As a politician, Stefan Löfven is quite boring. But his background is interesting. As a child he lived in an orphanage and he grew up in the north of Sweden with foster parents. He worked as a welder in a Swedish arms factory and rose through the ranks of the Swedish metal workers union to the position of chairman. He was elected party leader after a tumultuous period as a safe pair of hands, when being boring was a great asset.

And he has developed his own set of political rules. The first is a clear centrist instinct to make as many deals as possible and find common ground in the political centre. He does not triangulate the political opposition using a third way approach, he just steals their ideas. Most of the political positions in the new migration policy were just copied from the conservatives when his own policies failed to work. It is pragmatism as ideology.

The second and somewhat contradictory characteristic is a slightly authoritarian leadership style. In Sweden we sometimes divide political parties into mommy parties and daddy parties. The mommy party takes care of you and always gives you a second chance. The daddy party thinks that you can make it only if you work hard - so stop whining and get up again when you fall down. This is a quite sexist way of describing the difference between caring and demanding as political ethos and strategy. But the Social Democrats under Stefan Löfven are a typical daddy party.

He has resurrected an old slogan from the early twentieth-century workers' movement: »Do your duty - claim your rights«. This captures the essence of his rhetorical style.

The third component is rules-based order. It is no coincidence that his government aims to reach the minimum level according to international conventions and EU legislation. To break the rules is impossible. And by respecting international norms his government still receives more refugees than many other countries. At the end of 2016 Sweden welcomed around 30,000 new asylum seekers, all of whom actually claimed asylum after Sweden »closed« its borders.

These three components - the pragmatic policies, the daddy party style and the adherence to international rules - actually seem to work. According to long-term opinion trends the government are holding the fort and the Social Democrats are gaining support again.

It is too early to say whether the strategy will work all the way to the next election in 2018, but it might.

And that is in itself almost unbelievable, given where Stefan Löfven's party, his government and the entire country found themselves in the autumn of 2015.

It is actually a miracle.

Gianni D'Amato

The Migration Challenge: The Swiss Left in the Arena of Direct Democracy[1]

1. Introduction

Generally speaking, migration policy in Switzerland was characterised by a liberal regime after its inception in 1848, but with the rise of nationalism in Europe towards the end of the nineteenth century, this liberal democratic tendency began to subside. In search of a solid identity in Europe, the Swiss opted to invoke a past in which they were steeled in battle and steeped in different cantonal and regional cultures. The autonomy of the cantons and federalism were the new pillars upon which Helvetic identity was based. This shift in the direction of a republican-communal spirit was related to the profound social changes of the modern era. Industrialisation fundamentally changed the demographic structure of what had previously been an agrarian country, while technological progress undermined the livelihoods of many peasants engaged in small crafts and enterprises. The emigration of the rural population was compensated by labour immigration from surrounding countries.[2] Switzerland's urbanisation also rose steeply as a result of this internal European migration.

These developments were viewed with trepidation by conservative elements of society. There was a conviction that the growth of cities went hand in hand with an erosion of morals, while urbanisation also raised the »foreigner question«. As a result of the changing composition of the Swiss population, it was feared that the old rural value system, which was considered to provide the bedrock for Helvetian identity, would be lost. Moreover, the rising number of foreigners was extrapolated, with dire predictions of an imminent »*Überfremdung*« (»inundation« of foreigners). In the face of this »invasion«, a right to »self-defence« appeared only right and proper. While the Swiss working class was alarmed by the prospects of competition from Italian immigrants (»riots against Italians«), the middle class began to fear dependency on Germany.[3]

The question of »*Überfremdung*« became the dominant domestic policy issue towards the end of the nineteenth century, stylised by large sections of the social elite as a threat to be repelled.[4] However, this conflicted with Switzerland's foreign policy and economic interests. Restrictions on freedom of commerce, trade and establishment, which even then were vested in bilateral treaties and provided the Swiss with unparalleled prosperity, would not only have contradicted the basic liberal tenets of the ruling liberal strata, but would also have had negative economic consequences and, what is more, without doubt triggered retaliation by neighbouring countries.

In view of the pro-immigration laws and regulations, over time it was increasingly deemed necessary to assimilate foreigners. Although a modest federal law was passed in 1903, which under certain conditions provided for the possibility of *jus soli* (birthright citizenship) for children of foreigners, the objective was to counter the feared »*Überfremdung*« by means of nationalisation and application of *jus soli* to foreigners born in Switzerland. The co-existence of two population groups with different rights and obligations was also considered to pose a threat to the republican political system.[5]

The end of the First World War saw a departure from liberal traditions not only with regard to the issues of naturalisation and Swiss citizenship. The foreign populace living in Switzerland plummeted by one-third between 1913 and 1920, although the number of naturalisations rose over the same period (1904-1913: 4,097; 1914-1918: 8,468). This transformation took place at a time in which national solidarity was being put under considerable pressure by tensions resulting from the sympathy of the different language populations in Switzerland for belligerent kindred-language states and, in the wake of the Russian Revolution, in a period when deepening social rifts were beginning to cast doubt on the integrative force of Helvetian democracy. During this period, a movement coalesced against »unwanted« foreigners with the aim of expelling them. The Swiss Central Office for Immigration Police was established in 1917, tasked with controlling the entry and domicile of foreigners. In 1921, the Immigration Police was also commissioned by a federal bill to prevent »*Überfremdung*«. Foreigners were categorised as *residents permitted to stay* (»*Aufenthalter*«), and the remainder who did not receive a permit. Although a notion of assimilation was laid down in civil law, the question of assimilability came to the fore.[6]

As a result of a drastic reduction in the number of foreigners in the aftermath of the First World War (1910: 14.7 per cent; 1920: 10.4 per cent; 1941: 5.2 per cent) *jus soli* also lost its significance in the struggle against »*Überfremdung*«. The Immigration Police, on the other hand, proved to be an effective instrument in this regard. In 1925, the Swiss passed Article 69 of the Federal Constitution, which has since entitled the federal government to issue wide-ranging regulations on immigration and provided the basis for a national immigration policy. The end of the liberal migration policy was thus reflected in statute as well. The provisions of the law were intended to uphold and preserve Switzerland's »moral and economic interests« and limited labour migrants' geographic mobility and rights to a considerable extent. The Federal Act on the Residence and Settlement of Foreigners (*Bundesgesetz über den Aufenthalt und die Niederlassung der Ausländer* (ANAG) of 1934, which was only slightly modified following the Second World War, determined immigration policy until 2008.

The ideological effort to ward off »foreign elements« outlasted the Second World War.[7] Even towards the end of the war, it had become evident that Switzerland, which had been spared its horrors, would need labour in the economic upturn expected in the post-war period. This raised the question of how fears of »*Überfremdung*« could be harmonised with the need to import workers.

The attempt to solve this dilemma marks the beginning of a new phase in immigration policy. This commenced in 1948 in the guise of a bilateral treaty with Italy laying down immigrants' obligations and rights. This compendium of legal provisions was to serve as a means of checks and controls, not integration. This type of immigration policy was motivated primarily by economic-policy aims. Immigration was also meant to cushion economic fluctuations: during periods when labour demand was high, Switzerland would open its doors, while in downturns the doors were to be closed again.

In retrospect, it does not seem particularly surprising that an immigration policy that sought to prevent labour migrants from settling in Switzerland with an alternating »open door/closed door« approach was rather difficult to put into practice. Thus, in effect temporary residence was often extended to become permanent residence. The number of foreigners living in Switzerland, most of them from Italy, rose from 271,000 to 476,000 between 1950 and 1960.[8] As far back as the early 1960s, the federal government sought to confront growing popular fears of »*Überfremdung*« with a ceiling policy and to stabilise the number of foreigners (quotas).

Social tensions resulting from what was at that time a major influx of foreigners and the prospects of foreign labour being afforded better status due to the intervention of their countries of origin provided fertile ground

for the rise of political parties bewailing »*Überfremdung*«, beginning in the 1960s. These splinter parties wielded their mobilisation capacities and ability to initiate legislation through direct democracy in order to restrict foreigners' periods of residence. Although xenophobic bills have only rarely been adopted by the Swiss, significant support from the population has strengthened the veto power of this social movement against a liberalisation of immigration law. In the early phase, the government endeavoured to demonstrate to the population that it took its fears seriously by implementing a strict immigration policy.

When the economic crisis hit in the 1970s, the number of foreigners declined again for the first time since the Second World War. Migrants' function as a buffer against economic swings came into full play during the 1973-1974 oil crisis. Unemployed foreigners' residence permits were not renewed and they had to leave the country, often without a claim to unemployment benefits; of the 340,000 jobs lost, 228,000 were held by foreigners. The percentage of foreigners in Switzerland dropped from 18 to 16 per cent in a short time.[9] During the 1980s as well, despite the use of quotas, the government's attitude on this issue continued to revolve around business needs for a flexible labour supply. An average of around 50,000 new work permits were issued each year between 1985 and 1995 and 130,000 seasonal workers - who were required to leave again in nine months - were let into the country each year.

In the 1990s, migration policy was influenced by several factors. One was a phase of economic stagnation lasting several years, with Switzerland experiencing economic woes for the first time since the Second World War. Unemployment was exacerbated by the fact that foreigners no longer served as a buffer against economic swings, as they had during the period of the oil crisis. On the contrary, in the meantime they had been granted social rights and improved residence status. As a result of structural change in the Swiss economy, low-qualified labourers in particular were made redundant, a disproportionate share of whom were foreigners. Many foreigners had to leave the country as a result of the crisis, but these numbers were compensated by an increase in the number of non-working immigrants (refugees from the civil war in the former Yugoslavia and asylum-seekers) and family members migrating to Switzerland. As a result of this development, the number of foreigners residing in Switzerland rose from 1.24 million to 1.36 million between 1990 and 1997.[10]

The percentage of settlement approvals (*Niederlassungsbewilligungen*) rose from 30 to 75 per cent between 1970 and 1990. The classic Swiss immigration system thus lost its flexibility at the very time the EU was launching free movement of persons within its borders. But humanitarian considerations and international pressure also forced Switzerland to address forms of a migration that were not synchronised with the labour market. Thus, for instance, refugees and asylum-seekers were at the centre of the migration debate in the 1990s. Although asylum-seekers only numbered a few thousand at the beginning of the 1980s, their number shot up to 35,000 in 1990, climbing to 41,000 only one year later. The authorities did not come up with a coherent response to the problems posed by this altered situation. The debate on acceptance of refugees became the dominant topic in the public debate on migration around the end of the decade. This resulted in the general politicisation of immigration policy.[11]

In reaction to this debate, Swiss immigration policy was fundamentally reformed. The new immigration model established distinctions based on country of origin. The »inner circle« included the EU and EFTA states, for whom free movement was provided (Federal Office for Economics and Labour 1991). The express objective was to make it possible for Switzerland to adopt a more European orientation, as it was assumed that European labour and highly qualified persons from the »second circle« (USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Israel and several small European states) would meet with less resentment. Moreover, a statutory definition of integration was laid down for the first time, with corresponding measures that also took into account the desire to ease naturalisation.

This change was accompanied by the opening of the labour market through the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons with the European Union, which entered into force in 2002 and constituted a watershed change in Swiss migration policy. The quotas and priority for Swiss nationals - the hallmark of corporatist immigration policy catering to sectoral and regional political interests since the 1950s - hence appeared to be a thing of the past. This imposed a new dynamic on the Swiss labour market, with its protectionist-corporatist contours, which had formerly been geared to the domestic economy. As for immigration into Switzerland by non-Europeans, by comparison, the new Immigration Act in effect since 1 January 2008 still contains restrictions prioritising labour urgently needed by the economy as a result of special qualifications. The referendum held on 9 February 2014, however, in which 50.3 per cent of the eligible population voted in favour of stemming »mass immigration«, has cast doubt on the freedom of movement negotiated with the EU in bilateral treaties.

2. The Public Debate and Public Opinion

Migration policy has been a key element of right-wing populist mobilisation since the 1960s. As already noted, although initially of marginal importance in the eyes of the electorate, it has been able to influence the direction of the political system. Interdependence between radical right-wing populist parties and other political parties, interest representatives and government authorities has depended on various factors since the 1980s.

On one hand, the »neo-corporatist political cycle«[12] referred to above led to a complex negotiation of a specific mode of migration policy primarily based on an economic-utilitarian calculation of benefits. This mode was for the most part guided - as is the case in other liberal states - by coordinated economic interests. On the other hand, the system seemed to be heading towards gridlock through the direct democratic cycle which finally became a factor in the 1980s. Although, or precisely because, splinter parties such as the radical right-wing National Action (NA) were completely shut out of consultation processes with interest associations, the major established parties and the public administration, they were able to fall back on normative notions and ideologies deeply embedded in the narrative of national self-assertion and exploit them recklessly in the political realm. Once these had been successfully fed into the direct democracy cycle, they were able to throw a spanner into the works of what had thus far been routine migration management. It was no accident that the 1980s and 1990s were characterised by a veritable standstill in the area of migration policy.

Criticism of the central state's administration of migration policy was in particular nurtured by a desire for a return to national solidarity. This notion of an *affectively imagined community* (Anderson 1991) was meant to rekindle the political desire for a perceivable integration of indigenous Swiss, which had been endangered by »*Überfremdung*« - that was the buzzword for the development towards a heterogeneous population. The Right thus harped on about both the »undue strain on living standards« due to the presence of »foreigners« and the danger posed to Swiss autonomy and the loss of »national character«. In discursive terms they completely co-opted the notion of the people (»*das Volk*«).[13] Although right-wing populist parties did not succeed in pushing through any of their initiatives until well into the 1990s, the population nevertheless thwarted any reform and attempt to afford foreigners a better status.

Although all the established parties rejected the political arguments of rightist populist movements, putting them, so to speak, »in political quarantine«, their actions were nevertheless followed with tremendous interest, as their veto-potential harboured the risk of uncontrollable protests that under certain circumstances could pull the carpet out from under negotiation procedures. This explains why employers' representatives and the political parties affiliated with them consistently supported maintenance of the status quo in parliamentary debates: This is because, on one hand, they were in favour of variable, flexible labour markets and the strengthening of regional structures, while on the other hand they proactively called for a stabilisation policy as a result of perceived domestic policy exigencies. Out of consideration for the domestic population, these associations therefore did not want to make any concessions to the expansion of social and civil rights.

Despite its historical obligation to uphold a humanist ethos, the Left did not adopt a uniform stance, often expressing itself in ambivalent terms. Generally speaking, it limited its repertoire in the debate to topics such as equal social treatment of foreigners and the abolition of seasonal worker status (a decree from 1931 regulating the approval of brief seasonal residencies for foreign labour until 2002). But as far back as the 1970s, a demand was forwarded to the Bundesrat (Government) from the ranks of the Left to develop ideas to counter the right-wing splinter parties. It was also the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (SP) that had welcomed the modernisation of the economy in order to depart from the intensive labour methods employed in structural maintenance policy, bolstered by seasonal labour. It also criticised the lack of efforts to combat illegal work. However, the Left could not avoid heeding popular misgivings regarding foreigners in its party platform, as could be seen from the fact that the SP had internalised the primacy of stabilising the foreign population at existing levels and the demand for greater efforts at integration.

A concession was also made to xenophobic groupings by the Bundesrat, ever endeavouring to forge a consensus, through the adoption of language that came very close to the jargon bandied about by right-wing populist parties. Use of terms such as »stabilisation«, »balanced relationship« or the effort »to establish a homogenous labour market to the greatest extent possible«, which had already been laid down by the government in legislative initiatives (ANAG Revision 1982) in the 1980s, constituted a concession to the radical rightist National Action, as it was after all this party that had been incessantly calling for a ceiling and hence stabilisation of levels of foreigners. These new terms were not questioned either in parliamentary debates or in referendum campaigns. They reflected the broad consensus accepting the mental categories established by right-wing par-

ties.[14] It was this centrist position that allowed the Bundesrat to cite support that shifted according to respective interests every time a bill involving immigration policy was tabled. It was equally evident, however, that the bills introduced by the Left could be shot down with relative ease. Nevertheless, the Bundesrat was able to create the impression, with its centrist position, that it was pursuing a policy aimed at accommodation, thereby distracting the populace from the fact that it was embracing right-wing categories.

This development weakened the position of the Left, above all that of the trade unions. They especially had to wrestle with the difficult task of getting their members to accept the inclusion of foreign workers. This split between the base and the cadres in the trade unions spawned asymmetrical interests, markedly diminishing the clout of the Left down to the present day. Many Swiss trade union members backed tight regulation of foreign labour. On the threshold to the 1980s, however, it could already be seen that the trade unions could not carry on in the same way. The proposal to carve out a new centre position for employee representation had unleashed heated discussions that only ended in an opening up of unions to migrants following long, tedious debates. In the following period, the Left replaced its leadership, sapped as they were by the attrition of the long wearisome struggle, while a section of their members switched camp to the foes of *Überfremdung*.

Many such workers found a new home in the new Swiss People's Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei or SVP). New developments in Swiss migration policy could be witnessed at the beginning of the 1990s. This harked back first of all to the globalisation of flows of people and goods, the growing importance of transnational networks, the loudening debate over human rights and the adjustment of legal standards to conform with European ones.[15] Secondly, changing conditions underlying migration policy accompanied by raucous domestic policy conflicts in which the SVP, formerly a middle-class party whose constituents were mainly farmers and small businesses, took up the demands and arguments of the radical right-wing populist splinter parties and proceeded to occupy the spectrum on the right, not only in election campaigns, but also in its arguments. Whereas the majority of the SVP party leadership still subscribed to the migration policy of the Bundesrat in the 1980s, from 1991 it began not only to pursue a policy of opposition and obstruction, but also to venture into migration policy, particularly asylum policy.

Strategic patterns can be identified in the migration-policy campaigns of the »new« SVP. It sought to scandalise abuse of asylum, illegal immigration and dubious naturalisations, calling for an integration policy within the framework of which migrants completely adopt the »morals and customs« of Swiss society, which it was argued should apply particularly to Muslim migrants. On top of this, it linked its criticism of the alleged failure of the Bundesrat's asylum policy to the »abuse metaphor«, thereby casting doubt on the legitimacy of costly procedures and lavish government spending in the area of asylum. At the same time, it successfully evoked the image of the »dissolute« asylum-seeker, who abuses Switzerland's social system and humanitarian tradition, living it up at the expense of taxpayers. In its civil rights policy, the SVP also plays the »metaphor-of-abuse« card, bemoaning dubious naturalisations of »non-integrated« foreigners and the »fraudulent abuse« of Swiss civil law.

The »new« SVP wheeled out the stale populist line about an alleged chasm between the »elite« and the »people« and the importance of direct democracy as »expressing the will of the people«. On issues of naturalisation the SVP resisted the creation of a right for candidates for naturalisation to file appeals, thereby opening up a Pandora's box by reviving a tension that had hitherto been slumbering in the Swiss state system, namely, that between guaranteed due process and the sovereignty of direct democracy. The basic conflict between the importance of legal procedures and the sovereignty of referendums was communicated to the public in dramatic fashion following the decision issued by the Federal Tribunal in 2003, when the Supreme Court ruled on conditions governing fair naturalisation procedures. The Supreme Court's observation that foreigners, too, were protected by the Constitution in their capacity as parties to naturalisation procedures led to an upswell of rabble-rousing against the so-called »cabal of law professors«. The ruling handed down by the Federal Tribunal was portrayed as an attack on the tradition of direct democracy and held to be tantamount to a sell-out of Swiss civil law which was to be resisted by any means necessary. Invectives against the so-called jurisprudence »expertocracy« culminated in a conflict over asylum policy. In particular, the procedure for reviewing asylum, protected under international law, predestined this policy area for SVP agitation, as it could undermine any political campaign to combat »*Überfremdung*« and the influence of »foreign judges«.

While the SVP largely co-opted the electorate of right-wing populist splinter parties, claiming pole position on the political Right, more than doubling its seats on the National Council from 25 (10.9 per cent in 1991) to 66 (31.5 per cent in 2015), the »new« SVP - in contrast to previous splinter parties - was not resisted by efforts to brand it as a party that had to be

marginalised no matter what. As a result of its many years' involvement in community, cantonal and national parliaments, as well as government bodies, the established centre-right parties decided to try to bring the »new« SVP on board. The centre-right parties' - the Liberal Democratic Party (Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei - FDP, the Liberals) and the Christian Democratic People's Party (Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei - CVP) - co-optation strategy shifted gear to the parliamentary level by adopting more and more of the SVP platform on migration and asylum policy.[16]

An *analysis of the party platform* on migration issues confirms this view.[17] The SVP has positioned itself most resolutely against immigration and its effects, adopting an ever more rigid stance since the 1990s. Although the FDP has moved closer to these restrictive policies, its position has varied according to the particular topic. Whenever economic needs are at issue, in particular in connection with an opening of the Swiss market to the EU, the FDP tends toward liberal positions. The Christian Democratic CVP tends towards restrictive positions on migration.

The Social Democratic SP poses an analytical challenge, however, as issues related to migration do not play any role in the party platform, at least not in the period of enquiry, 1995-2011. Various methods of analysis nevertheless indicate a trend towards liberal positions in the SP party programme. Turning to the Green Party, according to Ruedin (2013) is represents an interesting case with regard to immigration: all scholarly analyses agree that the Greens take a liberal stance on migration, but they devote relatively little space to it in their party platform.

According to the »barometer of concerns« (gfs.bern 2016), »foreigners« are seen by many Swiss, especially in rural areas, to constitute a major problem. This is not a unique phenomenon, as in Switzerland regions with a low number of foreigners most frequently exhibit critical or even negative attitudes.

The assessment of foreigners as a problem correlates with political perspectives: a majority of SVP supporters (52 per cent) view foreigners as a problem, while only one-third (33 per cent) of other parties' sympathisers and independent voters do so. Among these there is a heightened belief that there is a problem in Latin Switzerland (39 per cent), whereas in particular persons aged 54 and over register almost the same level (53 per cent) as SVP sympathisers as a whole.

In a post-election study conducted in 2015, based on data from the Swiss Electoral Study 2015 (SELECTS 2015), attitudes towards foreigners and migrants, as well as with regard to other issues that are currently being debated were measured in a representative survey.[18] The aim was to explore whether the most important problem in Switzerland was deemed to be immigrants; whether the persons surveyed advocated the same opportunities for foreigners and Swiss; whether they supported an eased naturalisation procedure for third-generation foreigners (a majority of 60 per cent voted in favour of this in a referendum held on 12 February 2017); and whether Switzerland should accept more refugees from crisis regions.

Voters on the Centre-left are identified in these surveys as persons who voted for the SP or the Greens in 2015 or would most likely have voted for these parties; who feel close to these parties or are members of them; or who opt for positions 2 to 4 on a scale of 0 to 10. In a cross-table comparing the attitudes of the Centre-left with the positions of supporters of other political formations, it is clear that persons on the moderate Left view the issues of immigration and asylum to be most important problems, but consistently to a lower degree than members of other parties.

Table 1:
Comparison on attitudes of people on the centre-left with those of supporters of other parties agreeing on the question: Immigration and Asylum a Most Important Problem in Switzerland (%)

Definition	*Centre Left*	*Other Parties*
Voted centre-left in 2015	32	52
Voted centre-left or would have voted centre-left in 2015	42	51
High likelihood of voting centre left	46	53
Feel close to the centre-left	39	52
Member of a centre-left party	24	50
Align themselves with the centre-left	38	52

Source: Ruedin 2017 on the basis of SELECTS 2015

With regard to equal opportunity, there are five categories of answers precisely measuring negative attitudes towards foreigners. Table 2 presents persons who are (more) in favour of better opportunities for indigenous nationals. Responses indicate that supporters of the centre-left tend to favour more positive attitudes towards foreigners and improved access to equal opportunities.

Table 2:
Persons who are (more) in favour of better opportunities for indigenous nationals (%)

Definition	Centre Left	Other Parties
Voted centre-left in 2015	17	48
Voted centre-left or would have voted centre-left in 2015	21	50
High likelihood of voting centre left	32	56
Feel close to the centre-left	17	49
Member of a centre-left party	12	44
Align themselves with the centre-left	25	49

Source: Ruedin 2017 on the basis of SELECTS 2015

With regard to support for facilitated naturalisation of third-generation persons, Table 3 shows those who clearly support this, those who »tend to support« it or those who tend to be against it. Consistently, twice as many supporters of the moderate left advocate easing third-generation naturalisation than supporters of other parties.

Table 3:
Support for facilitated naturalisation of third generation

Definition	Centre Left	Other Parties
Voted centre-left in 2015	66	32
Voted centre-left or would have voted centre-left in 2015	61	29
High likelihood of voting centre left	45	26
Feel close to the centre-left	61	30
Member of a centre-left party	72	35
Align themselves with the centre-left	52	31

Source: Ruedin 2017 on the basis of SELECTS 2015

Regarding whether Switzerland should take in more refugees from crisis regions, Table 4 compares the position of persons who clearly support it with those who »tend to support« or are clearly opposed. The Centre-left accordingly advocates the acceptance of refugees more than supporters of other parties.

Table 4:
Support for taking in more refugees from crisis regions (%)

Definition	Centre Left	Other Parties
Voted centre-left in 2015	45	16
Voted centre-left or would have voted centre-left in 2015	42	14
High likelihood of voting centre left	29	11
Feel close to the centre-left	44	15
Member of a centre-left party	63	20
Align themselves with the centre-left	33	17

Source: Ruedin 2017 on the basis of SELECTS 2015

Persons backing the Centre-left accordingly tend to share attitudes that are positive towards immigrants, independently of how these are defined. There is a bandwidth within the left part of the spectrum, however, that is reflected by positions within the reference parties.

If one looks further back in history, the relationship between left-leaning persons and immigrants has never been void of strains and ambivalence. It was in particular the »national dimension« that also led to major tensions in the workers' movement both with regard to its historical self-understanding, its structures and platform, as well as with regard to its cultural and societal foundations.[20] The dualism between national and international tendencies has therefore been a constant in the history of the Swiss workers' movement. In the second founding of the Socialist Party in 1880, foreign workers and their organisations and amalgamations played a key role. They were allowed to become members, and they had the same rights as Swiss »of course with the exception of election issues, in which they are not entitled to vote« (minutes of the proceedings of Party Congress of the Swiss Social Democratic Party from 2 and 3 December 1911, held in Olten. Zurich 1912: 48). The national focus of the party was rein-

forced when the SP was re-founded in 1888. A crucial role here was played by the Grütliverein, which had been operating as a democratic, patriotic workers' association since 1838 and formed the second pillar of the Social Democratic Party in 1901. The Grütliverein decreed that »only Swiss nationals may join the association as active members; foreigners may only become members without voting rights, nor may they be elected to the Board«.[19]

In the initial phase, the distinction between Swiss and foreigners became an important division within the party, resurfacing with every revision of the party statutes. To some, foreigners were a manifestation of the danger of »*Überfremdung*« who could possibly make the Swiss a minority in the Social Democratic Party and transform it into a foreigners' party. To the internal grouping opposing this view, the distinction between foreign and Swiss members violated party ideals and philosophy: this faction denied the existence of a »foreigners issue«, underscoring the importance assumed by foreign workers in the founding of the Socialist Party and the need for solidarity between workers who were subject to the same laws and regulations, regardless of their origin. Thus the debate on foreigners also turned into a reflection on Swiss identity in the Social Democratic Party.

After the Second World War, this line of discourse was reactivated along a broad front: immigration of Italian labour provoked sharp criticism and opposition among the ranks of the trade unions, who feared wage pressure and rejected equal social rights for the immigrants, invoking the »*Überfremdung*« debate into the 1960.[21] This grouping feared that »pressure from below« against the influx of foreigners could soon disrupt industrial peace.

The many years of discrimination against foreigners in the area of social rights was related to the hesitant, even rejectionist, attitude of Swiss trade unions towards foreigners in the 1950s and 1960s, although despite its weight in Swiss consociational democracy it was unable to make their rejection of immigration a political reality. In their comparative study, Castles and Kosack (1973) pointed out that many trade unions reject labour immigration in principle because they rightly fear that they will lose »bargaining power«. In order to preserve this, they usually attempt to draw new workers into the trade unions when they stay in the country over the long term. Swiss trade unions were not only negatively disposed towards immigrants, however. In comparison with the efforts made by the German Trade Union Confederation (DGB) and French trade unions, with their links to particular ideologies or political parties, who took foreign labourers into their ranks, the Swiss trade unions did very little far into the 1970s.[22] This attitude cannot be explained solely on the basis of the new competition these workers posed in the labour market. Trade unions feared, rather, that the presence of immigrants could negatively impact the special relationship of employee representative bodies with employers' organisations, referred to as *Arbeitsfrieden* (»industrial peace«).

The integration of social democratic trade unions in the Swiss economy and politics, culminating in the closing of ranks against fascism in 1935, with Social Democrats committing themselves to a democratic welfare state governed by the rule of law, defence of the country and the objective of economic growth, meant that Swiss society could no longer be interpreted as antagonistic. According to Misteli (1996), with this »farewell to the proletariat« trade unions were able to sell themselves to their base as a hegemonic force. The massive recruitment of foreign labour, moreover, made it possible for a large part of core domestic workers in numerous branches to climb the occupational and social ladder. The ideological basis for this growth model was supplied by the notion of »spiritual and intellectual defence of the country« that emerged from the Second World War, thereafter perpetuating itself in the Cold War as a »cultural system of fortifications«,[23] serving as an important pillar of national integration. In terms of identification, the world was no longer structured along the lines of vertical cleavages, with a dichotomy between the working class and the bourgeoisie; instead, it was now characterised by a new, horizontal structure. Upon successful horizontal integration, employees increasingly viewed themselves in national terms as Swiss workers.

The spirit of national defence prevailing in the area of immigration policy was expressed in »*Überfremdung*« initiatives against foreign workers, but not under the sway of the trade unions.[24] Niederberger[25] hypothesises that the trade unions' strategy seeking consensus on immigration policy has given rise to a more vociferous opposition in a section of the Swiss working class that seems to have made its mind up. Turning *Überfremdung* into an issue has made immigrants a problem of national identity. Workers' organisations in their role as defenders of »all things Swiss« have been constrained in their ability to score points in this regard, however, because the *Überfremdung* movement, dominated by the radical Right, has assumed hegemony here.

Only in the guise of the New Left that rose up in the wake of the 1968 movement did the trade unions slowly have to change their positions. The New Left - with their demands for liberal conditions governing immigration and a greater focus on integration of foreign workers - turned against

the fundamental stance of the traditional trade unions, which, in the words of later Bundesrat member Willi Ritschard, were bound never to put domestic workers at a disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign workers.[26] The trade unions increasingly combated xenophobic initiatives from the 1980s. More and more foreign members reacted positively to the opening up of trade unions, assuming offices at middle and upper cadre levels. Individual trade union organisations successfully reached out above all to second-generation immigrants.

When one looks at the position papers of the Social Democratic Party over the past 15 years, it becomes clear how great the impact of generational change has been on party strategy.[27] In addition to social justice, the Social Democrats have been devoting more attention to topics arising from the new social movements of the 1980s and 1990s. In the history of the party (Social Democratic Party 2013), environmental policy, inter-generational and gender justice and the battle against neoliberalism have all played a key role. Although immigration policy only crops up on the margins of party history, it has nonetheless been playing an ever more prominent role in position papers. Thus, in 2007 the Social Democratic Party calls Switzerland a land that is a net host to immigrants and has an interest in immigration. It puts the spotlight on integration in order to promote equal opportunity and prevent female immigrants, as well as female Swiss from being discriminated against. Its party platform also affirms a commitment to the political participation of migrants, rapid family reconciliation and a naturalisation policy that encourages integration. These liberal mainstream principles meet with broad support in connection with the debate on integration role models[28] in the academic-liberal milieu. Its party platform from 2010, which was most heavily influenced by the religious Socialist Willy Spieler, states:

> Global migration offers significant opportunities and harbours significant risks. For this reason, an active migration policy is indispensable. It should be oriented towards human dignity and an inclusive social system, strengthen law governing refugees buttressed by international law and ensure that migration contributes to human emancipation, social development and international understanding, while helping avoid risks such as wage and social dumping, human trafficking and an unjust distribution of the costs of education between countries. The SP furthermore advocates putting residence of people living in Switzerland without valid permits on a more regular basis in a controlled manner. (›Sans-papiers‹)

This mainstream is occasionally called in question, however, in particular by representatives of the right-wing of the party, as in the so-called *Gurten Manifesto*. In this paper dating back to 2001, current (2018) Minister of Justice and Migration Simonetta Sommuraga - among others - advocated a departure from a »pie-in-the-sky« migration policy, calling, for example, for a more efficient state, a cap on taxes and a reduction in public debt. The manifesto criticises the cradle-to-grave welfare state and its detrimental effects on individual responsibility and initiative. Furthermore, it calls for a »*Service public*«, a pragmatic approach supplementing the state and market to the benefit of cost-aware citizens. Nor, with challenges looming on the horizon for European policy, was the delicate topic of migration left out. The manifesto demands a limit on immigration from countries outside the EU, while at the same time intensifying social integration. As expected, this summoned up knee-jerk criticism in the SP, accompanied by loud accusations of »currying favour« with the centre-right parties.

A few days later, left-wing SP MPs signed a counter-manifesto in which various figures spoke out against limits on immigration as called for in the manifesto, instead advocating extension of freedom of movement to people from outside the EU. Some members of national councils also signed the protest manifesto.

The Social Democratic Left confronts the dilemma of harmonising market integration and cultural opening (migration), while not jeopardising national social achievements. Parties of the Centre-left can be divided - very generally - between the »classic Left«, which continues to assign key tasks to the state, and advocates of a »third way«, who are in favour of globalisation and free trade along neoliberal lines.[29] Both currents may - but do not necessarily - support integration of migrants. Especially the *Gurten Manifesto* demonstrates how ambivalent the positions of neoliberal Social Democrats can be with regard to migration: they support it only if it is socially compatible. The Greens tend to be more troubled by an economic opening of borders and liberalisation of the economy, as this could negate achievements in the field of the environment. Nevertheless, they are positively inclined towards a cultural opening towards migrants. This can be surmised from the few party and election platforms of the Greens in Switzerland, which call much more loudly for a liberal migration policy, including the acceptance of migrants and labour migrants, combatting discrimination and easing naturalisation.

3. Political Repercussions

The past two years have marked a historical watershed in the Western world: the Brexit referendum; the election of President Trump; the ongoing, unsolved refugee and financial crises in Europe; the Ukraine crisis and

the challenge posed to European security and democracy by Putin's Russia; and the terrorist attacks that have hit France, Belgium and Germany particularly hard and may have an impact on parliamentary elections in 2017. High levels of youth unemployment in southern Europe, which have marginalised many young people early on in the form of precarious employment, are exacerbating the crisis. All these developments are mutually reinforcing and have the potential to trigger an existential crisis that is capable of shaking the entire European peace project to its core.[30]

In particular, the established moderate Left appears to be unequal to the challenge of populist parties and their clamouring for a plebiscite democracy. The claim of direct legitimation by the »people« is being leveraged by these radical groupings to weaken other sources of political legitimacy, be it constitutional courts, heads of state, the parliament or local and regional governments. Just like in Poland, not only are courts being neutralised or, like in the United Kingdom in the wake of the Brexit vote, branded as »enemies of the people«, but there are also efforts in Switzerland to subordinate international law completely to referendums (the SVP referendum »Swiss law instead of foreign judges«). The sleight of hand being employed by the populists consists of defining themselves as »the people«, even though they are only one part of the people. It is the others, however, who had better make sure that they are not excluded. In the USA it is Mexicans and Muslims, in Britain the Poles, in Turkey the Kurds and in Central Europe the Sinti, Roma and Jews. Moreover, everywhere it is the migrants, the refugees, gays, cosmopolitans, scholars and experts, elites and the media that are in the cross-hairs of hate and derision. The objective is ultimately to bring down pluralist, liberal democracy with its procedures guaranteed under the constitution and to suppress individual rights protecting minorities, the courts and civil society and their media based on human rights by means of a tyranny of the majority.

All the more important, then, to understand what aspects of economic and social transformation have led so many people to turn their backs on socio-liberal attainments. Richard Rorty in his book *Achieving Our Country* (1999) posited that globalisation would bring about a future in which the income levels of three-fourths of the American population would decline continuously. Social mobility would wane, and ever more powerful inherited family dynasties would retreat to the suburbs and raise the drawbridges over the moats.[31]

The problem for the Democratic Party in the USA, he continues, is that it is increasingly seen as a party of the privileged and not as the party of the majority of the population. According to Rorty, two factors are responsible for this change. The Left devoted tremendous energy to creating and expanding the social state in the twentieth century. But it did not have any answer when inequality began to grow again beginning in the middle of the 1970s. The party, as well as the trade unions had furthermore been limited to their traditional role, while its leadership had helped reshape and reduce social aid. Secondly, the »New Left« defined itself less in terms of social policy and more in terms of societal policy. The civil rights movement led to a break with all forms of nationalism, while the »Old Left« still had an affirmative attitude towards the nation. It was able to call for societal solidarity on this basis. Today the American Left therefore no longer has its base in the trade unions and organisations affiliated with them. Instead, this base is to be found at elite universities. Its electoral base is no longer made up of workers, but rather professionals - highly educated members of the middle class with academic titles.[32]

The Left, not only the American one, has to a certain degree become neoliberal. It has in many cases subscribed to the belief that only more economic competitiveness holds the key to social progress. The shibboleth of everyone sharing in prosperity has been transformed: now, everyone has to face up to the market and be competitive. The »third way« described above has also involved a change in the paradigm of the welfare state: social security is no longer to offer a safety net, and instead is supposed to motivate people to work, even below the level of their qualifications.

It is true that boosting competitiveness and promoting innovation and training to meet the needs of the economy are important aspects of an intelligent economic policy. It is a fatal development, however, when between the lines one reads the social Darwinist message that those who do not become more productive whatever help has been given them should be abandoned. It is not surprising, then, that those who have been forgotten by the neoliberal Left are following the sweet music of the sirens - the demagogues - because nobody else is fighting for their well-being. Many employees no longer feel represented by a Left oriented towards a meritocracy, which itself is given to populist spasms. The lesson to be drawn is thus simple: if the »constraints and exigencies of globalisation« have become so dominant that everyone has to fall in line behind them, then the Left has its work cut out. As Binswanger aptly put it:

> Either globalisation can be shaped by social policy, or it will come to an unsightly end. No policy can be pursued against the interests of the majority over the long haul. Otherwise the majority will look for what they believe to be per-

sons and organisations that will represent their interests. This is known as Democracy.

Under present-day conditions, the trick for the Left will be to win back a majority of workers without sacrificing the legitimacy and need for leftist social policy and without allowing a vacuum of indecisiveness to come about in fundamental questions of peaceful co-existence - here one must agree with Heinz Kleger (2016) in his reflections on the pathologies of democracy. The struggle against discrimination remains important. The focus must be returned to those things that tie society together, however. We need to return to an emphasis on cohesion. Especially the terrorist attacks in 2015 and 2016 have made it evident what type of freedom, what forms of living are being targeted by fanaticism and intolerance. In opposition to these and other forms of decay affecting solidarity, new political options and a certain resoluteness can and must arise to defend the achievements of the constitutional state and not set limits on human rights. The Left is therefore condemned to finding convincing answers to economic and social-policy challenges without giving in to the temptation of populism.

Annotations:

1 Parts of this article derive from research supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (NCCR on the move, IP 14).
2 Arlettaz (1975), S. 31-95.
3 Holmes (1988).
4 Holmes (1988).
5 D'Amato (2001).
6 Bundesblatt (1921) quotet in: Arlettaz (1990), S. 58.
7 Buomberger (2004).
8 See Mahnig and Piguet (2003).
9 Mahnig and Piguet (2003).
10 Piguet (2006).
11 Skenderovic and D'Amato (2008).
12 Cattacin (1987).
13 Braun (1970).
14 Ebel und Fiala (1983).
15 Jacobson (1996); Jacobson (1998); Soysal (1994).
16 Mazzoleni et al. (2007).
17 Ruedin (2013).
18 Ruedin (2017).
19 Gruner (1968).
20 Arlettaz (1985), p. 45.
21 Cerutti (1994).
22 Schmitter-Heisler (1980).
23 Tanner (1994).
24 Misteli (1996).
25 Niederberger (1982), p. 56.
26 Quoted from Zuppinger (1987), p. 73.
27 Here I would like to thank Irina Sille for her work on programme sources and summaries.
28 D'Amato/Gerber (2005).
29 Kriesi et al. (2006).
30 Garton Ash (2017).
31 Rorty (1998).
32 Binswanger (2017).

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