Book Review

Culture & Psychology

Theory as liminal experience

Culture & Psychology
0(0) 1–11

DOI: 10.1177/1354067X19831212
journals.sagepub.com/home/cap
SAGE

Liminality and Experience: A Transdisciplinary Approach to the Psychosocial by Paul Stenner, London: Palgrave, 2017. ISBN 978-1-137-27210-2. US $ 99.99, (hbk)

Reviewed by: Tania Zittoun, University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland

In *Liminality and Experience* (2017), Paul Stenner dares to do what only few attempt. Indeed, his goal is to propose an integrative theoretical framework accounting for the articulation of the social and the psychological, from a radical processual perspective. He does so by defending a transdisciplinary approach to the psychosocial, and he establishes at its core the concept of "liminality". Liminality is the phenomena of being "betwixt and between" (Turner, 1967); although it stems from an analysis of ritual, Stenner carefully crafts it, grounds it, polishes it, in such a way that it becomes a fundamental concept to address the processual, relational and developmental nature of human experience in society. Doing so, Stenner also has a second goal: to define a framework which enables him to establish the centrality of art-related, aesthetic experiences in human and social life. In this book, Stenner thus addresses questions which are at the heart of current (and recurrent) debates in social, cultural and critical psychology.

In what follows, I present the inspiring core argument of the book, and summarise its main movements; I then highlight a series of points for mutual enrichment between this psychosocial proposition and recent developments in sociocultural psychology.

Liminal experiences

Paul Stenner invites us to join in his reflexion by addressing a series of theoretical paradoxes that can precisely be overcome when engaging in liminal experiences. The first, introductory chapter spells out some of the key paradoxes of a psychosocial approach – how to define general knowledge of what is unique, how to address the social and yet the subjective, how to address change when things are meant to be stable or stability when studying a phenomena changes them. Stenner uses the concept of liminality to delve into these paradoxes: it designates this moment which is precisely between two states, out of the order of the social, out

of the known of the psychological, where things are suspended or mixed or redistributed, where the old dichotomies and their tensions, or paradoxes, are suspended. The key concepts proposed by the author are thus these of liminal experiences, which "are experiences that happen during occasions of significant transition, passage or disruption", or "becomings" (Stenner, 2017, p. 14). These can be "devised", as when we deliberately engage in a ritual or with a movie, or in contrast, "spontaneous" – when an unexpected event pushes us out of what we know; in any case, these are the locus of emergence of newness. Finally, Stenner calls "liminal affective technologies" any social or cultural dispositive that supports, creates or organises a liminal experience: "the devised liminal experience engendered through liminal affective technologies helps us to navigate and manage spontaneous liminality" (Stenner, 2017, p. 25). The liminal affective technology may be the film that guides our devised liminal experience, but it can also be the meeting with a therapist which brings order in the trouble created by an unexpected event. In either case, the liminal affective technology provides us with new symbolic forms that may enable us to grasp and render meaningful what is emerging, and thus, may participate to transformations in the life of a person or in the social world.

This core proposition, Paul Stenner grounds and expands in five chapters, each inviting us to experience liminality in a simple situation. He does so by questioning the obvious – a habit of thinking, or a common experience – generating a paradox, or at least, an uncertain moment of suspension of belief in the reader. Each experience is then discussed in the light of philosophical propositions, and current debates in the social sciences. Doing so, each chapter brings in some key elements of the psychosocial perspective proposed. In what follows, I summarise these five movements – necessarily widely oversimplifying and therefore losing their fine nuances.

"This is not. . ."

Each of the five liminal reading experiences constituting the main part of the book are summarised in the chapter's titles, formulated in "this is not a. . ." to question our taken-for-granted assumptions, before bringing us to core epistemological questions.

First, Stenner invites us to reflect on fabulation (chapter 2). Fabulation is not, as commonly held, the opposite of the truth. Rather, it is a "less a question of misrepresenting a pre-existent world of facts, and more a question of gaining imaginative access to a world that ever exceeds us, but that we are already in some sense part of" (Stenner, 2017, p. 40). Going back to Ancient Greek philosophy and poetry, Stenner explores the link between ritual, myth and philosophy, each seen as modes of fabulation; these are less "just about the fanciful description of an already existing world, but about the creation or emergence of new worlds" (Stenner, 2017, pp. 43–44). This first argument, Stenner then discusses in the light of Henri Bergson's reflexion on fabulation, as well as Gilles Deleuze's

response. Eventually, Stenner argues, fabulation is precisely the core of liminal experiences, and can take various modes – ritual, theatre, literature, music – which all demand to depart "from disturbing event to creative intuition" (p. 62), and operate at the limits of language, therefore participating in the development of humans and society.

In the next chapter, entitled "This is not… food. Food for thought", Stenner unpacks the experience of "this is not a…". Borrowing from a fable from Aesop, he presents the two key-moments of a certain type of liminal experiences starting with an "uh oh!" – the experience of surprise or bewilderment that this is not what I thought it was – and ending with an "ah ha!", expressing the newly acquired intuition or understanding of what this is about. Liminality, in that sense, is what is in-between these two moments. This chapter explains the transformative nature of that experience in terms of symbolic processes. It explores propositions by Suzanne Langer, George H Mead and mainly Alfred N Whitehead as the basis of a "deep symbolism", assuming that "symbolic culture is what differentiate human beings from other creatures and enables the cultivation of feelings" (Stenner, 2017, p. 73). The core proposition here is that the "uh oh" experience can be seen as an event in which a person (or an animal) makes a mistake in symbolic reference, suddenly experiencing the possible gap between two modes of experiencing – one distant one, as we can do by seeing or hearing, and one contact-based, as when we touch or feel; experiencing the gap may question the limit of what one thought was his or her world, "generating the affect we know of as surprise: *Uh oh!*" (p. 99). However, only a human can then engage in a symbolic, transformative experience, a new synthesis of the two modes of experiencing, which is concluded by an "*Ah ha!*" experience. Art is in that sense a technique that expresses such experience of symbolic transformation in the artist, and has been offered to others to have comparable feeling experiences; it may thus be conceived of as "fabulated fact for feeling" (Stenner, 2017, p. 74).

This disquieting experience of a breach in our relation to reality is further explored in chapter 4, entitled "This not … a pipe" after the experience proposed by painter René Magritte (the painted pipe next to which is written "ceci n'est pas une pipe"). This enables Stenner to build on Foucault's analysis of representation and to present his version of a "deep empiricism" based on Whitehead's process philosophy. Rather than seeing subject and object as separated, it proposes to view them as "(a) inherently relational (…); (b) inherently processual (…); and proper to a type of relational process that is found through nature, and hence relevant to all sciences (transdisciplinary)" (Stenner, 2017, p. 121). Drawing on William James and Whitehead that perspective enables Stenner to decompose experience in a series or a "cascade" of four modes of experiencing. The acronym PIPE summarises a series of moves, or "liminal transitions", along the experience of Magritte's painting: first, the pipe exists as *Power* – the actual power of the pipe that can be physically experienced, touched, weighted; it can be partly abstracted into an *Image*, only visually perceptible, of the pipe; it is further abstracted and transformed into a conceptual *Proposition* (here Stenner draws on Whitehead's

distinctive pre-linguistic use of the word proposition); finally, there may be a third transition leading to *Enunciation*, a communicative act of utterance. Hence, going through three "liminal transitions", each layer of experiencing is more distanced from the initial, embodied experience. However, the deep empiricism proposition is non dualistic, refusing to distinguish body from mind, inner from outer; hence all four layers, all relational, may actually be given at once in human experience. "Each mode of experience is part of a real unfolding process, and each re-enters, appropriates and builds upon experience from prior modes" (Stenner, 2017, p. 146). The strength of a painting like Magritte's, from this perspective, is that it "cracks open" this layered nature of our experience.

Having analysed the nature of human symbolic experience, chapter 5 addresses the question of entering or leaving liminal experiences. It does so by questioning the well-known notion of "shock" proposed by Alfred Schutz to describe the passage between multiple worlds, including the world of fiction. Stenner engages in a thorough discussion of the author, in the light of a series of examples – Don Quixote's daydreaming, the transformative effect of dreams as can be experienced by the reader or analysed by Sigmund Freud, or Arnold Van Gennep's work on rituals, among others. The key argument is that what matters is less the movement across pre-existing worlds ("this is not… a shock"), than the transformation of experience through different qualities of experiences. Eventually, "play, theatre, painting, humour and religion thus do indeed share something vitally important in common; (…) they are liminal in that they come into play – with rhythmic regularity – at the limits of everyday worlds of pragmatic, utilitarian activity" (Stenner, 2017, pp. 190–191).

In chapter 6, Paul Stenner engages in a systematic discussion about the status of affect in his proposition. He retraces the discursive turn in psychosocial studies, which was eventually replaced by what was called a "turn to affect". This theoretical turn brought about contradictions and unanswered problems concerning the nature of affect, or the difference between feelings, affect and emotions. Stenner takes distance from these debates, arguing that "this is not… a turn to affect". Here, he draws on Baruch Spinoza's theory of affects as well as on Whitehead, to propose an ontological concept of affect (or feeling) compatible with the proposed process ontology. Affect is thus understood as fundamental energy going through all living forms and transformed in relational encounters; only a specific layer of these transformations, experienced by humans, can then be identified as emotions. Experienced affects can be layered, and so affects in single living cells are part of, but not equivalent to, affects in humans. Humans are composed of an infinity of streams of affects yet grouped in the experience of being a separate region and having a continuity.

> From this perspective what we call a 'thought' is not to be distinguished from 'feeling', since it *is* a feeling. But such a rarefied feeling abstracts from and build upon the expression of all the other experiences composing the body of the thinker. A feeling is not always a thought, but a thought is always a feeling. (Stenner, 2017, p. 230)

On this basis, Stenner comes back to the distinction between devised or "staged" liminality, and an unstaged or spontaneous variety. Our cultural experiences – listening to a certain piece of music – are staged liminal experiences; "liminal affective technologies" such as songs or theatre plays precisely serve "to excite and shape emotional feelings" (Stenner, 2017, p. 233). Spontaneous or "unstaged" liminal affectivity occurs in any situation of transition and disruption (even though affects are present all the time), such as accidents, disasters, crises, and manifests itself in surprise, anger, grief, anxiety, etc. Yet even there, Stenner suggests, we tend to give some order and rhythmicity to the affects, as in rhythmic sobbing when we experience a tragic event, a patterning which would enable us to turn them into quasi liminal experiences – "and here we discern once again the rhythmic drum beat of the ritual" (Stenner, 2017, p. 240).

The conclusive chapter 7 synthesises the core contribution of the volume to a "psychosocial transdisciplinarity". It emphasises the importance of the transformative experiences supported by art objects, and links it to the post-vygotskian tradition. It also comes back to the centrality of an "ontological liminality", the idea that liminal occasions are moments of morphing and transformation of the social and the individual, the inner and the outer, from which newness can emerge. Liminality is in that sense relational, processual, related to emergence, and experienced as *going through* (Stenner, 2017, pp. 263–364), a proposition further discussed in the light of Whitehead, Mead and Simmel. In his final words, Stenner proposes to see in the series of concepts proposed not a means to celebrate permanent liminality or the primacy of imagination over the real, but rather, an invitation to "*becoming more active*, both individually and collectively" by identifying "*potentiality* in which 'what happens' *might* take many different courses" (Stenner, 2017, p. 282).

Liminality, the psychosocial and cultural psychology

In *Liminality as experience* Stenner has made quite a tour de force by formulating an ontology that grounds a non-dualistic understanding of the person and the social, the subjective and the objective or social and material shared reality. The anchorage in Spinoza and Whitehead, both defending a "process ontology", enables him to sketch the continuity and the gradation of differentiation between types of beings – "from rock to rabbi" (Stenner, 2017, p. 224). Doing so, he proposes both a new look at where changes do occur and newness may emerge – in liminal experiences – and what is specifically culturally human in shaping and using these transformative moments – through affective liminal technologies that support symbolic transformation, from ritual to rock and roll. Hence, addressing what seems to be a fragmented field of disciplines addressing psychosocial questions and issues related to discourse, emotions and affect, Stenner proposes an alternative, integrative construction.

Paul Stenner's proposition is also most welcome and challenging for cultural psychology. Although his theoretical path has taken a route going through quite

different parts of the theoretical landscape than authors in sociocultural psychology tend to explore, it brings him to strikingly similar propositions. For this reason, it is important to bring to the fore some complementarities and divergences.

First, in terms of ontology and epistemology, cultural psychology is still struggling with its attempts to be a developmental, historical science. One of the reasons for the struggle is perhaps that authors often fail to question their basic ontological assumptions. In a scientific world dominated by a static view and naïve cartesianism, to be authentically addressing the world in non-dualistic, processual manner demands a clear ontological statement – what some have for instance done in physical, pragmatic or dialogical terms (Brinkmann, 2017; Carré, Valsiner, & Hampl, 2016; Marková, 2016; Valsiner, 2005a, 2007). With his careful reading of Spinoza, Stenner goes back to the very author that inspired Vygotsky's monism (Zavereshneva & van der Veer, 2018) – a very timely move as this is currently debated in cultural–historical scholarship (Jornet & Cole, 2018); here, Spinoza's reading expanded by Whitehead makes it very compatible with the sort of complementarity proposed in cultural psychology (Valsiner, 2000, 2014b). That reading of Spinoza also enables us to better ground affect in developmental dynamics, and to justify further integration between cultural psychology and psychoanalysis (Salvatore & Zittoun, 2011; Valsiner, 2015). I read here a double invitation; to comparably engage in this ontological work in sociocultural psychology; and a more sustained integrative dialogue between psychosocial and sociocultural psychology.

Second, in terms of the phenomena at stake, the reflexion on liminal affective technologies and the transformative role of the arts is of course most welcome and perfectly consonant with recent developments in cultural and sociocultural psychology. In effect, there has been recently a wide expansion of studies on the importance of the arts and aesthetic experiences (among others, Klempe, 2016, 2018; Klempe & Lehmann, 2017; Lehmann, Chaudhary, Bastos, & Abbey, 2017), in link to imagination and development (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016; Zittoun & Glăveanu, 2018; Zittoun et al., 2013). Here, a fruitful dialogue is to be expected, both in terms of the roots of conceptualisation – going back to rituals as in Van Gennep, drawing on Winnicott and Freud, etc. – and in terms of accounting for the actual transformations taking place as we go through cultural experiences. On the one side, post-vygotskian accounts of the transformative effects of art may usefully support Stenner's reflexion (Kadianaki, 2014; Kuhn, 2005; Rogoff, 2003; Tisseron, 2013; Valsiner, 2005b; Zittoun, 2008); on the other hand, his PIPE model could offer a new entry point in such analysis.

Third, and more importantly, the principle of liminal experiences at the heart of change may also ground a fruitful dialogue. Cultural psychology is attempting to find models of change that are not linear and causal. Recently, this has been done theoretically by showing the theoretical impossibility of using causal models in psychology (Brinkmann, 2006, 2017), and by proposing alternative dynamic models, mainly through catalysis (Cabell & Valsiner, 2014; Kohler, 2014; Valsiner, 2014a). Alternatively, models or at least metaphors of emergence have been proposed (Abbey & Valsiner, 2004; Komatsu, 2010; Nelson, 2003) without

thorough analysis of their implications. Liminality as theorised here may actually give a grounded alternative answer to this problem. Interestingly, Valsiner has recently identified the concept of liminality as one of the key contributions in cultural psychology over the past five years (Valsiner, 2018).

It has to be noted, however, that the concept of liminality presented here also raises some questions. I will mention two, which appear to be related. The first one concerns the extension of the concept of liminality. Stenner uses the term in two strict meanings, and in two more open ones. The two strict ones are devised and spontaneous liminal experiences. The more open uses of the term apply when Stenner calls "liminal transitions" the movement across degrees of experiences, or ontological steps, or the risk of now conceiving the world as "permanent liminality". It seems to me that these latter two uses of the notion of liminality are metaphorical and could easily be replaced by terms such as emergence or change; I will not discuss them further. The first two uses need closer attention.

In terms of general processes, it is admissible that both spontaneous and devised liminal experience demand a comparable move out of a mundane structure to a moment where things can be recomposed in new manners, a movement of becoming that can be more or less guided (by liminal affective technologies). However, if we come back to the actual psychosocial experiences involved in the two cases, there are important distinctions that should not be overlooked. Unstaged liminal experiences are existential disruptions – to follow Stenner's examples, such as an accident, a crisis or a disaster; these can be experienced by a person and a crowd. Accidents or disasters do occur in the world of physical things and time, and are usually causal; a plane crashes, an employee has been sacked. These are disruptions, because a person's life and expected course of action are interrupted; these disruptions are accidents imposed upon the person. As a consequence of this experienced rupture, the person has to engage in a series of transformations, which here are not addressed – but that we have called transitions and can be further analysed (Zittoun, 2006; Zittoun, Aveling, Gillespie, & Cornish, 2012; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015). And if these ruptures bring people "off structure" and often out of the social order – not knowing how to behave in a new school, or becoming unemployed – the process they engage may not always be transformative, or may not clearly move them "out" of the liminal. On the other hand, devised liminal experiences – aesthetic or fabulated experiences, such as in art or rituals, can be seen as disruptions from the normal course of things. If people experience a disruption, it is actually caused by the device; and with the exception of very staged rituals, most disruptions caused by art experience are foremost engaged at the symbolic level, that is, in the space of meaning and reason (not physical causes), where time can be played with and reversed (Zittoun & Valsiner, 2016). In addition, most of these experiences are freely chosen; if I watch a film, or engage in a religious ritual, I know I am moving out of the paramount province of meaning, I can even do so willingly, even though I may not know what will be the consequence of that liminal experience. Finally, the end of the aesthetical liminal experience is always clearly fixed – by the closure of the ritual or of a book. At this first level, I would thus

argue, the ontological nature of these two types of liminal experience may be more divergent that is seems; and their pragmatic consequences are very different – in terms of how these are experienced, what they mean, and how a person's further course of life will be affected.

The second problem follows from this point. Actually, people are all different, and meet (or are met by) a liminal experience at a very specific point (in time and space) of their life trajectories; how they are going to be affected by a liminal experience is not given by the nature of the liminal experience or the liminal affective technology provided themselves, but by an unique dialogue taking place in a socioculturally situated unique encounter. Let me pursue my examples. The person who lost her job or who moved country may never benefit from any affective device to support their transition, and if they are offered such dispositives, they may not use them or find them relevant – a social worker at an employment office or a leaflet on how to adjust to a new country may actually *not* support the liminal transformation, whatever the intention of the conceivers may be. On the other hand, the person engaging in a devised liminal experience may, but need not experience it as transformative; this film may be the film that changes their life (Jurgensen, 2008; Rosenberg, 1993) – but in many cases, the person will simply be distracted, or even vaguely bored, and the liminal experience will fade in the limbo of all the movies seen and songs heard – whatever the intentions of the artists were. In their everyday life, going through disruptive experiences or not, people may actually find things – people, books, experiences – that they use as resources; but it is the *use* by a specific person, with a specific trajectory, in certain conditions, that turns things into efficient liminal technologies. Hence, I argue, the focus on processes may tend to eliminate what holds together a series of events from who experiences them – "a person", which has a history and an awareness of a sense of being "the same". Somehow, the proposition would still need to expand its "anthropology" and better theorise the perspective of the person (who feels and thinks, daydreams and imagines – and, some would say, has an agency).

Thus, I suggest that the integrative attempt proposed here would still need to be able to account for distinctions that are existentially, and pragmatically consequential: what are the triggers of a liminal experience; are they chosen or imposed; is it mainly occurring in any of a person's "everyday worlds of pragmatic, utilitarian activity", or is it primarily generated by a ritual or an art object? And whatever it is meant to do, does it work for that particular person, in that condition, and if so, what are the liminal transformations engaged? Other streams of psychology have attempted to address these issues; perhaps a next step to the integrative endeavour proposed here would be to enter in dialogue with these.

Triggering liminal transformations

Altogether, in *Liminality and experience*, Paul Stenner invites us to follow him in a transdisciplinary exploration, challenging classical disciplinary foundations, oppositions and boundaries, to rethink human embodied experience in society. His two

goals, grounding a psychosocial approach in process ontology through the study of liminal experiences, and showing the centrality of art experience as liminal affective technologies in human and social life, he achieves through a systematic and original work. With poetry, wit and great scholarship, in dialogue with personal experiences and distant others – from Spinoza to Serres – Stenner offers a unique contribution to theorisation in psychology and the social and human sciences. Even more, he invites the reader to quite a transformative experience – and this is good food for thought.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Tania Zittoun http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3203-2819

References

Abbey, E., & Valsiner, J. (2004). Emergence of meanings through ambivalence. *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, *6*(1), [58 paragraphs].

Brinkmann, S. (2006). Mental life in the space of reasons. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, *36*(1), 1–16. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5914.2006.00293.x

Brinkmann, S. (2017). *Persons and their minds: Towards an integrative theory of the mediated mind*. London, England: Routledge.

Cabell, K. R., & Valsiner, J. (2014). Systematic systemics: Causality, catalysis, and developmental cybernetics. In K. R. Cabell & J. Valsiner (Eds.), *The catalyzing mind* (pp. 3–13). New York, USA: Springer.

Carré, D. M., Valsiner, J., & Hampl, S. (2016). *Representing development: The social construction of models of change*. London, England: Routledge.

Jornet, A., & Cole, M. (2018). Introduction to symposium on Vygotsky and Spinoza. *Mind, Culture, and Activity*, *25*, 340–345.

Jurgensen, G. (2008). *J'ai grandi dans des salles obscures*. Paris, France: Jean-Claude Lattès.

Kadianaki, I. (2014). Sustaining identity change through the use of symbolic resources: The case of an immigrant living in Greece. In S. Salvatore, J. Valsiner, & A. Gennaro (Eds.), *Multicentric identities in globalizing world* (pp. 195–218). Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.

Klempe, S. H. (Ed.). (2016). *Cultural psychology of musical experience*. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.

Klempe, S. H. (2018). Music and imagination. In T. Zittoun & V. P. Glăveanu (Eds.), *Handbook of culture and imagination* (pp. 243–269). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Klempe, S. H., & Lehmann, O. V. (2017). Revining the logic of aesthetics: Potry and music in cultural psychology. In B. Wagoner, I. Bresco de Luna, & S. H. Awad (Eds.), *The psychology of imagination: History, theory and new research horizons* (pp. 67–82). Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publinshing.

Kohler, A. (2014). Cause and catalyst: A differentiation. In K. R. Cabell & J. Valsiner (Eds.), *The catalyzing mind* (pp. 33–70). New York, NY: Springer.

Komatsu, K. (2010). Emergence of young children's presentational self in daily conversation and its semiotic foundation. *Human Development*, *53*(4), 208–228. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1159/000320047

Kuhn, A. (2005). Thresholds: Film as film and the aesthetic experience. *Screen*, *46* (4), 401–414.

Lehmann, O. V., Chaudhary, N., Bastos, A. C., & Abbey, E. (Eds.). (2017). *Poetry and imagined worlds*. London, England: Palgrave.

Marková, I. (2016). *The dialogical mind: Common sense and ethics*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Nelson, K. (2003). Narrative and self, myth and memory: Emergence of the cultural self. In R. Fivush & C. A. Haden (Eds.), *Autobiographical memory and the construction of a narrative self: Developmental and cultural perspectives* (pp. 3–28). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.

Rogoff, B. (2003). Development as transformation of participation in cultural activities. In *The cultural nature of human development* (pp. 37–62). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Rosenberg, D. (Ed.). (1993). *The movie that changed my life*. New York, NY: Penguin.

Salvatore, S., & Zittoun, T. (Eds.). (2011). *Cultural psychology and psychoanalysis: Pathways to synthesis*. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.

Stenner, P. (2017). *Liminality and experience: A transdisciplinary approach to the psychosocial*. London, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tisseron, S. (2013). The reality of the experience of fiction. In A. Kuhn (Ed.), *Little madnesses: Winnicott, transitional phenomena and cultural experience* (pp. 121–134). London, England: Tauris.

Turner, V. (1967). Betwixt and between: The liminal period in Rites de passage. In *The forest of symbols: Aspects of Ndembu ritual* (pp. 93–111). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Valsiner, J. (2000). *Culture and human development*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Valsiner, J. (2005a). *Heinz Werner and developmental science*. New York, NY: Kluwer/Plenum.

Valsiner, J. (2005b). Scaffolding within the structure of dialogical self: Hierarchical dynamics of semiotic mediation. *New Ideas in Psychology*, *23*(3), 197–206. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2006.06.001

Valsiner, J. (2007). Developmental epistemology and implications for methodology. In W. Damon & R. M. Lerner (Eds.), *Handbook of child psychology* (Vol. 1, pp. 166–209). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Valsiner, J. (2014a). Breaking the arrows of causality: The idea of catalysis in the making. In K. R. Cabell & J. Valsiner (Eds.), *The catalyzing mind* (pp. 17–32). New York, NY: Springer.

Valsiner, J. (2014b). Cultural psychology and its future: Complementarity in a new key. In B. Wagoner, N. Chaudhary, & P. Hviid (Eds.), *Cultural psychology and its*

future: Complementarity in a new key (pp. 3–32). Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.
Valsiner, J. (2015). The place for synthesis Vygotsky's analysis of affective generalization. *History of the Human Sciences*, *28*(2), 93–102. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1177/0952695114559530
Valsiner, J. (2018, February). *Cultural psychologies and new general psychology: What has been learned in the past five years?* Keynote conference presented at the The Sixth Niels Bohr Lectures on Cultural Psychology, University of Aalborg.
Zavereshneva, E., & van der Veer, R. (2018). *Vygotsky's notebooks: A selection*. Singapore, Singapore: Springer.
Zittoun, T. (2006). *Transitions: Development through symbolic resources*. Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing.
Zittoun, T. (2008). Janet's emotions in the whole of human conduct. In R. Diriwaechter & J. Valsiner (Eds.), *Striving for the whole: Creating theoretical synthesis* (pp. 111–129). Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Zittoun, T., Aveling, E.-L., Gillespie, A., & Cornish, F. (2012). People in transitions in worlds in transition: Ambivalence in the transition to womanhood during World War II. In A. C. Bastos, K. Uriko, & J. Valsiner (Eds.), *Cultural Dynamics of Women's Lives* (pp. 59–78). Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.
Zittoun, T., & Gillespie, A. (2015). Transitions in the lifecourse: Learning from Alfred Schütz. In A. C. Joerchel & G. Benetka (Eds.), *Biographical ruptures and their repairs: Cultural transitions in development* (pp. 147–157). Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.
Zittoun, T., & Gillespie, A. (2016). *Imagination in human and cultural development*. London, England: Routledge.
Zittoun, T., & Glăveanu, V. P. (Eds.). (2018). *Handbook of imagination and culture*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Zittoun, T., & Valsiner, J. (2016). Imagining the past and remembering the future: How the unreal defines the real. In T. Sato, N. Mori, & J. Valsiner (Eds.), *Making of the future: The trajectory equifinality approach in cultural psychology* (pp. 3–19). Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.
Zittoun, T., Valsiner, J., Vedeler, D., Salgado, J., Gonçalves, M., & Ferring, D. (2013). *Human development in the lifecourse: Melodies of living*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Author biography

Tania Zittoun is a professor of sociocultural psychology at the University of Neuchâtel (Switzerland). She studies development in the lifecourse and imagination. Her current fieldworks include regional case studies, and issues related to education, mobility and ageing. She has used diaries, longitudinal documentaries, archival material and ethnographic work as data, and to reflect on the conditions of generalisation and theory building. She is the Associate Editor of *Culture & Psychology*, and her last books are *Imagination in Human and Cultural development* (with Alex Gillespie, Routledge, 2016) and the *Handbook of Culture and* Imagination (OUP, 2018, co-edited with Vlad P. Glaveanu).