vignette, they were asked to summarise what they had just read, and to say

what they would respond to the author of the text. The sixteen texts (four per table) were constructed using newspaper articles, and organised around two dimensions: neutral vs. partisan perspective and fact based vs. experience based perspectives. All the information presented was as 'correct' as possible (it represented the perspectives of real people and all facts included had been checked against several sources), but the statements in themselves were artificially constructed for the experiment (a debriefing document was given to the participants, clarifying how the vignettes had been made). A summary is presented in Table 6-1.

Eleven interviews/experiments lasting an average of 75 minutes were conducted, for a total of 37 events discussed in the first part and 47 vignettes picked in the second part. The data was then transcribed and coded using Nvivo, but the following focuses only the results of the second part of the interviews, the dialogical and qualitative experiment. Three series for codes were applied to the data, coding for: 1) the *resources* used by the participants to react to the vignette, including the sources of information used (TV, friends, books, school…) and the type of information mobilised (witness accounts, historical concepts, values, formal historical chronologies…); 2) the *processes* used by the participants when they mobilised these resources to reason about history (e.g., categorisation, narrative construction, perspective taking…); 3) the 'reactions' to the vignettes: what part of the vignette did the participant react to, what tension it provoked and the overall agreement or disagreement of the participant with the vignette. The categories were open-ended and were informed by both the data and the theory. A subsequent analysis compared 1) all the responses of different participants to a specific vignette or a specific category of vignette; and 2) all the responses of a specific participant to different vignettes. In the following, I present and discuss the results concerning the sources of dialogical tensions and the resources used by the participants to discuss the vignettes, as well as the model that emerged from these. A subsequent paper will focus on the processes of historical reasoning (see section II).

G. Analysing the Sources and Resources of Historical Reasoning

In the following, I present the four categories of elements of historical representations that participants mobilised while engaging in historical reasoning. These acted either as sources of tension – provoking a reaction – or were used as resources to solve the tensions. These categories are presented separately in the interest of clarity, but they should be understood as 'dimensions' of discourse rather than separate entities.

1. Meaning

The first element that created dialogical tensions with the vignette was the *meaning* they were seen as supporting. As explained above, meaning refers to the signification given to an object and that is assumed to be shared with others (Zittoun, 2017c). However, as dialogical approaches to thinking have shown, people are exposed to a multitude of meanings held by different social groups. In the experiment, participants referred, for instance, to the main meanings given to the role of Russia in the Ukrainian conflict (as interfering versus as helping), supposed that I was aware of them, and yet did not necessarily agree with them. *Meaning*, then, can be taken more globally as referring to the general signification and value given to a situation and that is assumed to be shared by a group of people.

Most of the vignettes in the experiment were read by the participants as defending a certain meaning they agreed with or not, which changed how they reacted to the vignette. For instance, half of the vignettes were using accurate facts to defend a perspective on the event – pro-Kiev (picked 11 times), neutral (picked 7 times) or pro-Russia (picked 9 times). However, the participants, all rather pro-Kiev, disagreed with the pro-Russia vignette two thirds of the time (6 out of 9), with the neutral one more than half of the time (4 out of 7) and with the pro-Kiev one in only one occasion (out of 11 picks). In their reactions, they also often voiced the different sides of the debate and reacted to them, even when the statement they had just read was neutral. For instance, this is how participant 04 reacted to a statement about the fact that both sides used weapons known to kill civilians:

> I would say okay, but somebody started it! It's one part starting it and Ukrainian people are just defending themselves. […] Ukraine wanted to join *the*[27] European Union and […] the government and Russia didn't want to accept it. And on Maidan, people didn't want to fight, they wanted to defend, in peaceful terms, their point of view. But *the* Ukrainian government, supported by Russians, decided to intervene, and it started.
>
> Participant 04/Vignette 06

[27] None of the participants were native English speakers and the italics indicate passages that were edited for clarity, without altering meaning.

In this excerpt, the participant is not discussing the facts presented in the vignette (she "would say okay") but the implied meaning that both sides are guilty, which is a source of tension. She then argues her case using a very broad narrative, not including factual information but focusing on the intentions and the meaning of the conflict for the different actors involved.

The *Meaning* of the conflict and the vignettes was also used by the participants as a resource for historical reasoning, with three main purposes. First, general meanings were used to frame the situation and to make sense of the discourse of others. For instance, vignette 02 was hard to understand for some participants, who seemed to have missed the general argument of the statement. The vignette was about how separatists in Eastern Ukraine had started to broadcast Russian propaganda to change people's minds. Participant 10, for instance, has a partner who is a journalist working in Eastern Ukraine and who struggled to access some information about the separatists. After reading the vignette, she said: "I think it's a question about free journalism, and what happened to Nemtsov when he was killed". She then goes on to explain that it is very difficult for journalists to know what is going on in Eastern Ukraine, "to be informed in an objective way". After deploring this lack of clear information, saying that it's "very difficult" and "very confusing", she argues that higher forces (like Russia) are controlling the situation anyway, a conclusion she had arrived at already by the end of the previous vignette. Thus, by linking the vignette to the question of free journalism, she uses a general meaning shared by journalists to make sense of the discourse of the other. Then, she solves the tension provoked by the lack of objective information by reframing the situation: obtaining proper information from Eastern Ukraine would be useless anyway, as the situation is controlled by higher forces, elsewhere. This is the second use participants made of *meanings* in historical reasoning: they used them to reframe the situation, disabling the dialogical tension.

Third, *meanings* were used as a 'higher' value to solve tensions between perspectives. For instance. Participant 11 read a statement about a woman in Eastern Ukraine who turned pro Russia because the Ukrainians were attacking them, while the Russians have been helping. And she says:

> There are two voices in me. One is trying to put myself in their position, also as a mother now. I would say […], my God, if it happened to my son, for example. I'd try to survive, so I would lean towards somebody who is actually, you know, showing me a helping hand. So I could in a way understand why they choose Russia. But then, knowing my history side, and what we have gone through and learning from, you know, from books mostly, all from people stories about the past, you know, not always who is smiling and helping you could see now is going

> to be the one who going to stay supportive in the future. […] But […] you know, survival is the first instinct and in the pyramid, the Maslow's pyramid […]. So I guess in this way, you think that Russians are the guys because they help to survive. Whereas pro-Kiev people didn't. So in a way, I would try not to judge.
>
> Participant 11/Vignette 11

In this excerpt, the participant clearly voices the dialogical tension she felt – a regular occurrence in the data – and attempts to solve it. To do so, she uses a meaning she considers of a higher value: the first thing on the Maslow pyramid is survival, and it is thus what is of upmost importance. Her conclusion, then, is that she should not judge the choices of the woman in the vignette.

Two main conclusions on *meaning* can be drawn. First, meanings do not just act as reflections of the subjective perspectives of the participants, but they allow them to locate themselves and their interlocutors in the social field, and to understand what the other is saying by anchoring it to a known social discourse. Linking the vignettes and their own discourses to general perspectives on the conflict not only facilitated comprehension, but also made communication with me, a foreign researcher, possible. Second, as had been long noted by Bartlett (1932), meanings tend to 'stick' to memory more than facts. Participants lacking factual knowledge thus used them to argue for their case, referring to what "people say" (participant 04) when asked to justify their position. Because meanings crystallise and condense the perspectives of generalised others, often in the form of broadly painted stories (as participant 04 used), they are easily understood both by speakers and audiences and they are thus versatile tools to reason about history.

2. Sense

The second category of elements mobilised for historical reasoning was *sense*. *Sense* generally refers to the personal signification taken by an object, shaped by people's unique trajectories (Zittoun, 2017c). However, as was the case for *meanings*, our lives are not populated solely by the *sense* we give to objects, but also by the ones of others – in a dialogical fashion. This is for instance what provoked a tension in the previous excerpt from participant 11: the personal sense the author of the vignette gave to the conflict clashed with the meaning of the events from a Polish perspective. And indeed, the experience-based perspectives proposed in the experiment – introducing the participants to new *senses* of the situation – were often sources of tension for the

participants, who did not dismiss them as easily as they did fact-based ones. Paradoxically, experience-based perspectives were either given a special status – that of being necessarily true from the perspective of the person, although not necessarily objectively true – or dismissed as mere opinions. In the later case, participants only engaged with the meaning of the vignette or with its factual aspects, elements discussed in the previous category or in the next one. In the first case, however, what characterised the participants' reactions was mainly empathy and identification, even when they did not necessarily agree with the general meaning the vignette was supporting. This was, for instance, the case in the reply from participant 11. It can also be seen in the reaction from participant 08 to a vignette from a Russian migrant complaining about how Russians are always presented as the "bad guys", even when the countries condemning them have done terrible things too. And he says:

> Well, I do empathise with the feeling that you're look down upon, and coming from Poland, I get that a lot too. We are not like the villains of history, or Poland gets the same treatment, like you know the Holocaust and famous polish camps that were not polish but were in Poland, but everyone thinks they were Polish because they were in Poland and stuff like that. […] But in this case I can't really sympathise with Russia, I can sympathise with Russians. […] I understand where she's coming from and I wouldn't want her to take it personally, because it's not like I'm judging her, I'm judging the Kremlin so… Those are two separate entities […]. In my reaction to it, I would just want to separate my relation to the person who is saying that and my reaction to the events that are unfolding.
>
> Participant 08/Vignette 13

As with participant 11, it is very important for participant 08 not to judge the perspective of his interlocutor, even if he does not agree with what she says. What he proposes instead is to distinguish between the Russians and Russia, between the individual perspective of this woman and the general meaning of the events for the Kremlin. Although here he uses the state and its government to contrast it with the perspective of an individual, other participants often referred to Putin, albeit in an almost allegoric way: he comes to represent the political and military intentions of his whole country. This re-categorisation of the actors was a frequent strategy for participants when the *sense* proposed in the vignette created a tension with the *meaning* they gave to the situation.

Tensions also arose in the opposite cases, where the *meaning* defended in the vignette clashed with the participants' *sense* of the situation. For instance, participant 09 reacted to the vignette 01, stating that Russia is invading Ukraine, by saying that the international community, and especially the European Union, should really intervene (a meaning shared by many participants). However, she then explained that it made her uncomfortable, because her family experiences with Ukraine in Eastern Poland were catastrophic, and she doesn't think they are good people (sense developed through personal experiences). She concluded that perhaps the European Union should intervene, but she would rather have Poland stay out of it. Here again, a re-categorisation is used, from Poland being part of the EU (she had chosen entering the European Union as a major historical event), to actually stepping down when it involves helping countries with which it has a difficult past.

Personal sense was also used by the participants as a resource to reason about history. First, they used it as an orienting tool, as did participant 09 in the example just above: it gives an emotional value to the situation, that participants tended to particularly trust. Second, it acted as a frame for the situation, as meanings did, especially for participants who seemed to either lack factual knowledge or who struggled to understand the vignettes. For instance, participant 07 is a coach and personal trainer who believes that states cannot protect their populations, and that one should learn to defend oneself. He also defends the idea that a proactive attitude is the only way to "win in life", mixing self-help and survivalism in a unique way, that he explains in the first part of the interview is at the centre of how he lives his life. And it is this personal sense that he uses to respond to each of the vignettes he reads. For example, when reacting to vignette 01, on Russia invading Ukraine, he concludes that it shows that the world is not civilised anymore, implicitly arguing that he is right to believe that states cannot protect their citizens. Later, when he reads a vignette about a woman who fled the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and who is accusing those who stayed of supporting Russia (vignette 12), he replies by saying that she should think for herself, and that none of the people who won in life were conformists.

The third use participants made of *sense* was to take the perspectives of others, as participant 08 and 11 did in the excerpts above. That is, they used the subjective and personal elements of the vignettes to try to put themselves in the position of the other and to evaluate the situation from this perspective. In both cases above, they also identified with the other, although this was not always done when participants used perspective taking. Globally, people's subjective perspective, either the ones of the participants or those of others, played a major role in how the participants reasoned about history. These were given a unique value, in so far as they did not incarnate too directly the interest of a social or national group – Putin's perspectives, for instance, were

strongly rejected, as were the ones of Russian journalists and politicians. These often existed in tension with general meanings held by the different actors. In addition, the analysis of the uses personal sense highlights the strong tension, in historical reasoning, between the collective and the individual, the general and the particular. On the one hand, and although the senses given to the situation are seen as partial and limited, they are given a specific value because they represent the individual perspectives of 'normal' people, whom the participants can identify with. On the other hand, general meanings have a validity given by their consensual nature and the fact that they reflect a more distant perspective on the situation; however, they are often considered to be defending the specific interests of social groups and people in power. Sense and meaning, thus, operate in a dialogical tension that prompts historical reasoning and participate in the construction of new historical representations.

3. Factual Knowledge

The third category of resources and sources of tension for historical reasoning is *factual knowledge*. By *factual knowledge*, I mean objective factual information that exists independently of its interpretation. Of course, knowledge is a discursive construction (Potter, 1996), and what may count as a fact is often open to discussion. But from both an epistemic and an epistemological perspective, certain things, albeit resting on socially constructed conventions, can be considered as objectively true, such as the height of Mount Everest (Searle, 1995), or in our case, the date of the World War II armistice. Its signification can be discussed, either in the form of its meaning or its sense, but it truthfulness has been or can be established.

In the experiment, the factual information read in the vignette often created tensions with the meaning and the sense the participants gave to the situation. It very rarely led to tension with prior knowledge, but this is probably due to the fact that all the information contained in the vignettes was, as much as is possible, correct. However, participants still frequently discussed whether the facts they were reading were true or false, even when they were supporting their position about the situation. The main strategy used was to doubt the quality of the source of the information, wondering where the speakers found the information, if they were trying to manipulate, or if they were influenced by propaganda. People reacted to these sources following what I would call a *proximity paradox*: the closer the source was to the event, the more it was considered a truthful source of information, but also to be potentially biased. And on the contrary, the more a source was distant from the situation, the less biased but also the less

informed it was considered to be. As a result, participants trusted both local populations and the international community the most, but for different reasons and different types of facts. For instance, this is how participant 05 reacted to a vignette where a member of the Russian parliament explained that Crimea was a gift made illegally from the USSR to Ukraine:

> I have no knowledge about that. I wouldn't like to discuss it with someone from the Russian table […] *but* for me it is good to hear what they want to say. However the most important thing is what international community thinks about that. But recently I spoke to one guy from Russia, one from Belarus and […] they were saying that this is not like the media shows, that it is not like the Russians are very aggressive, because also Ukrainians are very aggressive and of course there are so many pro Russia people so it's also obvious, and it cannot be ignored.
>
> Participant 05/Vignette 15

Earlier, however, he had picked a vignette on the referendum in Crimea, where an American journalist stated that 96% of the people in Crimea voted to be part of Russia, and that even though the numbers could be dubious, 60 % of the people who live in Crimea are Russian. The vignette concluded by saying "If the people in Crimea want to be part of Russia, who are we to oppose it?". And he had replied:

> The numbers like 97, 96%, I usually don't believe in such statistics […]. Based on […] my opinion on Russia and their politics, it could happen, the cheating […]. So I would agree… There is also *a* number, which is 60% of people that are pro Russia, there *are so* many other statistics and researchers. I don't know what is the source of such research, such data. But even if there are 96% of the people that are pro Russia, it is not the way that it should be done in the contemporary world.
>
> Participant 05/Vignette 07

While participant 05 doubts the quality of the source in vignette 07, others accused the journalist of being manipulated and spreading propaganda. In the first excerpt, we can see the specific value given to the international community perspective, compared to the statistics coming out of Crimea. In both cases, participant 05 more or less directly challenges the source of the factual information that goes against his representation of the situation – that it is "not the way it should be done". However, by the end of the interview, when he reacts to vignette 15, he has changed

his mind: “there are so many pro Russia people so it's also obvious, and it cannot be ignored”. Interestingly, what makes him change his mind is a conversation with people from Russia and Belarus that he had prior to the interview, and yet had not made him change his mind then. It is possible that the convergence between their perspectives and what he read in the vignettes made him revise his opinion and trust these people, whom he might have found biased at first. This points towards an interesting possibility: there is no real separation between the factual knowledge people may have heard and the sources from which they heard it. People forget, at times, where they have heard some things, but the way the participants in this experiment discussed the sources of information both in the vignette and what they had heard show that the evaluation of the value of the source is part of the fact itself.

Factual knowledge was not just a source of dialogical tension, but was also used as a resource by the participants. First, participants used the knowledge they had of the situation to evaluate what they were reading in the vignettes. For instance, one of the statements referred to the roles of Neo-Nazis supporters in the Maidan movement in Kiev (vignette 16). The two participants who had not heard about this before both doubted the quality of the source, a Russian journalist. The two other participants who picked this vignette had, on the contrary, heard about this before and had checked the information. They both used this as a resource to react to the vignette, agreeing with its content and discussing its consequences. Second, participants used *factual knowledge* to argue for their perspective on the situation. For instance, participant 03 discussed a vignette on the plane crash in Ukraine, that said that there were proofs that Russia had delivered weapons like the ones involved in the crash to the separatists (vignette 8). She agreed with the vignette, and argued that it was probably right because she knew from a friend in Eastern Ukraine that Russia was using propaganda to hide information. Third, participants used *factual knowledge* to evaluate how likely another piece of information was to be true. For example, participant 03 read a vignette on a Crimean Tatar activist, complaining about how both the Ukrainians and the Russians mistreat them and do not respect their human rights. Participant 03 works in inclusive education, and has intercultural experience in the field. Although she did not agree that both sides are equally bad, she made the parallel with how Russia and Ukraine treat children with special needs, and she said:

> I saw that it’s more medical, they are still focusing on what’s wrong from the medical point of view, it’s not the environment, it’s the people. […] It doesn’t matter if *they* [the children] don’t have the same rights. […] So in relation to

> human rights, from the perspective of people with disabilities and special needs kids in education, I think I can see the difference [with Western countries].
>
> Participant 03/Vignette 10

She then concludes that it is very possible that both Russia and Ukraine did not respect human rights in Crimea.

In conclusion, it seems that although people remember *meanings* and *senses* more easily than *factual knowledge*, the latter has a special status. Once its trustworthiness has been established, it provides unambiguous content on which to base historical reasoning and to evaluate the information provided by others. While meaning and sense seem to primarily orient reasoning, factual knowledge gives it content and grounds it in facts that are supposed, for the participants, to be undisputable. However, the separation between facts and the perspective from which they come is artificial, as the role of sources of information shows. Facts, thus, always have the potential to be revised in the light of new evidence, and remain a resource in constant evolution, as the reaction of participant 05 on the vignettes on Crimea showed.

4. Schemas

The last category of elements that acted as a source of tension and a resource for historical reasoning is *schemas*, a notion proposed by Bartlett (1932) and that he explained as follows (p. 200):

> An active organization of past reactions, or of past experiences, which must always be supposed to be operating in any well-adapted organic response. That is, whenever there is any order or regularity of behavior, a particular response is possible only because it is related to other similar responses which have been serially organised, yet which operate, not simply as individual members coming one after another, but as a unitary mass.

Schemas, then, are both the product of the organisation of past experiences and a resource to reason about them. They are flexible, open ended processes that allow people to generate new knowledge from the information available to them (McVee, Dunsmore, & Gavelek, 2005). For the purpose of this analysis, I propose to define *schemas* as any patterned organisation of information that people use to reason about an object, may it be in the form of generalisations,

categorisations, narrative constructions, etc. Although much of schema theory followed Bartlett's idea that they come from past experiences (see Vendler, 1984 for a critique), the literature on history education is exactly based on the idea that such schemas can be taught to children (e.g., van Drie, van Boxtel, Erkens, & Kanselaar, 2005). Thus, there is no reason to believe that people cannot make use of the schemas proposed by others, as we will see in some of the examples below.

In the experiment, *schemas* were a source of tension mainly in one type of circumstances: when some factual information, sense or meaning clashed with the schemas available to the participants. One frequent strategy was to dismiss the new information, as for instance when 05 reads statistics about how many people in Eastern Ukraine supported the separatists (vignette 02). He finds the number too high and thinks it's a lie "because I can't imagine that people in Ukraine are pro-Russia". That is, the new piece of information does not fit within any of his schemas, and he thus cannot imagine it to be true. However, some participants were also confronted with information that did not fit in their schemas and yet that they agreed with, provoking at times important tensions. This was especially the case with the vignette about a Tatar activist (vignette 10). While all four participants who picked it agreed with the perspective of the speaker, doing so was especially problematic for two participants. Indeed, the introduction of the Tatar perspective was problematic because it involved moving away from the national categories they had used to think about the conflict.

Participant 04, for example, after extensively explaining the conflict as an opposition between an aggressor (Russia) and a victim (Ukraine) in previous vignettes, said about the Tatar activist: "It didn't really change their situation, this change of government *in* Crimea. So my answer would be: so why *fight*?" She then struggles to make sense of the conflict, until she compares the situation with the Tatars in Poland, who are a minority there too. Doing so, she realises that actually the conflict is not about minorities, so the Tatars are not really concerned by it. At first, thus, the introduction of a perspective that challenges the categories she had used so far (Russians versus Ukrainian) makes her question the whole point of the conflict. It is only when she introduces the concept of minority by making a comparison with a situation she knows, that she can solve the tension and leave her original narrative undisturbed.

Schemas are also a very important resource for historical reasoning. Participants used a wide range of schemas, including generalisations (e.g., when participant 07 concludes that the Ukrainians need to think for themselves because winners are never conformists), comparisons and analogies (e.g., participant 03 compares the East/West differences in inclusive education to conclude

about the human rights situation of the Tatars), narrative constructions (e.g., participant 04 uses a basic narrative template about aggression to describe the situation in Ukraine), categorisation (e.g., by distinguishing between Russia and the Russians, as participant 08 did when considering the perspective of a Russian migrant) and concepts (e.g., minorities in the example above). These were also often used in combination. For instance, participant 09 read a vignette where the mayor of a small Russian town near Ukraine is accusing the US and the EU of encouraging hate against the Russians, to the point that the Ukrainians started to build a wall at the border, when Ukraine and Russia used to be "sister nations". And she says:

> Unfortunately, I don't agree with this man! […] He *says* that *the* United States, Europe, try to build a wall between Ukraine and Russia […] I do not agree with this because first of all, […] Europe and United States try to help people in Ukraine, military help, and humanitarian help. […] And second […] who was the first *to build* this wall? It's Ukraine or Russia? I think that this is Russia, because they come and […] they punish them for this […], because of *the Ukrainian* situation about *the* European Union.
>
> Participant 09/Vignette 14

In a previous answer, she had explained that Russia is invading Ukraine because the Ukrainians wanted to join the EU, and that international community is not doing anything but it should be helping Ukraine. There is thus a change of narrative here, and it looks like that she borrows the narrative schema she read in the vignette and builds a comparison by reversing all of the roles. This is especially visible in the end, where she arrives at the contradictory conclusion that the Russians are both invading Ukraine ("they come") and building a wall at the border with Ukraine as punishment for attempting to enter the EU, although it would actually play against this invasion. She thus follows these schemas to the end, using two different resources, one proposed by the 'interlocutor' (the speaker in the vignette) and one she constructs in her reply.

In conclusion, schemas are versatile, flexible tools that people mobilise to organise the information available to them when they engage in historical reasoning. They can be more or less concrete – from specific and specialised concepts to vague narrative frames – and can be used in combination. As with the previous categories, and in spite of how they have often been considered in psychology (Wagoner, 2013), they are not a static structure but an active process. They are also particularly powerful resources for historical reasoning because they crystallise past reasoning – through their "patterns", as Bartlett proposed in his definition of schemas – either

from oneself or from others. Indeed, historical concepts, narrations, common analogies, etc. are the product of historical reasoning and can be shared with others who may in turn use them. As such, schemas act in historical reasoning as cultural, social and cognitive resources that allow people to produce and share historical knowledge.

H. Conceptualising Historical Reasoning

A conceptual model of historical reasoning and the emergence of new historical representations can now be proposed, based on the findings presented above. To start, a brief summary of the multiple functions of each element within the analysis is necessary.

First, it was found that *meanings*, the general signification given to the situation by different groups, play a central role to position actors, speakers and audiences within the social field, and that they provide a frame and give value to the situation. They allow people to socially locate discourses and to communicate with others. Second, *senses*, as personal perspectives on history, were shown to help participants orient their responses to the discourses of others – through personal values, emotions and empathy – and to help them take the perspectives of others. This is in part because they are associated to 'real' and 'normal' people, instead of social groups and those who represent them and their interests. *Meanings* and *senses*, thus, represent 'subjective' perspectives on the situation – in singular (sense) or in plural (meaning) – which people construct and interact with in order to reason about history.

Third, the analysis showed that *factual knowledge* provides both content and an unambiguous basis for historical reasoning. Indeed, although what 'counts' as a fact is constructed in discourse and through social practices, it does not mean that facts do not exist either from an epistemological or an epistemic standpoint. What the study showed is that people are aware of the perspectival nature of social reality, but use what they consider to be undisputed facts as a resource to defend subjective perspectives on the situation. However, factual knowledge remains open to change, both because its signification is never fully settled and because it remains associated to a source whose trustworthiness can always be questioned. Fourth, *schemas* were found to play a central role in organising information, using semi-abstract patterns, such as narrative frames, and bringing together the different elements of historical reasoning. As such, they are both the basis and outcome of historical reasoning. That is, they both allow for it to happen, by providing flexible frames to organise and produce knowledge, and can be the result of historical reasoning, where patterns are extracted from historical representations through historical reasoning.

Moreover, *schemas* can be communicated with others, for instance in the shape of historical concepts or categories.

Factual knowledge and *schemas* represent, in opposition to *meanings* and *senses*, the 'objective' side of historical reasoning. Namely, they are an attempt to capture the situation from a 'bird-eye view'. This is not to say that *schemas* and *facts* exist independently from the perspective from which they are constructed or used, but that they are mobilised in an attempt to transcend such subjectivity. Historical reasoning exists in the tension between these 'objective' and 'subjective' perspectives on the past, that both participate in historical representations. A second tension can be found between 'general' and 'particular' resources. One the one hand, *meanings* and *schemas* provide general perspectives on the situation, by crystallising past experiences, regrouping multiple perspectives and organising information. On the other hand, *senses* and *factual knowledge* offer particular information about the situation and personal perspectives on it. They provide the specific content of an historical representation but are also justifications and illustrations for general perspectives. This second tension is also fundamental for historical reasoning, as both the 'general' and the 'particular' participate in the construction of historical representations.

Figure 6-1 summarises the model of historical reasoning outlined above. Each of the elements from the analysis represents a 'pole' of reasoning, separated from the other by lines of tension (in grey) between the general and the particular and between subjective and objective perspectives. These elements are connected by arrows (in black) that represent the interdependencies between them. The text in grey summarises how they have been used as resources for each other in the data: for instance, sense was used to give value to historical knowledge, while facts were used to provide an undisputable basis to the meaning given to the situation. The sources and resources of historical reasoning thus constitute a system of knowledge composed of flexible, malleable and interdependent elements. Because these elements exist in tension with each other, this is a dynamic and open-ended system that always has the potential to lead to the emergence of new representations when new perspectives and facts are introduced. Yet, it also includes the crystallisation of past historical reasoning – either from oneself or from others. Thus, it reflects both the constructive and historical aspects of reasoning: novelty can always emerge, but it never starts completely anew.

Presenting these elements in isolation, as noted earlier, is of course an analytical move: using an analogy, for instance, does not mean using only a schema but also building parallels between facts or perspectives. Narratives are probably the best illustrations of how these elements represent dimensions of reasoning and not entities, as a story can easily refer to all four of them at the same time. Studies of historical reasoning, thus, should include explorations of the

different processes that build on the four elements of the model and are dynamically involved in the emergence of new representations. This will be the object of a subsequent paper (see section II).



Figure 6-1 Sources of tension and resources for historical reasoning

I. Conclusion

In this paper I introduced a new 'sub-field' for collective memory research – historical reasoning, which focuses on the construction and use of historical representations – and proposed a conceptual model for it. Contrary to most of the work done on collective memory, it focuses on how individuals think about history, not how groups produce and maintain social

representations of history. And contrary to most theories on historical remembering, it is not primarily interested in memory, but it considers that people rely on a multitude of processes to think about the past. As such, it conceptualises historical reasoning as everyday thinking oriented towards the collective past, and it represents a new and complementary field of study for collective memory. In addition, this article presented a methodological innovation, in the form of a qualitative dialogical experiment, in order to study historical reasoning. Although it was especially designed for this purpose, it could be successfully used to study any psychological processes taking place at the intersection between the personal and the social.

The aim of this paper was to look at what types of ruptures and changes provoke the emergence of new representations, through what processes and with was consequences. First, the analysis showed that new perspectives or information lead to historical reasoning when they are not dismissed immediately and when they provoke dialogical tensions. Second, it highlighted how people use multiple elements – meanings, senses, factual knowledge and schemas – to produce complex thinking about history, a point that deserves future exploration. Third, it showed that historical reasoning allows for the integration of the new information and the resolution of the tension, with multiple consequences. These include reframing situation, revising facts, including new perspectives, or developing a new representation of history in general – a new metamemory (see Chapter 5) – with, for example, a participant concluding the experiment by saying that actually, history is made of multiple perspectives and not just of 'right' and 'wrong' ones.

More globally, this paper looked at how historical representations that diverge from the 'mainstream' narratives are produced. What historical reasoning shows, however, is that discourses on the past are never fully new – they rely on past experiences and on the discourses of others – and yet never entirely a repetition of previous ones. Emergence, thus, is a characteristic of historical reasoning. What the conceptual model proposed here helps us do is map what are the sources and resources for historical reasoning in order to better understand how people think about history, no matter how biased their conclusions may be. And hopefully this could help us, in turn, understand how to encourage reflexivity both in history education and in society at large. The role of collective memory in the current context – the 'post-truth' era of alternative facts (Higgins, 2016) – makes it a very timely endeavour.

II. Processes of Historical Reasoning (Paper 5)

Article submitted as:
de Saint-Laurent, C. (Submitted). Collective memory beyond memory: Psychosocial processes in historical reasoning. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science*.

A. Abstract

Collective memory is often studied as the one-sided, biased representation of history, which underpins many nationalist discourses. This paper, on the contrary, starts from the premise that this only one aspect of collective memory and proposes to explore how historical representations are not only constructed, but also challenged and transformed. First, I propose the notion of historical reasoning and argue that studying its processes requires moving beyond memory. Second, I present a model of historical reasoning and apply it to the study of a qualitative and dialogical experiment, where participants are confronted to different perspectives on a collective event. Third, I present the twelve processes that were found in the data, and I conclude that historical reasoning relies on both 'objective' and 'subjective' aspects. Finally, I discuss some of the potential consequences of this model for the field of collective memory.

B. Introduction

References to collective memory abound in the public sphere, from the latest museum exhibit to politicians using – and often abusing – allusions to the historical past. And when collective memory is mobilised for political purposes, either by public figures or lay citizens, it is often in a rather caricatural manner: facts have little importance over the glorification of a past that often never existed as such. Creating a narrative that will support national identity and present the group in the best of lights – while ideally painting the other as less advanced, civilised or peaceful – often seems to be the main function of collective memory (e.g., J. H. Liu & Hilton, 2005). Concrete examples of this can be found everywhere, as one quick look into the world of Internet comments easily shows. In the months preceding Brexit, for instance, the comments below, posted for online articles, were full of references to the 'EUSSR' or the 'Nazi European Union'

(de Saint-Laurent et al., 2017). See, for instance, this Guardian comment thread published a few days before the vote:

> User 1: The EU is a bad idea implemented fraudulently and waste fully. It's the USSR of the 21st century.

What followed this rather polite version of the EUSSR argument is, however, much more interesting:

> User 2: The USSR subjegated the whole of Eastern Europe by military force, brutally crushing revolts in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It also sent millions of its own citizens to the Gulag. How is this similar to the EU?
>
> Delusional.
>
> User 3: […] A better comparison might be the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a sclerotic, bumbling, bureaucratic organisation which never inspired much affection among its subjects – but which everyone missed terribly once it was gone.
>
> User 4: I think the Austro-Hungarian Empire had similarities to the European Union, but was also rather similar to the United Kingdom.

What is interesting here is not just that the comparison proposed by User 1 is contested, but that the participants in the conversation that follows actively reason about whether the comparison is valid and what alternatives would be a better fit. This level of discussion is not a unique occurrence, especially when users of online forums discuss historical analogies, as we have seen in other studies (Glăveanu & de Saint-Laurent, in press; Glăveanu, de Saint-Laurent, & Literat, submitted). Yet, cases like this one remain to be studied, begging the question: what do people actually do when they construct, discuss or contest representations of history? While studies of collective memory have shed light, for instance, on the social and intergroup dynamics of historical representations and their links to identity (e.g., Kulyk, 2011; J. H. Liu et al., 1999; Schmidtke, 2005), they have devoted very little attention to the processes underlying historical representations (Kansteiner, 2002), especially when individual accounts diverge from the socially and culturally prevalent narratives (Kansteiner, 2010). However, understanding how people construct representations of history, and more specifically how they come to contest hegemonic narratives, is both a theoretical and societal necessity. First, no theory of collective memory can

be complete without an account of how it is both constructed and contested. Second, the rise of new nationalisms, supported by national myths and popular rewritings of history (de Saint-Laurent et al., 2017), encourages us to explore how these narratives are resisted and with what resources.

In this article, I thus propose to explore the processes through which historical representations are constructed, maintained, contested and transformed. First, I present the notion of historical reasoning, and argue that studying the production of collective memory requires moving beyond the notion of memory. I then apply this concept to the study of a dialogical and qualitative experiment, in which participants were asked to interact with different perspectives on a recent conflict. Three categories of processes found in the data are then presented and illustrated with examples, showing the importance, in historical representations, of both 'objective' and 'subjective' dimensions. Finally, I present some of the consequences of this model for the field of collective memory.

C. Historical Reasoning

How to understand the construction, maintenance, transformation, and confrontation of historical representations? To answer this question, I have, elsewhere (see section I), proposed the notion of historical reasoning as both a process and a field of study. Before presenting in more details the model of historical reasoning that was developed, and how this paper proposes to expend on it, it is important to first discuss why such a concept may be useful. First, historical reasoning can be considered as a sub-field of study within collective memory. This is because the term collective memory is polysemous and covers a multitude of phenomena, from family memory (e.g., Welzer et al., 2013), to representations of history (e.g., Nicholson, 2017), and from the study of the social dynamics of our memory (e.g., Coman et al., 2009) to the study of the memory of social events (e.g., Awad, 2017). While these phenomena are interrelated – they all participate in the way we understand and remember the past – they do not all designate the same phenomenon and deserve to be studied in their own right. Being able to distinguish between them through of a more differentiated terminology would also mean being able to debate about them without confusions – and thus ensuring that we are, indeed, talking about the same thing – and propose theoretical and empirical advances that reflect best the object we are trying to study.

Second, the term collective memory implies that the main process underlying these phenomena is memory. While it is likely to be the case for some forms of collective memory – such as the

forms that have studied how social interactions shape how we recall recent collective events (Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012) – this is much less likely in the case of historical representations. Indeed, while representing World War II or even the French Revolution may mean, in some cases, relying on family memory, studying the construction of these historical representations as the result of memory processes would considerably narrow one's perspective on the topic. Thus, understanding how historical representations are constructed, maintained, and contested means moving *beyond* memory, which is what I propose to do with the term historical reasoning. It is intended as an umbrella term that covers all the processes by which one may construct historical representations. The aim of this paper, then, is to explore which processes exactly it involves.

The term of historical reasoning is borrowed from history education (e.g., Monte-Sano & Paz, 2012; van Drie & van Boxtel, 2007), where it has been used to study how children think (or more exactly, ought to think) about history. Because it has a rather normative aspect – as it designates how children should think about the past to be good amateur historians (e.g., van Boxtel & van Drie, 2004) – its scope a narrower than how the term is used in this paper (see definition below). However, it provides a good basis to study how people think about history because its premise is that people can rationally discuss history, and are not just repeating biased and self-serving narratives about the past (see section I). It is thus a good starting point to study how people construct historical representations, and through which processes.

I have proposed to define historical reasoning as "the process by which historical representations of the collective past are constructed, maintained, contested and challenged", where historical representations are "a system of values, ideas and practices about history that enables people to give meaning to it and to communicate about it" (section I, p. 170). This definition borrows from the theory of social representations (Moscovici, 1973), as many of its aspects remain relevant for historical reasoning. One particular issue is especially interesting for our purposes: the dialogical nature of social representations (Marková, 2003). Namely, social representations are organised around basic thematic oppositions that exist in social discourses (Marková, 2000), for instance between authority/democracy or health/sickness (Billig et al., 1988), and that generate social thinking (Marková, 2000). Indeed, social representations exist in tension with their alternative, and they always have the potential to be contested (Gillespie, 2008). From the perspective of collective memory, this means that glorifying the past, defending national myths, or denying past deeds all exist in a tension with alternative perspectives – for instance, with alternatives narratives which may not show one's social group in the best light (see Chapter 4). These dialogical tensions are what fuels historical reasoning and they have the potential to lead

to the emergence of new historical representations. A previous study has explored theses tensions in more details, and they are presented below (see also section I).



Figure 6-2 Historical reasoning: resources and sources of tensions (adapted from section I)

Indeed, the conditions that lead people to reason about history and the resources they used to do so (see section I) were explored in a previous paper, which resulted in the model presented in Figure 6-2. In this model, historical reasoning is provoked by and uses four different components of historical representations: *meaning*, *sense*, *factual knowledge* and *schemas*. *Meaning* and *sense* refer to the signification given to an object from a 'subjective' perspective. *Meaning* refers to significations assumed to be shared with others (Zittoun, 2017c) or by a group of people, and thus correspond, in historical reasoning, to the perspective of social groups on the historical event under consideration. For instance, the *meaning* given to the French Revolution is often that of the beginning of the French democratic state (see Chapter 4), a *meaning* commonly found in France. *Sense*, on the contrary, refers to the personal signification of an object (Zittoun, 2017c), and thus to singular perspectives on history. Events like World War II have different meanings for different social groups (crystallised, for instance, in opposing social representations), but each of their members may also give it a personal sense (developed, for example, through personal experiences and family narratives).

Factual knowledge refers to all "objective factual information that exists independently of its interpretation" (see section I, p. 179), while *schemas* designate the patterns used to organise the information and reason about an object, from narrative templates to categorisations. Directly borrowed from Bartlett, this conception of schemas considers them as culturally and socially shared resources people employ to adapt previous knowledge to the constraints of the present situation (Bartlett, 1932; Wagoner, 2013). A frequent form of schema, in historical reasoning, is the narrative template (Wertsch, 2008) or the historical charter (J. H. Liu & Hilton, 2005), which both refer to the recurrence of broad story lines in the collective memory of social groups and have long been an object of study. While *meanings* and *senses* reflect the 'subjective' aspects of historical reasoning, *schemas* and *factual knowledge* represent an *attempt* to construct an 'objective' perspective on the situation, although knowledge is always constructed from a subject's perspective. Thus, 'objective' here, and throughout this paper, should not be taken as a quality certain perspectives can have, which would make them undisputable and free of any subjectivity, but as the attempt to create a bird eye view perspective on the situation.

Historical reasoning, then, exists at the intersection between (at least) two dialogical tensions. First, there is a tension between what is considered to be the 'objective truth' and subjective perspectives, which is often at the heart of the distinctions made between history and collective memory (de Saint-Laurent et al., 2017) and is also present in everyday discourses about the collective past. Second, there is a tension between the general and the particular: between specific, unique, perspectives and facts on the one hand; and schemas and meanings, on the other hand, that can be generalised or used for events across times and places. The notions of charters (J. H. Liu & Hilton, 2005) and narrative templates (Wertsch, 2008) both echo this tendency towards generalisation, for instance, through the use of general story lines to cover multiple events and periods. On the other side, the fascination for the singular stories of victims reflects a pervasive interest for individual, unique perspectives.

These four elements of historical reasoning are here presented as discrete entities, when they are of course deeply related: how to construct a narrative that has no meaning and relies on no factual information, for instance? While at a theoretical level they can be discussed separately, at an empirical level they would be better defined as dimensions of discourse, and this how they are going to be used in the rest of this paper. Using this model of historical reasoning as a starting point, I now propose to go back to our original question: through what processes are historical representations constructed, maintained, contested and transformed? That is, the model introduced here presented the main elements of historical reasoning and the tensions around

which it is organised, but how are these elements combined, transformed, mobilised, confronted to produce historical representations?

D. A Dialogical Experiment

In order to answer this question, a qualitative dialogical experiment was designed. Qualitative experiments follow the same principle as their quantitative counterparts, introducing a stimulus and recording the response, but operate with the assumption that neither can or should be quantified (Wagoner, 2009). The data collected is thus analysed using qualitative methods. This experiment also included a dialogical component, using dialogical tensions – opposing elements – in order to provoke historical reasoning. In this case, participants from Poland were confronted with different perspectives on an on-going conflict with deep historical ramifications: the Ukrainian conflict. The types of perspective they were introduced to were chosen based on a previous study that had explored the *'trajectories of remembering'* of artists and intellectuals who had come to resist hegemonic representations of history (see Chapter 5). The vignettes presented to the participants, based on newspapers articles, thus included factual and subjective experiences, and were divided between neutral and partisan perspectives (pro-Kiev or pro-Russia, see section I, for a full description). The participants were chosen using a Historically Structured Sampling (Valsiner & Sato, 2006) that selects participants based on theoretical considerations instead of issues of representativity. In this case, the Polish sample was selected because of its proximity with the Ukrainian conflict: close enough so that issues of identity and historical issues would be salient, but distant enough so that there would be no major or additional ethical concern with the use such an experimental procedure.

The experiment was divided in two parts: in the first part, the participants were asked to chose the three historical events that were, for them, the most important, and to explain why. They were told that they were free to chose any event of their liking, independent of its temporal and spatial distance (that is, it could be a national event or not, and it could have taken place before or after their birth). Subsequent questions aimed at uncovering whether the participants' perspectives had changed in the past, what was their general relation to history, what type of resources they tended to use and with whom they had discussed these events. In the second part, the participants had to pick different vignettes (usually around four out of 16) representing different perspectives on the Ukrainian conflict. After each vignette, they were asked what they would reply to that perspective, what they would think and why. Eleven people took part in the

experiment, which lasted on average 75 minutes, picking a total of 37 events and 47 vignettes. The data collected – audio recordings – was then transcribed and coded using Nvivo. Three series of codes were then applied to the data. The two first series, focusing on the participants reactions to the vignettes (*sources of tension*) and the elements mobilised in their responses (*resources*) were used and analysed to construct the model of historical reasoning briefly presented in Figure 6-2. The third series of codes, the one discussed in this paper, focused on the processes mobilised by the participants to reason about the collective past, such as narrative construction, generalisation or perspective taking. These codes were informed both by the data and theories on reasoning, collective memory, and social thinking, using an iterative method. The processes found are thus not meant to be exhaustive, but to reflect the main processes used by the participants to reason about history in the experiment.

E. Processes of Historical Reasoning

Twelve processes were found in the data, presented in Table 6-2. For each process, a brief definition and an example are provided, taken from the second part of the experiment (when the participants had to react to the vignettes). The analysis showed that there was no difference, in terms of historical reasoning, between collective events that took place before the participants' birth and recent events that would not yet, perhaps, qualify as history. The last column indicates the estimated relative frequency of each process: as the participants mobilised multiple processes to react to the statements, and used each of them in a more or less prominent way to construct their answer, it is impossible to fully quantify them. The last column of the table thus reflects the number of times each process was predominantly used to react to a vignette (Low: 5 times or less; Average: from 6 to 10; High: more than 10 times). The processes are grouped in three categories, depending on the types of perspectives they *tend* to construct and manipulate: subjective (oriented towards personal perspectives, values, emotions, and significations), objective (oriented towards factual information, patterned organisation, and formalisation) and transversal (bringing both 'objective' and 'subjective' elements together). These are not, however, fixed nor exclusive categories.

In what follows, I propose to discuss in more detail interrelated processes from two categories above: analogies and generalisations on the one hand, and imagination, identification, and perspective taking on the other. The processes belonging to the last category have either been largely discussed in the literature already (narrative construction, see for instance Brockmeier,

2002; Wertsch, 2008) or in a previous paper (source monitoring, see section I). The analysis focuses on uncovering and discussing the processes (Table 6-2) with the help of the elements of historical reasoning presented in Figure 6-2.

Table 6-2. Processes of historical reasoning

Process	Definition	Example	Frequency
Processes oriented towards the construction and manipulation of **subjective** perspectives			
Perspective taking	Imagining oneself in the position of the other	"[I am] trying to put myself in their position […] I try to always imagine, my god, if it happened to my son!"	Average
Judgement of value	Evaluating the moral value of someone's actions/perspective	"Involving civilians in war it's *dis*honourable"	Average
Identification	Identifying with the experience of the other	"I do empathise with the feeling that you're looked down upon, and coming from Poland, I get that a lot too."	Low
Reflexivity	Looking at one's own perspective from the position of the other	"One side is definitely the aggressor by now! […] But [what I'm saying] is not something that would hold in court"	Low
Imagination	Constructing a representation of a remote scene or using as if thinking	"Ok, let's do it, […] let's do a kind of a poll, […] and say the two of us we like Denmark, so this zone will be part of Denmark. So see, this is not the way it should work!"	Low
Processes oriented towards the construction and manipulation of **objective** perspectives			
Generalisation	Abstracting common properties from different instances	"I never met anyone who thought Russia is good"	High
Comparison /analogy	Estimating the similarities or differences between two events, situations or perspectives	"I don't understand why one country can just go to another country and say this is our region […] because *of* history. […] For example *a* big part of Ukraine was *Polish* before the war. But […] the situation has changed […] and we don't have any rights to want *them back*."	High

Process	Definition	Example	Frequency
Categorisation	Organising or *re*-organising events or actors into significant categories	"I can't really sympathise with Russia, I can sympathise with the Russians. [What] I'm saying is […] those are two separate entities"	Average
Conceptualisation	Constructing or using a general abstract idea to explain or analyse events or actors	"It seems it's always about money. And I didn't realise that in Donetsk […] they have valuable *resources* or something, and it's the strategy, to show that Russia still *has* power"	Low
Normative logic	Using the rules of formal logic (e.g., inference) or referring to normative rules to reach a conclusion	"Taking the point of view that every person has the right to say where they want to be, and usually it is the majority who decides, then the rest either stays and accept the majority decision, or they probably have to move away […] That would probably be the common sense view!"	Low
Processes oriented towards the construction and manipulation of **transversal** perspectives			
Source monitoring	Evaluating the value of source of information (linking factual information to an individual or collective perspective)	"First *thing I* thought… *what* I want to know is from *what* place *did* this journalist *get* this information?"	High
Narrative construction	Using a narrative frame to describe an event (bringing together schemas, subjective perspectives and/or factual knowledge).	"Ukraine wanted to join *the* European Union and […] the government and Russia didn't want to accept it. And on Maiden, people […] wanted to defend, in peaceful terms, their point of view. But *the* Ukrainian government, supported by Russians, decided to intervene, and it started."	Average

1. Analogies and Generalisations

Two of the processes participants used the most were analogies and generalisations. An analogy compares a source with a usually less-known target in order to infer information about the later (Holyoak, 2005). In the case of historical reasoning, it meant that the participants compared an

event they wanted either to evaluate or they knew little about, with a well-know source, usually taken from Polish history. As for generalisations, they refer to the deduction of common properties between different instances. In the study, it meant that the participants compared different stories about the past to extract generalities either about specific countries or human behaviour at large. Both processes, then, were used to make links between different periods and to evaluate the present situation. As such, they often relied on schemas, representing the tendency towards generalisation and the attempt at objectivity. On a few occasions, they were also used together, as in the following example. In this excerpt, participant 04 reacts to a vignette where a member of the Russia Parliament explains that Crimea was a gift given illegally to Ukraine by the USSR, and that it had been Russian for two centuries before that. And here is what she says:

> If we *were*[28] to look *at* what was given, according to our modern vision of *the* law and what *is* illegal, we should completely change the map of Europe, because also in Poland we have such places like for example Wroclaw, *which used to be* Breslau. It was a German city for centuries, I think. And after the war it was given to Poland. Also *the* Germans may think now it was illegal, and they lost their houses. They lost everything, they had, for example, 10 hours to leave, rush up and *go*. And people from other parts of Poland, for example Lwów and Vilnius were given to Russia at that time then to Lithuania. And they were Polish before, we lost these *lands* […] We should give back Wroclaw again to Germany and take Lwów and Vilnius? And there are many places like this on our map, because it was kind of *an* artificial decision, one moment. And we live with this, we don't fight and *the* Germans don't come to kill us. […] We all in Europe live *with*, especially this part of Europe, Eastern Europe, central Europe, we live *with* uncomfortable divisions of our map. And also, former Yugoslavia, it's the same. Somebody had to decide it's the border here or here or here, and we live with this because we appreciate the peace and the collaboration. And I know Crimea is beautiful part of Ukraine, Russia […] but I don't see a reason to fight for it. I would like to think the borders are final and we don't fight about it any more.

[28] Italics, here and in Table 6-2, indicate that the quote was edited for English (with no alteration of meaning and only where it seemed necessary to facilitate understanding).

In this excerpt, participant 04 makes an analogy between Crimea and the complicated history of Poland's borders, a frequent occurrence in the data. To build her analogy, she uses a very basic narrative frame (*schema*) to draw parallels between different events: part(s) of a country is(are) given to another one because someone decided to change the border. This allows her to compare a chapter of the Polish history she knows well (*factual knowledge*) with the current situation in Crimea. Building the narrative about the history of Poland, she then refers to the subjective perspectives of those who had to leave (*sense*) to highlight that it was difficult for the local population, but yet that none of the countries involved now think it is illegal (*meaning*) or comes to attack the other (*factual knowledge*). From this, she constructs a generalisation: it is actually the whole of Central and Eastern Europe that lives with difficult borders. And yet, none of them complain, because they prefer peace and collaboration (*meaning*). This leads her to conclude that Russia has no reason or justification to claim Crimea.

Analogies and generalisations, thus, make use of the different elements of historical representations to reason about both the past and the present. They participate in the creation of new historical representations – for instance here the representation that history left more than half of Europe with an 'uncomfortable map' – in this case to solve the tension between historical and current ownership of the land. This can, in turn, be crystallised in a resource for future historical reasoning. In the example above, when participant 04 generalises about borders in Europe, she then proposes another example (former Yugoslavia), using the *schema* she has just produced. Finally, and although both analogies and generalisations also make use of subjective perspectives on the situation, these processes are oriented towards the production of an 'objective perspective'. While its objectivity can be debated, the term reflects here the attempt to transcend one's own subjective perspective and to reach an undisputable conclusion, conversely to the next example.

2. Imagination, Identification, and Perspective Taking

Imagination, identification and perspective taking were relatively less frequent in the data than analogies and generalisation. However, they were common in the first part of the interview (where participants had to describe historical events that were important to them) and still played an important role in the second part, where participants used them principally to engage with the perspective of the author of the vignette. All three terms have been the object of extensive research, although rarely in connection to collective memory, but this is beyond the scope of this

paper (see Chapter 7 for a discussion of imagination and collective memory; see de Saint-Laurent & Glăveanu, in press; Glăveanu & de Saint-Laurent, submitted, for a discussion of identification and perspective taking). For the purpose of this paper, we can define imagination as the process of engaging with alternative or future possibilities (as if and future thinking), which include imagining oneself in scenes or events of the past (imagining what it would have been liked to be there). As for identification and perspective taking, the former can be defined as the process of finding similarities between oneself and others, and the latter as imagining being in the place of the other, that is attempting to see the world from their perspective. All three processes are thus intersubjective – they emerge at the interaction between the perspectives of different subjects (Gillespie & Cornish, 2010) – and deeply interrelated. Perspective taking, for instance, can encourage identification by making one realise that self and other would behave similarly in the same situation. Similarly, identification and imagination can support perspective taking, as in the excerpt below. In this segment, participant 11 is reacting to a vignette where a woman in Eastern Ukraine explains that the Ukrainians have been bombing them and killing their children, while the Russians brought humanitarian help. The author of the vignette then explains that she now supports the Russians, a position none of the participants agreed with, although many expressed it only indirectly, as was the case with participant 11. Here is how she reacts:

> There are two voices in me. One is trying to put myself in their position, also as a mother now. I would say, obviously thinking of survival, […] I haven't been in that, fortunately, but I try to always imagine, my God, if it happened to my son, for example. I'd try to survive, so I would lean towards somebody who is actually, you know, showing me a helping hand. So I could in a way understand why they choose Russia. But then, knowing my history side, and what we have gone through and learning from, you know, from books mostly, all from people stories about the past […] not always who is smiling and helping you could see now is going to the one who going to stay supportive in the future. […]. But then you're left alone, and if you have no help, no support, no bandages, no food for your children, what do you do? So the history shows, you know, survival is the first instinct and in the pyramid, the Maslow's pyramid, you know, the physiological needs are the first ones you have to have to actually continue living and go to the top of the pyramid. So I guess in this way, you think that *the* Russians are the guys because they help to survive. Whereas pro-Kiev people didn't. So in a way, I would try not to judge.

In this excerpt, participant 11 starts by voicing the dialogical tension – as other participants did on a few occasions. Although she does not express it directly, the tension seems to be between the perspective of the woman in vignette (*sense*) and the impossibility, for the participant, to see Russia as helping (a *meaning* shared by almost all the participants and having its roots, as is shown in the excerpt above, in their representations of Polish history). To solve this tension, she first tries to take the perspective of the woman in the vignette, through both identification ("as a mother now") and imagination ("if it happened to my son"). The *sense* of the situation she hereby constructs matches the one of the Ukrainian woman, so that she "could in a way understand". However, this clashes with both what she read in books about history (*factual knowledge*) and the general idea that "not always who is smiling and helping… stay[s] supportive in the future" (*meaning*). This seems to be, indirectly, a reference to Russia's behaviour towards Poland at the end of World War II: while the Polish communist narrative presented the USSR as the saviour of Poland at the end of the war, post-communist narratives have insisted on events like the Warsaw Uprising, in 1944, that was crushed by the Germans while the Russian army decided not to intervene. Although participant 11 insists, throughout the interview, on remaining neutral about Russia, she did choose, in the first part of the interview, the Warsaw Uprising as one of the most important historical event for her. This generalisation can thus also be read, perhaps, as an attempt to avoid looking biased or judgmental. This statement, however, leaves participant 11 still torn between the two positions ("but then you're left alone"), and it is the introduction of a new concept that solves the tension by placing survival as the highest value. Thus, although she clearly does not agree with the woman in the vignette, she can understand her behaviour and, to a certain extent, accept that it does not fit with her general understanding of the situation.

Imagination, identification, and perspective taking, thus, make use and bring together the different elements of historical representations in order to produce and evaluate 'subjective' perspectives. However, it does also participate in 'objective' perspectives, if anything because, as the analysis showed, the different processes of historical reasoning are deeply intertwined. Indeed, although they have proved to be useful analytical categories – both here and in the many studies that have explored them outside of collective memory – these are not exclusive categories in any way: generalisations, for instance, often rest on categorisations of actors, while a good narrative construction will usually involve at least a bit of imagination. This also means that no single process can be designated as more prototypical of historical reasoning, or as producing more 'accurate' results – a normative ideal that is clearly incompatible with the dialogical epistemology underlying my discussion of historical reasoning (contrasting with how the term is used in history education, e.g., van Drie & van Boxtel, 2007). What this implies, moreover, is that

the list of processes proposed in Table 6-2 is not exhaustive: historical reasoning is open-ended, and people make use of 'whatever' resources and processes are available to them in order to face the demands of the current situation and (temporarily) resolve the dialogical tensions they are confronted with.

These two examples also show the importance of both 'objective' and 'subjective' aspects in historical reasoning. That is, they illustrate how historical reasoning relies both on processes more typically associated with the classic idea of reasoning (e.g., generalisations) and intersubjective processes for which collective memory if often accused of being biased (e.g., identification). However, both in the examples above and in the rest of the data, there was no direct link between the use of 'objective' perspectives and more complex or open reasoning, quite the contrary: participants using imagination, perspective taking and identification tended to be more reflexive and more open to the position of the other, even when they did not agree with the authors of the vignettes. The role of intersubjectivity and imagination in the construction of historical representations, then, deserves to be studied further.

F. Conclusion

In this article, I explored the processes by which historical representations are produced and challenged, regrouped under the heading of *historical reasoning* and based on two premises. First, people interact with a multitude of perspectives and representations about the past, which are often at odds with each other. This both creates tensions that motivate historical reasoning and provides the basis for the creation of alternative historical representations. That is, historical reasoning, as any form of everyday thinking, is profoundly dialogical (Marková, 2003). Second, the (main) process that underlies historical reasoning is not remembering and, as such, studying the construction of historical representations involves moving *beyond* memory. As this study has shown, people use a multitude of processes to reason about history, and there is still much to be done to understand how people think about history and mobilise historical representations.

This paper has four concluding observations to make in this regard. First, collective memory as a concept has become far too polysemous, and it now represents more a field of study than a theory about a specific phenomenon. As a result, researchers should clarify what object they are trying to study and to which phenomena their conclusions are applied to, avoiding arguments about the 'true' nature of collective memory. Second, the discussion on collective memory should be open to new concepts, borrowed from relevant fields, beyond memory,

representations, and identity. Here, reasoning was taken from the fields of education (e.g., van Drie & van Boxtel, 2007), cognitive psychology (e.g., Holyoak & Morrison, 2005) and sociocultural psychology (e.g., Bruner, 1990), but other 'imports' from social psychology (e.g., on attribution) or discursive psychology (e.g., on knowledge construction) could prove extremely useful. Third, new methods of study should be devised to investigate the different aspects of collective memory and go beyond unilateral discourses produced about single events. The dialogical nature of historical representations, as well as the fact that historical reasoning uses connections made between temporally and spatially distance events (as in analogies and generalisations), means that we need methods that are also able to capture these dimensions of the phenomenon. With this purpose in mind, a dialogical experiment was constructed as an illustration of a methodological innovation.

Last but not least, we need to pay closer attention to what people actually do with collective memory (de Saint-Laurent, 2017), and not just to the content of historical representations. This pragmatist approach (James, 1922) would solve, I believe, much of the debate about what 'counts' as collective memory, by focusing on the empirical differences it makes. In the study presented here, for instance, there was no pragmatic difference in historical reasoning between recent and distant collective events, and they were thus analysed together – which is not to say, of course, that there is no difference in other contexts. Taking on a pragmatist approach would also insure that we do not reify certain types of collective memory (namely the one that encourages nationalism and racism) by overly focusing on them, while overlooking other aspects (historical reasoning) that could actually help us challenge the more negative consequences of collective memory (de Saint-Laurent et al., 2017).

Coming back to the first example in this paper, we should go beyond the discourse of the first Internet user – on the 'EUSSR' – to study how it is challenged and contested by others. We should also pay closer attention to what they are actually doing in the situation: they are not merely reasoning about history, but, more importantly perhaps, they are arguing about their collective future. Indeed, if collective memory matters so much, if it is at the centre of so much scholarship and public discourses, it is because of what is at stake in historical representations: the way we understand our past, where we come from and who we have been, defines who we imagine we could be, where we should go, and what our collective future may look like (Merck et al., 2016). These connections are well worth exploring in future research.

Chapter 7.

Collective Memory and Future Imagination

I. Thinking Through Time (Paper 6)

Chapter to be published as:
de Saint-Laurent, C. (In press). Thinking through time: From collective memories to collective futures. In C. de Saint-Laurent, S. Obradović, K. Carriere (Eds.) *Imagining collective futures. Perspectives from social, cultural and political psychology*. London: Palgrave.

A. Abstract

In this chapter I look at the links between collective memory and the imagination of collective futures. Drawing on works on imagination and autobiographical memory, I first discuss the role of past experiences in imagining the future. I then explore the consequences of this perspective for collective memories and collective futures, which will lead me to argue that the former provides the basis for the latter. Three case studies are presented, each illustrating a different type of relation between collective memory and imagination. This will lead me to the conclusion that representations of the world are characterised by "temporal heteroglossia", the simultaneous presence of multiple periods of time, and that they mediate the relation between collective memory and imagination, allowing us to "think through time".

B. Introduction

> "It is change, continuing change, inevitable change, that is the dominant factor in society today. No sensible decision can be made any longer without taking into account not only the world as it is, but the world as it will be. […] This, in turns, means that our statesmen, businessmen, our every men must take on a science fictional way of thinking."
>
> Asimov, 1978, p. 6

Being able to imagine the future, in a world in constant change, is more than a necessity for action. Imagining where society might be going or should be going can shed new light on the present: imagining, for instance, a world were men and women are fully equal can highlight the

road left to travel and what remains to be done, while imagining the consequences of climate change can be a powerful drive to rethink our relation to the environment. The way we imagine collective futures – a form of political imagination (de Saint-Laurent & Glăveanu, in press; Glăveanu & de Saint-Laurent, 2015) – is thus of tremendous importance to understand how we act as members of society and how we represent the world we live in. However, as we do for our personal lives, we do not imagine where we may be going solely based on inferences made from the present; we build on past experiences to construct a plausible image of what the future might hold. In the case of collective futures, then, this implies that the way we represent history – our collective memory – plays a fundamental role in the way we can imagine the future. It is precisely this relation between collective memory and imagination of the collective future that this chapter sets to explore.

In a first section, the links between memory and imagination will be explored, initially in general, and then in the specific cases of collective memory and collective imagination. This will lead me to argue that collective memory provides the frame and materials from which to imagine the collective future. In the second section, three cases from different studies will be presented to illustrate this claim, each showcasing a different function of collective memory for imagination: 1) collective memory as framing the content of collective imagination; 2) collective memory as a source of experience and examples for collective imagination; and 3) generalisations from collective memory in the form of "Personal World Philosophy" which, in turn, shapes how the future can be imagined. Finally, I will argue that our representations of the world are characterised by "temporal heteroglossia", that is the simultaneous presence of different times, and that it is by connecting past and future that we can understand the world we live in and act within it.

C. Memory and Imagination

The deep links between memory and imagination can be summarised by the idea of "Mental Time Travel", as proposed by Tulving (2002). For him, memory and imagination both grant us the uniquely human ability to mentally travel through time, to experience events that are not anymore or that have not yet been. Although the notion of mental time travel is problematic in more than one respect – I will come back to this in the conclusion – it remains that imagination and memory are deeply associated processes: whether it is because they both involve scene construction (Mullally & Maguire, 2013), interacting with distal experiences (Zittoun & Gillespie,

2015), or moving away from the present (Berntsen & Bohn, 2010), these processes are similar in many ways. To the point that some have gone to suggest that this is because they are one and the same process (Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015), highlighting the complex relation between the two.

On the one hand, imagination does rest on past experiences: memory provides the 'material' transformed by imagination to produce something new (Vygotsky, 2004; Zittoun & de Saint-Laurent, 2015). Indeed, although we often suppose that children's imagination is the most fertile, it is not the case: experiences add content, thickness and richness to our imagination, and children's play cannot rival, for instance, with the works of proficient science fiction authors (Vygotsky, 1991). Furthermore, some types of imagination that anticipate the future can take the form of reminiscence of a past that is directly relevant to the situation, what Mattli, Schnitzspahn, Studerus-Germann, Brehmer, & Zöllig (2014) have called "prospective memory". Finally, some imaginations can become so rehearsed that they blur the line with memory. It is the case, for instance, of some imaginations of the future during adolescence that are engaged with regularly as one plans for one's life (Zittoun & de Saint-Laurent, 2015).

On the other hand, memory is not the mere repetition of the past but a reconstruction (Bartlett, 1932) that requires some form of imagination (de Saint-Laurent & Zittoun, in press). This is because memory is not ultimately oriented towards the past, but towards the future: it allows us to adapt to what is and what will be by flexibly reconstructing past experiences (Bartlett, 1932). This prospective function of memory, nowadays considered its most important one (Dudai & Carruthers, 2005; Schacter & Addis, 2007), has been mainly studied in relation to autobiographical memory. It has been found, for example, that remembering one's life gives it direction (Habermas, 2012); that autobiographical memory and future imagination develop in parallel and interdependently (D'Argembeau, 2012); or that there is a continuity, for instance, between the way parents remember their past and imagine the future of their children (Cole, 2007). Moreover, memory itself can be imaginative: giving meaning to the past and integrating experiences in a coherent narrative also involves taking distance from what happened in a way that is very similar to the work of imagination (de Saint-Laurent & Zittoun, in press).

What transpires from memory and imagination research is that one of the primary functions of memory is to provide material for imagination and to help us anticipate the future. Furthermore, imagination as a process participates in the reconstructive nature of memory. How does this, however, apply to collective memory and collective imagination?

D. Remembering History and Imagining the Future

Before we turn to the relations between collective memory and collective imagination, it is important to make clear what we mean by 'collective'. In both cases, the 'collective' aspects can refer to two different dimensions: memory or imagination can be about collective events or societal issues (e.g., remembering WWII or imagining alternatives to a political regime), or the dynamics underlying them can themselves be collective (e.g., remembering with friends where you were when you learned about 9/11 or imagining with colleagues the future of your organisation). Although one does not exclude the other, this chapter focuses more directly on the former, considering that imagination and memory are in any case social and cultural activities (de Saint-Laurent, 2017; Zittoun & Gillespie, in press, 2016). This means, however, that collective memory is not directly a mnemonic activity, as it does not exclusively concern *our* past but the past in general (de Saint-Laurent, 2017). How do collective memory and collective imagination relate to each other in this context?

In collective memory studies, it is generally considered that representations of history shape how the collective future is imagined (Szpunar & Szpunar, 2016), although little attention has been given to how and whether this actually takes place (Merck et al., 2016). There have been, however, a few notable exceptions. Brescó de Luna (in press, 2017), for instance, has adapted Cole's (2007) ideas on prolepsis to collective memory, to argue that it is the stories we tell about the past that in themselves 'announce' what will come next, a form of "end into the beginning" (Brescó de Luna, 2017) due, among other things, to the way we anticipate the end of stories with a well known narrative frame. Szpunar & Szpunar (2016), on the contrary, have argued that although collective memory serves as the basis for collective imagination, the relation is not unidirectional: the way we understand the past is shaped by how we imagine the future. They explain how, for instance, imagining a future characterised by technological progress vs. by pollution changes how people represent the invention of the car, either as a major progress or a the origin of unprecedented pollution. Such a mechanism has also been used in political campaigns, where the past is presented in such a way that it justifies the future candidates envision (de Saint-Laurent et al., 2017).

Studies of collective memory from a sociocultural perspective have also focused on the role of imagination in remembering, insisting on the constructive – and creative – aspects of collective memory (Wagoner, 2017). Understanding global events, for which we often have only partial and indirect accounts, does involve some form of collective imagination to fill in the gaps of experience (de Saint-Laurent & Glăveanu, in press; Glăveanu & de Saint-Laurent, 2015).

Moreover, imagining how one would have acted during historical events, or how it was like to live in a different period, participates in the creation of a sense of connection with the past and plays an important role in how it is represented (see Chapter 6).

There have been, on the other hand, very few studies of collective imagination (Merck et al., 2016), and even fewer on the links between collective imagination and collective memory (Szpunar & Szpunar, 2016). Nonetheless, we can infer from the existing literature on memory and imagination in both their individual and collective forms that: 1) collective memory (at least) sometimes relies on collective imagination (e.g., imagining how life was at a certain period of time); 2) collective memory provides the basis for collective future imagination (e.g., providing the experiences from which to imagine what could be possible for future societies), and 3) that collective future imagination in turns shapes how the past is remembered (e.g., by making some aspects of the past more relevant than others). It is on these two last points that the rest of this paper will focus. In particular, I will attempt to answer the two following questions: how does collective memory participate in the imagination of collective futures? And how does the resulting imagination affect how the collective past is remembered?

E. Collective Memory to Imagine Collective Futures

In order to better understand how collective memory provides the basis for how we imagine collective futures, I propose to now look at three cases illustrating different relational dynamics between these two processes. The cases come from previous studies that primarily focused either on collective memory and yet where collective imagination also played a central role. For the purposes of this chapter, a secondary analysis was carried out, looking at how collective memory is mobilised to imagine what the collective future will be or should be. Three main dynamics emerged: 1) history as a frame of reference, determining the main actors and the roles they should play in the future; 2) history as a source of experiences and examples from which we can draw to imagine what is likely, possible or desirable; and 3) history as generalisable experience from which global representations of the world can be built, which in turn inform the imagination of collective futures. Although these dynamics can be found in all three cases, albeit unequally, they are each illustrated in what follows with reference to the case they feature in most prominently.

1. Frames of Reference in Parliamentary Debates on Immigration

The first role that collective memory can play for the imagination of collective futures is that of a frame of reference. Indeed, understanding the past as the interactions between different national groups that have at times cooperated and at others been at war will make it likely that the future is imagined as involving national states as central actors and their changing interactions as the main events (see for instance Obradović, in press). Understanding, on the contrary, nation states as a recent historical development, and thus their role as transient, will probably lead to a very different imagination of the future, possibly without nations but with very different actors. This is, for instance, what made Foucault's method so successful (e.g., Foucault, 1993): discussing the historical roots of categories that seem to us natural makes it possible to imagine a world without them, for they have not always been there. More generally, however, collective memory provides frames that determine what is 'normal', expected and possible, whether it is in terms of actors, events or the general circumstances of life. Using collective memory to frame the future does not mean, however, imagining the future as a perpetual repetition of the past, but quite the contrary: ideas of progress, evolution or development (as well as their opposites) are not only historically rooted but often used to organise the past as a crescendo (or diminuendo) that culminates in the more or less distant future.

One particularly prominent way in which the past frames the future is through the use of *grand narratives*, which are highly general historical narratives that cover broad periods of time (see Chapter 4). They differ from the *narrative templates* often found in collective memory: narrative templates are general story lines repeated over multiple historical events (Wertsch, 2008), while *grand narratives* are storylines used to bring together a multitude of events often spanning centuries. The narrative of scientific progress, for instance, is a *grand narrative* that can be made to start as early as Antiquity and that presides over the organisation of many 'sub-stories' about science. Although they are quite close to the notion of *charters* (J. H. Liu & Hilton, 2005), they diverge from them in the sense that *charters* are supposed to determine and underlie – in an almost unconscious way – how the past, present and future are understood, while *grand narratives* are general storylines constructed in discourse and mobilised in certain contexts for specific purposes.

Grand narratives were found, for instance, in a previous study on the use of collective memory in political discourses on immigration (see Chapter 4). This study explored the references made to history by French politicians during the parliamentary debates that led to the adoption of the 2006 bill on "Immigration and Integration". In particular, it examined how the way different

political groups represent the past of the country changes how they see the nation and who should be part of it. Although the original analysis stopped there, it is possible to see how such representations change politicians' imagination of the future of the nation, particularly regarding immigration. This is reflected in the way they position themselves towards the bill and its many amendments. How do the *grand narratives* proposed by politicians, then, frame how they imagine the collective future?

In these parliamentary debates, two main grand narratives emerged, representing each side of the political spectrum, and both narrating the history of France since the Revolution. On the left side of the political spectrum (Socialists and Radical Left), the main narrative is one of on-going political struggle between 'humanists' and their opponents. This position is well illustrated in the following excerpt[29]:

> Jean-Pierre Brard (Radical Left): Really, two Frances are in confrontation, as throughout History: the one of Coblence against the one of the Revolution; [...] The one that supported Franco, Salazar, Mobutu (protestations on the Right's benches) against the one that defended Grimau, Cunhal, Lumumba[30],... [...] the France that supported the colonial wars against the France in solidarity with the oppressed populations! [...] We will fight you with every fibre and ounce of strength we have! [02.05.2013, third session]

One of examples of such struggles evoked frequently in the debates and concluding this quote is colonisation. Many comparisons are also made between the Right's desire to select immigrants based on "competencies and talents" and slavery or the WWII Vichy regime. However, the references to colonisation are the ones that the Members of Parliament (MPs) linked most directly with how they envision the future of the country with regard to immigration. This is made clear, for instance, in an intervention from the same deputy, the next day:

---

[29] All the transcripts come from the French Parliament website. The only additions are the political inclination in brackets after the name of the speaker, and [...] to signal that parts of the quote were removed to shorten it, although always while being careful not to alter meaning. Political affiliations were simplified for clarity (see Chapter 4 for full details). All the transcripts are identified by date and parliamentary session, and all the translations were made by the author.

[30] All the names in the quote work in opposite couples, one representing humanist ideals and the other their oppressors. The original quote, rather long, can be found in de Saint-Laurent, 2014, and includes more of such oppositions.

> Jean-Pierre Brard (Radical Left): When I fight against your bill, I am faithful to my anticolonial tradition. That others remain faithful to the opposite tradition, agreed, but they must take responsibility for it! When you see the state of the countries who have been victims of colonisation […] we evidently understand that France has a duty to redress the wrongs done and a duty of solidarity. [03.05.2006, first session]

The Left's representations of history define the main actors of history: humanists, oppressors, and victims. These are 'traditional' positions they wish to preserve, although with the hope that the humanists will win: there is a duty to redress, in the future, what was done.

The Right's narrative of French history paints a quite different picture: it presents the French nation as the product of the Enlightenment philosophy, and more specifically as the result of a form of Republican or civic pact concluded between the citizens of the country. This is made especially clear when they argue for the bill they proposed. This "Immigration and integration" bill, discussed in these debates, was centred on two main proposals: prioritising immigration from "talented" people and creating an "Integration Contract" immigrants would have to sign upon arrival, insisting on the need to learn French and to respect French values. In order to justify their positions, several right winged MPs referred to Enlightenment philosophers, and in particular Rousseau. One left winged MP argued that Rousseau would have been against these "Integration Contracts", as he believed in the good nature of people, and here is how a right winged deputy clarified his position:

> Christian Vanneste (Right): Reread Rousseau! […] It is precisely the social contract that is at the basis of good societies. [04.05.2006, first session]

Similarly, when the Left reacted to the Right's desire to prioritise "talented" immigrants – comparing it to a colonial plundering – here is how a right winged MP responded:

> Thierry Mariani (Right): Please allow me to remind you of the Article VI of a text you will probably recognise: 'Law is the expression of the general will. […] All citizens being equal in its eyes, they are equally admissible for all dignities, places and public employment, without any other distinctions than their virtues and talents.' This is the Article VI of the Declaration of Human and Citizen Rights, dating from 1789. The idea isn't new! [04.05.2006, third session]

What they propose is a narrative that puts the French Revolution and its constitution – product of the Enlightenment – at the root of the French nation. If a Republican pact is what founded the country, and if this pact is now in danger because newcomers do not respect the "French values", then a simple way to protect the country in the future is to ask immigrants to agree to such a pact. By the same token, it becomes acceptable – reasonable, even – to select only those deemed worthy of becoming part of this social contract.

In both of these examples, we can see how a broad historical narrative frames what kind of future can be imagined. In the first case, for the Left, the past tells a story of struggle between humanists and their opponents, who oppress populations for their own interest. The future, then, can only be imagined in terms of either reparation for the victims, which would mean a victory for the humanists, or as a continuation of the wrongs done – something comparable to past oppressions, such as colonial plundering and slavery – and thus a victory for their opponents. In the case of the Right, the *grand narrative* tells the story of a contract signed between different parties who wished to live together. Newcomers, then, have a duty to respect such a pact if they wish to join the country, because not doing so would threaten the future of the nation: without a social contract, we cannot be a "good society" anymore. In conclusion, the historical narratives found in these parliamentary debates frame the future, but they also make it look like the logical conclusion to the story being told, especially when they are broadly shared with one's social group, as was the case in this study. However, supposing that collective memory does more, in this case, than give general lines – a frame – would be forgetting that these accounts were also constructed by the participants to justify the policies they were advocating for. Looking at how politicians referred to the French revolution elsewhere, for instance, revealed that although the general frame remains the same, the specifics of the story are adapted to the needs of the situation (see Chapter 4).

2. Analogies in Historical Reasoning

The second role collective memory plays for collective imagination is to provide examples and experiences from which to infer what is possible, probable or desirable for the future. Although there are many ways to build on past events to imagine possible future outcomes, one of the most frequent one is through the use of *historical analogies*. Analogies work by using a source, that is usually well known, and mapping out the similarities with a target – usually less known – in order to infer things about the target (Holyoak, 2005). They are thus particularly adapted to infer

things about the future (the target) by mapping out similarities between the present and a past situation (the source), and looking at how the events unfolded in the past to predict what might happen. Research on the topic has found that we do use historical analogies to draw conclusions about present situations (Spellman & Holyoak, 1992), but it has not looked at how they are used to imagine the future. What has been found, however, is that although people are not always very efficient in finding analogies, they are very good at mapping existing ones (Holyoak, 2005). Once given an analogy between WWII and the first Gulf War, for instance, research participants were easily able to map out the correspondence between the two situations, although they did not all do so in the same way (Spellman & Holyoak, 1992). Research on the links between social representations and analogies has also showed that analogies can help people make diffuse and abstract ideas more concrete, serving both as a form of 'anchoring' of the unfamiliar into more familiar elements and as a way of illustrating one's ideas (Marková, Linell, Grossen, & Salazar Orvig, 2007).

In our own research, we found that historical analogies are very frequently used to infer information not only about the present and the future, but also about the past itself. Indeed, people employ historical analogies to reason about history, what I have termed elsewhere *historical reasoning* (see Chapter 6). This process does not only allow people to infer information about less known targets, but, perhaps more importantly, to transfer *meaning* from one event to the other, using history as a form of *symbolic resource* (Zittoun, 2006; Zittoun et al., 2003). For instance, in the examples presented in the previous section, comparing the bill proposed to slavery and colonisation is not just done to imply that it would have disastrous consequences were it to be adopted, but mainly to give value and sense to what is being done: a horribly wrong policy for which future generations will judge us. And although such processes are present in all three cases presented in this paper and used for quite various purposes, they become especially salient in cases where, similarly to the example above, participants are imagining where a present situation might lead.

And indeed, in a research on historical reasoning (Chapter 6), analogies were regularly used by the participants to infer about the present and the future[31]. In this study, using a qualitative and dialogical experiment, participants from Poland were asked to react to statements about the

[31] The participants in this study used a variety of processes to reason about history. However, analogies were employed quasi systematically when the participants were discussing the future, which was the case for no other process. For a full description, however, see Chapter 6.

Ukrainian conflict, illustrating different perspectives on the situation (see Chapter 6 for a full description). One of the vignettes was about the presence of Russian soldiers in Ukraine, to which one of the participants replied by saying that she thinks Russia is invading Ukraine, and that people call Putin the "new Hitler". I then asked:

> C: where did you hear people call him "new Hitler"? Is it something that people say here?
>
> I: yes, yes, and I heard it from some people, we… Often also on TV people compare Hitler and compare what happened before Second World War and compare the lack of reaction of other countries, of Alliance and it's very often said here that it's, it's new Hitler and it may be the same scenario, like… and I'm very, very afraid about it. And also my mother often recalls how her mother told that for years before the war, people were talking about war. And also in books like Gone with the wind… I remember Scarlett O'Hara says boys you are boring, you talk about the war all the time and it's not the war, yet. But they are talking, and talking and… I feel it's what we do now, we talk… We observe in the news and we are almost bored with news from Ukraine. But it happens and it's closer and closer to our borders and borders of *the* European Union and I wonder what must happen to make us *react* and I'm afraid it will be too late to react. If we react. […] I'm afraid it's the beginning, I hope it will be not the war as World War III would be much quicker than Second World War and with nuclear weapons it would be quick and rather many people would die immediately. […] I don't know but I'm afraid it will be that. The war.

In this excerpt, the participant uses the analogy proposed between Putin and Hitler to more broadly compare the situation in Ukraine with World War II. These successive analogies lead her to conclude that World War III may be coming, because of the similarities between what she knows of the discourses before World War II, the American Civil War, and the current situation. Four elements are particularly striking here. First, the interviewee refers to several historical analogies – Putin/Hitler, pre-WWII/discourses on Ukraine, Gone with the Wind/discourses on Ukraine – illustrating how widespread the use of analogies is, and how easily they can be mobilised and combined. Second, she borrows from different sources – books, TV, family narratives – either using the analogies proposed by others (for the comparisons with WWII) or that she constructs herself (American Civil War), showing once more their frequency and flexibility. Third, the use of analogies is in itself never justified by the participants, neither here

nor in any of the data collected: although people do discuss and contest the use of specific analogies, the process is never questioned in itself. Fourth, the analogies are not just used to imagine what may happen, but also to "learn" from the past what course of action may be desirable and thus to transfer meaning from one event to the other: when she compares the reactions of the European Union with the ones of the Allies during World War II, she is not just anticipating what may happen, but also, implicitly, how our own (lack of) actions may be judged in the future.

What we can conclude from this example is that collective memory provides a breadth of experiences from which people can draw to imagine the future, in particular by finding analogies between the past and the present and mapping out their consequences. These analogies allow the transfer of information between a past event and an unfolding one, but also of meaning and value (see also Marková et al., 2007). Indeed, history does not only provide examples of how things went in the past, but also of how, with time and distance, we came to judge what happened.

3. Generalisations: Metamemory and Personal World Philosophies

The third way in which collective memory participates to the imagination of collective futures is through the generalisation from past events into *metamemory* or *Personal World Philosophies*. In the first case, representations of history are used to develop a general understanding of how collective memory works (see Chapter 5). This is, for instance, what expressions such as "those who do not learn from the past are doomed to repeat it" capture. Second, collective memory can be used to develop *Personal World Philosophies* (PWP). The term is derived from the notion of *Personal Life Philosophies* (PLP), which are maxims, philosophies and other culturally shared wisdoms that are given a personal significance through generalisations from life experiences. Although they often take the form of culturally shared ideas (such as "actions speak louder than words" or "after a storm comes a calm") these become PLP when they take on a personal meaning for people, through life experiences (Zittoun et al., 2013). PWP work in a similar way: they are general understandings of the way the world works derived from past historical events and social experiences. They usually refer to commonly shared ideas about the world, but also take on a more or less personal form. For instance, one can generalise from history that "man is a wolf for man" (shared representation) or that, as one of our research participants did, wars were started when there was a deficit of jobs or of women (more unique construction). These beliefs are in turn used to imagine the future: in the first case, the future will necessarily be

imagined in terms of violent relations between people; in the second, the participant imagined that a war would necessarily happen with China, because they had a "dude overpopulation".

This second example comes from a study on people's relation to history, where participants were asked, among other things, to describe their relation to history and how it had changed over time (see Chapter 5 and de Saint-Laurent, in press). One of the final questions asked the participants to imagine where they thought the world was going. This is were Robert[32], in the example above, explained being afraid of a war with China and justified his answer with the idea that wars were started by unbalanced populations and by low employment rates. Another participant, Marc, replied to this question by saying that we are heading "straight into a wall". When asked what would cause it, here is what he responded:

> Marc: I think the economic stakes, and I think that the Middle Ages are a bit of a […] turning point where ideals shifted. I don't remember who said that but […] let's say that man before the Middle Ages is Homo Politicus. And after that, he truly becomes Homo Economicus. And I think are still in this history primarily governed by trade. […] I have the impression that maybe through trade we don't have anymore the question of how to live together. Maybe during Antiquity we were wondering about living together. […] It was not all pink, but we were thinking about it, and I have the impression that since the Middle Ages what connects us is only trade. […] I don't know where it's going but […] Maybe if we discovered another planet, for instance with other living people, who would not necessarily be human but who would have a conscience like us, maybe at the beginning we would wonder about how to live together, you see? We are here, in the Universe, but we are two now. And maybe once we would have found a kind of a compromise between our forms of intelligent life, maybe then we would start having commercial relations, and then, maybe at one point one would need to dominate the other or I don't know.

In this excerpt, Marc proposes a very general understanding of history: while during Antiquity we wondered about how to live together, since the advent of trade in the Middle Ages mercantile relations are what characterises humanity. This representation of the world is shared with others ("I don't remember who said that") and yet Marc appropriated it ("Let's say that…") in a way

[32] All names have been changed.

that allows him to think about the world and its future, fitting the above description of PWP. Marc imagines first that we are going "straight into a wall", but when asked to elaborate, he proposes an alternative: maybe if we encountered a completely new 'Other', then we would think about how we can best live together. However, his PWP leads him to conclude that even in such a case, we would possibly end up in the same situation as today, and one group would "dominate the other".

In theses examples, we can see how collective memory participates to the elaboration of representations of the world – PWP – that provide general understandings of how the world, societies, and human beings are or should be. These can in turn be used to imagine what the future might hold. In a sense, PWP are a form of *hyper generalised grand narrative* – Marc's narrative covers the whole of human history in two sentences – that may both employ and produce historical analogies – Robert's PWP allows him to draw an analogy between past wars and the situation in China, but was also probably constructed by building analogies between multiple past conflicts. The three roles collective memory plays for the imagination of collective futures – framing, exemplifying and generalising – are thus interdependent and they all participate in the creation and maintenance of general representations of the world, in particular Personal World Philosophies.

F. Thinking Through Time: Temporal Heteroglossia in our Representations of the World

I have, in the three cases presented in this chapter, mainly focused on how collective memory shapes how the future can be imagined. What about our second question, then: how do collective futures shape how the past is remembered? Before attempting to answer this question, two shortcomings need to be clarified. First, it is difficult, both in discourse and in the analysis, to reverse the course of time. Even at times when what we imagine about the future directly determines what we remember from the past – as in prospective memory, for instance – there is a sort of natural logic in presenting our thinking as following the irreversible flow of time. Second, it is more convincing, both for ourselves and for others, to start from what we believe actually happened and go towards what we think might happen. The first carries the aura of truth, while the other stinks of speculation. I could, for instance, imagine a future with flying cars, and justify its probability by a consideration of the evolution of personal vehicles over time, when the truth is that I watched the Fifth Element too many times as a child. However, I would not believe everything I have seen in science fiction movies to be possible in the future. The idea

of flying car fits quite well with my general representation that technological progress, especially if it leads to more autonomy and potential financial gain, is one of the characteristics of the societies we live in. But I would not imagine a future with light sabres as probable, because it does not fit with my representation of the world as building more and more violent and destructive weapons – I would, for that matter, more easily believe in a Death Star.

What this example points at is the fact that Personal World Philosophies, as general representations of the world, mediate the relation between the imagination of collective futures and the memory of the collective past by allowing us to alter the course of time. Indeed, what appears in the cases presented in this paper is that the way we understand the world is not bound to a specific period of time but, on the contrary, it is developed at the crossroad between multiple historical periods and temporalities. PWP are thus characterised by *temporal heteroglossia*, the simultaneous presence of multiple periods of time. Heteroglossia is a Bakhtinian concept (Bakhtin, 1981) that refers to how "any discourse contains the traces of previous discourses, is made of different genres (rhetoric, journalistic, literary, scientific, etc.), and echoes discourses (or voices) uttered by other people in different places at different times" (Grossen, 2010, p. 10). *Temporal heteroglossia*, then, refers to how discourses on the world, society, humanity, etc. are characterised by the simultaneous presence of multiple periods of time, and it is through this consideration of several temporalities that they are constituted. Indeed, even in cases where the representation seems to apply to only one period of time, it is done against the backdrop of other historical periods. For instance, current discourses on society and mass media seem to apply only to the present. However, they are built in contrast with other periods, where mass communication did not exist, and often in anticipation of a future of which we imagine they will be part. The alternative representation – of a world without mass media, as we used to have – is thus part of the representation itself (Gillespie, 2008).

In the first case presented in this paper, the way the MPs represent French society is done, for the Left, by considering simultaneously the various periods of time when "two Frances are in confrontation". Doing so is what allows politicians to develop a representation of the country as torn by a social struggle, and it assumes enough similarity between all of these periods for them to be comparable. For the right, the contrast is made between the period before the French Revolution and everything that came after, which still applies to the present. These representations of French society provide the basis from which the future can be imagined, but also the frame within which the past should be remembered – encouraging Left-winged MPs to focus on past oppositions in French politics and Right-winged MPs to overlook set backs in the constitution of the French Republic, for instance the Terror or Napoleon.

In the second study, a participant discusses the future of the Ukrainian crisis by comparing it to World War II, implicitly assuming that humanity has not significantly changed in the meantime. Indeed, what makes the comparison possible is the supposition that the behaviour of the different actors is today what it was in the past. This is what allows her to infer from the past – people talked a lot about the possibility of a war before WWII – something about the present circumstances – if we talk a lot about a possible war it may indeed be coming. Representations of how human beings behave in society and in the world in general are thus built on the assumption that we can learn about human nature from any given period of time and that our conclusions would globally be valid at any time. Although we usually accept that different circumstances produce different behaviours, it is still assumed that human nature remains generally unchanged, what Gergen criticised by calling social psychology "history" (Gergen, 1973). While we would generally agree that society widely changed with regard to authority in the past half century, Milgram's findings do remain, for instance, an important part of how many people represent the "natural" relation of human beings to authority.

In the third study, participants similarly draw from multiple periods of time to build personal representations of the world and where it is going. In doing so, they assume that what happened in the past remains relevant to the present because humanity did not change in ways that would invalidate the comparison – making it irrelevant to the present or the future. PWP thus provide a sense of continuity across vast periods of time, making the past and the future not only familiar – the world and its inhabitants were essentially the same – but also a source of knowledge for the present. It is because the past and the future bear enough similarity that we can use them to know how to behave in the present, learning from the past and anticipating what may happen.

Would this be, then, a form of mental time travel (Tulving, 2002)? Quite the contrary, actually. Where the notion of mental time travel implies that we can leave the here and now, in a rather dualist fashion[33], the temporal heteroglossia of Personal World Philosophies means that we can bring the past and the future in the present because our representations of the world are not bound to a specific time or a specific place. Representations of the world, crystallised into Personal World Philosophies, thus allow us to think through time and to use the past in answering one fundamental question: where are we going?

---

[33] The idea of time travel also employs a spatial metaphor, which has been shown to be deeply problematic for memory (Brockmeier, 2010).

Chapter 8.

Conclusion

I. Introduction

The four studies presented in this PhD explored quite different yet interrelated aspects of collective memory: its uses in a 'natural' setting and how it positions the speaker; its development across the life-course; its construction in an experimental situation; and its uses to imagine the future. One of the aims of this thesis was to shed new light on collective memory, and a multi-perspective approach seemed to be a fruitful way to proceed. Another important reason for this heterogeneity, however, is the time period during which these studies took place, from February 2013 to March 2017. Over this four years period, my perspective on the topic, my knowledge of the literature, my questions about the phenomena, etc. changed in a quite significant manner. This evolution is reflected in the choice of vocabulary (from collective memory to historical representations), of literature (from group construction to reasoning), and of data (from political discourses to qualitative experiments), differences that the last study partly aimed to bridge. This heterogeneity was also encouraged by a desire to make sure that, in the end, "something" could be said in my dissertation, when every study always seemed to fall a bit short and was long considered not to have its place in the final thesis. This collection of studies thus reflects more the intellectual journey this PhD took me on than a fully unitary or monolithic research project.

The aim of this conclusion, thus, is to "connect the dots" of the previous four chapters by taking stock of what has been proposed and argued from a more general perspective, as well as the consequences it may have. It is not to bring all of the studies together in a larger, all-encompassing model, that would confine more to a modelling challenge than to a real theoretical contribution. In the first section, I return to the research questions presented in the first chapters, and summarise the answers that the four studies have brought. Second, I highlight the contribution this thesis has made or tried to make, from a theoretical and methodological point of view. Third, I discuss the limits of the work presented, which will lead me, in the next section, to propose some future directions for research. Finally, I present the practical implications this work could have.

II. Addressing the Research Questions

The aim of this thesis was to look at how historical representations are constructed, challenged, and mobilised. It focused on four main questions, each addressed more specifically by an empirical study:

Study 1: How are representations of the past discussed and mobilised in interactions?

Study 2: How do people come to resist or challenge hegemonic representations of the past?

Study 3: How are new historical representations produced?

Study 4: How are they mobilised to imagine collective futures?

However, most questions were addressed, indirectly, by more than one study. I thus now propose to discuss each question in turn and summarise what answers the empirical studies and the models presented brought to it.

A. Collective Memory in Interactions

The first question, concerning collective memory in interactions, was mainly addressed by study 1, but also by the second part of study 2, and served as a premise for setting up study 3. Two main findings can be highlighted here. First, collective memory is constructed in dialogue with others, and second, it is dialogical. Although both points are linked, they differ in the sense that the first one refers to the importance of social interactions and communication in the construction of collective memory, while the second one refers to the dialogical nature of social knowledge. Let's address them in turn.

The studies developed in this thesis showed that collective memory is constructed in relation to what others say about the past, or are imagined to be thinking about it. First, it was shown that discourses on history are always addressed to someone. That is, discourses on history are part of an on-going conversation about the meaning of the past, and understanding what people say about it requires understanding what broader conversation it is part of (study 1) and through what conversations it was forged (study 2). Second, what people chose to say about the past positions them in the social field – as defending a certain political opinion (study 1), for instance,

or as having a certain type of knowledge (study 2). This goes beyond picking a side in an on-going conflict (as in study 3), and it is also linked to more subtle or micro social positions – such as one's relation to one's mother (study 2) – or to more general relations to the world – such as positioning oneself as a critique of human relations in general (study 4). Third, it was found that social interactions have a paradoxical effect on collective memory: on the one hand, it can polarise people's positions on the past, sometimes to the point of caricature (Putin as the "new Hitler" in study 4), while on the other hand, it is because people share some common grounds that they can argue about the past (study 1). Fourth, others proved to be a source of knowledge and opinions about the past (study 2), which could be used to construct historical representations and whose trustworthiness or expertise were not left unquestioned (study 3). Globally, thus, it can be said that collective memory is forged through social interactions, giving it content and shape, as well as its orientation and aims.

This thesis also showed that collective memory is dialogical, at two levels. First, it is constructed in dialogue with alternative representations – often introduced by others, but also sometimes by the self, making historical representations more fundamentally dialogical than the previous paragraph would imply. In other words, collective memory is not just built in interactions with others, but it is constructed in dialogue with alternative interpretations of the past (study 1 and 3). However, collective memory is dialogical at a second level as well. It is produced, on the one hand, in tension between a desire for presenting an objective, unbiased version of the past, and a will to account for the subjective perspectives of those who participated in it. On the other hand, it also exists in tension between a tendency to generalise our understandings of the world and an inclination towards producing specific, localised narratives that respect the particulars of the situation. These two tensions are dialogical in the sense that they produce accounts of the past that are in dialogue with alternative narratives that focus on different aspects of history – e.g., local personal stories vs. general ideas about human nature that explain what happened.

Because collective memory is dialogical and forged in interactions, it is a dynamic construction that remains open to change. However, it does not mean that people change their opinion on history in every conversation or every time their encounter a new perspective or piece of information. This is, in part, the issue the next question aimed to tackle.

B. Resisting and Challenging Representations

The second question this thesis aimed to answer was how people come to resist and challenge historical representations, especially those that tend to be widely shared. This question was mainly address by study 2, although it was also involved in study 3. Three important findings can be highlighted here: 1) collective memory is developmental; 2) it is linked to broader representations of the world; and 3) both alternative subjective accounts of the past and alternative objective facts have the potential to lead people to challenge existing historical representations. Let us now examine each claim in turn.

First, collective memory is developmental, in the sense that it is constructed through processes that unfold over the course of one's life. As people navigate the social world, they encounter different versions of the past – in school, at home, in popular culture, in political discourses, in museums, etc. – that may be in tension with each other. While it is often unproblematic, one version being considered more "true" than the others, it has the potential to lead to ruptures. These can be experienced quite violently, among other things because these ruptures may be touching other areas of one's life, such as ones' relation to one's mother or one's trust in what is taught in school (study 2). These ruptures lead to transitions, during which one's understanding of history is irremediably changed in order to make sense of the rupture, for instance by considering history to be a matter of perspective. While supposing that everyone experiences ruptures in their relation to history would be jumping the gun, the coexistence, in the social field, of so many narratives about the past means that people must learn to navigate these – as did my participants, albeit perhaps not always in such a strong way – and that we all, in one way or another, learn to resist other historical representations that may challenge our own. That is, we develop metamemories – representations of how memory works – and Personal World Philosophies – personal sets of values and ideas about the world that borrow from common knowledge – that help us navigate the different social discourses about the past. Indeed, development is not the perpetual rewriting of one's psyche, and people can learn to integrate different perspectives to build a representation of the past that suits most their needs, may they be social – positioning oneself towards others – or semiotic – finding meaning in the past. In the case of history, it may take the form of a process of secondarisation, the distancing of "oneself from an object of knowledge, to elaborate it so as to transform personal experience in a more generic and abstract form" (Zittoun & Grossen, 2013), a process usually associated with school but also found here (study 2).

Second, historical representations are deeply linked to people's more general understanding of the world. On the one hand, collective memory provides resources to think about more general issues, while on the other, the meanings people give to the world – their Personal World Philosophies – inform the meaning they give to specific historical events (studies 2 and 4). This relation will be discussed in more details in section D below, but an important point can be made here: collective memory is the product of an "effort after meaning" (Bartlett, 1932), both for the specific event one is referring to and the world we live in. This is why it has the potential to create ruptures in people's lives: it is not just about learning new facts, but discovering that not all that one learnt in school is true (study 2); it is not just about understanding the evolution of economic relations in the Middle Ages, but about defining the characteristics of human societies (study 4); it is not just about debating the history of colonisation, it is about questioning the status quo (study 1). People's relation to history, the perspectives they chose to defend, the narrative frames they use, and the sources they rely on thus depend on more than the social and cultural 'factors' collective memory has sometimes been reduced to – such as showing allegiance to one's social group and defending its interests, or simply using 'whatever' cultural resources one is familiar with. Instead, it relates to how people understand the world they live in and the people they share it with, in a two-way relationship.

Third, two categories of information seem to have the potential to create ruptures in one's historical representations. Alternative subjective accounts, that question one's understanding of the past and come from a trusted (enough) source, can lead one to develop new representations of history and to challenge what one had learn so far. This can also result in changes in the ways history in general is represented (study 3), and in particular how people believe it to be constructed – metamemory – leading them to the conclusion that collective memory is a matter of perspectives (study 2). Alternative objective facts, that make people question the validity of some stories, can play a similar role, provided too that they are trusted enough. Here again, as in other places where the word "objective" was used in this thesis, it refers to people's – researchers and participants alike – attempts towards a truth that would not depend on the person who utters it. An impossible endeavour, but that still deeply permeates the way we think about the world. While alternative facts seem to provoke a lot of face rejection based on the sources from which they emanated (study 3), they nonetheless can lead to important ruptures as well as changes in metamemory – for example towards thinking that history is all false because it is written by the victors. Some participants seemed to trust one type of information more easily than the other (study 3), although both worked best in conjunction – when a subjective story included alternative facts (study 2).

In summary, people do not 'inherit' historical representations from their social and cultural environment, but they use social and cultural resources as well as the historical representations they encounter to construct their own understanding of the past, and of the world. This is a developmental, life-long process, through which people learn to navigate the various representations and resources given to them, may it be by integrating them, systematically rejecting some perspectives, or anything in between (study 2).

C. Constructing Historical Representations

The third question this PhD aimed to answer was how are new historical representations constructed, an issue primarily addressed by study 3, but that permeated through all four studies. As a consequence, some of the results concerning this question have been discussed already: interactions and dialogical tensions participate in the construction of historical representations, and new representations may be the product of transitions provoked by alternative facts and perspectives. However, three points can still be made.

First, historical representations are the product of an effort after meaning – as discussed in the two sections above – and are thus constructed as an attempt to make sense of what happened, what is happening, or what may happen. I chose to name this process historical reasoning, to highlight its differences with collective memory (not the same object of study) and its aims (finding *reasons* for the past). This also points towards the cognitive dimension of historical representations: while it has important social, cultural, and semiotic dimensions, its cognitive aspects have often been reduced to memory. However, it was found that people construct historical representations by manipulating complex information and making informed judgement about it (study 3 and 4). This is not to say, of course, that is not deeply social and cultural, nor oriented towards meaning, characteristics that cognitive processes do share anyway. But it does mean that constructing and manipulating historical representations is an intellectual activity where people do try to be rational agents – using for instance formal logic, conceptualisations, and analogies.

Second, this research showed that historical representations are flexible systems of knowledge that rely on four categories of elements: shared meanings, personal sense, general schemas, and specific facts. These elements are used to produce discourses about the past and can be sources of tensions that may lead to reorganisations or new representations. They do not constitute a fully consistent whole, but are not fully disarticulated either, allowing for both adaptation and

coherence. They also represent 'poles' of what the participants appeared to believe would be a 'perfect' account of the past – at the same time including individual perspectives and general significations, specific knowledge and broader ideas – and yet often seemed irreconcilable. While this dissertation discussed these tensions only in relation to the third study, they were found in almost every fieldwork (with the exception of study 1, where such tensions were less obvious, maybe because these were public and political discourses with a more rhetorical construction). As such, I would not consider them to be the 'absolute' and 'necessary' elements of historical representations, but what the cultural practices around collective memory have defined as constituting the 'proper' way to talk about the past.

Third, this research showed that a large range of psychological processes is involved in historical reasoning, building on the four elements discussed just above. While study 3 resulted in 12 processes, it merely highlighted that people can use 'whatever' processes and resources are available and relevant to them when reasoning about the past. It also showed the importance of processes that have been often overlooked when discussing collective memory – and social thinking in general – such as imagination and perspective taking. Other processes, such as conceptualisation and narrative construction, have been given a central role in history education (for the former) and collective memory studies (for the latter), and were found to be relatively marginal, especially in comparison to the extremely frequent generalisations and analogies used by the participants.

In summary, it was found that new historical representations emerge as the result of tensions between their components and in an effort after meaning. Historical reasoning is a flexible, open-ended process that relies on a multitude of psychological processes and sources, that are both semiotic and cognitive, general and particular.

D. Mobilising Collective Memory

The fourth and final question this thesis aimed to answer was how are historical representations mobilised, in particular to imagine collective futures. Although never explicitly stated, mobilisation has referred, in this thesis, to the action by which social, cultural, and material resources are put in movement, transformed, and used in order to respond to the demands of the situation. It is thus a dynamic form of 'bricolage' from semiotic, intersubjective, and material tools.

The question of mobilisation was addressed through the fourth study, which proposed a transversal analysis of the three first studies. Three main findings can be highlighted here. First, collective memory can frame, give meaning, or participate in the construction of imaginations of the collective future either directly or through the construction of representations of the world. In other words, collective memory provides both content and direction for future imagination by showing what is possible, desirable, or probable, both in terms of events (what could happen) and actors (what are human beings capable of). Second, this use can be made quite explicit by the participants, but may also remain rather unconscious. Robert, a participant of study 2 discussed in study 4, for instance, insisted in his interview that he was not in any way interested in the past, only in the future. Yet, every time he discussed the future, he did so by evoking history. Third, historical representations are not bound to a specific temporality but are used to think about the world as a global whole, through temporal heteroglossia – or dialogue between several time periods. Generalisations and analogies, in particular, allow people to 'think through time', and draw conclusions about who we are, where are coming from, and where we are going. That is, to give meaning to the world. Thus, collective memory is also a form of social thinking that is deeply related to how we think about our social environment.

All the 'answers' provided by this thesis are of course to take with caution and in light of the limitations of this work. Before addressing those, however, I will present the theoretical and methodological contributions brought by this dissertation in my attempt to empirically answer these questions, in order to discuss all the limitations together.

III. Theoretical and Methodological Contributions

A. Theoretical Contributions

At a theoretical level, this thesis' contribution lies in the models it has proposed of collective memory, as a dynamic symbolic resource, constructed in interactions and developed throughout the life-course, using reasoning processes and various semiotic (meanings and senses) and cognitive (schemas and factual knowledge) resources, that may be more or less general, in order

to give meaning to the world. In the sections below, I explore each term of this argument in turn.

1. Collective Memory as a Symbolic Resource

Collective memory can be considered to be a dynamic symbolic resource – a cultural element that used to make sense of a rupture (Zittoun et al., 2003) – for two reasons. First, it can be used as a resource to give meaning to present ruptures or difficulties that are anticipated to be coming. Many of the participants in study 3, for instance, mobilised the history of Poland and Russia during World War II to make sense of the rupture provoked by the Russian intervention in Ukraine, using it as a symbolic resource through an analogy. Second, collective memory can be itself the product of a symbolic resource: it too is a rupture that is made sense of with the help of cultural elements. For instance, it is possible, in study 4, that the participant referring to "Gone with the Wind" used this book to make sense of her mother's discourse about men always talking about the war, before using it to make sense of the discourses on Ukraine. This is what makes of collective memory a truly "dynamic" symbolic resource: as the past is mobilised to understand the present or imagine the future, it always has the potential to be re-interpreted, to fit best the needs of the situation.

2. Collective Memory as Constructed in Dialogues

Collective memory is constructed in dialogues at two levels. First, it emerges in interactions with others, who can be both a resource for collective memory – that is by providing information, ideas, or meanings – and a "target" – that is someone towards whom the speaker is positioning herself. Indeed, the stories one choses to tell, the facts one choses to believe, and the actors one choses to identify with all locate the person in the social field, and define which others are seen similar to the self or fundamentally alien to it.

Second, at a more fundamental level, and we have seen above (section II.A), collective memory is dialogical: it is constructed in orientation toward an other (Linell, 2009) and around thematic antinomies (Marková, 2000). Five types of antinomies were found to play a role in collective memory: 1) between different interpretations of the past (e.g., between France as the defender of Human Rights and France as a Colonial Empire); 2) between different interpretations of memory (e.g., between the past as a matter of perspective and the past as verifiable facts); 3)

between the general and the particular (e.g., between the specifics of an event and one's general understanding of history); 4) between the objective and the subjective (e.g., between the official records of what happened and the statements of direct witnesses); and 5) between different time periods (e.g., between periods predating modern economy and the ones that came after). These antinomic couples are at the basis of collective memory and historical reasoning, fuelling discourses and debates about the past, and always have the potential to lead to the emergence of new historical representations.

3. Collective Memory as a Developmental Process

Collective memory is a developmental process. On the one hand, it unfolds in time, and evolves as people encounter new interlocutors, resources, and situations, and as they become familiar with various systems of values and narratives about the past. It is not a succession of stages that come to replace each other, but a complex integration between the different 'layers' of one's relation to the past. On the other hand, it relies on a multitude of psychological processes that have themselves a developmental history, such as imagination (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016), perspective taking (Martin & Gillespie, 2010), concept formation (Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991), or narrative construction (Habermas, 2007). This further participates to making collective memory a developmental process.

This takes place at two levels. First, at the level of the course of ones' life, people's relation to history evolves with the ruptures and transitions the person may experience. Second, at a more micro level, the emergence of a new historical representation does, too, unfold in time and is not a sudden or immediate change. In the third study, for instance, participants who changed their mind did so slowly over the course of several vignettes, and never left with a completely different opinion than the one they had at the start. This points to an interesting possibility: that collective memory is indeed contextual – changing as the context changes – but that it develops at a slower pace than the spheres of experiences we live in succeed to each other. That is, while we may encounter new experiences, people, narratives, resources, values, and ideas at a very fast pace, constructing a representation of the world based on these is a process that takes times and that slowly develops as we learn to integrate these in a meaningful system of knowledge.

4. Collective Memory as a Reasoning Process

Collective memory is also a reasoning process, in two ways. First, it is an effort after meaning (Bartlett, 1932), an attempt to find 'reasons' for what happened – or is happening. Second, it is also a cognitive, 'rational' effort to understand the world and its history. My point here is not to make a clear distinction between semiotic and cognitive processes, but to highlight that they have tended to reflect more some ways of thinking than others, as their respective fields of study have clearly embraced by choosing different objects of study. Globally, thus, we can say that semiotic processes are oriented towards finding meaning through open-ended and socially and culturally oriented processes (such as imagination or narrative construction), while cognitive processes have been oriented towards reaching solutions to problems, through close-ended, logic oriented processes (such as analogies or categorisations). This does not imply that one does not borrow from the other, but that both reflect different aspects of thinking that are deeply interrelated yet represent different orientations, a distinction that is not new (e.g., Bruner, 1990; Evans & Over, 1996). This means that collective memory cannot be reduced, on the one hand, to processes of categorisation, source monitoring, or generalisation that would be 'biased' by the desire to defend the interests of one's group, or, on the other hand, to processes of narration, imagination, or perspective taking that would only aim at making sense of what happened. What makes collective memory such a complex and interesting phenomenon is precisely the fact that it relies on all these processes and interrelates them.

5. Collective Memory as a Tool to Think About the World

Finally, collective memory is a tool to think about the world; it is oriented towards understanding and acting in the social world. In that sense, collective memory is more linked to social thinking than to memory per se – an idea also reflected in the choice of literature in Chapter 2. Thus, it is not about 'travelling through time', but about creating dialogues between different periods of time. Indeed, it is because we can superpose different eras that we can give them meaning, allowing us to see what is similar, different, or related, and thus use the past to give meaning to the present. Analogies, generalisations, and narratives play here a central role, as they allow people to make one period relevant for the other by superposing them, applying the conclusions of one to the other, or making one a consequence of the other. As a result, collective memory is part of a wider system of knowledge – social knowledge – that it participates in shaping and is shaped by in turn On the one hand, it provides resources, examples, and frames that one can use

to understand the world we live in – using what we believe happened but yet did not experience. On the other hand, our representations of the world, what we deem to be possible, to be desirable, or to be 'natural' for human beings shapes the stories we will believe to be true about the past and the meaning we will give to them.

6. Beyond Collective Memory

The theoretical contributions proposed by this thesis can thus be globally grouped into two categories: 1) the elaboration of a sociocultural approach to historical representations that takes into account its developmental, social, semiotic, and dialogical aspects; and 2) the reframing of the concept of collective memory to focus on different aspects of the phenomena it refers to. That is, moving beyond the idea of collective memory as only the memory of the collective, and towards the study of how people understand history as a whole and use it to think about the world. Not with the idea that one is more important or interesting than the other, but with the idea that both have often been collapsed together under the name of collective memory. Yet, the memory of the collective – for instance, the way I remember the 2011 London riots, that I directly witnessed and which were an important topic of discussion in the months that followed – and the representations of history – for example, my representations of the role of France during World War II – are not the same thing. They are deeply linked, and the line is not always easy to draw, but these are undeniably different phenomenon that deserved to be studied in their own right. The latter was chosen over the former for empirical reasons (I was interested in how history helps us understand the present and draw lessons to imagine the future), and theoretical reasons: while many sociocultural theories of the memory of the collective have been proposed (e.g., Brockmeier, 2002a; Brown & Reavey, 2015; Wagoner, 2012), less had been said about historical representations (Wertsch, 2002).

Despite the name of this thesis, however, one may note that I did not fully move beyond collective memory, and that it remains a frequently used term in this conclusion. And indeed, while I believe that it is a too broad umbrella term and that a new and more precise terminology needs to be developed to discuss how we relate to the collective past, it is a concept one is not easily rid off, and for two main reasons. First, it is now widely used in psychological research, and it would be an odd and complicated exercise to discuss the literature and the contributions this thesis has tried to make to it by using a completely different vocabulary. Second, and more importantly, it does refer to a set of interrelated phenomena about the collective past that are

also interesting to discuss as whole. This is because they share common features, may it be from a theoretical perspective (they share some social and psychological processes), an epistemological and epistemic perspective (they question how knowledge about the past is constructed both in everyday life and in scientific research), a methodological perspective (they often present similar challenges in their study), or a social perspective (they are part of a broad category of social activities about the past and its commemoration). That is, I would argue that what we need is to move *with* and *beyond* collective memory, considering it more of a field of research than a specific scientific concept.

B. Methodological Contributions

This thesis proposed two types of methodological contributions to the existing literature. First, it brought new insights on collective memory by looking at it from the perspective of the person, not of the event or the social group. Where most collective memory research has primarily focused on how a specific event is remembered or on the memory of a social/national group, most of the studies here – with the exception of study 1 – were concentrated on the person and what in history is important to her. This shed new light unto the phenomenon, among other things because it allowed me to look at how the representations of different events are connected to each other, and to broader representations of history – such as metamemory – and of the world – such as Personal World Philosophies. Moreover, this approach allowed the participants to go beyond the canonical narrative presentation of the past, and thus showed how different processes participate in the construction of historical representations – narrative construction being one of them, but not the only one.

Second, this thesis introduced some innovative methods, either for data collection (dialogical experiment) or data analysis (reconstructing narratives by superposing the narrative templates). Two of them in particular can be highlighted here: trajectory analysis and dialogical experiments. Life trajectory analysis is, of course, not a new method, and it has extensively been used elsewhere (e.g., Sato, Hidaka, & Fukuda, 2009; Zittoun, 2006). However, what was new here was the combination of 1) a life narrative analysis (Rosenthal, 1993; Rosenthal & Fisher-Rosenthal, 2004), used to construct the trajectory from the interview, with 2) the analysis of ruptures and transitions (Zittoun, 2012; Zittoun et al., 2013), both as a unit of analysis and an analytical method, 3) to focus on representations, not on practices (e.g., Greco Morasso & Zittoun, 2014),

4) and their evolution throughout the life-course, not just at a very local level. This method allowed me to shed new light on collective memory, especially its developmental aspects.

The dialogical experiment proposed in study 3 took inspiration from microgenetic experiments (Bartlett, 1932; Wagoner, 2009), as qualitative experiments that can give researchers access to psychological processes as they unfold. However, it added an important dimension to it: it used different voices from the social field – all the vignettes presented to the participants corresponded to actual positions of social actors – in order to provoke dialogical tensions and microgenetic changes. That is, it was an attempt to reproduce the kind of debates and perspectives a person might encounter in the public space in order to observe what reactions and changes it may lead to, and – most importantly – how these changes may emerge. This allowed me to analyse the complex reasoning processes of the participants as they unfolded, as micro-trajectories of emergence. More classically for an experiment, it was also a way to 'test' the importance of some aspects of collective memory that the trajectory analysis had showed to play a role – not by confirming the hypothesis in a 'clean' experimental setting, but by observing whether they also played a role at a more micrological level.

More generally, the methodological 'innovations' proposed in this thesis consisted in building from existing methods, and either combining them in new ways or 'tweaking' them with the help of theory in order to adapt them to my objectives. The two examples of innovations presented above are no exception. To a certain extent, then, none of the methods used in this thesis is fully original, but none is fully traditional either: all the data collections and analyses carried out borrowed from the large stock of existing methods and adapted them to the needs of this project. Their creativity depends on the distance between what was available, and what it was that I was trying to do. This is, I believe, what cultural psychology's call for methodological innovation (Valsiner, 2014a) means.

IV. Limits

This research also has limitations, and it is important, before the end of this thesis, to take stock of some of them. Because any work always has limits – the only variation being their magnitude – the aim here is not to list all the limitations of the present thesis in their details, but to point

towards what could temper the contributions of this work and/or could be solved in future research.

First, the variety of the studies meant that I privileged breadth over depth. This was a deliberate choice – as explained in Chapter 3, I wanted to understand new aspects of the phenomenon under investigation, giving the present work a sometimes exploratory quality. Thus, although it allowed me to cover much ground, it also means that every one of the studies of this thesis could (and should) be further developed in the future. Moreover, some concepts surroundings memory and some of its aspects are missing or only briefly examined. In particular, emotions and family transmission, two important parts of memory (e.g., Brown & Reavey, 2015; Fivush et al., 2008), are never or rarely directly discussed in this thesis. Developing a more complete understanding of historical representations from a sociocultural perspective – considering the object of psychology to be the developing person in her context – would also require considering and possibly including both.

Third, and this is in part a consequence of the first limitation, the samples used in the studies were of limited size. This was mainly due to the means that were available to me; in particular time and how long the transcriptions took. I do not believe that supplementary data would have changed the findings in a significant way – saturation had been reached – but it would made them more robust and it would have allowed me to be more confident in some of the conclusions.

Fourth, the populations studied in this thesis all fall more or less directly under the category "educated" or "very educated". This is a very specific population, and it has some effects on the data collected – although, as discussed in Chapter 3 for study 3, the answers were not homogenous at all in this regard (that is, all participants may have been 'globally' educated, they were not necessarily so when it came to history). Many attempts were made to address this issue, unsuccessfully. One new potential solution was found, but could not be executed before the end of this PhD. Instead, it is presented in the next section, on future perspectives.

Fifth, the data and its analysis were not discussed with the participants, a practice that is becoming more and more common in critical studies as a replacement for traditional measures of reliability (Gaskell & Bauer, 2000). Participants in study 3 were offered the possibility to send comments or discuss their answers when they were sent the debriefing document, but none chose to do so (although some responded to discuss the aims of the research or the protocol). While I long contemplated the idea of using respondent validation, I chose against it for two reasons: 1) it may be difficult for participants to hear/read themselves, especially if they have

never done so before, and 2) the analysis of the results involves a specific theoretical and methodological position as well as a certain distance towards the object. Thus, the potential analytical gains seemed too limited in comparison to the ethical and methodological concerns. However, it would have been interesting, if I had had the time, to discuss the findings with the participants by using a report specifically created for this purpose and explaining, among other things, the context of the study and how the data was analysed in a manner accessible to non-specialists.

Finally, none of the studies proposed focused on the memory of a single event or a single group. While this was a choice made in order to explore other aspects of collective memory, it also has some limitations. In particular, it would have been very interesting to apply the models developed in this thesis to a more classic study of collective memory. This could have allowed me to check the models against different forms of collective memory – seeing where they fit and where they don't. This could also have helped me, perhaps, to propose a more integrative model of collective memory based on what was constructed in this thesis.

V. Future Perspectives

The contributions and limits of this work point towards some interesting future perspectives, which I discuss alongside the research projects they could lead to. First, it would be interesting to extend the qualitative experiment, by refining the vignettes presented – adapting them following the results obtained in study 3 – and more importantly by increasing participation, both in terms of numbers and variety. One possibility would be to transform it into an online experiment using an online survey software and combining open (qualitative) and closed (quantitative) questions. This would perhaps extend the pool of participants by making it less 'scary' than a face to face interview on history, for instance by giving the participants the opportunity to check some sources if they wish. It would also make it easier to administrate, allowing for more variation of the experiment, for instance to propose combinations of vignettes that seemed to have favoured, taken together, the emergence of new historical representations.

Second, it would be interesting to study the representations of a specific historical event – as discussed in the limitations – across several social groups. In particular, following on the previous point, one could use a dialogical experiment to study the representations of a historical event (and not just a recent event): instead of collecting static stories about the past, it would allow us to study the historical representations of an event in their dialogicality, for instance by looking at the antinomies that traverse them.

Third, future research could focus on issues of trust in the sources of information. Indeed, this is an important aspect of historical reasoning that was highlighted in the third study, but which deserves to be studied further. In particular, most participants said that they rejected some of the vignettes because of their source, yet it seemed to depend more on the type of information provided than on the source itself. This issue could be included in a dialogical experiment on a historical event. However, the recent rise of post-truth politics (Higgins, 2016) shows that the question of trust in one's sources of information goes much deeper than collective memory. It would thus be interesting to study, at a more general level, how people trust or resist information about their social environment and to explore whether the use of the Internet and mass media fundamentally affects the way we think about the social world.

Another venue for future research would be to explore further the trajectories of individual's representations on a social object, to see if similar patterns can be found. For instance, research could focus on publicly available data where activists discuss their trajectory and what led them to take action – such as an oral history project that has collected this type of interviews[34]. This would expend on the findings presented in this thesis, and offer the advantages of public data (ease of collection and transparency). As a last suggestion for future research, one could also focus on longitudinal data, avoiding the pitfalls of a posteriori accounts, for instance by studying public figures and the evolution of their discourses on their object of interest.

These are only a few of the many possibilities that emerged from this thesis. This is because, as any scholarly work, it has left more questions than it has brought answers. This is not, I hope, because it has brought more confusion than clarity, but because it has opened new perspectives.

---

[34] As did for instance the « Voices of Feminism Oral History Project » of the Smith College Library (https://www.smith.edu/libraries/special-collections/research-collections/resources-lists/oral-histories/voices-of-feminism)

VI. Implication for Education, Policy, and Society

To conclude this work, I would like to discuss some of its practical implication for education, policy and society. From an educational perspective, seven main implications can be outlined:

1) Importance of metamemory: the way people understand collective memory in general and how history is written is a central part of their relation to the past. It is thus necessary to include it in history education and to discuss the roots and consequences of the main representations of collective memory.

2) Importance of alternative narratives: encountering alternative narratives has undeniable consequences in adults' relation to history, both because it changes how they understand it – usually towards making them more reflexive – and because it can lead them to doubt sources they used to trust – such as school or their family – in a manner that is sometimes painful to them. It is thus important to introduce children to alternative narratives (Psaltis et al., 2017), a method has already successfully been implemented in cases of conflicts (e.g., Goldberg & Ron, 2014), and to guide them in the process. It also seemed, in the cases analysed in this thesis, that the introduction of widely different narratives – not just 'the other side' of the conflict or the other discourses one may hear in the public sphere – has a beneficial effect.

3) Importance of sources: being able to evaluate sources of information appears to be critical in people's historical reasoning. The importance of teaching children how to identify and evaluate sources has already been emphasised in history education (e.g., van Boxtel & van Drie, 2004). What this work showed, however, is that people may not be aware of their own biases towards source monitoring, something that could be included in history education. More importantly, sources of information are fast evolving in the age of Internet and social media, and new strategies need to be developed in this regard.

4) Importance of factual knowledge: having sufficient historical knowledge to be able to discuss history, and to dispose of less ambiguous information about the past seems to play a great role in people ability to reason about history. This is quite unsurprising, but it deserves to be noted as it tends to disappear from history education research and recommendations (e.g., Psaltis et al., 2017; van Drie & van Boxtel, 2007).

5) Importance of teaching the difference between facts, meanings, and subjective experiences: people rely on these forms of knowledge to discuss about the past, and are aware of the fact that they have different statuses, as was shown in study 3. Indeed, factual claims, interpretations of the significations of events, and people's subjective experiences of them do not have the same ontogenetic and epistemic status (see Chapter 1.II.E). Teaching to children how to differentiate between these, and how they can all be questioned, albeit differently, could be an invaluable resource to help them navigate alternative narratives. Being able to make the difference, for instance, between challenging the interpretations of past events and challenging the veracity of verifiable historical facts could help students understand and respond better to issues such as negationism or the rise of conspiracy theories.

6) Importance of imagination, perspective taking, and identification: because imagination plays a role in people's relation to history, it is important to include it in education and not to leave it entirely to historically inspired movies and novels, which may offer very biased pictures of the past. In this case, and as with perspective taking, it is also important to make children sensible to the fact that our impression of what it was like, what it would have been like to be there, and how we would have behaved then may not be quite accurate, as this may support misinterpretations of the past (for instance over-estimating resistance during World War II by imagining that we would have necessarily participated to it, a myth debunked in part by Milgram's experiment). Moreover, it is important to problematise issues of identification, and how/why we tend to identify more our groups with heroes or victims.

7) Importance of generalisations, analogies, and categorisations: while history education has long highlighted the importance of cognitive processes such as conceptualisations (e.g., Tutiaux-Guillon & Bataillon, 1992), less has been said about children's ability to make connections between distant periods or places – a tendency globally not encouraged in history. However, adults frequently use generalisation, analogies, and categorisations to connect, compare, and discuss different historical periods, and to make the past relevant for the present and the future. Thus, teaching children these processes could be beneficial, by helping them use the past more efficiently to think about the world and the present, and by helping them question dubious analogies and generalisations.

Globally, thus, the implication of this research for history education is that its scope should be expended to support children's understanding of the past in general and their ability to mobilise it efficiently.

This also has consequences for policy and society. First, almost all the implications presented above can also be applied for the development of museum exhibits, cultural programmes, and commemorations of history. Second, at a more political level, the research discussed and constructed in this thesis shows that attempting to impose a unified narrative is a vain endeavour: collective memory is organised around antinomic oppositions, and trying to produce a monologue about the past only polarises the positions of others. Third, if what is said about the past matters so much for the present and for the future, then more checks should be put in place not to leave abusive uses of history unsanctioned. While some forms of historical denial are punished by law in some countries – it is for instance illegal in France to deny a genocide that has been recognised by the state – most abusive uses of the past are left unquestioned. However, glorifying the past to make a point about the present – for instance through Brexit's "Take back control" or Trump's "Make America great again" – does have consequences for the way periods characterised by colonialism or segregation are understood. The point is not to say that these should be punished by law, but that perhaps they should not be left to become major political slogans without any public discussion on the matter. Fourth, national myths should be put into perspective (Psaltis et al., 2017), for instance by comparing them with the myths of other nations or to the other facets of the past that historical research has uncovered. That is, the aim is not to rid ourselves completely of any complaisant version of the past – after all, thinking of our nations as championing justice, equality, and freedom is also what pushes people to take action when they do not – but not to consider them as an undeniable truth that reflects who we (and others) essentially are.

Finally, and most importantly, collective memory gives us the impression that nations are both natural and eternal, to the point that living without them seems unimaginable (Billig & Marinho, 2017). They give us a sense that the world we live in is the logical and direct conclusion of the past, and that the future can only be the prolongation of this trajectory. Being able to question historical narratives, interpretations of the past, and more generally how we construct representations of the world thus has tremendous potential. It has the potential to make us free to imagine new societies, new ways of being together, and new ways of relating to our environment, that perhaps would be less inclined towards nationalism, populism, and exclusion.

References

Abbey, E., & Zittoun, T. (2010). The social dynamics of social science research. Between poetry and the conveyer belt. *Qualitative Studies, 1*(1), 2–17.

Abélès, M. (2001). *Un ethnologue à l'Assemblée*. Paris: Odile Jacob.

Abric, J. C. (1994). *Pratiques sociales et représentations*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Ali, L., & Sonn, C. C. (2010). Constructing identity as a second-generation Cypriot Turkish in Australia. The multi-hyphenated other. *Culture & Psychology, 16*(3), 416–436. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X10361398

Anadon, M., & Guillemette, F. (2007). La recherche qualitative est-elle nécessairement inductive? *Recherches Qualitatives*, *5*, 26–37.

Anderson, D. R. (1986). The evolution of Peirce's concept of abduction. *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 22*(2), 145–164.

Asimov, I. (1978). Foreword. In R. Holdstock (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of science fiction* (pp. 6–8). London, England: Octopus Books.

Atkinson, R. (2001). The life story interview. In J. Gubrium & J. Holstein (Eds.), *Handbook of interview research* (pp. 120–140). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412973588.n9

Austin, J. (1975). *How to do things with words* (2 edition). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Aveling, E.-L., & Gillespie, A. (2008). Negociating multuplicity. Adaptive asymmetries within second-generation turks' "society of mind." *Journal of Constructivist Psychology*, *21*, 200–222. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10720530802070635

Awad, S. H. (2017). Documenting a contested memory: Symbols in the changing city space of Cairo. *Culture & Psychology*, *23*(2), 234–254. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X17695760

Bakhtin, M. M. (1981). *The dialogic imagination: four essays*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Bakhtin, M. M. (1986). *Speech genres and other late essays*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Bar-Tal, D. (2014). Collective memory as social representations. *Papers on Social Representations*, *23*, 5.1-5.26.

Barthes, R. (1977). *Elements of semiology*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Bartlett, F. C. (1932). *Remembering. A study in experimental and social psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barton, K. C. (1997). "I just kinda know". Elementary students' ideas about historical evidence. *Theory & Research in Social Education*, *25*(4), 407–430. https://doi.org/10.1080/00933104.1997.10505821

Bauer, M. W., & Gaskell, G. D. (1999). Towards a paradigm for research on social representations. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, *29*, 163–186. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5914.00096

Bauer, M. W., & Gaskell, G. D. (Eds.). (2000). *Qualitative researching with text, image and sound. A practical handbook for social research*. London: Sage Publications.

Bauer, M. W., Gaskell, G. D., & Allum, N. C. (2000). Quality, quantity and knowledge interests. Avoiding confusions. In M. W. Bauer & G. D. Gaskell (Eds.), *Qualitative researching with text, image and sound* (pp. 4–17). London: Sage Publications. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781849209731.n1

Beim, A. (2007). The Cognitive Aspects of Collective Memory. *Symbolic Interaction*, *30*(1), 7–26. https://doi.org/10.1525/si.2007.30.1.7

Belzen, J. A. (2010). *Towards cultural psychology of religion. Principles, approaches, applications*. New York, NY: Springer.

Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1966). *The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. London: Penguin.

Berghahn, D. (2006). Post-1990 screen memories. How East and West German cinema remembers the Third Reich and the Holocaust. *German Life and Letters*, *59*(2), 294–308. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0016-8777.2006.00351.x

Berntsen, D., & Bohn, A. (2010). Remembering and forecasting: The relation between autobiographical memory and episodic future thinking. *Memory & Cognition*, *38*(3), 265–278. https://doi.org/10.3758/MC.38.3.265

Billig, M. (1987). *Arguing and thinking. A rhetorical approach to social psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Billig, M. (1995). *Banal nationalism*. London: Sage Publications.

Billig, M. (1998). Repopulating social psychology. A revised version of events. In B. Bayer & J. Shotter (Eds.), *Reconstructing the Psychological Subject: Bodies, Practices and Technologies* (pp. 126–152). London: Sage Publication.

Billig, M. (2013). *Learn to write badly. How to succeed in the social sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Billig, M., Candor, S., Edwards, D., Gane, M., Middleton, D. J., & Radley, A. (1988). *Ideological dilemnas. A social psychology for everyday thinking*. London: Sage Publications.

Billig, M., & Marinho, C. (2017). *The politics and rhetoric of commemoration. How the Portuguese Parliament celebrates the 1974 Revolution*. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Blanchard, P., & Veyrat-Masson, I. (2008). *Les guerres de mémoires. La France et son histoire*. Paris: La Découverte.

Boesch, E. (1997). The sound of the violin. In M. Cole, Y. Engestrom, & O. Vasquez (Eds.), *Mind, culture and activity. Seminal papers from the laboratory of comparative human cognition* (pp. 164–184). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brescó de Luna, I. (in press). How the future weights on the past. Prolepsis and other ways of reconstructing the past in relation to different imagined futures. In C. de Saint-Laurent, S. Obradović, & K. Carriere (Eds.), *Imagining collective futures. Perspectives from social, cultural and political psychology*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Brescó de Luna, I. (2009). Form and content of historical accounts. Studying the (re)construction of past events through different narratives and identitarian positionings. *Psychology & Society*, *2*(2), 102–123.

Brescó de Luna, I. (2017). The end into the beginning. Prolepsis and the reconstruction of the collective past. *Culture & Psychology*, *23*(2), 280–294. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X17695761

Breux, S., Arcidiacono, F., & Perret-Clermont, A.-N. (2014). Reprendre la parole de l'autre dans une situation d'entretien piagétien. *TRANEL*, *60*, 109–120.

Brinkmann, S. (2012). *Qualitative inquiry in everyday life. Working with everyday life materials*. London: Sage Publications.

Brinkmann, S. (2013). *Qualitative interviewing*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brinkmann, S. (2016). Methodological breaching experiments. Steps toward theorizing the qualitative interview. *Culture & Psychology*, *22*(4), 520–533. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X16650816

Brockmeier, J. (2002a). Introduction. Searching for cultural memory. *Culture & Psychology*, *8*(1), 5–14. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X02008001616

Brockmeier, J. (2002b). Remembering and forgetting. Narrative as cultural memory. *Culture & Psychology*, *8*(1), 15–43. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X0281002

Brockmeier, J. (2010). After the archive. Remapping memory. *Culture & Psychology*, *16*(1), 5–35. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X09353212

Brown, S. D., Middleton, D. J., & Lightfoot, G. (2001). Performing the Past in Electronic Archives: Interdependencies in the Discursive and Non-Discursive Ordering of Institutional Rememberings. *Culture & Psychology*, *7*(2), 123–144. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X0172001

Brown, S. D., & Reavey, P. (2015). *Vital memory and affect. Living with a difficult past*. London: Routledge.

Brown, S. D., & Reavey, P. (2017). False memories and real epistemic problems. *Culture & Psychology*, *23*(2), 171–185. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X17695764

Bruner, J. S. (1986). *Actual minds, possible worlds*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University press.

Bruner, J. S. (1987). Life as narrative. *Social Research*, *54*, 11–32.

Bruner, J. S. (1990). *Acts of meaning*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bruner, J. S. (1991). The narrative construction of reality. *Critical Inquiry*, *18*, 1–21.

Bruner, J. S. (2003). *Making stories. Law, literature, life*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Cameron, J. J., Wilson, A. E., & Ross, M. (2004). Autobiographical memory and self-assessment. In D. R. Bleike, J. M. Lampinen, & D. A. Behrend (Eds.), *The self and memory* (pp. 207–226). New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Carlston, D. (Ed.). (2013). *The Oxford handbook of social cognition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199730018.001.0001

Carretero, M., & Kriger, M. (2011). Historical representations and conflicts about indigenous people as national identities. *Culture & Psychology*, *17*(2), 177–195. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X11398311

Cole, M. (1996). *Cultural psychology. A once and future discipline*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Cole, M. (2007). Phylogeny and cultural history in ontogeny. *Journal of Physiology-Paris*, *101*, 236–246.

Coman, A., Brown, A. D., Koppel, J., & Hirst, W. (2009). Collective memory from a psychological perspective. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, *22*(2), 125–141. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-009-9057-9

Connerton, P. (1989). *How societies remember*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cornish, F., & Gillespie, A. (2009). A pragmatist approach to the problem of knowledge in health psychology. *Journal of Health Psychology*, *14*, 800–809. https://doi.org/10.1177/1359105309338974

Costa-Lascoux, J. (2001). L'ethnicisation du lien social dans les banlieues françaises. *Revue Européenne de Migrations Internationales*, *17*(2), 123–138. https://doi.org/10.3406/remi.2001.1781

Dafermos, M. (2014). Soviet psychology. In T. Teo (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of critical psychology* (pp. 1828–1835). New York, NY: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5583-7_297

Dahinden, J., & Zittoun, T. (2013). Religion in meaning making and boundary work. Theoretical explorations. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science*, *47*(2), 185–206. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-013-9233-3.

Danziger, K. (2008). *Marking the mind. A history of memory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

D'Argembeau, A. (2012). Autobiographical memory and future thinking. In D. Bernsten & C. Rubin (Eds.), *Understanding autobiographical memory* (pp. 311–330). New York: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139021937.022

de Saint-Laurent, C. (in press). Staying on topic. Doing research between improvisation and systematisation. In C. Wegener, N. Meier, & E. Maslo (Eds.), *Cultivating creativity in methodology and research. In praise of detours*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

de Saint-Laurent, C. (2012). *Dialogue in democratic institutions. A dialogical analysis of the French parliamentary debates on immigration of 2006* (Unpublished dissertation). London: London School of Economics.

de Saint-Laurent, C. (2014). *L'histoire sur scène. La construction du rapport au passé dans un cadre atypique* (Unpublished research report). Neuchâtel: University of Neuchâtel.

de Saint-Laurent, C. (2015a). Dialogue and debate in psychology. Commentary on the foundational myth of psychology as a science. In J. Cresswell, A. Haye, A. Larrain, M.

Morgan, & G. Sullivan (Eds.), *Dialogue and debate in the making of theoretical psychology* (pp. 231–239). Ontario: Captus.

de Saint-Laurent, C. (2015b). (No) Empathy for the monkey? Book review of "The cultural origins of human cognition." *Europe's Journal of Psychology*, *11*(2), 363–368. https://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v11i2.990

de Saint-Laurent, C. (2017). Memory acts. A theory for the study of collective memory in everyday life. *Journal of Constructivist Psychology*, (Online first), 1–15. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10720537.2016.1271375

de Saint-Laurent, C., Brescó de Luna, I., Awad, S. H., & Wagoner, B. (2017). Collective memory and social sciences in the post-truth era. *Culture & Psychology*, *23*(2), 147–155. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X17695769

de Saint-Laurent, C., & Glăveanu, V. P. (in press). Cultural psychology and politics. Otherness, democracy and the refugee crisis. In B. Wagoner, I. Brescó de Luna, & V. P. Glăveanu (Eds.), *The road to actuliazed democracy*. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.

de Saint-Laurent, C., & Zittoun, T. (in press). Memory in life transitions. In B. Wagoner (Ed.), *Handbook of memory and culture*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Debbasch, R. (1988). *Le principe révolutionnaire d'unité et d'indivisibilité de la République. Essai d'histoire politique.* (Vol. 18). Marseille: Economica.

Delori, M. (2011). Le poids de la mémoire sur la politique étrangère. *Politique Européenne*, *34*(2), 231–241. https://doi.org/10.3917/poeu.034.0231

Déloye, Y. (2002). Halbwachs Maurice (1877-1945). In J. Barus-Michel, E. Enriquez, & A. Lévy (Eds.), *Vocabulaire de psychosociologie* (pp. 498–500). Paris: Eres.

Diriwächter, R. (2012). Völkerpsychologie. In J. Valsiner (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of culture and psychology* (pp. 43–57). New York: Oxford University Press.

Doise, W. (1993). *Logiques sociales dans le raisonnement*. Neuchâtel/Paris: Delachaux et Niestlé.

Dudai, Y., & Carruthers, M. (2005). The Janus face of Mnemosyne. *Nature*, *434*(7033), 567–567. https://doi.org/10.1038/434567a

Duveen, G. (2001). Representations, identities, resistance. In K. Deaux & G. Philogene (Eds.), *Representations of the social* (pp. 257–270). Oxford: Blackwell.

Echterhoff, G. (2011). The pervasiveness of memory. *Culture & Psychology*, *17*(1), 3–9. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X10388856

Edwards, D., Middleton, D. J., & Potter, J. (1992). Remembering as a discursive phenomenon. *The Psychologist*, *15*, 441–446.

Elder, G. H. (1998). The life course as developmental theory. *Child Development*, *69*(1), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1998.tb06128.x

Engeström, Y. (1987). *Learning by expanding. An activity-theorical approach to developmental research*. Helsinki: Orienta-Konsultit Oy.

Engeström, Y. (1999). Learning by expanding. Ten years after. Introduction to the German and also Japanese edition of 'Learning by expanding', published in 1999. Retrieved from http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Paper/Engestrom/expanding/intro.htm

Engeström, Y. (2001). Expansive learning at work. Toward an activity theoretical reconceptualization. *Journal of Education and Work*, *14*(1), 133–156. https://doi.org/10.1080/13639080020028747

Engeström, Y. (2009). Expansive learning. Toward an activity-theoretical reconceptualization. In K. Illeris (Ed.), *Contempary theories of learning* (pp. 59–87). London: Routledge.

Ergur, A. (2009). Shame and pride in Turkish collective memory. *Turkish Policy Quaterly*, *8*(1), 89–98.

Evans, J. (1989). *Bias in human reasoning. Causes and consequences*. Brighton: Erlbaum.

Evans, J., & Over, D. E. (1996). *Rationality and reasoning*. Hove: Psychology Press.

Evers, C. W., & Wu, E. H. (2006). On generalising from single case studies. Epistemological reflections. *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, *40*(4), 511–526. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.2006.00519.x

Farr, R. M. (1996). *The roots of modern social psychology: 1872-1954*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Farr, R. M., & Anderson, T. (1983). Beyond actor-observer differences in perspective. Extensions and applications. In M. Hewstone (Ed.), *Attribution theory. Social and functional extensions* (pp. 45–64). Oxford: Blackwell.

Fasulo, A. (2002). 'Hiding on a glass roof', or a commentator's exercise on 'rewriting memories.' *Culture & Psychology*, *8*(1), 146–152. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X02008001627

Favero, P. (2010). Italians, the "good people". Reflections on national self-representation in contemporary Italian debates on xenophobia and war. *Outlines. Critical Practice Studies*, *12*(2), 138–153.

Fernyhough, C. (2008). Getting Vygotskian about theory of mind. Mediation, dialogue, and the development of social understanding. *Developmental Review*, *28*(2), 225–262. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2007.03.001

Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). *Social cognition*. Singapore: McGraw-Hill.

Fivush, R. (2011). The development of autobiographical memory. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *62*(1), 559–582. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.121208.131702

Fivush, R., Bohanek, J. G., & Duke, M. (2008). The intergenerational self. Subjective perspective and family history. In F. Sani (Ed.), *Self continuity. Individual and collective perspectives* (pp. 131–143). New York, NY, US: Psychology Press.

Flick, U. (2014). *An introduction to qualitative research*. London: Sage Publications.

Foucault, M. (1993). *Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison*. Paris: Gallimard.

Fuchs, A. (2006). From 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung' to generational memory contests in Günter Grass, Monika Maron and Uwe Timm. *German Life and Letters*, *59*(2), 169–186. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0016-8777.2006.00343.x

Gall, M. D., Gall, J. P., & Borg, W. R. (2003). *Educational research. An introduction*. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.

Gaskell, G. D., & Bauer, M. W. (2000). Towards public accountability. Beyond sampling, reliability and validity. In M. W. Bauer & G. D. Gaskell (Eds.), *Qualitative researching with text, image and sound* (pp. 337–350). London: Sage Publications. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781849209731.n19

Gavriely-Nuri, D. (2013). Collective memory as a metaphor. The case of speeches by Israeli prime ministers 2001-2009. *Memory Studies*, *7*(1), 46–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698013497953

Gergen, K. J. (1973). Social psychology as history. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *26*, 309–320.

Gillespie, A. (2005). G.H. Mead. Theorist of the social act. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, *35*(1), 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0021-8308.2005.00262.x

Gillespie, A. (2006). *Becoming other. From social interaction to self-reflection*. Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing.

Gillespie, A. (2008). Social representations, alternative representations and semantic barriers. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, *38*, 375–391. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5914.2008.00376.x

Gillespie, A. (2011). Foreword. In M. Märtsin (Ed.), *Dialogicality in focus. Challenges to theory, method and application.* New York: Nova Science Publishers.

Gillespie, A., & Cornish, F. (2010). Intersubjectivity. Towards a dialogical analysis. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, *40*, 19–46. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5914.2009.00419.x

Gillespie, A., Cornish, F., Aveling, E.-L., & Zittoun, T. (2008). Conflicting community commitments. A dialogical analysis of a British woman's World War II diaries. *Journal of Community Psychology*, *36*(1), 35–52. https://doi.org/10.1002/jcop.20215

Gillespie, A., Howarth, C., & Cornish, F. (2012). Four problems for researchers using social categories. *Culture & Psychology*, *18*, 391–402. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X12446236

Gillespie, A., & Martin, J. (2014). Position exchange theory. A socio-material basis for discursive and psychological positioning. *New Ideas in Psychology*, *32*, 73–79. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2013.05.001

Girier, J.-M. (2007). *L'identité en debat. Representations et ideologies dans les discours sur l'immigration au sein de l'espace public.* (Unpublished Master Dissertation). Université de Lyon II, Lyon. Retrieved from http://www.memoireonline.com/09/07/590/identite-en-debat-representations-et-ideologies.html

Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). *The discovery of grounded theory. Strategies for qualitative research.* Chicago, IL: Aldine Publishing Company.

Glăveanu, V. P. (2010). Principles for a cultural psychology of creativity. *Culture & Psychology*, *16*, 147–164.

Glăveanu, V. P., & de Saint-Laurent, C. (in press). Taking the perspective of others. A conceptual model and its application to the refugee crisis. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology.*

Glăveanu, V. P., & de Saint-Laurent, C. (2015). Political imagination, otherness and the European crisis. *Europe's Journal of Psychology*, *11*(4), 557–564. https://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v11i4.1085

Glăveanu, V. P., de Saint-Laurent, C., & Literat, I. (submitted). Making sense of refugees on social media. Perspective-taking, political imagination, and Internet memes. *American Behavioral Scientist*.

Goldberg, T., & Ron, Y. (2014). 'Look, each side says something different'. The impact of competing history teaching approaches on Jewish and Arab adolescents' discussions of the Jewish–Arab conflict. *Journal of Peace Education*, *11*(1), 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/17400201.2013.777897

Gómez-Estern, B. M., & de la Mata Benítez, M. L. (2013). Narratives of migration. Emotions and the interweaving of personal and cultural identity through narrative. *Culture & Psychology*, *19*(3), 348–368. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X13489316

Greco Morasso, S., & Zittoun, T. (2014). The trajectory of food as a symbolic resource for international migrants. *Outlines. Critical Practice Studies*, *15*(1), 28–48.

Griffin, C. (2007). Being dead and being there. Research interviews, sharing hand cream and the preference for analysing `naturally occurring data'. *Discourse Studies*, *9*(2), 246–269. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461445607075340

Grossen, M. (2001). La notion de contexte. Quelle définition pour quelle psychologie? Un essai de mise au point. In J.-P. Bernié (Ed.), *Apprentissage, développement et significations* (pp. 59–76). Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux.

Grossen, M. (2010). Interaction analysis and psychology. A dialogical perspective. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science*, *44*(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-009-9108-9

Grossen, M., & Salazar Orvig, A. (2011). Dialogism and dialogicality in the study of the self. *Culture & Psychology*, *17*(4), 491–509. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X11418541

Haas, V., & Jodelet, D. (2000). La mémoire, ses aspects sociaux et collectifs. In N. Roussiau (Ed.), *Manuel de psychologie sociale* (pp. 121–134). Paris: Editions In Press.

Habermas, T. (2007). How to tell a life. The development of the cultural concept of biography. *Journal of Cognition and Development*, *8*(1), 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1080/15248370709336991

Habermas, T. (2012). Identity, emotion, and the social matrix of autobiographical memory. A psychoanalytic narrative view. In D. Bernsten & D. Rubin (Eds.), *Understanding autobiographical memory. Theories and approaches* (pp. 33–53). Cambridge University Press.

Hacker, P. M. S. (2012). The relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology to the psychological sciences. In P. Stekeler (Ed.), *Wittgenstein. Zu Philosophie und Wissenschaft. Proceedings of the Leipzig conference on Wittgenstein and science 2007* (pp. 205–223). Hamburg: Meiner Verlag.

Haegel, F. (2005). Pertinence, déplacement et renouvellement des analyses en termes de clivage en France. *Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée*, *12*, 35–45. https://doi.org/10.3917/ripc.121.0035

Halbwachs, M. (1950). *La mémoire collective*. Paris: Albin Michel.

Halbwachs, M. (1992). *On collective memory*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Hammack, P. L. (2010). The cultural psychology of Palestinian youth. A narrative approach. *Culture & Psychology*, *16*(4), 507–537. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X10380159

Harré, R., & Gillett, G. (1994). *The discursive mind*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452243788

Hartmann, U., & Hasselhorn, M. (2008). Historical perspective taking. A standardized measure for an aspect of students' historical thinking. *Learning and Individual Differences*, *18*(2), 264–270. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lindif.2007.10.002

Herlihy, J., Jobson, L., & Turner, S. (2012). Just tell us what happened to you. Autobiographical memory and seeking asylum. *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, *26*(5), 661–676. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.2852

Hermans, H. (2002). The dialogical self as a society of mind. Introduction. *Theory & Psychology*, *12*, 147–160. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354302122001

Hewer, C. J., & Kut, M. (2010). Historical legacy, social memory and representations of the past within a Polish community. *Memory Studies*, *3*(1), 18–32. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698009348292

Hewstone, M., & Brown, R. (1986). Contact is not enough. An intergroup perspective on the 'contact hypothesis.' In M. Hewstone & R. Brown (Eds.), *Contact and conflict in intergroup encounters* (pp. 1–41). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Higgins, K. (2016). Post-truth. A guide for the perplexed. *Nature News*, *540*(7631), 9. https://doi.org/10.1038/540009a

Hirst, W., & Echterhoff, G. (2012). Remembering in conversations: the social sharing and reshaping of memories. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *63*, 55–79. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-120710-100340

Holtz, P., Dahinden, J., & Wagner, W. (2013). German muslims and the 'integration debate'. Negotiating identities in the face of discrimination. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science*, *47*(2), 231–248. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-012-9227-6

Holyoak, K. J. (2005). Analogy. In K. J. Holyoak & R. G. Morrison (Eds.), *The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning* (pp. 117–142). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Holyoak, K. J., & Morrison, R. G. (Eds.). (2005). *The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hopf, C. (2004). Qualitative interviews. An overview. In U. Flick, E. von Kardoff, & I. Steinke (Eds.), *A companion to qualitative research* (pp. 203–208). London: Sage Publications.

Hviid, P. (2008). "Next year we are small right?" Different times in children's development. *European Journal of Psychology of Education*, *23*, 183–198. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03172744

Jahoda, G. (2007). *A history of social psychology. From the eighteenth-century Enlightenment to the Second World War*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Jahoda, G. (2012). Culture and psychology. Words and ideas in history. In J. Valsiner (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of culture and psychology* (pp. 25–42). Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

James, W. (1890). *The principles of psychology* (Vol. I). New York: Dover Publications.

James, W. (1922). *Pragmatism. A new name for some old ways of thinking*. New York and London: Longmans, Green and Co.

Johnson, R. B., Onwuegbuzie, A. J., & Turner, L. A. (2007). Toward a definition of mixed methods research. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, *1*(2), 112–133. https://doi.org/10.1177/1558689806298224

Jovchelovitch, S. (2002). Re-thinking the diversity of knowledge. Cognitive polyphasia, belief and representation. *Psychologie & Société*, *5*, 121–138.

Jovchelovitch, S. (2007a). In defence of representations. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, *26*, 121–135. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5914.1996.tb00525.x

Jovchelovitch, S. (2007b). *Knowledge in context. Representations, community and culture*. Hove and New York: Routledge.

Jovchelovitch, S. (2012). Narrative, memory and social representations. A conversation between history and social psychology. *Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science*, *46*(4), 440–456. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-012-9217-8

Julliard, J. (2012). *Les gauches françaises. Histoire, politique et imaginaire, 1762-2012*. Paris: Flammarion.

Kansteiner, W. (2002). Finding meaning in memory. A methodological critique of collective memory studies. *History and Theory*, *41*(2), 179–197. https://doi.org/10.1111/0018-2656.00198

Kansteiner, W. (2010). Memory, media and Menschen. Where is the individual in collective memory studies? *Memory Studies*, *3*(1), 3–4. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698009348276

Katriel, T. (1994). Sites of memory. Discourses of the past in Israeli pioneering settlement museums. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, *80*, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/00335639409384052

Katzev, R., & Brownstein, R. (1989). The influence of enlightenment on compliance. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, *129*, 335–347.

Keyes, R. (2004). *The post-truth era. Dishonesty and deception in contemporary life*. New York: Macmillan.

King, B. (2002). On patterned interactions and culture in great apes. In R. Fox & B. King (Eds.), *Anthropology beyond culture* (pp. 83–104). Oxford: Berg.

King, N., & Horrocks, C. (2010). *Interviews in qualitative research*. London: Sage Publications.

Kirschner, S. R., & Martin, J. (2010). The sociocultural turn in psychology. An introduction and an invitation. In S. R. Kirschner & J. Martin (Eds.), *The sociocultural turn in psychology. The contextual emergence of mind and self* (pp. 3–27). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Kulyk, V. (2011). The media, history and identity. Competing narratives of the past in the Ukrainian popular press. *National Identities*, *13*, 287–303. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2011.591373

Kvale, S., & Brinkmann, S. (2009). *InterViews. Learning the craft of qualitative research interviewing*. London: Sage Publications.

Lamont, M., & Molnár, V. (2002). The study of boundaries in the social sciences. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *28*(1), 167–195. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.28.110601.141107

Landowski, E. (1977). Le débat parlementaire et l'écriture de la loi. *Revue Française de Science Politique*, *27*, 428–441.

Landowski, E. (1989). *La société réfléchie*. Paris: Editions du Seuil.

Lang, J. (2001). Ouverture des travaux. In D. Borne, J.-L. Nembrini, & J.-P. Rioux (Eds.), *Actes de la DESCO université d'été octobre 2001* (pp. 3–7). Versailles: CRDP.

Latour, B. (2000). When things strike back. A possible contribution of "science studies" to the social sciences. *British Journal of Sociology*, *51*, 107–123. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2000.00107.x

Le Bon, G. (1896). *Psychologie des foules*. Paris: Alcan.

Léchot, C., Grossen, M., Laufer, D., Ansermet, F., & Germond, M. (2013). The category 'natural' in the discourse of couples who used medically assisted procreation. *Journal of Applied Linguistics and Professional Practice*, *8*(2), 187–208. https://doi.org/10.1558/japl.v8i2.187

Lee, K. (2014). Fighting in the shadow of the past. The mobilizing role of vernacular memories of the 1987 pro-democracy movement in the 2008 candlelight protests in Korea. *Memory Studies*, *7*(1), 61–75. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698013497954

Leone, G., & Mastrovito, T. (2010). Learning about our shameful past. A socio-psychological analysis of present-day historical narratives of Italian colonial wars. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV)*, *4*(1), 11–27. https://doi.org/10.4119/UNIBI/ijcv.57

Leveau, R. (1994). L'Islam et la construction de l'Europe. *Revue Européenne de Migrations Internationales*, *10*(1), 157–168. https://doi.org/10.3406/remi.1994.1396

Licata, L., Klein, O., & Gély, R. (2007). Mémoire des conflits, conflits de mémoires. Une approche psychosociale et philosophique du rôle de la mémoire collective dans les processus de réconciliation intergroupe. *Social Science Information*, *46*(4), 563–589. https://doi.org/10.1177/0539018407082593

Linell, P. (2009). *Rethinking language, mind and world dialogically. Interactional and contextual theories of sense making*. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.

Liu, J. H., Goldstein-Hawes, R., Hilton, D., Huang, L.-L., Gastardo-Conaco, C., Dresler-Hawke, E., … Hidaka, Y. (2005). Social representations of events and people in world history

across 12 cultures. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *36*(2), 171–191. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022104272900

Liu, J. H., & Hilton, D. (2005). How the past weighs on the present. Social representations of history and their role in identity politics. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *44*, 537–556. https://doi.org/10.1348/014466605X27162

Liu, J. H., Wilson, M. S., McClure, J., & Higgins, T. R. (1999). Social identity and the perception of history. Cultural representations of Aotearoa/New Zealand. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *29*, 1021–1047. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199912)29:8<1021::AID-EJSP975>3.0.CO;2-4

Liu, L. (2004). Sensitising concept, themata and shareness. A dialogical perspective of social representations. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, *34*, 249–264. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0021-8308.2004.00247.x

Manin, B. (2008). *Principes du governement representatif*. Paris: Flammarion.

Marková, I. (2000). Amédée or how to get rid of it. Social representations from a dialogical perspective. *Culture & Psychology*, *6*, 419–460. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X0064002

Marková, I. (2003). *Dialogicality and social representations. The dynamics of mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marková, I. (2016). *The dialogical mind. Common sense and ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marková, I., Linell, P., Grossen, M., & Salazar Orvig, A. (2007). *Dialogue in focus groups. Exploring socially shared knowledge*. London: Equinox.

Martin, J. (2013). Life positioning analysis. An analytic framework for the study of lives and life narratives. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology*, *33*(1), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0025916

Martin, J., & Gillespie, A. (2010). A neo-Meadian approach to human agency. Relating the social and the psychological in the ontogenesis of perspective-coordinating persons. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science*, *44*, 252-272 %U http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12124-010-9126–7.

Mason, M. (2010). Sample size and saturation in PhD studies using qualitative interviews. *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, *11*(3), Art. 8. https://doi.org/http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs100387

Mattli, F., Schnitzspahn, K. M., Studerus-Germann, A., Brehmer, Y., & Zöllig, J. (2014). Prospective memory across the lifespan. Investigating the contribution of retrospective and prospective processes. *Neuropsychology, Development, and Cognition. Section B, Aging, Neuropsychology and Cognition*, *21*(5), 515–543. https://doi.org/10.1080/13825585.2013.837860

McAdams, D. P. (1988). Biography, narrative, and lives. An introduction. *Journal of Personality*, *56*(1), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1988.tb00460.x

McAdams, D. P. (1993). *The stories we live by. Personal myths and the making of the self.* New York: William Morrow.

McVee, M. B., Dunsmore, K., & Gavelek, J. R. (2005). Schema theory revisited. *Review of Educational Research*, *75*(4), 531–566. https://doi.org/10.3102/00346543075004531

Mead, G. H. (1977). *On social psychology*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Mehmeti, T., & Perret-Clermont, A.-N. (2016). Seeking success of migrant students through designed tasks. A case study with Albanian students in Switzerland. In A. Surian (Ed.), *Open spaces for interactions and learning diversities.* (pp. 137–150). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.

Merck, C., Topcu, M. N., & Hirst, W. (2016). Collective mental time travel. Creating a shared future through our shared past. *Memory Studies*, *9*(3), 284–294. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698016645236

Middleton, D. J. (1997). Conversational remembering and uncertainty. Interdependencies of experience as individual and collective concerns in teamwork. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, *16*(4), 389–410. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X970164002

Middleton, D. J., & Brown, S. D. (2005). *The social psychology of experience. Studies in remembering and forgetting*. London: Sage Publications.

Middleton, D. J., & Edwards, D. (1990). *Collective remembering*. London: Sage Publications.

Milgram, S. (1974). *Obedience to authority. An experimental view*. London: Tavistock Publications.

Milza, P., & Bernstein, S. (1987). *Histoire du XXème siècle. Tome 2. De 1945 à 1973, le monde entre guerre et paix*. Bruxelles: Editions Complexe.

Misak, C. (2004). Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914). In C. Misak (Ed.), *The Cambridge companion to Peirce* (pp. 1–26). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521570069.001

Monte-Sano, C., & Paz, S. D. L. (2012). Using writing tasks to elicit adolescents' historical reasoning. *Journal of Literacy Research*, *44*(3), 273–299. https://doi.org/10.1177/1086296X12450445

Moscovici, S. (1961). *La psychanalyse, son image et son public*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Moscovici, S. (1973). Foreword. In C. Herzlich (Ed.), *Health and illness. A social psychological analysis* (pp. ix–xiv). London: Academic Press.

Moscovici, S. (1984). The phenomenon of social representations. In R. Farr & S. Moscovici (Eds.), *Social representations* (pp. 3–69). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Moscovici, S. (1988). Notes towards a description of social representations. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *18*, 211–250.

Moscovici, S., & Perez, J. (2003). La méthode expérimentale. In S. Moscovici & F. Buschini (Eds.), *Les méthodes des sciences humaines* (pp. 59–83). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Mullally, S. L., & Maguire, E. A. (2013). Memory, imagination, and predicting the future. A common brain mechanism? *The Neuroscientist*, *20*(3), 220–234. https://doi.org/10.1177/1073858413495091

Murakami, K. (2012). *Discursive psychology of remembering and reconciliation*. New York, NY: Nova Science.

Murakami, K., & Middleton, D. J. (2006). Grave matters. Emergent networks and summation in remembering and reconciliation. *Ethos*, *34*(2), 273–296. https://doi.org/10.1525/eth.2006.34.2.273

Murray, M. (2015). Narrative psychology. In J. A. Smith (Ed.), *Qualitative psychology. A practical guide to research methods* (3rd ed., pp. 111–132). London: Sage Publications.

Nelson, K. (2003). Narrative and self, myth and memory. Emergence of the cultural self. In R. Fivush & C. A. Haden (Eds.), *Autobiographical memory and the construction of a narrative self: Developmental and cultural perspectives* (pp. 3–28). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.

Nelson, K. (2006). *Narratives from the crib*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Nelson, K. (2007). *Young minds in social worlds. Experience, meaning, and memory*. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press.

Nelson, K., & Fivush, R. (2004). The emergence of autobiographical memory. A social cultural developmental theory. *Psychological Review*, *111*(2), 486–511. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.111.2.486

Nicholson, C. (2017). The role of collective memory in protracted conflict. *Culture & Psychology*, *23*(2), 217–233. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X17695762

Nora, P. (1997). *Les lieux de mémoire*. Paris: Gallimard.

Obradović, S. (in press). Creating integration. A case study from Serbia and the EU. In C. de Saint-Laurent, S. Obradović, & K. Carriere (Eds.), *Imagining collective futures. Perspectives from social, cultural and political psychology*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Olick, J. K. (1999). Collective memory. The two cultures. *Sociological Theory*, *17*(3), 333–348. https://doi.org/10.1111/0735-2751.00083

Pachucki, M. A., Pendergrass, S., & Lamont, M. (2007). Boundary processes. Recent theoretical developments and new contributions. *Poetics*, *35*(6), 331–351. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2007.10.001

Páez, D., Bobowik, M., & Liu, J. H. (2017). Social representations of the past and competences in history education. In M. Carretero, S. Berger, & M. Grever (Eds.), *Palgrave handbook of research in historical culture and education* (pp. 491–510). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52908-4_26

Peirce, C. S. (1955). *Philosophical writings of Peirce.* (J. Buchler, Ed.). New York: Dover.

Peirce, C. S. (1985). Logic as semiotic. The theory of signs. In R. E. Innis (Ed.), *Semiotics. An introductory anthology* (Indiana University Press, pp. 1–23). Bloomington, IN.

Peirce, C. S. (1991). *Peirce on signs. Writings on semiotic.* (J. Hoopes, Ed.). Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Peirce, C. S. (1998). *The essential Peirce. Selected philosophical writings (1893-1913).* (The Peirce Edition Project, Ed.). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Piaget, J. (1964). *Six études de psychologie*. Genève: Gonthier.

Polkinghorne, D. E. (1995). Narrative configuration in qualitative analysis. *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education*, *8*(1), 5–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/0951839950080103

Pontecorvo, C., & Girardet, H. (1993). Arguing and reasoning in understanding historical topics. *Cognition and Instruction*, *11*(3/4), 365–395.

Pottage, A. (2013). Ius resistendi. Resistance as reflexivity. In M. W. Bauer, R. Harré, & C. Jenson (Eds.), *Resistance and the practice of rationality* (pp. 262–281). Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Potter, J. (1996). *Representing reality. Discourse, rhetoric and social construction*. London: Sage Publications.

Potter, J. (2016). Discursive psychology and the study of naturally occurring talk. In D. Silverman (Ed.), *Qualitative Research* (4th ed., pp. 189–206). London: Sage Publications.

Potter, J., & Edwards, D. (1999). Social representations and discursive psychology. From cognition to action. *Culture & Psychology*, *5*(4), 447–458. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X9954004

Potter, J., & Hepburn, A. (2005). Qualitative interviews in psychology. Problems and possibilities. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, *2*(4), 281–307. https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088705qp045oa

Potter, J., & Litton, I. (1985). Some problems underlying the theory of social representations. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *24*, 81–90. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8309.1985.tb00664.x

Poulter, J. (2017). The discursive reconstruction of memory and national identity. The anti-war memorial the Island of Ireland Peace Park. *Memory Studies*, 1750698016688240. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698016688240

Psaltis, C. (2012). Intergroup trust and contact in transition. A social representations perspective on Cyprus conflict. In I. Marková & A. Gillespie (Eds.), *Trust and conflict. Representation, culture and dialogue* (pp. 83–104). London: Routeldge.

Psaltis, C., McCully, A., Agbaria, A., Makriyianni, C., Pingel, F., Karahasan, H., … Papadakis, Y. (2017). *Recommendations for the history teaching of intergroup conflicts*. COST IS 1205 Working Group.

Rahman, S. A. (2010). The presence of the past. Negotiating the politics of collective memory. *Contemporary Political Theory*, *9*(1), 59–76. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/cpt.2008.44

Ratner, C. (2002). *Cultural psychology*. Boston, MA: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0677-5

Ratner, C. (2008). Cultural psychology and qualitative methodology. Scientific and political considerations. *Culture & Psychology*, *14*(3), 259–288. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X08088557

Raudsepp, M., & Wagner, W. (2012). The essentially other. Representational processes that divide groups. In I. Marková & A. Gillespie (Eds.), *Trust and conflict. Representation, culture and dialogue* (pp. 105–122). London: Routeldge.

Rautenberg, M. (2010). Stereotypes and emblems in the construction of social imagination. *Outlines. Critical Practice Studies*, *12*(2), 126–137.

Redhead, M. (2002). Making the past useful for a pluralistic present. Taylor, Arendt, and a problem for historical reasoning. *American Journal of Political Science*, *46*(4), 803–818. https://doi.org/10.2307/3088435

Reicher, S., Haslam, S. A., & Rath, R. (2008). Making a virtue of evil. A five-step social identity model of the development of collective hate. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *2*(3), 1313–1344. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2008.00113.x

Reisman, A., & Wineburg, S. (2008). Teaching the skill of contextualizing in history. *The Social Studies*, *99*(5), 202–207. https://doi.org/10.3200/TSSS.99.5.202-207

Ringer, F. K. (1989). Causal analysis in historical reasoning. *History and Theory*, *28*(2), 154–172. https://doi.org/10.2307/2505033

Rogoff, B. (1990). *Apprenticeship in thinking*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Rogoff, B. (1993). Children's guided participation and participatory appropriation in sociocultural activity. In R. H. Wozniak & K. W. Fischer (Eds.), *Development in context, acting and thinking in specific environments* (pp. 121–153). Londres: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.

Rorty, R. (1998). *Truth and progress. Philosophical papers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rose, R., & Urwin, D. W. (1970). Persistence and change in Western party system since 1945. *Political Studies*, *18*, 287–319.

Rosenstein, A. (2014). *Décris-ravage*. Théâtre Océan Nord.

Rosenthal, G. (1993). Reconstruction of life stories. Principles of selection in generating stories for narrative biographical interviews. *The Narrative Study of Lives*, *1*(1), 59–91.

Rosenthal, G., & Fisher-Rosenthal, W. (2004). The analysis of narrative-biographical interviews. In U. Flick, E. von Kardorff, & I. Steinke (Eds.), *A companion to qualitative research* (pp. 259–265). London: Sage Publications.

Rosoux, V.-B. (2001). National identity in France and Germany. From mutual exclusion to negotiation. *International Negotiation*, *6*(2), 175–198. https://doi.org/10.1163/15718060120849035

Salvatore, S., & Valsiner, J. (2010). Between the general and the unique. Overcoming the nomothetic versus idiographic opposition. *Theory & Psychology*, *20*(6), 817–833. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354310381156

Sato, T., Hidaka, T., & Fukuda, M. (2009). Depicting the dynamics of living the life. The trajectory equifinality model. In J. Valsiner, P. Molenaar, M. Lyra, & N. Chaudhary (Eds.), *Dynamic process methodology in the social and developmental sciences* (pp. 217–240). Dodrecht: Springer.

Schacter, D. L., & Addis, D. R. (2007). Constructive memory. The ghosts of past and future. *Nature*, *445*(7123), 27–27. https://doi.org/10.1038/445027a

Schmidtke, O. (2005). Re-modelling the boundaries in the new Europe. Historical memories and contemporary identities in German-Polish relations. In K. Eder & W. Spohn (Eds.), *Collective memory and european identity. The effects of integration and enlargement* (pp. 69–86). Hants: Ashgate.

Schoeman, S. (2007). Cognitive processes in history. Learners' explanation of the causes of colonialism in Africa. *South African Journal of Education*, *27*(4), 709–727.

Searle, J. R. (1995). *Construction of social reality*. London: Allen Lane.

Shi–Xu. (2002). The discourse of cultural psychology. Transforming the discourses of self, memory, narrative and culture. *Culture & Psychology*, *8*(1), 65–78. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X0281004

Shweder, R. A. (1990). Cultural Psychology. What is it ? In J. W. Stigler, R. A. Shweder, & G. Herdt (Eds.), *Cultural psychology. Essays on comparative human development* (pp. 1–43). Cambridge: Cambridge University press.

Shweder, R. A., Goodnow, J. J., Hatano, G., LeVine, R. A., Markus, H. R., & Miller, P. J. (2007). The cultural psychology of development. One mind, many mentalities. In *Handbook of child psychology* (pp. 1–13). New Jersey, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470147658.chpsy0113

Speer, S. A. (2002). "Natural" and "contrived" data. A sustainable distinction? *Discourse Studies*, *4*(4), 511–525. https://doi.org/10.1177/14614456020040040601

Spellman, B. A., & Holyoak, K. J. (1992). If Saddam is Hitler then who is George Bush? Analogical mapping between systems of social roles. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *62*(6), 913–933. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.62.6.913

Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. M. (1998). *Basics of qualitative research. Techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory* (2nd ed.). London: Sage Publications.

Szpunar, P. M., & Szpunar, K. K. (2016). Collective future thought. Concept, function, and implications for collective memory studies. *Memory Studies*, *9*(4), 376–389. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698015615660

Tajfel, H. (1970). Experiments in intergroup discrimination. *Scientific American*, *223*(5), 96–102.

Tajfel, H. (1978). Individuals and groups in social psychology. *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, *18*, 183–190.

Teo, T. (2015). Critical psychology. A geography of intellectual engagement and resistance. *American Psychologist*, *70*(3), 243–254. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0038727

Tileagă, C. (2013). *Political psychology. Critical perspectives*. Cambridge University Press.

Tulving, E. (2002). Episodic memory. From mind to brain. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *53*(1), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135114

Turner, D. (2010). Qualitative interview design. A practical guide for novice investigators. *The Qualitative Report*, *15*(3), 754–760.

Tutiaux-Guillon, N., & Bataillon, F. (1992). La conceptualisation en histoire. In F. Audigier (Ed.), *Didactiques de l'histoire, de la géographie, des sciences sociales* (Vols. 1–173-180). Paris: INRP.

Valsiner, J. (1987). *Culture and the development of the children's action. A cultural-historical theory of developmental psychology*. New York, NY: John Wiley & sons.

Valsiner, J. (1994). Irreversibility of time and the construction of historical developmental psychology. *Mind, Culture, and Activity*, *1*(1–2), 25–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/10749039409524655

Valsiner, J. (2002). Buggers in the field. Researchers as tricksters in the universe of social sciences. *Culture & Psychology*, *8*(4), 489–495. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X0284006

Valsiner, J. (2007). *Culture in minds and societies. Foundations of cultural psychology*. New Delhi: Sage.

Valsiner, J. (2009). Cultural psychology today. Innovations and oversights. *Culture Psychology*, *15*(1), 5–39. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X08101427

Valsiner, J. (2012a). Culture in psychology. A renewed encounter of inquisitive minds. In J. Valsiner (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Culture and Psychology* (pp. 3–24). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Valsiner, J. (2012b). Psychology courting culture. Future directions and their implications. In J. Valsiner (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of culture and psychology* (pp. 1092–1104). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Valsiner, J. (2014a). *An invitation to cultural psychology*. London: Sage Publications.

Valsiner, J. (2014b). Needed for cultural psychology. Methodology in a new key. *Culture & Psychology*, *20*(1), 3–30. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X13515941

Valsiner, J., & Sato, T. (2006). Historically structured sampling (HSS). How can psychology's methodology become tuned in to the reality of the historical nature of cultural psychology? In J. Straub, D. Weidemann, C. Kölbl, & B. Zielke (Eds.), *Pursuit of meaning* (pp. 215–251). Bielefeld: Transcript.

van Boxtel, C., & van Drie, J. (2004). Historical reasoning. A comparison of how experts and novices contextualise historical sources. *International Journal of Historical Learning, Teaching and Research*, *4*(2), 89–97.

Van Der Valk, I. (2003). Right-wing parliamentary discourse on immigration in France. *Discourse & Society*, *14*(3), 309–348. https://doi.org/10.1177/09579265030143004

Van der Veer, R. (2012). Cultural-historical psychology. Contributions of Lev Vygotsky. In J. Valsiner (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of culture and psychology* (pp. 58–68). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). *Understanding Vygotsky. A quest for synthesis*. London: Wiley-Blackwell.

Van Dijk, T. A. (2001). On the analysis of parliamentary debates on immigration. In M. Reisigl & R. Wodak (Eds.), *The semiotics of racism. Approaches to critical discourse analysis*. (pp. 85–104). Vienna: Passagen.

van Drie, J., & van Boxtel, C. (2007). Historical reasoning. Towards a framework for analyzing students' reasoning about the past. *Educational Psychology Review*, *20*(2), 87–110. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10648-007-9056-1

van Drie, J., & van Boxtel, C. (2011). In essence I'm only reflecting. Teaching strategies for fostering historical reasoning in whole-class discussion. *International Journal of Historical Learning, Teaching and Research*, *10*(1), 55–66.

van Drie, J., van Boxtel, C., Erkens, G., & Kanselaar, G. (2005). Using representational tools to support historical reasoning in computer-supported collaborative learning. *Technology, Pedagogy and Education*, *14*(1), 25–41. https://doi.org/10.1080/14759390500200191

Vendler, Z. (1984). *The matter of minds*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Verene, D. P. (1981). *Vico's science of imagination*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Vico, G. (1999). *New science*. London: Penguin UK.

Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). *Mind in society. The development of higher psychological processes*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Vygotsky, L. S. (1981). The instrumental method in psychology. In J. Wertsch (Ed.), *The concept of activity in Soviet psychology* (p. 134–188.). New York.

Vygotsky, L. S. (1991). Imagination and creativity of the adolescent. *Soviet Psychology*, *21*(1), 73–88.

Vygotsky, L. S. (2004). Imagination and creativity in childhood. *Journal of Russian and East European Psychology*, *42*(1), 7–97.

Vygotsky, L. S., & Luria, A. (1994). Tool and symbol in child development. In R. V. de Veer & J. Valsiner (Eds.), *The Vygotsky reader* (pp. 99–174). Oxford: Blackwell.

Vygotsky, L. S., & Rieber, R. W. (1997). The problem of the development of higher mental functions. In *The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky* (Vol. 4: The History of the Development of the Higher Mental Functions). New-York and London: Plenum Press.

Wagoner, B. (2009). The experimental methodology of constructive microgenesis. In J. Valsiner, P. Molenaar, N. Chaudhary, & M. Lyra (Eds.), *Dynamic process methodology in the social and developmental sciences* (pp. 99–121). Dodrecht: Springer.

Wagoner, B. (2012). Culture in constructive remembering. In J. Valsiner (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of culture and psychology* (pp. 1034–1055). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Wagoner, B. (2013). Bartlett's concept of schema in reconstruction. *Theory & Psychology*, *23*(5), 553–575. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354313500166

Wagoner, B. (2015). Collective remembering as a process of social representation. In G. Sammut, E. Andreouli, G. Gaskell, & J. Valsiner (Eds.), *The Cambridge handbook of social representations* (pp. 143–162). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wagoner, B. (2017). *The constructive mind. Bartlett's psychology in reconstruction*. New York, NY: Cambridge Univerity Press.

Wagoner, B., & Gillespie, A. (2014). Sociocultural mediators of remembering. An extension of Bartlett's repeated reproduction method. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *53*(4), 622–639. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12059

Welzer, H., Moller, S., & Tschuggnall, K. (2013). *Grand Père n'était pas un nazi. National-socialisme et Shoah dans la mémoire familiale*. Paris: Editions Gallimard.

Wertsch, J. (1997). Narrative tools of history and identity. *Culture & Psychology*, *3*(1), 5–20. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X9700300101

Wertsch, J. (1998). *Mind as action*. New York, NY: Oxford university press.

Wertsch, J. (2002). *Voices of collective remembering*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wertsch, J. (2007). Mediation. In H. Daniels, M. Cole, & J. Wertsch (Eds.), *The Cambridge companion to Vygotsky* (pp. 178–192). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521831040.008

Wertsch, J. (2008). The narrative organization of collective memory. *Ethos*, *36*, 120–135. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1352.2008.00007.x

Wertsch, J., & Batiashvili, N. (2012). Mnemonic communities and conflict. Georgia's narrative template. In I. Marková & A. Gillespie (Eds.), *Trust and conflict. Representation, culture and dialogue* (pp. 37–48). London: Routledge.

Wineburg, S. S. (1991). Historical problem solving. A study of the cognitive processes used in the evaluation of documentary and pictorial evidence. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, *83*(1), 73–87. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-0663.83.1.73

Wundt, W. (1916). Elements of folk psychology. Outlines of a psychological history of the development of mankind. In K. Thompson (Ed.), *The early sociology of culture* (Vol. VII). London and New York: Routledge.

Yin, R. K. (2011). *Qualitative research from start to finish*. New York & London: Guilford Press.

Zittoun, T. (2006). *Transitions. Development through symbolic resources*. Greenwich: Information Age Publishing.

Zittoun, T. (2008). Learning through transitions. The role of institutions. *European Journal of Psychology of Education*, *23*, 165–181. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03172743

Zittoun, T. (2012). Lifecourse. A socio-cultural perspective. In J. Valsiner (Ed.), *The Handbook of culture and psychology* (pp. 513–535). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Zittoun, T. (2015). From Vico to the sociocultural imagination. *Culture & Psychology*, *21*(2), 251–258. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X15575796

Zittoun, T. (2017a). Imagining self in a changing world. An exploration of "Studies of marriage." In M. Han & C. Cunha (Eds.), *The subjectified and subjectifying mind* (pp. 85–116). Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.

Zittoun, T. (2017b). Modalities of generalization through single case studies. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science*, *51*(2), 171–194. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-016-9367-1

Zittoun, T. (2017c). Symbolic resources and sense-making in learning and instruction. *European Journal of Psychology of Education*, *32*(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10212-016-0310-0

Zittoun, T., Cornish, F., Gillespie, A., & Aveling, E.-L. (2008). Using social knowledge. A case study of a diarist's meaning making during World War II. In T. Sugiman, J.-K. Gergen, W. Wagner, & Y. Yamada (Eds.), *Meaning in action. Constructions, narratives, and representations* (pp. 163–179). New York: Springer.

Zittoun, T., & de Saint-Laurent, C. (2015). Life-creativity. Imagining one's life. In V. P. Glăveanu, A. Gillespie, & J. Valsiner (Eds.), *Rethinking creativity. Contributions from cultural psychology*. (pp. 58–75). Hove and New York: Routeldge.

Zittoun, T., Duveen, G., Gillespie, A., Ivinson, G., & Psaltis, C. (2003). The use of symbolic resources in developmental transitions. *Culture & Psychology*, *9*, 415–448. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X0394006

Zittoun, T., & Gillespie, A. (in press). Imagination from a sociocultural perspective. In C. de Saint-Laurent, S. Obradović, & K. Carriere (Eds.), *Imagining collective futures. Perspectives from social, cultural and political psychology*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Zittoun, T., & Gillespie, A. (2011). Using diaries and self-writings as data in psychological research. In E. Abbey & S. E. Surgan (Eds.), *Developing methods in psychology* (pp. 1–26). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Zittoun, T., & Gillespie, A. (2015). Integrating experiences. Body and mind moving between contexts. In B. Wagoner, N. Chaudhary, & P. Hviid (Eds.), *Integrating experiences. Body and mind moving between contexts* (pp. 3–49). Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.

Zittoun, T., & Gillespie, A. (2016). *Imagination in human and cultural development*. London: Routledge.

Zittoun, T., & Glăveanu, V. P. (in press). Imagination at the frontiers of psychology. In T. Zittoun & V. P. Glăveanu (Eds.), *Oxford handbook of imagination and culture*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Zittoun, T., & Grossen, M. (2013). Cultural elements as means of constructing the continuity of the self across various spheres of experience. In M. B. Ligorio & M. César (Eds.), *Interplays between dialogical learning and dialogical self* (pp. 99–126). Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.

Zittoun, T., Valsiner, J., Vedeler, D., Salgado, J., Gonçalves, M. M., & Ferring, D. (2013). *Human development in the life course. Melodies of living*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Appendices

Appendix A. Table of Parliamentary Debates (Study 1)

Table A-1 Details of the parliamentary sessions

Session	President	Representative of the government	Content
02.05.2006 2nd session	Jean-Louis Debré President of the National Assembly	Nicolas Sarkozy (Interior Minister) Christian Estrosi (Deputy Minister of Planning)	Discussion of the bill Objection of inadmissibility (rejected)
02.05.2006 3rd session	Jean-Luc Warsmann Vice-President	Christian Estrosi (Deputy Minister of Planning)	Preliminary question Point order Vote on the question (rejected) General discussion
03.05.2006 1st Session	Mhélène Mignon, Vice-President	Christian Estrosi (Deputy Minister of Planning) Nicolas Sarkozy (Interior Minister)	General discussion Point of order General discussion Points of order (2) General discussion Point of order General discussion Point of order General discussion Points of order (2) General discussion Point of order Motion for referral back to the committee (Rejected)
03.05.2006 2nd session	Hélène Mignon, Vice-President	Christian Estrosi (Deputy Minister of Planning)	Discussion Article 2 Point of order Discussion Article 2
04.05.2006 1st Session	Yves Bur, Vice-President	Christian Estrosi (Deputy Minister of Planning)	Discussion Articles 3-4 Points of order (3) Discussion Articles 4-5
04.05.2006 2nd session	Hélène Mignon, Vice-President	Brice Hortefeux (Deputy Minister of Local Government)	Discussion Articles 5-7
04.05.2006 3rd session	Éric Raoult, Vice-President	Brice Hortefeux (Deputy Minister of Local Government) Christian Estrosi (Deputy Minister of Planning)	Discussion Articles 8-10 Point of order Discussion Article 10 Point of order Discussion Articles 10-12 Point of order Discussion Article 12 Point of order

Session	President	Representative of the government	Content
			Discussion Article 12
05.05.2006 1st Session	Hélène Mignon, Vice-President	Christian Estrosi (Deputy Minister of Planning) Brice Hortefeux (Deputy Minister of Local Government)	Discussion Articles 1, 13-15, 23-24
05.05.2006 2nd session	Jean-Luc Warsmann, Vice-President	Christian Estrosi (Deputy Minister of Planning) Nicolas Sarkozy (Interior Minister)	Discussion Article 24 Points of order (6) Discussion Article 24 Point of order Discussion Article 24
05.05.2006 3rd session	Jean-Luc Warsmann, Vice-President	Christian Estrosi (Deputy Minister of Planning)	Discussion Article 24 Change to the agenda (additional time for the debate, modification of the order of examination of the articles) Discussion Article 24-29
09.05.2006 2nd session	Éric Raoult, Vice-President	François Baroin (Minister of the Overseas)	Discussion Article 67 Point of order Discussion Articles 67-73
09.05.2006 3rd session	Yves Bur, Vice-President	François Baroin (Minister of the Overseas) Christian Estrosi (Deputy Minister of Planning)	Discussion Articles 73-79 Point of order Discussion Article 30
10.05.2006 1st Session	René Dosière, Vice-President	Christian Estrosi (Deputy Minister of Planning)	Discussion Article 31 Point of order Discussion Articles 31-32, 16
10.05.2006 2nd session	Jean-Luc Warsmann, Vice-President	Christian Estrosi (Deputy Minister of Planning)	Discussion Articles 17-22, 33-66, 80-84
17.05.2006 1st Session	Hélène Mignon, Vice-President	Nicolas Sarkozy (Interior Minister)	Explanation of vote and vote on the amended bill
10.06.2006 2nd session	Éric Raoult Vice-President	Christian Estrosi (Deputy Minister of Planning)	Transmission, discussion and vote of the text decided by the Joint Parliamentary Committee (CMP)

Appendix B. Secondary Sources: Governmental Documents (Study 1)

N°2986 Projet de loi relatif à l'immigration et à l'intégration (29 Avril 2006). [Bill on immigration and intrgration (April 29th, 2006)].

N°2932 Rapport d'information déposé par la commission des lois constitutionnelle, de la législation et de l'administration générale de la République sur la situation de l'immigration à Mayotte (8 Mars 2006) [Information report tabled by the commission for constitutional laws, legislation, and the general administration of the Republic on the situation of immigration in Mayotte (March 8th, 2006)].

N° 3058 Rapport fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la législation et de l'administration générale de la république sur le projet de loi (n° 2986), relatif à l'immigration et à l'intégration par Thierry Mariani (26 Avril 2006) [Report done in the name of the commission for constitutional laws, legislation, and the general administration of the Republic on the bill (# 2986), on immigration and integration by Thierry Mariani (April 26th, 2006)]

N°36 Compte rendu de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la législation et de l'administration générale de la république sur le projet de loi (n° 2986), relatif à l'immigration et à l'intégration. (29 mars 2006) [#36 Minutes of the commission for constitutional laws, legislation, and the general administration of the Republic on the bill (# 2986), on immigration and integration (March 29th, 2006)]

N°39 Compte rendu de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la législation et de l'administration générale de la république sur le projet de loi (n° 2986), relatif à l'immigration et à l'intégration. (26 avril 2006) [#39 Minutes of the commission for constitutional laws, legislation, and the general administration of the Republic on the bill (# 2986), on immigration and integration (April 26th, 2006)]

N°40 Compte rendu de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la législation et de l'administration générale de la république sur le projet de loi (n° 2986), relatif à l'immigration et à l'intégration. (2 mai 2006) [#40 Minutes of the commission for constitutional laws, legislation, and the general administration of the Republic on the bill (# 2986), on immigration and integration (May 2nd, 2006)]

Appendix C. Summary of the Bill (Study 1)

N°2986 Projet de loi relatif à l'immigration et à l'intégration (29 Avril 2006).

Are summarised here only the articles that proved central to the debates.

Art. 2: To obtain a residency permit is will now be necessary to obtain first a long term visa in the country of origin.

Art. 3: A residency permit can be revoked if the conditions under which it was obtained are not fulfilled anymore.

Art. 4: A reception and integration contract will have to be signed by to obtain a residency permit of a long term visa.

Art. 5: New definition of the condition of integration: personal engagement to respect the principles of the French Republic, the enactment of these principles and a sufficient knowledge of the French language.

Art. 7: New criteria added to obtain a student visa: project, ability to speak French, bilateral interest of France and the country of origin, academic abilities. Simplification of the procedure to work under a student visa.

Art. 10: Limitation of the work visas to specific departments and areas of expertise decided by a national list. Creation of a specific visa for seasonal work.

Art. 12: Creation of the card 'skills and talents' for people showing a cultural, scientific or sportive potential and giving the right to family reunification.

Art. 24: Suppression of the right to regularization for illegal immigrants who can prove that they have been in France for more than ten years. Obligation for people married to French citizens to obtain first a long term visa in their country. Family reunification to be limited by the evaluation of the depth and stability of the relations.

Art. 26: Revocation of their visa for people married to French citizens if the union last less than four years.

Art. 30: Necessity to have been in France for more than eighteen month to obtain family reunification.

Art. 31: Necessity to have sufficient resources to obtain family reunification, and which cannot include allowances.

Art. 32: Revocation of visas obtained under family reunification if the union is dissolved.

Art. 67-79: Further tightening of the previous articles for the Oversea Territories and Departments (DOM-TOM).

Appendix D. Analysis of the Parliamentary Debates: Paper and Pen (Study 1)

Figure D-1 Dialogical analysis of the parliamentary debates (paper and pen)



Appendix E. Analysis of the Parliamentary Debates: Example of Figure (Study 1)





Figure E-1 Dialogical analysis of the parliamentary debates: example of figure

Appendix F. Interview Guide (Study 2)

Translated from French

10) Introduction

- Explain the project
- Tell them they can refuse to answer any question and stop at any time
- Ask if I can record and make them sign the form
- Ask if they have questions

11) The play

- How did you come to hear about the play?
- What did you think about it?
- What do you remember of it? What marked you about it?
- Did it change your opinion on the conflict?

12) Relation to history?

- Does history have a specific place in your life?
  - o Why?
  - o Which events?
  - o How does it manifest itself?
- Did history have a specific place in your childhood?
  - o Were there historical events your family would talk about?

13) Personal history in history

- Were there moments when your personal life was touched by historical events?
  - o When?
  - o What happened?
- Do you remember the first time you realised something historical was going on?
  - o If can't say: not necessarily historic, but collective?
  - o What happened?
  - o How did you realise it was historical/important?
  - o Do you know why you remember it? Did it mark you? Why? Did people talk about it?
  - o How old were you?
- Do any of these events still matter for you today?
  - o Which ones?
  - o How?
- What is for you the historical event that changed your life the most?
  - o Even indirectly? Are there any historical events that really changed life?
  - o Why?

14) Historical reflexivity

- From event they talk about the most:
  - Did you ever hear other versions of this event?
  - If can't answer, suggest social groups that are likely to have a different perspective
  - What were their stories?
  - Did they surprise you?
- Did you ever question what you learnt about history?
  - What in particular?
  - Why?
  - Was it the first time?
  - What was your reaction?
  - Did it mark you?
  - Why?
  - What did you do?
- Did you ever see the 'official' history being questioned by others?
  - What did you think about it?
- Did you ever see your own version of history being questioned?
  - Did you ever get information contradicting what you thought happened?
  - How did you react?
  - What did you think?

15) History education

- What do you think about how history is discussed in the media and in public discourses?
- What did you think of the way history was taught to you in school?
- Do you think the way history is taught changed?
- What would you change in history education?
  - What do you think to be problematic?
  - What do you find positive?
- Depending on what they said before: do you think there is more one historical truth or a multitude of versions of the past?
  - Which one should we teach to children?
  - How would you teach it?

16) Direction of history

- If you could change one thing in history, what would you change?
  - Why?
  - What would it change for the present?
- Of what is going on now, what do you think will become part of history?
  - How will we remember it?
  - And of the things that seem very important now, what do you think we will forget?
  - Why?

- Do you think there is a 'direction' to history?
    - Why?
    - Where does it go?
    - How do you see the future?

17) Demographic questions

- Where are you from?
- How old are you?
- What is your profession?
- What did you study?

18) Questions and comments

- Do you have any questions, comments?
- Would you like to add anything?
- Would you like to be updated on the results of the study?

Appendix G. Authorisation to Record (Study 2)

Institut de psychologie et éducation
Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines

- Espace Louis-Agassiz 1
- CH-2000 Neuchâtel

Autorisation d'enregistrer et/ou de filmer
(Cocher la/les cases correspondantes à votre situation)

Par la présente, j'autorise Constance de Saint-Laurent

- □ à m'enregistrer

et/ou

- □ à me filmer

et à utiliser ces données pour les besoins de sa recherche. Ces données seront traitées de manière anonyme et confidentielle.

- □ J'autorise également que des extraits de ces enregistrements puissent éventuellement ensuite être présentés, par le chercheur à d'autres chercheurs de la discipline (durant un exposé à un congrès ou une conférence). Ces données seront utilisées uniquement dans le cadre de recherches et présentations scientifiques et en aucun cas diffusées à l'extérieur de ce cadre.

Nom, prénom : …………………………………

Lieu, date : ……………………………………..

Signature : ………………………………………

S'il s'agit d'une personne mineure, signature d'un représentant légal :

………………………………

■ Téléphone : +41 78 837 37 54 ■ E-Mail : constance.desaintlaurent @unine.ch

Appendix H. Example of Trajectory (Study 2)



Figure H-1 Example of paper and pen analysis of a trajectory: overview

Figure H-2 Example of paper and pen analysis of a trajectory: zoom on the analysis



Figure H-3 Example of paper and pen analysis of a trajectory: zoom on the data

Appendix I. Interview Guide (Study 3)

PRELIMINARY: DEMOGRAPHICS

- Age/year of birth (precise that it is because it makes it easier to analyse the time line that we are going to build)
- Occupation and studies
- Where are you from?

PART 1: PERSONAL HISTORIES

In the first part of the interview, I am going to ask you to choose 3 historical events that are especially important for you.

I will then ask some follow up questions. Some will be to clarify some things or make them explicit, as I am not Polish and I am not a historian, so I need to know a bit about the events you are talking about and what you understand by them.

Some other questions will be to understand why this or that event is important to you, how you got to be interested in it, etc.

Do you have any question?

Should we start?

QUESTIONS TO TRIGGER EVENTS:

- Is there an historical event that is especially important to you?
- Are there events that especially come to your mind when people talk about history?
- Are there historical events that interest you especially? On which you are more likely to read a book, even a fiction, watch a movie or a documentary?
- Are there historical events that have a special place in your personal life?
- In the life of your family?
- Are they historical events that your friends and family talk about often?
- Are there events that you hear about a lot, at work, on TV or on the radio, for instance?
- Are there historical events that you think are particularly important to understand the world today?

FOLLOW UP QUESTIONS:

- To develop the story:
    - What especially about it interest you?
    - What marked or touched you?
    - What stories did you hear about it?
    - What do you think about them?
    - How did you get interested by it?

- Sources:
    - Do you mostly read about it? Watch movies about this period? Look for information on the Internet?
    - Where did you hear that (story) from?
- Audiences:
    - Who do you talk about it with?
- **Alternative versions:**
    - Did you ever hear other versions of this story?
    - What would other people say about it?
    - Did you ever hear story about it and thought "but this is not what happened"?
    - Did you hear contradicting versions?

END QUESTIONS:

- If no alternative version yet: did you ever encounter contradicting versions of history? In which circumstances? How did you react to them?
- Would you like to add anything?

CONCLUSION PART 1

Thank you very much. We are done with the first part of the interview, and we are going to move to the second part now. But do you have any questions before we move on?

PART 2: TALKING ABOUT UKRAINE AT A DINNER PARTY (QUALITATIVE DIALOGICAL EXPERIMENT)

In this part of the interview, I am going to ask you to engage with different statements and opinions about a current event: the conflict in Ukraine. It looks a bit like a game (show the cardboard game), and I am going to ask you to make an effort of imagination. So this is a dinner party, and you have 4 tables with different groups of people linked to the conflict in Ukraine. I am going to ask you to pull chairs in turn, open them (show how), read the statement to yourself and then summarise it aloud so that I know which one it is.

I will ask you to tell me what you would be your impressions and feelings if someone at a dinner or at a party told you that, and then what you would reply.

You can choose them in any order you prefer. We won't have time to do all of them, so you can also leave out the ones you don't want to pick.

You can refer to history and to some of the events we have just talked about if you want, but you don't have to, it entirely up to you.

All the statements are inspired by real statements made by people in the media, or real journal articles. I will send you after the interview the list of sources for each statement and the links with the articles.

You don't need any specific knowledge of the conflict to reply to the statements. This is not a knowledge test, so if you have never heard of what is said in the texts it is totally okay. I am still interested in your impressions and opinions.

The statements are in themselves informative. So don't worry if you feel a bit lost in the beginning or don't know what to answer. You can wait until you have read a few statements before you answer my questions, if you want, as they will familiarise you with the conflict or refresh your memory.

If you feel uneasy talking about the conflict and change the subject, I would be interested in knowing why and what you can say about it.

Do you have any questions before we start?

FOLLOW UP QUESTIONS:

- On how the person would react:
  - What would you think if someone was telling you that about the Ukrainian conflict?
  - How would that make you feel?
  - And what would you say to this person?
- On their argumentation:
  - How would you defend that or make a case for your opinion?
  - And if you knew more about the conflict, what would you like to say?
  - If you had time to go look for some information somewhere before answering that, where do you usually turn?
- To push back on history:
  - What do you think caused that?
  - And has it always been like that?

END QUESTIONS:

- Would you add any other voices, perspectives or facts here? Is anyone missing? Is an important argument missing?
- Who would sit next to in the end?
- Who would you send home because they don't have their place here?
- Did any of this change your mind a bit on the conflict? What parts made you change your mind? How?

CONCLUSION/DEBRIEFING

We are now going to finish the interview, do you have any questions? Anything you would want to add?

I am going to send to you the list of statements, a few information on them and the list of sources for each in the coming days. If you have any question, please feel free to email me whenever. Even if it is a small question, something we already discussed, or something you feel was missing from the interview.

And to thank you for your participation, here is the best Swiss chocolate! (give the Frigor, and if they don't want it, eat it myself).

Appendix J. Experimental Material (Study 3)

Figure J-1 "Dinner party tables" for the qualitative experiment: presentation

Figure J-2 "Dinner party tables" for the qualitative experiment: choosing a table

Figure J-3 “Dinner party tables” for the qualitative experiment: opening a chair

Figure J-4 “Dinner party tables” for the qualitative experiment: opening a statement

Appendix K. List of Vignettes (Study 3)

UKRAINIAN TABLE

Text 1:

There are currently, according to American intelligence sources, about 12'000 Russian soldiers in Eastern Ukraine, another 29'000 in Crimea and 50'000 stationed at the border, on the Russian side. Russia had so many troops in Crimea from the beginning of the conflict, and look at what happened there! Russia is clearly invading Ukraine, no matter the lies Vladimir Putin feeds to the international community.

Andriy Lysenko, Ukrainian military spokesman

Sources:

- Reuters in "Some 12,000 Russian soldiers in Ukraine supporting rebels/ U.S. commander" (http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/03/us-ukraine-russia-soldiers-idUSKBN0LZ2FV20150303)
- The New Republic in "Russia Invades Ukraine, Breaking Ceasefire. That's Old News" (http://www.newrepublic.com/article/120250/nato-russia-invades-ukraine-breaking-ceasefire-thats-old-news)

Modifications from the original articles:

The first part of the quote, until "on the Russian side", was actually said by the U.S. Army Europe Commander in Reuters ("Some 12,000 Russian soldiers in Ukraine supporting rebels/ U.S. commander"). Andriy Lysenko did not say what is written in the quote, but it resembles many of his public interventions as the Ukrainian military spokesman.

Text 2:

Only a minority of people in Eastern Ukraine were pro-Russia at the beginning of the conflict. In March 2014 only 33% of the population in Donetsk was pro-Russian and only a few hundred people demonstrated against Kiev and Maidan (in a city of 1 million inhabitants). But in April 2014, separatists attacked local TV stations and replaced Ukrainian TV by Russian TV. Russian programmes present the Maidan movement as a "fascist coup" and superpose images of Maidan with World War II Nazis. People got scared, and many of them ended up believing the Russian propaganda, but that's because they are fed lies!

Igor Todorov, a professor of international relation at Donetsk University

Sources:

- The Guardian in "pro-Russian forces seize TV station in Donetsk and parade captives"

(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/27/ukraine-donetsk-pro-russian-forces-seize-tv-station-parade-captives)

- The Guardian in "Donetsk's old Soviet faithful and young radicals look to Moscow" (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/22/ukraine-crisis-donetsk-Soviet-faithful-young-radicals-moscow)

Modifications from the original articles:

The first part of the quote (until "in a city of 1 million inhabitants") comes from an article in The Guardian ("Donetsk's old Soviet faithful and young radicals look to Moscow"). It is a summary of part of what Igor Todorov said and he is indeed a professor of international relation at Donetsk University. The second part of the text, however, is taken from the analysis made by a journalist in another article from The Guardian ("pro-Russian forces seize TV station in Donetsk and parade captives").

Text 3:

I was on the barricades from the very beginning, and I fought in the East against the rebels. I know things are difficult and complicated now, I have seen it. And I know that it's unrealistic to expect a complete transformation overnight. But we are fighting for the right of our country to choose its own destiny. But Russia did as it always does: it felt threatened by the loss of influence, and so it attacked us. They didn't change since the USSR, and they are still trying to make us a puppet state. We need peace to be able to reconstruct our country, but Russia won't let us.

Myroslav Gryshyn, 28 year-old Ukrainian protestor

Sources:

- The Guardian in "Ukraine's revolution dream stalling due to war in the east and political stasis" (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/05/ukraine-revolution-dream-stalling-war-east)
- Foreign Affairs in "How Crimea Compares to Russia's Other Frozen Conflicts" (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141210/jeffrey-mankoff/russias-latest-land-grab)

Modifications from the original articles:

The first part of the text is taken from Myroslav Gryshyn's interview in The Guardian ("Ukraine's revolution dream stalling due to war in the east and political stasis"), and he is indeed a 28 year-old Ukrainian protestor. The historical argument (starting with "But Russia did as it always does") comes from the article in Foreign Affairs ("How Crimea Compares to Russia's Other Frozen Conflicts").

Text 4:

Our government, the police, judges, everyone was so corrupt, it was incredible. I mean, there are the big stories, with the president using our money to build villas or to enrich his son. But it was also in the little things, everywhere, everyday. I remember policemen going to the ice cream shop by my house. They would threaten the owner not to pay for the ice cream they gave their children. This is what the revolution was about: we wanted to stop our government because they were looting us.

Andrey Kurkov, Ukrainian writer

Sources:

- The Guardian in "Ukraine Diaries/ Dispatches from Kiev review – an invaluable guide to the present crisis" (http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/aug/17/ukraine-diaries-andrey-kurkov-review)
- The Guardian in "Viktor Yanukovych boasted of Ukraine corruption, says Mikheil Saakashvili" (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/25/viktor-yanukovych-ukraine-corruption-mikheil-saakashvili)

Modifications from the original articles:

Most of the text and the examples are intercepts from the Ukrainian writer Andrey Kurkov's latest book. The idea that the main aim of the Maidan movement was to get rid of corruption comes from there too. These ideas can be found in the review published in The Guardian ("Ukraine Diaries/ Dispatches from Kiev review – an invaluable guide to the present crisis"). More general statements about corruption in Ukraine come from the second article ("Viktor Yanukovych boasted of Ukraine corruption, says Mikheil Saakashvili").

RUSIAN TABLE

Text 5:

Crimea was a gift made to Ukraine by the USSR, but it has been Russian for most of its modern history. This is not an annexation: it is a reunification with a peninsula that was Russian for 2 centuries and apart only for 60 years. And anyway, this gift was made illegally. The Soviet authorities had actually no right to give away parts of the country that were inhabited by Russian populations just to serve their political interests.

Valentina Matviyenko, Speaker of Russia's upper house of parliament

Sources:

- TASS in "German government press service corrects data on Crimea after Lavrov's criticism" (http://tass.ru/en/world/766569)

- NPR (US National Public Radio) in "With New Moves, Russia's Parliament Looks To Rewrite History" (http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2015/02/10/385197419/with-new-moves-russias-parliament-looks-to-rewrite-history)

Modifications from the original articles:

The story told in the text comes from an article by the official Russian Press Agency, TASS ("German government press service corrects data on Crimea after Lavrov's criticism"). In the NPR article ("With New Moves, Russia's Parliament Looks To Rewrite History"), Valentina Matviyenko, the speaker of Russia's upper house of parliament, announced that this version of events was going to be made official by the Russian parliament in May 2015.

Text 6:

Many people who took part in the Maidan Movement are part of neo-Nazi groups. And now, many people fighting for Ukraine in the East of the country are part of extreme-right groups who clearly support white supremacist views. They wear Nazis insignias and made their views clear even in interviews with Western media. Some of their leaders have been appointed to central positions in the Ukrainian government, for instance Yuriy Mykhalchyshyn. How can we let that happen? Shouldn't we support the Ukrainian people fighting these neo-Nazis?

Lyudmila Alexandrova, Russian journalist

Sources:

- The Guardian in "Ukraine has ignored the far right for too long – it must wake up to the danger" (http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/nov/13/ukraine-far-right-fascism-mps)
- TASS in "Far-right nationalist paramilitaries in Ukraine determined to make war, not peace" (http://tass.ru/en/opinions/775181)

Modifications from the original articles:

Most of the content of this text is taken from The Guardian article ("Ukraine has ignored the far right for too long – it must wake up to the danger"). The journalist's name and affiliation comes from the second article. This article is on the same topic but comes from the Russian media ("Far-right nationalist paramilitaries in Ukraine determined to make war, not peace") and is an opinion piece.

Text 7:

Whatever we do or say, we Russians are always accused of all crimes and declared guilty without evidence. Each time I defend my country, even a little bit, people accuse me of lying, of being blinded by Russian propaganda and of defending a country that does not respect human rights. Yes, Russia is not perfect and

the Soviet authorities were terrible. But Russia is not the USSR, and no country is absolutely clean when it comes to human rights. So why are we always the villains in Western stories?

Tamara Shakhovskoy, third generation Russian immigrant in Western Europe

Sources:

- TASS in "Descendants of first-wave Russian emigres warn Europe against bias in Ukraine conflict" (http://tass.ru/en/world/769098)
- Russia Today in "'Stop blaming everything on Russia'/ Heirs to 1917 revolutionary-era emigrants appeal to EU" (http://rt.com/politics/217551-russia-emigrants-letter-history/)

Modifications from the original articles:

The text is closely inspired by an open letter written by Dmitry and Tamara Shakhovskoy, descendants of Russian aristocrat families that immigrated to Western Europe at the beginning of the 20th century. The letter has received much attention in the Russian media, but was largely ignored in other countries.

Text 8:

I know how the Ukrainian authorities were ruining the country, and people just had enough of it. And it's good that these people are gone. But the United States and Europe pushed them for their own interest, and now the Ukrainians hate us. We all have family in Ukraine: my brother and my sister live there. They were our "sister nation" and the border used not to matter at all. Now they are building a wall between us, all because the United States and Europe wanted to expend their sphere of influence.

Vasily Shmatkov, mayor of Sudzha, a small town close to the Ukrainian border

Source:

- Bloomberg Business in "Mud and Loathing on Russia-Ukraine Border" (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-21/mud-and-loathing-on-russia-ukraine-border)

Modifications from the original article:

The content of Vasily Shmatkov's interview was not modified. The original article, however, included many other interviews.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TABLE

Text 9:

I don't want to defend one side over the other, because I think that in the end, both are doing terrible things. Like with the weapons they use. They all blame each other for the massive civilian casualties in the Eastern Ukraine, but experts concur that both side owns Grad rockets. These weapons are extremely

powerful, but they are also famous for being incredible imprecise and killing many civilians. How could I support anyone who thinks their views are more important than the death of innocent local people?

Tom Plate, journalist for The Japan Times

Sources:

- The Japan Times in "Beyond Good And Evil In Ukraine" (http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/04/21/commentary/world-commentary/beyond-good-evil-ukraine/#.VRLP1VxaJGg)
- The Guardian in "An Audience With Ukraine Rebel Chief Igor Bezler, The Demon Of Donetsk" (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/29/-sp-ukraine-rebel-igor-bezler-interview-demon)

Modifications from the original articles:

The general opinion defended in this text and the name of the journalist come from the article in the Japan Time ("Beyond Good And Evil In Ukraine"). But the content of the text comes from the article in The Guardian ("An Audience With Ukraine Rebel Chief Igor Bezler, The Demon Of Donetsk").

Text 10:

I think it's too early in the conflict to pick a side, because there is so much we still don't know. Even things from the very beginning of the events. Do you remember those snipers that attacked demonstrators in Kiev, back in February 2014? They thought Yanukovych was doing it, that he was giving orders to attack his own people. And then they discovered that the same guys killed demonstrators and police alike. Some people said it was done by people who were against Yanukovych, to start the conflict. But it's been more than a year, and in the end no one knows what happened

Ewen MacAskill, British journalist for The Guardian

Sources:

- The Guardian in "Bugged call reveals conspiracy theory about Kiev snipers" (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/05/ukraine-bugged-call-catherine-ashton-urmas-paet)
- BBC News in "What we know about the Kiev snipers" (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26866069)

Modifications from the original articles:

The general opinion expressed in this text is fictitious. The information about the snipers is taken from the two articles above, but the name of the journalist comes from the article in The Guardian ("Bugged call reveals conspiracy theory about Kiev snipers").

Text 11:

Crimea voted its independence and, in March 2014, more than 96% Crimeans voted to join the Russian federation. I know some people said that the vote was not done right and that Russia cheated. But the truth is, it doesn't really matter: almost 60% of the people who live in Crimea are Russian, and even those who aren't Russians tend to be pro-Russia anyway. So we may not like the results of the referendum but, if people in Crimea want to be part of Russia, who are we to oppose it?

Carol Morello, journalist for the Washington Post

Sources:

- TASS in "Major life changing events of 2014" (http://tass.ru/en/world/768024?page=3)
- Washington Post in "Crimeans vote to break away from Ukraine, join Russia" (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2014/03/16/ccec2132-acd4-11e3-a06a-e3230a43d6cb_story.html)

Modifications from the original articles:

The general opinion expressed in this text is fictitious, but it is closely inspired by the two articles cited above and quite close to the views expressed in them. The name of the journalist and most of the arguments are taken from the Washington Post ("Crimeans vote to break away from Ukraine, join Russia").

Text 12:

How can we doubt that Russia is delivering weapons to the rebels in Ukraine after what happened to that plane in July? A Malaysia Airlines plane, coming from the Netherlands, was shot by a Russian missile above the territory of Eastern Ukraine. How do you believe this missile arrived there? Almost 300 people died, and the rebels tried to cover it up. They prevented international investigators from entering the site for so long and they looted the site. But we have recordings of the rebels' conversations now, and you hear them admit they shot down the plane. There is no doubt now.

David Clinch, social media journalist in Dublin

Sources:

- BBC News in "MH17 crash/ Ukraine releases alleged intercepts" (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28362872)
- The Guardian in "MH17 investigators frustrated at limited access due to fighting" (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/05/mh17-investigators-frustrated-at-limited-access-due-to-fighting)
- The Guardian in "how Storyful's 'social sleuthing' helped verify evidence" (http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jul/27/mh17-storyful-social-media-twitter-youtube)

Modifications from the original articles:

The general opinion expressed in this text is fictitious, but it is closely inspired by the three articles listed above. The details about the crash are from the two first articles, one from BBC News ("MH17 crash/ Ukraine releases alleged intercepts") and The Guardian ("MH17 investigators frustrated at limited access due to fighting"). The name is taken from a journalist interviewed in The Guardian ("how Storyful's 'social sleuthing' helped verify evidence"): David Clinch. He developed methods to authenticate social media photos and videos, and used it in an attempt to prove the views expressed in this text. For an alternative view, see: TASS in "Major life changing events of 2014" (http://tass.ru/en/world/768024?page=7)

LOCAL POPULATIONS

Text 13:

My son was in the military, in Kostroma, a few hours North-East of Moscow. They sent him on a mission, but they wouldn't say where, not even to him. But then, a few weeks later, I saw his picture on TV, and it said the Ukrainians had captured him. I went to the base and I told them, I told them it was my son. But they said it was photoshoped, that I was lying. I want to help the people in the East of Ukraine, and we shouldn't let them down. But they can't send our sons like that, and not tell us, and lie to us. I don't know, are we at war or not?

Olga Pochtoyeva, mother of a Russian soldier

Sources:

- BBC News in "Russian families look for soldier sons" (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28968526)
- The Guardian in "Russians start asking/ are we at war?" (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/29/russia-ukraine-war-asking)

Modifications from the original articles:

The text is composed of different stories told by mothers of Russian soldiers to Western media and published in the articles listed above. Olga Pochtoyeva is one of these mothers, and most elements of the text are taken from her story, published in The Guardian ("Russians start asking/ are we at war?").

Text 14:

You know, for us, the Tatars of Crimea, it didn't really change anything that Crimea became Russian. We were not welcomed by the Ukrainians and they tried to chase us out of our land. And now the Russians are doing the same. None of them likes us, just because we are Muslim. They are all racists and obsessed with power and corruption. If I had to choose between the Ukrainians and the Russians? I would pick neither: neither cares for human rights and neither cares for others.

Sinaver Kadyrov, Crimean Tatar activist

Sources:

- The Moscow Time in "Crimea Is Clamping Down on Human Rights" (http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/crimea-is-clamping-down-on-human-rights/515258.html)
- Foreign Policy in "Putin's Peninsula Is a Lonely Island" (http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/06/putin-peninsula-lonely-island-crimea-annexation-russia-ukraine/)

Modifications from the original article:

The final opinion expressed in this text is fictitious (from "If I had to choose"). Most elements are taken from the Moscow Time article ("Crimea Is Clamping Down on Human Rights") where multiple Crimean activists were interviewed. In this article, Sinaver Kadyrov and other Crimean activists explain how their Human Rights have been violated since Crimea became Russian. However, both articles explain that the situation was hard for the Tatar minority even before the referendum.

Text 15:

Here, in the East of Ukraine, half of the people used to be pro-Kiev, and the other half pro-Russian. But not anymore. We have spent most of the year hiding, and since May we have lived underground to protect ourselves from the Ukrainian shelling. How can they bomb us? We are all Ukrainians, and yet they are killing our children! Why should we support people who attack us? Why should we support people who say they are on our side but try to kill us? At least the Russians they bring help here, humanitarian convoys and support to those who want to escape from here. So now, no one supports Kiev anymore.

Vira, inhabitant of Alexandrovska in Eastern Ukraine

Sources:

- BBC in "Amateur fighters defending Donetsk" (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31665378)
- Russia Today in 'Time to wake up and start doing something'/ How refugees live in Donbass" (http://rt.com/op-edge/216051-donbass-refugees-ukraine-war/)
- TASS in "Russian humanitarian aid delivered to east Ukraine's Luhansk" (http://tass.ru/en/russia/780894)

Modifications from the original article:

Vira is an invented name (one of the most common Ukrainian name) for a woman interviewed by BBC ("Amateur fighters defending Donetsk"). Her declaration is mixed with the one of an unknown man, interviewed by BBC in the same video. Both live in Alexandrovska, in Eastern Ukraine. The end of the text (from "At least the Russians") is taken from the articles in Russia Today ("Time to wake up and start doing something'/ How refugees live in Donbass") and TASS ("Russian humanitarian aid delivered to east Ukraine's Luhansk").

Text 16:

A few months ago, our city was taken by the separatists and the Russians. We had to run away, it was terrible. With the children and all. But we were lucky that the Ukrainian army took the city back, so we were able to come back home. But everyday we see people coming from the East, running away from all the fighting there and going to Kiev or to the West. You know, those who stay there support the Russians and the terrorists, and we won't forget that.

Vika, 34 year old resident of Kramatorsk, East Ukraine

Sources:

- Vice News in "'You Think It's Normal Carrying a Weapon in Here?'/ Divided Ukrainian Frontier Towns Brace for More" (https://news.vice.com/article/you-think-its-normal-carrying-a-weapon-in-here-divided-ukrainian-frontier-towns-brace-for-more-war)
- The Guardian in "Kommunar, east Ukraine/ 'Nothing to eat, nothing to do, no point in life'" (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/06/ukraine-life-hard-horrors-war-kommunar-food-medicine-russian)

Modifications from the original article:

Vika's testimony is taken from the Vice News article ("'You Think It's Normal Carrying a Weapon in Here?' Divided Ukrainian Frontier Towns Brace for More"). Some elements were added and some points made a bit stronger, but globally her story was left unchanged. The small changes were made in the light of information from both articles listed above.

Appendix L. Participation Information Sheet (Study 3)

Institut de psychologie et éducation
Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines

- Espace Louis-Agassiz 1
- CH-2000 Neuchâtel

Participant information sheet

PROJECT TITLE
Remembering history

RESEARCH TEAM
Constance de Saint-Laurent, under the supervision of Professor Tania Zittoun.

INVITATION
You are being asked to take part in a research study on the way people remember historical events and use them to understand current events. The aim is to study people's discourses on history and how it helps them of not to assess present situations.

This research is my doctoral thesis, and is done under the supervision of Professor Tania Zittoun, at the University of Neuchâtel in Switzerland.

WHAT WILL HAPPEN
In this study, you will be asked to answer a series of questions, divided in two parts. First, you will be asked questions about your relation to history, which events are important for you, and the connection they may have to your life. In the second part, you will be asked for your point of view on a current event. You will be shown different printed material (texts and photographs) and asked what you think of them.

No specialist knowledge is required for either part of the interviews, as I am primarily interested in your opinions and impressions.

TIME COMMITMENT
The study typically takes 90 minutes.

PARTICIPANTS' RIGHTS
You may decide to stop being a part of the research study at any time without explanation. You have the right to ask that any data you have supplied to that point be withdrawn/destroyed.
You have the right to omit or refuse to answer or respond to any question that is asked of you.
You have the right to have your questions about the procedures answered (unless answering these questions would interfere with the study's outcome). If you have any questions as a result of reading this information sheet, you should ask the researcher before the study begins.

■ Phone: +41 32 718 18 56 ■ Fax: +41 32 718 18 51 ■ E-Mail: sophie.lambolez@unine.ch ■ Website: www.unine.ch/ipe/

Université de Neuchâtel unine

INSTITUT DE PSYCHOLOGIE ET ÉDUCATION ASSOCIÉ À LA MAPS MAISON D'ANALYSE DES PROCESSUS SOCIAUX

Institut de psychologie et éducation
Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines

- Espace Louis-Agassiz 1
- CH-2000 Neuchâtel

BENEFITS AND RISKS

There are no known benefits or risks for you in this study.

CONFIDENTIALITY/ANONYMITY

No one will link the data you provided to the identifying information you supplied (e.g., name, address, email). If you provide additional personal information during the interview that may lead to your identification, it will be removed and/or modified to ensure that you cannot be identified. Only my supervisor and myself will have access to the original recordings and the transcriptions.

The results of the interviews will be published in scientific journals and books, as well as in my doctoral dissertation. Some quotes from your interviews may be printed for illustration or demonstration purposes. However, it will remain anonymous and every step will be taken to ensure that you cannot be recognised.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

I will be glad to answer your questions about this study at any time. You may contact me at constance.desaintlaurent@unine.ch or c.desaintlaurent@gmail.com.

If you want to find out about the final results of this study, you should contact me after the interview by email or check on my webpage (http://cdesaintlaurent.wix.com/cdesaintlaurent). Please be aware that publishing scientific results takes time.

■ Phone: +41 32 718 18 56 ■ Fax: +41 32 718 18 51 ■ E-Mail: sophie.lambolez@unine.ch ■ Website: www.unine.ch/ipe/

Appendix M. Informed Consent (Study 3)

Université de Neuchâtel unine

Institut de psychologie et éducation
Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines

- Espace Louis-Agassiz 1
- CH-2000 Neuchâtel

INSTITUT DE PSYCHOLOGIE ET ÉDUCATION ASSOCIÉ À LA MAPS MAISON D'ANALYSE DES PROCESSUS SOCIAUX

Informed consent form

RESEARCH: REMEMBERING HISTORY

By signing below, you are agreeing that: (1) you have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet, (2) questions about your participation in this study have been answered satisfactorily, (3) you are aware of the potential risks (if any), and (4) you are taking part in this research study voluntarily (without coercion).

____
Participant's Name (Printed)*

__________________________________ __________________________________
Participant's signature* Date

Constance de Saint-Laurent __________________________________
Name of person obtaining consent (Printed) Signature of person obtaining consent

**Participants wishing to preserve some degree of anonymity may use their initials (from the British Psychological Society Guidelines for Minimal Standards of Ethical Approval in Psychological Research)*

■ Phone: +41 32 718 18 56 ■ Fax: +41 32 718 18 51 ■ E-Mail: sophie.lambolez@unine.ch ■ Website: www.unine.ch/ipe/

Appendix N. Authorisation to Record (Study 3)

Université de Neuchâtel unine

INSTITUT DE PSYCHOLOGIE ET ÉDUCATION ASSOCIÉ À LA MAPS MAISON D'ANALYSE DES PROCESSUS SOCIAUX

Institut de psychologie et éducation
Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines

- Espace Louis-Agassiz 1
- CH-2000 Neuchâtel

Authorisation to record
(Please tick the box corresponding to your situation)

I hereby authorise Constance de Saint-Laurent to record me:

- □ Yes
- □ No

And to use the recordings for research purposes. The data will be treated anonymously and confidentially.

- □ I also authorise the researcher to present parts of the recordings to students (for teaching purposes exclusively) or to other researchers (at conferences or during presentations).
- □ I do not authorise the researcher to present parts of the recordings.

____
Participant's Name*

________________________________ ________________________________
Participant's signature* Date

Constance de Saint-Laurent ________________________________
Name of person obtaining consent (Printed) Signature of person obtaining consent

**Participants wishing to preserve some degree of anonymity may use their initials (from the British Psychological Society Guidelines for Minimal Standards of Ethical Approval in Psychological Research)*

■ Phone: +41 32 718 18 56 ■ Fax: +41 32 718 18 51 ■ E-Mail: sophie.lambolez@unine.ch ■ Website: www.unine.ch/ipe/

Appendix O. Cover for the Debriefing Document (Study 3)

Université de Neuchâtel unine

INSTITUT DE PSYCHOLOGIE ET ÉDUCATION ASSOCIÉ À LA MAPS MAISON D'ANALYSE DES PROCESSUS SOCIAUX

Institut de psychologie et éducation
Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines

- Espace Louis-Agassiz 1
- CH-2000 Neuchâtel

Debriefing document
Research project "Remembering history"

Please note that this is a confidential document: it is part of an on going research project and should under no circumstances be distributed without the researcher's authorisation.

This aim of the document is to give you additional information on the material proposed in the second part of the interview. You were given small texts based on newspaper articles. Below is the list of all these texts and the sources used. The texts in themselves are not quotations but their content is based on the articles cited.

As there are many sources, the texts of the original articles are not given, only the link to their online version. However, if one of the articles becomes unavailable online and you want to read it, please let me know via email. I will send you a PDF copy of the article.

Different opinions are expressed in the texts: 6 texts defend Kiev and the Maidan movement, 6 defend Moscow and the separatists in Eastern Ukraine and 4 are neutral (or do not defend a particular side of the conflict). As opinions, they are of course debatable and what was asked of you was to discuss them during the interview. But the facts and statements you can find in these short texts were all checked against multiple sources.

As you will see, many articles were taken from the same newspapers. In particular, British and Russian sources were often used. Western sources are principally British – although a few are American – and were chosen for language purposes. The Guardian is most often cited because it offered interviews, local opinions and summaries of the conflict more often than the other newspapers. Of the Russian sources, TASS and Russia Today were chosen because they are published in English and yet represent a very different perspective on the conflict.

If you have any questions about this document or about the interview, do not hesitate to contact me (c.desaintlaurent@gmail.com).

■ Phone: +41 32 718 18 39 ■ E-Mail : constance.desaintlaurent@unine.ch / c.desaintlaurent@gmail.com ■ Website: www.unine.ch/ipe/