

# Spatialities of security and surveillance: Managing spaces, separations and circulations at sport mega events

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## A B S T R A C T

The paper explores empirically how contemporary security and surveillance practices and techniques permeate the production and management of everyday urban spaces. It does so from three interrelated perspectives, focusing on separation and access control, the management of circulations, and the internal organisation and monitoring of specific spatial enclaves. This analysis draws upon empirical insights into security governance at the European Football Championships 2008 in Switzerland and Austria (Euro 2008).

The paper also considers a number of more fundamental insights with regard to the intertwined spatialities of surveillance, relating to enclosure and circulation, fixity and fluidity, external separation and internal organisation. Three key issues stand out: firstly, the complex challenges associated with the necessary balancing and reconciliation of the core requirements of mobility and security, circulation and enclosure in contemporary security governance; secondly, the "atmospheric" implications of spatially articulated security and surveillance measures; and, thirdly, the logics and impacts of surveillance with regard to the orchestrations of urban life.

### *Keywords:*

Surveillance, Space, Sport mega events, Enclosure, Circulation

## 1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to explore empirically how contemporary security and surveillance practices and technologies permeate the production and management of everyday urban spaces. This problematic is addressed from a viewpoint centred on sport mega-event security, drawing upon empirical insights into security governance at the 2008 European Football Championships in Austria and Switzerland (Euro 2008). On this basis, the paper succinctly deals with three interrelated spatial logics of security and surveillance, relating to separation and access control, the management of circulations, and to the internal organisation and monitoring of specific spatial enclaves. Together, these three perspectives elucidate how surveillance, today, contributes to orchestrate urban life.

This analytical focus connects neatly with a growing body of research that now explores the surveillance-relevant role of space and, in turn, the space-producing role of surveillance. A rapidly developing literature suggests that surveillance tends not only to relate to specific persons or social groups (Lyon, 2003) but also to select, differentiate and manage specific categories of space. However, whilst the importance of space as the locus, object and tool of surveillance has been acknowledged, there is to date little reflection aimed at bringing the existing studies together with a

view to approaching the spatialities of surveillance more fully and systematically. This paper aims to fill this lacuna.

Existing literatures on surveillance and space can be organised under at least three broad headings, expressing three complementary perspectives of research. It is worth outlining these in some detail before moving to discuss the research approach adopted here. This will provide the foundation for the analysis of this paper, which aims to elucidate the interdependences of different spatialities of urban surveillance.

The first broad direction of research addresses issues of urban security and surveillance from a viewpoint centred on the "splintering urbanism problematics" (Graham and Marvin, 2001). This literature highlights and problematises current trends towards the increasing fragmentation of the urban environment into a patchwork of "more or less purified insides, separated from more or less dangerous outsides" (Franzen, 2001, p. 207). Studied examples range from secluded inner city zones (Coaffee, 2004) and gated communities (Connell, 1999) to shopping malls (Benton-Short, 2007; Helten and Fischer, 2004), recreational facilities, leisure spaces and bunkered private homes (Flusty, 1994). Thus urban security and surveillance is approached as a combined problematic of enclosure and accessibility. Surveillance is studied and conceptualised as an ensemble of techniques and practices for the monitoring and regulation of the flow of people and objects, crossing inner-city borderlines at particular points in space. The key issue here is access control, implying a spatial logic of power that

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encloses, fixes and keeps “things” apart (where things include places, people, objects, functions, etc.), based on new control and filtering techniques (Bauman, 2000, p. 115; Boyne, 2000).

One of the key lessons derived from this literature is that the distinction between inter-state border control, and the monitoring of spatially more diffuse “everyday borders” and access-points across the national and urban territory is increasingly blurred (from a spatial, functional, technological and organisational viewpoint) and thus quite relative (Walters, 2004; Lyon, 2005; Salter, 2005; Albert and Jacobsen, 2001; Amoore et al., 2008, p. 96). As Graham puts it,

“borders cease to be geographical lines and filters between states (always an over-simplified idea) and emerge instead as increasingly interoperable assemblages of control technologies strung out across the world’s infrastructures, circulations, cities and bodies” (Graham, 2010, p. 132).

Recent investigations have also explored the logics and implications of spatially articulated forms of (self-)encapsulation as a way to manage and monitor distinct “atmospheres”, understood here not in a physical but in a psycho-political sense, as jointly inhabited, self-animated spaces of togetherness (Sloterdijk, 2004). Concerned with the social and psycho-political logics and implications of enclosure and separation, many of these approaches mobilise metaphors that emphasise the internal “spherical volume” of the created spatial entities. Examples range from Don Mitchell’s “S.U.V. model of citizenship” (Mitchell, 2005), to Peter Sloterdijk’s “foam city” (Sloterdijk, 2004) and de Cauter’s “capsular civilisation” (de Cauter, 2004). Access control, from such a viewpoint, is seen not only to separate physical surfaces, but also to create and to defend more or less rigid and exclusive forms of togetherness, thus structuring the urban environment into a patchwork of secluded “spherical conglomerates of co-isolation” (Klauser, 2010).

The second direction of research is concerned not so much with how filtering and surveillance relates to spatial separation and enclosure, but with how – and to what effects – multi-layered “surveillant assemblages” (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000) are coalescing around mobile objects and people themselves. Thus the key concern here is not access control, but the continuous localisation and management of people and objects on the move (Dodge and Kitchin, 2007; Buhr, 2003). These studies provide much-needed critical accounts of how emerging geographies of surveillance work to align the circulation of mobile bodies, data, objects and services with localisation, identification, verification and authentication controls, and of how the practices and techniques of surveillance engage with the key infrastructural networks that aim to filter and manage movements within and between cities. Thus traditionally, this research perspective is concerned strongly with how surveillance relates to (urban) infrastructures, an emphasis that has been confirmed on various grounds and from various perspectives (Debrix, 2001; Wekerle and Jackson, 2005). Furthermore, and especially in more recent years, increased attention has been paid to the “surveillant capacities” of increasingly mobile, ubiquitous and “smart” information and communication technologies (Farman, 2011; De Souza e Silva and Frith, 2012).

Whilst both aforementioned research directions offer important insights into the control and management of inner urban and/or interurban separations and connections, little attention is paid, in most cases, to how precisely surveillance relates to, and permeates, monitored spaces themselves (enclosed enclaves, secured passage points, high-risk buildings, etc.). For example, transport nodes such as airports and railway stations are studied almost exclusively as filtering points for the procession of mobility (Castells, 1996; Fuller, 2002), without according the same type of attention to the

internal structuring and monitoring of these places, as security zones in their own right.

I do not contest the importance of border control and mobility management, but my feeling is that something important is overlooked in this picture. Indeed, all too frequently the study of how particular spaces are organised and shaped by surveillance – in terms of their internal constitution, functioning and architecture – becomes separated from that of surveillance as border- and mobility-control, as if it could somehow be regarded either as a side-show or as a passive side-product to more important and fundamental issues.

The third broad direction of research addresses precisely this research lacuna, studying the logics, functioning and effects of control and regulation in particular geographical locales, from buildings to public squares and larger urban areas. Anna Vemer Andrezejewski offers perhaps the most sophisticated study of the imbrications of architecture and surveillance (in factories, post offices, prisons, religious camps and private homes in Victorian America) (Andrezejewski, 2008). Other investigations have studied the spatial articulation of surveillance in shopping malls (Helten and Fischer, 2004) and football stadia (Bale, 2005; Hagemann, 2007), for example. What matters in all these studies is how space is (internally) organised around surveillance and how, in turn, surveillance is shaped by the specific characteristics of particular places.

This third research perspective underscores that space must be considered as one of the constitutive dimensions of surveillance (as both the product and producer of relevant practices and techniques) rather than as a static background structure. The functions and logics of surveillance operations, their scope, their impact and the risks they pose cannot be understood without referring to the spaces concerned and created by their deployment and performance. Yet in most of these micro-geographical or architectural studies, the wider picture regarding surveillance and inner or inter-city mobilities is lost. Therefore, one central objection is that such studies often ignore the broader urban, national or international networks within which the studied micro-spaces of surveillance are positioned and monitored. In this sense, this research direction both contributes to, and depends on, the previously outlined literatures.

## 2. Aim of the paper

The three directions of research outlined above are not hermetically sealed and mutually exclusive. On the contrary, many studies touch on various spatial logics and scales of surveillance. For example, Jones’s analysis of “checkpoint security” (Jones, 2009) and Graham’s work on “passage point urbanism” (Graham, 2010) powerfully combine the enclosure/access-control and mobility-management dimensions of surveillance. However, Jones and Graham largely overlook how exactly spatial enclaves are organised and monitored internally through everyday surveillance practices. In turn, many studies dealing with gated communities and other enclosures emphasise both the access control to, and internal surveillance of, secluded zones. Yet such studies beg the question of how flows of people and objects are monitored, channelled and filtered on the move in between fortified places.

Despite the wealth of insight provided by recent research on the imbrications between space and surveillance, there is to date no empirically grounded, systematic reflection about the associations and tensions between different spatialities of surveillance, combining different geographical scales and spatial logics. Indeed, little is known about the dissonances and resonances between surveillance practices and techniques relating to enclosure and circulation, fixity and fluidity, external separation and internal organisation.

This paper contributes to filling this gap. My basic premise is that the centrality of space to surveillance, and, in turn, the impacts of surveillance on space, can only be fully grasped when the three research directions are brought together. More specifically, the key argument I am seeking to advance here is that surveillance (in its spatialities) has to be studied simultaneously with regard to fluidity and fixity, flows and presences, circulations and enclosures, external separation and internal organisation, because it is the articulation and reconciliation of precisely these contrapuntal pairs of logics that condition the functioning and implications of urban surveillance today.

Therefore, the different spatialities of surveillance have to be understood in their mutual constitution and tensions, rather than as a matter of one being more important than the other, or as a mere co-evolution. In addition, two further points need to be made before explaining the empirical focus of this paper.

The first point is of conceptual nature. As outlined above, this paper argues that to different degrees, and in different ways, space must be understood as the locus, tool and object of surveillance. Yet the actual key for deciphering the spatialities of surveillance is not to be found in space itself, but rather in the intentions and aims of surveillance, mediating the spatially bound control practices and techniques (Raffestin, 1986). We have to study the interests and aims behind surveillance to understand its intertwined (and conflicting) spatialities. Applied to my previous argument, this means that if surveillance (in its spatialities) has to be studied simultaneously with regard to fluidity and fixity, flows and presences, external separation and internal organisation, it is because its very aims – filtering and enclosing, separating and following, channelling and dispersing – are themselves fundamentally intertwined in mutual enhancement and conflict.

The second additional point relates to the question of why analysing the spatialities of surveillance really matters: Surveillance impacts on everyday life not merely because it implies a wide range of practices and techniques for the accumulation of personal information, but – more importantly – because it enables unique forms and possibilities of classification, differentiation and prioritisation, which may affect the life chances of individuals or social groups in ways that are often opaque to the public and that easily evade conventional democratic scrutiny. It is important to focus on the spatialities of surveillance because we may subsequently understand where, how, by whom and for what reasons surveillance shapes urban life (Graham, 2005, p. 562).

These questions underlie the present paper, and I will show at different stages of my analysis how surveillance in the context of Euro 2008 produced prioritisation, differentiation and thus orchestration of urban life.

### 3. Security and surveillance at sport mega events

The centrality of the arguments put forth above can only be fully understood when specific case studies are investigated. To do so, this paper focuses on the field of sport mega-event security. More specifically, my analysis draws upon empirical insights provided by a 2-year research project relating to security governance at the European Football Championships 2008 in Switzerland and Austria (Euro 2008). Facilitated by longstanding research collaboration, the project involved ten in-depth interviews with diverse stakeholders in the securitisation of Euro 2008 in the Swiss city of Geneva. These stakeholders included the security coordinator of the Euro 2008 stadium in Geneva, security personnel at Geneva International Airport, representatives from the Ministry of Justice, the city's security coordinator and police ground personnel. Furthermore, the research relied on the extensive and systematic study of official documents (minutes of local, regional and national executive and parliament sittings, executive responses to parlia-

mentary interpellations, and official documents from police sources and UEFA) and on information gathered from various local, national and international media articles.

Regarded as the third largest recurrent sporting event in the world (Stadtpolizei Zürich, 2007a), the European Football Championships present important analogies to the FIFA World Cup in that they affect several host cities (Euro 2008 was hosted by eight cities in two countries: Basel, Berne, Geneva and Zurich in Switzerland; Innsbruck, Klagenfurt, Salzburg and Vienna in Austria), evoke similar concern in terms of hooliganism and crowd management, and result in a comparable cluster of spatial enclosures across the host cities (Klauser, 2011). Although restricted to national football teams from Europe (with the exception of Israel, if qualified), the event is clearly global in scope and scale, in terms of fan inflows and media interest (Roche, 2000): In the eight host cities of Euro 2008 an estimated 10 m spectators gathered between 7th and 29th June 2008 (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand, 2008, p. 12). Football matches were broadcast in 231 countries world-wide and were followed by 155 m TV viewers on average per game (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand, 2008, p. 12). In Austria and Switzerland, ca. 10,000 media representatives and journalists were accredited during the event. Thus there is good reason to understand Euro 2008 as a truly global sporting event, evoking important business opportunities but also raising major local, national and international security concern.

For the study of the intertwined spatialities of surveillance, the investigation of sport mega-event security presents at least three important advantages. Firstly, the example is of particular interest because of the very scope and importance of security governance in this context. Recent developments of the security costs for sporting mega events powerfully underline this point. Security expenditure for the 2004 Athens Olympics amounted to £700 million; more than double that for the 2000 Sydney Olympic games (Samatas, 2007), whereas security arrangements at the 2012 London Olympics are estimated to approach £1 billion (Magnay, 2010). These numbers highlight that in the context of sport mega events, an exceptionally wide range of security issues and strategies become crystallised in a specific set of layered national and urban geographies. As a result, the case study offers ideal conditions for investigating how precisely these intertwined security and surveillance strategies interact with the spaces concerned by their deployment and performance.

Secondly, sport mega-event security serves as a particularly useful frame for studying new trends and best practices in the field of urban surveillance. Recent investigations confirmed and elaborated upon the quality of sport mega events as privileged sites and moments for testing advanced high-tech surveillance systems, for developing novel (public-private and police-military) security collaboration and for implanting new, security-relevant legislation (Samatas, 2007; Boyle and Haggerty, 2009; Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010; Fussey et al., 2011). Euro 2008 made no exception to this. In Switzerland, the event led not only to unprecedented military involvement in public safety, combined with international police and private security collaboration, but also to the testing of a range of new surveillance techniques, from mobile fingerprint identification devices to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles for crowd control. Focusing on sport mega-event security not only provides a glimpse into future trends and best practices in this field, but also allows the study of the very places and mechanisms shaping contemporary developments in urban security and surveillance.

Thirdly, the example is of great interest because sport mega-event security, at its very core, condenses and accentuates one of the central issues that shapes contemporary security governance, namely, the need to reconcile and combine (in consensus and conflict) the demands for mobility and security (Aas, 2005; Amoores, 2006; Amoores et al., 2008). In Bern alone, a city with 130,000

inhabitants, more than 150,000 fans came together when Euro 2008 football games were staged in the city (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand, 2008, p. 65). Here the challenges of managing massive densities of presence and circulation within and across urban space mix uncomfortably with the dilemmas involved in trying to anticipate and prevent threats, while at the same time managing public perception of risks. At the interface of two apparently opposed worlds – the necessary entrance and mobility of visitors, spectators and officials, and the institution of security measures and restrictions – the basic question is: how to keep the host city open and moving, whilst also anticipating, monitoring, managing and preventing the security threats at the tournament?

This challenge is not exclusive to sport mega events. However, it is of heightened relevance in this context because of the event's scale and special characteristics (density, diversity, visibility and risk exposure). Using Euro 2008 as a case study thus offers ideal conditions for investigating how, today, densely packed flows and presences of people and objects are monitored, secured and managed between and within cities.

In my analysis, this security problem will be related to the three spatial logics of surveillance outlined above: enclosure/access control, mobility management and internal organisation. I will show how security governance at Euro 2008 worked through the combination and reconciliation of surveillance practices and techniques aiming to bring together and to balance the demands for organising and managing 'mass movement' and 'mass presence', fluidity and fixity, external separation and internal organisation.

#### 4. Structure of the case study

To address these problematics the case study of Euro 2008 that follows is structured into three main parts, aiming to study and to problematise the event-related surveillance system from a perspective centred on access control and spatial enclosure (1), with a view to the differentiation, tracking and channelling of mobilities (2), and in relation to the internal control and organisation of myriad security enclaves (3).

With this approach, I do not attempt to provide an exhaustive overview of the panoply of surveillance practices and techniques at Euro 2008; I merely propose an exploratory analysis of the intertwined spatial logics of select surveillance measures, situated on two main scales: the host cities of the event, and the security enclaves within these cities. Yet this approach also aims to bring to the fore a number of more fundamental insights in contemporary security governance. Three key issues stand out: firstly, the complex challenges associated with the necessary balancing and reconciliation of the core requirements of mobility and security, circulation and enclosure in contemporary security governance; secondly, the "atmospheric" implications of spatially articulated security and surveillance measures; and, thirdly, the logics and impacts of surveillance with regard to the orchestrations of urban life.

### 5. Enclosure and access control

#### 5.1. Splintering urbanism

With the staging of sport mega events, entire city centres are temporarily reconfigured as security landscapes. At Euro 2008, *RentES*, a company specialising in renting out fences and other security installations for large-scale events, provided more than 30 km of fences to six of the eight host cities, adding to those fences already placed in each city (*RentES*, 2008, online). Thus it can be assumed that Euro 2008 resulted in the installation of up to 20 km of fences per city, demarcating a multitude of access-

controlled spatial entities, from the stadiums to the referee headquarters, from team hotels to fan zones and from private camping grounds to "official fan villages" (offering accommodation and attractions for fans).

Accessibility to different enclaves varied in degree and nature: from sporadic ID and luggage checks at fan zones to electronic ticket-controls at stadiums and from body searches at training grounds to the more or less hermetic enclosure of team hotels, depending on the risk assessment of each team (Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2008, pp. 61–62). Together, the examples bear striking testimony to the enclosure and access control problematics at sport mega events. Event cities exemplify the splintering of the contemporary urban environment into a wide range of more or less hermetically enclosed and tightly access-controlled security perimeters that are supported by advanced surveillance technologies and increased numbers of security personnel (Klauser, 2011). Securing these separations became one of the main concerns for police forces and private security staff before and during Euro 2008.

Fan zones provide the most illuminating example for the large scale restructuring of Swiss and Austrian city centres at the event. The UEFA fan zone in Vienna, for example, covering more than 100,000 m<sup>2</sup> of the city centre, was surrounded by more than 4 km of fencing (Vienna Organising Committee EURO 2008, 2008). Other host cities erected fencing around fan zones of similar proportions. Thus fan zones bore striking testimony to the event-related "festivalisation" of urban public space (Häussermann and Siebel, 1993), offering space for supporters to drink and party whilst watching the matches on giant television screens. In addition they allowed for the concentration and regulation of fans on specifically designed and enclosed perimeters, whilst other urban areas remained less considered.

A similar interpretation can be made of stadium security rings, as a second example of the translation of event security onto the level of urban morphology, following the need to manage a context of increased density and risk. Up to several hundred metres from the stadium, depending on the city, stadium security rings constituted the first fenced barrier to the stadium for arriving fan groups. Restricted to holders of match tickets, accredited staff, members of the press and other authorised persons, the area was closed to the general public for the whole duration of the event.

In the second and third parts of my analysis I show how different enclosures were connected to each other and monitored internally. However, at this stage, I am interested predominantly in the spatial and regulatory dynamics of access-control, stemming from a concern for how surveillance orchestrates urban life.

#### 5.2. Spatial and regulatory dynamics of access control

Fan zones, stadium security rings, enclosed team hotels, training grounds and other secluded places stand for a particular spatial logic of surveillance. The aim is to guarantee the good functioning of selected, enclosed and hierarchically organised portions of space by controlling and filtering the flows of people and objects crossing their borderlines at specific access and control points.

Enclosure and access control are thus intrinsically related, and yet they also harbour specific dilemmas. Throughout the interviews conducted, one key issue emerged: how to seclude space, whilst also allowing swift access for those entitled to enter. Or in other words, how to accelerate entries, whilst also monitoring, regulating and restricting access where necessary. The key issue is not only that of fixing, demarcating and fragmenting urban space, but also of allowing and facilitating access. Below, I seek to highlight the sophisticated system of filters and surveillance at Euro 2008 aiming to address this problem, starting with the following quotation dealing with accreditation and stadium security:

“The accreditation system was conceptualised and implemented by EURO 2008 SA. The main objective was to identify every person working in the event venues. To this end, 10 categories [of workers] and about 50 sub-categories were created. [...] On match days, access to stadia was restricted to people with either an accreditation or a valid ticket. Each stadium was subdivided into 13 different zones, relating to different accreditations. The Analysis and Prevention Service in the Federal Office of Police examined more than 45'000 UEFA accreditations before and during the event” (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand, 2008, p. 85).

The quote portrays stadium security as an exercise of differentiation and categorisation. The objective is to allow access to take place, based on the differentiation between various types of inflows. People are categorised according to occupation and into target groups and risk categories before being treated and monitored accordingly. Whilst “bad” inflows are singled out and prevented from entering (hooligans, political activists, etc.), “good” inflows are induced, facilitated and accelerated (peaceful fans, trusted workers and official delegations). This strategy relied fundamentally on increased efforts in gathering, analysing and exchanging data, including the international HOOGAN database, information exchange on terrorist suspects and political extremists, etc. (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand, 2008, pp. 61; 86).

In the quotation, accreditation and access control are approached from a perspective centred on stadium security. However, filtering also occurred in and through many other places, on different geographical scales. “Risky” foreign fans encountered access control (and denial) somewhere in between their private home (through requests to report to their national police during the tournament, or by unsuccessfully trying to book an aeroplane-or tournament ticket online), at the national border of the two host nations (Switzerland implemented 702 refusals of entry at its external border, 110 of which were due to active travel bans and 12 because of registration in the HOOGAN database (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand, 2008, p. 44)) or at the entrance gates of stadiums, training grounds or fan zones (through police spot checks and biometric fingerprint identification devices). Together, the examples provide a strong flavour of the multi-scalar system of threat filters situated both within and outside the Swiss and Austrian national territory, implying an increased dissociation of surveillance-as-border-control from the territorial frontiers (Albert and Brock, 1996, p. 62). This “de-bordering process” (Rumford, 2006; Côté-Boucher, 2008) is not exclusive to mega-event security, but the special conditions of, and measures at, sport mega events add further importance to it.

Yet to fully grasp the selection and differentiation processes related to access control, we should move beyond the databases and exchange of information aimed at the identification and preclusion of the “unwanted” and “risky”. Instead, we must also study the negotiation and compromises accounting for the *preferential* treatment of particular visitor- or worker-categories. The aim of access control is not only whom (and how) to exclude, but also whom (and how) to prioritise. There are at least three important points to highlight with regard to the emerging “analytics of access management”.

Firstly, it is rather obvious that differentiation, categorisation and prioritisation not only resulted from risk assessments and security considerations, but also responded to external stipulations, private interests and commercial rationales. Sport mega events imply a wide range of “event partners” (sponsors, representatives from the organising committee, etc.), whose privileges are already fixed in pre-established guidelines and agreements; here again, a variety of geographical scales are at stake. On the national level, for example, the Austrian and Swiss governments had to

provide a series of guarantees, as early as the pre-bidding stage, including assurances about granting visas/work permits and the free importation of goods listed in UEFA’s “Schedule of Conditions” (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand, 2008, pp. 100–105). From the very start of the bidding process for Euro 2008, UEFA ensured that official delegations (such as UEFA delegates, delegations of national teams, official UEFA partners, official LOC suppliers and media journalists) were provided with free visas and exempted of taxes linked to their professional activities in Switzerland and Austria.

On the urban level, UEFA guidelines stipulated a range of special conditions with regard to venue access (such as maximum walking distances for dignitaries and officials, and special sectors for commercial partners). Furthermore, according to UEFA’s “Clean Site Principle” (UEFA, undated, p. 44), UEFA requested exclusive branding rights for its sponsors in fan zones, stadium security rings and other “official sites” of the event, which had to be made available to UEFA free of any contractual obligations (including sponsorship agreements, leases, utilisation agreements, supplier agreements, etc.) (UEFA, undated, p. 44). Thus the fragmentation of urban space into a series of access-controlled perimeters also served to temporarily re-territorialise parts of the host cities in the interests of visibility and branding for UEFA and its commercial partners. If enclosures contributed to the orchestrations of urban life during the event, they did so for many reasons and in order to serve many different interests.

Secondly, it is worth highlighting that the interests shaping access control in its foci and modalities were, inevitably, both complementary and ridden with contradictions. Two examples from my interviews, related to issues of access control and enclosure, must suffice:

- In the field of stadium security, the need to reconcile UEFA privileges for commercial partners (for example in terms of maximum walking distances for venue access) with police security norms (for example, to screen all vehicles approaching the stadium).
- With regard to fan zones, the need to reconcile security-related requirements (for example, the police’s need of space for fences and surveillance technologies), UEFA’s interest in space for commercial purposes, and the interests of previously established residents and businesses.

Event security thus appears as a complex process of exchanges and negotiations, occurring on all levels across the hierarchy of actors involved, aimed at balancing and reconciling diverse needs. Most of these negotiations, despite their implications for urban life during the event, remained secret and hence a priori excluded from democratic scrutiny. This applied for example to the negotiations leading to the *Host City Charter*, a comprehensive cooperation agreement between UEFA and the host cities. Only in some very specific cases, conflicts and tensions did shine through in official documents and parliamentary protocols. One example at hand can be found in the *Final Report* of the Swiss organizing committee of Euro 2008, which offers a surprisingly open account of the tensions between UEFA’s efforts to enhance exclusive branding in fan zones and the claims of spatial ownership by local businesses and residents (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand, 2008, pp. 72–73). Thirdly, it should be reiterated that differential access control not only implied databases and negotiation, but also resulted in a meticulously planned, spatially articulated system of “filters, valves and locks” (Hagemann, 2007). Overall, *RentES* installed 1400 turnstiles along the inner and outer security rings of the eight event stadiums (RentES, 2008, online), offering dedicated entry points to fan groups of different nationalities, but also to privileged clientele (VIPs, officials, etc.). In airports, special lanes were set up

to accelerate customs clearance procedures for accredited players, officials and UEFA staff (Public Authorities Project Organisation, 2007, p. 35). At fan zones, special arrangements allowed rapid access for rescue services and police, etc. Thus differential access control was both the product and the producer of complex spatial arrangements, meticulously planned and carefully coordinated, aiming to manage presences and flows across the host cities of Euro 2008.

## 6. Managing circulations

For the event's host cities to function well, the management, monitoring and maintenance of safe and efficient flows are of central importance. The following section discusses a series of select aspects regarding the surveillance of circulations at Euro 2008, and, in so doing, highlights the fact that mega-event security not only implies enclosure and filtering, but also channelling and following.

### 6.1. "Passage points" and "conductive lines"

Each Euro 2008 host city comprised a 2–4 km-long "fan mile" across the city centre. Closed off to vehicle traffic during the tournament, fan miles connected fan sites, attractions and sponsors' installations. They were freely accessible to the public, yet closely monitored by national and international (static and patrolling) police forces, additional CCTV cameras and drones in the sky (in Zurich, Bern and Basel). On match days, fan miles were further enlarged by a traffic-free, monitored and secured corridor called the "walk of fans", linking the city's railway station to the stadium. Before and after the football games, temporary and spatially flexible road barriers and check points for police control of spectators were erected on these corridors.



A closer look into the security reports of Euro 2008 reveals many other, spatially diffuse sites for the surveillance of flows. Examples include monitored *nodal points* – railway stations, street crossings – *passage points* along lines of movement – such as increased police and private surveillance of restaurants and parking fields along motorways (Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2008, p. 72) – and *transport networks*, with precautions taken to segregate supporter groups upon airport arrival (Public Authorities Project Organisation, 2007, p. 35). Thus throughout the host nations and cities of Euro 2008, major event attractions and venues were connected by monitored routes, through which fan flows were managed and traffic (train, buses, cars) was channelled.

The emerging system of "conductive lines" and "nodal/passage points" stands for a second spatial logic of surveillance that maps onto, without being synonymous with, enclosure and access control. Both logics of surveillance are punctual and linear in their spatial articulation (focussing on particular entrance points and separating lines in the case of access control and enclosure, whilst working through the monitoring of passage points and conductive lines for the management of circulations). Yet this second type of surveillance aims not to separate and to fix space, combined with differentiated and restricted/facilitated access, but to manage connections along the very circuits where groups and individuals circulate. Michel Foucault, in his conceptualisation of "apparatus of security" (Foucault, 2009) grasps the spatiality of this kind of surveillance with unequivocal clarity:

"[the problem] is no longer that of fixing and demarcating the territory, but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, shifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement, constantly moving around, continually going from one point to another, but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out" (Foucault, 2009, p. 65).

What matters is channelling and guiding flows of people along predefined routes and through flexible gateways, whilst also checking bodies, belongings and behaviours (Jones, 2009, p. 81). Along these lines and points of control, some flows may be interrupted, whilst others may be simply surveyed (Côté-Boucher, 2008, p. 146). What is emerging is a temporally limited, security-related form of "passage-point urbanism" (Graham, 2010, p. 145). Thus event surveillance appears as a "programme of government of movement" (Côté-Boucher, 2008), aimed at establishing routes and passage points for channelling, tracking and monitoring as well as facilitating and speeding up various lines and types of

circulation, from point to point and from zone to zone. Yet compared to the differentiation and categorisation of access control, such processes of ordering (privileging and restricting) circulations are not neutral. They raise a series of critical power issues that are of particular importance, especially if the differential treatment of individuals and spectator groups not only results from risk assessments and security considerations, but also responds to private interests and commercial rationales.

To further refine this picture, at least three characteristics of “passage point urbanism” in the event-context deserve some discussion. Firstly, the spatial and temporal flexibility and adaptability of the event-related system of connections and separations needs emphasising. Components of the system (fences of fan zones, police check points, turnstiles around stadia, etc.) were constantly rearticulated and modified during the tournament. Echoing the marketing slogan of *RentES* – “logistics just in time” (*RentES*, 2008, online) – the regulatory control of urban space was adapted constantly to the changing characteristics of the event-crowd. Rather than a system of permanent and rigid spatially articulated constraints, we find a type of regulation that works through the evaluation and combination of different parameters and interests, thus allowing for a form of security governance that acts in differential and flexible ways, based on a series of special arrangements. The organisation and intensity of surveillance depends on the level of risk assessed at a given time, combined with a number of other parameters whose relations with the managed context of increased risk, density and visibility are carefully evaluated. This confirms the sophisticated “analytics of surveillance and regulation” identified above.

Secondly, the complex interplay of security agents, surveillance technologies and material objects is worth noting. Surveillance in mega-event cities relies on a complex and dynamic assemblage of people, technologies and objects (fences, police cars for road blocks, etc.). These “surveillant assemblages” (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000) must be studied as a dynamic and complex whole in order to understand and to problematise the interactions (in consensus and conflict) of different spatialities of surveillance.

Thirdly, the intrinsic relationship between the two spatial logics of surveillance discussed so far – separations and circulations – needs emphasising. To a large degree, the two logics complement each other; indeed, the example of mega-event security powerfully illustrates the intertwined logics of fixing, enclosing and delimiting space on the one hand, and of managing, guaranteeing, and improving circulations on the other. However, in the event’s context of increased density, coexistence and risk exposure, the core requirements for the management of enclosures and circulation, fixity and fluidity also compete with each other. For example, UEFA’s stipulation for fan zones to be “located in close proximity to the stadia on or adjacent to significant spectator access routes” (UEFA, undated, p. 22) resulted in the issue of how to seclude space without impacting on circulation. In police documents and event reports, traffic obstructions through and next to fan zones – with a view to spectator flows and escape or rescue routes – were discussed centrally (Stadtpolizei Zürich, 2007b; Republik Österreich, 2008, p. 47). Here we touch again on the issue of the “struggle for space”, outlined above with regard to the frictions between security and commercial needs for space.

## 6.2. Surveillance on the move

Fences cannot be repositioned and extended infinitely and police road blocks only make sense in certain conditions. Thus by contrast with a mode of surveillance of circulations that focuses exclusively on specific passage points and conductive lines, mega-event surveillance also aims to become mobile in space.

For example, international trains transporting “risky” supporters were followed by border control guards, whilst local and regional trains were monitored by (rail) police (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand, 2008, p. 68). Across the host cities, fan groups were accompanied by police delegations and fan monitors from their own countries, whilst football teams, officials and political dignitaries were piloted by police convoys (Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2008, p. 75). Fan zones and other areas of increased fan concentrations were patrolled by local, national and foreign police (also in plain clothes), fan monitors and private security staff.

Surveillance of circulations therefore worked through a geographically and collaboratively extended security scheme, bringing together a large chain of actors, from border control guards and (foreign) police delegations to fan monitors and private security staff. The carefully coordinated network of actors offered a multi-scalar and, above all, mobile system of surveillance for accompanying and managing mobile individuals, groups and activities. Adapted to and embracing the monitored mobilities, this system combined punctual access and passage controls with logics of surveillance and regulation that were either more linear (along transport routes) or planar (in fan zones, around stadiums, etc.).

The “mobile fingerprint identification system”, deployed by the Swiss police for identity checks in fan zones and at railway stations, provides a powerful example for the efforts towards diffused and mobile surveillance. As Mark Hess, spokesperson for the Swiss Federal Police, was quoted,

“Mobile AFIS [Automated Fingerprint Identification System] enables us to operate quickly and discreetly in busy and crowded areas. It’s an ideal solution for targeted border control, helping to protect citizens and visitors. An event like EURO 2008, when our borders will be much busier than normal, is a good example of how much flexibility a mobile solution can provide” (Motorola, 2008, online).

The quotation bears striking testimony to the technologically mediated developments towards “ubiquitous borders” (Graham, 2010), thus elucidating how new technologies disrupt and delocalise territorial boundaries (Aas, 2005, p. 207) and how verification, identification and authorisation becomes ever more mobile in space.

Whilst mobile fingerprint identification devices enabled ID checks throughout the urban environment, they did not allow the monitoring and following of large fan groups. For this purpose, police used mobile CCTV cameras, spotters and plainclothes officers along and within the moving fan groups, as well as helicopters and drones above the event cities (Stadtpolizei Zürich, 2007a). This provides perhaps the most powerful example accounting for the quest of mobile and flexible monitoring techniques for crowd control.

## 7. Regulatory dynamics of internal organisation and zonal surveillance

Mega-event surveillance implies not only a complex system of connections and separations, but also myriad carefully regulated and internally monitored perimeters of varying size, scale and functionality. For example, as shown elsewhere in more detail (Klauser et al., 2008), railway stations and airports were monitored not only as transit points, but also as security zones in their own right. Surveillance focused on these sites as both a nodal point for the procession, channelling and filtering of flows, and as a “security bubble” with its own internal activities, shops, etc. Thus event surveillance also worked as zonal spatial intervention of power, through diverse mechanisms and instruments, from sniffing dogs in stadium perimeters (Marinka, 2006, p. 4) to no-flight

zones above the host cities (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand, 2008, p. 75).

At this point, I do not attempt to put forward an exhaustive analysis of zonal surveillance at Euro 2008, in all its sites and qualities. I merely devote some attention to a number of important elements characterising the regulatory dynamics of this kind of surveillance, so as to further elucidate the intertwined spatialities correlative to the management of spaces, separations and circulations. To do so, emphasis will be placed, again, on the example of fan zones.

The first point to highlight is rather obvious: namely, surveillance practices and technologies in fan zones – from patrolling security agents and CCTV cameras to the *Scanning Infrared Gas Imaging System* for the detection of hazardous chemicals deployed in Bern and Basel (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand, 2008, p. 47) – exemplify that enclosed perimeters were not only access controlled, but also monitored and regulated internally. This is related, of course, to the very purpose of fan zones, which is to fix and to concentrate presences (rather than to keep the event crowd in “tamed” motion such as in “fan miles” and the “walk of fans”). Yet if fan zones are intended to contain, collect and protect the event crowd, they also rely on the filtering and channelling of inflowing and outflowing people and objects. Internal surveillance both complements and depends on surveillance related to enclosure and circulation.

Secondly, what matters with regard to the internal surveillance of fan zones is not merely the monitoring of distinct physical surfaces, but the management of spatially anchored atmospheres (Klauser, 2010; Pavoni, 2011). Fan zones provide a space for the collection of individual spectators into larger conglomerates of contemplative togetherness. They constitute the territorial framework for the concentration of high densities of fans into collectively inhabited spheres of emotions and analogous rituals. Security and surveillance practices in fan zones must therefore be understood as sphere-creating forces in their own right. In other words, to understand the spatialities of surveillance in fan zones, emphasis has also to be placed on the atmospheric attributes of enclosure and internal organisation/monitoring. This is important precisely because space is not just a means, but also an object and aim of surveillance.

Thirdly, if surveillance of fan zones is to be understood as an ensemble of atmospherically active practices and techniques, this does not imply that fan zones were internally homogeneous and unstructured. On the contrary, managing enclosures is related intrinsically to the internal structuring of space. As Bale (2005) and Hagemann (2007) have shown, this comment applies forcefully to stadium security: At Euro 2008, stadium perimeters were subdivided into 13 different zones, as seen above. Different subdivisions matched with different routes and modalities for venue access (for different fan communities, dignitaries, commercial partners, etc.). In the case of fan zones, the principle of internal structuring was also present, but less pronounced (access control was also less sophisticated). Internal structuring was reduced to the use of “wave breakers” (physical barriers and obstacles, Republik Österreich, 2008, p. 48) and to the erection of stands and platforms related to special activities and access criteria. Yet in both cases, internal structuring aimed towards the planned, hierarchical and functional distribution of people and objects across the enclosed inside (Foucault, 2009, p. 20), bound up also with differential access and circulation management.

The fourth and final point I want to reiterate here is that surveillance in fan zones differed from adjoining space not only in intensity, spatiality and internal organisation, but also in substance and regulative principles. Unlike in open public space, security in fan zones (and stadia) was delegated to Euro 2008 SA, which accomplished the task by contracting private security companies. Con-

structional, technical, organisational and operational security aspects in fan zones thus fell under the authority of UEFA, with national and international police ready to intervene if need be (Public Authorities Project Organisation, 2007, pp. 46–47). Yet security and surveillance in fan zones not only implied a different source of authority, but also relied on a different normative foundation. UEFA’s “Binding Safety and Security Instructions” provided a detailed set of directives, stipulations and house rules aimed at the control and “disciplination” of the enclosed compound, following a binary and a priori defined opposition between the allowed and the forbidden. This set of instructions, as previously shown, responded to both security and commercial rationales. As a result, fan zones appear as spatially fixed, separated, access-controlled and internally monitored security bubbles, motivated by security considerations, but also by UEFA’s intentions to create a clean environment for its official partners’ branding and merchandise.

## 8. Conclusions

The paper has explored the spatial orderings around mega-event surveillance from three complementary perspectives, focusing on separation and access control, the management of circulations, and the internal organisation and monitoring of security enclaves.

With this analysis, I make no claim that mega-event surveillance presents clear and simple analogies to urban security and surveillance in “normal” circumstances. On the contrary, sport mega-event security relies on increased planning and coordination, which contributes to the strict coalescence of different spatial, temporal and functional logics of surveillance within a carefully orchestrated and comprehensive security system. Thus a variety of measures and logics of surveillance are bound together here more firmly and consciously than in other cases and contexts studied in the existing literatures.

Despite this particularity, however, there are at least three major lessons from my analysis that need highlighting. I am doing so with a view to embark on a broader theoretical project, aimed at conceptualising the imbrications of power, space and surveillance in the contemporary world. Firstly, the framework I have developed in this paper suggests some new directions for critical enquiry into the complementarities and tensions between different spatialities of surveillance. The paper exemplifies how, at Euro 2008, different spatial logics of surveillance called on each other, supported each other, modified and shaped each other, but also – in specific cases – conflicted with each other in ceaseless reciprocity. These complex imbrications resulted, fundamentally, from intertwined ambitions to channel, filter and follow circulations, to enclose, fix, monitor and organise spatial enclaves, and to create and defend spatially bound atmospheres. Although in other circumstances, urban security and surveillance might not be as carefully coordinated, there is good reason to assume that this intrinsic relation between the various aims and spatialities of surveillance is of more general and hence exemplary value.

Secondly, and following from the previous point, my investigation illustrates in exemplary fashion the intertwined pair of impulses to facilitate, accelerate and promote flows of people and objects on the one hand, and to reinforce enclosures and restrict accessibilities on the other. Here, this problematic has been approached through the lens of mega-event security, as a world with either no borders (for some) or ubiquitous borders (for others). Having said this, the sophisticated regulatory dynamics of filtering and differentiating between those allowed (and helped) to move and those doomed to miss out is often understood more generally as a defining feature of globalisation (Bauman, 1998, p. 88). It is therefore located at the very core of contemporary security

governance (Aas, 2005, p. 200). For further research – focusing like this paper on specific sites and moments in order to reveal the micro-articulations of the two ambitions – a central challenge will be to undertake detailed and comparative empirical investigations into how precisely different forms, objectives and scales of filtering interact with each other. It will also be necessary to further problematise the implications this has on contemporary socio-spatial practices and relations.

Thirdly, the present analysis illustrates powerfully that surveillance operations – in their multiple and intertwined spatialities – respond to a range of goals, from different actors. In particular, one of the key issues emerging from my analysis relates to the role and importance of UEFA in shaping security and surveillance at Euro 2008, as well as in re-territorialising the event cities for purposes of global branding. Therefore, more generally speaking, in investigating the spatialities of surveillance, critical attention must also be paid to the interests, motivations and needs mediating the spatial articulations of specific measures and practices, its modalities and, consequently, its implications on urban life.

Together, the three lessons are of critical importance if we are to study the complex and intertwined spatialities of power and surveillance along with its effects and problems. Yet self-evidently, this problematic requires much more first-hand research into the everyday expressions of surveillance in (and through) space. What I offer here – based on the contrapuntal pairs of fixity and fluidity, enclosure and circulation, external separation and internal organisation – is one possible organising framework for such inquiry.

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